POPULATION DYNAMICS, POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A DEMO-ECONOMIC AND SPATIAL FRAMEWORK

Jean Marie Cour World Bank Consultant, France

Email: jeanmariecour@numericable.fr

DINÁMICAS POBLACIONALES, REDUCCIÓN DE LA POBREZA Y DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE: UN MARCO DEMO-ECONÓMICO Y ESPACIAL

Jean Marie Cour Consultor Banco Mundial, Francia

E-mail : jeanmariecour@numericable.fr Resumen La región subsahariana de África es la última del mundo en llevar a cabo su transición demográfica. En vez de estancarse, este poblado continente está experimentando profundos cambios a una velocidad y dimensión sin precedentes. En primer lugar, su población se ha multiplicado por diez en el transcurso de un siglo, lo que conlleva la emigración, urbanización y densificación de los patrones de asentamiento. En segundo lugar, la región se ha abierto a la economía mundial, puesto que los avances y la sociedad de la globalización impulsan la relación de la región con el mundo exterior. Muchos de los fracasos de las políticas y programas propuestos por organismos de ayuda extranjeros se deben a que el paradigma subyacente del desarrollo de la economía ignora en gran medida las consecuencias de las dinámicas poblacionales. Se presenta brevemente el marco conceptual demo-económico y espacial que tiene como objetivo superar esta tendencia y sirve como base para el Estudio de las perspectivas a largo plazo de África Occidental. La presentación termina con algunas implicaciones políticas: a) movilidad es la clave para el desarrollo sostenible. Cualquier política que intente restringir la movilidad o proporcione alicientes a la gente para que no emigren, provocarán a largo plazo situaciones difíciles de gestionar. b) es posible prevenir conflictos o mitigar sus consecuencias si se presta más atención a las grandes tendencias de las dinámicas poblacionales. c) las estrategias de reducción de la pobreza deberían ser planteadas de nuevo. En las zonas rurales, la única manera de alcanzar un crecimiento sostenible de la media de los ingresos por agricultor es fomentando, o al menos no impidiendo, la división del trabajo entre los agricultores y los consumidores (principalmente la gente que vive en la ciudad). En la ciudad, la presencia de los pobres no es lo que debería preocupar, puesto que la función de las ciudades es la de atraer el máximo número posible de gente capaz de subsistir en un ambiente urbano, sino que es más importante el promedio de tiempo que necesitan las ciudades para asimilar inmigrantes. Por último, la mejor manera de combatir la pobreza consiste en tratar el tema desde las zonas urbanas y locales y reforzar la capacidad de relacionarse de los habitantes urbanos y rurales. Aunque esta presentación se centra en el caso del Oeste de África, se pueden sacar las mismas conclusiones de otras regiones del mundo que se están poblando. Controlar el aumento de la población en el planeta se ha convertido en el desafío más importante de nuestros días y la comunidad internacional debería darle prioridad para facilitar este proceso. Además, se deberían suministrar infraestructuras para responder a la demanda. Ello implica que estos países seguirán necesitando los fondos financieros de los países ya desarrollados y poblados durante al menos dos décadas más. Estas transferencias Norte-Sur deben considerarse como la contrapartida de la distorsión provocada por la economía global en los países del hemisferio norte, que imponen al resto del mundo la libre circulación de bienes y servicios, de información, tecnología e ideología, pero al mismo tiempo imponen un estricto control de los movimientos migratorios internacionales.

DYNAMIQUES DE POPULATION, ALLEGEMENT DE LA PAUVRETE ET DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE: UN CADRE DEMO-ECONOMIQUE ET SPATIAL

Jean-Marie Cour Consultant de la Banque Mondiale, France.

Résumé L’Afrique Subsaharienne est la dernière région du monde à entreprendre sa transition démographique. Loin de stagner, ce continent en plein peuplement est en train de vivre des changements profonds, d’une rapidité et d’une taille sans précédents. D’abord, la population s’est multipliée par dix en un siècle, provoquant l’apparition de phénomènes tels que la migration, l’urbanisation et la densification de population. Ensuite, la région s’est ouverte à l’économie mondiale, par le biais de l’avancée de la mondialisation et d’une société plus engagée avec le monde hors de ses frontières.

Nombreux sont les échecs des politiques et des programmes soutenus par des organismes d’aide étrangers dus au fait que le paradigme sous-jacent des économies de développement tend à ignorer les implications des dynamiques de population. Nous présenterons brièvement le cadre conceptuel démo-économique et spatial visant à contrecarrer ces dérives et servant de base à l’étude des perspectives à long terme pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Nous terminerons avec quelques implications politiques: i) la mobilité est un facteur clef du développement durable. Toute politique qui tendrait à restreindre la mobilité ou à allouer des subventions aux individus pour les dissuader de circuler si tel était leur souhait donnerait lieu, à terme, à des situations ingérables ; ii) il est possible d’empêcher des conflits ou d’atténuer leurs conséquences en étant plus attentifs aux principales tendances des dynamiques de population ; iii) les stratégies d’allégement de la pauvreté doivent être repensées. En milieu rural, la seule façon d’assurer une augmentation durable du revenu moyen par fermier est d’encourager (tout du moins de ne pas empêcher) la division des tâches entre les fermiers et les consommateurs (en particuliers les citadins urbains). En milieu urbain, ce n’est pas la présence de gens pauvres qui devrait être une source d’inquiétude, puisque le rôle des villes est d’attirer le plus grand nombre d’individus pouvant subsister dans un environnement urbain. La durée moyenne d’assimilation des migrants dans les villes et villages est bien plus importante. Enfin, le meilleur moyen de lutter contre la pauvreté est de poser la problématique au niveau des zones urbanisées locales et de renforcer la capacité des habitants urbains et ruraux à intervenir. Nous nous concentrerons sur le cas de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Toutefois, les conclusions que nous en tirerons sont applicables aux autres régions en voie de peuplement du monde. La gestion du processus de peuplement de la planète apparaît comme le défi majeur à l’heure actuelle. Cette priorité doit être celle de la communauté internationale: faciliter ce processus. Les infrastructures doivent être fournies en fonction de la demande. Ceci implique que les transactions financières des pays développés et peuplés vers les pays en voie de peuplement seront encore nécessaires pendant une vingtaine d’années au moins. Ces transactions Nord-Sud doivent être considérées comme la contrepartie du décalage introduit dans l’économie mondiale par les pays du nord qui imposent au reste de la planète la libre circulations des biens et des services, des informations, des technologies, des idéologies, …mais imposent en même temps un contrôle strict sur les migrations internationales. Abstract Sub-Saharan Africa is the last region of the world to undertake its demographic transition. Far from stagnating, this “peopling” continent is undergoing profound changes of unprecedented speed and size. First is the tenfold increase of the population within the span of a century, which brings with it migration, urbanization, and the densification of settlement patterns. Second is the opening up of the region to the world economy, as globalization advances and society engages more with the world outside the region. Many failures of the policies and programs sponsored by foreign aid agencies result from the fact that the underlying paradigm of development economics largely ignores the implications of population dynamics. The demo-economic and spatial conceptual framework that aims to overcome this bias and serves as the basis of the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study is briefly presented. The paper ends with a few policy implications: i) mobility is a key to sustainable development. Any policy which would tend to restrain mobility or provide incentives for people to refrain from moving if they wish to do so would, in the long run, lead to unmanageable situations; ii) it is possible to prevent conflicts or mitigate their consequences by paying more attention to mega trends in population dynamics; iii) poverty alleviation strategies should be rethought. In rural areas, the only way to achieve sustained growth in average income per farmer is to encourage (or at least not impede) the division of labor between farmers and consumers (mainly town dwellers). In town, it is not the presence of poor people that should cause concern, since the role of towns is to attract the maximum number of people compatible with subsistence in the urban environment. More important is the average time taken by cities and towns to assimilate migrants. Finally, the best way to fight poverty is to address that issue at the level of local, urban-centered areas and to strengthen the capacity of urban and rural dwellers to interact. This paper focuses on the case of West Africa. However, similar conclusions can be drawn for other peopling regions of the world. Managing the peopling process of the planet appears to be the most important challenge of our time. Priority must be given by the international community to facilitate this process. The provision of infrastructure must follow the demand. This implies that financial transfers from already developed and populated countries to peopling countries will remain necessary for at least two more decades. Such north-south transfers must be seen as the counterpart of the distortion induced in the global economy by northern countries which impose to the rest of the world the free circulation of all goods and services, of information, technology and ideology,.. but at the same time impose a strict control of international migrations.

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INTRODUCTION

Many observers over the last thirty years have viewed Sub-Saharan Africa as a continent engaged in a downward spiral of population growth, degradation of the natural resource base, slow agricultural growth, extreme food vulnerability and impoverishment. Migrations and urbanization are often interpreted as the undesirable consequences of biased policies that favor urban elites at the expense of the rural economy. So called “structural adjustment policies” and, more recently, poverty alleviation, “pro poor growth” strategies and other initiatives have tended to shorten the time horizon of policy makers in the region and prevented them to realize that most African countries are experiencing considerable structural changes, among which the demographic transition, the growing importance of urban-rural interactions, the development of regional markets, the opening up of the region to the world economy and, above all, socio-cultural changes.

Many failures of the policies and programs sponsored by foreign aid result from the fact that the underlying paradigm of development economics is (a) utopian, ignoring the spatial dimension and the neighborhood relations between agents; (b) disincarnate, with no consideration of people (the aggregates produced by macro-economic models are virtually independent of population size and distribution) and (c) "demostatic" (taking settlement patterns as a given rather than a variable).

Such a paradigm which ignores the implications of population dynamics is particularly misguiding in the case of Sub Saharan Africa which is the last region of the world to undertake its demographic transition. This is why, since the early 1980s, I urged the donor community to test an alternative paradigm where population dynamics (overall growth and spatial and social redistribution of the population) is given the central place that it deserves.

The West Africa Long Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) which I will briefly present was the first exercise of significant importance to explore the implications of this new paradigm1. In Part One, I present the vision of the West Africa region as a whole that emerges from WALTPS. Part Two provides a few policy implications, with an emphasis on issues linked to the theme of this Symposium: in short, managing the “peopling” process, i.e. the spatial and social redistribution of the population is the key to sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also in other regions of the world that are still engaged in their demographic transition.

PART ONE: UNDERSTANDING STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN WEST AFRICA

West Africa is, with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, the last region of the world engaged in the demographic transition, i.e. the transition from a situation of high death- and birth-rates to one of low death- and birth-rates. Loosely speaking, this phase covers the period from 1930 to 2030. Between these two dates, before and after which population

1 The WALTPS study, carried out from 1992-1995 with the support of the World Bank, the European Union, the BAD and several bilateral funding sources, was published in 1998 by the OECD under the heading ‘Preparing for the future, a vision of West Africa for 2020'. The ECOLOC programme, whose objective is to revive local economies in Africa, is being managed by the Municipal Development Partnership (PDM) with the support of several bilateral funding organizations including France, Switzerland, Canada and the OECD (the Sahel Club).

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growth is moderate (of the order of 1% per year) and therefore easily managed, total population will have risen from 45 million to 450 million inhabitants, or a tenfold increase in one century - that is, within four or five generations. Obviously, such a growth of the population is not and cannot be evenly distributed throughout the region, which is therefore in a state of permanent disequilibrium and affected by various processes of population redistribution, among which urbanization. During that same period, the urban population, defined as the population living in centers with more than 5,000 inhabitants, will have risen from 2 million to 280 million, or a multiplication by a factor of more than one hundred, while the rural population will have increased fourfold. Understanding the “peopling process” (i.e. the process of growth and redistribution of the population) and its implications is at the core of the “demo-economic and spatial conceptual framework” that will be presented in the next section.

1. Main features of population redistribution in West Africa.

Migration has a significant impact on population distribution among the countries and ecological zones. For example, between 1930 and 1990, the population of what is now Burkina Faso trebled from 2.8 to 8.7 million inhabitants, whereas the population of the Ivory Coast multiplied by eight, rising from 1.4 to 11.4 inhabitants. Half as populated as the present Burkina Faso in 1930, the Ivory Coast is today a third more populated. About forty percent of individuals do not live in the place in which they or their parents were born2, and thirteen percent do not live in their country of origin. Real mobility is higher because migration is not all in one direction. The areas of immigration now contain half of the regional population as against thirty percent in l960, and their current average density of settlement is double that of the areas of emigration.

Urban areas have absorbed a quarter of total demographic growth between 1930 and 1960 and about two thirds of total population growth between 1960 and 1990. If the level of urbanization had remained constant since 1960, the rural population would be 50% higher than it is today, and it would above all be very differently distributed within the region. Burkina Faso for instance would have 12 million rural dwellers, or nearly double the current figure.

2 For this analysis of migrations, the West Africa region has been divided into 6000 "districts".

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Figure 1

50,000 to 100,000

100,000 to 200,000

200,000 to 500,000

500,000 to 1 million

1 to 2 million

2 to 5 million

5 to 10 million

over 10 million

Cities size

1960 : 600 villes of which 17 over 100.000 inhab.

2020 : 6000 cities of which 300 over 100.000 inhab.

1990 : 2500 cities of which 90 over 100.000 inhab.

Network of Cities over 50.000 inhabitantsin West Africa:

evolution between 1960 and 1990and projection for 2020

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The West Africa region can be roughly divided into four large zones that are relatively homogeneous from the demo-economic point of view.

Figure 2

Zone 1 covers the main poles of urban growth in the coastal countries and their immediate hinterland. It is characterized by high population density (an average of 141 inhabitants km-2, or 44% of the regional population for 7% of the total surface area) and by a high rate of urbanization (56% in 1990). It is this Zone which has undergone the greatest population growth over the past thirty years.

Zone 2 covers the remaining area close to the coasts. With 25% of the total population on 23% of the regional surface area, this Zone is under-populated relative to its potential and is under-urbanized. Until recently, it had a relatively low population growth.

Zone 3 corresponds approximately to dense Sahelian settlements inherited from the former empires. These densely populated areas, which have preserved their power of attraction, constitute the most dynamic part of the Sahelian countries, but they are in general over-populated relative to their resources and their development potential.

Finally, Zone 4 covers the rest of the Sahelian and arid rural area. It is in this Zone that the potential for demographic and economic growth is most visibly limited. Transhumance is a source of growing conflicts among farmers and herders, and nomadism is on the decline. This Zone is one of the main emigration areas.

Notwithstanding the rise of some 60% in its rural population between 1960 and 1990, Zone 2, which in many respects is the most important land reserve for the coming generation, has remained significantly under-populated, in the west and in the east (for example in the Cameroon forest area) and in the center (between southern Burkina Faso and northern Benin). This current under-population of the intermediate low-density Zone is a consequence of the slave trade and health factors (onchocercosis). The process of densification of this Zone has begun, starting in Nigeria, where densities today reach 30 inhabitants km-2, and are higher in the south (Ibo) and the north (Haoussa).

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Table 1 PAST AND PROJECTED GROWTH OF POPULATION BY AREA in million inhabitants and % of regional total POPULATION PERCENT of total ZONE YEAR 1930 1960 1990 2020 1930 1960 1990 2020 Zone 1 Coastal growth poles 14 31 79 174 31% 37% 41% 40% Zone 2 Coastal hinterland 13 25 54 137 29% 30% 28% 32% Zone 3 Sahelian growth poles 13 21 50 101 29% 25% 26% 23% Zone 4 Sahelian fringes 5 7 12 20 11% 8% 6% 5% Total West Africa 45 84 195 432 100% 100% 100% 100% Source: Club du Sahel, 1995

2. The growing role of market forces.

The African continent has always been characterized by strong population mobility. In the past decades, acceleration of population growth and the emergence of the market economy have disrupted the traditional economic structures and induced a major spatial redistribution of human activities and settlements.

The distribution of the rural population is more and more determined by the size and location of urban markets and by infrastructure, with the rural population density decreasing with the distance from the markets according to a similar law in all the agro-climatic zones. The map below shows the geographic correlation between areas of rural density over 50 inhabitants per sq. km (in gray) and cities over 50000 (in black) in the Gulf of Guinea.

Figure 3 Urban network and rural population density

3. The demo-economic and spatial conceptual framework of WALTPS

To understand the transformation of the West Africa region, it is essential to have a conceptual framework that takes account of the particular features of this region in population transition. In addition to population dynamics, one must take into account : i) the fundamentally unbalanced state of this region, characterized by high and increasing disparities between geographical areas ; ii) the high transaction costs resulting from the low density of population and economic activity and from the underdeveloped state of infrastructure ; and iii) the necessity for African societies to accommodate new comers and provide each of them with an activity, be it at a low and stagnant level of productivity : the priority given to activity over productivity of labor is

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at the core of the dual nature of African economies, and this duality cannot disappear until the end of the peopling process.

These characteristics lead to the demo-economic and spatial framework used in WALTPS, which focuses on long-term trends in the "population * space * economy * social and political change" complex. For a detailed presentation of this framework and of the databases, analytical tools and conclusions of the study, the reader is advised to refer to the report “Preparing for the Future: a 2020 Vision of West Africa” (see note 1). Here, I will only recall how the study proceeded to reassess the performance of the so-called “real economy” of the region over the three past decades, describe some important features of urban-rural interactions and draw attention to the process of geographic concentration of activities in urban-centered areas.

Population dynamics, a key to understand structural changes in the regional economy. The economic analysis in WALTPS starts with an analysis of the transformation over time of the population settlement matrix. The total population is divided among different types of areas (urban, rural, large and small towns, coastal and inland areas etc.) and different strata reflecting typical lifestyles and living standards (e.g. mainly agricultural, informal, modern). Each of these population categories is linked to a pattern of behavior as regards demand (needs for goods and services, income needs) and supply; both of these are differentiated according to locality and type of interaction, with the help of spatial models.

To take account of the fact that population is itself a production factor (and not only in the form of the “labor variable” of traditional production functions), the economy is considered to be made up of two interdependent levels. In the so-called “base level”, activities meeting essential needs of the various categories of household are driven by demand and depend only indirectly on the macro-environment, insofar as this latter affects the distribution of the population among the various household categories. The second, or "exposed" level, depends more directly on the macro-economic environment, linkages with the outside world and supply constraints. The structure and growth of "real" gross domestic product resulting from the combination of these two levels are thus linked both to the behavior of the exposed economy, which depends heavily on relations with the rest of the world, and to trends in settlement patterns.

Let me now explain how the demo-economic and spatial approach helps to understand and interpret: i) linkages between urban food demand and structural changes in agriculture and the rural economy; and ii) linkages between urbanization and changes in the structure of the real economy.

Urban food demand and changes in agriculture To meet the needs of consumers who do not produce food or other farm produce, "marketed farm productivity" i.e. the surplus each farmer, on average, brings to market after satisfying on-farm and local consumption needs, must roughly increase in line with the ratio between non-farm and farm populations. In Africa, taking account of improvements in food intake, this means an increase by a factor of a hundred or more in the course of a century.

Farmers' capacity to respond to urban demand and their ability to adapt to market stimulus are obviously not the same everywhere. Agricultural supply and demand for food meet in a space that is structured by transport and communication networks, with

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transaction costs and internal and external competition conditions that depend very much on locality. That is why it is essential to include the spatial dimension in any approach to exchanges between agriculture and urban areas.

To measure the intensity of interactions between the food production zones (mainly rural) and the localities where these goods are processed and consumed (towns), an indicator has been devised of "market attractiveness", to reflect the intensity of the "signal" cities and towns send out to rural areas. The market attractiveness indicator takes account of

- the size of the different markets and how far away they are,

- the wide variation in the cost of transport across these distances depending on infrastructure, relief, etc.;

- supply conditions for surplus farm produce (agro-climatic factors, rural population density etc.);

- the effects of competition among the different markets for allocation of this surplus;

- "shut-off" effects that keep market attractiveness below a certain ceiling, above which imports are more competitive.

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Figure 4 Market attractiveness indicator in 1960,1990 and 2020

The three maps of Figure 4 show the spatial distribution of this indicator in 1960, 1990 and 2020. The latter is based on the 2020 vision of settlement patterns in the region which is discussed at the end of this section. Black areas have a strong link with the market, gray areas a moderate link, while the white areas are very weakly linked to the market, so that farmer behavior there is assumed to be mainly determined by local considerations such as food security.

Comparison between the results of the market attractiveness model and existing localized data confirms the relevance of the model, both as a tool for describing

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agricultural and rural geography at a given moment and as a tool for interpreting and predicting long-term changes:

- rural population density correlates well with market attractiveness. The more an area is "exposed" to the market, the higher its population density. For West Africa as a whole, this relationship gives a better explanation of the wide variations in settlement density than do agro-ecological criteria, which only operate to a significant extent where population density is high.

- output per hectare (yield) and output per rural inhabitant (agricultural productivity) are also closely related to market attractiveness: the model thus explains big differences in yield and productivity between regions with the same agro-ecological conditions.

Market attractiveness maps also enable one to visualize "market catchments", i.e. the areas belonging to each market center. One can see from the maps here that up to now, the main markets have remained separate; they do not merge significantly until 2020, when half of the total trade in food will take place between countries of the region.

As to agricultural intensification, i.e. the shift to more sophisticated farming methods giving higher yields, this only occurs at a later stage in the urbanization process, especially where land and labor are in relatively plentiful supply as they still are today in most of rural West Africa. Where there are no limitations on land, one farming family can produce enough surpluses to feed one other family. So until local urbanization exceeds 50%, the surplus of food for the market can increase without any notable change in farming systems, i.e. with traditional methods, hand tools and no notable use of inputs. Only beyond this urbanization threshold of about 50% do a significant proportion of farmers have the motivation to adopt different cultivation methods, enabling labor productivity to increase faster (thanks to mechanization) and, if a restricted land supply warrants it, increased yields.

On the other hand, in geographical areas where the ratio of non-farm population to farming population varies little over time and space, it is unlikely that farmers' choice of technology will change fast without sustained extension work and supervision, which is costly. A farming project far from the nearest town and the nearest market has little chance of surviving once the project managers have left.

For the system of food supply from rural communities to towns to function, urban consumers must at least be solvent. The next paragraph addresses this question.

How does migration affect the urban economy? Are urban food consumers solvent, and where do their incomes come from? The reasoning set out above, according to which the main driving force in the transformation of African farming is urban and regional demand, also applies to the other kinds of essential goods and services, on which the urban economy largely depends. The demand for these essential goods, and hence the corresponding supply and incomes, depends on the size of the population, its spatial distribution and how it is divided between social categories. The process involved and its implications may be seen from the example of the urban informal sector which, in terms of the number of people involved, has multiplied tenfold in the past thirty years and is now becoming the sector that absorbs most of the population increase, overtaking the primary sector.

On average, when an individual leaves the countryside and moves into town, his total expenditure needs increase threefold, and so does his need for monetary income. The long-term increase in the informal population shows that this sector is still attracting

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newcomers, with highly positive net migration flows. For those new migrants who succeed in becoming integrated, their need for increased expenditure has to be matched by a corresponding increase in their income and productivity or average value added. This is roughly what the accounts of the real economy show. Despite the constant influx of relatively poor migrants, average levels of productivity and income in the informal sector population do not fall, remaining two to three times as high as those of the home area. The attractiveness of the urban informal sector and its capacity to absorb new migrants depend on the quality of the infrastructure and opportunities offered by each town, and, of course, the macro-economic situation. The relative stability of living standards in the informal sector is due to the fact that, when the economy slackens, the pace of net migration into towns also slows down, and conversely when the economy picks up.

The economic growth of the informal sector is therefore extensive rather than intensive: the priority is to provide work for as many people as possible, not to increase productivity or make enterprises more competitive. This will doubtless continue to be the case as long as the reservoir of potential migrants (in rural areas, other towns or other countries) remains proportionately large. The average productivity of the informal sector cannot begin to increase significantly until migration slows down.

The average "productivity" in both the informal and modern urban sectors increases with town size. Thus the average productivity of a town with a population of 50,000 is twice that of a town of 5,000 and only half that of a city of two million inhabitants.

These town-size effects are partly obscured by the development of the informal sector, which now accounts for two-thirds of the total urban population as against one-third in the 1960s. This trend can be interpreted as an "endogenization" of an urbanization process whose initial impetus came from outside, through a highly outward-looking modern sector. Despite this informalization, the contribution of urban areas to "real" gross regional product has doubled since the 1960s; it now stands at two-thirds of the total.

On average, per capita value added, and therefore income, in the urban population is more thant double that in rural areas. Over the long term, this gap tends to narrow slowly, owing to the informalization of the urban economy and the relative stagnation of average productivity in this sector on the one side, and on the other, rising agricultural and rural productivity, a result, as we have seen, of urbanization. But for several decades yet, until settlement patterns have stabilized, this ratio in productivity and income levels between town and country will remain high, generally more than two: urban-rural linkages will be influenced by these sharp disparities for many years yet.

Migration, concentration of economic activity and the emergence of urban-centered growth poles. The areas of immigration mentioned earlier, which gather about half of the total population on one third of the total area of the region, accounts for four-fifths of the total gross regional product. We are witnessing a progressive concentration of the population and of urban and rural economic activity in a set of regions that are both well endowed with natural resources and infrastructure, and well-placed relative to foreign markets and to the regional market. Although it has increased geographical disparities, this geographical concentration is undoubtedly a necessary condition for a future reduction of the differences in living standards among inhabitants of the region.

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The economy of a country should therefore be interpreted not only as a combination of sectors, but also as an interlocking system of local economies each made up of an urban center (or cluster of towns) and its rural hinterland. It is in these small urban-centered areas that the main innovations in land tenure, farming and trading systems and also in social relations occur.

The decentralization process, which all West African countries have undertaken, is thus the logical consequence of the emergence of these new urban-centered growth poles. In order to help the newly created local authorities and their civil society to face their responsibilities, the Club du Sahel and the Municipal Development Program (MDP) have jointly launched a program called ECOLOC (Managing the Economy Locally in West Africa) which, among other objectives, helps to provide local decision makers with the tools to understand the functioning of their local economy and its linkages with the rest of the country and the region. ECOLOC exercises include the construction of relatively detailed demo-economic, social and geographic information systems of each urban-centered area, with a retrospective analysis and elements of long term visions of the area. This long term perspective helps local decision makers to understand structural changes in their area and to build coalitions of interests around a strategy for local development, a condition to regain some control of their own future. The dozen of ECOLOC studies already completed confirm the overall validity of WALTPS assumptions and main conclusions.

4. A 2020 vision of West Africa

What does the future hold? Will migration continue despite the economic crisis of the past decade, which has hit many of the countries experiencing net immigration? Or will there be, on the contrary, a reversal of net flows towards the traditional countries of emigration and, in particular towards the Sahel, as suggested by recent events in Côte d’Ivoire? What will be the economic, socio-economic and, above all, environmental, consequences? If a halt or reversal of migration were to bring unbearable pressure to bear on the resources and environment of pre-Saharan and Sahelian areas and accelerate the process of desertification, what development strategies should be implemented in order to limit the risks of such an eventuality? Where do we foresee that the 430 million West Africans of the year 2020 will live? What is the population distribution that will be considered desirable in a generation from now? What development strategies will have been put into effect in the countries of emigration and those of immigration? What investments will have been made in order to facilitate this population redistribution, and how will these investments have been financed? What will the costs and the advantages of these migratory flows have been, particularly in terms of the management of natural resources and the environment? What should the international institutions do and not do to facilitate this process?

WALTPS provides elements of answers to these questions, using the above-mentioned conceptual framework which links population dynamics and structural changes in the economy and in society, at a time scale of one generation. This paper is not the place to present the WALTPS’s vision of the distribution of population, economic activity and trade, social change, land use patterns in 2020 and its implications. Let me just say that this 2020 vision assumes a continuation of relatively free intra-regional migration, in accordance with mechanisms similar to those analyzed in the retrospective analysis, but at a pace which will obviously depend on the world and regional macro-economic environment.

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This vision is also based on the option of a recovery of sustained and sustainable regional economic growth (compatible with environmental macro-economic constraints) at the end of the current phase of economic stabilization and structural adjustment. A significant portion of the predicted twofold increase in average per capita income in the region between 1990 and 2020 appears to be the direct consequence of the redistribution of population among countries, between remote areas and growth poles, between the farming and non-farming sectors, and between rural and urban areas. This long term vision of the regional economy highlights the growing role of the internal and regional markets as the main engine of transformation of the agricultural sector.

Recent events show that the region is at the same time able to follow the path described in this 2020 vision (as predicted, the growth rate of the gross regional product is above 5 % ) and extremely vulnerable to risks. Those risks include:

- political instability, especially in immigrations countries and indigenization of large cities (see the case of Nigeria);

- environmental degradation. As long as extensive farming is still possible, it is a rational choice on the part of the farmer, at least economically and in the short term. When scarcity of resources forces farmers to intensify, they still need the incentives, inputs and technical skills to do it and to stabilize or even restore soil fertility.

- vulnerability to external shocks. Africa is a balkanized continent which is less capable to protect itself against the destructive effects of globalization than any other part of the world. Local entrepreneurs are victims of the race for productivity and competitiveness on world markets and for low-price imports of our surpluses (food products, clothes, vehicles, etc…) which detrimentally effect the development of the 1001 minor professions on which the towns of our developed countries have been able to generate employment, income and knowledge. Globalization also forces the local elite to mimic the behavior of their counterpart in rich countries, thus exacerbating inequalities and frustration.

- incapacity of the international community to really understand the implications of the peopling process and to behave accordingly. Part Two of this paper draws the attention of donor agencies to this issue.

PART TWO : A FEW POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Favoring mobility, a key to sustainable development Population mobility is a necessary condition of sustainable development and poverty alleviation in West Africa. Any action that aims to restrain mobility would lead to unmanageable situations.

Preventing conflicts by paying more attention to mega trends in population dynamics The increasing number of local and sub-regional conflicts, such as those we are witnessing in West Africa as well as in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, result in part from our inability to manage the peopling process. Three hundred million people or 10% of the population of developing regions live in conflict zones and thirty million people are refugees. Apart from officially declared conflicts, numerous countries live in conditions of chronic instability for this very same reason.

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Reassessing poverty alleviation strategies In rural areas, it is clear that the best way to achieve rapid and sustained growth in average income per farmer is to encourage (or at least not impede) the division of labor between producers (farmers) and consumers (mainly town dwellers). The transformation of agriculture in response to the needs of the regional market is not occurring at an equal pace in all areas. One response of the rural population to the trend towards greater inequality linked to market access will be, as it has been in the past, geographical mobility. Rural poverty alleviation strategy must include measures that encourage this mobility and provide alternatives to those who feel that they have no future in their present activity or area.

In the peopling countries, one of the functions of cities and towns is to attract the maximum number of people compatible with subsistence in the urban environment. Most of the recent migrants have to face a three times increase in the cost of living in town than where they came from and are counted as poor in household surveys. The proportion of “poor people” in a town is a growing function of that town's growth rate. A town with very few poor people would be a sort of apartheid town, seeking to shelter from migration. So it is not the presence of poor people in town that should cause concern, but the average time taken to assimilate migrants.

Finally, the best way to fight poverty is to address that issue at the level of local, urban-centered areas and to strengthen the capacity of urban and rural dwellers to interact, instead of focusing programs on urban areas and rural areas taken separately.

Overcoming the urban-rural divide National economies should be perceived not only as a set of interacting “sectors” such as agriculture and education, but also as a combination of local urban-centered systems. Unfortunately, most institutions such as the FAO and donor agencies, being organized by sector, are structurally in a poor position to design policies and programs at the scale of these urban-centered areas and to foster urban-rural linkages. Hence the proliferation of agricultural project that totally ignore the urban side of the coin. When such projects are located in the countryside, far from any town, they are likely doomed to failure as explained earlier in the presentation of the maps of “market attractiveness”. Similarly, many urban projects involving the rehabilitation of central markets have not been as successful as initially envisaged for lack of consideration of the linkages between such central markets and the many secondary markets and rural markets of the hinterland. Overcoming this artificial urban-rural divide is an issue that can only be efficiently addressed in the context of the demo-economic and spatial framework presented in this paper.

CONCLUSION: MANAGING THE PEOPLING PROCESS OF THE PLANET IS THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME

This paper focuses on West Africa. Comparable analyses could be undertaken for other peopling regions of the world. Between now and 2050, the world population will increase from six to nine billion individuals, and the urban population will double from three to six billion individuals. Indeed, the prosperity and stability of the world over the present century will depend to a great extent on the way in which we act now to deal with this extraordinary change. There will only be sustainable development if we are able to manage this peopling process and to commit the necessary resources. Governance, institutions, capacity building are important, but not sufficient. The international community must also behave in such a way as to make sure that the

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provision of infrastructure and local purpose public investment follows the needs involved by this transformation of the world population.

Whatever mechanisms for the mobilization of resources are put in place at national or local level, with or without a cost to future generations via borrowing, financial transfers from already developed and populated countries to peopling countries will remain necessary for at least two more decades. Such north-south transfers must be seen as the counterpart of the distortion induced in the global economy by northern countries which impose to the rest of the world the free circulation of all goods, services, information, technology, ideology,.. but at the same time impose a strict control of international migrations.

Is the international community moving towards a more responsible behavior vis-à-vis the peopling countries? The prerequisite is a shift in paradigm, and, for the donor community, a structural adjustment in the true sense of the word.

References Arnaud, M., Bosssard, L. Cour, J.M., Yatta, F.P. [2001], Gérer l’économie localement en Afrique, Manuel

Ecoloc, OCDE et PDM, Paris.

Club du Sahel (ed.) 1998. Preparing for the Future. A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020 Paris, OECD. See also the 14 WALTPS working papers and the national case studies, which are listed in the bibliography attached to that study. Also included is a list of reference documents.

Club du Sahel and Municipal Development Program (1998-2000) : ECOLOC case studies available in French and English and ECOLOC methodological handbook Paris, OECD.

Cour, J.M. [2000], Population dynamics, urban-rural linkages and local development in West Africa :a demo-economic conceptual framework. World Bank, Washington D.C., March 2000.

Cour, J.M. [2003], Sustainable development and poverty reduction strategy revisited: a demo-economic conceptual framework and its application to Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, EEPRI.

Cour, J.M. [2005], Investissements de peuplement, besoins de financement et implications pour la coopération internationale ; in : Techniques financières et développement, Nr 80, Paris.

Mortimore, M.J. 1993b. The Intensification of Peri-Urban Agriculture: the Kano close-settled zone 1964-1986. In Population Growth and Agricultural Change in Africa, ed. B.L II Turner, G Hyden, and R.W Kates. pp356-400. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

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