Political Linkage and Political Space -In Era of Decolonization

7/24/2019 Political Linkage and Political Space -In Era of Decolonization

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Introduction: Political Linkage and Political Space in the Era of DecolonizationAuthor(s): Nic CheesemanReviewed work(s):Source: Africa Today, Vol. 53, No. 2, Creating the Kenya Post-Colony (Winter, 2006), pp. 3-24Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187770.

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Introduction:

Political

Linkage

and Political

Space

in the Era

of

Decolonization

Nic

Cheeseman

The

continuing

importance of Kenya's

institutional colonial

inheritance has been underestimated because the impact of

decolonization on

Kenya's

formal political

institutions

has

rarely

been systematically

addressed.

Consequently,

there

is

a

pressing

need

to

reevaluate the structure

of government

in

the colonial and postcolonial

periods

in

a manner that takes

a critical

perspective

on the domestic

relationship

between

government

and

opposition.

In

addition to

introducing

the

papers that

follow,

this

essay

examines the

factors

that under-

pin the continued

supremacy of

the

executive-administrative

axis

in

the

Kenya postcolony. It develops the twin concepts

of political

linkage

and

political space

as

tools to describe

the

political

landscape of

the

colonial and

postcolonial eras.

Institutional

factors,

it

is

argued, must be

central to any

attempt

to

explain

the

longevity

and eventual

breakdown

of

KANU

rule.

Introduction

The

extent to which

Africa's colonial

past

has

influenced its

postcolonial

present

has

long generated debate

among students

of

African history and

politics.

Chabal

and

Daloz,

for

example, have

warned

against the ten-

dency

to

overestimate the

impact

of

colonialism on

the

formation

of

the

contemporary

African state

(1999:11).

Against

this, others, most

notably

Mamdani in

Citizen

and

Subject (1996),

have sought to

accord the

colonial

state

a

central role in

explaining

developments since

independence. Others

still

have

doubted the

oft-implied contrast

between

a rational and

stable

colonial

system

and an

irrational

and

unstable postcolonial

era.' Question-

ing

the value of

such a

distinction, Ranger

concludes that colonial

Africa

was

much more

like

post-colonial

Africa

than most of us

have

hitherto

imagined.

And its

dynamics

have

continued

to

shape

post-colonial

society

(Ranger

1996:280).


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Creating

the

Kenya

Post-Colony,

a conference held at Oxford

on

18

and

19 April 2005, addressed

Ranger's

concerns

by

re-evaluating

the

significance

of

Kenya's

colonial

past

for its

postcolonial

state formation

and

development.2

The common

theme that

emerged

in conference

discussions

was the

importance

of

the

continuities

that

bridge

the

colonial/postcolonial

divide.3The papers presented at the conference, five of which are included

in

this special

issue,

were

underpinned

by

a

common

emphasis

on how

not to think about decolonization. This consensus is founded

upon

two

central

points

of

agreement.

First,

the achievement of

independence

was

not so

uniform, neat,

and unidirectional a

process

as the term

decoloniza-

tion

might

be taken

to

imply.

Consequently,

those

presenting

were aware

of the need to avoid a

conceptualization

of

decolonization that sanitizes

struggle,

eliminates contradictions and

smuggles

a

plan

into

Kenya'spoliti-

cal history (Atieno-Odhiambo

1995:26).History

rarely proceeds

in

straight

lines. Second, conference delegates agreedon the importance of resisting

an

understanding

of

decolonization

that focuses

solely

on the

question

of

national

sovereignty.

On

this

interpretation,

decolonization is

concerned

not simply with one specific freedom

(usuallyunderstood in this

context as

self-determination),

but with a

range

of

overlapping

and

sometimes

compet-

ing

freedoms,

incorporatingpolitical, economic,

cultural,

and

psychological

dimensions.4

The

contributors

to this

issue,

sharing

a

common

belief that

Kenya's

colonial

past

is

ripe

for

re-examination,

consciously focus

on

how

indepen-

dence has affected the political dimension of freedom. In part, this focus is

inspired by the

continuing political

salience of Kenya'scolonial

experience,

most

notably

in

the recent

controversy surrounding the

constitutional

review

process.

In

December

2002,

the National

Rainbow Coalition

(NARC)

defeated the

incumbent

Kenya African

National Union

(KANU),

promising

comprehensive

political

and

economic

reforms,

including

the

completion of

the

constitutional review

process. NARC's commitment to

revise Kenya's

constitution

highlighted

the

popular

llegitimacy

of a

political system rooted

in the

structure of

government

established under

colonial rule. Despite

NARC's election promise, the draft constitution finally approvedby par-

liament failed to reduce

the powers of

the president, reflecting

President

Kibaki's desire

to maintain

Kenya's

top heavy

structure of

government

ahead

of

general

elections

scheduled

for December

2007.

Disagreement

over the

proposed

constitution

split an

alreadyfractious NARC

coalition.

In the

referendumon the draft

constitution held in

November 2005, cabinet

members

openly

campaigned against

one

another.

Ultimately,

the

no

campaignemerged

victorious,

with 58

percent of those voting

rejecting the

new constitution.

The

proposedconstitution's

defeatleaves in place

Kenya's

top-heavy political system, and ensures that the legitimacy of these

institutions will

continue to be

debated.

That

neither the

transition to

multiparty politics, nor the

transfer of

power

from

KANU

to

NARC,

has

brought

about an

effective

decentralization

of

power

is

not

surprising.

The

survival of a

political structure in

which a

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4/23

powerful executive rules

through

a

highly

centralized

system

of

administra-

tion has been

the

defining

feature

of

all four of

Kenya'spolitical

transitions

in

the

last sixty years.5

t

is this

axis of

power

that

represents

Kenya's

most

striking

and

potent

postcolonial

continuity.

The

strength

of this axis is

the

most distinctive feature of the

Kenyan

state,

understood here to

be thehis-

torically conditioned set of institutions ... which, more or less adequately,

secures the social conditions for the

reproduction

of the dominant mode

of

production,

in

this case capitalism

(Lonsdale

and Berman

1979:489).

The

outcome of the constitutional review

process

highlights

the dura-

bility of the

bureaucratic-executive

ystem

of

rule

(Branch

nd

Cheeseman

2006), and suggests that it

is

the

continuity

in the centralized

institutions

of

government

that accounts for

political

stability

in

Kenya.

Scholars

have

not

recognized

the

importance

of

the

Kenyan

state in

explaining political

outcomes,

even

though

all successive

Kenyanpresidents

have

recognized

the

indispensability of the political structurethey have inherited. Assessments

of the

impact

of decolonization on

Kenya's

formal

political

institutions

are

rare.

Ghai and McAuslan

helpfully document

Kenya's

egal

inheritance

(Ghai

1972; Ghai and McAuslan

1970),

but like

Okoth-Ogendo

(1972), they

do

not

develop

the

all-important

connection between the

theoretical

continuity

in

colonial

legal

and

political

institutions

and the decisions

made

by postcolo-

nial

political

actors.

In

contrast,

this connection is made

by

Gertzel's seminal

study

(1970)

of continuities in the

legislative

and

electoral

process,

and in

Bienen's

analysis (1977)of the basis of

Kenyatta'sadministrative

and

politi-

cal control. These studies are well complemented by Bourmaud'sanalysis

(1988)

of

continuities

in

administrative

power

and

Mueller's account

(1984)

of how

KANU defeated the

challenge

of the

Kenya

People's Union. Taken

together,

this

body

of work makes a

powerful

case

for

a

methodological

focus

that

prioritizes the role

of formal

political

institutions and,

consequently,

Kenya'spostcolonial institutional

inheritance.

Despite

its

strengths, the early

literature does not

theorize

about

the

nature of

Kenya's

colonial

legacy,

nor does it

assess the

ways

in

which

Kenya's institutional inheritance

is

self-perpetuating.

Unfortunately, there

have been few attempts to build on the structuralcomponents of the work

of

Bienen,

Bourmaud,

and

Gertzel. Much

research

that seeks to

explain the

roots of

political

stability

in

Kenya

(e.g.,

Tamarkin 1978;Murunga

2004)

is

not

concerned with

tracing political phenomena

back to

the colonial

period.

In

contrast, research that has

viewed Kenyan politics

in the

long

duree

has

tended to

ignore the

significance of formal

institutions and their

influence on the

political

landscape.6Analysis has

tended to focus on

the

role of

ethnicity

in

conditioning political

allegiances. BothMutiso

(1975)

and

Atieno-Odhiambo

(1995)have

documented the

impact of the Mau Mau

rebel-

lion and the promotion of a loyalist elite, who gainedpreferential access to

economic

opportunities

and

political positions.

Similarly,Anyang'

Nyong'o

(1989),

Kyle (1999),

and

Throup (1987a, 1987b)

have

highlighted the role of

personal

loyalty

and

ethnicity

in

forming the

coalitions that

contested the

Kenyatta

succession in

the

late 1970s.7

As a result,

the role of the state

in

p;

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explaining

political outcomes

in

Kenya,

including

the

salience

of

ethnicity,

has

been

marginalized.

Similarly,

as

Orvis

argues

in

the

conclusion to

this

edition,

the literature on

neo-patrimonialism

has

tended to

underestimate

the

importance of formal

political

institutions,

instead

focusing

on the

role

of

informal

institutions

and the

extent to

which the

state is

captured

by certain sections of society (2006). Where the question of the changing

nature of

the state is

directly

addressed,

as

in

Ogot

and

Ochieng

(1995),

Oyugi

(1994),

and

Widner

(1992),

there

has been

little

attempt

to

provide

a

conceptual framework to

enable

systematic

colonial-postcolonial

compari-

sons. While

the state is

seen

as a central

factor in

shaping

African

politics

under

colonial

rule,

it

rarelyreceives the

same

attention in

discussions

of

the

postcolonial era.

Only

the

dependencyand

underdevelopment

iteratures that came

out

of the

Kenya

debate n

the

1970s

and

1980s

attempted

to

provide

a

system-

atic frameworkthrough which to understandthe institutional continuities

and

changes since

independence.

This

body

of

work

focused

on the

meaning

of

uhuru

(independence)

or

economic

self-determination,

and

consequently

overlooked the

importance of

domestic

political

institutions.

Within

the

Kenyadebate of

the

1970s and

1980s,

African

states

were

seen as

being

locked into

structures of

exploitation and

development

by

the

international

system:

the

focus

was on

the

constraints

on

Kenyan

agency.

Through

the

work

of

Kitching

(1980),

Leys

(1975),

and

others,

the

immediate

postinde-

pendence

period

came to

be

characterized as

an

era of

neocolonialism,

in which the dominant theme was understoodto be economic, rather than

political,

continuities. All

too

often,

underdevelopment

and

dependency

theorists

depicted African

peoples as

objects

of

outside

manipulation,

and

consequently overlooked

the extent

to

which

Kenyan eaders

had

molded

the

institutions

they had

inherited

(Bayart

1993:3).

The

conflation of

economic

and

political

self-determination

resulted in

a

systematic

underestimation

of the

importance of

domestic

political

institutions

and the

ability of Afri-

can

actors to

engagewith

existing

structures of

domestic

and

international

power.8

This

tendency spread

beyond

the

confines of

the

Kenya

debate, n

partbecause of the influence that this debate,andLeysin particular,exerted

over

the

style

and

focus of

Kenyan

scholarship. To

this

day,

Kenyan

scholar-

ship

remains

influenced

by the

legacy

of

the

Kenya

debate, and

has

yet to

compensate

fully

for

its

shortcomings.

This

issue

is a

first

step toward

remedying

the gap

left

by this

lit-

erature.

More

specifically,

there

is a

need

to

systematically

reevaluate

the

formal

institutions

of

the

colonial

and

postcolonial

period,

since

these

structures

have

shaped

the

ideas

and

actions of

political

actors

since inde-

pendence.

In

seeking

to

perform

this

task, the

papers

presented

here

explore

the relationship between government and opposition. Put most simply,

they speak to

the

politics

of

inclusion

and

exclusion.

Within

the

focus on

postcolonial

continuities,

they

adopt

two main

methodological

approaches.

The

first

endorses

Ranger's

concern

that

the

colonial

period

should not

be

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6/23

unquestioningly privileged by

seeking

a balanced

comparison

of the

two

eras. Matt Carotenuto's work on the

relationship

between the Luo

Union,

its

members,

and the

state

employs

this

approach.

By tracing

the

sixty-

year

existence of the Luo

Union,

Carotenuto shows how the

organization

attempted to establish and

maintain a

space

within

which its members

could interact and unite. While its more cultural focus made it accept-

able to the

regime during

colonial

times,

after

independence, ethnically

based

organizations

increasingly began

to be

seen

as

being

in

direct

conflict

with the

nation-buildingprocess

(Carotenuto

2006:

pg. 54). By

comparing

the

relationship

between the Luo

Union

and the state in the two

periods,

Carotenuto

demonstrates the

continuing

tension between the

state and

competing

sources of

power.

In

doing

so,

he

makes the

important

point

that

the

impact

of

independence

on African

associational life was

complex,

and

in

many

cases

did

not

empower

African

political

actors.

The second approachunderpinningthese papersseeks to demonstrate

that

many of the roots of

postcolonial

discourses

and

structures lie

in

the

colonial

period.

Marie-Emmanuelle

Pommerolle's

analysis

of

the relation-

ship between Mau Mau and

contemporaryhuman-rights

defenders

adopts

this stance.

By

showing

how

contemporaryhuman-rights

defenders

appropri-

ate and utilize Mau

Mau

imagery,

Pommerolle

addresses the

contemporary

relevance of

symbols and ideas cultivated

duringthe colonial era.

She shows

that

by adopting

Mau Mau

symbolism, human-rights defenders have

been

able

to

impose

their cause and

to

keep

alive

social and

political demands

regarding wealth and accountability in the national community (2006:

pg.

76).

Her

paper

is

significant,

as it reveals

both the

contested nature of

memory

and the

ability

of

postcolonial actors to

imagine

and

reimagine

Kenya'spast

as a

strategy

for

political mobilization.

Another

study that

adopts

this

approach s Daniel

Branch'sanalysis of

African

electoral

politics

(2006).

Branch

argues

that

the colonial

government

effectively

manipulated

elections

in

Central

Province in

1957 and

1958 to

ensure the

promotion

of an

African elite

sympathetic

to British

interests.

Through

an

analysis

of

these

elections, he demonstrates

how Kenya's

ound-

ing fathers learnedthe lesson of the triumph of the system. His argument

provides

an

insight

into

the extent

to which

colonial

forces deliberately

influenced the transition

from

colonial rule to suit their

own needs;

how-

ever,

the real

value

of

his work

is that it

illuminates how

an African elite

that

would

bend

Kenya's inherited

political

institutions to its own

needs

was

produced.

Taken

together,

these papers

bring a broadrange of

perspectives

to bear

on a

common

theme. This

introduction

and the

essays by Branchand

Orvis

focus on

the

significance

of

institutions

in

shaping the options

available to

Kenyanpolitical actors. The two remainingessays, by Carotenuto andPom-

merolle,

reverse this

viewpoint

to

look at how different

groups-explicitly

political

and

otherwise-have

responded to

this process.

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Conceptualizing

Government and

Opposition

in

Kenya

In evaluating

interactions

among individuals,

organizations,

and the

state,

all

four papersraise questions concerning

the

availability

of

political space.

Often used

but

rarely defined,

the

concept

of

political space

here refers to

the arenas within which political actors engage in political activities in

the absence

of coercive

pressure.9

As

Haugerud

argues, political space may

exist

in

various arenas, ranging

from formal

political parties

and national

assemblies

to informal

spaces,

such as

public meeting places

and theaters

(Haugerud 1995:28-33).

Of

course,

the

degree

of coercion

and hence the

availability

of

political space

are not

all-or-nothing concepts,

and need to be

thought

of as a continuum. This continuum

involves two dimensions: the

number

of arenas that

support political space,

and the

quality

of

political

space

within

any given

arena. Both are needed to accommodate

regimes

that

allow a small sphereof uncensoredactivity andregimes that tolerate many

spheres

of

heavily regulated political activity.

Defining political space

in

relation to the absence of

coercion binds the

concept

of

political space

to the

capacity

of the

state,

and

hence

to the nature and effectiveness of the struc-

tures

through

which

the

state is

reproduced.10

t

suggests

that

the

concept

of

political space

is

inherently

related

to the

concept

of

political linkage,

where

political linkage

is understood to refer to those institutions that connect the

population

to

the

government.

The

term institution is here taken to refer

to sets of

rules, norms,

or standards that

regulate

political

action. On this

interpretation, elections, bureaucracies,and patronagenetworks all count

as institutions.

Political

space

is both made

possible

and

constrained

by

the structure

of

political linkage,

which

may

be

providedby both formal

(the

electoral

system,

the

administration)

and informal

(patron-client

networks)

institu-

tions. In the

Kenyan

case it is formal

institutions that have

played

a

leading

role

in

shapingpolitical space.

To understandwhen and how

Kenyansexpress

dissent,

we

need to understandhow the structure of

political linkage shapes

the available

political space; however,

the need to

bring

he state

back

in

does not mean that an institutional focus should be used in isolation. IMore

cultural

approaches

are

useful when

dealing

with

authoritarian states in

which much

political activity

occurs

underground. The authoritarian en-

dencies of the

Moi

regime

forced

Kenyans

to carve out

their own democratic

spaces

in

bars,

matatu

taxis,

and

funerals

(Haugerud

1995:81-99).

In

this

context, critiques

of the

government

tend to become

articulated in the form

of

commonly

understood

metaphors

and

symbols,

the inherent

ambiguity

of such

mediums

providing

some

protection for the performer rom state

censorship; however,

while

recognizing the value of a cultural

approach n

illuminating these phenomena, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that

such

underground

criticism is a direct

response to the state's

coercive

capacity.

It is

only

when discussions

concerningpolitical space are located in

the

context of the

structure of the state that the

dynamic interactions among

structure, culture,

and

agency can be revealed. In

connecting the actions

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8/23

of individuals and

groups

to the

ongoing

tension between

government

and

opposition,

the contributions

of

Pommerolle

and Carotenuto in this

issue

speak to the dialectic between

structure and culture. This

relationship

suggests

that our

understanding

of the

dynamics

of

Kenyan politics

will

be

greater the

more institutional and cultural

approaches

nteract.

It is not just Kenya'soverarchingpolitical structure that merits greater

attention: the

organization

of individual institutions

shapes

the

type

of

linkage they

provide,

and hence

determines the

impact

of the institution on

political space.

We therefore

need to reevaluate

political

institutions

from

both a macro and a micro

perspective.

A

typology

of

different modes of

linkage

differentiated

by

the

mediating

institution is

suggested

in

Figure

1.12

(The typology is not intended to be

exhaustive,

and the

types

detailed are not

exclusive.)

More hierarchical

organizations,

such as bureaucraciesand

police

forces,

increase

the

control

of those at the

top

over the

activities

of

those at

the bottom, hence limiting possibilities for feedback and interaction. Con-

versely,

more

egalitarian

nstitutions,

such as

political parties,

trade

unions,

and electoral

mechanisms,

allow

greater space

for creative

activity

and

so

tend to offer

greater

possibilities

for

dialogue

and

interaction.'3

Of

course,

terms such as

bureaucracy

and

party help

in the

understanding

of the nature

of

political linkage only

to the extent that

they

conform to hierarchical or

egalitarian organizationaltypes

(Douglas

1986;

Hood

1998);

however,

these

labels represent

a shorthand

through

which to

map

out

the broad structure

of

political space.

Participatoryandrepresentative inkage is essential to citizens' ability

to

operate

within the formal

institutions of the

political

system. Bycontrast,

the

strength

of

coercive linkage determines the

authoritariancapacity of

the state and hence the

ability

of the state to

regulate

political space. Con-

sequently,

the combination of

coercive and

interactive linkage

structures

provides

the

context for the

quantity

and

quality of

political space

available

in

any given

system. It also helps us

understandpolitical stability.

As Orvis

argues

(following Joel Migdal), political institutions are

unlikely to endure

if

they

lack

meaning. While

a

range of factors may influence the

degree to

which a population finds meaning in an institution, the extent to which

citizens feel

they

can

participatein

the political

system is surely one of the

most

important. As

demonstrated by Orvis, the longevity of

KANU rule

was

underpinned

by

the

ability to combine an

effective structureof coercive

linkage that

allowed for the

extension of central control with

structures of

interactive

linkage that offeredinclusion and

meaning

(2006).

The

Evolution of Political

Linkage

Using

the

concept

of

political

linkage

as a

lens offers a new

perspective on

the

continuing

influence of Kenya's colonial

past. By tracing the

possibili-

ties

for

interactive

linkage through political

parties and

elections, and the

strength

of

coercive

linkage

through the administration, the

analysis that

0

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Figure 1

Types of

Political

Linkage

Interactive

linkage

Examples

Unidirectional

Examples

linkage

Participatory

inkage

Political

Coercive

Police,

Linkage

hrough

parties,

linkage

Army,

Linkage

through

Admes

Poincistatio

organizations that enable

interest

Linkage

Provincial

citizens to coordinate

groups

through

political

activity

directive

institutions,

used to

maintain

control

Representative Elections,

linkage

referenda,

Linkage

through

media

institutions that

publicize

citizens'

policy

preferences

Reciprocal

linkage Patron-client

Citizens'

support

is

networks

exchangedfor favors,

potentially

integrating

them into the

political

system

follows

seeks to

explore

the

structural

context of

political

space

in

the

colo-

nial and

postcolonial

periods.

In

doing

so,

it will

lay

the

foundation for the

more

detailed

analysis

found in

the

papersthat follow.

The distinctive feature of political linkage in Kenya has been the

government's reliance on

coercive

linkage

through

the

provincial admin-

istration,

since

the local

structures of

ruling parties have been

weak. In

the

immediate

postindependence

period,

the

desire to

maintain

political

stability

and the

absence of

effective

party structures

persuaded

President

Kenyatta and his

clique

within

the

Kenya African

National

Union

(KANU)

government

to

replicate

the

broad

pattern

of colonial

rule.

Consequently,

linkage

in

the

independence

era

tended to

replicate

the

predominantly

coer-

cive structures

of the

colonial

period. This

had two main

consequences for

political space. First, the political space available within the institutions

that

provided

political

participation

and were

recognized

by

the

state,

most

notably

the

party system

and the

electoral

system, was

progressively

closed

off.

Second,

the

ability

of

individuals

and

groups

to

engage

in

political acts

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outside of

officially

sanctioned arenas was

severely

constrained. This

con-

straint forced cultural

groups,

such as the Luo

Union,

to continue

their

emphasis on

nonpolitical

activities,

and

dissenting political

groups,

such

as the

mysterious

Mwakenya,

to

operate

underground.

KANU's

longevity

was a function of the

regime's

ability

to

regulate

political space without, in the short to medium term, totally undermining

the

meaning associated

with

Kenya's

participatory

and

representative

linkage

structures. To maintain the

legitimacy

of

Kenya's

formal

political

institutions,

Kenyatta,

and later

Moi,

fused

them with a

system

of

patron-

client relations and harambee

cooperative

development

projects.

In

many

areas, elections became referenda on local leaders'

ability

to

bring

central

funds,

sourced from the

executive,

to the

locality.

The result was that

while

Kenya'selectoral and

party system

offeredno

chance

to

effect real

change

at

the national

level,

the

Kenyan

electorate continued

to be able to

participate

in the selection of the community patron. As a result, legislative elec-

tions

in

Kenyaremained

more

significant

(and

controversial)

han

one-party

elections

in

nearby

Zambia and Tanzania.

In

merginginherited formal

political institutions with

informal struc-

tures,

the

KANU

executive

fostered a state in which

strong

coercive

linkage

could coexist with more

participatory

and

popular

linkage structures. The

colonial state was not

only

maintained: it was

improved

upon.

The

impact

of

independence

was

varied.

The

white

settlers lost their

privileged

access

to

the colonial

government,

but

they remained

influential. By

contrast,

the wealthy Kiambuelite, who formed a core component of Kenyatta's

support,

rose to a

dominant

position

after

independence.

Others,

including

the Luo

Union and ex-Mau

Mau

fighters,

continued

to

experience a tense

relationship

with

the state.

Decolonization

thus failed

to bring

about a

revolution

in

the

structure of the

state,

and it had a

complex impact on the

availability

of

political

space.

Political

Space and Political

Linkage

underColonial

Rule

For Africans until the very end, colonial rule allowed only for coercive

forms of

political

linkage, maintained

through the

hierarchical

organization

of

the

provincial

administration. The

administration divided

Kenya into

eight

provinces,

each with

its own

provincial

commissioner, appointed by

the

governor. Each

province

was broken down

into a number of

districts,

presided over

by

a

district

commissioner.

Indispensable to

the work of the

provincial

commissioners was

a layer of

appointed

chiefs, who

formed the

final

link in

the

chain.

Although

ultimate

authorityresided

with the

colonial

secretary,

t

was the

governor,

acting through the

provincial

administration,

who ruled. The importance of the administration lay in its institutional

capacity

and

the

scope

of its

responsibilities, which

included

three major

functions:

control, co-ordination

andmobilization

of the

public fordevelop-

ment

(Gertzel

1970:25).

Significantly, t

was the

administration,andnot the

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11/23

police, that was

ultimately

responsible

for law

and order.This

position

was

entrenched

during

the

state of

emergency,

when the number of

administra-

tive

officer

posts increased from 184 to

370,

and

as

a

result[,]

the

adminis-

trative network was able to effect much

closer control

(Gertzel

1970:26).

In contrast to

much of the

African experience of colonial

rule,

the

scope

of

the provincial administration in Kenyagave the colonial government great

coercive

capacity

in rural and urban

areas

(Branch

and

Cheeseman

2006;

Mueller

1984).

By 1963,

Kenya's

administration

was

approximately

one-third

larger

than

Tanganyika's,

hough Tanganyika

had a much

larger

population

(Bienen

1977:30).

The administration

was

by

far the most

importantlinkage

mechanism

of

the colonial

era,

but its

hierarchical structure

prevented

wider

participa-

tion and

offeredonly narrowavenues for

feedback.

Despite this,

the

extent to

which the

administration

penetrated

African

society,

and the

ability

of

some

administrative officers to make local policy as they saw fit (Asquith 1961),

meant that it could have acted

as

a

conduit for African

grievances;

however,

the colonial

government's desire to

suppress

African

political

organization

prevented

the

development of

a

more

inclusive administration.

Instead,

the

ability

to make local

policy

was

mostly used to entrench

administrative

control.

Closer

control,

in

turn,

was used to

limit African

political

space.

The most

prominent African

political

associations, most

notably

the

Kikuyu

Central Association and

later the

Kenya

African

Union,

suffered

frequent

restrictions on

their

activities,

including

the

exile of

prominent leaders,

restrictions on their ability to collect funds, and refusals to grant licenses

for

public

meetings.14

In

the

early period

of colonial

rule,

the

administration's

strengtheffec-

tively

crowded

out

any

form of

participatory

linkage

that African

political

parties

could have offered. In

part,

the

impetus

to

regulatepolitical

space

so

tightly

came from

Kenya's

white

settlers,

who

made the

first

breakthrough

n

creating

new

arenas of

political space,

and

subsequently

set about

defending

their

right

to

access these

arenas

exclusively.

In

1907,

they persuaded

the

colonial

government to

establish a

legislative council

that

included three

nominated unofficial Europeans,paving the way for more substantial

structures of

representative

linkage, through which

setters could elect

their

own

representatives.

By 1922,

9,651 Europeans

were

in

the

territory,

and

their

access to the

colonial

government

enabled

them to

achieve a

virtual

monopoly

over the

best land.

Henceforth,

land and

representation

within

parliament,

and

African

demands

for

both, came to

play a

central role in

Kenyan

politics.

The

settlers' economic

influence

generated

a struggle

among them, the

colonial

government,

Asian

capital,

and

African

small-scale

agriculturefor

political power. This mix of interests, dominated by the struggle between

Africans and

settlers over

who would

inherit the

colonial state,

ensuredthat

Kenyaenjoyed a

more

complex path to

independence

than its East

African

neighbors.

Wary

of the

growing sense of

injustice

amongthe

Africanpopula-

tion,

the

settlers

were keen to

use their

position

on

the

council to

maintain

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12/23

a highly

inequitable

distribution

of

political space.

Their efforts to

prevent

Africanpolitical representation

were

partially

successful:

Africans were

not

appointed

to

the legislative

council until

1944,

and were

directly

elected

to it

only

in

1957.

The lack

of

representative

linkage

structures such

as

open

elections,

and

the

limited

participatory

inkage

structures because

of

the repressionof African political organizations,denied Africans access to

political space

within the formal structures

of

government.

Consequently,

Africans were forced

to carve

out

democratic

space

in

unconventional

arenas. As Carotenuto

shows,

the Luo

Union

attempted

to

escape

colonial

interference by avoiding political

activities. Other

organizations,

such

as the Union's sister

association,

the

Luo Thrift

and

Trading

Corporation,

sought

to

empower

their members

through

economic,

rather than

political,

advancement.

For the

radical Kikuyu

of

Central Province, the combination

of land

grievances and political suppression led to a different and more confronta-

tional outcome

in

the

form

of the Mau

Mau

rebellion.

In

1951, prompted

by

concerns over the

spread

of

secret

oath-taking

ceremonies and the

promise

of violent attacks

against

Europeans

and

collaborating chiefs,

the colonial

government

declared

Mau Mau

unlawful.

In

1952,

Sir

Evelyn Baring,

then

governor,

declared

a

state of

emergency. Shortly

afterward,

in

Operation

JackScott, Kenyatta and almost two hundred leaders were

arrested. The

emergency

had

a

profound

impact

on

the structure of

political linkage

in

Kenya.

African

political parties were banned-and when

they

were

legal-

ized (in June 1955), it was only at the district level and at the discretion of

colonial officers.

This

situation

empoweredthe colonial

government to pick

and choose the local

parties

it

wished

to

encourage.Such colonial

policies

had

the effect of

nurturing local

politics

while

hindering the expression

of

national

aspirations

(Anderson

2005b:

3).

The

restrictions on African

political

organizationsencouraged he developmentof

one-partydistricts,

which

entrenched the bond between

local leaders

and their often ethnically

homogenous supporters. 5

s a

result,

the

1950s

saw a proliferation of local

organizationsthat

competed

with the

colonial

government for the right

to

exist and with each other for the right to exert the greatest influence on

colonial rule.16

The strength of local political bosses

and the tension

between

different ethnic

communities

created

a

powerful check on the

integration

of

local

political

machines

into a

national party structure. As a result,

the

system

of

participatorylinkage provided by African

political parties

that

developed

in

Kenya was more

fragmented and

internally divided than in

Tanzania.

Even after

1969,

when

Kenya became a

de facto one-party

state,

the

legacy

of

this

fragmentedpolitical

evolution continued to undermine

the

effectiveness of the

political linkage offeredby

KANU.

Mau Mau was eventually contained, but not before it had profoundly

altered

Kenya'spolitical

landscape.17As much as it

was an anticolonial strug-

gle,

it

was also civil war,

albeit one forced upon the

central highlands by the

colonial

state.

Kikuyu loyalists

were drafted to man the Home Guard,

and

Kikuyusmade

up

the

vast majority of the casualties.

The policy of

coopting

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African loyalists to act as a buffer between the colonial government and the

more radicalelements of African nationalism had far-reaching onsequences

for Kenya's political institutions.

In

attempting

to

generate

a

sympathetic

African middle class, both within the Kikuyu

and

without,

the colonial

government set out to manipulate electoral politics, the distribution of

new economic opportunities, and the Africanizationof the administration.

The impact of this process

on

the

elections to the

Legislative

Council

in

1957 and 1958 is documented

in Daniel

Branch'scontribution

to this issue.

Branch

shows the extent to

which

these elections

for African

representa-

tives,

held on

a

qualified

franchise in

eight constituencies,

were

designed

to

favor leaders sympathetic

to

the colonial

government.

To achieve this

result,

a

loyalty

test was enforced

in areas

directly

affected

by

the

emergency.

As

Branchnotes, this policy effectively excluded

the more

radical

elements of

the Kenyan political community,

whose votes had

already

been diluted

by

electoral boundariesthat penalized the main centers of Mau Mau activity.

Although

his

analysis

focuses on events

in

Central

Province,

the

use

of a

qualitative

franchise that favored

wealthy

and educated men means that

Branch's analysis resonates outside that province.'8

This

manipulation

of

the electoral

process

denied

Africans

meaningful political space

within the

state's

representative linkage

structure.

It

set

a

dangerousprecedent,

which

would dog postcolonial elections.

As Branch

argues,

the success of

loyalist

politicians

was an

early example

of what

Throup

and

Hornsby

(1998)

term

the

triumph

of

the

system.

As the colonial government was forced to allow greaterAfrican politi-

cal

representation,

the debate over the

structure

of the

future Kenyan

state intensified, splitting

the African nationalist movement.

In

1960,

the

divisions

crystallized

into the formation of

KANU

and the

Kenya

African

Democratic Union (KADU). KANU

was more radical and

progressive,

and

mainly

drew

support

from the

Kikuyu

and Luo

communities; by contrast,

KADU brought together a

more

conservatively minded coalition,

united in

their belief that a

majimbo

(regionalist)

constitution was essential to

protect

their

interests. This

group included Moi's Kalenjin

Political

Association,

Muliro'sKenyaAfricanPeople's Partyand Ngala'sCoastalAfrican People's

Union.

KADU's

majimboist

ideology was encouragedby European iberals,

led

by

Michael Blundell.

The common thread uniting KADU and the set-

tler

community

was

the

fear that

KANU would

inherit the

strong coercive

linkage structures

of

the colonial state, and that consequently their political

space

would

be progressivelyclosed off (Anderson2005b).A regionalist con-

stitution that would create arenas within which

KANU could

not

dominate

political space promised

to

protect

minorities and

exaggerate

the role of

moderate

political

forces.'9

A decentralized system of government was initially an attractive

proposition

to the British

government. Regionalism promised to protect

groups sympathetic

to colonial interests

and diffuse some

of

Kenya's more

alienated

groups' demands

for

secession. One group that made this claim

was the Somalis

of the Northern

FrontierDistricts (NFD), who argued that

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their

inclusion

in

Kenyan

territory

was

an

accident

of

history.

Such

demands

were not

solely

related

to

ethnicity,

but reflected the

fact that

colonialism

hadmarginalized

Northern

Kenya.

The

closed-districts

policy

of

the

NFD

was

compounded

by

the

fact that the

colonial

government

saw the

North

as

having little

economic value. Institutionalized

through

legislation

such

as the Northern FrontierProvince Poll Tax, the isolation of regionssuch as

the NFD

addedaproblematic

dynamic

to

Kenya's ndependence

negotiations

and to

the

development

of

the

postcolonial

Kenyan

nation.

The

potential for a

regionalist

system

of

government

to resolve such

tensions, and the

natural

sympathy

of the British

government

toward

the

settlers and

KADU,ensured that this coalition

would

prove

far

stronger

than

its electoral

supportmight have

suggested.

Although KADU

won

just

16.4

percent of the vote

in

the

election of

1961,

the outcome of the

Lancaster

House constitutional

talks,

held in

1960, 1962,

and

1963,

favored their

regionalist ambitions; however, over time, the personal popularity of the

recently

released

Kenyatta

and

KANU's clear

dominance at the

ballot box

eroded

British

support

for

majimboism.

In

the final round of

talks

before

independence, the

British government

agreed to a

change

that permitted

amendments to the constitution via

a

two-thirds

majority

vote in the House

of

Representatives. This

agreement

undermined

the

protection offered

by

the

regionalist tenor of the

constitution, and

transferred

control

over the

structure

of

the

postcolonial state

to

KANU

(Gertzel

1970;Kyle

1999).

PoliticalLinkagen the PostcolonialEra

Although the

independence

constitution failed

to

live up to

KADU'sexpec-

tations, the

creation

of

regional

assemblies and plans

for

regions to take

charge

of

their

own

finances

representeda

threat to the

centrality of

KANU's

authority.

Consequently,

KANU set

about

dismantling

the

majimbo

consti-

tution

as soon as

independence

was

secured.

Responsibility

forresisting

the

decentralization of the

administration

until

KANU had an

opportunity

to

introduce a

new

constitution

fell on the

Minister for Home

Affairs,

Oginga

Odinga,who improviseda new way of keeping as much central control as

possible

(Odinga

1967:243).

The

subsequent

republican

constitution of

1964

abolished

the

regional

system of

government and

created a

strong

president

in

place

of

the

prime

minister

(Ochieng

1995:107).

Not

only was

the

admin-

istration

once again

placed underthe

executive's

direct

control, but

the office

of

regional

president was

abolished, and

provincial

commissioners,

directly

appointed

by

the

president, were

put

in

its place.

As a

result,

political

linkage in the

postcolonial

state came

to closely

resemble

the political

linkage structure

of the

colonial

state. This

continu-

ity can only be understood as stemming from the conscious choice of the

KANU

executive to

reinstitute

the

structures

of

colonial rule

and govern

through

the

administrationat

the

expense

of

the party.

This latter

choice

was

primarily

based on

three main

factors,

to

which the

importance of

Kenya's

colonial

legacy

is

obvious.

First, the

continued

strength of

local

political

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bosses

within KANU

ensured

that it was the administration,not

the party,

that represented

the

path

of least

resistance

to the extension of

executive

control. Second,

the success

of moderate

political

leaders

during

the colo-

nial period

meant

that the KANU

elite had an interest

in

pursuing

a

course

of economic

and political

continuity,

which

led them to favor

the more

conservative administration. Third, the administration's strength relative

to KANU's

structural

weakness

supported

the

administration's

continued

dominance

over KANU.

Consequently,

the formal

party

structure of KANU

atrophied.

By

1966,

three years

after

independence,

a

delegates'

conference

had not been

held since

October 1962

and a secretariat meeting

had not been

held since

February

1964.

Furthermore,by

this date,KANU

was some

?20,000

in

debt,

and the telephones

at KANU

headquarters

had been cut off

(Good1968:125).

The

supremacy

of the provincialadministration

over party

structures

at this

point is demonstrated by the regulation of party affairsby the provincial

and district commissioners.

During

the

1960s,

the

administration's

role

in

approving

public

meetings

was used

to

prevent

activity

in KANU

branches

where the loyalty

of

the branch to the

executive was

in

question.

Where

branch

disputes

persisted,

the administration

was often

brought

in to act

as

arbitrator,

as

in Mombassa and

Machakos

in

1968.

The continued

dominance

of

the

coercive linkage

structure of the

administration

crowded out

any

effective linkage

role for

KANU.

As a

result,

there

remained few state-sponsored

arenas supportive

of

political

space. While this situation constrained the organizationand expression of

dissatisfaction

with KANU

rule,

it limited

KANU's

ability

to effect political

mobilization.

The administration's

hierarchical structure

meant that the

administration

continued

to be an unsuitable

organization

through

which

to

include Kenyans

in the

process

of

government

and

to

generatesupport

for

the

regime.

As Huntington

has argued,organizations

that develop a

limited

set

of

responses

to deal

with a

specific

set of

challenges

often

cling

to

past

successes

and

prove

unable to

adapt

to

provide

new

services

(1968:13).

In

Tanzania

and Zambia, the

provincial administration,

established to ensure

the maintenance of law and order,was seen to be an unsuitable organiza-

tion through

which

to

meet the

new challenges of economic

development

and

political

mobilization.

Nyerere,

and to a lesser

extent

Kaunda, sought

to overcome this limitation by

merging the party and

the administration

(Tordoff

1970),

creating

a

one-party

state,

in which there was

no separation

between party

andgovernment.

In

contrast,

although Kenyattarelied

heavily

on

Kenya'shighly

politicized

administration (BranchandCheeseman

2006),

the

marginalization

of

KANU

meant that during this period,

Kenya

is better

thought

of

as an

example

of a

no-party

tate.

The limited participatorylinkage providedby political parties exag-

gerated

the

significance

of the electoral

system.

Following the assimilation

of KADU

into

KANU immediately

after

independence,

the de facto one-

party

state offered

the electorate

a

severely

constrained choice. Apart from

the brief

period

between

1966

and 1969, when the

Kenya People's Union

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16/23

(KPU)

challenged KANU

hegemony,

the

single-party

electoral

system

failed

to offer

Kenyans

a

say

over

who

should

be

president

and

the

direction

of

public

policy. The constraints

on

participatory

and

representative

linkage,

combined with the

strong

coercive

linkage provided

by

the

administration,

meant that the

structure

of

political

linkage

in the

postcolonial

era came

to

mirror hat of the colonial period.Althoughthe relationshipbetween govern-

ment and

opposition

changed,

many

groups

found

they

were no more able

to

participate

effectively

in

politics

than

they

had

been

during

the latter

years

of colonial rule. This was the

experience

of the Luo

Union. As

Carotenuto's

paper

shows, the union's

disappointed expectations

of

independence

led

to

the emergence of a

specifically postcolonial tension. As ethnic welfare

organizations

increasingly

came

to be seen to be in

conflict with

the

nation-

buildingprocess, the union was

forced to avoid

explicitly political

activities.

Instead,

it

concentrated on

providing social and cultural

services,

such as

football matches and dances.In its attempts to find a role that would aid its

members and

be

acceptable

to the

KANU

executive,

the union's

experience

speaks to

the

constraints

on

political

space

after

independence

and to

the

extent of

Kenya's

colonial

legacy.

As Carotenuto

argues,

the Luo

Union's

shape and structure extended

colonial influences

far into the

history

of

independent

Kenya (2006:pg.

54).

The

administration's

preeminence,

and the

continuing

constraints on

organizations

such as the Luo

Union, threatened

the

legitimacy

of

KANU

rule. While

attempting to

regulate

political

space,

the executive

recognized

the need to create an image of Kenya that was inclusionary and participa-

tory. Although

KANU

was

structurallyweak, the

symbolic

potency of the

KANU brand

ad to be

maintained.

Despite the

limitations of the

electoral

system,

it

was

largelythroughthis institution that

Kenya'spolitical leaders

attempted to

create a sense

of

local

ownership of

the political

system. As

Barkanand

Okumu have

argued

(1978,

1980), in

the

absence of an

effective

party structure, interactive

political

linkage

in

Kenya came

to depend

on

the role of

independent

legislators as

local

representatives.

Importantly,

Kenyatta's focus on

harambee

self-help projects

meant

that in many

con-

stituencies, elections became local referendaon the ability of the incumbent

member

of

Parliament

to

deliver

development. This

circumstance

fused

informal

and

formal

institutions to

enhance

the

importance of

single-party

elections. The

formal

structure of

the

electoral system,

most

notably the

constituency-basedsystem of

representation,

shapedthe

choice of

Kenyans;

however,

it was

the position

of

legislators as

local patrons

and

their ability

to link

constituents

to state

funds

that made this

choice

meaningful.

The

emphasis

on

local

patrons built

upon the

development of local

political

leaders

duringthe

colonial

period andplayed

into

understandings

of moral

ethnicity (Lonsdale1993). The representative inkage structure of electoral

politics

became

infused

with,

and

strengthened by,

a

patron-client

system

that

conferred

resources

and

duties

on patrons.

Through the

linkage

role

played by

legislators,

disparate

communities

could be

incorporatedinto

the

KANU

state.

In

the

long

run, this

practice

solidified

lines of

patronage

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and strengthened the

relationship

between local leaders and their

often

ethnically homogenous

communities.

The role of harambee was

important

in

adding meaning

to electoral

politics.

By

combining representative

and

reciprocal

linkage

structures

and

connecting

them to the call for

harambee,

Kenyatta

managed

to

link

the

development efforts of local communities to the activities of elite politi-

cians. Members of Parliament were

expected

to

help

coordinate

harambee

projects

and to contribute to them

personally (Kenya2003;

Transparency

International

Kenya2001;

Widner

19921.

The

importance

of

harambee

was

not the same in all

constituencies,

and

personal

and ethnic ties

played

a

key

role in

determiningvoters' behavior.

Nevertheless,

the

ability

to select

local

representatives on the basis of

candidates' contributions to the

community

played an

important role

in

maintaining

the

legitimacy

of

KANU

rule.

Though

harambee projects

may

not

always

have

been as

grass-roots

and

voluntary as Kenyatta'srhetoricsuggested (Kenya2003; Male 1976;Mbithi

and Rasmusson

1977),

the

extent

of

participation

in

harambee

projects,

and

the

popularity

of

many

of

these

projects

with

the local

electorate,

cannot be

doubted

(Holmquist

1984).

The structural

foundations of

KANU rule were

premised

on the com-

bination of the

meaning

offered

through

the electoral

system

and

the

administration's

coercive

capacity.

The

gradual

decline in the

legitimacy

of

KANU, and the

increasing reliance

upon

the

administration to main-

tain

order,owed

much to

KANU's

inability to maintain

this

set of linkage

structures in the long run. Daniel arap Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta as

president in

1978, attempted

to entrench his

own position

by using

state

funds to

enable himself and

his

supporters to make

generous harambee

contributions. In

the face of

dwindling resources

through which to

support

public

spending,

he

endeavored to maintain

his

popularityby

distributing

an

increasing

proportion

of

revenue

through highly

publicized

harambee

donations.

Between

1980 and

1989, the number of

reported

harambees

more

than

quadrupled,and the

total amount of

reported

harambee

contributions

increased from

Ksh.

30,724,807 in

1980 to KSh.

669,781,543

in 1989. From

1980 to 1989, Moi personally contributed Ksh. 130,594,285 (Transparency

International

Kenya

2001).

This

pattern

of

contributions

exaggerated

the

importance of

haram-

bee in

the short

run,

but Moi's

refusal

to

countenance dissent led

him to

undermine the

very

electoral

system

through

which

patron-clientnetworks

and

harambee

projects connected

the regime

to the wider

population.

After

initial

attempts

to

sideline

disobedient

members of

Parliament by

support-

ing rival

candidates in the

1983

elections failed,

the subsequent

introduction

of

queue

voting

and

the

widespread

electoral

malpractice of

the late 1980s

discredited he electoralsystem (ThroupandHornsby1998).As Orvisargues,

by

undermining

an

institution

that had

conferred

egitimacy on the

regime,

Moi

removed a

pillar

that

had been

helping prop up the

KANU

government.

Consequently,his

regime became

increasinglyreliant

on the

administration

to

suppress

and

intimidate

opposition.

Toescape

censorship

andpunishment

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by an

increasingly oppressive government,

critical voices were

forced

to

operateunderground.Mwakenya (PatrioticFront

for

the Liberationof

Kenya)

was

one

such

organization. Although

there are no

reliably precise

estimates

of the size and

composition

of

its

membership,

evidence

suggests

that it was

largely

composed

of

students and intellectuals

(Amutabi

2002).

Operating

with a high level of secrecy,it attemptedto coordinateopposition to the Moi

regime through

influential publications,

including Mpatanishi (Reconciler)

and Pambaba

(Struggle).

Fearful of the

unknowable scale

of the

organiza-

tion, Moi

pursued

an

ever more confrontational

and

dictatorial

approach.

As human-rights abuses and

intimidation of

suspected Mwakenya

activists

escalated (Amutabi

2002:171-173),

the

quantity

and

quality

of

political

space

available to

Kenyans

reached its lowest

point

in the

postcolonial

era.

Recognizing

the

strength

of

the

state's coercive

apparatus,

human-

rights activists sought to operationalize

new

tactics

to

defend

political

space. One method used to mobilize support for human-rights issues was

the

appropriation

of

symbolic

events from

Kenya'spast. Pommerolle,

in

her

analysis

of this

tactic,

demonstrates how

symbols

and

images

of the

past

can

serve as a

resource

to

political

actors

in the

present.

Recurrentreferences

to the

past,

she

argues,

allowed

human-rights

defenders

to

impose

their

cause

and

to

keep

alive social and

political

demands

regarding

wealth and

accountability

in

the national

community

(2006: pg.

76).

Keeping these demands

alive

did

not,

on its

own, radically change

the

government

or

government policy.

As Orvis

documents,

it

required

the

intervention of international donors in 1991 and a further eleven years of

KANU rule before

Kenya

witnessed

a

transferof

power;however,

the

actions

of

human-rights

defenders,

and

of other

organizations (such

as

the Law Soci-

ety

of

Kenya),

helped

secure the survival of an

undercurrent of

resistance

in

Kenyan political

life

(Klopp

and

Orina

2002). Resisting

the extension of

government

control over all

aspects

of

Kenyan life,

these

groups

were forced

to look for new

arenas

of

political space-ones that the government

would

not,

or

could

not, regulate. The structure of

political linkage continued to

shape

the

availability

of

political space,

and in

turn to be

shaped by debates

and events occurringwithin these arenas.

Conclusion

The struggle of

groups such as the Luo Union and human-rights

defenders

to

carve out their own

political space

in

independent Kenya is a

testament

to the

continuities that cross

the colonial-postcolonial divide. In

the con-

text

of

tight constraints on

participatoryand representative

linkage, and

of the strong coercive linkage provided by the administration, groupssuch

as

Mwakenya

were

forced

to

look for new

and imaginative arenas within

which

to

pursue their cause.

The structure of

political linkage shaped the

availability

of

political space, at once

supporting certain arenas (such

as the

electoral

system),

and

closing

off others

throughthe regulation of

political

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19/23

activity. There

is a need

to

reevaluate

the

political

impact

of

decolonization

in

Kenya, and to do this from

a

perspective

that recognizes the

importance

of formal

political institutions.

Kenyatta and

KANU

overcame an

unbalancedpolitical

landscape by

fusing formal and

informal institutions. The incorporationof a fast-emerg-

ing

network of patron-client

relationships into the

electoral

system helped

maintain

the

legitimacy

of

KANU and the

political system as a

whole.

Underpinned

by

the

harambee

movement,

this

arrangement

supported

a

linkage structure

that, despite its

limitations,

enabled

many Kenyans

to

feel connected to the

political process. The

gradual

decay of these

institu-

tions

undermined this

connection,

and in the

long

run

greatly weakened the

authority of KANU and

Moi. With

the

decreasingeffectiveness

of

Kenya's

interactive

linkage

structures, the regime

became

increasingly

reliant on

the coercive role of the administration. As at the end of the colonial period,

it was the administration

that

played

a

defining

role

in

marking

out the

boundaries

of political

space.

The papers

that follow speak

to this

continuity from the

perspective

of

the

tension between

government

and

opposition,

and

together

demon-

strate that while no

group

was unaffected

by independence, decolonization

did not

represent

the

change

that

many

hoped for. The significance

and

continued relevance of

Kenya's colonial

legacy

described in

these studies

calls

into

question

a crude

labeling

of

political time that

references a colo-

nial

and a

postcolonial

era to

imply that

one

was

radically different to

the

other. Instead,

Kenyanhistory

duringthis period

was

made up of many

strands,

all of which started

and ended at

different

points,

with

little

respect

for the

boundary

implied

by

the distinction

between the

colonial and the

postcolonial.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The

research or this

paper

was

carriedout while a doctoral

student

at

NuffieldCollege,

University

of Oxford

and was

supported by

the Economicand Social

Research

Council.The

authorwould like

to thank

JuliaLabeta,Adrienne

LeBas,David Anderson,

and the

anonymous reviewers

for their

comments and

suggestions.

NOTES

1. Foran

exampleof

such an

approach, ee Seibert

1999.

2. The

Creatinghe Kenya

Post-Colony

onference was

convenedby the

author

and Daniel

Branchat

St

Peter'sCollege,

Oxford

University,o

bring together

those

workingon

Kenya,

especially

postgraduate tudents.

The convenorswish

to

express

their

thanksto St. Peter's

C)

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20/23

College (OxfordUniversity), he

AfricanStudies Department(OxfordUniversity),

nd the

Departmentof Politicsand InternationalRelations OxfordUniversity),

ithout whose

help

the conferencewould not have been possible.

3. Theremay,of course,be political ontinuities

hat stretchback o nineteenth-century olitical

structures.With o littleavailable vidence, racing uch continuities s extremelydifficult, ut

none of the argumentspresented

n

this issue

is intended

to

ruleout

this

possibility.

4.

A

helpfuldiscussionof the different omponents

of decolonization cane found

in

Maloba

1995. Political ommentatorsrarely ddress

he issue

of

cultural nd psychological

reedom

explicitly.ThreexceptionsareCabral 979;

Gifford&Louis1988;Maloba1995.Others, nclud-

ing postcolonial heorists, evolutionaries,nd literaryheorists,have sought to address hese

issues fromvariousperspectives.A powerfuland influential iscussion s provide

Documents

Political Linkage and Political Space -In Era of Decolonization