Political Science 837 Formal Models of International ... · Final Paper 40% Course Schedule: Fall 2015 Month Date Required Reading Item Due September 18 IRT Chapter 1 25 IRT Chapter

Political Science 837Formal Models of International Relations

ITV Version

Andrew H. KyddUniversity of Wisconsin

Department of Political Science

August 27, 2015

Basic Information

Meeting Time Friday, 11:00 am to 1:00 pm Central TimeMeeting Place 227 Pyle Center

My Office 322c North HallMy Phone 608-263-2024My Email [email protected]

Office Hours Tuesday 10:00 am to 12:00 pm or by appointment

Topic

The purpose of this course is to survey applications of game theory to in-ternational relations and further develop students’ game theoretic modelingskills. Students should have some familiarity with both game theory andinternational relations theory. We will cover cooperation, bargaining, theorigins and termination of war, communication, multilateral politics, andthe impact of domestic politics on international relations.

Textbook

The lectures will be based on chapters from my book.

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• Andrew H. Kydd. International Relations Theory: The Game TheoreticApproach. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Hereinafter this will be referred to as IRT.

Requirements

Students will be required to complete a research paper for the course. Thepaper should take a problem of interest to the student and develop a modelof it. A good ideal to strive for is the kind of model paper found in Interna-tional Organization, where the problem is well defined and grounded in theempirical and non-formal literature and the model is relatively simple andused to provide theoretical and substantive insights. The finished result canform the basis for a dissertation chapter or a stand alone article.

Students will turn in two preliminary items and then the final paper.

• First is a research proposal which will include a statement of the topicand question to be addressed, along with a brief literature review. Thiswill eventually become the introduction to the paper.

• Second is the set up of the model. This will include the enumeration ofplayers, description of the game tree or strategy space, utility functionsfor the players and information structure of the game.

• Third is the final paper. This will solve the model and discuss theresults. Length is not crucial, but shoot for 8–10 thousand words.

The proposal and model setup may be resubmitted once after responding tomy comments.

All written material must have a title page resembling that usually foundon an article manuscript to be circulated at a conference. It must haveyour name, university affiliation, course identification, date, and a title thatinforms the reader of both the topic and what stage it is, for instance; PaperProposal, Model Setup or Final Draft. The body must be double spaced withpage numbers and citations using the author date system with a reference listat the back in the APSA style. Papers must be submitted via email, by noonon the date due. The file name must be your last name, followed by a 1 forthe proposal, 2 for the model set up and 3 for the final paper. For instance,

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Smith’s model setup would be smith2.pdf. Use of LaTeX is encouraged butoptional.

In addition there are problems at the end of Chapters 2-11. Each problemset must be turned in in class the week after the material is covered in class.

The grade will be determined as follows.

Grading SchemeProblem Sets 30%Paper Proposal 10%Model Setup 20%Final Paper 40%

Course Schedule: Fall 2015

Month Date Required Reading Item DueSeptember 18 IRT Chapter 1

25 IRT Chapter 2October 2 IRT Chapter 3

9 IRT Chapter 4 Paper Proposal16 IRT Chapter 523 IRT Chapter 630 IRT Chapter 7

November 6 IRT Chapter 8 Model Setup13 IRT Chapter 920 IRT Chapter 10

December 4 IRT Chapter 1111 Final Paper

Further Readings

In addition, for each week I list some readings that are a mixture of earliermaterial that you should have already read or should read now to catchup, and later material on the topic of the week. I strongly recommendthat you read some of this literature each week, but don’t assign specificarticles as required because each of you will have different ones that youhave already read and different interests you want to pursue. After coveringthe lecture material we can discuss the readings if desired. At the end of the

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list of lectures I list additional topics and readings you may be interested inpursuing.

Helpful textbooks on game theory include

• James D. Morrow. Game Theory for Political Scientists. PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, 1994

• Martin J. Osborne. An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford Univer-sity Press, Oxford, 2004

• Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz. Political Game Theory: An In-troduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006

Some other readings may be useful to help familiarize yourself with theapproach and debates surrounding it.

• David A. Lake and Robert Powell, editors. Strategic Choice and Inter-national Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, is anedited volume that contains some good chapters on the basic outlinesof the approach.

• Robert Powell. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1999, is an exemplary application of game theory to inter-national security questions, primarily relating to bargaining and war.

• In 1999 International Security published a forum on game theory insecurity studies.

– Stephen M. Walt. Rigor or rigor mortis? rational choice and se-curity studies. International Security, 23(4):5–48, 1999

– Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow. Sorting throughthe wealth of notions. International Security, 24(2):56–73, 1999

– Lisa L. Martin. The contributions of rational choice: A defense ofpluralism. International Security, 24(2):74–83, 1999

– Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook. Return of the lud-dites. International Security, 24(2):84–96, 1999

– Robert Powell. The modeling enterprise and security studies. In-ternational Security, 24(2):97–106, 1999

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– Frank C. Zagare. All mortis, no rigor. International Security,24(2):107–114, 1999

– Stephen M. Walt. A model disagreement. International Security,24(2):115–130, 1999

These are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Steven E.Miller, and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, editors. Rational Choice and SecurityStudies. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000.

• Around the same time, Pierre Allan and Cedric Dupont criticized theempirical robustness of incomplete information game theory. PierreAllan and Cedric Dupont. International relations theory and gametheory: Baroque modeling choices and empirical robustness. Interna-tional Political Science Review, 20(1):23–47, 1999.

• Ten years earlier, World Politics published a symposium on rationaldeterrence theory.

– Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal. Rational deterrencetheory and comparative case studies. World Politics, 41(2):143–169, 1989.

– Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. Deterrence and foreignpolicy. World Politics, 41(2):170–182, 1989.

– Robert Jervis. Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence. WorldPolitics, 41:183–207, 1989.

– Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein. Rational deterrencetheory: I think, therefore i deter. World Politics, 41:208–224, 1989.

– George W. Downs. The rational deterrence debate. World Politics,41(2):225–237, January 1989.

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Lecture Topics and Additional Readings

Lecture 1 Introduction

• Kydd, IRT, Chapter 1.

Additional Readings

• Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Steven E. Miller, and Sean M.Lynn-Jones, editors. Rational Choice and Security Studies. MITPress, Cambridge, 2000

• James D. Fearon and Alexander Wendt. Rationalism v. construc-tivism: A skeptical view. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, andBeth A. Simmons, editors, Handbook of International Relations.Sage, London, 2002

• David A. Lake. Why “isms” are evil: Theory, epistemology, andacademic sects as impediments to understanding and progress.International Studies Quarterly, 55(2):465–480, 2011

Lecture 2 What States Want

• Kydd, IRT, Chapter 2.

Additional Readings

• Joseph Grieco. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A real-ist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. InternationalOrganization, 42(3):485–507, 1988.

• Robert Powell. Absolute and relative gains in international rela-tions theory. American Political Science Review, 85(4):1303–1320,1991.

• Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green.Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995, Chapter 6(for expected utility theory).

• Jeffry A. Frieden. Actors and preferences in international rela-tions. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell, editors, StrategicChoice and International Relations, pages 39–76. Princeton Uni-versity Press, Princeton, 1999.

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• Robert Powell. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 1999, Chapter 1.

• Barry O’Neill. Risk aversion in international relations theory. In-ternational Studies Quarterly, 45(4):617–640, 2001.

• Matt Rabin and Richard H. Thaler. Anomalies: Risk aversion.Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1):219–232, 2001.

Lecture 3 Varieties of Strategic Settings

• Kydd IRT, Chapter 3.

Additional Readings

• Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing. Conflict among Nations: Bar-gaining, Decisionmaking and System Structure in InternationalCrises. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.

• Robert Jervis. Cooperation under the security dilemma. WorldPolitics, 30(2):167–214, 1978.

• Arthur A. Stein. Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in ananarchic world. International Organization, 36(2):299–324, 1982.

• Duncan Snidal. Coordination versus prisoner’s dilemma: Implica-tions for international cooperation and regimes. American Politi-cal Science Review, 79(4):923–942, 1985.

• Duncan Snidal. Relative gains and the pattern of internationalcooperation. American Political Science Review, 85(3):701–726,1991.

• Lisa L. Martin. Interests, power and multilateralism. InternationalOrganization, 46(4):765–792, 1992.

• Robert Powell. Defending against terrorist attacks with limited re-sources. American Political Science Review, 101(3):527–541, 2007.

• Robert Powell. Allocating defensive resources with private infor-mation about vulnerability. American Political Science Review,101(4):799–809, 2007.

• Andrew H. Kydd. Terrorism and profiling. Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 23(3):458–473, 2011.

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Lecture 4 Bargaining


Additional Readings

• James D. Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. InternationalOrganization, 49(3):379–414, 1995.

• Abhinay Muthoo. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

• Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. Monotone com-parative statics for models of politics. American Journal of Polit-ical Science, 50(1):214–231, 2006.

Lecture 5 Preventive War


Additional Readings

• James D. Fearon. Bargaining over objects that influence futurebargaining power. 1996

• James D. Fearon. Why do some civil wars last so much longerthan others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3):275–301, 2004

• Robert Powell. The inefficient use of power: Costly conflict withcomplete information. American Political Science Review, 98(2):231–241, 2004

• Robert Powell. War as a commitment problem. InternationalOrganization, 60(1):169–203, 2006

• Thomas Chadefaux. Bargaining over power: when do shifts inpower lead to war? International Theory, 3(2):228–253, 2011

• Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe. Arms diffusion and war.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(4):651–674, August 2012

Lecture 6 Private Information and War


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Additional Readings

• Robert Powell. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 1999, Chapter 3

• Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar. Does private informationlead to delay or war in crisis bargaining? International StudiesQuarterly, 52(3):533–553, 2008

• Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay. Mutual optimism and war.American Journal of Political Science, 51(4):738–754, 2007

• Branislav L. Slantchev and Ahmer Tarar. Mutual optimism asa rationalist explanation of war. American Journal of PoliticalScience, 55(1):135–148, 2011

• Scott Wolford, Dan Reiter, and Clifford J. Carrubba. Information,committment and war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(4):556–579, 2011

Lecture 7 Arms Competition and War

• Kydd IRT Chapter 7.

Additional Readings

• Michael D. Intrilligator and Dagobert L. Brito. Can arms raceslead to the outbreak of war? Journal of Conflict Resolution,28(1):63–84, 1984

• Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intrilligator. Conflict, war andredistribution. American Political Science Review, 79(4):943–957,1985

• George W. Downs and David M. Rocke. Tacit Bargaining, ArmsRaces, and Arms Control. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,1990

• Andrew Kydd. Game theory and the spiral model. World Politics,49(3):371–400, 1997


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• Andrew Kydd. Arms races and arms control: Modeling the hawkperspective. American Journal of Political Science, 44(2):222–238,2000

• Branislav L. Slantchev. Military coercion in interstate crises.American Political Science Review, 99(4):533–547, 2005

• Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli. Strategic militariza-tion, deterrence and wars. Quarterly Journal of Political Science,4(4):279–313, 2009

• Adam Meirowitz and Anne E. Sartori. Strategic uncertainty as acause of war. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(4):327–352,2008

• Sandeep Baliga and Thomas Sjostrom. Strategic ambiguity andarms proliferation. Journal of Political Economy, 116(6):1023–1058, 2008

• Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom. Arms races and negotia-tions. Review of Economic Studies, 71(2):351–369, 2004

• Branislav Slantchev. Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion andthe Price of Peace. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011

• Philip Arena and Scott Wolford. Arms, intelligence and war. In-ternaional Studies Quarterly, 56(2):351–365, 2012

Lecture 8 Cooperation Theory


Additional Readings

• Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, NewYork, 1984

• Kenneth A. Oye, editor. Cooperation Under Anarchy. PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986

• Duncan Snidal. International cooperation among relative gainsmaximizers. International Studies Quarterly, 35(4):387–402, 1991

• James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining interethniccooperation. American Political Science Review, 90(4):715–735,1996

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• Curtis S. Signorino. Simulating international cooperation underuncertainty. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(1):152–205, 1996

• Susanne Lohmann. Linkage politics. Journal of Conflict Resolu-tion, 41(1):38–67, 1997

• James D. Fearon. Bargaining, enforcement and international co-operation. International Organization, 52(2):269–305, 1998

• Kenneth A. Schultz. The enforcement problem in coercive bar-gaining: Interstate conflict over rebel support in civil wars. Inter-national Organization, 64(2):281–312, 2010

Lecture 9 Diplomacy and Signaling


Additional Readings

• Keisuke Iida. Analytic uncertainty and international cooperation:Theory and application to international economic policy coordi-nation. International Studies Quarterly, 37(4):431–457, 1993

• James D. Morrow. Modeling the forms of international cooper-ation: Distribution vs. information. International Organization,48(3):387–423, 1994

• James D. Fearon. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying handsvs. sunk costs. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1):68–90,1997

• Andrew Kydd. Trust, reassurance and cooperation. InternationalOrganization, 54(2):325–357, 2000

• Barbara Koremenos. Loosening the ties that bind: A learningmodel of agreement flexibility. International Organization, 55(2):289–325, 2001

• B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner. The optimal design of inter-national trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. InternationalOrganization, 55(4):829–858, 2001

• Barbara Koremenos. Contracting around international uncertainty.American Political Science Review, 99(4):549–565, 2005

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• Andrew H. Kydd. Learning together, growing apart: Global warm-ing, energy policy and international trust. Energy Policy, 38(6):2675–2680, 2010

• Robert F. Trager. Diplomatic calculus in anarchy: How communi-cation matters. The American Political Science Review, 104(2):347–368, 2010

• Branislav Slantchev. Feigning weakness. International Organiza-tion, 64(3):357–388, 2010

• Avidit R. Acharya and Kristopher W. Ramsay. The calculus ofthe security dilemma. 2011

Lecture 10 Multilateral Politics


Additional Readings

• Jack Hirshleifer. From weakest link to best shot: The voluntaryprovision of public goods. Public Choice, 41(3):371–386, 1983.

• Duncan Snidal. The limits of hegemonic stability theory. Inter-national Organization, 39(4):579–614, 1985.

• Robert Pahre. Multilateral cooperation in an iterated prisoner’sdilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2):326–352, 1994.

• Robert Pahre. Leading Questions: How Hegemony affects the In-ternational Political Economy. University of Michigan Press, AnnArbor, 1999.

• George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. Man-aging the evolution of multilateralism. International Organization,52(2):397–419, 1998.

• Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley. Economics of alliances: Thelessons for collective action. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(3):869–896, 2001.

• Michael J. Gilligan. Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in in-ternational multilateral agreements? International Organization,58(3):459–484, 2004.

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• Randall W. Stone, Branislav L. Slantchev, and Tamar R. London.Choosing how to cooperate: A repeated public goods model of in-ternational relations. International Studies Quarterly, 52(2):335–362, 2008.

Lecture 11 Domestic Politics and International Relations


Additional Readings

• Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic oftwo-level games. International Organization, 42(3):427–460, 1988

• Keisuke Iida. When and how do domestic constraints matter? un-certainty in international relations. Journal of Conflict Resolution,37(3):403–426, 1993

• Keisuke Iida. Involuntary defection in two-level games. PublicChoice, 89(3/4):283–303, 1996

• Ahmer Tarar. International bargaining with two-sided domesticconstraints. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3):320–340, 2001

• Ahmer Tarar. Constituencies and preferences in international bar-gaining. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(3):383–407, 2005

• Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. Trust and cooperationthrough agent-specific punishments. International Organization,54(4):809–824, 2000

• Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. The impact of leadershipturnover and domestic institutions on international cooperation.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(5):639–660, 2005

• Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. Credibility in compli-ance and punishment: Leader specific punishments and credibility.Journal of Politics, 68(2):248–258, 2006

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Additional Topics

1. War Termination

• Donald Wittman. How a war ends: A rational model approach.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23(4):743–763, 1979

• Alastair Smith. Fighting battles, winning wars. The Journal ofConflict Resolution, 42(3):301–320, 1998

• R. Harrison Wagner. Bargaining and war. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 44(3):469–484, 2000

• Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner. A bargaining model of warand peace: Anticipating the onset, duration and outcome of war.American Journal of Political Science, 46(4):819–838, 2002

• Branislav L. Slantchev. The power to hurt: Costly conflict withcompletely informed states. American Political Science Review,97(1):123–133, 2003

• Branislav L. Slantchev. The principle of convergence in wartimenegotiations. American Political Science Review, 97(4):621–632,2003

• Robert Powell. Bargaining and learning while fighting. AmericanJournal of Political Science, 48(2):344–361, 2004

• Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner. Bargaining and fighting:The impact of regime type on war onset, duration and outcomes.American Journal of Political Science, 48(2):296–313, 2004

• Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam. Bargaining and the nature ofwar. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6):783–813, 2004

• Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay. The common priors as-sumption: A comment on ”bargaining and the nature of war”.The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4):pp. 607–613, 2006

• Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam. Divergent beliefs in ”bargain-ing and the nature of war”: A reply to fey and ramsay. The Journalof Conflict Resolution, 50(4):pp. 614–618, 2006

• James D. Fearon. Fighting rather than bargaining

2. Alliances and the Balance of Power

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• William H. Riker. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Praeger,1962.

• R. Harrison Wagner. The theory of games and the balance ofpower. World Politics, 38(4):546–576, 1986.

• Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose.The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems. Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

• James D. Morrow. Alliances, credibility, and peace time costs.Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2):270–297, 1994.

• Alastair Smith. Alliance formation and war. International StudiesQuarterly, 39(4):405–426, 1995.


• Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantine Sonin. Coali-tion formation in non-democracies. Review of Economic Studies,75(4):987–1009, 2008.

3. Democracy and War

• George W. Downs and David M. Rocke. Conflict, agency, andgambling for resurrection: The principal-agent problem goes towar. American Journal of Political Science, 38(2):362–80, 1994.

• Alastair Smith. Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems.International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 1996.

• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siver-son, and Alastair Smith. An institutional explanation of the demo-cratic peace. American Political Science Review, 93(4):791–807,1999.

• Kenneth A. Schultz. Do democratic institutions constrain or in-form? contrasting institutional perspectives on democracy andwar. International Organization, 53(2):233–266, 1999.

• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson,and James D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press,Cambridge, 2003.

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• Kenneth A. Schultz. The politics of risking peace: Do hawksor doves deliver the olive branch? International Organization,59(1):1–38, 2005.

• Ahmer Tarar. Diversionary incentives and the bargaining ap-proach to war. International Studies Quarterly, 50(1):169–188,2006.

4. Audience Costs

• James D. Fearon. Domestic political audiences and the escala-tion of international disputes. American Political Science Review,88(3):577–592, 1994.

• Alastair Smith. International crises and domestic politics. Amer-ican Political Science Review, 92(3):623–639, 1998.

• Kenneth A. Schultz. Domestic opposition and signaling in inter-national relations. American Political Science Review, 92(4):829–844, 1998.

• Kenneth A. Schultz. Looking for audience costs. Journal of Con-flict Resolution, 45(1):32–60, 2001.

• Kristopher W. Ramsay. Politics at the water’s edge: Crisis bar-gaining and electoral competition. Journal of Conflict Resolution,48(4):459–486, 2004.

• Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar. Prenegotiation public com-mitment in domestic and international bargaining. American Po-litical Science Review, 99(3):419–433, 2005.

• Branislav L. Slantchev. Politicians, the media, and domestic audi-ence costs. International Studies Quarterly, 50(2):445–477, 2006.

• Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoglu. Public commitment in crisisbargaining. International Studies Quarterly, 53(3):817–839, 2009.

5. Mediation and Intervention

• Andrew Kydd. Which side are you on? bias, credibility and medi-ation. American Journal of Political Science, 47(4):597–611, 2003.

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• Alastair Smith and Alan Stam. Mediation and peacekeeping ina random walk model of civil and interstate war. InternationalStudies Review, 5(4):115–135, 2003.

• Robert W. Rauchhaus. Asymmetric information, mediation andconflict management. World Politics, 58(2):207–241, 2006.

• .

• Katja Favretto. Should peacemakers take sides? major power me-diation, coercion and bias. American Political Science Review,103(2):248–263, 2009.

• Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay. When is shuttle diplo-macy worth the commute? information sharing through media-tion. World Politics, 62(4):529–560, 2010.

• Arman Grigoryan. Third party intervention and the escalation ofstate-minority conflicts. International Studies Quarterly, 54(4):1143–1174, 2010.

6. Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models

• Alastair Smith. A summary of political selection: The effect ofstrategic choice on the escalation of international crises. AmericanJournal of Political Science, 42(2):698–701, 1998.

• Alastair Smith. Testing theories of strategic choice: The exam-ple of crisis escalation. American Journal of Political Science,43(4):1254–1283, 1999.

• Curtis S. Signorino. Strategic interaction and the statistical anal-ysis of international conflict. American Political Science Review,93(2):279–297, 1999.

• Curtis S. Signorino. Structure and uncertainty in discrete choicemodels. Political Analysis, 11:316–344, 2003.

• Jeffrey B. Lewis and Kenneth A. Schultz. Revealing preferences:Empirical estimation of a crisis bargaining game with incompleteinformation. Political Analysis, 11(4):345–367, 2003.

• Curtis S. Signorino and Ahmer Tarar. A unified theory and testof extended immediate deterrence. American Journal of PoliticalScience, 50(3):586–605, 2006.

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• Muhammet Ali Bas, Curtis S. Signorino, and Robert W. Walker.Statistical backwards induction: A simple method for estimatingrecursive strategic models. Political Analysis, 16(1):21–40, 2008.

7. Reputation

• David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson. Reputation and imperfectinformation. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):253–279, 1982.

• Anne E. Sartori. The might of the pen: A reputational theory ofcommunication in international disputes. International Organiza-tion, 56(1):121–149, 2002.

• Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith. Honest threats: Theinteraction of reputation and political insitutions in internationalcrises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(2):175–200, 2002.

8. International Institutions

• Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. Therational design of international institutions. International Orga-nization, 55(4):761–800, 2001.

• Andrew Kydd. Trust building, trust breaking: The dilemma ofnato enlargement. International Organization, 55(4):801–828, 2001.

• Erik Voeten. Outside options and the logic of security councilaction. American Political Science Review, 95(4):845–858, 2001.

• Avner Greif and David D. Laitin. A theory of endogenous institu-tional change. The American Political Science Review, 98(4):633–652, 2004.

• Andrew H. Kydd. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005, Chapter 5.

• Terrence L. Chapman. International security institutions, domes-tic politics, and institutional legitimacy. Journal of Conflict Res-olution, 31(1):134–166, 2007.

• Fey, Jo and Kenkel Critique of Chapman 07.

• Songying Fang. The informational role of international institu-tions and domestic politics. American Journal of Political Science,52(2):pp. 304–321, 2008.

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• Songying Fang. The strategic use of international institutions indispute settlement. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5:107–131, 2010.

• Terrence L. Chapman and Scott Wolford. International organi-zations, strategy and crisis bargaining. The Journal of Politics,72(1):227–242, 2010/11.

• Michael J. Gilligan and Leslie Johns. Formal models of interna-tional institutions. Annual Review of Political Science, 15:221–243, 2012

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References

[1] Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantine Sonin. Coalitionformation in non-democracies. Review of Economic Studies, 75(4):987–1009, 2008.

[2] Avidit R. Acharya and Kristopher W. Ramsay. The calculus of thesecurity dilemma. 2011.

[3] Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal. Rational deterrence theoryand comparative case studies. World Politics, 41(2):143–169, 1989.

[4] Pierre Allan and Cedric Dupont. International relations theory andgame theory: Baroque modeling choices and empirical robustness. In-ternational Political Science Review, 20(1):23–47, 1999.

[5] Philip Arena and Scott Wolford. Arms, intelligence and war. Inter-naional Studies Quarterly, 56(2):351–365, 2012.

[6] Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. Monotone comparativestatics for models of politics. American Journal of Political Science,50(1):214–231, 2006.

[7] Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, NewYork, 1984.

[8] Sandeep Baliga and Thomas Sjostrom. Strategic ambiguity and armsproliferation. Journal of Political Economy, 116(6):1023–1058, 2008.

[9] Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom. Arms races and negotiations.Review of Economic Studies, 71(2):351–369, 2004.

[10] Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe. Arms diffusion and war. Jour-nal of Conflict Resolution, 56(4):651–674, August 2012.

[11] Muhammet Ali Bas, Curtis S. Signorino, and Robert W. Walker. Sta-tistical backwards induction: A simple method for estimating recursivestrategic models. Political Analysis, 16(1):21–40, 2008.

[12] Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intrilligator. Conflict, war and re-distribution. American Political Science Review, 79(4):943–957, 1985.

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[13] Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Steven E. Miller, and Sean M.Lynn-Jones, editors. Rational Choice and Security Studies. MIT Press,Cambridge, 2000.

[14] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson,and Alastair Smith. An institutional explanation of the democraticpeace. American Political Science Review, 93(4):791–807, 1999.

[15] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, andJames D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press, Cam-bridge, 2003.

[16] Thomas Chadefaux. Bargaining over power: when do shifts in powerlead to war? International Theory, 3(2):228–253, 2011.

[17] Terrence L. Chapman. International security institutions, domesticpolitics, and institutional legitimacy. Journal of Conflict Resolution,31(1):134–166, 2007.

[18] Terrence L. Chapman and Scott Wolford. International organizations,strategy and crisis bargaining. The Journal of Politics, 72(1):227–242,2010/11.

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Political Science 837 Formal Models of International ... · Final Paper 40% Course Schedule: Fall 2015 Month Date Required Reading Item Due September 18 IRT Chapter 1 25 IRT Chapter