Post Conflict Economic Development 28

8/3/2019 Post Conflict Economic Development 28

1/26

Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better?1 War, the State,

and the Post-Conflict Challenge in Afghanistan

Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the challenges currently facing Afghanistan. It argues

that post-conflict peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan may depend on adramatic expansion of institutionalized economic interdependence: this will

not necessarily require obeisance to standard international policy paradigms

and it will have to draw on existing patterns of interdependence, even though

many of these are rooted in brutally exploitative war economy conditions.

The authors argue further that neither peace nor economic development will

hold without a centralized, credible and effective state, that the emergence of

such a state is a political problem more than a technical problem, and that

it will depend on a monopolization of force by the state. Such developments

cannot be envisaged without policy being based on a close reading of the long

and decidedly non-linear, conflictual experiences in state formation and failurein Afghanistan, a history whose patterns and implications are summarized in

this article.

INTRODUCTION

Economists commonly project a fantasy of perfectly competitive markets

onto the real world, where it becomes a benchmark against which actual

market institutions and behaviour look distorted. Equally, political scientists,political economists, and international financial institutions regularly

project a fantasy of liberal states benignly providing basic services and

public goods. Set against reality, this fantasy becomes a benchmark of good

governance and, in an extraordinary double twist of self-deception, shared

values. Where states fall short, the fantasy is often displaced onto decentral-

ized, local governance structures. These common fantasies show a remark-

able lack of historical memory and contemporary understanding. And they

are never more common than at the beginning of so-called post-conflictmoments.


2/26

Arguably, international responses to the Afghan predicament after the

fall of the Taliban are infected by such fantasies.2 This essay suggests an

alternative basis for engagement. Three factors are central to our analytical

and empirical framework: the state, the configuration of material interests,

and violence. We argue that policy towards Afghanistan cannot treat the

country as though it were in an isolation ward. For Afghanistan is clearly

part of a regional conflict complex. The significance of this is that strategies

of reproduction adopted by states play themselves out beyond national

borders. Nation- and state-building in one country, for instance Pakistan,

may derive benefits from violence, economic interest and state disarray in

another, for example Afghanistan.

The regional (and international) dimension of violence and state-buildingis one of the reasons for scepticism about the usefulness of the post-conflict

tag. Indeed, the label usually describes a predicament in which violent social

conflict changes its form and intensity, perhaps becoming more amenable to

internationally sponsored reconstruction and reform efforts. Given high

levels of violence in the aftermath of apparently successful peace settlements

in countries such as El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and South Africa, it

should be a basic expectation that in a post-conflict society, violence of one

sort or another will continue to be one of the primary policy challenges. One

reason is that in most countries after a formal peace deal the state still has

not secured an effective monopoly over the means of violence.3

In the rest of this essay, we first develop our analytical framework and

then discuss the history of violence, attempts at state-building, and material

interests in Afghanistan. We argue, first, that peace is likely to depend on an

institutionalized expansion of economic interdependence nationally and

internationally, and that this requires effective centralized state formation.

We then argue that it is impossible to understand states and state formation

without a political and historical analysis of where states come from, andthat violent conflict has been a central part of most long-term endeavours in

state-building. This analysis suggests that international efforts must support

the development of a state in Afghanistan that is capable of making effective

interventions that, in turn, encourage the development of productive forces

within the country. Next, we outline a brief history of conflict and experi-

ences in state formation in Afghanistan. Finally, we draw out significant

implications for international engagement with Afghanistan, which hinge

on the promotion of a centralized, credible and effective state capable of tax

886 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand


3/26

collection and regulation and secure in monopolizing the legitimate means

of violence.

WAR ECONOMIES AND POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Milward (1984) pointed out that, despite the lack of a formal settlement,

peace after World War II held far more successfully than after World War I.

The key, he argued, was the astonishing expansion of economic inter-

connectedness among and between European peoples. This institutionalized

interdependence was not bred by any single policy approach. The US

Marshall Plan aid did come with pressure for more open trading regimes inEurope, but there was nonetheless considerable variety in national policies

in trade, production and employment.

This argument captures a much older belief that keeping people busy with

economic activities would divert their more violent capabilities, that interests

can weaken the darker passions (Hirschman, 1977). The same idea unites

contemporary perspectives on appropriate post-conflict policies. For example,

contributors to policy debates in the wake of transitions to peace in El

Salvador (Boyce, 1996; del Castillo, 2001) and Mozambique (Cramer, 1999;

Hanlon, 1996; as well as numerous World Bank and International Monetary

Fund documents) display a common commitment to the idea that economic

development with appropriate policies will play a significant role in con-

solidating peace. In other words, it is assumed that peace is a precondition

for development but that recently-secured peace will probably remain fragile

without significant economic development.

Much of the post-conflict policy debate at the general level (Harris, 1999;

Haughton, 1998; Marshall, 1997; Schierup, 1999) focuses on how best to

promote an increasing intensity of economic encounters.4

Usually left implicitare underlying questions of the promotion of structural change and capital

accumulation. Yet, economic history clearly demonstrates that all countries

rapidly developing their economies have relied upon substantial and highly

effective state interventions. This has not been a straightforward matter of

the relative size of states.5 What has mattered more is the quality of state

interventions, which in turn has depended on analytical capacity, on resource

mobilization by the state, on the politics of the state, and on the balance of

material interests driving that politics. States have had to promote particular

4 F i i l i f fli i id h i d i

The Post-Conflict Challenge in Afghanistan 887


4/26

activities, whether or not they have undertaken productive activities them-

selves, and they have had to protect national interests in a context of

extremely intense, even hostile, international competition. It is absurd to

pretend that societies emerging from years of bitter and destructive warfare

will seamlessly merge with the world economy, thriving simply on the signals

of comparative advantage, without such intervention. Indeed, state inter-

vention also matters to foreign capital. Multinational companies are typically

still rooted in a home country and draw on the support of their home state

(Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1999). They also require states in host countries to

protect their accumulation, intervene to secure their footing in local and

regional markets (for example, post-socialist Eastern Europe), provide

physical security, regulate labour markets, and protect their interests throughtax breaks and infrastructure investments (Amsden et al., 1994).

Economic experiences in wartime add a particular twist to this argument.

Contrary to the liberal interpretation of war (Milward, 1972), according to

which war is always and exclusively negative in its impact, it has increasingly

been acknowledged in recent years that the consequences of wars in devel-

oping countries are not exclusively negative. In wartime, most economic

activities become more risky. This acts as a deterrent to some potential

participants and raises the monopoly rent available to those few who are

willing to take the risk. Thus are spawned wartime entrepreneurs, historically

labelled profiteers, economic criminals and greedy warlords, but often builders

of a basis for longer term, more legitimate economic success. Thus, too, in

pockets of society (often substantial pockets) there is intense economic activity

and interconnectedness during wartime. Small businesses take off (for

example, delivering South African and Swazi beef and bacon to militarily

and economically besieged consumers in Maputo, Mozambique). So does

trade in military spare parts, mineral resource extraction and primary

commodity production and trade (such as diamonds in Angola, timber inCambodia, tantalite ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and, of

course, opium in Afghanistan) (see Musah and Cooper, both this volume).

Post-conflict policies need not only to recognize the existence of these

economies, but also to appreciate how difficult it will be to change them.

Awkward legal and political challenges are involved, especially when

economic intensity has increased because of illicit commodities. Interests in

the continuing production and trade of such commodities will be entrenched;

skills and market connections that have enabled capital accumulation will

not be easily transferable. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that capital

will be reinvested within a country if market distortions are reduced (that



5/26

entrepreneurs after a peace settlement have been to be to shift capital

abroad, or to continue exploiting illicit or high-rent market opportunities

with little state regulation, or to invest in speculative construction projects

or poorly regulated financial sectors. In post-conflict economies, orthodox

financial sector liberalization has thus often facilitated market behaviour

that has undermined macroeconomic stability and economic expansion

(Addison et al., 2001).

The challenge is deepened by the fact that wartime capital accumulation is

brutal. War is the most common contemporary form of primitive accumu-

lation: examples from Sudan (Keen, 1994), Mozambique (Chingono, 1996),

Israel/Palestine (Riddell, 2001) and elsewhere confirm the coercive extremes

that underpin this activity. The asset portfolios (Collier, 1995) of thesewartime accumulators are not built on arms length transactions but on

slavery or extraordinarily oppressive working conditions, on fear and force.

Under conditions of primitive accumulation, the distinction between interests

and passions breaks down. Normally, successful wartime accumulation of

this kind requires social organization and command over means of violence

as a tool of accumulation and to protect interests. This is the basis for

localized political interests and power relations, what Duffield (this volume)

calls emerging political complexes, distinctly non-liberal foundations of

material change and political interest. Primitive accumulation, if left alone,

may well survive the formal end of a war and continue to thrive, even

providing opportunities for escape from indigence for some people.7

Arguably, centralized authority is required in order to break up violent

primitive accumulation and to protect the interests of the poorest in these

conditions and bring about structural transformation. A decentralized

governance system in which the state is pared down to the management of

macroeconomic basics (and of the governmentdonor relationship) will not

reduce the scope for regulatory capture by wartime accumulators. Centralstates, in contrast, provide some basis for political action oriented to poverty

reduction and other goals (Putzel and Moore, 1999). Indeed, even an imperfect

centralized state, corrupt and perhaps conniving with primitive accumulation

activities, may be preferable (see Demetriou, this volume). At least it would

offer a tangible focus for domestic political and international criticism.

The policy challenges will remain immense. Given the allure of high

returns to primitive accumulation and the social relations required to support

it, the beneficiaries of war economies typically resist central interference and

control. They resist a states mobilization of resources through military

levies or through taxation Sometimes too they resist peace and national



6/26

important influences on the state, pursuing and protecting their own

interests through the state and hence affecting its capacity to generate long-

run structural change. In short, the realities of wartime carried over into

a post-conflict period make political tensions inevitable and post-

conflict violence, if not renewed war, highly likely.

WAR-MAKING AND STATE-BUILDING

A society can thus become locked into a set of tensions that has

characterized most experiences of state formation since the late middle

ages. Indeed, if there is anything to the neo-medieval label sometimesattached to contemporary conflicts, it is that these conflicts echo the

political tussles that accompanied the beginnings of the formation of

modern states. We have argued that there exists a range of reasons, aside

from the politics of power, to encourage the formation of an effective central

state in post-conflict societies. Yet there is, and will be, resistance to that

effort. Central states make considerable demands on people, as Clapham

(this volume) points out. Many people naturally resist these demands, and

(at least) make their own claims upon the state. Historically, one of the keys

to the successful endurance of nation-states has been state intervention to

provide reciprocal benefits (public goods, for example), to settle some of

these claims, and hence to manage a negotiation of resource allocation. This

historical tension is crystallized in the politics of taxation and budget

allocation (di John and Putzel, 2000).8 It is also important to note that the

tensions around state-building efforts have always involved violence, and

have always turned on an eventual credible monopoly of violence by the

central authority.

Mobilization efforts, claims upon the state, and state reciprocation haveoften been mediated through war (Howard, 2000). Yet, the outcome of this

struggle around the organization of power and the allocation of resources is

not historically pre-determined. Outcomes are likely to depend on the form

of war and its technology, which affect the extent to which states need to

mobilize people or funds. Outcomes will also turn on the interests of capital

(domestic and foreign), on the extent to which states can mobilize resources

through aid rather than through interacting with subject populations, and

on the distribution of the means of violence. Finally, they will be affected by

the ideological (including religious) resources at hand to enable the state

to persuade people to accept its power and develop official nationalism



7/26

involves more than provision of infrastructure, education, and so on. It also

involves ideological efforts to persuade people that the centralization of

authority in the state is in their interests. This may materialize in anti-

colonial nationalism, in a nationalization of the societys past, or (with

obvious relevance to the history of state-building efforts in Afghanistan) in

the political use of religion to overcome fissiparous regionalism or ethnic

rivalry.

The post-conflict moment, such as it is, is therefore not simply one in

which we stand back, take stock of the destruction and undoing, and go

about re-building. It is instead a different phase in the long-term process of

resolving state-building tensions. War and its post-war legacy are very much

part of that process. In late medieval Europe, for example, states evolvedtowards modern forms through the management of these tensions while the

nature of war itself was undergoing changes. As wars became more costly

and technologically complex, states began to forego their earlier dependence

on relatively small, often foreign mercenary militias, and to build up

standing, national armies. Increasingly, states especially those that became

the most successful also relied less on international financial mechanisms

and turned to national mobilization of finances to fund wars. These two

developments generated institutional changes, including the development of

modern fiscal and welfare institutions (Mann, 1988; Tilly, 1992; see also

Kolko, 1995 for twentieth-century developments generated by war).

To argue that contemporary conflicts should be understood within a state

formation perspective runs counter to the popular representation of todays

wars as barbaric reversals of modernization or simple apolitical brutality

(de Soysa and Gleditsch, 1999: 29). This historical perspective helps in

understanding Afghanistan. First, it makes some sense of the Afghan past.

Afghanistan, despite its relative lack of colonial experience, has never simply

been a vacuum. Rather, as we will show later, it has experienced a series ofcontests over the locus of power, the distributional structure of violence,

sources of political legitimacy, and state-building enterprises. Second, the

framework reveals some of the risks of not backing fully a centralized state.

These include continuously divisive violence within the country and a

society in which most people remain trapped in chronic poverty, or at best

draw precarious benefits from being bound in exploitative and coercive

relationships with local warlords-cum-mafiosi.

Third, the framework developed here reveals a major threat to any state-

building exercise in Afghanistan. Afghanistan does not exist in a regional

vacuum Other states are also trying to develop their power and legitimacy;



8/26

(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998). Of course, the international role in

Afghan state formation goes beyond the immediate region: most notably, in

the last forty years the USA and the Soviet Union both managed to frustrate

particular state-building episodes.

THE FITFUL EXPERIENCES OF STATE FORMATION IN AFGHANISTAN

What has been the history of conflict and state formation in Afghanistan?

This section provides an overview of the key phases of Afghan state forma-

tion (and collapse), followed by an analysis of this history by elaborating the

framework outlined above.

From Tribal Confederacy to Buffer State

Located in the interstices of the powerful empires of Iran, the Indian sub-

continent and Central Asia, Afghanistan originated as a tribal confederacy,

established by the Durrani rulers between 1747 and 1798. War-making and

conquest were key to this early phase of state formation. Ahmad Shah

Durrani (174772) unified the Pashtun tribes by distributing the fruits of

conquest. Rather than having a standing army, the ruler relied on a lashkar

(tribal militia), which was decided upon by the council of clan chiefs (or jirga).

The jirga, as a founding myth of the Afghan state, has been re-enacted in

times of crisis (Roy, 1985). To an extent, the state was never able to escape

the original principle which gave it legitimacy it was always to remain

tribal and Pashtun.9

Within two generations of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the embryonic state was

to unravel due to a succession crisis and the loss of foreign revenues fromconquest. In a scenario that resonates with more recent events, Afghanistan

underwent four decades of civil war and was divided into mini-fiefdoms,

with neighbouring powers Persia, Burkhara and Punjab taking back

territories lost to Ahmad Shah (Rais, 1998: 9). It was foreign invasion by the

British in the first Anglo-Afghan war (183942) that once again united the

Pashtun tribes against a foreign enemy.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, with British imperial control in

India and an expanding Tsarist Empire to the north, the imperial powers

together demarcated the territory of Afghanistan in order to make it an

effective buffer state. Although independent in internal affairs, Afghanistans



9/26

described his countrys precarious position as a goat between two lions

(Abdur Rahman Khan, 1900, cited in Arnold, 1985: 2). Foreign subsidies,

however, enabled Afghan rulers to consolidate their internal control. In

1882, for example the British granted Abdur Rahman a yearly subsidy of

1.2 million Indian rupees to employ conscripts as troops, which in turn

enabled him to increase direct tax revenue from landowners. Potential

opposition was defeated on the battlefield, fragmented or exiled. Tribal and

Islamic traditions were co-opted to gain legitimacy. The loya jirga or national

council was established and given a legally codified meaning. Abdur Rahman

was recognized as imam, a leader of the Islamic community, and the claim

of Islamic sovereignty was institutionalized by establishing sharia courts in

all provinces. At the turn of the century the Amir left a consolidated, ifterrorized, state to his successors.

State-Building in the Twentieth Century

During the early twentieth century Afghanistan began to emerge from its

isolation. In 1919, Afghanistan became a sovereign member of the state

system. With the loss of the British subsidy there was a need to develop a

domestic resource base. Amanullah (191929) regularized the system of

taxation, instituted private property in arable land and pasture and initiated

the development of a new transportation network. Afghanistans first

constitution of 1921 reflected a trend towards strengthening the account-

ability and legality of the state with rights of universal citizenship being

defined for the first time. Education was promoted although the initial

impetus for this was security rather than enlightenment the first English

language training, for example, was aimed at Afghans working with British

experts setting up arms manufacturing in factories in Kabul. Schoolsbecame a vehicle for nationalist ideology and this period saw the beginnings

of modern political movements.

However, reforms partially inspired by Kemals revolution in Turkey

were resisted by tribal and religious elites, as they struck at the heart of the

religious establishment and sought to undermine the autonomy of the tribes.

Unlike Abdur Rahman, Amanullah lacked external backing and, fatally, he

did not make the armys strength and loyalty a top priority. A demoralized

army failed to respond to rebellions in 1928, driven by religious and tribal

opposition to his reform programme (a pattern repeated in 197879).

Amanullah was briefly replaced by the Tajik Amir Habibullah Kakkani



10/26

leaders in government. British grant aid in the 1930s helped them re-

establish the army. The Musahiban regime between 1930 and 1960 achieved a

modus vivendi between the competing interest groups of the state, traditional

power groups and a new elite of bureaucrats and educated middle class

(Oleson, 1995: 172).

Partition of the British Empire left Pakistan as an existentially insecure

state (Rubin et al., 2001). Pakistans quest for strategic depth in relation to

India and the Pashtunistan question10 were to have an ongoing influence

on relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Afghanistan

pursued a policy of non-alignment (bi-tarafi both sides), the deterioration

in relations between the two countries in the 1950s pushed Afghanistan into

a closer relationship with Russia. This reinforced Afghanistans position asa rentier state, relying on foreign subsidies, previously from the British and

then from the Soviet Union. The ruling elite was never forced to develop

domestic accountability through internally derived revenue (Pain and Good-

hand, 2002). From 1956 to 1978 the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan

with US$ 1,265 million in economic aid and roughly US$ 1,250 million in

military aid (Rubin, 1995: 22).

The New Democracy period (196370) saw Prime Minister Daoud press-

ing ahead with a modernization policy that aimed to make the government

more independent of the tribes and ulama. A new, more democratic con-

stitution in 1964 marked the beginning of a period of growing political

instability (Magnus and Naby, 1998: 47). In 1973 Daoud seized power and

Afghanistan was declared a republic with King Zahir Shah forced into exile.

Daoud felt that his new army and police were strong enough to confront the

tribes and religious establishment. However, foreign aid undermined old

patterns of social control. New elites emerged from aid-funded schools and

the bureaucracy, who were to join the Islamist and Marxist movements.

Ultimately foreign aid produced not only a rentier state, but also rentierrevolutionaries (Rubin, 1996) with Russia and Pakistan supporting new

elites who were opposed to the state, principally the Parcham and Khalq

factions of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the

Jamiat-I Islamiand Izhahh Hizb-I Islami parties of the Islamist movements.

In 1978, members of the PDPA gained power in a coup (Saur Revolution)

and embarked upon a radical reform programme that provoked armed

resistance in the countryside. A second coup followed in 1979 and with

growing insurrection and a breakdown of social control, the Soviets invaded

later that same year.



11/26

The State at War, War on the State

PDPA Regime: A State under Siege

The history of the Afghan conflict has been described and analysed else-

where (see, for example, Hyman, 1992; Rubin, 1995, 1996). Here our focus is

on what happened to the state during more than two decades of war. Both

Russia and the United States poured far more resources into Afghanistan

to sustain the conflict than they had ever devoted to co-operation for

development. However, the PDPA regime did not fall until 1992, three years

after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Many analysts characterize

the period of Soviet occupation as one of state breakdown. Despite massivesupport for the mujahedin,11 however, state institutions survived, although

failing to fulfil many of their core functions. Urban areas came under the

remit of the Soviet-backed regime while the mujahedin controlled much of

the countryside. Competing leaders relied on opposing flows of politically

motivated aid (Rubin, 2000: 1791). The state became even more dependent

on foreign aid and sales of natural gas to Russia. Conversely, political

parties in Pakistan and Iran interceded as logistical conduits between the

local resistance commanders and fronts in Afghanistan. Western aid

fostered a new leadership, with the emergence of commanders and the demise

of the countrys intelligentsia and local khans (Fielden and Goodhand,

2001). The system of brokerage that developed around the arms pipeline laid

the foundations for the regionalized war economy that was to emerge in the

1990s. Profits accumulated by commanders and traders were invested in

illicit activities such as the drugs and cross border smuggling economies.

The Mujahedin Government: The Fragmentation of Afghanistan

In April 1992, mujahedin forces took control of Kabul and installed a new

government. Afghanistan was renamed the Islamic State of Afghanistan, in

an attempt to give Islamic legitimacy to a centralized state (Oleson, 1995:

303). This marked a new phase of the conflict, in which the war mutated

from a Cold War conflict into a regionalized civil war. The break up of the

Soviet Union and the creation of the newly independent Central Asian states

meant that Afghanistan lost the strategic position it had previously enjoyed

as a buffer state and to an extent reverted to its previous position as a

transmission zone with open borders crossed by trade routes Neighbouring



12/26

conflicts, which together formed a regional conflict system of interconnected

zones of instability including Kashmir, Tajikistan and the Ferghana valley.

During this period, the state did indeed collapse, reversing the state-

building processes of the previous century. The minting of different

currencies by opposing politico-military groups symbolized the fragmenting

of sovereignty. An older pattern of governance re-emerged with the units of

political and military action being ethno-regional coalitions, sustained by

external support and internally generated resources from the expanding war

economy. The Afghan economy became increasingly peripheralized with the

economies of provincial centres becoming more integrated with neighbour-

ing countries and Kabul becoming an economic backwater. As superpower

support declined, warlords increasingly had to generate resources locally tofund their military activities. During this period the war economy expanded

and Afghanistan became in effect a transport and marketing corridor for

drugs and contraband.

The fragmenting of authority became one of the main obstacles to a

political settlement. The carrots and sticks of traditional inter-state diplomacy

had limited influence on the motivations and actions of freewheeling non-state

actors. Arguably regional strong men had few incentives to put the state

back together. Peace would disrupt the systems of production and exchange

that provided warlords and their followers with livelihoods. The case of

Afghanistan (and several other warlord conflicts) shows how war-making,

far from inevitably building states, can play into processes of state collapse.

Afghan warlords were not proto-state builders driven by an ideological

project. Violence became a means of controlling markets and creating a

monopoly of predation. Conflict entrepreneurs also used ethnic and tribal

allegiances as a basis for forging alliances or confederations.

The Taliban Regime

The Taliban emerged in 1994, and between 1996 and 2001 controlled Kabul

and roughly 90 per cent of Afghanistan, with the remaining territory under

the United Front.12 In 1996, Mullah Mohammed Omar was named Amir,

and in October 1997 Afghanistan became the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The Taliban arose out of the parochial and conservative milieu of the

madrasas (seminaries for training ulama). Marginalized by state modernization

programmes in the twentieth century, the madrasas became reinvigorated by

exile in Pakistan and the experience of warlord-dominated Afghanistan



13/26

(Rubin et al., 2001: 17). The coming to power of the Taliban reversed pre-

war social relations with the countryside ruling the city. External actors were

also key in the transformation of the Taliban into a dominant military and

political force. Chief among these were official, quasi-official and private

groups in Pakistan (Davis, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 2001). The Bhutto

and Sharif administrations lent their military and political support because

the Taliban was seen to be a Pashtun front sympathetic to Pakistans in-

terests (Jan, 1999). By 1999, up to 30 per cent of the Taliban troops were

estimated to be Pakistani volunteers (Rashid, 2000: 100); estimates in 2001

put the number of non-Afghan Taliban fighters at between 8,000 and 15,000

(Human Rights Watch, 2001: 11). Afghanistan became both a safe-haven

and a training field for stateless internationalist Muslim fighters (Roy,2001: 81), ensuring continued international isolation and destabilizing

neighbouring states, particularly Pakistan and Uzbekistan.

The relative security brought by the Taliban saw the further consolidation

and expansion of the war economy. Afghanistan became the worlds major

source of opium, production peaking at 4,600 tonnes in 1999. The Talibans

control of the main roads, cities, airports and customs posts meant that they

were able to establish a monopoly of violence and predation in Afghanistan.

While abandoning many of the other core functions of the nation state such

as welfare and representation, the Taliban maintained effective security and

military capabilities. This relative order and security can be argued to have

represented a state-building project that at least partly reversed Afghanistans

collapse. Certainly, the Taliban employed many of the early state-building

strategies of previous rulers, being intent on centralizing power, fragmenting

regional alliances and drawing upon tribal solidarity networks. It is difficult

to imagine any previous regime enforcing a poppy ban, as the Taliban did in

2000.

The international community adopted contradictory positions in relationto the Taliban. On the one hand the United Nations Office for the Co-

ordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) con-

ceptualized Afghanistan as a failed state and to an extent saw itself as a

surrogate government. Aid programmes held out the promise of filling the

void left by a collapsed state, through the delivery of health and welfare

programmes for example. On the other hand the diplomatic arm of the

United Nations, the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan

(UNSMA), conceptualized Afghanistan as a rogue state, with the Taliban

being credited with powers of centralization and political cohesion (Duffield

et al 2001: 21) The fact that one of the few levers the international



14/26

regime had limited popularity or legitimacy, their removal rather than

leading to better government may lead to no government. The centrifugal

forces of warlordism, regional interference and the war economy may yet

reassert themselves. On the other hand, it may be argued that a collapsed

state which the removal of the Taliban precipitated may be a good

thing if more perfect political communities emerge from the debris.

AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILING STATE

The trajectory of Afghan state-building has been one of punctuated

equilibrium. Try again, fail again is an apt description of the Afghan state-

building project over the last two centuries in that it has occurred not in

linear and gradualist fashion, but rather in fits and spurts. Change has been

the result of complex combinations of contingent factors. A famine in 1970

71, for example, was one such contingent factor, which undermined regime

legitimacy leading subsequently to the Saur Revolution. Efforts to build a

modern nation-state through mixtures of capital and coercion have

been interrupted periodically by violent resistance and war itself has been a

forcing house for accelerated political and social change.

A careful reading of the history of Afghan state-building points to thesalience of three factors (Milliken and Krause, this volume). These were the

inability of state-builders to develop in a sustained way (a) a monopoly of

violence; (b) a trajectory of development that provided wealth and welfare

for its citizens; and (c) credible forms of representation and legitimacy.

These will be examined briefly below.

War, Order and Insecurity

Territorial sovereignty has been an ideal to which Afghan rulers aspired but

rarely, if ever, achieved in practice. Arguably, processes of internal

colonization were never completed in Afghanistan because rulers lacked

the military force to subdue the tribes or withstand external aggression.

Ahmad Shah Durrani established the first Afghan standing army. From

then on, the military, along with the schools, became the focus for a number

of contests of authority between the state and the tribes. The tribal areas

were some of the best recruiting grounds for the army because of the

Pashtun valorization of warfare and the lack of economic opportunities

there (Edwards, 2002: 55). The point of friction was always the terms of



15/26

(Edwards, 2002). Regimes that failed to develop a strong and loyal army

were resisted and ultimately overthrown as, for example, in the case of

Amunullah who failed to build the power base to push through his reform

programme. In contrast, Daouds reform programme during the 1950s and

1960s had the strong backing of the armed forces. Soviet aid provided both

the cash and weapons for the accumulation and concentration of the means

of violence in a modern army and national police force (Rubin, 1996: 65).

The first arms contract with the Soviet Union, worth US$ 25 million, was

signed in 1956. By 1970, some 7,000 junior officers had attended either Soviet

or Czech training programmes (Hyman, 1992: 29). This reliance on military

force meant, however, that there were few civil and political institutions for

mediating between state and citizens (see below), and that regimes werevulnerable to any changes in the loyalty and internal coherence of the army.

For example, in 1978 under the PDPA regime, the army virtually disintegrated

in a series of insurrections (Rubin, 1995: 120).

We noted earlier the impact of changes in the technology of warfare on

state-building processes. The arms pipeline and the subsequent arming of

warlords by regional powers (Human Rights Watch, 2001) have had a

profound effect on the Afghan polity and society. Warlords have access to

sophisticated weaponry and lootable resources while fighters can be recruited

for one meal a day. The means of violence became increasingly decentralized,

driven by the centrifugal forces of neighbouring country interference and the

war economy. This was the key factor behind state collapse in 1992. It was

also why the Taliban initially received widespread support as they were seen

as an alternative to the corruption and insecurity of mujahedin rule. They

exercised power in the same brutal way as Abdur Rahman a century earlier.

The state-building strategies of the regional powers have contributed to the

fragmenting of authority in Afghanistan. Ironically, Pakistan in its search

for strategic depth has suffered severe blow-back effects that have in turnundermined its own monopoly of force. Armed proto-Taliban groups have

caused growing instability in Pakistan and may threaten the long-term

security of the state (Maley, 2001).

Wealth and Welfare

Enduring nation-states, besides building a monopoly of violence, develop

the capacity to provide reciprocal benefits or public goods. The capacity of the

Afghan state to mobilize and redistribute resources has always been limited



16/26

In the twentieth century, because Afghanistan relied on rentier income,

there was limited organizational and political investment in developing a

taxation system to generate internal incomes. During the 1960s internally

generated state finances depended almost entirely on heavy duties levied on

imported goods (as the merchant class was politically weak), rather than

agricultural resources that formed the backbone of the economy. In 1972,

for example, the two greatest single sources of national wealth agriculture

and livestock yielded a mere 1 per cent of state revenues (Hyman, 1992:

32). This meant that Afghanistan suffered unduly from sudden disruptions

of imports by closures of borders or by international crises (Hyman, 1992:

31). The administration was too weak and inefficient to alter the traditional

pattern in rural areas, while in the southeast the price for tribal support inthe civil war of 1929 had been precisely this favourable treatment of landed

interests by the state. This bargain was upheld until the downfall of the

Musahiban rulers in 1973.

The welfare functions of the state which were funded through the

unearned income of foreign aid played an important role in regime

legitimation and maintenance strategies. Aid was used to support neo-

patrimonial redistributive structures. Foreign assistance projects favoured

particular groups and regions, with most irrigation projects benefiting Eastern

Pashtuns, for example. Khans in the countryside competed with one another

for state patronage and government corruption contributed to a growing sense

of grievance: from the perspective of both rulers and their subjects (rayat) an

official government appointment at any level was seen as a means of extracting

and accumulating wealth from the people and not one of dispensing the

needed services for their citizens (ruaya) (Shahrani, 1998: 228). At the same

time, however, government attempts to provide public entitlements in some

cases actually undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan state. Education

programmes contributed to frustrated expectations, while PDPA reformssuch as land redistribution sparked off rebellion in the countryside.

The development of the war economy has had a profound impact on

entitlement configurations and the social structure. The war economy has

led to a violent redistribution of wealth and assets. It tends to concentrate

wealth and power primarily into the hands of commanders and the cross-

border trucking mafia, and causes widespread impoverishment. It also

undermines the economies of neighbouring countries cross border

smuggling, for instance, circumvents Pakistans customs duty and sales tax

with its consequent impacts on revenue collection and the undercutting of

local producers (Pain and Goodhand, 2002: 28).



17/26

relationship between state and society. Rentier economies with access to

conflict goods do not have to build up a social contract with their citizens.

By the 1960s, Afghan society had become increasingly divided between an

urban, educated elite dependent on an externally-funded state sector and a

rural, illiterate population engaged in subsistence agriculture. This is not to

say that Afghan society was static. Since the end of the last century, migra-

tions, evictions and modifications to the social structure itself have thrown

the country into turmoil (Roy, 1985: 12). The war has also produced profound

social transformations (Goodhand, 2000). Moreover, the statesociety dichot-

omy wrongly implies that the two are completely separate and autonomous,

whereas (as discussed below), interactions between them often led to a blurring

of lines, with for instance tribal solidarity groups colonizing the state.In seeking to supplement rentier bargains and lessen the need for coercion,

rulers (and revolutionaries) have employed three main modes of persuasion

to gain legitimacy tribalism, Islam and nationalism (Roy, 1985: 14).

Tribalism

Tribalism, as a tool for generating legitimacy, is a doubled-edged sword.

Whilst it may buy short-term room for manoeuvre, tribal systems do not

provide stable institutionalized bases of power. They are fragmented structures

subject to fluctuations and fissure. This has been one of the dilemmas of

tribally-based state builders.

There is a Pashtun proverb: Honour (nang) ate up the mountains; taxes

(qalang) ate up the plains (cited in Rubin, 1996: 28). The qalang Pashtun are

subjects or rulers of states they pay or collect land rent and taxes. The

nang Pahstun, however, are free of domination by others. Most acts of anti-

state violence originated from the Pashtun tribal belt.13

Interference by thestate in the domestic sphere was particularly sensitive as Amanullah and the

PDPA found to their cost. As well as violently resisting state power, tribal

structures have historically attempted to subvert or co-opt the institutions of

the state. Solidarity networks or quam colonized state institutions: The state

was no more than a stake in a larger game and the strategy of a quam

consisted in establishing an advantageous relationship with the institutions

of the state (Roy, 1985: 24).

A range of strategies was employed by rulers to co-opt or manipulate

tribal networks when they served the rulers interests.14 The loya jirga, for



18/26

instance, while appealing to tribal traditions, is historically speaking a young

phenomenon and owes its existence less to inherent Pashtun traditions than

to the political needs of the centralized state (Noelle-Karimi, 2001: 37).15

Other strategies aimed to distance the state from tribal influences. The

Durrani Pashtuns, for example, chose to relocate the capital to Kabul to

escape from local Pashtun domination to which Kandahar was subject

(Hyman, 1992: 20). Similarly, it was the practice of the government to

appoint officials in the provinces from outside the area and to rotate them

regularly. In the twentieth century, rulers attempted to create a detribalized

elite through the education system. The emergence of deracinated, detribalized

Talibs from the madrasas of Pakistan is in some ways a bizarre inversion of

this process:

Their simple belief in a messianic puritan Islam was the only prop they could hold onto and

which gave their lives some meaning. This deracinated fanaticism a kind of bleak Islamic

cosmopolitanism made the Taliban a more effective fighting force than any of their

localized adversaries. Although Pashtun in origin, the Taliban leaders could be sure their

young soldiers would not succumb to the divisive lure of ethnic or tribal loyalties of which

even the Afghan left had found it difficult to rid itself. (Ali, 2000: 136)

The conflict caused shifts in the ethnic power balance and Pashtun

hegemony was challenged by a new assertiveness of the minorities. War

provided an opportunity for those on the margins to advance their position.

However, the Talibans arrival led to a violent re-balancing of power back in

favour of the Pashtuns. This was again reversed with the removal of the

Taliban who were replaced by a United Front dominated interim authority.

While the origin of the war may not be ethnic, the politicization of ethnicity

has had a corrosive effect on the potential for national reconciliation

(Fielden and Goodhand, 2001).

Islam

The nation, or millat, is seen as a religious community (umma) by the great

majority of Afghan peasants. Legal authority is vested in Islam, and the

faith requires a strong central power to defend the community of believers

against infidels. This becomes more important during times of crisis and the

notion of struggle or jihad has been used as a mobilizing ideology by rulers

and revolutionaries.

The Afghan state as the arbiter of the faith draws legitimacy from Islam.

State religion and politics are intrinsically connected (Oleson 1995: 298)



19/26

Rulers such as Abdur Rahman drew upon Islamic heritage to sanction the

centralized state and create a political community that transcended the

parochial identities of tribe, ethnic group and local community.

Religious leaders have historically occupied a position on the margins

between tribe and state. Charismatic ulama have repeatedly mobilized the

tribes against external enemies (as for instance during the wars against the

British) or against reforming Afghan rulers. The growing secularization of

the state in the 1960s met religious opposition, not from the ulama but from

Islamists who emerged from the university campuses and schools after 1965.

Their vision of Islam was different from the religion of the village. It in-

volved a perception of Islam as a political movement aiming to address

society in its entirety. In this sense, Islamism is a modern movement (Roy,1998: 199). The Islamists influence peaked in the 1980s and their political

parties attracted the bulk of western aid to the mujahedin. But after the

Soviet withdrawal, the subsequent fall of the PDPA regime and the failure

of the mujahedin to establish an Islamic state, there was a general decrease

in the influence and militancy of the Islamist movement.

The neo-fundamentalism of the Taliban emerged following the crisis of

political Islam (Roy, 2001). As with previous Afghan rulers, the Taliban

harnessed Islam to consolidate their power. Mullah Mohammad Omar was

designated Amir al-Mumunin or Leader of the Faithful in a similar manner

to Abdur Rahmans assertion of his divine right to rule in the nineteenth

century. While the Taliban may have been removed, the processes of Taliban-

ization or radicalization of Islamic groups continue within the region.

Nationalism

Many of the trappings of nationhood such as the national anthem, flag andthe celebration of a national day were introduced at the turn of the century.

Like other modes of legitimation, nationalism served particular interests.

Afghan nationalism was essentially Pashtun nationalism. Musahiban rulers

used the resources obtained from international connections to create a

patronage network calculated to strengthen Pashtun nationalism (Rubin,

1996). Daoud instrumentalized a nationalist discourse to keep the issue of

Pashtunistan alive, while non-Durrani Pashtuns saw it as a means of wresting

a monopoly of power from the establishment. The Taliban similarly attempted

to mobilize around a Pashtun nationalist discourse. Historically such attempts

to enforce conformity to Pashtun culture were resisted by Persian speakers



20/26

than colonial territories in the region. This contributed to disaffected and

competing elites. The expanded, foreign-funded education system of the

1960s produced a nationalist youth, who instead of becoming government

functionaries, became revolutionaries. Islam and communism were products

of this modernist discourse.

The experience of the PDPA regime is instructive. While its lack of a

monopoly of force may have been decisive, it also mishandled the symbolic

apparatus of power (Edwards, 2001: 86). A fatal mistake for instance was to

use womens rights as a banner issue interference in domestic matters and

cultural practices violated a basic tenet of governance in Afghanistan. In

addition, the adoption of the red flag and Soviet inspired insignia further

undermined its legitimacy.

FAILING BETTER? THE POST CONFLICT CHALLENGE

Early in this essay, we questioned the donor fantasy of minimal, liberal

states. The one size fits all prescriptions flowing from the analyses under-

pinning this fantasy strip the state of its historical context and assume that

institutions, state capacity and governance are purely technical, depoliticized

entities. However, the analysis above shows that these processes have been

decidedly non-linear and profoundly political; they have also been affected

by intricately intertwined global, regional, national and local forces. In this,

Afghanistans history confirms a more realistic pattern of state formation

rooted in conflict and contingency. The post-Taliban moment presents a

new and dramatic opportunity for forging less violent statesociety relations.

International contributions to taking advantage of this opportunity must be

based on an appreciation of the history outlined in this paper: otherwise, we

argue, international policy prescriptions and interventions are likely to re-inforce, rather than counteract, the dynamics that have repeatedly under-

mined state-building endeavours in Afghanistan. In short, post-conflict

interventions are more likely to repeat history if they do not effectively reflect

on that history.

A number of key implications follow from the analysis and argument

presented here. Afghanistan needs a centralized, credible and effective state

if it is to accelerate economic development and poverty reduction, if it is to

consolidate peace, and if it is to reduce the scope for extremes of brutality

and exploitation in social and economic relations. The fiscal and regulatory

policies that would be involved mean that creating such a state is more than



21/26

1992. The danger of a back to the future scenario, with a return to the

warlord period, is very real. International interventions may make this more

or less probable. The US-led coalitions arming of tribal militias in the

south, for instance, is likely to undermine the position of the central state.

A holistic and comprehensive approach to the security sector is required, as

opposed to a piecemeal approach which separates out security from the

wider issue of governance.

Fiscal, regulatory and allocative decisions of the state will be affected by

the complex set of incentives and disincentives for peace. International

support for policy formulation has to be based on a sophisticated under-

standing of those incentives. For example, how aid is delivered may tip the

balance between a warlord choosing to become part of the government orcontinuing to control processes of accumulation within his own fiefdom.

Institutions of governance also need to be developed in the context of

Afghan history and social relations rather than simply implanted from off-

the-peg models of liberal democracy. If institutions are not merely incentive

mechanisms but also the residue of conflict resolution, then they will pre-

sumably be more effective if they reflect the specific matrices of incentives

in Afghanistan and if they reflect and manage Afghan political conflicts.

Elections, for example, should not be viewed as the be-all and end-all of

good governance and consolidation of peace. In a number of post-conflict

settings, they have been de-stabilizing and counter-productive (see Ottaway,

this volume). Decentralized or federal systems may sound attractive, but

they are likely to lead to massive tensions in Afghanistan between the centre

and regions and to be inherently de-stabilizing. Without a strong central

state, a criminalized war economy will merely become a criminalized peace

economy. Evidence suggests that this is already happening: as of May, 2002

there were frequent violent clashes between warlords vying for territory and

influence, autonomy from the state, and power within it (Carroll, 2002).The credibility of the state will depend not just on its monopoly of

violence but also on developing political legitimacy. Afghanistans history,

for example, shows that there may be limits on how far certain kinds of

social and economic reform can be taken without riding roughshod over

entrenched and potentially violent sets of interests. Economic growth, an

institutionalized expansion of economic interdependence, might provide one

source of legitimacy. Drawing again on the echo of post-World War II

Europe, at that moment rapid economic expansion was the only available

source of legitimacy for European governments in the wake of war and the

failure of various alternative legitimating ideologies (Milward 1984) The



22/26

Afghans is likely to be a central challenge and this depends largely on the

provision of basic security and the states ability to mobilize and redistribute

resources. A decentralized and criminalized economy is no basis for genuine

social and political legitimacy, let alone poverty reduction and social progress.

Additional sources of legitimacy in Afghanistan nationalism and Islam

are likely to continue to be important modes of persuasion for Afghan leaders:

however, as we have shown, both can have ambiguous consequences.

Any huge investment commitment of this kind has to take account of the

regional dimensions of conflict in Afghanistan and of the established regional

patterns of economic activity. The state-building strategies of regional powers

have contributed to state collapse in Afghanistan. These states are themselves

in many respects failing states, and international donors will need to addressthe problems of security at a regional level. Although it may be somewhat

ironic, given the international communitys history of either fuelling or

ignoring the Afghan conflict, there is unlikely to be any semblance of stability

in the region without an international guarantor. In effect, this means strong

United States backing for the United Nations. This would enable the

development of a state that, on the one hand, could withstand the intrusive

interests of regional states and, on the other hand, could develop investment,

tax, and employment linkages around regional economic interdependence.

Although it may be a truism, the problems of the state in Afghanistan are

rooted in complex, context-specific, historical processes yet policies

currently being encouraged are simply read off from tried and unaccount-

ably trusted paradigms. To sustain the comparison with Europe at the end

of World War II, it is worth stressing the variety of policy packages allowed

for under the broad remit of the Marshall Plan. There remains one hugely

significant risk in international aid to Afghanistan. For as we have shown,

reliance on international funding has typically, in the past, encouraged

versions of the Afghan state to forego the evolution of reciprocal relationswith the variety of interest groups in the country, not needing to mobilize

the resources for its own reproduction from those groups and, consequently,

having less incentive to deliver reciprocal benefits, public goods or devel-

opment. In other words, without due attention to the real politics of

Afghanistan, there is every danger that international aid supporting the

state capacity will simply reproduce a state incapable of managing the

conflicting interests passed down the generations and reshaped by two

decades of war.



23/26

Ali, T. (2000) Afghanistan: Between Hammer and Anvil, New Left Review 2 (MarchApril):

1328.

Amsden, A. (2001) The Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing

Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Amsden, A., J. Kochanowicz and L. Taylor (1994) The Market Meets its Match: restructuring

the Economies of Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

(2nd edn). London: Verso.

Arnold, A. (1985) Afghanistan. The Soviet Invasion in Perspective. Stanford, CA: Hoover

Institution Press, Stanford University.

Boyce, J. (ed.) (1996) Economic Policy for Building Peace: Lessons from El Salvador. Boulder,

CO and London: Lynne Rienner.

Bru ck, T., E. V. K. Fitzgerald and A. Grigsby (2000) Enhancing the Private Sector Con-

tribution to Post-War Recovery in Poor Countries. QEH Working Paper 45 (1). Oxford:Queen Elizabeth House.

Byrd, W. (2001) Aid Management during Post-conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from

International Experience. Conference on Preparing for Afghanistans Reconstruction,

Islamabad (2729 November). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Carroll, R. (2002) The Other War in Afghanistan, The Guardian 2 May (London).

del Castillo, G. (2001) Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Challenge to International

Organisations: the Case of El Salvador, World Development 29(12): 196785.

Chingono, M. (1996) The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in

Mozambique, 19751992. Aldershot: Avebury.

Collier, P. (1995) War, Peace and Private Portfolios, World Development 23(2): 23341.

Cramer, C. (1999) Can Africa Industrialize by Processing Primary Commodities? The Case of

Mozambican Cashews, World Development 27(7): 124766.

Davis, A. (1998) How the Taliban became a Military Force, in W. Maley (ed.) Fundamentalism

Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, pp. 4364. London: Hurst & Company.

Duffield, M., P. Grossman and N. Leader (2001) Review of the Strategic Framework for

Afghanistan. Commissioned by the Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afghanistan.

Edwards, D. (2002) Before Taliban. Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad. Berkeley, CA: University

of California Press.

Fielden, M. and J. Goodhand (2001) Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and United

Nations Peacemaking, Conflict, Security, Development 1(3).

Gleditsch, N. P., O. Bjerkholt, A. Cappelen, R. P. Smith and J. P. Dunne (eds) (1996) The Peace

Dividend. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Glyn, A. and B. Sutcliffe (1999) Still Underwhelmed: Indicators of Globalization and their

Misinterpretation, Review of Radical Political Economics 31(1): 11132.

Goodhand, J. (2000) From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in

North Eastern Afghanistan, Central Asian Survey 19(2): 26580.

Gregorian, V. (1967) The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and

Modernization, 19801946. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hanlon, J. (1996) Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique.

Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; London: James Currey.

Harris, G. (1999) Recovery From Armed Conflict in Developing Countries. London: Rout-ledge.

H ht J (1998) Th R t ti f W T E i T h i l P H d



24/26

Hyman, A. (1992) Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 19641991 (3rd edn). London: Mac-

millan.

Jan, A. (1999) Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan: The Role of Pakistan. New York: Inter-

national Peace Academy.di John, J. and J. Putzel (2000) State Capacity Building, Taxation and Resource Mobilisation

in Historical Perspective. Paper presented at conference on New Institutional Economics,

Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction, Development Studies Institute, London

School of Economics (78 September).

Keen, D. (1994) The Benefits of Famine. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kolko, Gabriel (1995) Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society since 1914. New York:

New Press.

Magnus, R. H. and E. Naby (1998) Afghanistan. Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. New Delhi:

HarperCollins.

Maley, W. (2001) Talibanisation and Pakistan, in CPN Talibanisation: Extremism and

Regional Instability in South and Central Asia, pp. 5374. Brussels: CPN and Stiftung

Wissenschaft und Politik.

Mann, M. (1988) State and Society, 11301815: An Analysis of English State Finances,

in M. Mann (ed.) States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford: Basil

Blackwell.

Marshall, K. (1997) Emerging from Conflict: What Roles for International Development

Finance Institutions?. Development Discussion Paper No 587. Boston, MA: Harvard

University: Harvard Institute for International Development.

Milward, A. S. (1972) The Economic Effects of the Two World Wars on Britain. Basingstoke:

Macmillan.

Milward, A. S. (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 194551. London: Methuen.

Moore, D. (2000) Levelling Playing Fields and Embedding Illusions: Post-Conflict Discourse

and Neo-Liberal Development in War-Torn Africa, Review of African Political Economy

27(83): 1128.

Noelle-Karimi, C. (2001) The Loya Jirga An Effective Political Tool?, in C. Noelle-Karimi,

C. Schetter and R. Schlagintweit (eds) Afghanistan A Country without a State?, pp. 3750.

Frankfurt: IKO Verlag fur Interkulturelle Kommunikation.

Oleson, A. (1995) Islam and Politics in Afghanistan. London: Curzon Press.

Pain, A. and J. Goodhand (2002) Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-economic

Situation and Prospects. ILO Infocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction,

Working Paper no 8. Geneva: International Labour Organization.Parvanta, A. (2001) Afghanistan Land of the Afghans? On the Genesis of a Problematic

State Denomination, in C. Noelle-Karimi, C. Schetter and R. Schlagintweit (eds)

Afghanistan A Country without a State?, pp. 1725. Frankfurt: IKO Verlag fur

Interkulturelle Kommunikation.

Paus, E. (1995) Exports, Economic Growth and the Consolidation of Peace in El Salvador,

World Development 23(12): 217393.

Putzel, J. and M. Moore (1999) Politics and Poverty: A Background Paper for the World

Development Report 2000/01. Brighton: IDS, University of Sussex.

Rais, R. B. (1998) Afghanistan Country Paper. Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for

Ethnic Studies; The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Institute of International Relations.Rashid, A. (2000) Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. London: I. B.

Tauris



25/26

Roy, O. (2001) The Transnational Dimension of Radical Islamic Movements, in CPN

Talibanisation: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia, pp. 7588.

Brussels: CPN and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Rubin B. (1995) The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. From Buffer State to Failed State. NewHaven, CT and London: Yale University Press.

Rubin, B. (1996) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the

International System. Lahore: Vanguard Books.

Rubin, B. (2000) The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan, World Development

28(10): 17891803.

Rubin, B., A. Ghani, W. Maley, A. Rashid and O. Roy (2001) Afghanistan: Reconstruction in

a Regional Framework. Bern: Centre for Peacebuilding, Swiss Peace Foundation.

Schierup, C.-U. (ed.) (1999) Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political

Economy of Reconstruction. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Shahrani, M. N. (1998) The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governancein Afghanistan, in W. Maley (ed.) Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban,

pp. 21242. London: Hurst & Company.

de Soysa, I. and N. P. Gleditsch (1999) To Cultivate Peace: Agriculture in a World of Conflict.

PRIO Report 1/99. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).

Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 9901992. Cambridge, MA:

Blackwell.

Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg (1998) Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes,

198997, Journal of Peace Research 35(5): 62134.

Christopher Cramer is a lecturer in the Department of Development Studies,

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh

Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, [email protected]. His current

research interests include the political economy of war and rural labour

markets and poverty in Southern Africa.

Jonathan Goodhand is a lecturer in Development Practice in the Department

of Development Studies at SOAS, University of London. He has managed

aid programmes in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Sri Lanka and conducted

research and published on aid, conflict and peacebuilding.



26/26

Documents

Post Conflict Economic Development 28