Political Law Reviewer Q & A

8/11/2019 Political Law Reviewer Q & A

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POLIREV MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Distinguish sovereignty from dominion.

Held:

Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State. It is often referred to as the power of imperium,which is dened as the government authority possessed by the State . On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State toown or acquire property such as lands and natural resources. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R.No. !"!#", Dec. $, %&&&, En 'anc, See ootnote #$)

How did Spain acquire the Philippines?

Held: 1. he !hilippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery# and conquest. $onsequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish $rown. he Spanish %overnment too& charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, bothmilitary and civilian (Antonio H. Nole!as" #and $itles and Deeds" p. % &')*+, $hese grants were etter -nown as repartimientos and encomiendas.epartimientos were handouts to the military as /tting reward for their services to the Spanish crown. $he encomiendas were given to Spaniards toadminister and develop with the right to receive and en!oy for themselves the triutes of the natives assigned to them. 0 Ponce" supra" p. '1" citing2enite3" History of the Philippines" pp. '1%4'1*5. !rivate land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by thevarious modes of land grant from the $rown (Narciso Pena" egistration of #and $itles and Deeds" p. 1 &'6+5. (Separate Opinion, *uno, J., inCruz v. Secretary of Environ+ent an Natura- Resources, !/ SCR0 %#, $$, En 'anc 1*er Curia+2)

'. (hen Spain acquired sovereignty over the !hilippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation thereof in the 1)th century and the reaty of ordesillas of 1*+* which it entered into with !ortugal (7nder the $reaty of $ordesillas" the world was divided etween Spain and Portugal" with theformer having e8clusive power to claim all lands and territories west of the Atlantic 9cean demarcation line &#ynch" $he #egal 2ases of Philippine:olonial Sovereignty" *1 Phil. # ; 1<" 1)= &')<+5 the continents of sia, the mericas and frica were considered as terra nullius although alreadypopulated by other peoples (See A-ehurst" a >odern ntroduction to nternational #aw" % th ed." '614'6=5. he discovery and occupation by the-uropean States, who were then considered as the only members of the international community of civilied nations, of lands in the said continentswere deemed su/cient to create title under international law (See :ru3" nternational #aw" '* ed." pp. '@*4'@<5 (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. !"!#", Dec. $, %&&&, !/ SCR0 %#, %/, En 'anc 1*er Curia+2)

Discuss the concept of !ura regalia and how it evolved in the Philippines. Does it negate native title to lands held in private ownership since timeimmemorial?

Held:

%enerally, under the concept of !ura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish $rown or itssuccessors, the merican $olonial government, and thereafter, the !hilippine 0epublic. he belief that the Spanish $rown is the origin of all landtitles in the !hilippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere (Pena"egistration of #and $itles and Deeds" '6 rev. ed." p. '%5.

In its broad sense, the term !ura regalia refers to royal grants (' 2ouvierBs #aw Dictionary" =rd revision" p. '<%5" or those rights which the ing hasby virtue of his prerogatives (2lac-Bs #aw Dictionary" *th ed." p. '1)15. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything inwhich a sub2ect has a right of property or propriedad (<* :orpus ;uris Secundum" citing Hart v. 2urnett" '% :al. %=@" %**5. hese were rightsen2oyed during feudal times by the &ing as the sovereign.

he theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the ing, and while the use of lands was granted out to others whowere permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the ing theoretically retained the title (Cashurn" p. 66, see also Cilliams" Principles 9f $he#aw 9n eal Property" *th ed. &'))*+" p. 1, 2igelow" p. 15. 3y ction of law, the ing was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the trueand only source of title, and from him all lands were held (Carvelle" Astracts and 8amination of $itle to eal Property &'@<+" p. ')5. he theory of !ura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest (' Dictionary of nglish #aw &;owitt" ed.+ p. <<5.

he 0egalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmar& case of :arino v. nsular Eovernment (6' Phil. =%" 1'1 7.S. 66" %= #. d. %6 &'@+5" the 4nited States Supreme $ourt, reversing the decision of the pre5war !hilippine Supreme $ourt, made the following pronouncement6

x x x -very presumption is and ought to be ta&en against the %overnment in a case li&e the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and su/cient tosay that when" as far ac- as testimony or memory goes" the land has een held y individuals under a claim of private ownership" it will e presumed to have een held in the same way from efore the Spanish conquest" and never to have een pulic land. 8 8 8 (:arino v. nsular Eovernment" supra note <%" at 6'5

he above ruling institutionalied the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by 7ilipinos by virtue of possessionunder a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish $rown, as an exception to the theory of !uraregalia.

x x x

:arino was decided by the 4.S. Supreme $ourt in 1+8+, at a time when decisions of the 4.S. $ourt were binding as precedent in our 2urisdiction(Section '@" Philippine 2ill of '@15. (e applied the :arino doctrine in the 1+*) case of 9h :ho v. Director of #ands (<% Phil. )@ &'6*+5" where westated that "9a:ll lands that were not acquired from the %overnment either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but 9a:n exceptionto the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, forsuch possession would 2ustify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even

before the Spanish conquest.# (d." at )15. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. !"!#", Dec.$, %&&&, !/ SCR0 %#, %$#3%/&, En 'anc

Chat was the asis for the early Spanish decrees emracing the theory of !ura regalia? s this also the asis of the declaration in Section 1" Article F of the ')< :onstitution that all lands of the pulic domain are owned y the State? :onsequently" did Spain acquire title over all lands in thePhilippines in the '*th century?

Held:

Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of !ura regalia. he declaration in Section ', rticle ;II of the 1+<=$onstitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is li&ewise founded on dominium. If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of !ura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 1) th century were limited to non5private lands, because it could only acquirelands which were not yet privately5owned or occupied by the 7ilipinos. >ence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied andunclaimed, i.e., public lands. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. !"!#", Dec. $, %&&&, En'anc, See ootnote #$)



Chat is the Doctrine of :onstitutional Supremacy?

Held:

4nder the doctrine of constitutional supremacy , if a law or contract violates any norm of the $onstitution, that law or contract, whether promulgatedby the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force ande?ect. hus, since the $onstitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute andcontract. (4ani-a *rince 5ote- v. GSIS, %$/ SCR0 &# 166/2 1'e--osi--o2)



Chat are self4e8ecuting and non4self e8ecuting provisions of the :onstitution?

Held: provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in rticle II of the 1+<= $onstitution, is usually not self5executing. 3ut aprovision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which suppliessu/cient rule by means of which the right it grants may be en2oyed or protected, is self5executing. hus a constitutional provision is self5executingif the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are xed by the $onstitution itself, so that they can be determined by anexamination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the sub2ect is referred to the legislature for action . (4ani-a*rince 5ote- v. GSIS, %$/ SCR0 &# 166/2 1'e--osi--o2)

Are provisions of the :onstitution self4e8ecuting or non4self e8ecuting? Chy?

Held:

4nless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions areself5executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self5executing, the legislature would have the power toignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. his can be cataclysmic. (4ani-a *rince 5ote- v. GSIS, %$/ SCR0 &# 166/2 1'e--osi--o2)

s the Gilipino irstI Policy e8pressed in Section '@" Article F of the :onstitution a self4e8ecuting provision?

Held:

@es. It is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for itsenforcement. 7rom its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se 2udicially enforceable. (hen our$onstitution mandates that &i+n the grant of rights" privileges" and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" the State shall give preference to quali/ed ilipinos" it means 2ust that A qualied 7ilipinos must be preferred. (4ani-a *rince 5ote- v. GSIS, G.R. No. #%6", 4ay %, 66/, %$/ SCR0 &# 1'e--osi--o2)

Eive e8amples of non4self e8ecuting provisions of the :onstitution.

Held:

3y its very nature, rticle II of the $onstitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies.# hese principles in rticle II are not intended to beself5executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. hey are used by the 2udiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of 2udicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. s held in the leading case of Jilosayan" ncorporated v. >orato (16* S:A %6@"%*6" ;uly '<" '%5" the principles and state policies enumerated in rticle II and some sections of rticle ;II are not "self5executing provisions, thedisregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in courts. hey do not embody 2udicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines forlegislation.# (7anaa v. 0ngara, %/% SCR0 # 166/2, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

Chen are acts of persons considered GState actionI covered y the :onstitution?

Held:

In constitutional 2urisprudence, the act of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action# covered by the $onstitution B1C whenthe activity it engages in is a "public function#D B'C when the government is so signicantly involved with the private actor as to ma&e thegovernment responsible for his actionD and BEC when the government has approved or authoried the action. (4ani-a *rince 5ote- v. GSIS, %$/SCR0 &# 166/2 1'e--osi--o2)



THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Discuss the asis of the doctrine of State immunity from suit.

Held:

he basic postulate enshrined in the $onstitution that "9t:he State may not be sued without its consent,# reFects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express a/rmation of the unwritten rule e?ectively insulating it from the 2urisdiction of courts . It isbased on the very essence of sovereignty. s has been aptly observed by Gustice >olmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of anyformal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma&es thelaw on which the right depends . rue, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty# because it grantsthe state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invo&ing its non5suability. (e have had occasion to explain in itsdefense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non5suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental e/ciency and the

obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties,if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of 2udicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. (Depart+ent of 0gricu-ture v. N9RC, %%/ SCR0 $6!, Nov. , 66! 1:itug2)

s the rule asolute" i.e." that the State may not e sued at all? How may consent of the State to e sued given?

Held:

he rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, ascorrectly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consentD# its clear import then is that the State may at times besued. he StateHs consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. -xpress consent may be made through a general law (i.e." :ommonwealth Act No. =1<" as amended y Presidential Decree No. '66% &Sections 64%@+" which requires that all money claims against the government must /rst e /led with the :ommission on Audit which must act upon it within si8ty days. e!ection of the claim will authori3e the claimant to elevate thematter to the Supreme :ourt on certiorari and" in eKect" sue the State therey5 or a special law. In this 2urisdiction, the general law waiving theimmunity of the state from suit is found in ct o. E8<E, where the !hilippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claiminvolving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between the private parties.# Impliedconsent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into acontract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of itssovereign immunity. his rule x x x is not, however, without qualication. ot all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non5suabilityD distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done inits proprietary capacity.

In 7nited States of America v. ui3 ('=* S:A 6)<5" where the questioned transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in the navalinstallation at Subic 3ay, we held6

"he traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. his rule is anecessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of States. >owever, the rules of International Jaw are not petriedD they areconstantly developing and evolving. nd because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them 5 betweensovereign and governmental acts (!ure imperii5 and private, commercial and proprietary acts (!ure gestionis5. he result is that State immunity nowextends only to acts !ure imperii. he restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the 4nited States, the 4nited ingdom and otherstates in (estern -urope.

x x x

he restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, itscommercial activities or economic a?airs. Stated di?erently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus bedeemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate to theexercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the pro2ects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the 4nitedStates and the !hilippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest orderD they are not utilied for nor dedicated to commercial or

business purposes.# (Depart+ent of 0gricu-ture v. N9RC, %%/ SCR0 $6!, Nov. , 66! 1:itug2)

Chen is a suit against a pulic oLcial deemed to e a suit against the State? Discuss.

Held:

1. he doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints led against public o/cials for acts done in the performance of their duties. herule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of the 2udgment against the public o/cial concerned willrequire the State itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plainti?.

he rule does not apply where the public o/cial is charged in his o/cial capacity for acts that are unlawful and in2urious to the r ights of others.!ublic o/cials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.

either does it apply where the public o/cial is clearly being sued not in his o/cial capacity but in his personal capacity, although the actscomplained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. (0+ao J. 9ansang v. C0, G.R. No. &%$$/, e8. %!, %&&&, % n

Div. 1;uisu+8ing2)

'. s early as 1+K*, this $ourt has pronounced that an o/cer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his o/ce when his acts are wholly without authority. 4ntil recently in 1++1 (:have3 v. Sandiganayan" '= S:A 1)1 &''+5" this doctrine stillfound application, this $ourt saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalie irresponsibility and non5accountability nor grant a privilegedstatus not claimed by any other o/cial of the 0epublic. (Repu8-ic v. Sanova-, %%& SCR0 %, 4arc< 6, 66!, En 'anc 1Ca+pos, Jr.2)

State instances when a suit against the State is proper.

Held:

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are6

1. (hen the 0epublic is sued by nameD

'. (hen the suit is against an unincorporated government agencyD

E. (hen the suit is on its face against a government o/cer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the o/cer but to thegovernment.

Has the government waived its immunity from suit in the >endiola massacre" and" therefore" should indemnify the heirs and victims of the >endiolaincident? :onsequently" is the suit /led against the epulic y petitioners in said case really a suit against the State?

Held:



!etitioners x x x advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by therecommendation made by the $ommission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Lendiola incident and by the publicaddresses made by then !resident quino in the aftermath of the &illings, the State has consented to be sued.

x x x

his is not a suit against the State with its consent.

7irstly, the recommendation made by the $ommission regarding indemnication of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by thegovernment does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that .O. 11 expressly states thatthe purpose of creating the $ommission was to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that too&place.# In the exercise of its functions, .O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads6

"7irst, its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any o?ense and of the persons probably guilty of the sameshall be su/cient compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be led directly with the proper

court.#

In e?ect, whatever may be the ndings of the $ommission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides tolitigate hisMher claim. herefore, the $ommission is merely a preliminary venue. he $ommission is not the end in itself. (hateverrecommendation it ma&es cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become nal and executory. his isprecisely the essence of it being a fact4/nding ody.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then !resident quino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waivedits immunity from suit. he !residentNs act of 2oining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the Stateof any liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioner x x x, "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people.# Loreover, petitionersrely on !resident quinoNs speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. 3y this alone, it cannot be inferredthat the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

lthough consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstancesobtaining in the instant case.

hirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.

x x x

(hile the 0epublic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. lthough the military o/cers andpersonnel, then party defendants, were discharging their o/cial functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be o/cial themoment they exceeded their authority. 3ased on the $ommission ndings, there was lac& of 2ustication by the government forces in the use of rearms. Loreover, the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under 3.!. 3lg. <<8 as there wasunnecessary ring by them in dispersing the marchers.

s early as 1+K*, this $ourt has pronounced that an o/cer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of hiso/ce when his acts are wholly without authority. 4ntil recently in 1++1 (:have3 v. Sandiganayan" '= S:A 1)1 &''+5, this doctrine still foundapplication, this $ourt saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalie irresponsibility and non5accountability nor grant a privileged status notclaimed by any other o/cial of the 0epublic. he military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly aswell as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty5bound to protect. >owever, the facts as found by the trial court showed thatthey red at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.

(hile it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courtsexcept when it has given its consent, it cannot be invo&ed by both the military o/cers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs andvictims to demand indemnication from the government. he principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no a/rmative o/cial action on the part of the State nor the a/rmative discharge of any obligation which belongs tothe State in its political capacity, even though the oLcers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only y virtue of a title of thestate and as its agents and servants. his $ourt has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license topersecute or rec&lessly in2ure another.#

he inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on

the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this $ourt in Shauf v. :ourt of Appeals ('' S:A <'= &'@+5" herein publico/cials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. (Repu8-ic v. Sanova-, %%&SCR0 %, 4arc< 6, 66!, En 'anc 1Ca+pos, Jr.2)



>ay the Eovernment validly invo-e the doctrine of State immunity from suit if its invocation will serve as an instrument for perpetrating an in!usticeon a citi3en?

Held:

o our mind, it would be the apex of in2ustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners5contractorsN right to be duly compensated for actualwor& performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benets from saidhousing pro2ect and reaped the fruits of petitioners5contractorsN honest toil and labor.

Incidentally, respondent li&ewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invo&ing the constitutional doctrine of Non4suaility of the State" otherwise &nown as the oyal Prerogative of Dishonesty.

0espondentNs argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of State immunity nds no application in the case before us.

4nder these circumstances, respondent may not validly invo&e the oyal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the StateMs cloa- of

invinciility against suit" considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. rue enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for itdoes not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. (:itations omitted5

hus, in Amigale v. :uenca, this $ourt, in e?ect, shred the protective shroud which shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in thelandmar& case of >inisterio v. : of :eu that Gthe doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating anin!ustice on a citi3en.I It is 2ust as important, if not more so, that there be delity to legal norms on the part of o/cialdom if the rule of law were tobe maintained. (:itations omitted5

lthough the Amigale and >inisterio cases generously tac&led the issue of the StateNs immunity from suit vis a vis the payment of 2ustcompensation for expropriated property, this $ourt nonetheless nds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instantcontroversy, considering that the ends of 2ustice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the StateNs immunity from suit.

o be sure, this $ourt A as the staunch guardian of the citiensN rights and welfare A cannot sanction an in2ustice so patent on its face, and allowitself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Gustice and equity sternly demand that the StateNs cloa& of invincibility against suit be shred inthis particular instance, and that petitioners5contractors be duly compensated A on the basis of quantum meruit A for construction done on thepublic wor&s housing pro2ect. (E*G Construction Co. v. :igi-ar, !" SCR0 "$$, 4ar.$, %&&, %n Div. 1'uena2)

CITIZENSHIP

$o what citi3enship principle does the Philippines adhere to? 8plain" and give illustrative case.

Held:

he !hilippine law on citienship adheres to the principle of !us sanguinis. hereunder, a child follows the nationality or citienship of the parentsregardless of the place of hisMher birth, as opposed to the doctrine of !us soli which determines nationality or citienship on the basis of place of birth.

!rivate respondent 0osalind @basco Jope was born on Lay 1), 1+E* in apier errace, 3roome, (estern ustralia, to the spouses, elesforo @basco,a 7ilipino citien and native of aet, $amarines orte, and heresa Larque, an ustralian. >istorically, this was a year before the 1+EK$onstitution too& into e?ect and at that time, what served as the $onstitution of the !hilippines were the principal organic acts by which the 4nitedStates governed the country. hese were the !hilippine 3ill of Guly 1, 1+8' and the !hilippine utonomy ct of ugust '+, 1+1), also &nown as the Gones Jaw.

mong others, these laws dened who were deemed to be citiens of the !hilippine Islands. x x x

4nder both organic acts, all inhabitants of the !hilippines who were Spanish sub2ects on pril 11, 1<++ and resided therein including their childrenare deemed to be !hilippine citiens. !rivate respondentNs father, elesforo @basco, was born on Ganuary K, 1<=+ in aet, $amarines orte, a factduly evidenced by a certied true copy of an entry in the 0egistry of 3irths. hus, under the !hilippine 3ill of 1+8' and the Gones Jaw, elesforo @basco was deemed to be a !hilippine citien. 3y virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, elesforoNsdaughter, herein private respondent 0osalind @basco Jope, is li&ewise a citien of the !hilippines.

he signing into law of the 1+EK !hilippine $onstitution has established the principle of !us sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of !hilippinecitienship x x x. So also, the principle of !us sanguinis" which confers citienship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained underthe 1+=E and 1+<= $onstitutions. hus, the herein private respondent, 0osalind @basco Jope, is a 7ilipino citien, having been born to a 7ilipinofather. he fact of her being born in ustralia is not tantamount to her losing her !hilippine citienship. If ustralia follows the principle of !us soli"then at most, private respondent can also claim ustralian citienship resulting to her possession of dual citienship. (:a--es v. CO4E9EC, !!/SCR0 "!, 0ug. 6, %&&&, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

Chat are the ways of acquiring citi3enship? Discuss.

Held:

here are two ways of acquiring citienship6 B1C by birth, and B'C by naturaliation. hese ways of acquiring citienship correspond to the two &indsof citiens6 the natural5born citien, and the naturalied citien. person who at the time of his birth is a citien of a particular country, is a natural5born citien thereof.

s dened in the x x x $onstitution, natural5born citiens "are those citiens of the !hilippines from birth without having to perform any act toacquire or perfect his !hilippine citienship.#

On the other hand, naturalied citiens are those who have become 7ilipino citiens through naturaliation, generally under $ommonwealth ct o.

*=E, otherwise &nown as the 0evised aturaliation Jaw, which repealed the former aturaliation Jaw Bct o. '+'=C, and by 0epublic ct o. KE8.(0ntonio 'engson III v. 5RE7, G.R. No. %#&, 4ay /, %&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

$o e naturali3ed" what must an applicant prove? Chen and what are the conditions efore the decision granting Philippine citi3enship ecomese8ecutory?

Held:

o be naturalied, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualications and none of the disqualications provided by law to become a7ilipino citien. he decision granting !hilippine citienship becomes executory only after two B'C years from its promulgation when the court issatised that during the intervening period, the applicant has B1C not left the !hilippinesD B'C has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or professionDBEC has not been convicted of any o?ense or violation of government promulgated rulesD or B*C committed any act pre2udicial to the interest of thenation or contrary to any government announced policies (Section '" .A. %=@5. (0ntonio 'engson III v. 5RE7, G.R. No. %#&, 4ay /, %&&,En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

Chat quali/cations must e possessed y an applicant for naturali3ation?



Held:

Section ', ct *=E provides the following qualications6

1. >e must be not less than '1 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petitionD

'. >e must have resided in the !hilippines for a continuous period of not less than ten yearsD

E. >e must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the !hilippine $onstitution, and must have conductedhimself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the !hilippines in his relation with theconstituted government as well as with the community in which he is livingD

*. >e must own real estate in the !hilippines worth not less than ve thousand pesos, !hilippine currency, or must have some &nownlucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupationD

K. >e must be able to spea& and write -nglish or Spanish and any of the principal languagesD and

). >e must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognied by the 3ureau of !rivateSchools of the !hilippines where !hilippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, duringthe entire period of the residence in the !hilippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturaliation as !hilippinecitien.

Chat are the disquali/cations under Section 6" Act 6<=" in an application for naturali3ation?

Held:

Section *, ct *=E, provides the following disqualications6

1. >e must not be opposed to organied government or a/liated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrinesopposing all organied governmentsD

'. >e must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success andpredominance of their ideasD

E. >e must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamyD

*. >e must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitudeD

K. >e must not be su?ering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseasesD

). >e must have, during the period of his residence in the !hilippines Bor not less than six months before ling his applicationC, mingledsocially with the 7ilipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the7ilipinosD

=. >e must not be a citien or sub2ect of a nation with whom the !hilippines is at war, during the period of such warD

<. >e must not be a citien or sub2ect of a foreign country whose laws do not grant 7ilipinos the right to become naturalied citiens orsub2ects thereof.

:an a legitimate child orn under the '=% :onstitution of a ilipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citi3enship fourteen ('65 years after he has reached the age of ma!ority?

Held:

4nder rticle IP, Section 1BEC of the 1+EK $onstitution, the citienship of a legitimate child born of a 7ilipino mother and an alien father followed thecitienship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of ma2ority, the child elected !hilippine citienship. $.. o. )'K which was enactedpursuant to Section 1BEC, rticle IP of the 1+EK $onstitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to ma&e a valid election of !hilippine citienship. >owever, the 1+EK $onstitution and $.. o. )'K did not prescribe a time period within which the election of !hilippinecitienship should be made. he 1+EK $harter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of ma2ority.# he age of ma2ority then commenced upon reaching twenty5one B'1C years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Gustice on cases involving the validity of election

of !hilippine citienship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this $ourt prior to the e?ectivity of the 1+EK$onstitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing !hilippine citienship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the epartmentof State of the 4nited States %overnment to the e?ect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time# after attaining the age of ma2ority. he phrase "reasonable time# has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three BEC years from reaching the ageof ma2ority.

he span of fourteen B1*C years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of ma2ority until he nally expressed his intention to elect!hilippine citienship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of ma2ority.#

!hilippine citienship can never be treated li&e a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient . One who isprivileged to elect !hilippine citienship has only an inchoate right to such citienship. s such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasmand promptitude. (Re= 0pp-ication for 0+ission to t<e *<i-ippine 'ar, :icente D. C<ing, 'ar 4atter No. 6, Oct. , 666, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)



How may Philippine citi3enship e renounced? s the application for an alien certi/cate of registration" and the possession of foreign passport"tantamount to acts of renunciation of Philippine cit i3enship?

!etitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a 7ilipino citien, she has nonetheless renounced her !hilippinecitienship. o buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondentNs application for an alien $erticate of 0egistration B$0C and Immigrant$erticate of 0esidence BI$0C, on September 1+, 1+<<, and the issuance to her of an ustralian passport on Larch E, 1+<<.

x x x

In order that citienship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. !etitionerNs contention that the application of privaterespondent for an alien certicate of registration, and her ustralian passport, is bereft of merit. his issue was put to rest in the case of A3nar v.:9>#: (')% S:A <@= &'@+5 and in the more recent case of >ercado v. >an3ano and :9>#: (E.. No. '=%@)=" =@< S:A *=@" >ay 1*"'5.

In the case of nar, the $ourt ruled that the mere fact that he is an merican did not mean that he is no longer a 7ilipino, and that an application

for an alien certicate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his !hilippine citienship.

nd, in >ercado v. >an3ano and :9>#:" it was held that the fact that respondent Lanano was registered as an merican citien in the 3ureauof Immigration and eportation and was holding an merican passport on pril '', 1++=, only a year before he led a certicate of candidacy forvice5mayor of La&ati, were 2ust assertions of his merican nationality before the termination of his merican citienship.

hus, the mere fact that private respondent 0osalind @basco Jope was a holder of an ustralian passport and had an alien certicate of registrationare not acts constituting an e?ective renunciation of citienship and do not militate against her claim of 7ilipino citienship. 7or renunciation toe?ectively result in the loss of citienship, the same must be express. s held by this $ourt in the aforecited case of A3nar , an application for analien certicate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of oneNs citienship. he application of the herein privaterespondent for an alien certicate of registration, and her holding of an ustralian passport, as in the case of >ercado v. >an3ano" were mere actsof assertion of her ustralian citienship before she e?ectively renounced the same. hus, at the most, private respondent had dual citienship Ashe was an ustralian and a 7ilipino, as well.

Loreover, under $ommonwealth ct )E, the fact that a child of 7ilipino parentMs was born in another country has not been included as a ground forlosing oneNs !hilippine citienship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her !hilippine citienship, petitionerNs claim that respondentmust go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. (:a--es v. CO4E9EC, !!/ SCR0 "!, 0ug. 6, %&&&, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

How may ilipino citi3ens who lost their citi3enship reacquire the same?

Answer:

7ilipino citiens who have lost their citienship may x x x reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. $ommonwealth ct o. )E enumeratesthe three modes by which !hilippine citienship may be reacquired by a former citien6 B1C by naturaliation, B'C by repatriation, and BEC by directact of $ongress. (riva-o v. CO4E9EC, %"/ SCR0 /%/, June %#, 66$, En 'anc 1*angani8an2> 0ntonio 'engson III v. 5RE7, G.R. No.%#&, 4ay /, %&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

Distinguish naturali3ation from repatriation.

Held:

aturaliation is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of !hilippine citienship. s a mode of initially acquiring !hilippine citienship,naturaliation is governed by $ommonwealth ct o. *=E, as amended. On the other hand, naturaliation as a mode for reacquiring !hilippinecitienship is governed by $ommonwealth ct o. )E (An Act Providing for the Cays in Chich Philippine :iti3enship >ay 2e #ost or eacquired&'=*+5. 4nder this law, a former 7ilipino citien who wishes to reacquire !hilippine citienship must possess certain qualications and none of thedisqualications mentioned in Section * of $.. *=E.

0epatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citienship due to6 B1C desertion of the armed forces(Section 6" :.A. No. *=5, B'C service in the armed forces of the allied forces in (orld (ar II (Section '" epulic Act No. *% &'%=+5, BEC service in the

rmed 7orces of the 4nited States at any other time (Sec. '" epulic Act No. 1*=@ &'*@+5, B*C marriage of a 7ilipino woman to an alien (Sec. '"epulic Act No. )'<' &'%+5, and BKC political and economic necessity (id5.

s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturaliation, repatriation simply consists of the ta&ing of an oath of allegiance to the 0epublic of the!hilippines and registering said oath in the Jocal $ivil 0egistry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. epulic (='6 S:A 6=) &'+5" we held6

9!:arenthetically, under these statutes Breferring to 0 os. +)K and ')E8C, the person desiring to reacquire !hilippine citienship would not even berequired to le a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to ta&e an oath of allegiance to the 0epublic of the !hilippines and to register thatfact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the !hilippines.

Loreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. his means that a naturalied 7ilipino who lost his citienship will berestored to his prior status as a naturalied 7ilipino citien. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural5born citien before he lost his !hilippinecitienship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural5born 7ilipino. (0ntonio 'engson III v. 5RE7, G.R. No. %#&, 4ay /, %&&, En'anc 1Kapunan2)

Cho may validly avail of repatriation under .A. No. )'<'?

Held: 0.. o. <1=1, which has lapsed into law on October 'E, 1++K, is an act providing for the repatriation BaC of 7ilipino women who have losttheir !hilippine citienship by marriage to aliens and BbC of natural5born 7ilipinos who have lost their !hilippine citienship on account of political oreconomic necessity. (Geraro 0ngat v. Repu8-ic, G.R. No. !%%, Sept. , 666 1:itug2)

2efore what agency should application for repatriation under .A )'<' e /led?

Held: 4nder Section 1 of !.. o. ='K, dated Gune K, 1+=K, amending $.. o. )E, an application for repatriation could be led with the Special:ommittee on Naturali3ation chaired by the Solicitor %eneral with the 4ndersecretary of 7oreign ?airs and the irector of the ational Intelligence$oordinating gency as the other members. lthough the agency was deactivated by virtue of !resident $oraon $. quinoNs Lemorandum of Larch '=, 1+<=, it was not, however, abrogated. he $ommittee was reactivated on Gune <, 1++K. >ence, the application should be led with saidgency, not with the 0egional rial $ourt. (Geraro 0ngat v. Repu8-ic, G.R. No. !%%, Sept. , 666 1:itug2)

>ay a natural4orn ilipino who ecame an American citi3en still e considered a natural4orn ilipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citi3enshipand" therefore" quali/ed to run for :ongressman?



Held: 0epatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. his means that a naturalied 7ilipino who lost his citienship will be restoredto his prior status as a naturalied 7ilipino citien. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural5born citien before he lost his !hilippinecitienship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural5born 7ilipino.

In respondent $ruNs case, he lost his 7ilipino citienship when he rendered service in the rmed 7orces of the 4nited States. >owever, hesubsequently reacquired !hilippine citienship under 0.. o. ')E8, which provides6

Section 1. ny person who had lost his !hilippine citienship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the rmed 7orces of the 4nitedStates, or after separation from the rmed 7orces of the 4nited States, acquired 4nited States citienship, may reacquire !hilippine citienship byta&ing an oath of allegiance to the 0epublic of the !hilippines and registering the same with Jocal $ivil 0egistry in the place where he resides or lastresided in the !hilippines. he said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citienship.

>aving thus ta&en the required oath of allegiance to the 0epublic and having registered the same in the $ivil 0egistry of Langatarem, !angasinan inaccordance with the aforecited provision, respondent $ru is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural5born citien, a status which

he acquired at birth as the son of a 7ilipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover" or return to" his originalstatus efore he lost his Philippine citi3enship.

!etitionerNs contention that respondent $ru is no longer a natural5born citien since he had to perform an act to regain his citienship is untenable.9:he term "natural5born citien# was rst dened in rticle III, Section * of the 1+=E $onstitution as follows6

Section *. natural5born citien is one who is a citien of the !hilippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his!hilippine citienship.

wo requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such6 B1C a person must be a 7ilipino citien from birth and B'C he does not have toperform any act to obtain or perfect his !hilippine citienship.

4nder the 1+=E $onstitution denition, there were two categories of 7ilipino citiens which were not considered natural5born6 B1C those who werenaturalied and B'C those born before Ganuary 1=, 1+=E (the date of eKectivity of the '<= :onstitution5, of 7ilipino mothers who, upon reaching theage of ma2ority, elected !hilippine citienship. hose "naturalied citiens# were not considered natural5born obviously because they were not7ilipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire !hilippine citienship. hose born of 7ilipino mothers before the e?ectivity of the 1+=E$onstitution were li&ewise not considered natural5born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their !hilippine citienship.

he present $onstitution, however, now considers those born of 7ilipino mothers before the e?ectivity of the 1+=E $onstitution and who elected!hilippine citienship upon reaching the ma2ority age as natural5born. fter dening who are natural5born citiens, Section ' of rticle IP adds a

sentence6 "hose who elect !hilippine citienship in accordance with paragraph BEC, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural5born citiens.#$onsequently, only naturalied 7ilipinos are considered not natural5born citiens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citiens under thepresent $onstitution that there are only two classes of citiens6 B1C those who are natural5born and B'C those who are naturalied in accordance withlaw. citien who is not a naturalied 7ilipino, i.e." did not have to undergo the process of naturaliation to obtain !hilippine citienship, necessarilyis a natural5born 7ilipino. oteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing !hilippinecitienship, subsequently reacquire it. he reason therefore is clear6 as to such persons, they would either be natural5born or naturalied dependingon the reasons for the loss of their citienship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. s respondent $ru wasnot required by law to go through naturaliation proceedings in order to reacquire his citienship, he is perforce a natural5born 7ilipino. s such, hepossessed all the necessary qualications to be elected as member of the >ouse of 0epresentatives. (0ntonio 'engson III v. 5RE7, G.R. No.%#&, 4ay /, %&&, En 'anc)

Distinguish dual citi3enship from dual allegiance.

Held: ual citienship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the di?erent laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneouslyconsidered a national by the said states. 7or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citiens of a state whichadheres to the principle of !us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of !us soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntaryact on his part, is concurrently considered a citien of both states.

ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.

(hile dual citienship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individualNs volition. (4ercao v. 4anzano, !&/ SCR0 $!&, 4ay %$,666, En 'anc)

Chat is the main concern of Section %" Article O" ')< :onstitution" on citi3enship? :onsequently" are persons with mere dual citi3enshipdisquali/ed to run for elective local positions under Section 6@(d5 of the #ocal Eovernment :ode?

Held: In including Section K in rticle IP on citienship, the concern of the $onstitutional $ommission was not with dual citiens per se but withnaturalied citiens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturaliation. >ence, the phrase "dual citienship# in0.. o. =1)8, Section *8BdC BJocal %overnment $odeC must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.# $onsequently, persons with mere dualcitienship do not fall under this disqualication. 4nli&e those with dual allegiance, who must, x x x, be sub2ect to strict process with respect to thetermination of their status, for candidates with dual citienship, it should su/ce if, upon the ling of their certicate of candidacy, they elect!hilippine citienship to terminate their status as persons with dual citienship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conFicting laws of di?erent states.

3y electing !hilippine citienship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citiens andthereby terminate their status as dual citiens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has note?ectively renounced his foreign citienship. hat is of no moment. (4ercao v. 4anzano, G.R. No. !"&#!, !&/ SCR0 $!&, 4ay %$, 666 14enoza2)

:ite instances when a citi3en of the Philippines may possess dual citi3enship considering the citi3enship clause (Article O5 of the :onstitution.

Held:

1. hose born of 7ilipino fathers andMor mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of !us soliD

'. hose born in the !hilippines of 7ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fatherNs country such children are citiens of thatcountryD

E. hose who marry aliens if by the laws of the latterNs country the former are considered citiens, unless by their act or omission they aredeemed to have renounced !hilippine citienship.

Does res !udicata apply in cases hinging on the issue of citi3enship?

Held: !etitioner maintains further that when citienship is raised as an issue in 2udicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decisionthereon is generally not considered res 2udicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the sameD citing the case of >oy a #im ao v.:ommissioner of mmigration (6' S:A 11 &'<'+5. >e insists that the same issue of citienship may be threshed out anew.



!etitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e." the principle of res !udicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issueof citienship. >owever, in the case of 2urca v. epulic (%' S:A 16) &'<=+5" an exception to this general rule was recognied. he $ourt ruled inthat case that in order that the doctrine of res !udicata may be applied in cases of citienship, the following must be present6

aC a personNs citienship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a partyD

bC the Solicitor %eneral or his authoried representative too& active part in the resolution thereof, and

cC the nding on citienship is a/rmed by this $ourt.

lthough the general rule was set forth in the case of >oy a #im ao" the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citienship. Itelucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent o/cial ndings, though not really binding, to ma&e the e?ort easier orsimpler. (:a--es v. CO4E9EC, !!/ SCR0 "!, 0ug. 6, %&&&, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

>ay the Eovernment" through the P:EE" validly ind itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the >arcos heirs pending efore theSandiganayan and other courts in a :ompromise Agreement entered into etween the former and the latter?

Held: his is a direct encroachment on 2udicial power, particularly in regard to criminal 2urisdiction. (ell5settled is the doctrine that once a casehas been led before a court of competent 2urisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the 2udge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within thesound discretion of the government prosecutorD but the court decides, based on the evidence pro?ered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Gurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the 2ustice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismissthe complaint. he prosecutionNs motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules requirethe trial court to ma&e its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to e?ecting a disposition of the caseitself.

hus, the !$%%, as the government prosecutor of ill5gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against theLarcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. (C<avez v. *CGG, %66 SCR0 /, Dec. 6, 66# 1*angani8an2)

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Chat are the tests of a valid delegation of power?

Held: -mpowering the $OL-J-$, an administrative body exercising quasi52udicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority x x x. >owever, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself isvalid. It is valid only if the law BaC is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegateDand BbC xes a standard A the limits of which are su/ciently determinate and determinable A to which the delegate must conform in theperformance of his functions. su/cient standard is one which denes legislative policy, mar&s its limits, maps out its boundaries and species thepublic agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be e?ected. (Santiago v. CO4E9EC, %/&SCR0 &$, 4arc< 6, 66/)

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

>ay the Supreme :ourt properly inquire into the motives of the lawma-ers in conducting legislative investigations? :an it en!oin the :ongress or any of its regular and special committees from ma-ing inquiries in aid of legislation?

Held: In its comment, respondent $ommittee claims that this $ourt cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawma&ers in conductinglegislative investigations, much less can it en2oin the $ongress or any of its regular and special committees x x x from ma&ing inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtains in our present system of government.

he contention is untenable. x x x

he "allocation of constitutional boundaries# is a tas& that this $ourt must perform under the $onstitution. Loreover, as held in a recent case(Neptali A. Eon3ales" et al. v. Hon. :atalino >acaraig" ;r." et al." E.. No. )<*=*" ' Novemer '@" '' S:A 6%1" 6*=5 , "9t:he political questiondoctrine neither interposes an obstacle to 2udicial determination of the rival claims. he 2urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has beengiven to this $ourt. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1+<= $onstitution, although said provision by no means does away with theapplicability of the principle in appropriate cases.# (Section '" Article O of the ')< :onstitution5

he $ourt is thus of the considered view that it has 2urisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate 3lue 0ibbon $ommittee to conduct inquires into private a?airs in purported aid of legislation. ('engzon, Jr. v.Senate '-ue Ri88on Co++ittee, %&! SCR0 /$/, Nov. %&, 66, En 'anc 1*ai--a2)



s the power of oth houses of :ongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation asolute or unlimited?

Held: he 1+<= $onstitution expressly recognies the power of both houses of $ongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation (n Arnault v.Na3areno" )< Phil. 1" this :ourt held that although there was no e8press provision in the '=% :onstitution giving such power to oth houses of :ongress" it was so incidental to the legislative function as to e implied.5. hus, Section '1, rticle PI provides x x x.

he power of both houses of $ongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribedby the afore5quoted provision of the $onstitution. hus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with itsduly published rules of procedure# and that "the rights of persons appearing in or a?ected by such inquiries shall be respected.# It follows then thatthe rights of persons under the 3ill of 0ights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testifyagainst oneNs self.

he power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate ules of Procedure Eoverning nquiries in

Aid of #egislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re5examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or theformulation of future legislation. hey may also extend to any and all matters vested by the $onstitution in $ongress andMor in the Senate alone.

s held in ;ean #. Arnault v. #eon Na3areno" et al" (No. #4=)1@" ;uly ')" '%@" )< Phil. 15" the inquiry, to be within the 2urisdiction of the legislativebody ma&ing it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the $onstitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

4nder Sec. * of the aforementioned 0ules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution led by any Senatorwhich in its 2udgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of aninquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. ('engzon, Jr. v. Senate '-ueRi88on Co++ittee, %&! SCR0 /$/, Nov. %&, 66, En 'anc 1*ai--a2)

9n '= Septemer '))" the Senate >inority loor #eader" Hon. ;uan Ponce nrile delivered a speech Gon a matter of personal privilegeI efore theSenate on the alleged Gta-e4over of S9#9# ncorporated" the Qagship on the irst >anila >anagement of :ompanies (>>:5 y icardo #opaI andcalled upon Gthe Senate to loo- into the possile violation of the law in the case" particularly with regard to epulic Act No. =@'" the Anti4Eraft and :orrupt Practices Act.I

9n motion of Senator 9rlando >ercado" the matter was referred y the Senate to the :ommittee on Accountaility of Pulic 9Lcers (2lue ion:ommittee5. $hereafter" the Senate 2lue ion :ommittee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and icardo #opa were supoenaedy the :ommittee to appear efore it and testify on Gwhat they -nowI regarding the Gsale of the thirty4si8 (=*5 corporations elonging to 2en!amin

RJo-oyM omualde3.I

At the hearing held on 1= >ay ')" icardo #opa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may Gunduly pre!udiceI the defendants in:ivil :ase No. @@=% efore the Sandiganayan. Petitioner ;ose .S. 2eng3on" ;r. li-ewise refused to testify invo-ing his constitutional right to due process" and averring that the pulicity generated y respondent :ommitteeMs inquiry could adversely aKect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co4defendants in :ivil :ase No. @@=% efore the Sandiganayan.

$he Senate 2lue ion :ommittee" thereupon" suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to /le their memorandum on the constitutionalissues raised" after which" it issued a resolution dated % ;une ') re!ecting the petitionersM plea to e e8cused from testifying" and the :ommitteevoted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. 8 8 8

:laiming that the Senate 2lue ion :ommittee is poised to supoena and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings efore the:ommittee" in e8cess of its !urisdiction and legislative rights" and that there is no appeal nor any other plain" speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law" the petitioners /led the present petition for prohiition with a prayer for temporary restraining order andor in!unctive relief.

Held: perusal of the speech of Senator -nrile reveals that he BSenator -nrileC made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 'September 1+<< accusing Lr. 0icardo "3aby# Jopa of "having ta&en over the 7LL$ %roup of $ompanies.# x x x

Perily, the speech of Senator -nrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislationD he merely called upon the Senate to loo& into a possibleviolation of Sec. K of 0 o. E81+, otherwise &nown as "he nti5%raft and $orrupt !ractices ct.# In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be

conducted by respondent 3lue 0ibbon $ommittee was to nd out whether or not the relatives of !resident quino, particularly Lr. 0icardo Jopa, hadviolated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the E) or E+ corporations belonging to 3en2amin "o&oy# 0omualde to the Jopa %roup. here appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

x x x

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent $ommittee is not really "in aid of legislation# because it is not related to apurpose within the 2urisdiction of $ongress, since the aim of the investigation is to nd out whether or not the relatives of the !resident or Lr.0icardo Jopa had violated Section K of 0 o. E81+, the "nti5%raft and $orrupt !ractices ct#, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. 3esides, the $ourt may ta&e 2udicial notice that Lr. 0icardo Jopa died during the pendency of this case. In ;ohn $. Cat-ins v. 7nited States (=%6 7.S. '<)" ' #. ed. 1D '1<= &'%<+5" it was held6

"x x x. he power of $ongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is inherent in the legislative process. hat power is broad. It encompassesinquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling $ongress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the 7ederal%overnment to expose corruption, ine/ciency or waste. 2ut road as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. $here is no general authority toe8pose the private aKairs of individuals without !usti/cation in terms of the functions of :ongress. $his was freely conceded y the Solicitor Eeneralin his arguments in this case. Nor is the :ongress a law enforcement or trial agency. $hese are functions of the e8ecutive and !udicial departmentsof government. No inquiry is an end in itself, it must e related to and in furtherance of a legislative tas- of :ongress. nvestigations conductedsolely for the personal aggrandi3ement of the investigators or to RpunishM those investigated are indefensile.I Bitalics suppliedC

It cannot be overloo&ed that when respondent $ommittee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in $ivil $ase o.88EK had already been led with the Sandiganbayan. perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against hereinpetitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the E) Bor E+C corporations belonging to 3en2amin "o&oy# 0omualde. Since the issues insaid complaint had long been 2oined by the ling of petitionersN respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent$ommittee is one over which 2urisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre5empted by that court. o allowthe respondent $ommittee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conFicting 2udgments between a legislative committee and a 2udicial tribunal, but if the $ommitteeNs 2udgment were to be reached before that of theSandiganbayan, the possibility of its inFuence being made to bear on the ultimate 2udgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In ne, for the respondent $ommittee to probe and inquire into the same 2usticiable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be anencroachment into the exclusive domain of 2udicial 2urisdiction that had much earlier set in. ('engzon, Jr. v. Senate '-ue Ri88on Co++ittee,%&! SCR0 /$/, Nov. %&, 66, En 'anc 1*ai--a2)

PetitionersM contention is that epulic Act No. <<'* ($he 8panded4OA$ #aw5 did not Goriginate e8clusivelyI in the House of epresentatives asrequired y Art. O" Sec. 16 of the :onstitution" ecause it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct ills" H. No. '''< and S. No. '*[email protected] this connection" petitioners point out that although Art. O" Sec. 16 was adopted from the American ederal :onstitution" it is notale in two



respectsT the ver Gshall originateI is quali/ed in the Philippine :onstitution y the word Ge8clusivelyI and the phrase Gas on other illsI in the American version is omitted. $his means" according to them" that to e considered as having originated in the House" epulic Act No. <<'* must retain the essence of H. No. '''<.

Held: his argument will not bear analysis. o begin with, it is not the law 5 but the revenue bill 5 which is required by the $onstitution to "originateexclusively# in the >ouse of 0epresentatives. It is important to emphasie this, because a bill originating in the >ouse may undergo such extensivechanges in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. he possibility of a third version by the conference committee will bediscussed later. t this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. o insist that arevenue statute 5 and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law 5 must substantially be thesame as the >ouse bill would be to deny the SenateHs power not only to Gconcur with amendmentsI but also to " propose amendments.I It would beto violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of $ongress and in fact ma&e the >ouse superior to the Senate.

he contention that the constitutional design is to limit the SenateHs power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to theSenate of the treaty5ratifying power (Art. O" Sec. 1'5 and thereby equalie its powers and those of the >ouse overloo&s the fact that the powers

being compared are di?erent. (e are dealing here with the legislative power which under the $onstitution is vested not only in any particularchamber but in the $ongress of the !hilippines, consisting of "a Senate and a >ouse of 0epresentatives.# (Art. O" Sec. '5 he exercise of the treaty5ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a chec& on the executive power. here is, therefore, no 2ustication forcomparing the legislative powers of the >ouse and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of a similar non5legislative power by the Senate. he possession of a similar power by the 4.S. Senate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the >ouse of 0epresentatives.

x x x %iven, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which arerequired by the $onstitution to originate in the >ouse.

It is insisted, however, that S. o. 1)E8 was passed not in substitution of >. o. 111+= but of another Senate bill BS. o. 11'+C earlier led and thatwhat the Senate did was merely to "ta&e B>. o. 111+=C into consideration# in enacting S. o. 1)E8. here is really no di?erence between theSenate preserving >. o. 111+= up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause Bwhich, it would seem,petitioners admit is an amendment by substitutionC, and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same sub2ect matter. Ineither case the result are two bills on the same sub2ect.

Indeed, what the $onstitution simply means is that the initiative for ling revenue, tari?, or tax bills, bills authoriing an increase of the public debt,private bills and bills of local application must come from the >ouse of 0epresentatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, themembers of the >ouse can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected atlarge, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. 3oth views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such

laws.

or does the $onstitution prohibit the ling in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the >ouse, so long as actionby the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the >ouse bill. he $ourt cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the factthat on Larch 1, 1++E, eight months before the >ouse passed >. o. 111+=, S. o. 11'+ had been led in the Senate. fter all it does not appearthat the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received >. o. 111+= on ovember 'E, 1++E that the process of legislation inrespect of it began with the referral to the Senate $ommittee on (ays and Leans of >. o. 111+= and the submission by the $ommittee on7ebruary =, 1++* of S. o. 1)E8. 7or that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of ling of bills, the fact is that it was in the>ouse that a bill B>. o. 'KEC to amend the P law was rst led on Guly '', 1++'. Several other bills had been led in the >ouse before S. o.11'+ was led in the Senate, and >. o. 111+= was only a substitute of those earlier bills. (7o-entino v. Secretary of inance, %!" SCR0 $!&,$$3$$!, 0ug. %", 66, En 'anc 14enoza2)

Discuss the nature of the Party4#ist system. s it" without any quali/cation" open to all?

Held:

1. he party5list system is a social 2ustice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also toenable them to become veritable lawma&ers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benet them. Itintends to ma&e the marginalied and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the StateNs benevolence, but active participants in the

mainstream of representative democracy. hus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to havethe same opportunity to participate in party5list elections would desecrate this lofty ob2ective and mongrelie the social 2ustice mechanism into anatrocious veneer for traditional politics. (0ng 'agong 'ayani ? O@ 9a8or *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. /"#6, June %$, %&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

'. $rucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social 2ustice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. heparty5list system is one such tool intended to benet those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuinepower. It is a message to the destitute and the pre2udiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation forthem to come out of their limbo and seie the opportunity.

$learly, therefore, the $ourt cannot accept the submissions x x x that the party5list system is, without any qualication, open to all. Such positiondoes not only wea&en the electoral chances of the marginalied and underrepresentedD it also pre2udices them. It would gut the substance of theparty5list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalied, it would further wea&en them andaggravate their marginaliation. (0ng 'agong 'ayani ? O@ 9a8or *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. /"#6, June %$, %&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

Are political parties 0 even the ma!or ones 0 prohiited from participating in the party4list elections?

Held: 4nder the $onstitution and 0 =+*1, private respondents cannot be disqualied from the party5list elections, merely on the ground that theyare political parties. Section K, rticle PI of the $onstitution, provides that members of the >ouse of 0epresentatives may "be elected through aparty5list system of registered national" regional" and sectoral parties or organiations.

7urthermore, under Sections = and <, rticle I; 9$: of the $onstitution, political parties may be registered under the party5list system. x x x

uring the deliberations in the $onstitutional $ommission, $omm. $hristian S. Lonsod pointed out that the participants in the party5list system may"be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, 4IO, Lagsasa&a, or a regional party in Lindanao.# x x x.

Indeed, $ommissioner Lonsod stated that the purpose of the party5list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to partiesthat consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in $ongress . >e explained6 "he purpose of this is to open thesystem. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,888,888or 1,K88,888 votes. 3ut they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the ssembly. 3ut this way, theywould have ve or six representatives in the assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially themechanics, the purpose and ob2ective of the party5list system.#

7or its part, Section ' of 0 =+*1 also provides for "a party5list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organiations orcoalitions thereof, x x x.# Section E expressly states that a "party# is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.# Lore tothe point, the law denes "political party# as "an organied group of citiens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the



general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of itsleaders and members as candidates for public o/ce.#

7urthermore, Section 11 of 0 =+*1 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party5list system. ; x x

Indubitably, therefore, political parties A even the ma2or ones A may participate in the party5list elections.

hat political parties may participate in the party5list elections does not mean, however, that any political party A or any organiation or group forthat matter A may do so. he requisite character of these parties or organiations must be consistent with the purpose of the party5list system, aslaid down in the $onstitution and 0 =+*1. ; x x (0ng 'agong 'ayani ? O@ 9a8or *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. /"#6, June %$, %&&, En'anc 1*angani8an2)



Cho are the marginali3ed and underrepresented sectors to e represented under the party4list system?

Held: he marginalied and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party5list system are enumerated in Section K of 0 =+*1 x x x.

(hile the enumeration of marginalied and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectorscan be represented under the party5list system. ; x x

9(:e stress that the party5list system see&s to enable certain 7ilipino citiens A specically those belonging to marginalied and underrepresentedsectors, organiations and parties A to be elected to the >ouse of 0epresentatives. he assertion x x x that the party5list system is not exclusive tothe marginalied and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super5rich and overrepresented can participatedesecrates the spirit of the party5list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantage of !ayatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of 7orbes!ar&. he interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparateD hence, the x x x position to treat them similarly dees reason and common sense.; x x

(hile the business moguls and the mega5rich are, numerically spea&ing, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalied nor underrepresented, for thestar& reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. raditionally, political power doesnot necessarily emanate from the sie of oneNs constituencyD indeed, it is li&ely to arise more directly from the number and amount of oneNs ban&accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalied and underrepresented in our midst are the ma2ority who wallow in poverty, destitution and inrmity. Itwas for them that the party5list system was enacted A to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine powerD to give them opportunity to beelected and to represent the specic concerns of their constituenciesD and simply to give them a direct vote in $ongress and in the larger a?airs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party5list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Perily, it invites thosemarginalied and underrepresented in the past A the farm hands, the sher fol&, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement A tocome out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. he State cannot now disappoint andfrustrate them by disabling the desecrating this social 2ustice vehicle.

3ecause the marginalied and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditionalpoliticians and vested groups, '8 percent of the seats in the >ouse of 0epresentatives were set aside for the party5list system. In arguing that eventhose sectors who normally controlled <8 percent of the seats in the >ouse could participate in the party5list elections for the remaining '8 percent,the OS% and the $omelec disregard the fundamental di?erence between the congressional district elections and the party5list elections.

s earlier noted, the purpose of the party5list provision was to open up the system, in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups andorganiations to gain representation in the >ouse of 0epresentatives through the simplest scheme possible. Jogic shows that the system has beenopened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it A those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the"simplest scheme possible# to do so. $onversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it A those privilegedsectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

x x x

Perily, allowing the non5marginalied and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party5list system would not only dilute" but also pre!udice the chance of the marginalied and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. he party5list system is a tool forthe benet of the underprivilegedD the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the pre2udice of the intended beneciaries. (0ng'agong 'ayani ? O@ 9a8or *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. /"#6, June %$, %&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

Section %(15" Article O of the :onstitution provides that &t+he party4list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total numer of representatives including those under the party4list. Does the :onstitution require all such allocated seats to e /lled up all the time and under allcircumstances?

Held: he $onstitution simply states that Q9t:he party5list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representativesincluding those under the party5list.Q

x x x

(e rule that a simple reading of Section K, rticle PI of the $onstitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that $ongress was vested withthe broad power to dene and prescribe the mechanics of the party5list system of representation. he $onstitution explicitly sets down only thepercentage of the total membership in the >ouse of 0epresentatives reserved for party5list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, $ongress enacted 0 =+*1. s said earlier, $ongress declared therein a policy to promoteQproportional representationQ in the election of party5list representatives in order to enable 7ilipinos belonging to the marginalied andunderrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benet them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organiations andcoalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party5list system in order to be entitled to a party5list seat. hose garnering more than this percentage could have Qadditional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.Q 7urthermore, nowinning party, organiation or coalition can have more than three seats in the >ouse of 0epresentatives. ; x x x

$onsidering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown x x x that Section KB'C, rticle PI of the $onstitution is not mandatory. It merelyprovides a ceiling for party5list seats in $ongress. (:eterans eeration *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. !$/#, Oct. $, %&&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

Chat are the inviolale parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine4style party4list election?

Held: o determine the winners in a !hilippine5style party5list election, the $onstitution and 0epublic ct o. =+*1 mandate at least four inviolableparameters. hese are6

irst" te twent! "er#ent $ll%#$t&%n 5 the combined number of all party5list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total

membership of the >ouse of 0epresentatives, including those elected under the party list.Second" te tw% "er#ent tres%ld 5 only those garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party5list system areQqualiedQ to have a seat in the >ouse of 0epresentatives.

$hird" te tree se$t l&'&t 5 each qualied party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seatsDthat is, one QqualifyingQ and two additional seats.

ourth" "r%"%rt&%n$l re"resent$t&%n 5 the additional seats which a qualied party is entitled to shall be computed Qin proportion to their totalnumber of votes.Q (:eterans eeration *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. !$/# an Co+panion Cases, Oct. $, %&&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

State the guidelines for screening Party4#ist Participants.

Held: In this light, the $ourt nds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the $onstitution, to assist the$omelec in its wor&.



irst" the political party, sector, organiation or coalition must represent the marginalied and underrepresented groups identied in Section K of 0=+*1. In other words, it must show A through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and trac& record Athat it represents and see&s to uplift marginalied and underrepresented sectors. Perily, ma2ority of its membership should belong to themarginalied and underrepresented. nd it must demonstrate that in a conFict of interest, it has chosen or is li&ely to choose the interest of suchsectors.

Second" while even ma2or political parties are expressly allowed by 0 =+*1 and the $onstitution to participate in the party5list system, they mustcomply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "7ilipino citiens belonging to marginalied and underrepresented sectors x x x to be electedto the >ouse of 0epresentatives.# In other words, while they are not disqualied merely on the ground that they are political parties, they mustshow, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalied and underrepresented. ; x x.

$hird" in view of the ob2ections directed against the registration of ng 3uhay >ayaang @umabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the $ourtnotes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party5list system. x x x

7urthermore, the $onstitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.# (Sec. 1 &%+" Article F &:+5 he prohibitionwas explained by a member of the $onstitutional $ommission in this wise6 "9:he prohibition is on any religious organiation registering as apolitical party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. hat is not prohibited hereD it is the registration of areligious sect as a political party.#

ourth" a party or an organiation must not be disqualied under Section ) of 0 =+*1, which enumerates the grounds for disqualication as follows6

1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organiation or association organied for religious purposesD

'. It advocates violence or unlawful means to see& its goalD

E. It is a foreign party or organiationD

*. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organiation, whether directly or through any of itso/cers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposesD

K. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to electionsD

). It declares untruthful statements in its petitionD

=. It has ceased to exist for at least one B1C yearD or

<. It fails to participate in the last two B'C preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum B'RC of the votes cast under theparty5list system in the two B'C preceding elections for the constituency in which it had registered.#

ote should be ta&en of paragraph K, which disqualies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations.

hese laws include Section ' of 0 =+*1, which states that the party5list system see&s to "enable 7ilipino citiens belonging to marginalied andunderrepresented sectors, organiations and parties x x x to become members of the >ouse of 0epresentatives.# party or organiation, therefore,that does not comply with this policy must be disqualied.

ifth" the party or organiation must not be an ad2unct of, or a pro2ect organied or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. 3y the verynature of the party5list system, the party or organiation must be a group of citiens, organied by citiens and operated by citiens. It must beindependent of the government. he participation of the government or its o/cials in the a?airs of a party5list candidate is not only illegal andunfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the ob2ective of the law6 to enable citiens belonging to marginalied and underrepresented sectorsand organiation to be elected to the >ouse of 0epresentatives.

Si8th" the party must not only comply with the requirements of the lawD its nominees must li&ewise do so. x x x

Seventh" not only the candidate party or organiation must represent marginalied and underrepresented sectorsD so also must its nominees. orepeat, under Section ' of 0 =+*1, the nominees must be 7ilipino citiens "who belong to marginalied and underrepresented sectors,organiations and parties.# Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retireeD neither can those of the urban poor or thewor&ing class, by an industrialist. o allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalied andunderrepresented.

ighth" x x x while lac&ing a well5dened political constituency, the nominee must li&ewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benet the nation as a whole. x x x (0ng 'agong 'ayani ? O@ 9a8or *arty v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. /"#6, June %$, %&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)

Accused4appellant :ongressman omeo E. ;alos!os /led a motion efore the :ourt as-ing that he e allowed to fully discharge the duties of a:ongressman" including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having een convicted in the /rst instance of a non4ailale oKense. He contended that his reelection eing an e8pression of popular will cannot e rendered inutile y any ruling" giving priority to any right or interest 0 not even the police power of the State. esolve.

Held: he immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the >ouse of 0epresentatives x x x arises from a provision of the$onstitution. he history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. he provision granting anexemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implicationor equitable considerations.

he 1+EK $onstitution provided in its rticle PI on the Jegislative epartment6

Sec. 1K. he Senators and Lembers of the >ouse of 0epresentatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privilegedfrom arrest during their attendance at the sessions of $ongress, and in going to and returning from the sameD x x x.

3ecause of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. congressman li&e the accused5appellant, convicted under itle -leven of the 0evised !enal $ode could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. >e was sub2ect to the samegeneral laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

he 1+=E $onstitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows6rticle PIII, Sec. +. Lember of the 3atasang !ambansa shall, in all o?enses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privilegedfrom arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

7or o?enses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. he restrictive interpretation of immunity andthe intent to conne it within carefully dened parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit6

x x x but the 3atasang !ambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its ad2ournment for arecess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

he present $onstitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of $ongress to surrender the sub2ect $ongressman to the custodyof the law. he requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. 7or relatively minor o?enses, it isenough that $ongress is in session.

he accused5appellant argues that a member of $ongressN function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 1)B'C, rticle PI of the $onstitutionwhich states that A





Do courts have the power to inquire into allegations that" in enacting a law" a House of :ongress failed to comply with its own rules?

Held: he cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enactinga law, a >ouse of $ongress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision orthe right of private individuals. In 9smena v. Pendatun ('@ Phil. At )<@4)<'5" it was held6 "t any rate, courts have declared that Tthe rules adoptedby deliberative bodies are sub2ect to revocation, modication or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.N nd it has been said thatT!arliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. hey may be waived or disregarded by thelegislative body.N $onsequently, Tmere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate that action Bta&en by a deliberative bodyC whenthe requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.N#

It must be realied that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade withoutupsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. ue regard for the wor&ing of our system of government, more than mere

comity, compels reluctance on the part of the courts to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the >ouse. $ourts mustaccordingly decline the invitation to exercise their power. (0rroyo v. De :enecia, %// SCR0 %$#, 0ug. , 66/ 14enoza2)

Chat is the 2icameral :onference :ommittee? Discuss the nature of its function and its !urisdiction.

Held: (hile it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising di?erences between the Senate and the >ouse, it is notlimited in its 2urisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus6

conference committee may deal generally with the sub2ect matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise di?erences between the twohouses. -ven where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its 2urisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with whichnew sub2ect matter can be inserted into the conference bill. 3ut occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyondits mandate. hese excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee 2urisdiction. his is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. (*<i-ippine Juges 0ssociation v. *rao, %%/ SCR0 /&!, Nov. , 66!, En 'anc 1Cruz2)



Discuss the nrolled 2ill Doctrine.

Held: 4nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of >. 3ill o. =1<+ by the Spea&er of the >ouse and the !resident of the Senate and thecertication by the secretaries of both >ouses of $ongress that it was passed on ovember '1, 1++) are conclusive of its due enactment. x x x obe sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the -P cases ($olentino v. Secretary of inance5 that the enrolled bill embodies aconclusive presumption. In one case (Astorga v. Oillegas" %* S:A <'6 &'<6+5 we "went behind# an enrolled bill and consulted the Gournal todetermine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.

3ut, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this $ourt will respect the certication of the presiding o/cers of both >ouses that a bill hasbeen duly passed. 4nder this rule, this $ourt has refused to determine claims that the three5fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment tothe $onstitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.# x x x

his $ourt has refused to even loo& into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the !resident contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously#inserted in the conference committee x x x. ($olentino v. Secretary of inance5

It has refused to loo& into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of rt. PI, Sec. ')B'C of the $onstitutionthat "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed.# (Philippine ;udges AssMn v. Prado" 11< S:A <@=" <'@ &'=+5

In other cases, this $ourt has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certied by the presiding o/cers of both >ouses of $ongress.

he enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well5established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. he enrolled bill rulerests on the following considerations6

x x x. s the !resident has no authority to approve a bill not passed by $ongress, an enrolled ct in the custody of the Secretary of State, andhaving the o/cial attestations of the Spea&er of the >ouse of 0epresentatives, of the !resident of the Senate, and of the !resident of the 4nitedStates, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with theduty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by $ongress. he respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the 2udicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed $ongress, all bills authenticated in the manner statedD leaving thecourt to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the ct, so authenticated, is in conformity with the $onstitution. (>arshall ield U:o. v. :lar-" '6= 7.S. *6" *<1" =* #. d. 16" =@=5

o overrule the doctrine now, x x x is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. (0rroyo v. De:enecia, %// SCR0 %$#, 0ug. , 66/ 14enoza2)

Chen should the #egislative ;ournal e regarded as conclusive upon the courts" and why?

Held: he Gournal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the $onstitution to be recorded therein. (ith respect toother matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Gournals have also been accorded conclusive e?ects. hus, in 7nited States v. Pons(=6 Phil. <1" <=% &''*++" quoting e8 rel. Herron v. Smith" 66 9hio =6) &'))*+5" this $ourt spo&e of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Gournals as "public memorials of the most permanent character,# thus6 "hey should be public, because all are required to conform to themD theyshould be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at someremote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.# ; x x. (0rroyo v. De :enecia, %// SCR0 %$#, %6#3%66, 0ug. ,66/ 14enoza2)

Chat matters are required to e entered on the ;ournal?

Held:

1. he yeas and nays on the third and nal reading of a bill (Art. O" Sec. 1*&1+5D

'. he yeas and nays on any question, at the request of one5fth of the members present (d." Sec. '*&6+5,

E. he yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the !residentNs veto (d." Sec. 1<&'+5D and

*. he !residentNs ob2ection to a bill he had vetoed (d.5.

A disquali/cation case was /led against a candidate for :ongressman efore the election with the :9>#:. $he latter failed to resolve that disquali/cation case efore the election and that candidate won" although he was not yet proclaimed ecause of that pending disquali/cation case.s the :9>#: now ousted of !urisdiction to resolve the pending disquali/cation case and" therefore" should dismiss the case" considering that !urisdiction is now vested with the House of epresentatives lectoral $riunal (H$5?

Held: 1. In his rst assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the Lay <, 1++K elections, the $OL-J-$ lost its 2urisdiction overthe question of petitionerNs qualications to run for member of the >ouse of 0epresentatives. >e claims that 2urisdiction over the petition fordisqualication is exclusively lodged with the >ouse of 0epresentatives -lectoral ribunal B>0-C. %iven the yet5unresolved question of 2urisdiction,petitioner avers that the $OL-J-$ committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as thewinning candidate in the Second $ongressional istrict of La&ati $ity. (e disagree.

!etitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the >ouse of 0epresentatives and a member of the same.Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 1= of rticle PI of the 1+<= $onstitution reads6

he Senate and the >ouse of 0epresentatives shall have an -lectoral ribunal which shall be the sole 2udge of all contests relating to the election,returns and qualications of their respective Lembers.

4nder the above5stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes 2urisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and

qualications of candidates for either the Senate or the >ouse only when the latter become memers of either the Senate or the >ouse of 0epresentatives. candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not ta&en his oath of o/ce cannot be said to be a member of the >ouse of 0epresentatives sub2ect to Section 1= of rticle PI of the $onstitution. (hile the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial,3.!. 3lg. <<1 in con2unction with Sec. ) of 0.. ))*) allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. hus, petitionerNscontention that "after the conduct of the election and BpetitionerC has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the $OL-J-$ is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualication# nds no basis in law, because even after theelections the $OL-J-$ is empowered by Section ) Bin relation to Section =C of 0.. ))*) to continue to hear and decide questions relating toqualications of candidates. ; x x.

4nder the above5quoted provision, not only is a disqualication case against a candidate allowed to continue after the election Band does not oustthe $OL-J-$ of its 2urisdictionC, but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedingsagainst him when the evidence of guilt is strong. (hile the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong# seems to suggest that the provisions of Section ) ought to be applicable only to disqualication cases under Section )< of the Omnibus -lection $ode, Section = of 0.. ))*) allows theapplication of the provisions of Section ) to cases involving disqualication based on ineligibility under Section =< of 3!. 3lg. <<1. ; x x. (0uino v.CO4E9EC, %# SCR0 &&, /36, Sept. #, 66", En 'anc 1Kapunan, J.2)

'. s to the >ouse of 0epresentatives -lectoral ribunalNs supposed assumption of 2urisdiction over the issue of petitionerNs qualications after theLay <, 1++K elections, su/ce it to say that >0-Ns 2urisdiction as the sole 2udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualications of







Impeachment $ourt is now functus oLcio" it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should rst be impeached and then convicted before hecan be prosecuted. he plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for itwill place him in a better situation than a non5sitting !resident who has not been sub2ected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the ob2ectof a criminal prosecution. o be sure, the debates in the $onstitutional $ommission ma&e it clear that when impeachment proceedings havebecome moot due to the resignation of the !resident, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be led against him x x x.

his is in accord with our ruling in n eT Saturnino 2ermude3 ('6% S:A '*@ &')*+5 that "incumbent !residents are immune from suit or from beingbrought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure# ut not eyond) $onsidering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachmentprocess against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner -strada cannot demand as a condition sine quanon to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. (Estraa v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.$/&3", 4ar. %, %&&, en 'anc)

State the reason why not all appointments made y the President under the ')< :onstitution will no longer require con/rmation y the:ommission on Appointments.

Held: he aforecited provision (Section '*" Article O5 of the $onstitution has been the sub2ect of several cases on the issue of the restrictivefunction of the $ommission on ppointments with respect to the appointing power of the !resident. his $ourt touched upon the historicalantecedent of the said provision in the case of Sarmiento v. >ison ('%* S:A %65 in which it was ratiocinated upon that Section 1) of rticle PIIof the 1+<= $onstitution requiring conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments of certain appointments issued by the !resident contemplates asystem of chec&s and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government. -xperience showed that when almost allpresidential appointments required the consent of the $ommission on ppointments, as was the case under the 1+EK $onstitution, the commissionbecame a venue of Qhorse tradingQ and similar malpractices . On the other hand, placing absolute power to ma&e appointments in the !resident withhardly any chec& by the legislature, as what happened under the 1+=E $onstitution, leads to abuse of such power. hus was perceived the need toestablish a Qmiddle groundQ between the 1+EK and 1+=E $onstitutions. he framers of the 1+<= $onstitution deemed it imperative to sub2ectcertain high positions in the government to the power of conrmation of the $ommission on ppointments and to allow other positions within theexclusive appointing power of the !resident. (4ana-o v. Sistoza, !% SCR0 %!6, 0ug. , 666, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

numerate the groups of oLcers who are to e appointed y the President under Section '*" Article O of the ')< :onstitution" and identify thoseoLcers whose appointments shall require con/rmation y the :ommission on Appointments.

Held: $onformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento v. >ison (id.5" and in the subsequent cases of

2autista v. Salonga ('<1 S:A '*@5" Vuintos4Deles v. :onstitutional :ommission ('<< S:A 1%5" and :alderon v. :arale (1@) S:A 1%65" underSection 1), rticle PII, of the $onstitution, there are four groups of o/cers of the government to be appointed by the !resident6

7irst, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, o/cers of the armed forces from the ran& of colonelor naval captain, and other o/cers whose appointments are vested in him in this $onstitutionD

Second, all other o/cers of the %overnment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by lawD

hird, those whom the !resident may be authoried by law to appointD

7ourth, o/cers lower in ran& whose appointments the $ongress may by law vest in the !resident alone.

It is well5settled that only presidential appointees belonging to the rst group require the conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments.(4ana-o v. Sistoza, !% SCR0 %!6, 0ug. , 666, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

7nder epulic Act *<% (the D#E Act of '@5" the Director Eeneral" Deputy Director Eeneral" and other top oLcials of the Philippine NationalPolice (PNP5 shall e appointed y the President and their appointments shall require con/rmation y the :ommission on Appointments.espondent Sisto3a was appointed Director Eeneral of the PNP ut he refused to sumit his appointment papers to the :ommission on Appointments for con/rmation contending that his appointment shall no longer require con/rmation despite the e8press provision of the lawrequiring such con/rmation. Should his contention e upheld?

Held: It is well5settled that only presidential appointees belonging to the rst group Benumerated under the rst sentence of Section 1), rticle PIIof the 1+<= $onstitutionC require the conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments. he appointments of respondent o/cers who are not withinthe rst category, need not be conrmed by the $ommission on ppointments. s held in the case of $arrosa v. Singson (1=1 S:A %%=5" $ongresscannot by law expand the power of conrmation of the $ommission on ppointments and require conrmation of appointments of other governmento/cials not mentioned in the rst sentence of Section 1) of rticle PII of the 1+<= $onstitution.

$onsequently, unconstitutional are Sections ') and E1 of 0epublic ct )+=K which empower the $ommission on ppointments to conrm theappointments of public o/cials whose appointments are not required by the $onstitution to be conrmed. x x x. (4ana-o v. Sistoza, !% SCR0%!6, 0ug. , 666, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

Cill it e correct to argue that since the Philippine National Police is a-in to the Armed orces of the Philippines" therefore" the appointments of police oLcers whose ran- is equal to that of colonel or naval captain will require con/rmation y the :ommission on Appointments?

Held: his contention is x x x untenable. he !hilippine ational !olice is separate and distinct from the rmed 7orces of the !hilippines. he$onstitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. 4nder Section * of rticle ;PI of the 1+<= $onstitution,

Qhe rmed 7orces of the !hilippines shall be composed of a citien armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may beprovided by law. It shall &eep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.Q

On the other hand, Section ) of the same rticle of the $onstitution ordains that6

Qhe State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlledby a national police commission. he authority of local executives over the police units in their 2urisdiction shall be provided by law.Q

o so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, $ongress enacted 0epublic ct )+=K x x x.

hereunder, the police force is di?erent from and independent of the armed forces and the ran&s in the military are not similar to those in the!hilippine ational !olice. hus, directors and chief superintendents of the !! x x x do not fall under the rst category of presidential appointeesrequiring conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments. (4ana-o v. Sistoza, !% SCR0 %!6, 0ug. , 666, En 'anc 1*urisi+a2)

$o what types of appointments is Section '%" Article O of the ')< :onstitution (prohiiting the President from ma-ing appointments two monthsefore the ne8t presidential elections and up to the end of his term5 directed against?

Held: Section 1K, rticle PII is directed against two types of appointments6 B1C those made for buying votes and B'C those made for partisanconsiderations. he rst refers to those appointments made within two months preceding the !residential election and are similar to those which





" designation as cting $hairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. o cause need be established to 2ustify its revocation. ssuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as cting $hairman of the $ommission on -lections may be withdrawnby the !resident of the !hilippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees t. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted suchdesignation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

he $onstitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the $ommission on -lections, foremost among which is the security of tenureof its members. hat guarantee is not available to the respondent as cting $hairman of the $ommission on -lections by designation of the!resident of the !hilippines.#

-arlier, in acionalista !arty v. 3autista B<K !hil. 181 91+*+:C, a case decided under the 1+EK $onstitution, which did not have a provision prohibitingtemporary or acting appointments to the $OL-J-$, this $ourt nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor %eneral asacting member of the $OL-J-$. his $ourt ruled that the designation of an acting $ommissioner would undermine the independence of the$OL-J-$ and hence violate the $onstitution. (e declared then6 "It would be more in &eeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the$onstitution to appoint a permanent $ommissioner than to designate one to act temporarily.#

In the instant case, the !resident did in fact appoint permanent $ommissioners to ll the vacancies in the $OL-J-$, sub2ect only to conrmation bythe $ommission on ppointments. 3enipayo, 3orra and uason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of $ongress. hey werenot appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unli&e $ommissioner >aydee @orac in 3rillantes v. @orac and Solicitor %eneral 7elix3autista in acionalista !arty v. 3autista. he ad interim appointments of 3enipayo, 3orra and uason are expressly allowed by the $onstitutionwhich authories the !resident, during the recess of $ongress, to ma&e appointments that ta&e e?ect immediately.

(hile the $onstitution mandates that the $OL-J-$ "shall be independent,# this provision should be harmonied with the !residentNs power toextend ad interim appointments. o hold that the independence of the $OL-J-$ requires the $ommission on ppointments to rst conrm adinterim appointees before the appointees can assume o/ce will negate the !residentNs power to ma&e ad interim appointments. his is contrary tothe rule on statutory construction to give meaning and e?ect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framersof the $onstitution.

he original draft of Section 1), rticle PII of the $onstitution A on the nomination of o/cers sub2ect to conrmation by the $ommission onppointments A did not provide for ad interim appointments. he original intention of the framers of the $onstitution was to do away with ad interimappointments because the plan was for $ongress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief E85day compulsory recess. >owever,because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the $onstitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisionsof the 1+EK $onstitution on ad interim appointments. ; x x.

x x x

$learly, the reinstatement in the present $onstitution of the ad interim appointing power of the !resident was for the purpose of avoidinginterruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government o/ces, including the threeconstitutional commissions. In his concurring opinion in %uevarra v. Inocentes B1) S$0 E=+ 91+)):C, decided under the 1+EK $onstitution, Gustice0oberto $oncepcion, Gr. explained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in this manner6

"ow, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limitedU 3ecause, if they expired before the session of $ongress, the evil sought to beavoided A interruption in the discharge of essential functions A may ta&e place. 3ecause the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to bee?ective during the session of $ongress and before its ad2ournment. 4pon the other hand, once $ongress has ad2ourned, the evil aforementionedmay easily be con2ured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or reappointments.#

Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 1), rticle PII of the $onstitution barely avoided the interruption of essentialgovernment services in the Lay '881 national elections. 7ollowing the decision of this $ourt in %aminde v. $ommission on ppointments BE*= S$0)KK 9'888:C, promulgated on ecember 1E, '888, the terms of o/ce of constitutional o/cers rst appointed under the $onstitution would have tobe counted starting 7ebruary ', 1+<=, the date of ratication of the $onstitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. 3y thisrec&oning, the terms of o/ce of three $ommissioners of the $OL-J-$, including the $hairman, would end on 7ebruary ', '881 BSee Section 19':,rticle I;5$ of the $onstitutionC.

; x x

uring an election year, $ongress normally goes on voluntary recess between 7ebruary and Gune considering that many of the members of the>ouse of 0epresentatives and the Senate run for re5election. In '881, the -leventh $ongress ad2ourned from Ganuary +, '881 to Gune E, '881.

$oncededly, there was no more time for 3enipayo, 3orra and uason, who were originally extended ad interim appointments only on Larch '','881, to be conrmed by the $ommission on ppointments before the Lay 1*, '881 elections.

If 3enipayo, 3orra and uason were not extended ad interim appointments to ll up the three vacancies in the $OL-J-$, there would only havebeen one division functioning in the $OL-J-$ instead of two during the Lay '881 elections. $onsidering that the $onstitution requires that "all x xx election cases shall be heard and decided in division,# the remaining one division would have been swamped with election cases. Loreover, sinceunder the $onstitution motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by the $ommission en banc#, the mere absence of one of the four remainingmembers would have prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the $ommissioners are expected to travel around the countrybefore, during and after the elections. here was a great probability that disruptions in the conduct of the Lay '881 elections could occur becauseof the three vacancies in the $OL-J-$. he successful conduct of the Lay '881 national elections, right after the tumultuous -S II and -S IIIevents, was certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.

-vidently, the exercise by the !resident in the instant case of her constitutional power to ma&e ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 1), rticle PII of the $onstitution. his power to ma&e ad interimappointments is lodged in the !resident to be exercised by her in her sound 2udgment. 4nder the second paragraph of Section 1), rticle PII of the$onstitution, the !resident can choose either of two modes in appointing o/cials who are sub2ect to conrmation by the $ommission onppointments. 7irst, while $ongress is in session, the !resident may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the $ommissionon ppointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume o/ce. Second, during the recess of $ongress, the !resident may extend an ad interimappointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume o/ce.

(hether the !resident chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the!resident because the $onstitution grants her that power. his $ourt cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the !resident in theexercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac& or excess of 2urisdiction on her part, which has not beenshown in the instant case.

he issuance by !residents of ad interim appointments to the $OL-J-$ is a long5standing practice. ; x x

he !residentNs power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed brieFy put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and conrmingpowers. his situation, however, in only for a short period A from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the $ommission onppointments gives or withholds its consent. he $onstitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade5o? against the evil of disruptions in vitalgovernment services. his is also part of the chec&5and5balance under the separation of powers, as a trade5o? against the evil of granting the!resident absolute and sole power to appoint. he $onstitution has wisely sub2ected the !residentNs appointing power to the chec&ing power of thelegislature.

his situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the $OL-J-$ as a constitutional body. he vacancies in the $OL-J-$ areprecisely staggered to insure that the ma2ority of its members hold conrmed appointments, and no one !resident will appoint all the $OL-J-$members. ; x x. he special constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the $OL-J-$ remain in place BSee Sections, E, *, K and ),rticle I;5 of the $onstitutionC.



In ne, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the !resident to 3enipayo, 3orra and uason, as $OL-J-$ $hairman and$ommissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution.(4ati8ag v. 'enipayo, !#& SCR0 6, 0pri- %, %&&%, En 'anc 1Carpio2)

Does the renewal of ad interim appointments violate the prohiition on reappointment under Section '(15" Article F4: of the ')< :onstitution?

Held: !etitioner also argues that assuming the rst ad interim appointment and the rst assumption of o/ce of 3enipayo, 3orra and uason areconstitutional, the renewal of their ad interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of o/ce to the same positions violate the prohibitionon reappointment under Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution, which provides as follows6

"he $hairman and the $ommissioners shall be appointed by the !resident with the consent of the $ommission on ppointments for a term of

seven years without reappointment. Of those rst appointed, three Lembers shall hold o/ce for seven years, two Lembers for ve years, and thelast Lembers for three years, without reappointment.I

!etitioner theories that once an ad interim appointee is by5passed by the $ommission on ppointments, his ad interim appointment can no longerbe renewed because this will violate Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution which prohibits reappointments. !etitioner asserts that this isparticularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed o/ce, which is the situation of 3enipayo, 3orra and uason if their ad interimappointments are deemed permanent in character.

here is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the $ommission on ppointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. he disapproval is a nal decision of the $ommission on ppointments in the exercise of its chec&ing power on the appointing authority of the!resident. he disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the $ommission on ppointments to give its consent after deliberating onthe qualications of the appointee. Since the $onstitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is nal and bindingon the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the !resident can no longer renew the appointment not because of theconstitutional prohibition on appointment, but because of a nal decision by the $ommission on ppointments to withhold its consent to theappointment.

n ad interim appointment that is by5passed because of lac& of time or failure of the $ommission on ppointments to organie is another matter. by5passed appointment is one that has not been nally acted upon on the merits by the $ommission on ppointments at the close of the session of $ongress. here is no nal decision by the $ommission on ppointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the$onstitution. bsent such decision, the !resident is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by5passed appointee. his is recognied inSection 1= of the 0ules of the $ommission on ppointments x x x. >ence, under the 0ules of the $ommission on ppointments, a by5passedappointment can be considered again if the !resident renew the appointment.

It is well5settled in this 2urisdiction that the !resident can renew the ad interim appointments of by5passed appointees. Gustice 0oberto $oncepcion, Gr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Euevarra v. nocentes (Supra" note =65 why by5passed ad interim appointees could be extended newappointments, thus6

"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be e?ective upon disapproval by the $ommission, because the incumbent can not continue holdingo/ce over the positive ob2ection of the $ommission. It ceases, also, upon "the next ad2ournment of the $ongress#, simply because the !residentmay then issue new appointments A not because of implied disapproval of the $ommission deduced from its intention during the session of $ongress, for, under the $onstitution, the $ommission may a?ect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by omission. If thead2ournment of $ongress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the !resident could no longer appointthose so by5passed by the $ommission. 3ut, the fact is that the President may reappoint them" thus clearly indicating that the reason for saidtermination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the $ommission, but thecircumstance that upon said ad!ournment of the :ongress" the President is free to ma-e ad interim appointments or reappointments.I

Euevarra was decided under the 1+EK $onstitution from where the second paragraph of Section 1), rticle PII of the present $onstitution on adinterim appointments was lifted veratim. he 2urisprudence under the 1+EK $onstitution governing ad interim appointments by the !resident isdoubtless applicable to the present $onstitution. he established practice under the present $onstitution is that the !resident can renew the

appointments of by5passed ad interim appointees. his is a continuation of the well5recognied practice under the 1+EK $onstitution, interruptedonly by the 1+=E $onstitution which did not provide for a $ommission on ppointments but vested sole appointing power in the !resident.

he prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution applies neither to disapproval nor by5passed ad interimappointments. disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is nal underSection 1), rticle PII of the $onstitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution. by5passed ad interim appointment cannot be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no nal disapproval under Section 1), rticlePII of the $onstitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the xed term of seven years.

Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution provides that "9t:he $hairman and the $ommissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment.# here are four situations where this provision will apply. he rst situation is where an ad interim appointee to the$OL-J-$, after conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments, serves his full seven5year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the$OL-J-$, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. he second situation is wherethe appointee, after conrmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven5year term of o/ce ends. Such person cannot bereappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee alsoserving more than seven years. he third situation is where the appointee is conrmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died orresigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancyarising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.

he fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation.-ven if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited becausehis situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution. his provision refers tothe rst appointees under the $onstitution whose terms of o/ce are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under anysituation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of 2enipayo" 2orra and $uason.

he framers of the $onstitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of o/ce as $OL-J-$ member A whether for a full termof seven years, a truncated term of ve or three years, or even an unexpired term for any length of time A can no longer be reappointed to the$OL-J-$. ; x x

x x x

In Oisarra v. >iraQor () S:A ' &'*=+5, Gustice ngelo 3autista, in his concurring opinion, quoted Nacionalista v. De Oera ()% Phil. '1* &'6+5 that a9r:eappointment is not prohibited when a $ommissioner has held, o/ce only for, say, three or six years, provided his term will not exceed nine yearsin all.# his was the interpretation despite the express provision in the 1+EK $onstitution that a $OL-J-$ member "shall hold o/ce for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed.#

o foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment# appears twice in Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the present $onstitution. he rstphrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. he second phrase prohibits reappointment of any



person previously appointed for a term of ve or three years pursuant to the rst set of appointees under the $onstitution. In either case, it doesnot matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of o/ce for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any &ind.

>owever, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the $ommission on ppointments does not constitute a term of o/ce. heperiod from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a xed term nor an unexpired term. o hold otherwisewould mean that the !resident by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of o/ce in the $OL-J-$ without the consentof the $ommission on ppointments. his interpretation renders inutile the conrming power of the $ommission on ppointments.

he phrase "without reappointment# applies only to one who has been appointed by the !resident and conrmed by the $ommission onppointments, whether or not such person completes his term of o/ce. here must be a conrmation by the $ommission on ppointments of theprevious appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. o hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the !residentNspower to ma&e ad interim appointments.

In the great ma2ority of cases, the $ommission on ppointments usually fails to act, for lac& of time, on the ad interim appointments rst issued to

appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the !resident will certainly hesitate to ma&e ad interim appointmentsbecause most of her appointees will e?ectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the $ommission on ppointments. his will nullify theconstitutional power of the !resident to ma&e ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. his$ourt cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wrea& havoc on vital government services.

he prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. he framers of the present $onstitution prohibitedreappointments for two reasons. he rst is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and conrmed even if they served for less than seven years. he second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond thexed term of seven years. ; x x.

x x x

!lainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any &ind. On the other hand, the prohibition ontemporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointeeNstotal term of o/ce exceeding seven years. he evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specic A reappointment of any &ind andexceeding oneNs term in o/ce beyond the maximum period of seven years.

ot contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the $onstitution tightened even further the screws on those who might wish toextend their terms of o/ce. hus, the word "designated# was inserted to plug any loophole that might be exploited by violators of the $onstitutionx x x.

he ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of 3enipayo, 3orra and uason do not violate the prohibition onreappointments because there were no previous appointments that were conrmed by the $ommission on ppointments. reappointmentpresupposes a previous conrmed appointment. he same ad interim appointments and renewal of appointments will also not breach the seven5year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of 2enipayo" 2orra and $uason are for a /8ed term e8piring on eruary 1" 1@@). ny delay in their conrmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of o/ce. $onsequently, there is no danger whatsoever thatthe renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twinprohibitions in the $onstitution. he continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of o/ce expire on 7ebruary ', '88<, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 B'C, rticle I;5$ of the $onstitution. (4ati8ag v.'enipayo, !#& SCR0 6, 0pri- %, %&&%, En 'anc 1Carpio2)

>a. velyn S. Ae!a was a municipal mayor. She ran for reelection ut lost. 2efore she vacated her oLce" though" she e8tended permanent appointments to fourteen new employees of the municipal government. $he incoming mayor" upon assuming oLce" recalled said appointmentscontending that these were Gmidnight appointmentsI and" therefore" prohiited under Sec. '%" Art. O of the ')< :onstitution. Should the act of the new mayor of recalling said appointments on the aforestated ground e sustained?

Held: he records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen B1*C private respondents beforethe $S$, the only reason he cited to 2ustify his action was that these were "midnight appointments# that are forbidden under rticle PII, Section 1Kof the $onstitution. >owever, the $S$ ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and infact, there is no law that prohibits local elective o/cials from ma&ing appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. (De Ra+a v. Court of

0ppea-s (!"! SCR0 6, e8. %#, %&&, En 'anc 1Bnares3Santiago2)

Distinguish the PresidentMs power to call out the armed forces as their :ommander4in4:hief in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence"invasion or reellion" from his power to proclaim martial and suspend the privilege of the writ of haeas corpus. 8plain why the former is not su!ect to !udicial review while the latter two are.

Held: here is a clear textual commitment under the $onstitution to bestow on the !resident full discretionary power to call out the armed forcesand to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 1<, rticle PII of the $onstitution, which embodies the powers of the!resident as $ommander5in5$hief, provides in part6

he !resident shall be the $ommander5in5$hief of all armed forces of the !hilippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out sucharmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, hemay, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of haeas corpus" or place the !hilippines or any part thereof undermartial law.

he full discretionary power of the !resident to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and furtherreinforced in the rest of Section 1<, rticle PII x x x.

4nder the foregoing provisions, $ongress may revo&e such proclamations Bof martial lawC or suspension Bof the privilege of the writ of haeascorpusC and the $ourt may review the su/ciency of the factual basis thereof. >owever, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with therevocation or review of the !residentHs action to call out the armed forces. he distinction places the calling out power in a di?erent category from

the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of haeas corpus" otherwise, the framers of the $onstitutionwould have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualication. 8pressio unios est e8clusio alterius. ; x x. hat the intent of the $onstitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the!resident, is extant in the deliberation of the $onstitutional $ommission x x x.

he reason for the di?erence in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the !resident the widest leeway andbroadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspendthe privilege of the writ of haeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certainbasic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by $ongress and review by this $ourt.

Loreover, under Section 1<, rticle PII of the $onstitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of haeas corpus or toimpose martial law, two conditions must concur6 B1C there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, B'C public safety must require it. heseconditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. he only criterion is that Qwhenever it becomes necessary,Q the!resident may call the armed forces Qto prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.Q he implication is that the !resident is givenfull discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the !resident acted without factual basis, then this $ourt cannot underta&e anindependent investigation beyond the pleadings. he factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantiable and cannot be



ob2ectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to thecourts. 3esides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to 2udge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such 2udgment mightalso prove unmanageable for the courts. $ertain pertinent information might be di/cult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In manyinstances, the evidence upon which the !resident might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constitutingtechnical proof.

On the other hand, the !resident as $ommander5in5$hief has a vast intelligence networ& to gather information, some of which may be classied ashighly condential or a?ecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on5the5spot decisions may be imperatively necessary inemergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent orsuppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any e?ect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we considerthe present situation in Lindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. he determination of the necessityfor the calling out power if sub2ected to unfettered 2udicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be undulystrait2ac&eted by an in2unction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

hus, it is the unclouded intent of the $onstitution to vest upon the !resident, as $ommander5in5$hief of the rmed 7orces, full discretion to callforth the military when in his 2udgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 4nless thepetitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the !residentHs exercise of 2udgment deserves to be accorded respectfrom this $ourt. (Integrate 'ar of t<e *<i-ippines v. 5on. Rona-o '. a+ora, G.R. No. %#, 0ug. ", %&&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

2y issuing a $9 on the date convicted rapist #eo chegaray is to e e8ecuted y lethal in!ection" the Supreme :ourt was critici3ed on the ground"among others" that it encroached on the power of the President to grant reprieve under Section '" Article O" ')< :onstitution. ;ustify the S:Bsact.

Held: Section 1+, rticle PII of the 1+<= $onstitution is simply the source of power of the !resident to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardonsand remit nes and forfeitures after conviction by nal 2udgment. his provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts tocontrol the enforcement of their decisions after the nality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by nal 2udgment still possesses collateralrights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. 7or instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his nal conviction cannotbe executed while in a state of insanity (See Article < of the evised Penal :ode5. he suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably anexercise of 2udicial power. It is not usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its e?ect is the same A the temporary suspension of theexecution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that $ongress can at any time amend 0.. o. =)K+ by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. he e?ect of such an amendment is li&e that of commutation of sentence. 3ut by no stretch of the imagination can theexercise by $ongress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the !residentNs power to commute nal sentences of

conviction. $he powers of the 8ecutive" the #egislative and the ;udiciary to save the life of a death convict do not e8clude each other for thesimple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. (Ec<egaray v. Secretary of Justice, !& SCR0 6$, Jan. 6, 666, En 'anc 1*uno2)

Discuss the nature of a conditional pardon. s its grant or revocation y the President su!ect to !udicial review?

Held: conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the $hief -xecutive and the convicted criminal to thee?ect that the former will release the latter sub2ect to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommittedto prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one (Alvare3 v. Director of Prisons" )@ Phil. %@5. 3y the pardoneeNs consentto the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the $hief -xecutive or his delegate who isduty5bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. 4nder Section )*BiC of the 0evised dministrative$ode, the $hief -xecutive is authoried to order "the arrest and re5incarceration of any such person who, in his 2udgment, shall fail to comply withthe condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.# It is now a well5entrenched rule in this 2urisdiction that this exercise of presidential 2udgment is beyond 2udicial scrutiny. he determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound 2udgment of the $hief -xecutive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the 2udgment of the powerthat has granted it, cannot invo&e the aid of the courts, however erroneous the ndings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

It matters not that the pardonee has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases led against him subsequent to his conditionalpardon, and that the third remains pending for thirteen B1EC years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

4ltimately, solely vested in the $hief -xecutive, who in the rst place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is thecorollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own 2udgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges led against him,warrants the same. $ourts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the !resident of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been ourfortied ruling that a nal 2udicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the !resident to determine whether or notthere has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. here is li&ewise nil a basis for the courts to e?ectuate the reinstatement of aconditional pardon revo&ed by the !resident in the exercise of powers undisputably solely and absolutely in his o/ce. (In Re= @i-freo Su+u-ong7orres, %" SCR0 /&6, Dec. %6, 66" 15er+osisi+a2)

Cho has the power to ratify a treaty?

Held: In our 2urisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the !resident and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. he role of the Senate islimited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratication . ('0B0N 1'agong 0-yansang 4aa8ayan2 v. EFecutiveSecretary Rona-o a+ora, G.R. No. !#"/&, Oct. &, %&&&, En 'anc 1'uena2)

Chat is the power of impoundment of the President? Chat are its principal sources?

Held: Impoundment refers to the refusal of the !resident, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by $ongress. It is the failure to

spend or obligate budget authority of any type.

!roponents of impoundment have invo&ed at least three principal sources of the authority of the !resident. 7oremost is the authority to impoundgiven to him either expressly or impliedly by $ongress. Second is the executive power drawn from the !residentNs role as $ommander5in5$hief. hird is the 7aithful -xecution $lause.

he proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the !resident desist from implementing the law if doing so would pre2udicepublic interest. n example given is when through e/cient and prudent management of a pro2ect, substantial savings are made. In such a case, itis sheer folly to expect the !resident to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (*5I9CONS0 v. Enriuez, %!" SCR0 "&$, 0ug. 6, 66 1;uiason2)

Distinguish the PresidentMs power of general supervision over local governments from his control power.

Held: On many occasions in the past, this $ourt has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. In $aulev. Santos (1@@ S:A %'1 &''+5 , we held that the $hief -xecutive wielded no more authority than that of chec&ing whether a local government orthe o/cers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. >e cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same orits o/cers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior



bodyD it does not include any restraining authority over such body BIbid.C. O/cers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are notfollowed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervisiondoes not cover such authority. Supervising o/cers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nordoes he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the wor& done or re5done to conform to theprescribed rules. >e cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act (Drilon v. #im" supra" '615. ('ito3Onon v. ernanez, !"& SCR0/!%, Jan. !, %&&, !r Div. 1Gonzaga3Reyes2)

s the asence of a recommendation of the Secretary of ;ustice to the President fatal to the appointment of respondent as prosecutor?

Held: his question would x x x pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the 0evised dministrative $ode of 1+<= (2oo- O" $itle ":hapter " Section 5 to the e?ect that A

"ll provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the !resident upon the recommendation of the Secretary.#

!etitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior recommendation of the Secretary of Gusticeendorsing the intended appointment citing, by analogy, the case of San ;uan v. :S: ('* S:A *5 x x x.

(hen the $onstitution or the law clothes the !resident with the power to appoint a subordinate o/cer, such conferment must be understood asnecessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the !resident is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus and o/ces.# $ontrol means the authority of anempowered o/cer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate o/cer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as tosubstitute the 2udgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. -xpressed in another way, the !resident has the power toassume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and o/ce. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the !resident caninterfere in the exercise of discretion of o/cials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

It is the considered view of the $ourt, given the above disquisition, that the phrase Gupon recommendation of the Secretary"I found in Section +,$hapter II, itle III, 3oo& IP, of the 0evised dministrative $ode, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise,exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. herecommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. he !resident, being the head of the -xecutive epartment, could very welldisregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or o/ces even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, hecannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.

he doctrine in San ;uan" relied upon by petitioners, is tangential. (hile the tenor of the legal provision in -xecutive Order o. 11' has somesimilarity with the provision in the 1+<= dministrative $ode in question, it is to be pointed out, however, that San ;uan ('* S:A *5" in construingthe law, has distinctively given stress to the constitutional mandate on local autonomyD x x x. he $ourt there has explained that the !residentmerely exercises general supervision over local government units and local o/cials (Section 6" Article F" :onstitution5, hence, in the appointment of a !rovincial 3udget O/cer, the executive department, through the Secretary of 3udget and Lanagement, indeed had to share the questioned powerwith the local government.

In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Gustice and the appointment of the !resident are acts of the -xecutive epartmentitself, and there is no sharing of power to spea& of, the latter being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of thepersonality of the !resident. ('er+uez v. EFecutive Secretary Ru8en 7orres, G.R. No. !%6, 0ug. , 666, ! r Div. 1:itug2)

Discuss the three distinct powers of the President under Section ')" Art. O of the ')< :onstitution. Are they su!ect to !udicial review" or are they political questions?

Ans): here are three distinct powers of the !resident under Sec. 1<, rt. PII of the $onstitution, to wit6 1C her calling out power, as $ommander5in5$hief of the rmed 7orcesD 'C her martial law powerD and EC her power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

>er martial law power and her power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are sub2ect to 2udicial review as expressly provided underSec. 1<, rt. PII of the 1+<= $onstitution because these two are the greater powers, compared with her calling out power, as they involve thecurtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms (2P v. Wamora" E.. No. '6'1)6" Aug. '%" 1@@@" n 2anc&Japunan+5.

>er calling out power is a political question and not sub2ect to 2udicial power as this is the lesser and more benign of the three powers under Sec. 1<,rt. PII of the 1+<= $onstitution (2P v. Wamora" E.. No. '6'1)6" Aug. '%" 1@@@" n 2anc &Japunan+5. It is a question in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated by the $onstitution to the !resident, as their $ommander5in5$hief, to call out the armed forces whenevershe deems it necessary in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. o sub2ect such calling out power to unfettered 2udicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster as such power may be unduly strait2ac&eted by an in2unction or a 0O every time it isexercised.

4nless it can be shown that the exercise of such discretion to call out the armed forces was gravely abused, the !residentNs exercise of 2udgmentdeserves to be accorded respect from the $ourt. nd the burden to show that the !resident gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armedforces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, lies



THE *UDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Chat are the requisites efore the :ourt can e8ercise the power of !udicial review?

Held:

1. he time5tested standards for the exercise of 2udicial review are6 B1C the existence of an appropriate caseD B'C an interest personal andsubstantial by the party raising the constitutional questionD BEC the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunityD and B*C thenecessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v.Secretary of Environ+ent an Natura- Resources, et a-., G.R. No. !"!#", Dec. $, %&&&, En 'anc).

'. (hen questions of constitutional signicance are raised, the $ourt can exercise its power of 2udicial review only if the following requisites arecomplied with, namely6 B1C the existence of an actual and appropriate caseD B'C a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the

constitutional questionD BEC the exercise of 2udicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunityD and B*C the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. (Integrate 'ar of t<e *<i-ippines v. 5on. Rona-o '. a+ora, G.R. No. %#, 0ug. ", %&&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

Chat is an actual case or controversy?

Held: n Qactual case or controversyQ means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of 2udicialdetermination, and that which is not con2ectural or anticipatory, or that which see&s to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. petition raising a constitutional question does not present an Qactual controversy,Q unless it alleges a legal right or power. Loreover, it must showthat a conFict of rights exists, for inherent in the term QcontroversyQ is the presence of opposing views or contentions . Otherwise, the $ourt will beforced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lac& such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from aclash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi5faceted situation embracing conFicting and demanding interests. he controversymust also be 2usticiableD that is, it must be susceptible of 2udicial determination . (Integrate 'ar of t<e *<i-ippines v. 5on. Rona-o '. a+ora, G.R. No. %#, 0ug. ", %&&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

Petitioners sagani :ru3 and :esar uropa rought a suit for prohiition and mandamus as citi3ens and ta8payers" assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of epulic Act No. )=<'" otherwise -nown as the ndigenous Peoples ights Act of '< (PA5" and its mplementing ules andegulations. A preliminary issue resolved y the S: was whether the petition presents an actual controversy.

Held: $ourts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases . he threshold issue, therefore, is whether an QappropriatecaseQ exists for the exercise of 2udicial review in the present case.

x x x

In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. law has been enacted, and the Implementing 0ules and0egulations approved. Loney has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. Itcannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripefor 2udicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of Stateownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Loreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement analleged unconstitutional statute, this $ourt possesses su/cient authority to resolve and prevent imminent in2ury and violation of the constitutionalprocess. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of Environ+ent an Natura- Resources, et a-., G.R. No. !"!#",Dec. $, %&&&, En 'anc)





3enipayo, 3orra and uason when she led her petition before this $ourt, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issuebefore a competent body. 7urthermore, this $ourt may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may bepassed upon (id." citing Sotto v. :ommission on lections" <* Phil. %'* &'6*+5. here is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue ontime.

Loreover, the legality of petitionerNs reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of 3enipayoNs ad interim appointment and assumption of o/ce.4nless the constitutionality of 3enipayoNs ad interim appointment and assumption of o/ce is resolved, the legality of petitionerNs reassignment fromthe -I to the Jaw epartment cannot be determined. $learly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. he legality of the directives and decisions made by the$OL-J-$ in the conduct of the Lay 1*, '881 national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved.In &eeping with this $ourtNs duty to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the $onstitution and havenot abused the discretion given them, this $ourt may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised (9plev. $orres" 1= S:A '6'1 &')+, others omitted5. >ere the petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities. Loreover, public interest

requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. (4ati8ag v. 'enipayo, !#& SCR0 6, 0pri- %, %&&%, En 'anc 1Carpio2)

Chat is the meaning of G!usticiale controversyI as requisite for the proper e8ercise of the power of !udicial review? llustrative case.

Held: 7rom a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely led. 4nder the undisputed facts there is as yet no 2usticiable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground.

(e gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitionerNs memorandum that the alleged application for certicate of ancestral landclaim B$J$C led by the heirs of $arantes under the assailed -0 special orders has not been granted nor the $J$ applied for, issued. he -0is still processing the application of the heirs of $arantes for a certicate of ancestral land claim, which the -0 may or may not grant. It isevident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of $arantes to possessa common portion of a piece of land. s the undisputed facts stand there is no 2usticiable controversy between the petitioners and the respondentsas there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitionersN asserted right to possess the land by reason of the implementation of the questionedadministrative issuance.

+,st&#&$-le #%ntr%.ers! has been dened as, "a denite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legalinterests# (Sinco" Philippine Political #aw" '*1 ed." quoting from the 7.S. Declaratory ;udgment Act of '=6" p. =*@5 which may be resolved by acourt of law through the application of a law (>acasiano v. National Housing Authority" 116 S:A 1=) &'=+, 2ernas" $he :onstitution of theepulic of the PhilippinesT A :ommentary" Ool. " ')) ed." pp. 1<641<%5. $ourts have no 2udicial power to review cases involving political

questions and as a rule, will desist from ta&ing cogniance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has becomemoot (:ru3" Philippine Political #aw" ') ed." p. 1%<41%5. Sub2ect to certain well5dened exceptions (Solicitor4Eeneral v. >>A" Decemer ''"''" 1@6 S:A )=<, Dumlao v. :omelec" % S:A =1 &')@+5 courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been agovernmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse e?ect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity ($an v.>acapagal" 6= S:A *<) &'<1+5. In the case of PA:7 v. Secretary of ducation (< Phil. )@* &'%%+5 the petition contesting the validity of aregulation issued by the Secretary of -ducation requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all thepetitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. he petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that thepermit might be denied them in the future. his $ourt held that there was no 2usticiable controversy because the petitioners su?ered no wrong bythe implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. mere apprehension that the Secretary of -ducationwill withdraw the permit does not amount to 2usticiable controversy. he questioned regulation in the !$4 case may be questioned by a privateschool whose permit to operate has been revo&ed or one whose application therefore has been denied (2ernas" supra.5.

his $ourt cannot rule on the basis of petitionersN speculation that the -0 will approve the application of the heirs of $arantes. here must be anactual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause in2ury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land beforethe 2urisdiction of this $ourt may be invo&ed. here is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of $arantesunder orders from the -0. he petitionersN allegation that certain documents from the -0 were shown to them by the heirs of $arantes to 2ustify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent -0 or its o/cers authoried theattempted eviction. Su/ce it to say that by the petitionersN own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved theapplication of the heirs of $arantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as

the -0 may or may not approve $arantesN application. 4ntil such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from thepremises at some future time. 3orrowing from the pronouncements of this $ourt in the !$4 case, "hey Bthe petitionersC have su?ered no wrongunder the terms of the law A and, naturally need no relief in the form they now see& to obtain.# (PA:7" supra" at p. )'@5 If indeed the heirs of $arantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitionersN possession thereof even without prior approval by the -0 of the claim of theheirs of $arantes, the case is simply one of forcible entry. (Cutaran v. DENR, !"& SCR0 $6/, Jan. !, %&&, !r Div. 1Gonzaga3Reyes2)

Should the :ourt still resolve the case despite that the issue has already ecome moot and academic? 8ception.

Held: either do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed 3arangay apico, the petition of theLunicipality of $ainta has already been rendered moot and academic. he issue raised by the Lunicipality of $ainta in its petition before the$OL-J-$ against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of 3arangay apico are still pending determination before the ntipolo 0egional rial$ourt.

In $an v. :ommission on lections (E.. No. <='%%" '61 S:A <1<" <6'4<61 &')*+5" we struc& down the moot and academic argument as follows A

"$onsidering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non5compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite hadbeen held and a new province proclaimed and its o/cials appointed, the case before 4s cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.$ontinuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to beinquired into by this ribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse forperpetration of such wrong. 7or this $ourt to yield to the respondentsN urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this $ourt should passivelyaccept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. ismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is aproposition fraught with mischief. 0espondentsN submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this $ourt decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to rec&lessly andwith ulterior motives, create, merge, divide andMor alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either braenly or stealthily, condent that this$ourt will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.#

9n >ay '" 1@@'" President >acapagal4Arroyo" faced y an Gangry and violent mo armed with e8plosives" /rearms" laded weapons" clus" stonesand other deadly weaponsI assaulting and attempting to rea- into >alacanang" issued Proclamation No. =) declaring that there was a state of reellion in the National :apital egion. She li-ewise issued Eeneral 9rder No. ' directing the Armed orces of the Philippines and the PhilippineNational Police to suppress the reellion in the National :apital egion. Carrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of theGreellionI were thereafter eKected. Hence" several petitions were /led efore the S: assailing the declaration of State of eellion y President Eloria >acapagal4Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly eKected y virtue thereof.

Held: ll the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of state of rebellion by !resident %loria Lacapagal5rroyo and the warrantless arrestsallegedly e?ected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Signicantly, on Lay ), '881, !resident Lacapagal5rroyo orderedthe lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion# in Letro Lanila. ccordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. s



to petitionersN claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion# is being used by the authorities to 2ustify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Gustice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specic persons in connection with the "rebellion.# >e states that what is extant aregeneral instructions to law enforcement o/cers and military agencies to implement !roclamation o. E<. x x x (ith this declaration, petitionersNapprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest. (9acson v. *erez, !"/ SCR0 /"$, 4ay &, %&&, En 'anc 14e-o2)

Chen is an action considered GmootI? >ay the court still resolve the case once it has ecome moot and academic?

Held: 1. It is alleged by respondent that, with respect to the !$$0 9!reparatory $ommission on $onstitutional 0eform:, this case has become mootand academic. (e agree.

n action is considered "moot# when it no longer presents a 2usticiable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.4nder -.O. o. *E, the !$$0 was instructed to complete its tas& on or before Gune E8, 1+++. >owever, on 7ebruary 1+, 1+++, the !resident issued-xecutive Order o. =8 B-.O. o. =8C, which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissionNs wor& x x x. he !$$0 submitted itsrecommendations to the !resident on ecember '8, 1+++ and was dissolved by the !resident on the same day. It had li&ewise spent the funds

allocated to it. hus, the !$$0 has ceased to exist, having lost its raison dMXtre. Subsequent events have overta&en the petition and the $ourt hasnothing left to resolve.

he staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. 3asically, petitioneras&s this $ourt to en2oin the !$$0 from acting as such. $learly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be en2oined nolonger exists. It is well5established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. t thispoint, any ruling regarding the !$$0 would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is denitely beyond the permissible scope of 2udicial power. (Gonza-es v. Narvasa, !!/ SCR0 /!!, 0ug. , %&&&, En 'anc 1Gonzaga3Reyes2)

'. he petition which was led by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners toadmit them for enrolment. a&ing into account the admission of private respondents that they have nished their ursing course at the Janting$ollege of ursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overta&en by events and should therefore bedismissed. >owever, the case of astern 2roadcasting :orporation (D5 v. Dans" etc." et al." E.. No. %=1" ;uly '" ')%" '=< S:A *1) is theauthority for the view that Qeven if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated.# (e shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the meritsof this petition. (niversity of San 0gustin, Inc. v. Court of 0ppea-s, %!& SCR0 /$, //&, 4arc< /, 66 1Nocon2)

n connection with the >ay ''" ') elections" the :9>#: issued a resolution prohiiting the conduct of e8it polls on the ground" among others"that it might cause disorder and confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees" which further ma-es the e8it polls unreliale. $he

constitutionality of this resolution was challenged y A2S4:2N 2roadcasting :orporation as violative of freedom of e8pression. $he Solicitor Eeneralcontends that the petition has een rendered moot and academic ecause the >ay ''" ') election has already een held and done with and"therefore" there is no longer any actual controversy to e resolved. esolve.

Held: (hile the assailed 0esolution referred specically to the Lay 11, 1++< election, its implications on the peopleNs fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. he holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. 3y its very nature, exitpolling is tied up with elections. o set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a tas& that could well crop up again in futureelections.

In any event, in Salonga v. :ru3 Pano ('=6 S:A 6=)" 6*=" e. ')" ')%5" the $ourt had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulateguiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extentof protection given by constitutional guarantees.# Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invo&ed here, we haveresolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they li&ewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derivedtherefrom. (0'S3C'N 'roacasting Corporation v. CO4E9EC, G.R. No. !!#$, Jan. %#, %&&&, En 'anc 1*angani8an2)



Discuss the nature of a ta8payerMs suit. Chen may it e allowed?

Held:

1. !etitioner and respondents agree that to constitute a taxpayerHs suit, two requisites must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by apolitical subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the petitioner is directly a?ectedby the alleged ultra vires act. he same pronouncement was made in Jilosayan" nc. v. Euingona" ;r." (1=1 S:A ''@ &'6+" where the $ourt alsoreiterated its liberal stance in entertaining so5called taxpayerHs suits, especially when important issues are involved. closer examination of thefacts of this case would readily demonstrate that petitionerHs standing should not even be made an issue here, Qsince standing is a concept inconstitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.Q

In the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made in 1+=K when the !rovince bought the lands from Ortigas at !118.88 per squaremeter in line with the ob2ectives of !.. )=*. !etitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused onthe alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing mar&et value of neighboring

lots. he rst requirement, therefore, which would ma&e this petition a taxpayerHs suit is absent. he only remaining 2ustication for petitioner to beallowed to pursue this action is whether it is, or would be, directly a?ected by the act complained of. s we stated in Jilosayan" nc. v. >orato(supra.5"

QStanding is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally in2ured by theoperation of a law or by o/cial action ta&en, but by concerned citiens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. >ence thequestion in standing is whether such parties have Halleged such a personal sta&e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of di/cult constitutional questions.H(:iting 2a-er v. :arr" =* 7.S. ')*" <l. d. 1d *== &'*1+5

4ndeniably, as a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely a?ected by an illegal use of public money. (hen, however, no such unlawfulspending has been shown, as in the case at bar, petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction validly executed by and betweenthe !rovince and Ortigas for the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, andconsequently no locus standi" in the instant case. (7<e 0nti3Graft 9eague of t<e *<i-ippines, Inc. v. San Juan, %$& SCR0 %"&, %"!3%"", 0ug. , 66$, En 'anc 1Ro+ero2)

'. taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in allegedcontravention of the law or the $onstitution . hus, a taxpayerNs action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by $ongress of its taxingor spending power (last v. :ohen" =1 7S )=" 1@ # d 1d 6<" )) S :t '615. his was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners elecommunications and 3roadcast ttorneys of the !hilippines B-J-3!C and %L etwor&, Inc. questioned the validity of Section +' of 3.!. 3lg.<<1 Botherwise &nown as the "Omnibus -lection $ode#C requiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the $ommission on -lectionsduring the campaign period ($elecommunications and 2roadcast Attorneys of the Philippines" nc. v. :ommission on lections" 1) S:A ==<&')+5. he $ourt held that petitioner -J-3! did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing orspending power of $ongress.

Lany other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public fundsby the legislature. In Sanidad v. :ommission on lections (<= S:A === &'<*+5" the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayerNs suit toquestion several presidential decrees promulgated by then !resident Larcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the$ourt explaining that A

x x x 9i:t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute A !residential ecrees are of such nature A may be contested by one who willsustain a direct in2ury as a result of its enforcement. t the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may been2oined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an o/cer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds. he breadth of !residential ecree o. ++1 carries an appropriation of 7ive Lillion !esos for the e?ectiveimplementation of its purposes. !residential ecree o. 18E1 appropriates the sum of -ight Lillion !esos to carry out its provisions. he interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money su/ciently clothes them with that personalityto litigate the validity of the ecrees appropriating said funds x x x.

In still another case, the $ourt held that petitioners A the !hilippine $onstitution ssociation, Inc., a non5prot civic organiation A had standing as

taxpayers to question the constitutionality of 0epublic ct o. E<E) insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation andsic& leaves to Senators and 0epresentatives and to the elective o/cials of both houses of $ongress (Philippine :onstitution Association" nc. v.Eimene3" '% S:A 6< &'*%+5. nd in Pascual v. Secretary of Pulic Cor-s (''@ Phil. ==' &'*@+5" the $ourt allowed petitioner to maintain ataxpayerNs suit assailing the constitutional soundness of 0epublic ct o. +'8 appropriating !<K,888 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. ll these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.

Leanwhile, in 2ugnay :onstruction and Development :orporation v. #aron ('<* S:A 1%' &')+5" the $ourt declared that the trial court was wrongin allowing respondent 0avano to bring an action for in2unction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of leasecovering the public mar&et entered into between the $ity of agupan and petitioner. he $ourt declared that 0avano did not possess the requisitestanding to bring such taxpayerNs suit since "9o:n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into betweenpetitioner and the $ity shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the mar&et building.#

$oming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by $ongress of its taxing or spending power. he !$$0 was createdby the !resident by virtue of -.O. o. *E, as amended by -.O. o. =8. 4nder Section = of -.O. o. *E, the amount of !E million is QappropriatedQ forits operational expenses Qto be sourced from the funds of the O/ce of the !resident.# x x x. he appropriations for the !$$0 were authoried bythe !resident, not by $ongress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all. "In a strict sense, appropriation has been deed Tas nothing more thanthe legislative authoriation prescribed by the $onstitution that money may be paid out of the reasury,N while appropriation made y law refers toTthe act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to itscreditors.N# he funds used for the !$$0 were ta&en from funds intended for the O/ce of the !resident, in the exercise of the $hief -xecutiveNspower to transfer funds pursuant to Section 'K BKC of rticle PI of the $onstitution.

In the nal analysis, it must be stressed that the $ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayerNs suit . In the case atbar, there being no exercise by $ongress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the !$$0 in hiscapacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or willsustain direct in2ury as a result of its enforcement.# In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest A that he will stand to bebeneted or in2ured by the 2udgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. owhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to ma&esuch a representation. (Gonza-es v. Narvasa, !!/ SCR0 /!!, 0ug. , %&&&, En 'anc 1Gonzaga3Reyes2)

Chat is a !usticiale controversy? Chat are political questions?

Held: s a general proposition, a controversy is 2usticiable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review . It pertains to issues whichare inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognied by law. evertheless, the $ourt does not automatically assume 2urisdiction overactual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the $ourt hesitates to rule onare Qpolitical questions.Q he reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of aparticular act or measure being assailed. Loreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normallyinterfere with the wor&ings of another co5equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the$onstitution.



s $anada v. Angara ('@= Phil. '@%' &'%<+5 puts it, political questions refer Qto those questions which, under the $onstitution, are to be decided bythe people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.Q hus, if an issue is clearly identied by the text of the $onstitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Gustice 3rennan in 2a-er v. :arr (=*7.S. ')*" )1 S :t. *'" < #. d. **=" *<) &'*1+5" Q9p:rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textuallydemonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political departmentD or a lac& of 2udicially discoverable and manageablestandards for resolving itD or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a &ind clearly for non2udicial discretionD or theimpossibility of a courtHs underta&ing independent resolution without expressing lac& of the respect due coordinate branches of governmentD or anunusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already madeD or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifariouspronouncements by various departments on the one question.Q

he 1+<= $onstitution expands the concept of 2udicial review by providing that QBChe Gudicial power shall be vested in one Supreme $ourt and insuch lower courts as may be established by law. Gudicial power includes the duty of the courts of 2ustice to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac&or excess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the %overnment.Q (Article O" Sec. ' of the ')< :onstitution5 4nder thisdenition, the $ourt cannot agree x x x that the issue involved is a political question beyond the 2urisdiction of this $ourt to review. (hen the grantof power is qualied, conditional or sub2ect to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualications or conditions have been met or thelimitations respected, is 2usticiable 5 the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom . Loreover, the 2urisdiction to delimit constitutionalboundaries has been given to this $ourt. (hen political questions are involved, the $onstitution limits the determination as to whether or not therehas been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac& or excess of 2urisdiction on the part of the o/cial whose action is being questioned.

3y grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of 2udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty en2oined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in anarbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 4nder this denition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated. 3ut while this $ourt has no power to substitute its 2udgment for that of $ongress or of the !resident,it may loo& into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. showing that plenary power is granted eitherdepartment of government may not be an obstacle to 2udicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to 2usticiablecontroversy. (Integrate 'ar of t<e *<i-ippines v. 5on. Rona-o '. a+ora, G.R. No. %#, 0ug. ", %&&&, En 'anc 1Kapunan2)

s the legitimacy of the assumption to the Presidency of President Eloria >acapagal Arroyo a political question and" therefore" not su!ect to !udicialreview? Distinguish DSA People Power from DSA People Power .

Held: 0espondents rely on the case of #awyers #eague for a 2etter Philippines andor 9liver A. #o3ano v. President :ora3on :. Aquino" et al. andrelated cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent rroyo, ergo, they present apolitical question. more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the governmentof former !resident quino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. o less than the 7reedom$onstitution declared that the quino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the 7ilipino people "in deance of theprovisions of the 1+=E $onstitution, as amended.# It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution bypeople power is beyond 2udicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In chec&ered contrast, thegovernment of respondent rroyo is not revolutionary in character. he oath that she too& at the -S Shrine is the oath under the 1+<=$onstitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1+<= $onstitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is dischargingthe powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1+<= $onstitution.

In ne, the legal distinction between -S !eople !ower I and -S !eople !ower II is clear. -S I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrows the whole government. -S II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly topetition the government for redress of grievances which only a?ected the o/ce of the !resident. -S I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the sub2ect of 2udicial review, but -S II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting!resident that it caused and the succession of the Pice !resident as !resident are sub2ect to 2udicial review. -S I presented a political questionD-S II involves legal questions. ; x x

eedless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. he principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1+<= $onstitution, notably Section 1 of rticle II, and Section < of rticle PII, and the allocation of governmental powersunder Section 11 of rticle PII. he issues li&ewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. hey also involve the correctcalibration of the right of petitioner against pre2udicial publicity. s early as the 1<8E case of >arury v. >adison (' :ranch &% 7S+ '=<" # d *@&')@=+5/ the doctrine has been laid down that Git is emphatically the province and duty of the !udicial department to say what the law is 8 8 8.I hus, respondentNs invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dar&. (Josep< E. Estraa v. 0niano Desierto, G.R. Nos.$/&3", 4arc< %, %&&, En 'anc 1*uno2)

s the PresidentMs power to call out the armed forces as their :ommander4in4:hief in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence" invasion or reellion su!ect to !udicial review" or is it a political question? :larify.

Held: (hen the !resident calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises adiscretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. his is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the $onstitution itself. he $ourt,thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the !residentHs wisdom or substitute its own. >owever, this does not prevent an examination of whethersuch power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. Inview of the constitutional intent to give the !resident full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it isincumbent upon the petitioner to show that the !residentHs decision is totally bereft of factual basis. he present petition fails to discharge suchheavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no 2ustication for calling out the armed forces. here is, li&ewise,no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate theconstitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this $ourtHs duty of Qpurposeful hesitationQ before declaringan act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the $ourt interfere with the !residentHs 2udgment. o doubt is to sustain. (Integrate 'ar of t<e *<i-ippines v. 5on. Rona-o '. a+ora, G.R. No. %#, 0ug. ", %&&&, En'anc 1Kapunan2)

Do lower courts have !urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a law? f so" how should they act in the e8ercise of this !urisdiction?

Held: (e stress at the outset that the lower court had 2urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 1<=, this authority being embraced inthe general denition of the 2udicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamentallaw. Specically, 3! 1'+ vests in the regional trial courts 2urisdiction over all civil cases in which the sub2ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. '&'+5, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he ischarged with violating and of the proceedings ta&en against him, particularly as they contravene the 3ill of 0ights. Loreover, rticle PIII, SectionKB'C, of the $onstitution vests in the Supreme $ourt appellate 2urisdiction over nal 2udgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which theconstitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,or regulation is in question.





Chat cases are to e heard y the Supreme :ourt en anc?

Held: 4nder Supreme $ourt $ircular o. '5<+, dated 7ebruary =, 1+<+, as amended by the 0esolution of ovember 1<, 1++E6

x x x, the following are considered en banc cases6

1. $ases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidentialdecree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in questionD

'. $riminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penaltyD $ases raising novel questions of lawD

E. $ases a?ecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consulsD

*. $ases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the $ivil Service $ommission, $ommission on -lections, and $ommission on uditD

K. $ases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a 2udge, o/cer or employee of the 2udiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or eitherthe suspension of any of them for a period of more than one B1C year or a ne exceeding !18,888.88 or bothD

). $ases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modied or reversedD=. $ases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three BEC members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are

acceptable to a ma2ority of the actual membership of the court en bancD and

<. ll other cases as the court en banc by a ma2ority of its actual membership may deem of su/cient importance to merit its attention.

Chat is /scal autonomy? $he /scal autonomy clause?

Held: s envisioned in the $onstitution, the scal autonomy en2oyed by the Gudiciary, the $ivil Service $ommission, the $ommission on udit, the$ommission on -lections, and the O/ce of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full Fexibility to allocate and utilie their resources withthe wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognies the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, x rates of compensationnot exceeding the highest rates authoried by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as maybe provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

7iscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. he Gudiciary, the $onstitutional $ommissions, and the Ombudsman must have theindependence and Fexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. he imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner theindependent constitutional o/ces allocate and utilie the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to scal autonomy and violative notonly of the express mandate of the $onstitution but especially as regards the Supreme $ourt, of the independence and separation of powers uponwhich the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. ('engzon v. Dri-on, %&# SCR0 !!, 0pri- ", 66%, En 'anc 1Gutierrez2)

>ay the 9mudsman validly entertain criminal charges against a !udge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases efore thecourt.

Held: !etitioner criticies the 2urisprudence (>aceda v. Oasque3" 11' S:A 6*6 &'=+ and Dolalas v. 9Lce of the 9mudsman4>indanao" 1*%S:A )') &'*+5 cited by the O/ce of the Ombudsman as erroneous and not applicable to his complaint. >e insists that since his complaintinvolved a criminal charge against a 2udge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme $ourt to resolve whether a crime wascommitted and the 2udge prosecuted therefor.

he petition can not succeed.

x x x

(e agree with the Solicitor %eneral that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting the writs prayed for. he issues havebeen settled in the case of n eT ;oaquin 2orromeo (16' S:A 6@)" 6*@ &'%+5. here, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal actionagainst a 2udge for a violation of rts. '8* and '8K B&nowingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or orderC can be entertained, there must rst be "anal and authoritative 2udicial declaration# that the decision or order in question is indeed "un2ust.# he pronouncement may result from either6

a. an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the 2udgmentD or

b. an administrative proceeding in the Supreme $ourt against the 2udge precisely for promulgating an un2ust 2udgment or order.

Ji&ewise, the determination of whether a 2udge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive 2udicial function (n eT2orromeo" supra" at 6*'5.

"o repeat, no other entity or o/cial of the government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other ranch , not any functionarythereof, has competence to review a 2udicial order or decision A whether nal and executory or not A and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay thebasis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order. hat prerogative elongs to the courts alone.

his having been said, we nd that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and 2urisprudence when he referred the cases against Gudge!elayo to the Supreme $ourt for appropriate action. (De :era v. *e-ayo, !!" SCR0 %#, Ju-y $, %&&&, st Div. 1*aro2)

Discuss the validity of G>emorandum Decisions.I

Held: 1. he constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts andthe law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of Qmemorandum decisionsQ which adopt by reference the ndings of fact and conclusionsof law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. ; x x

>ence, even in this 2urisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lowercourts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court (rancisco v. Perms-ul" '<=S:A =16" ===5. his is particularly true when thedecision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at x x x. (Oi- an Natura- GasCo++ission v. Court of 0ppea-s, %6! SCR0 %$, Ju-y %!, 66# 14artinez2)

'. (e have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or su/ciently complied with the constitutional in2unction notwithstanding thelaconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there 9was left: much to be desired in terms of 9their: clarity, coherence andcomprehensibility# provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legalqualications of the o?ense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed andthe civil liabilityD or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the o?ense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered averdict and imposed the corresponding penaltyD or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutionNs memorandum but made their own ndings andassessment of evidence, before nally agreeing with the prosecutionNs evaluation of the case.

(e have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions (n rancisco v. Perms-ul" '<= S:A =16" === &')+" the :ourt descried G&t+hedistinctive features of a memorandum decision are" /rst" it is rendered y an appellate court" second" it incorporates y reference the /ndings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision" order" or ruling under review. >ost li-ely" the purpose is to aLrm the decision" although it isnot impossile that the approval of the /ndings of facts y the lower court may lead to a diKerent conclusion of law y the higher court. At any rate" the reason for allowing the incorporation y reference is evidently to avoid the cumersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court" or portions thereof" in the decision of the higher court. $he idea is to avoid having to repeat in the ody of the latter decision the /ndings or conclusions of the lower court since they are eing approved or adopted anyway.5 , a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in



accordance with the provisions of Section *8, 3.!. 3lg. 1'+ on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and doc&et status of our courts.(e have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.

In rancisco v. Perms-ul" however, we laid the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, thus6

he memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the ndings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remotereference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. 7orthe incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in astatement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authoried under Section *8 of 3.!. 3lg. 1'+ should actuallyembody the ndings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision wasmerely a/rmed without a prior examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. he pro8imity at least of the annexed statement shouldsuggest that such examination has been underta&en. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply

with rticle PIII, Section 1* as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. he $ourt nds necessary to emphasie that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an additive excuse for 2udicial sloth.It is an additional condition for the validity of this &ind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by bothparties and easily determinable by the 2udge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the lawsinvolved. he memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviouslygroundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

x x x

>enceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when theymay be rendered. ny deviation will summon the strict enforcement of rticle PIII, Section 1* of the $onstitution and stri&e down the Fawed 2udgment as a lawless disobedience.

ested against these standards, we nd that the 0$ decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutionalin2unction. he 0$ decision is brief indeed, but it is star&ly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothingand attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy spea&s for itself.

(e cannot even consider or a/rm said 0$ decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid downin rancisco v. Perms-ul. It merely a/rmed in toto the Le$ decision without saying more. decision or resolution, especially one resolving anappeal, should directly meet the issues for resolutionD otherwise, the appeal would be pointless (See A2D 9verseas >anpower :orporation v. N#:"1)* S:A 6%6" 6*6 &')+5.

(e therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos ndustrial :orporation v. :ourt of Appeals (1@* S:A '1<" '=6 &'1+5" in that while we concededthat brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substanceD and again in rancisco v.Perms-ul" where we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non5compliance with the constitutionalrequirements.

his is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and moresignicantly, of 2ustice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Gustice 7eria as the ponente in omero v. :ourt of Appeals come true, i.e." if anappellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he wasaccorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. his situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in thiscase, where not only property rights are at sta&e but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.

7aithful adherence to the requirements of Section 1*, rticle PIII of the $onstitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fairplay. It is li&ewise demanded by the due process clause of the $onstitution . he parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided,with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. he court cannot simply say that 2udgment is renderedin favor of ; and against @ and 2ust leave it at that without any 2ustication whatsoever for its action. he losing party is entitled to &now why helost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. decision that does not clearly anddistinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dar& as to how it was reached and is precisely pre2udicial to thelosing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal . Lore than that, the requirement is anassurance to the parties that, in reaching 2udgment, the 2udge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the

impetuosity of the 2udge, preventing him from deciding ipse di8it . Pouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the $onstitution but nonethelessvested with the sovereign prerogative of passing 2udgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the 2udge must ultimately depend on thepower of reason for sustained public condence in the 2ustness of his decision.

hus the $ourt has struc& down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the $ourt of ppeals whose careless disregard of the constitutionalbehest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but li&ewise to their avowed fealty to the $onstitution.

hus, we nullied or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 1*, rticle PIII of the $onstitution, a decision, resolution or order which6 containedno analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusionsD contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both partiesD convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to supportconclusions that the letter in question was libelousD consisted merely of one B1C paragraph with mostly sweeping generaliations and failed tosupport its conclusion of parricideD consisted of ve BKC pages, three BEC pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiterNs decision includingthe dispositive portion and barely a page Btwo 9': short paragraphs of two 9': sentences eachC of its own discussion or reasoningsD was merelybased on the ndings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes, or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moraldamages.

In the same vein do we stri&e down as a nullity the 0$ decision in question. (Bao v. Court of 0ppea-s, ! SCR0 %&%, Oct. %, %&&&, st Div. 1Davie2)

Does the period for decision ma-ing under Section '%" Article O" ')< :onstitution" apply to the Sandiganayan? 8plain.Held: he above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. he provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the presenthierarchy applies only to the $ourt of ppeals.

he Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the $ourt of ppeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of 2ustice, withfunctions of a trial court.

hus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. he Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure. >owever, on Larch E8, 1++K, $ongress repealed the SandiganbayanNs power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and insteadprescribed that the 0ules of $ourt promulgated by the Supreme $ourt shall apply to all cases and proceedings led with the Sandiganbayan.

"Special courts are 2udicial tribunals exercising limited 2urisdiction over particular or specialied categories of actions. hey are the $ourt of axppeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the ShariNa $ourts.# (Supra" Note 1=" at p. )5

4nder rticle PIII, Section K9K: of the $onstitution "0ules of procedure of special courts and quasi52udicial bodies shall remain e?ective unlessdisapproved by the Supreme $ourt.#

In his report, the $ourt dministrator would distinguish between cases which the Sandiganbayan has cogniance of in its original 2urisdiction, andcases which fall within the appellate 2urisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. he $ourt dministrator posits that since in the rst class of cases, the





metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. n act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in itswordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advanceas in all other statutes. (Josep< EAercito Estraa v. Sanigan8ayan 17<ir Division2, G.R. No. #"$&, Nov. 6, %&&, En 'anc 1'e--osi--o2)

Does Article '= (5 of the #aor :ode de/ning Grecruitment and placementI violate the due process clause?

Held: In support of her submission that rticle 1E BbC is void for vagueness, appellant invo&es People v. Panis ('61 S:A **6 &')*+5" where this$ourt x x x "criticied# the denition of "recruitment and placement# x x x.

ppellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement# su?er from overbreadth since by merely "referring# a person foremployment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

hese contentions cannot be sustained.ppellantNs reliance on People v. Panis is misplaced. he issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of rticle 1EBbC, the crime of illegalrecruitment could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or o?ered any employment for a fee.# he $ourtheld in the negative x x x.

x x x he $ourt, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lac& of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. he absence of suchrecords notwithstanding, the $ourt was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawingfrom the language and intent of the law itself. Section 1EBbC, therefore, is not a "perfectly vague act# whose obscurity is evident on its face. If atall, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

x x x

hat Section 1EBbC encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as "labor or employment referral#B"referring# an applicant, for employment to a prospective employerC does not render the law overbroad. -vidently, appellant misapprehendsconcept of overbreadth.

statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms a/rmatively guaranteed by the $onstitution,such as the freedom of speech or religion. generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punishedis unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and theconstitutionally impermissible applications of the statute (Cright v. Eeorgia" =<= 7S 1)6" '@ # d 1d =6" )= S :t '16@ &'*=+5.

In 2lo 7mpar Adiong v. :ommission on lections (1@< S:A <'1 &'1+5 , for instance, we struc& down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibitingthe posting of election propaganda in any place A including private vehicles A other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the $OL-J-$.(e held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citien of his right tofree speech and information. he prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence,void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by thedenition of "recruitment and placement# that would render the same constitutionally overbroad. (*eop-e v. De-a *iera, !"& SCR0 $!, Jan.%, %&&, st Div. 1Kapunan2)

s the Plunder #aw unconstitutional for eing vague?

Held: s it is written, the !lunder Jaw contains ascertainable standards and well5dened parameters which would enable the accused to determinethe nature of his violation. Section ' is su/ciently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribesthe elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. ; x x

s long as the law a?ords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are sub2ect to it what conduct would render them liableto its penalties, its validity would be sustained. It must su/ciently guide the 2udge in its applicationD the counsel, in defending one charged with itsviolationD and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little di/cultythat what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public o/cer in amassing or accumulating ill5gotten wealth of at least !K8,888,888.88 througha series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. BdC, of the !lunder Jaw.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely trac&s the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of theo?ense which petitioner is alleged to have committed x x x.

(e discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous A as there is obviously none A that will confuse petitioner in his defense. lthoughsub2ect to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast betweenthe innocent and the prohibited acts. 4pon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as toenable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

!etitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory denition of the terms "combination# and "series# in the &ey phrase "acombination or series of overt or criminal acts# found in Sec. 1, par. BdC, and Sec. ', and the word "pattern# in Sec. *. hese omissions, according topetitioner, render the !lunder Jaw unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

he rationaliation seems to us to be pure sophistry. statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,or because of the employment of terms without dening them ()1 :.;.S. *)" P. ''=, People v. ing" <@ P.1d 1)'" 1* :al. App. 1d Supp. <*)5 D muchless do we have to dene every word we use. 3esides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to deneeach and every word in an enactment. $ongress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so dene the wordsemployed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can begathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the !lunder Jaw.

Loreover, it is a well5settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinaryacceptation and signication (>ustang #umer" nc. v. :ourt of Appeals" E.. No. '@6))" ') ;une '*%" 1%< S:A 6=@" 66)5 , unless it is evidentthat the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words (P#D$ v. astern $elecommunications Phil." nc." E.. No. 6=<<6"1< August '1" 1'= S:A '*" 1*5. he intention of the lawma&ers A who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers A to usestatutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. hus, (ebsterNs ew $ollegiate ictionary contains the following commonly accepteddenition of the words "combination# and "series.#

:omination A the result or product of combiningD the act or process of combining. o comine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscureindividual characters.

Series A a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

hat $ongress intended the words "combination# and "series# to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislativedeliberations on the bill which eventually became 0 =8<8 or the !lunder Jaw x x x.

x x x



hus when the !lunder Jaw spea&s of "combination,# it is referring to at least two B'C acts falling under di?erent categories or enumeration providedin Sec. 1, par. BdC, e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. BdC, subpar. B1C, and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the ational%overnment under Sec. 1, par. BdC, subpar. BEC.

On the other hand, to constitute a "series# there must be two B'C or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumerationfound in Sec. 1, par. BdC, say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. BdC, subpar. B1C.Perily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination# and "series,# it would have ta&en greater pains inspecically providing for it in the law.

s for "pattern,# we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is su/ciently dened in Sec. *, in relation to Sec. 1, par. BdC,and Sec. ' A

8 8 8 under Sec. ' (d5 of the law" a RpatternM consists of at -east a co+8ination or series of overt or cri+ina- acts enu+erate insu8sections () to ($) of Sec. (). Secondly" pursuant to Sec. 1 of the law" the pattern of overt or criminal acts is irecte toHars a

co++on purpose or goa- H<ic< is to ena8-e t<e pu8-ic ocer to a+ass, accu+u-ate or acuire i--3gotten Hea-t<. And thirdly" theremust either e an overa-- un-aHfu- sc<e+e or conspiracy to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood" the term Roverall unlawfulschemeM indicates a Rgeneral plan of action or methodM which the principal accused and pulic oLcer and others conniving with him follow toachieve the aforesaid common goal. n the alternative" if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used y multipleaccused vary" the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

x x x

>ence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and su/cient notice of what it see&s to penalie. 4nder thecircumstances, petitionerNs reliance on the "void5for5vagueness# doctrine is manifestly misplaced.

x x x

Loreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Lr. Gustice Picente P. Lendoa during the deliberations of the $ourt that theallegations that the !lunder Jaw is vague and overbroad do not 2ustify a facial review of its validity A

he void5for5vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of commonintelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and di?er as to its application violates the rst essential of due process of law.# (:onnally v.Eeneral :onstr. :o." 1* 7.S. =)%" ='" <@ #. d. =1) &'1*+ cited in rmita4>alate Hotel and >otel 9perators AssMn. v. :ity >ayor" 1@ S:A )6")*< &'*<+5 he overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.# (NAA:P v. Alaama" =<< 7.S. 1))" =@<" '1" 1 #. d =1%" ==) &'%)+,Shelton v. $uc-er" =*6 7.S. 6<" % #. d. 1d 1=' &'*@+5

facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling e?ect# upon protectedspeech. he theory is that "9w:hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle forrehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to 2ustifyallowing attac&s on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person ma&ing the attac& demonstrate that his own conduct could not beregulated by a statute drawn with narrow specicity.# (Eooding v. Cilson" 6@% 7.S. %')" %1'" =' #. d. 1d 6@)" 6'= &'<1+ &internal quotation mar-somitted+5 he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speed to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protectedspeech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory e?ects of overly broad statutes.

his rationale does not apply to penal statutes. $riminal statutes have general in terrorem e?ect resulting from their very existence, and, if facialchallenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot ta&e chances as in the area of free speech.

he overbreadth and vagueness doctrine then have special application only to free speech cases. hey are inapt for testing the validity of penalstatutes. s the 4.S. Supreme $ourt put it, in an opinion by $hief Gustice 0ehnquist, "we have not recognied an ToverbreadthN doctrine outside thelimited context of the 7irst mendment.# In 2roadwic- v. 9-lahoma (6'= 7.S. *@'" *'14*'=" =< # d. 1d )=@" )6@4)6' &'<=+5" the $ourt ruled that"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, see& to regulate only spo&en words# and,again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invo&ed against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be appliedto protected conduct.# 7or this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most di/cult challenge to mountsuccessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the ct would be valid.# (7nited States v. Salerno"

supra.5 s for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications." plainti? who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.# (Oillage of HoKman states v. lipside" HoKman states" nc." 6%% 7.S. 6)" 664%" <' # d. 1d =*1" =* &')1+5

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces# statutes in free speechcases or, as they are called in merican law, 7irst mendment cases. hey cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminalstatute. (ith respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attac&the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be ta&en as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might beunconstitutional.# (7nited States v. aines" =*1 7.S. '<" 1'" 6 #. d. 1d %16" %1 &'*@+. $he paradigmatic case is a3oo U >ississippi Oalley . v. ;ac-son Oinegar :o." 11* 7.S. 1'<" %< l. d. '= &''1+5 s has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the 7irst mendment context, li&eoverbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found to be vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated9only: Tas appliedN to a particular defendant.# (E. Eunther U J. Sullivan" :onstitutional #aw '1 &1@@'+5 $onsequently, there is no basis forpetitionerNs claim that this $ourt review the nti5!lunder Jaw on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face# invalidation of statutes results in stri&ing them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the$ourt whose activities are constitutionally protected (d. at '=1)5. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the$onstitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts (:onstitution" Art. O" Sections 'and %. :ompare Angara v. lectoral :ommission" *= Phil. '=" '%) &'=*+5. 3ut, as the 4.S. Supreme $ourt pointed out in ounger v. Harris (6@'7.S. =<" %14%=" 1< #. d. 1d **" *)@ &'<'+, others omitted.5

9:he tas& of analying a proposed statute, pinpointing its deciencies, and requiring correction of these deciencies before the statute is put intoe?ect, is rarely if ever an appropriate tas& for the 2udiciary. he combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on thelegislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line5by5line analysis of detailed statutes,x x x ordinarily results in a &ind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

7or these reasons, "on its face# invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine,# to be employed "sparingly and only asa last resort,# (2roadwic- v. 9-lahoma" 6'= 7.S. at *'=" =< #.d.1d at )6', National ndowment for the Arts v. inley" %16 7.S. %*" %)@ &')+5 andis generally disfavored (CP2S" nc. v. :ity of Dallas" 6= 7.S. 11=" '@< #.d.1d *@= &'@+, :ru3 v. Secretary of nvironment and Naturalesources" E.. No. '=%=)%" * Decemer 1@@@ &>endo3a" ;." Separate 9pinion+5. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, itsprovisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged(7nited States v. National Dairy Prod. :orp." =<1 7.S. 1" =14==" #.d.1d %*'" %*%4* &'*=+5

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the !lunder Jaw, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length bypetitioner, is more imagined than real. mbiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnishsupport to critics who cavil at the want of scientic precision in the law. -very provision of the law should be construed in relation and withreference to every other part. o be sure, it will ta&e more than nitpic&ing to overturn the well5entrenched presumption of constitutionality andvalidity of the !lunder Jaw. fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the !lunder Jaw is all about. 3eing one of the Senators who votedfor its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of



which he even registered his a/rmative vote with full &nowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. (Josep< EAercitoEstraa v. Sanigan8ayan 17<ir Division2, G.R. No. #"$&, Nov. 6, %&&, En 'anc 1'e--osi--o2)

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