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Positive analysis of OS and the network externalities. Faculty of Economics, Keio University Tatsuo TANAKA. Email:[email protected]. Application software. Users. Users. Router. Router. API. Operating system. File Format. Word processor and spreadsheet. Routers. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Positive analysis of OS and the network externalities
Faculty of Economics, Keio UniversityTatsuo TANAKA
Email:[email protected]
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Network externality works in terms of the interface among modules or users.
• PC’s OS– Modules are
application software and OS.
– Interface is API.
Application software
Users Users
API
File FormatOperatingsystem
OSWord processor and spreadsheet Routers
• Word Processor and spreadsheet– Modules are users– Interface is file format (+ friends-are-
teacher effects)• Routers
– Modules are users (or routers)– Interface is TCP/IP protocol and its
implementation
Router
Router
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Market structure : two contrary views
• When interface is not open, there exists a tendency towards monopoly even if firms obey the fair trade rules.– Once the monopoly is established, no firm can challenge the
monopoly firm unless there is a “huge” innovation that overcomes the benefit of the network externality. (so-called “lock-in”)
– Competition becomes weak. The price remains high and incentive for innovation becomes low. (Losses of monopoly)
– The monopoly firm will try to extend the monopoly by bundling complimentary products to its monopoly module (“leverage”)
• Such “huge” innovations are common in the information technology related industries.– History shows successive changes of the dominant firms in the IT
industries. Windows faces potential challengers such as Linux.– Decrease of price, enough incentive for innovations.– Bundling the compliments into the products is beneficial to the users
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Solutions : two contrary views
• [First best] Make the interface open so that other firms can reap benefits from the network externality. – In other word, the interface (e.g., API) should be unbundled from the
specific products. • [Second best] Disintegrate the product or company into the
monopoly module and other modules. – In other words, the monopoly module (e.g., OS) should be unbundled
from other modules (e.g., applications).
• The first solution discourages the incentive for innovations. • The second solution is harmful to users because bundling the
products is beneficial to the users.
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Our approach to this issue
• Step3: Consider solutions’ cost and benefits – Make interface open– Disintegrate the product
Is network externality strong? Ordinary
competitionpolicy
Yes
No
Losses from monopoly?
Watchanti-competitiveaction
Yes
No
Solutions’effects and side effects Watch
anti-competitiveactioneffective
Not effective
Solutions1) make the interface open2)disintegrate the product
• Step 1: Estimate network externality – Compare the effect of
network externality with functional changes by innovations.
• Step 2: Evaluate losses from monopoly – Price: Does price decrease
continuously?– Innovations: Does the speed
of innovation get slower?
• Start: High and stable share or profit. Strategic(predatory) pricing.
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Today’s subject: OS• User survey (n=3319)
– History of OS usage during 1993-2004– Reason of choice of OS– Subjective evaluation of the OS– Number of application software he/she regularly uses.– Price of OS
• Presumption of this study– Users remember his usage history of OS well.
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04OS MacOS W98 W2000 WXPReason 1 2 3 3NofAppli 5 7 8 7Price NA 25k NA NA
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Question:Why did you choose the OS?
• Reason of Choice– 1)Excellent functions – 2)Many application on this OS– 3)Many users to ask for advise– 4)Already bought applications on this OS– 5)I get used to the operation of this OS– 6)Same OS as in my company– 7)Low price– 8)No other choice in the PC shop– 9)I just choose PC hard– 10)Other
Functions(Innovation)
NE + SCPrice
Others
Network Externalities
Switching Cost
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Reason of OS choice:Windows
old
new
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
MSDOS
Win3.1
Win95
Win98
WinME
Win2000
WinXP
Excelent functions(Innovations)Many application on thisOS (NE)There are many users ofthis OS (NE)Already bought appli onthis OS (SC)I get used to this OS (SC)
Same OS as in mycompany (SC + NE)Low price
No other choice in the PCshopI just choose PC hard
Other
Functions NE SC Price
Functions :Increased 10%25%Network E. :Decrease 40%20%Switching C. :Increased 5%15%
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Reason of OS choice:Mac OS
old
new
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
System7
MacOS7
MacOS8
MacOS9
MacOSX
Excelent functions(Innovations)Many application on thisOS (NE)There are many users ofthis OS (NE)Already bought appli onthis OS (SC)I get used to this OS(SC)Same OS as in mycompany (SC + NE)Low price
No other choice in thePC shopI just choose PC hard
Other
Functions NE SC
Functions :30%~45%Network E. :Decrease 20%10%Switching C. :Increased 5%20%
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Variables: how to measure
• Functions– Users’ subjective evaluation of the OS– Q:”Please evaluate the OS by score 0 ~ 100”
• Network Externalities– Share of the OS– Dummy for the largest share OS
• Switching Cost– Number of application software in use.
• Price– Average of users’ reports
Vij:utility when OS i’s user chooses OS j as a new OS.
Vij=a + b*Pricej + c*Functionj
+ d*Switching Costij + e*Network Effectj
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Evaluation on Functions by OS versions
0102030405060708090
MSDO
S
Win
3.1
Win
95
Win
98
Win
ME
Win
2000
Win
XP
Sys
tem
7
Mac
OS7
Mac
OS8
Mac
OS9
Mac
OSX
Average score of of all users
Functions:Subjective Evaluation of OS’s functions Q:” Evaluate the functions of the OS by score 0 – 100.”
Windows MacOS
Functional evaluation has increased.
Windows’ score is slightly higher than MacOS
Innovations continue.
Functional difference can explain Windows’ larger share to some extent.
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Number of users by OS versions
0
500
1000
1500
2000
250019
93
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
1 MS- DOS=
2 Windows3.1=
3 Windows95=
4 Windows98=
5 WindowsMe=
6 Windows2000=
7 WindowsXP=
8 system7=
9 MacOS7=
10 MacOS8=
11 MacOS9=
12 MacOSX=
13 Linux=
14=その他Unix
15=その他OS
MSDOS
Win3.1
Win95
Win98
WinXP
WinMe
Win2000
Number of Users by OS versions (total=3319)
MacOs
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Network Externalities:Share of Windows and MacOS
Win vs Mac share, source=PC white book Web source、
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Win Mac
Windows share has increased steadily from 70-80% to 90%
Network Externalities has increased. The difference of the share is over 80%
Windows
MacOS
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Switching Cost: Number of software Q:” How many application software do you use regularly? “
number of application soft that are used a few times amonth, by OS
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
MSD
OS
Win
3.1
Win
95
Win
98
Win
ME
Win
2000
Win
XP
Sys
tem
7
MacO
S7
MacO
S8
MacO
S9
MacO
SXAverage number of software of the OS users
Windows MacOS
Number of software has increased to around 7.
No difference between Windows’ users and MacOS users.
Switching cost has increased
Variance among users are very large.
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Price of OSQ:” Write your OS’s price if you purchased it”
Prices of OS (unit=yen)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
MS
DO
S
Win
3.1
Win
95
Win
98
Win
ME
Win
20
00
Win
XP
Syst
em
7
MacO
S7
MacO
S8
MacO
S9
MacO
SX
Price of Windows increased, whereas price of MacOS decreased.
Since MacOS9, Windows are more expensive than MacOSs
Windows MacOS
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Model: OS i,j = Windows or MacOS
• Functionkj:user k’s subjective evaluation of the OS j• Network Externalitiesj
– (1) Market share of OS j– (2) Dummy for the Windows
• Switching Costkij :– If i=j, 0– if i is not equal to j, number of software in use of user k
• Pricej: average price of OS j
Vkij:utility when user k using OS i chooses OS j as a new OS.
Vkij=a + b*Functionkj + c*Network Externalitiesj
+ d*Switching Costkij + e*Pricej
Users choose OS j that Vkij> Vkij’ for other OS j’
Discrete choice model
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Estimated result and interpretation
Case1 Case2Evaluation(0-100) 0.0522 0.0528
(0.00) (0.00)Share of previous year 0.0244(unit=%) (0.00)Dummy for Windows 1.8655
(0.00)-0.1589 -0.1612
(0.00) (0.00)0.0123 0.0270
unit=1000yen( ) (0.00) (0.00)
quasai R2(no coefficient) 0.670 0.670quasai R2(With constant) 0.249 0.248Number of observations 6895 6895p-value in the parenthesis
Number of applicationsoftware
Price
Functions
SwitchingCost
NetworkExternalitie
s
Assume 80% difference in share.How much functional advance is necessary to beat Network E?(0.0244*80)=1.949 utility 1.949/0.0522=37.3
Assume 7 application software.How much functional advance is necessary to beat switching cost?(0.1589*7)=1.11 utility 1.11/0.0522=21.3
Need 37 points gain in function to beat network externalities.
Significant, and sign is as expected except for price
Need 21 points gain in function to beat switching cost.
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Evaluation on Functions by OS versions
0102030405060708090
MS
DO
S
Win
3.1
Win
95
Win
98
Win
ME
Win
2000
Win
XP
Sys
tem
7
Mac
OS
7
Mac
OS
8
Mac
OS
9
Mac
OS
X
Average score of of all users
Evaluation on Functions by OS versions
0102030405060708090
MS
DO
S
Win
3.1
Win
95
Win
98
Win
ME
Win
2000
Win
XP
Sys
tem
7
Mac
OS
7
Mac
OS
8
Mac
OS
9
Mac
OS
X
Average score of of all users
WindowsWindows MacOSMacOS
Does innovation beat the network externalities and switching cost?
• Need 37 points to beat NE, 21 points to beat SC. Total=58 points• Increase of functional improvement of version-up has been about
10 points(See the graph again)
58 point is correspond to5.8 times version-ups.In other words, if we assume that version-up is done in 2.5 years, new OS maker needs to make OS with over 15-years advanced technologies.
It is almost impossible.Thus, there is entry barrier that is not likely to be overcome by innovations.
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How to introduce competition
• (1) Compatibility: Opening the interface completely.
– API of OS
– File format of MS Word and Excel
– Former Interface, Current Interface, Next Interface
• (2) Disintegration or Regulation of vertical integration
– Separating the noncompetitive part (OS or Office) from the competitive part(other application software)
Critiques: These policies harm the incentive for the innovation of new interface
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Optimum level of incentive
Opening the interface
Discourage the innovation welfare loss
Competition is recovered welfare gain
Which is large?
A special case of general question of incentive design for innovation
weak Patent strong protection
Benefit of current innovators
Benefit of users and future innovators
Patent scope: narrow --- widePatent period: short --- long
Interface: How many years of monopoly is optimal? #monopoly=single firm’s control.
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Case of Interface
Opening : Next Current Former not open Version version version
Monopoly: 5years 10years 15years unlimitedperiod
Current innovator’sbenefit
User’s benefit + Future innovator’s benefit
Social optimum
Question:Let’s assume that we make Microsoft to open the interface.
Does it discourage critically potential innovators who want to be next Bill Gates?
Does it encourage innovators who want to challenge Microsoft by providing compatible goods?If so, users also get the benefit.
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Thank you for your attention!