Author: Olivia G. Rosete 10 February 2017

Title:

The Possibility of a Democratic Islam in Iran:

A Comparative Analysis on the Reformist and Neo-Conservative Intellectual Circles

Total Number of Words: 2499

After the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution that established the Islamic Republic, Iran now faces an

intellectual revolution. This intellectual revolution signifies the emergence of different Iranian

discourses and their respective intellectual circles. This paper focuses on two of these circles —

the Reformist and Neo-Conservative Intellectual Circles—and their clashing ideologies about

inserting democracy in Iran. This paper seeks to answer if there is any middle ground between

the two circles by using historical comparative method and by applying constructivism in

identifying the underlying motivations that constituted the said clash. This paper hypothesizes

that with the institution of elections, Iran has already found a middle ground in which both

circles have co-existed.

Democracy and the Islamic Republic

Democracy is a type of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and

exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation. This concept came

from Aristotle’s forms of regimes wherein he described democracy as the ‘rule of many’. This is

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advocated and adopted by mostly Western states. Diamond and Morlino (1988, p. 218) ascribe

seven features to any democracy.i According to Bukay (2007, p. 72) this approach is important,

because it emphasizes civil rights and liberties, instead of over-reliance on elections and formal

institutions of the state. Despite laying out the seven features, contemporary scholars have not

been subtle about their debate over the requirements of democracy.

According to Eposito and Voll (1996, p. 3) ‘[r]eligious resurgence and democratization are two

of the most important developments of the final decades of the 20 th century.’ In Iran, issues are

raised with special force because of the strength of the Islamic resurgence and the intensity of the

demands for greater popular participation in the political process. Most people have this vague

assumption that Iran is under a simple authoritarian, or in some cases, a dictatorial rule. The

point of this confusion is the role of the Iranian Supreme Leader. With this term in mind, most

people think that Iran is ruled by an iron fist. What people don’t know is that, Iran has a unique

and complex government. It is an Islamic Republic.

For Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East, an ‘Islamic republic’ is a compromise between

a purely Islamic caliphate, and secular nationalism and republicanism. The sovereignty of such

republic resides and emanates from the sole leader. Religious leaders, also believe that the penal

code of the Islamic republic must be compatible with some or all laws of Sharia, which is

derived from two main Islamic texts: the Quran and the Hadith.ii

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According to Adiong et.al. (2013, p. 4), there is this general assumption that Islam is

incompatible with democracy. This orientalist mentality made Islam hostile to Western culture.

This makes the world see that the West is superior to that of the rest of the world. Anderson

(2004, p. 197). argues that ‘[w]ith regard to Islam it was argued that reliance on a fixed religious

text and quasi-legal ordinances, the emphasis on divine sovereignty, and the supposed lack of

distinction between the religious and the political realm, all worked against democratic

development’.

Iranians’ Fight for Democracy

The Iranian government is quite democratic compared to its neighboring governments in the

region, despite making no claim to be a democracy in the Western sense. Iranians get to elect the

members of their legislature, and their president. Although, the Iranian elections are never

considered, by the Western standards, as free and fair. The Iranian political system combined

authoritarian forms of government with democratic elements. In accommodating a procedural

democracy within Iran, gives it a democratic surface structure, yet it does not necessarily make a

state democratic (Jahanbakhsh, 2001, p. 3).

The great majority of the Iranian people are deeply dissatisfied with the Iranian regime after the

Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Iranian Massacre (1988). This dissatisfaction became clear

when millions of Iranians defied the wishes of their Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, of

electing his preferred candidate in the 1997 Presidential elections. Iranians elected Mohammad

Khatami, a reformist cleric with experience in public office. Khatami’s promises, which included

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individual rights and promotion of democratic practices, were considered the ‘beginning of the

end of dogmatic theocracy’ (Gheissari, et.al., 2006, p. 5). This simple act of suffrage of the

Iranians became a common and significant knowledge that can be considered as a starting step,

debunking the orientalist’s idea that Islam is incompatible with democracy. It signified that Iran,

through the acts of majority of its population, is now ready for modernity and reform.

The Intellectual Circles

A lot of intellectual circles have emerged after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Two of these are the

Reformist Intellectual Circles and the Neo-Conservative Intellectual Circles. The one is post-

modern in nature and breaks with tradition; while the second, is more widely adhered to be an

extension of classical theology and stays true to tradition (Madaninejad, 2011, p. 1). According

to Fazili (2010, p. 40), this is neither a battle of secularism versus religion; nor clerics versus

non-clerics. For it is a struggle within the religio-political establishment.

By using the historical comparative method, the gathered data are more on the background,

advocacies and stance of the said intellectual circles about inserting democracy in Iran. With the

use of the theory of constructivism, this paper identifies significant factors including persons,

events and ideas that constructed the said clash.

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Presentation of Data or Findings

From the mid-19th century onward, five major patterns of political behavior and discourse are

traceable in the modern history of Iran. These are the traditional patrimonialism of the Qajar era,

democratic parliamentarianism of the Constitutional era, modernizing autocracy of the Pahlavi

era, revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Republic, and the recent democratic pluralism of the

reform movement (Jahanbakhsh, 2003, p. 244).

The Reformist Intellectual Circles

The 1906-1911 Iranian Constitutional Revolution has been commonly recognized as a nationalist

and a democratic revolution. It was an expression of the political awakening of Iran which aimed

to eradicate the traditional patrimonialism and establish a modern parliamentary system that may

be fit into the modern concept of sovereign nations. The revolution was successful, however, it

didn’t completely eradicated patrimonialism. During the Pahlavi period (1925-1979), absolutism

was restored, with democratic parliamentarianism by Muhammad Mossadeq visible for a short

period of time. The democratic ideals of the constitutional movement were somehow revived by

the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The draft of the constitution proposed a democratic government

with no superior position reserved for the clergy. However, the political direction moved toward

a clerical neo-patrimonialism, with the establishment of the first clerical government that granted

the mandate of the jurists (velayat-e faqih) by Ayatollah Khomeini. This became an aid to the

clerics’ seizure of political power in post-revolutionary Iran. Then, the religious and political

discourse became inseparable.

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The most notable challenger and critic to the Ideological Islam was Abdolkarim Soroush.

Soroush’s theory was successfully launched, arguing that any understanding of religion is

humane and that no understanding of religion is ever sacred, absolute or final. He questioned the

ideological understanding of religion and its totalitarian grip on political power in his articles that

were published in 1994 and 1995. This theory, and many related ideas, became the turning point

in the current religious discourse and nourished the mind and the language of the generation that

was to bring about the political reform movement in the late 1990s (Jahanbakhsh, 2003, p. 247).

With the victory of Khatami in the 1997 presidential elections, democracy signifies quest for

societal and individual freedoms, political pluralism and restrictions on the arbitrary state

authority (Kamrava, 2008, p. 151). This boosted the anti-clerical sentiments of the Iranians.

Although this reform movement is still evolving, its points of departure from the ruling

theocratic regime are evident. The call for reform is driven by social, economic, cultural, and,

international factors among others. These include the rise of a new generation, economic crisis,

political factionalism and power struggles, the pressure of globalization and the state’s relatively

isolation from the rest of the international community.

In the absence of political parties in the Islamic Republic, the intellectual circles and journals

such as Soroush’s Kiyan had functioned as quasi-political parties preparing the intellectual

foundation and a discourse for political change. The reformist papers contested the neo-

patrimonial rule of the clergy. Democratic religious discourse succeeded in de-legitimizing the

ideological religious absolutism and its peer political absolutism. Yet, the political reformists in

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power have so far achieved only partial success in democratizing the political culture of Iran.

These circles recognize reforms in Islamic thought, democracy, civil society, and religious

pluralism; and, oppose absolute supremacy of the Islamic jurist called the Faqih. iii The political

reform movement of Iran has still a long way to go in institutionalizing democracy; not only in

the sense of overcoming practical challenges imposed on it by the conservatives, also in the

sense of working out the details of its ideal form of government that is to be based on popular

sovereignty.

The Neo-Conservative Intellectual Circles

Adam Tarock said that the present conflict between the religious conservatives and reformers is

the legacy of the ideological dispute that began early last century (Hashemi, 2010, p.52). The

proper location of political sovereignty is at the heart of this debate. In the speech delivered on

July 17, 2009, two-time former President Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanhani dealt with the question

of the roots of political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He affirmed that without the

consent of the people, there could be no Islamic republican system. iv Conservative clerics in Iran

took this as Rafsanhani’s open support of the reformist opposition, with his interpretation of

where the Islamic republic derived its legitimacy.

The ideology of the neo-Conservatives oriented around the identity and ideals of the Islamic

revolution. Under the leadership of the Ayatollah, the foreign policy of Iran was guided by two

principles: to distance Iran from both the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ sides of the Cold War,

emphasizing Islamic authenticity and identity (Rakel, 2007, p. 167); and, to seek the

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advancement of revolutions abroad by rhetoric, financial support and action (Soltani, 2010, p.

199). The Neo-Conservative Circles, on the other hand, are in favor of the supremacy of the

leader and are strongly against concepts such as democracy, civil society and pluralism.

Moshen Kadivar, the person who epitomizes the intellectual but tradition-bound wave of post-

revolutionary theological thought in Iran, is the most representative thinker of this neo-

conservative thought. Kadivar and the rest of the neo-conservatives are concerned with

‘adapting’ the Islamic tradition to a new era (Madaninejad, 2011, p. 4). This theological, neo-

conservative thought seeks to ‘amend’ the orthodoxy and is the most consistent with pre-

revolutionary trends in Shii Orthodoxy. It seeks solutions that better fit with the public’s modern

lives while staying within the confines of orthodoxy (Madaninejad, 2011, p. 8).

Analysis

The Constructed Intellectual Revolution

In using the theory of constructivism, there need to exist a socially constructed phenomenon. The

author identifies the Intellectual Revolution as this phenomenon. This revolution is ‘socially

constructed’ because of its dependence on social factors rather than material ones. Social factors

specifically the modern history of Iran that was shaped by the ideologies, advocacies and actions

of the leaders of different groups of different eras. The most prominent factor would be the

Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) which established the Islamic Republic of Iran and hindered the

emerging Westernization measures by the Pahlavi monarchy.

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Finding a Middle Ground

The author has found out that both Turkey and Mali are democracies despite the fact that

majority of their population are Muslim. The difference between these Muslim democracies and

Iran is that, Iran has incorporated Islam into their politics. It is an Islamic Republic. Religion and

politics have become inseparable, in some ways. On one hand, Islam may be compatible with

democracy, but it depends on what is understood as Islam and as democracy. It is another issue

to talk about the compatibility of the Islamic republic and democracy.

A statement attributed to the Rightly Guided Caliph Abu Bakr asserts, "God has left people to

manage their own affairs so that they will choose a leader who will serve their interests." This

statement may pave a meeting point between the Reformists and Neo-Conservatives in Iran. The

Reformists’ advocacy in incorporating elements of democracy into the government with the

institution of elections does not automatically oppose the Neo-Conservatives’ belief that

sovereignty emanates from God and not the people. In Sunni Islam, it is well-established that the

Prophet died without naming a successor, intentionally leaving a choice of leadership to the

Muslim community. It can be considered as a democratic element, to elect their President

(directly) and Supreme Leader (indirectly). Upon electing this God’s vicegerent, electorates have

acknowledged the possibility of error of judgment, temptations, and vices associated with human

fallibility —still abiding the Islamic law.

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Conclusion

Democratization and religious resurgence are considered the most important developments of the

20th century. In some areas, these two developments coincided; in Iran however, these two are

still in conflict. Two intellectual circles namely the Reformists and Neo-Conservatives have

opposing views with regard to inserting democracy in Iran or at least incorporating some

democratic elements. The first one is post-modern and wants to look past the traditional

theocracy, while the second one is combining Islamic culture with modernity.

The findings presented are based on the events that transpired within contemporary Iran which

shaped and influencedthe ideas of Islamist thinkers who supported different circles. Significant

events, specifically the Constitutional (1911) and the Iranian (1979) Revolutions and the 1997

Presidential Elections, became turning points for the idea of inserting democracy in the Islamic

Republic.

Despite having opposing advocacies, the Reformist and Neo-Conservative Intellectual Circles in

the Islamic Republic of Iran have co-existed in the aspect of the democratic element in the form

of elections.

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i Seven features of Democracy include: individual freedoms and civil liberties; rule of the law; sovereignty resting upon the people; equality of all citizens before the law; vertical and horizontal accountability for government officials; transparency of the ruling systems to the demands of the citizens; and equality of opportunity for citizens. (Diamond et.al., 1988, p. 218)ii Quran the Holy Book of Islam; and, Hadith as one of various reports describing the words, actions, or habits of the Prophet Muhammad. Hadith is second only to Quran in developing Islamic jurisprudence.iii A Faqih is a person trained in fiqh. Historian Ibn Khaldun describes fiqh as ‘knowledge of the rules of God which concern the actions of persons who own themselves bound to obey the law respecting what is required (wajib), sinful (haraam), recommended (mandūb), disapproved (markūh) or neutral (mubah)’ (Levy, 1957, p. 150).iv As you are aware, according to the constitution, everything in the country is determined by people’svote.PeopleelectthemembersoftheAssemblyofExpertsandthentheyelectthe [Supreme] leader, that is, the leader is [indirectly] elected by the people’s vote. Presidents, MPs, members of the councils are elected by direct votes of the people. Other officials are also appointed [indirectly] through the people’s vote. Everything depends on the people. (Translated in English) Full speech available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SjDC1SrheE