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Religion, ethnicity, social organizationsand terrorists’ behavior – a case ofTaliban movement in PakistanMuhammad Feyyaza

a School of Governance and Society, University of Managementand Technology, Lahore, PakistanPublished online: 17 Jul 2015.

To cite this article: Muhammad Feyyaz (2015): Religion, ethnicity, social organizations andterrorists’ behavior – a case of Taliban movement in Pakistan, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism andPolitical Aggression, DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2015.1062791

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Religion, ethnicity, social organizations and terrorists’ behavior –a case of Taliban movement in Pakistan

Muhammad Feyyaz∗

School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology, Lahore,Pakistan

(Received 6 August 2014; accepted 12 June 2015)

Religion and ethnicity is widely associated with the unrelenting Taliban-ledviolence in Pakistan. Their shari’a rhetoric coupled with a sympathetic politico-religious constituency compounds the terrorism landscape for the generalaudience. Besides, less academic treatment of the phenomenon entailing analysisof its wholesome dimensions further constrains its understanding. Conceding thefact that religion pervades all aspects of contemporary conflict, this article arguesthat the present setting is neither rooted in the ethnicity nor in the religionliterally as the conflict formation variables; it is instead governed since itsinception by dynamics germinating from Pakhtunwali (a social code of conductof tribal Pashtun), mainly its retributive imperative. It specifically investigatesthe Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s rent seeking, greed and hypocritical behavior,which, it contends, lies in the selective perversion of Pakhtunwali permeated alsoby the nuanced influence of foreign fighters. The peace advocates’ claim forpotential success in dialog with Taliban is therefore considered as misleading.Drawing upon an adapted theoretical framework, the article attempts toempirically demonstrate the viability of these assertions.

Keywords: federally administered tribal areas; Taliban; Pakhtunwali; organizedhypocrisy; terrorism; rent seeking

Backdrop†

The government versus Taliban conflict in Pakistan has entered its second decade.Thousands of civilians, personnel of law enforcement agencies mainly army andpolice, and militants have lost their lives in the ensuing violence. With exceptionalinterludes, attacks directed against state and public targets have persisted even in theface of a full-scale military operation in North Waziristan. The mediation entered thescene to facilitate conflict settlement. It was however short-lived due to unrelenting ter-rorist activity by TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and its affiliates (Ali, 2014); somequarters have blamed the government for its lack of sincerity in exploring prospectsfor a peaceful outcome (“Taliban had agreed”, 2014). It is unclear what course thisviolent contestation may follow in future; the conflict landscape at this stage is see-mingly underlain by three distinct features: religion, ethnicity and rampant violence.The TTP, for example, claims for enforcement of shari’a in Pakistan, which was a

# 2015 Society for Terrorism Research

∗Email: faizy68@googlemail.com†This research work is primarily based on empirical sources; the inspiration for this undertakingstems from the writer’s extensive experience of interaction with the tribes during nearly twoyears stay in North Waziristan Agency from 2006–2008.

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1062791

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key objective at the time of its formation during 2007. Consequently, religious contentdominates TTP’s grand jihadi narrative, recruitment and propaganda material in allforms of mass communication. The justification of violent means by TTP is under-pinned by un-Islamic character of the state of Pakistan especially its pro-west orien-tation. Besides, since the Pashtun ethnicity remains a major determinant oforganizational framework of TTP, and of those internally displaced due to militaryinterventions, the conflict has been tagged as ethnic war; some observers have evenviewed the anti-terror operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as NorthWest Frontier Province) as attempted genocide against the Pashtuns of tribal areasand as a threat to their ethnic and Islamic identity (Ahmad, 2010).

The given description evokes a threefold impression about this conflict, that is, it isethno-religious in nature as has been previously underscored by Lieven (2008), Markey(2008), and Nawaz (2009); that the mediation had (or still has) a space for its resolution;and that the incidence of violence might have subsided if government-Taliban engagementwas sustained. If history is a guide, then such contemplation is reckoned inherently flawedand highly misleading. The reason-germinating mindset amenable to such formulation canbe found in the type of literature emerging on FATA (Federally Administered TribalAreas) and Taliban. Most of it is policy driven for the USA, which narrows the scopeof scientific study, is reductionist and apologetic in particular that produced in the massmedia and by think tanks owned by politico-religious parties in Pakistan. Importantly,the conflict literature by Pakistani writers is also largely devoid of theoretical innovations.At the same time the existing theories focusing on this and other ethno-religious armedconflicts only partially explain the dynamics latent in Taliban-led war in Pakistan.Hence, a widespread confusion prevails about the objective nature of the conflict in thepolicy, literary and public circles. This article is an effort to engender clarity to the gener-ally misunderstood Taliban movement in Pakistan.

It argues that while religion pervades all aspects of contemporary conflicts, the pre-vailing conflict condition is neither rooted in the ethnicity nor in the religion literally asthe conflict forming variables; it is instead governed, since its inception, by dynamicsspawned by Pakhtunwali (a social code of conduct of tribal Pashtun), mainly its retri-butive imperative. Specifically, the TTP’s terrorist behavior characterized by rentseeking, greed and organized hypocrisy results from selective perversion of Pakhtun-wali and the nuanced influence by the foreign fighters. Consequently, the prospectsof securing a meaningful peace with the Taliban through dialog are least probable.The mediation in future might manage the conflict at best only superficially.

Research approach and organization

No single theory offers itself germane to capture dynamism latent in any given context.Inevitably, this study resorts to an eclectic perspective by turning to a group of theories(to understand the reality) which have been frequently used by peace, conflict and ter-rorism scholars, that is, resource mobilization, collective action, economic, instrumen-tal and organizational, and political communication (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000;Crenshaw, 1988, p. 13; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1965, p. 51; Schmid, 2011,p. 246). Each of these theories revolves around a central variable(s) which defines itsprincipal orientation (Figure 1). The notion of organized hypocrisy by Lipson (2002)supplements the organizational approach, arguing that formal structures are establishedto symbolically conform to standards of legitimacy (or to stand for human or doctrinalideals); at the same time, however bureaucratic behavior largely disconnected from

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such structures is driven by the interests of organizational actors and constituencies.Besides, McCarthy and Zald (1977) originally conceived of a social movement and asocial movement organization as different entities, their construction is slightlyaltered, persuming that ontologically the Taliban embodies both the notion of a move-ment, that is, (in this case Pakhtunwali) as well as a social movement organization (i.e.TTP) to attain stated goal(s). Similarly, the social movement industry and sector havebeen modified to imply criminalized violence than the entrepreneurial underpinning ineconomics. The empirical evidence presented later in this article attempts to materializethe referred theories.

Furthermore, the armed conflict is construed in this paper as is generically under-stood while terrorism implies all violence carried out deliberately and systematicallyagainst unarmed, innocent and unprepared citizenry by non-state actors. The fatalitieshave been accordingly differentiated for terrorism and armed conflict. Besides, theterms conflict and civil war have been used interchangeably (Definitions, 2015).The paper begins by a brief overview of Pakhtunwali to contextualize the discussionfollowed by an examination of some relevant explanations on ethno-religious con-flicts and the violent landscape of Pakistan by foreign and local writers. Thereafter,the discussion analytically engages the social reality of conflict. This portion aimsat presenting the main evidence. In light of the insights gained, hypotheses arethen subjected to detailed scrutiny to extract the findings, which also concludes thepaper.

Figure 1. Key variables of chosen theories.

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What is Pakhtunwali?

Pakhtunwali dates back to the pre-Islamic era of Bactria (see Leriche & Grenet, 1988for details on Bactria). It is believed to have evolved over a long period of 3000–4000years and reflects the multiple worldviews of all the people who interacted with thePashtun in the historic Gandhara civilization (Rafiullah, 2011). Pakhtunwali has beendefined in numerous ways by historians, sociologists and anthropologists studyingethnic Pashtun. In simple terms, it governs the whole array of social life of tribesmenby acting as an informally binding and socially guiding framework. Therefore, it hasbeen conceptualized by some writers as Pakhtun social organization (Naz, Khan,Rehman, Daraz, & Hussain, 2011). Poetry, art, literature, architecture, music anddance have been inseparable parts of the code that could be retraced over the lastseveral centuries (Hussain, 2013). This social system has been prevalent in entirePashtun society with varied emphasis in North West Pakistan and eastern parts ofAfghanistan adjoining border regions of Balochistan, FATA, Dir and Chitral districtsof Pakistan. That also delineates the geopolitical and psychosocial span of the conflictunder review, not least confined to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Nevertheless, here theaccent is essentially on seven agencies of FATA – Bajuar, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand,Orakzai, North and South Waziristan with the latter two sharply focused due to thescene of major developments. All except Orakzai share a border with Afghanistanand each has a dominant tribe or tribal group and economic base and physical charac-teristics that distinguish it from the others (Figure 2) (Nawaz, 2009). Apart from FATA,

Figure 2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (instep Pakistan)Source: FATA Disaster Management Authority.

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district Swat from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has also been integrated in the analysis for itsrelationship with the Taliban movement.

The word Pakhtunwali or Pashtunwali (pashtunwalei or pashtungwali) meansPathan’s way or pashtunness. It is an umbrella idiom which is composed by a fewcardinals accumulated over time as the human experiences progressed in theseareas even though there is no agreement on these fundamental pillars of Pakhtunwali.Several studies by authors such as by Ahmed (1977, 1980), Lindholm (1982), Gins-burg (2011), Tarzi and Lamb (2011) endorse Badal, Melmastia and Nanawati as theoverarching architecture of Pakhtunwali. Each of these studies has connoted mean-ings of these terms literally as well as in some cases in explanatory form; inessence, these convey same sense as collated here, that is, ‘melmastia’ (hospitalityand protection to every guest); ‘nanawati’ (the right of a fugitive to seek a placeof refuge, and acceptance of bona fide offer of peace and pardon); and ‘badal’ (theright of blood feuds or revenge or ‘vendetta’). Proverbially the revenge taken evenafter a century is considered early among pashtun, implying isteqamat (persistence:constancy) and sabat (steadfastness) without regard to temporal considerations.Deceit and surprise in methods to invoke revenge is socially acceptable (Report, 1November 2011). Among others, namus (defense of the honor of women (Glatzer,1998, p. 4) is an important segment of pakhtunwali; it can be stated with some auth-ority that tribal culture firmly stands for safeguarding the honor and life of women.While imandari (righteousness) is also part of the tradition, hypocrisy in rhetoric anddeed can be seen. These and dozens other features of pakhtunwali that are stillevolving have become part of the normative practices called ‘rawaj’ (customarylaw), which is the de facto law of the land. The institution to operationalizePakhtunwali or rawaj is jirga (council of elders). The tribal society has been savedfrom genocidal tendencies resulting from mutual enmity due to apprehension ofassured armed retribution and the role of jirga as a conflict mitigating or managementinstrument.

Information on evolution of Islam in tribal areas is hampered by the absence of lit-erary production by which to trace religious interpretations or the precise nature of reli-gious practice in the Pakhtun areas (Haroon, 2007, p. 33). Anecdotal evidence suggestsit entered FATA consequent to Afghans’ conversion to this religion during seventhcentury AD, which was temporally earlier than it reached the current-day Pakistan.The interactive union of Pakhtunwali and religion subsequently produced a distinctform of Islam characterized by tribal features with ‘boundaries and disjunctionbetween them’ evident from the symbolic and situational Muslimness of Pashtun(Sammon, 2008, p. 34). In practice, Rawaj has been more powerful than religiousethos. A striking example is the notion of revenge which Islam has also retained inits message; but has enjoined it as Qisas which means equality (in retribution) with astrong recommendation for mercy and forgiveness (Ali, n.d., p. 71).1 Pakhtunwali islikewise explicit about exercising restraint but it is unusual in imposing an affirmativeduty to seek revenge: failing to do so will cause one to suffer a reputational sanction inbeing thought of as a coward (Ginsburg, 2011). Further, several dimensions of rawaj (orPakhtunwali) contradict some of the fundamental teachings of Islam, for example,walwor (selling and buying girls for marriage), levying interest on loan, swara(exchange of women to resolve feuds) (Ginsburg, 2011; Usafzai, 2004), denial ofinheritance rights to women folk, wife inheritance (Economist, 2006), forced marriages(Shinwari, 2008).2

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Existing explanations on ethno-religious conflicts

The conflict literature abounds with studies dealing with the causes of civil war. Thesehave used a variety of variables to explore this causal association such as but not limitedto, for example, demography, identity, diversity, geography, environment, greed andresource curse, economic, conflict history, bad/conflicted neighborhood, neighborhoodspillovers and regime change (Bosker & Ree, 2012; Dixon, 2009). Invariably, all ofthese factors find their way into the conflict surrounding FATA with a few such asdemography, geography, economy, history and conflicted neighborhood assumingmore accentuation than others. There are however two major problems here. First,there is no consensus among social and political scientists on a standard model ofcivil war initiation (Dixon, 2009). Further, the examination of these determinantssingly or in dyads does not resolve the complexity underlying the prevailing contextdue to their parsimony or generality reasons. For example, there are varying argumentsfor or against spillover effects and living in bad neighborhoods. Sambanis and Hegre(2006) claim that neither the neighborhood spillovers are significant nor is there agree-ment over the effects of living in ‘bad’ neighborhoods. Bosker and Ree (2012) confirmthat there is no evidence that all civil wars have the same tendency to spread acrossinternational boundaries but affirm that only ethnic civil wars pose a significantthreat to neighboring countries’ stability. Within this category, they identify that notall countries are at the same risk of contagion since ethnic civil wars only spreadalong ethnic lines. They defend this perspective among others, by citing spread ofAfghanistan’s civil war to Pakistan’s North-western provinces. Indeed, these accountsdo relate to conflict reality of FATA and Pakistan but without the ethnicity being adetermining factor. The Afghan Jihad in 1980s resulted in several adverse effects onthe socio-economy of Pakistan. Nevertheless when spillover effects of protractedcivil war from Afghanistan were most likely, Pakistan and FATA did not descendinto chaos (Khan, 2012). Similarly, the suffering of the Afghans are received withanguish by their frontier brethren in Pakistan, yet, those who went to fight againstthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during 2000s comprised thejihadis drawn largely from mainstream Pakistani society, and not the Pashtun alone.Why Afghan crisis still spread to north western Pakistan has reasons in dynamics (dis-cussed later in this paper), which the civil war definition employed by Bosker and Ree(2012) does not account for.3 The bad neighborhood is driven by the assumption thatliving in bad neighborhoods – that is, in regions with mostly poor, autocratic regimes –might increase the risk of civil war in the neighborhood (Sambanis & Hegre, 2006).More than FATA, this analogy seems fitting within South Asian parameters. The auto-cratic rule in Pakistan has led to major wars with India, but eruption of classic civil warsin the neighborhood such as China, India or Afghanistan, owing to this basis is hard todiscover. Kargil conflict initiated under a democratic government has been an excep-tion; in which the role of the military dominates than what might have been thehigher direction of war under civilian oversight, but it does not fall into the categoryof typical civil war either.

As regards the impact of economy, abject poverty has existed in the tribal areassince the inception of Pakistan with around 60% of its residents living below thepoverty line, with a per capita public expenditure in the region estimated one-thirdof the average for Pakistan (Shinwari, 2008). Intense debate has therefore focused onFATA concerning the extent to which poverty and illiteracy, as causal variables, arerelevant to militancy in tribal areas. Mostly, the belief that poverty and lack of

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education undergirds terrorism is pervasive within policy circles (Fair, 2008). Suchclaims are generally inconsonant with the consensus within the terrorism literaturewhere little direct connection is found between poverty, education and participationin terrorism and politically motivated violence (Fair & Shapiro, 2009/2010; Krueger& Maleckova, 2002). Fair (2008) therefore warns against generalizing the povertylexicon, arguing that depicting Pakistan’s militants as ‘poor’ or ‘uneducated’ misrepre-sents the diversity of their backgrounds and the diversity of the missions for which theyare employed. Aftab (2008) likewise finds little evidence to support the contention thatpoverty, in and of itself, fuels extremism. Her finding is insightful given the swathe ofthe data employed, that is, entailing subjects hailing from lower strata of socio-econ-omic classes who fought in Afghanistan during early 2000s. By and large, these con-clusions correspond with the empirical reality of FATA which has somehow remainedinternally stable despite its woeful per capita income.

In addition to the cited causes, a widely accepted narrative about the onset of civilwars associates it with the end of the Cold War, wherein the root cause of many or mostof these have been ethnic nationalism or religious diversity. James Fearon and DavidLaitin (2003) refute these theories. They find that the factors that explain whichcountries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristicsbut rather the conditions that favor insurgency include poverty, which marks financiallyand bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment-political instability,rough terrain and large populations. With some variation, Bleaney and Dimico (2009),in their study on the Incidence, the Onset and Duration of Civil Wars, also support thisformulation. This generalization has glaring shortcomings. First, its explanatory poten-tial stands neutralized in the face of several contemporary instances such as civil war inBosnia-Herzegovina, Tutsi-Hutu conflict in Rwanda, Shia-Sunni violence in Iraq andSyria, apartheid in South Africa and violence in Northern Ireland. These examplesinsinuate strong presence of ethnic and religious content in addition to a healthy econ-omic outlook of some of these countries. Poverty–terrorism/violence nexus has other-wise become obsolete in the light of numerous groundbreaking studies that challengesuch perceptions (e.g. see also Blair, Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 2012). Second,while FATA in Pakistan, which is the primary theater of operation of the Talibanagainst security forces and a launch pad for the spread of violence in the country,shares all the environmental factors, these seem perfunctory without reference to geo-political and cultural uniqueness of FATA or similar regions originating from the deco-lonization project. Moreover, the mountainous terrain emerges as an important variablein the causes of wars, and it is striking that, even with so many analyses devoted to thisvariable, there is no consensus on whether it actually predicts civil war (Dixon, 2009).Due to its peculiar dynamics, FATA has a history of inter/intra tribal wars but the regionhas not been the seat of a violent movement drawing contiguous populations into aconflict.

The rational choice economics literature is another stream of civil war scholarshipwhich offers two possible explanations for the origin of a conflict: grievance andgreed (Murshed, 2006). The grievance or deprivation perspectives received wideattention in the early 1970s, but a number of studies negated expected relationshipsbetween objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenom-ena. The basis of the argument that there is always enough discontent in any society atany given time to fuel a movement has itself been vital in undermining the grievance-based approach (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). When applied to the Pakistani case, theprevalence of nationwide grievances would suggest that more societal mobilization

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should be seen than has been (Surendra, 2009). The other variable to cause conflict isgreed or what is termed as ‘rational pursuit of economic self – interest’, which restsupon economic motives driving onset of conflicts. Closely related to the Olson’s(1965, p. 51) concept of ‘selective incentive’ for mobilizing larger groups, Collierand Hoeffler (2000) have propounded the greed model by likening the rebels’greed akin to loot-seeking. Examining the empirical pattern of civil wars between1965 and 1999, they assert that ‘the true cause of much civil war is not the loud dis-course of grievance but the silent force of greed’. Surendra (2009) in a comparativestudy of two ethnicities (Balochis and Kashmiris) from Pakistan keenly draws on PaulCollier’s variables but, on the ‘logic of collective action’, she renders greed theory asunsatisfactory by attributing anti-state ambitions of the Baloch and their contentiousbehavior to the absence of institutional pluralism, manifest nationalism and presenceof particular opportunities encouraging rebellion; to the contrary in Azad Kashmirgrievances are ample, but mobilization is very little due to insufficient opportunitiesfor rebellion. A noteworthy counter to greed discourse has come from Zartman andArnson (2005) by questioning the adequacy of explaining internal armed conflictspurely in terms of economic factors rather than deprivation, discrimination, identityand grievances as fundamental grounds creating and sustaining internal wars. The-ories by Collier and Zartman are indeed novel, but these only partially addressdynamics feeding the conflict situation in Pakistan. A fundamental weakness ofthese and other theoretical frameworks on the onset of civil wars is their inabilityto respond to the ethos underwriting violence as a sanctioned process embedded inpsychosocial institutions of tribal societies (Ginsburg, 2011). Comparatively thecase study of Balochistan and Kashmir by Surendra is more germane due to its con-ceptual breadth with reference to opportunity structures, it nevertheless dismisses thenotion of greed altogether from the conflict calculus, and does not discuss rent-seeking proclivity even when strong indicators of such orientation are clearly pre-sented in the Balochistan militancy. For example, Akbar Bugti (a leading Balochtribal elder) consistently received huge sums as royalty of Sui Gas annually,peaking up to Rupees 240 million during 2007. It was widely speculated that heused this money to fund local insurgents, possibly even the Balochistan LiberationArmy (Surendra, 2009).

Karim (2013) uses Chechen civil wars to explain the transformational and intensitydimensions of conflict due to the role of foreign fighters. This argument relates to Pakis-tani context but involving influence of a different genre. The participation of foreignfighters in this situation stems more from their compulsion to survive in an aliensetting. Consequently, while Waziri tribes and militants belonging to this tribe fromthe North and South Waziristan Agencies (NWA and SWA) have contested presenceof foreign fighters in their midst (Khattak, 2010; Sulaiman, 2010), the TTP hasalways vowed to protect their foreign guests. Baitullah Mehsud engaged in deadlyclashes with Maulvi Nazir on the issue of protecting Central Asia fighters (CCS,n.d.).4 The tradition has continued ever since, inspired more by strategic reasonsthan by an element of Pakhtunwali, that is, ‘melmastia’ (hospitality and protection toevery guest).

Pakistani scholarship on Taliban-led conflict

A lot has been published in and outside the country by Pakistani writers providing anarray of perspectives about the genesis, sustenance and strategy of Taliban-led violence.

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Broadly this literature can be divided into three categories: descriptive cum policy, jour-nalistic and selectively theoretical.

Luras and Aziz (2010), Nawaz (2009), Abbas (2010), Khan (2012), and Hussian(2013) can be considered part of the first category. Aziz (2007) points to historicalas well as socioeconomic basis coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan andpolicy follies by the government that created conditions and sources of instability intribal areas, which gradually spread to adjacent districts and later to other regions ofthe country. In Swat, Luras and Aziz (2010) mainly link geo-historical context aswell as socioeconomic reasons generating a sympathetic constituency for theTaliban. Nawaz (2009) makes two key observations. First, the Kalusha operation bythe army in SWA during March 2004 heightened the local dynamics, and second,Pashtun nationalism in FATA has been replaced by political Islam. He highlightsgreed behavior of the unemployed locals, criminals and some tribesmen who soughtto acquire wealth and influence by harboring and sheltering foreign militants,Taliban and others who had fled Afghanistan, thereby forsaking the traditional normof Melmastia. Abbas (2010) opines that [Afghan] Taliban sympathizers and supportersin bordering areas of Pakistan revived themselves slowly after 2003–2004, when theyrealized that neither was Pakistan pursuing them with any special zeal, nor was Afgha-nistan a lost cause, given that the USA was diverting its resources and energies towardIraq . . . [and] Pakistani military’s unprecedented presence and movement in FATAproved to be an additional incentive for them to ‘rise from their slumber’. Fromthere on, they picked their battles intelligently and cut deals strategically to earn anew lease on life. Consequently, their support networks and organizational strengthincreased in the tribal territories, and they emerged with a bang under the banner ofTTP in 2007. He partially links the persistence of violence with the use of force,both by Pakistan and by the USA.

The main concern by Khan (2012) is the state formation processes in Pakistanentailing past decisions and policies by the governments in ignoring FATA. Withoutexplicitly outlining cause and processes generating violence, Khan argues that initiallythe violence was restricted to North and South Waziristan, but growing instability inAfghanistan particularly in 2007 led to trouble spilling to the relatively stable andpeaceful agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai and Kurram. She proposes Pakistan’salliance with the USA coupled with the activities of elements, including al-Qaeda, theTaliban, splinter groups and other regional groups, has led to unrelenting instability inthe region. Hussian (2013) argues in favor of homogenized worldview by militants asthe casualty, through a reconstructed triangular of Jihad-Khilafat-Shahadat (martyr-dom), that seeks to eliminate indigenous socio-cultural fabric everywhere. He holdsthe militants responsible for destroying human life, property and dignity of almostthe whole population of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA besides other parts of Paki-stan. Almost disposed identically like policy perspectives, the journalistic stream isinspired by narratives that dwell around the Pakistan Army, Islam, ISI, al-Qaeda,Taliban, proxies, militancy, Kashmir, Afghanistan, policy propositions for America.(Hussain, 2010; Rashid, 2008; Shahzad, 2011). A few local journalists from Swathave underscored the primacy of the element of class consciousness challenging thedominance of the khawaneen, the landed classes in tribal areas as well as anti-imperi-alism in particular in Bajuar, Waziristan (Khan, 2008).

Compared to the aforementioned, the work by Rabia Aslam, Nasreen Ghufran,Nazia Fiaz, Abdul Basit, Khuram Iqbal and Nizami, et al. can be classified as scholarly.Viewing from the perspective of game theory, Aslam (2008) cites June and October

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2003 military operations by the Pakistan Army as the reason resulting in soaring levelof local support to the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in tribal areas. She makes a vaguemention of badal by describing the June 2006 air strikes, killing 41 militants, includingtheir Chechen commander, in a raid on their hideout in NWA which was furiously reta-liated by local militants by storming the bazaar of Miramshah (the headquarters of thisAgency). Ghufran (2009) observes that the rise and contemporary dynamics of theTaliban insurgency in the NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and FATA is not necessarilya product or reflective of Pashtun ethno-nationalism. Instead, it is based on a particularinterpretation of Islam, irrespective of ethnic or linguistic demarcations. She views theUSA and NATO military intervention along the Afghan-Pakistan border since 2001 tohave exacerbated the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan. Fiaz (2012) sees reasons of erup-tion of the conflict in the discourses generated by the Afghan Jihad. This representation,according to her, in the absence of a state apparatus and regulation, was left intact in thetribal region and allowed to grow and flourish. Basit (2013) grounds his argument forthe rise of militancy in the TTP affiliates’ subscription to the Khurasaan utopia, whichrelates to a prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. According to them,

an Islamist movement of black flags will rise from the land of Khurasaan (current dayAfghanistan, tribal regions of Pakistan, Xinjiang province of China and some parts ofCentral Asia and Iran). It will establish the system of Islamic caliphate across the globeand no power will be able to stop them.

The study by Iqbal and Silva (2013) is deemed novel contingent to its complete cover-age of the TTP temporal spectrum employing terrorist lifecycle theory. Claiming thatthe TTP is already on its way to demise in its lifecycle, they ascribe the emergenceof the Taliban as a result of spillover effects of the war in Afghanistan, describingthe onset of the conflict identical to Hassan Abbas. Nizami, Rana, Hassan, andMinhas (2014) who examine terrorism in Pakistan from a behavioral sciences perspec-tive per se, factually account for a host of historical and socio-religious factors perpe-tuating non-state violence. They do tacitly refer to revenge, renown and reaction andexistential anxiety experienced by terrorists, as few of the violence contributors.

In essence, all the referred studies thematically share many of their emphases. Assuch, none of the variables constituting hypotheses of this paper have received in-depth attention, especially the dynamics spawned by Pakhtunwali and its distortedforms.

The reality of conflict and terrorism as it is

Role of badal

In all probability, the genesis underlying the prevailing conflict lay in providing asylumto foreign fugitives by the local tribes and those Afghan veterans residing in Bajuar,North and SWA as part of traditional hospitality as well as for monetary gains,which founded the violent discord between them and the government forces whenasked to surrender guests (Rabasa et al., 2007; Rubin, 2000). The major catalyst wasa two-weeks-long military campaign during March 2004 known as Kalusha operationnear the Wana area in South Waziristan. Enclosing an area of 20 kilometers radius, itwas the largest of its kind since the entry of the army into FATA in 2002. AmnestyInternational reported in April (2004) that a range of human rights violations were com-mitted, including arbitrary arrest and detention, possible unlawful killings and

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extrajudicial executions and the deliberate destruction of dozens of houses to punishwhole families alleged to have harbored people associated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was the major foe contending thearmy who suffered heavily in this operation. The report further informed about theuse of massive fire power by army employing multiple firing platforms, helicopter gun-ships, artillery coupled with eviction of at least 30,000 people from the area prior tooperation. At this time, resistance spots had erupted in several agencies: well-entrenched TNSM (Tehrik-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi) in Bajuar, reinforcedTehrik-e-Taliban (Movement of the Taliban) – which had operated from OrakzaiAgency since 1998, and the local Taliban force in Mirali raised by the Dawar tribeof North Waziristan (Abbas, 2006), not to mention tribal militias operating in otheragencies for protection of foreign guests. This operation sowed the seeds for badalamong armed groups as well as within the population. Shortly after the targeteddeath of Nek Muhammad wazir, the Taliban commander from South Waziristan on19 June 2004, violence was warned by the militants across Pakistan (Kronstadt &Vaughn, 2004). NWA witnessed first suicidal attack in June 2004 by a foreignfighter against the army, which increased to five during 2006 inside the tribal territoryand expanding into settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (South Asia Terrorism Portal(SATP), 2007).

The real triggers spawning new generation of violence were provided by a US-leddrone strike on a religious seminary belonging to the TNSM in the village of Chenegaiin Bajuar Agency in October 2006 and the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) fiasco at Islama-bad in July 2007 (Feyyaz, 2013a). Scores of civilians, including young madrassa (reli-gious seminaries) students mainly belonging to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were killed inthe Lal Masjid operation. These included many homeless adolescents from the 2005earthquake who died in the cross-fire, while being forced to provide cover to the mili-tants (Nizami et al., 2014). Revenge through jihad was pledged by thousands of tribes-men, the youth and the entire militant grouping from FATA as well as mainstreamPakistan (“Militants vow to avenge”, 2007). Further, the Lal Masjid operation addedfuel to the anti-government sentiment among the Pashtun population in Khyber Pakh-tunkhwa. Students of various madrassas in the province retaliated by storming theoffices of the political agents of Khyber and Mohmand agencies as well as militaryconvoys (Ahmad, 2010). The ultimate formation of diverse Taliban groupings into asingle Taliban movement, that is, TTP, also resulted from this operation.

Other than incessant attacks on security forces mainly in FATA and KhyberPakhtunkhwa, 54 suicidal attacks were carried out during 2007, several by twinbombers targeting state symbols, law enforcement agencies, strategic installations,school children, political processions and public across entire country. 765 citizens(including soldiers and the former Prime Minister) lost their lives and about 1700were injured. Of the total incidents, 14 were terrorist acts, with one instance inKarachi killing 144 and injuring 550 others (SATP, 2007). The victims were mostlyethnic Pashtun, followed by Punjabis and Sindhis. Over 80% of suicide bombersbelonged to tribes from FATA (Koprowski, 2009). In terms of the trend over aperiod of five years (2006–2011), sectarianism accounted for only 4.96% of the totalfatalities (1850 of 37226 victims) in the attacks, remaining were [conflictual and] ter-rorism (Feyyaz, 2013a). This observation can be empirically viewed in the yearly shift-ing trend of attack targets in Figure 3 for the period from 2002 to October 2009, basedon 198 events (Feyyaz, 2013a). In Swat, the ruthless suppression of all dissent and thebrutal targeting of known opponents cowed the local populace into submission (Abbas,

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2010). It will be useful also to recall that evoking strong reactions to military operationsin Swat and the NWA was one of the major objectives of the TTP at the time of itsestablishment in December 2007 (Abbas, 2008). The revenge letting has been country-wide ever since, owned publicly by the Taliban. Meanwhile there has been no letup inmilitary operations; the Pakistan Air Force had flown more than 5500 strike sorties overthe country’s troubled FATA region between May 2008 and November 2011 (“PAFconducted”, 2011).

Organization’s ethnic and ideological assortment

In their entirety violent social movements in Pakistan can be termed as a key violencesector equal to (or in certain aspects, superior to) the stately monopolized law enforce-ment and military structures. Until January 2014, the Interior Ministry of Pakistanidentified up to 53 different extremist and terrorist groups, mostly from FATA andKhyber Pakhtunkhwa (“Number of banned”, 2013). In early February 2014, theleading national daily DAWN showed that number to be around 60. Rana (2010), aleading journalist on studies of violence and radicalization, counted over 100 militantand Taliban groups and foreign terrorist networks during September 2010 operating inand from the tribal areas of Pakistan. These should include numerous smaller outfitsthat are loosely affiliated with TTP, operating from diverse locations and the splintergroups, mostly Punjabi, who renounced their parent organization, for example, rene-gades of mainstream Kashmiri fighters Lashkar–e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin al-Alami and possibly Harkat-ul-Ansar (Feyyaz,2013b). This collectivity excludes cell-centric entities that operate autonomouslywith elusive identity and without a central control. Several independent Taliban clustersare also based in FATA. For example, Waziri and Dawar Taliban from the NWA

Figure 3. Variations in Targets Terrorism.Source: Conceptualising terrorism trend patterns in Pakistan, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2013.

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comprising about 16 major and minor factions led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur are a formid-able grouping that has generally remained away from the TTP due to divergent politicaldispositions. Likewise, there are six independent Waziri, Mehsud and Bhittani groupsbelonging to SWA, including the Maulvi Nazir groups that maintain their distinct iden-tity (Feyyaz, 2013b). Non-Taliban armed groups, including Lashkar-e-Islam andInsarul Islam, are based in the Khyber Agency, who pursue intra-sect, anti-crime andanti-state objectives.

The TTP was originally a purely mono-ethnic group comprising a shura of 40 seniorTaliban leaders represented from all of FATA’s seven tribal agencies, but also from thesettled districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan,Buner and Malakand (Abbas, 2008). This ethnic preference was in accord with tra-ditional lifestyles of tribal Pashtun who are known for preserving coherence even inthe midst of non-tribal Pashtuns. The TTP however now blends elements from othernationalities such as Punjabi, Seraiki, Kashmiri, Baloch and Urdu-speaking operativeswho are managing regional setups (Feyyaz, 2013a). This meshing up has been going onsince January 2006 when splintering commenced from Kashmir-based Jihadi groups. Ithas of-late accelerated due to mounting size of independent competitors (e.g. Daesh),growing jointness with sectarian as well as secular groups and the need to enhanceas well as modernize operational efficiency. In the aftermath of Lal Masjid operation,Punjabi Taliban comprised a noticeable portion of TTP formations. Mercenaries andoutsourcers integrated temporarily do not form part of the regular structure of theTTP. This organizational diversity generates varying conflict narratives emanatingfrom their individual experiences and variety of theological traditions. In fact, the com-peting dynamics of integration and fragmentation has long morphed Deobandi narrativeof the TTP into a theological mosaic interspersed by the elements of Ahle hadit,Wahabi, Hanbli, Salafi and of late somewhat of barelvi belief systems (Feyyaz,2013a). Other than considerations for survivability amidst competitive andhostile environment, organizationally they are held together by the lure of selectiveincentives, and the state repression works to solidify than break their organizationalcohesion.

Rent-seeking and greed behavior

The social processes, predatory mechanisms appended by the British in the form ofMaliki system to manage local affairs who pried on public money and the multiplepower institutions (including jirga) have historically existed in tribal society. Themaliki system was primarily developed during the early decade of twentieth centuryto allow the colonial administration to exercise control over the tribes. Under thissystem, local chiefs (maliks) were designated as intermediaries between the membersof individual tribes and the colonial authorities to assist in the implementation of gov-ernment policies (History of FATA, n.d.; Sammon, 2008). Factually, it created newmodes of deviant behavior that were abhorrent under the pakhtunwali but became per-missible given the new incentives (Sammon, 2008). All the invading columns fromcentral or western Asia heading for Delhi in the distant past could not pass through stra-tegic passes without paying for transit through these routes. The British were the last inthis chain who disbursed heavy subsidies to border clans for strategic communicationand movement across borders into Afghanistan (Nichols, 2005). Apart from organizedcrimes, raiding of settled areas or trading (smuggling) across western frontiers has beenan integral ingredient of tribal life since ages (Trench, 1985). The administrative

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division of earlier unified Waziristan into north and south, the carving out of territorialpockets of semi-settled nature called frontier regions between FATA and the regulardistricts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during early twentieth century, and the frequent puni-tive reprisals into the agencies by the British military were primarily instigated byraiding expeditions by the tribesmen. Moreover, ‘money for services’ is common prac-tice in these areas, including smuggling and providing refuge to criminals and terrorists(Ahmad, 2010; Ahmed, 2008). A new dynamic was added by the influx of Arab ‘muja-hideen’ in the 1980s and of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants since 2001, which alongwith political Islam, brought money and illegal economic activity to the region(Tajik, 2011).

Several writers have endorsed greed-based loyalty to al-Qaeda among Pashtun tri-besmen and religious clerics (Mullahs) who supported it and other foreign militants andgave them sanctuary more for the lure of money than owing to ethnic or ideologicalaffinity or sympathy with their cause (Tohid, 2005). As the Taliban’s strength grewin South Waziristan in early 2000s, the processes and mechanism for wealth accumu-lation began to be streamlined. In the first instance, they allowed petty thieves to jointhe movement. Taliban commanders were also accused of taking bribes and bribinglocal political administrators (Mahsud, 2010). There are reports of appointment of ahead of criminals within the leadership hierarchy of Taliban to oversee generation ofmoney by the gangs for the TTP through crime in the settled districts of Pakistan(Mahsud, 2010). In 2008, sources disclosed of the TTP using managed religiousdecree (fatwa) from handpicked scholars to justify criminal acts such as bank robberies,forced taxes, smuggling, kidnappings for ransom, and drug money to finance its ‘holywar’ (Iqbal & Silva, 2013). This practice has been widespread since. In a public surveyby Bari (2009) in Swat, when people were asked who joined the Taliban, the majorityof both men and women respondents (64%) mentioned criminals as the top categorywho were joining the ranks of Taliban. Within the TTP’s ranks are therefore criminalsand outlaws who grew beards and professed piety in order to enhance their social pro-files – which would otherwise be impossible given their hereditary position in society(Yusuf, 2011, p. 86).

As more areas fell under their control a ‘tax schedule’, system was introduced inFATA as well as Swat and its adjoining districts. Collection of revenue has been sys-tematic and even more efficient than the government system (Acharya, Bukhari, &Sulaiman, 2009). The TTP recruited hardened criminals in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,Sindh and Punjab provinces to commit robberies, vehicle snatching, thefts and kidnap-ping for ransom to fill their coffers (Acharya, Bukhari, & Sulaiman, 2009). The Swatconflict presents a novel case study from this perspective that appears to have begunwith sociopolitical aims but soon afterwards mutated into conflict in which economicbenefits became paramount (Feyyaz, 2011). The Taliban under Fazalullah in Swatalone accumulated rents to the tune of Rupees 708.6–819.6 million (US $7.34–8.49) between November 2007 and May 2009 through extortion. The violence was vir-tually turned into a market commodity by them. Since June 2012, the TTP factions inKarachi became more brazen and violent in organized crime especially against tribalsdwelling here (Rehman, 2013). The reasons of infighting for leadership in the TTP afterthe death of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 were essentially stirred by the desire tocontrol financial sums (Feyyaz, 2010). This huge income networking justifies whyHakimullah Mehsud was able to pay Rupees 1.7 million for the walwor (bridebuying). He lived in a state-of-the-art house in the NWA until his death. Nawaz(2009) therefore refers to being Taliban as a fulltime occupation, which also includes

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post-life welfare arrangements for their families. A recent report by the InternationalCrisis Group (2013) reveals that the militant networks active in Malakand Divisionof Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recruit less on ideology than on the promise of money anda sense of purpose.

The rent-seeking behavior can be best witnessed in cutting peace deals with the gov-ernment. In majority of the cases, the government provided significant financial com-pensation to the militants on the pretext of property damage. This money likelyexceeded the actual cost of damages, in effect providing militants funding for futureoperations (Khattak, 2012). Three peace agreements are noteworthy from this aspect.In the Shakai Agreement signed on 24 April 2004 between Taliban commander NekMuhammad Wazir and government representatives, in addition to the commitmentby the government to pay compensation for collateral damage caused and casualtiesinflicted during the operation, money to the tune of more than $800,000 was imbursedto four tribal commanders as part of deal to repay their debt to al-Qaeda (Tohid, 2005).Sararogha Peace Deal reached during February 2005 with Baitullah Mehsud becamecontroversial after reports emerged that money had been paid to the militants duringthe negotiations. Similarly, an unspecified amount of money was transferred fromPakistani government’s coffers to the militants to materialize Miramshah PeaceAccord in North Waziristan during September 2006 (Tajik, 2011). In addition to secur-ing regular rents from local mineral and timber industry, FATA provides for routes toorganized criminal networks dealing with arms supply and drug trafficking to SoutheastAsian black markets through China (UNODC, 2013, p. 23). Credible estimates projectannual earning of the Taliban and their allies into millions of US $. Major splittingamong the TTP ranks during 2014 alleging its leadership having ‘fallen into thehands of a bunch of conspirators’, and the umbrella organization’s involvement ‘incriminal activities like robbery and extortion’ (Sherazi, 2014) lends strong credenceto the lusty mores of Taliban.

Myth of the religion and organized hypocrisy

Exemplifying the Afghan Taliban and TNSM, enforcement of shari’a (divine law) inPakistan has been a consistent theme in Taliban rhetoric since the launch of theirmovement. Spatial constraints do now allow a full discussion on Shari’a; suffice itto say that it is a highly banalized and abused term in contemporary discourse on vio-lence. As opposed to conventional perception of tribesmen being highly religious,role of Islam in tribal life is symbolic at best. This finds an apt expression in expla-nation by Anderson (quoted by Sammon, 2008) that the ‘Ghilzai (a pathan lineage inAfghanistan) stress that Islam is essential to their definition of self, while at the sametime asserting that their culture is contrary to it’ (Sammon, 2008). Where there is con-tradiction between the customs and the Islamic law, such as denial of inheritancerights to women and widespread practice charging interests on loans, Pakhtunwould recognize it with guilt (Jan, 2010). Against all universal practices of humanrights and to generate money, walwor is regarded legal by a sizeable majority, includ-ing women folk under tribal law even though un-Islamic (Shinwari, 2008). Edwards(1996) is firm in his opinion that during 1897 real inspiration and trigger of revolt bytribesmen against the Imperial Empire were rooted in emotive narrative than in reli-gion, since civil unrest was inspired by government attempts to expand its influenceand authority into the tribal areas. Fakir of Ipi,5a widely acclaimed freedom fighter,presents an objective embodiment of a tribal Muslim. More writers such as Alan

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Warren, Sana Haroon, Maqbool Wazir and Al-Arqam are inclined in seeing him aPashtun or tribal nationalist and an opportunist than a religious figure. Warren(2000) therefore cautions against reading too deeply into his rhetoric of oppositionto kafir and protection of Islam in India arguing that his great popularity was partlyTori Khel tribal interest in preventing government penetration into their area and pre-serving the autonomy of Tochi Valley in NWA (Warren, 2000). However, Warren’sexplanation does not account for the participation of Afghan Wazris in the anti-Britishmovement by Faqir who came from across the border and the Mehsuds, who did notshare Tori Khel territorial concerns. Haroon (2007, p. 161) fills the void by locatingthis participation in the attraction of target practice against the Indian Army and thepromise of booty from trans-border raids. Wazir (2009) details the financial incen-tives available to Faqir from the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Afghanistan) infomenting troubles against the British Empire and later against Pakistan. Intriguinglyenough, Faqir supported the Indian Congress movement on the one hand despite hisanimosity toward Hindus in their communal tussle with Muslims, but stood firmlybeside his co-religionists in defense of the Muslim rights and honor although vehe-mently opposing the All India Muslim League and the creation of Pakistan. LikewiseAl-Arqam (2012) articulates his opinion around cultural milieu of FATA, which pro-pelled Faqir of Ipi to fame than any religious triggers. Hauner (1981) appears to be asingle voice who disputes such claims and argues that the insurrection led by Faqirwas primarily driven by religious zeal and he always portrayed himself as the ‘cham-pion of Islam’. The saint does personify the general character of a typical tribal; it willbe affront to compare him with the values the Taliban fight for.

The TTP drew nine peace deals with the Pakistani government. The signatories inmost cases included militant leadership or their designated envoys. Some deals par-ticularly mentioned abstaining from terrorist acts at public places and against womenat market places such as in Swat, Khyber agency and Miramshah deals; all the othersspecifically urged them against actions across the entire territory of Pakistan. ExceptShakai, which was scrapped by the government upon failure to meet deadlines, therest were unilaterally revoked by the militants on different pretexts. Each time apeace deal was concluded with the government, the Taliban emerged stronger, rein-vigorated with the spirit to heighten militancy and expansionist tendencies. Itappears surreal that none of the mediated settlement succeeded in the long rundespite intervention by highly influential personalities. One possible explanationis suggested by Tajik (2011) that the Taliban were not structured and hierarchicalbut horizontally compartmentalized. Hence, agreements in one or more agenciescould not be taken as a comprehensive peace deal, representative of entire militantpopulation. This assertion should be consumed with a pause. All the Taliban (i.e.TTP, its affiliates including the Swat chapter and its earlier incarnations) thosealigned with foreign networks in some measure or having foreign elementsespecially the central Asian, always broke the accords compared to those such asby Gul Bahadur from NWA and earlier Maulvi Nazir from SWA who werecareful in initiating any such breach. This aspect does not figure out upfront in ana-lyses on FATA.6 Secondly, an aspect mostly neglected by scholars is that other thanin Swat where it was flouted, shari’a never emerged as a precondition for cessation ofhostilities, nor was it made substantive part of the agreements. Yet why religionbecomes a central issue in some civil wars has been an amply debated issue in exist-ing conflict scholarship. In addition to Iqbal and Silva (2013) who have highlightedempirical dimensions of attempts by Taliban to seek popular legitimacy of their

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actions based on religious rhetoric but were ultimately exposed, Toft (2007) pro-poses to view this behavior from the lens of religious outbidding theory entailingtactic of reframing issues of contention as religious issues by the elites to outbidthe opposition group (the governments) in order to gain support from domestic audi-ences to prolong their chance to survive. The TTP took what it needed from Pukh-tunwali—the compulsion to take revenge and to embrace agnatic rivalry –andignored its respect for elders, their role in the jirga the chivalric attitude towardwomen and children, among other details. From Islam, the TTP-selected verses ofthe Quran demanding that believers stand up and fight in the way of God andignored those that underlined God’s preference for peace over war in every situation(Ahmed, 2013, p. 79).

These observations highlight that in Pakistan the extremist religious groups mayhave different motives but they all share the lust for political power and the aspirationto take control over the state (Bari, 2009). It should not be surprising therefore that inthe period intervening or following peace agreements, 59 suicidal attacks were carriedout during 2008 and 76 during 2009, including one by a female; public places, worship-pers, restaurants, malls, shopping plazas, courts, academic institutions, political leader-ship, schools, mosques, residential areas and peace militias were the main targets ofterrorism. Ironically, during this while the TTP was constantly defending its adherenceto traditional code of avoiding reprisals against the weaker segments of the society.‘Tribal people have their own customs. We don’t strike women’ (Abbas, 2008). Prac-tically, among the targets hit by TTP suicidal bombers, females were victimized indis-criminately. Attempted assassination of Malala Yousufzai shines as the foremostprecedence in this respect. Besides, there are rumors of unreported incidents amongsections of Swati population about kidnapping and raping by the Taliban (Bari,2009). The Taliban used to marry women without their consent. Similarly, storiesare numerous on practice of frequent marriages by Taliban to girls of choice andleaving them at will for another one. Important local commanders are heard to havetwo to three or even four wives at a time disregarding all civic social norms. Thoseresisting were made to pay dearly (Feyyaz, 2011). The Swat Taliban also did not lagin provision of entertainment to its cadres and operatives. Abductees from Swat haveallegedly indicated the supply of women and wine on a sustained basis to non-residentfighters. Paradoxically, the same lot was otherwise seen flogging women in public oncharges of misdeeds, and the same mothers who were initially behind Swati Talibanwere now persuading army units to eliminate the Taliban (Feyyaz, 2011).

While giving an interview to BBC in October 2013, Hakimullah Mehsud deniedcarrying out recent deadly attacks in public places, saying his targets were ‘Americaand its friends’ (BBC, 2013). These incidents included exploding a bus carryingcivil servants, blasts against general public in Qisa khawani bazaar, and suicidalbombing of a church almost in succession during September 2013 in Peshawar,killing about 200 citizens. The TTP first denied involvement in Church attacks, butlater condoned it citing Shari’a permitted attacks against Christians (Ahmad, 2013).Rawalpindi blast on 20 January 2014, which killed several civilians including a teen-ager, bespeaks the reality of commitment to spare the unarmed or the public places(“Says TTP”, 2013) which should be viewed in Taliban’s later declaration of killinginnocent people as haram (Khan, 2014). Killing of unarmed civilians during attackon Karachi airport in June 2014 and Peshawar massacre in December 2014 strengthensthis assertion.

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Discussion and findings

The primary argument was predicated on the dominant role of Pakhtunwali in shapingconflict environment. It was argued that badal, rent seeking, greed and organizationalhypocrisy govern conflict dynamics. The discussion particularly attempted to relatetheoretical aspects to the reality both prevailing and longitudinally through referenceto scholarship and empirical evidence. Practically available body of knowledge isfound piecemeal, linear and fractured as regards interpretation of the reality, and there-fore, limited in providing critical insights to understand complexities of the context ofviolence. Nevertheless, it does bring to the fore religion and ethnicity as weak causal-ities with Pakhtunwali mentioned only sparingly. The evidence presented in this paperon the other hand offers a concrete and wider spectrum to conceptualize the instability.

First, while it is conceded that reengineering of Pakhtunwali for real-politick is not anew phenomenon, nevertheless the targeted variables are novel, that is, character, scale,mode and criminalization of violence, moral hypocrisy and de-ethnicisation. This para-digm measurably contrasts that of Afghan Jihad due to context variations. As itemerges the genesis of conflict lay in geographical proximity insofar that it compelledthe Afghan and foreign fighters to take refuge in FATA, ethnicity became accidentlyassociated with it. The fact that the TTP also turned against tribal people suspected of sup-porting or symbolizing the state of Pakistan indicates a tenuous notion of intraethnic strife.Otherwise, the Taliban targeted the entire strata of society and the state with impunity. Atpresent the ethnic content resides in the leadership echelons of the TTP and to an extentamong its general cadre, whereas allied organizations are non-Pashtun. Secondly, theelement of badal comes out strongly in intensifying the conflict – both its armed aswell as terrorist dimensions. The terrorist acts occupied a discernable fraction in the cam-paign planning by the Taliban especially during the years 2007–2009, which did not dis-tinguish between ethnicity, gender, age, creed and sanctity of public space. The trend hasnot relented; instead, it has witnessed a heightened pace. Instrumentalism and politicalcommunication present vividly in terrorism and brash revenge drive by the Taliban. InIslam, the concept of revenge (qisas) only allows life for a life, and not killing of wholelot of people as is practiced by Taliban on the name of Islam. Pakhtunwali, which ismuch older social code than Islam, does not permit indiscriminate killing either. If Pakistanwere at war with the entire tribal society, targeting the civilians might have made somesense. That has not been the case. Decidedly, the use of force by the state and the USAplayed a role in accentuating the situation, but there are no traces of genocidal tendenciesnoticed or reported by independent sources during such overtures. The present badal para-digm characterizes assertion of cultural institutions evolved over time but with a dispropor-tionate discontinuity in terms of its ferocity in part also due to stakes involved. Besides,badal as a concept has permeated all violent groups allied with the TTP, which reflectsselective infusion of Pakhtunwali among non-Pashtun collectivity.

The hypocrisy by conflict entrepreneurs is not unique to this situation but outbiddinginvolvement of shari’a and then Pashtun being historically famous for standing with theweaker makes it one. The use of religion has been opportunistic, and the situation specificduring the past centuries. The TTP has perverted its construction to unprecedented levels.It could hardly demonstrate legitimacy of the cause, which carried a transitory euphoriaattracting the public temporarily but this disappeared quickly as soon the Taliban began tobrutalize their fighting and integrated criminal activity into it. The appeal of religion wasdifficult to sustain in any case due to the absence of a credible political vision and popularsupport, which instead became their principal target to project power.

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In a five years’ time span, roughly nine peace deals materialized. Barring periods ofparlays and three to four weeks succeeding the deals, the armed conflict witnessed surgein terms of expansion in typology of targets, territorial breadth and intensity. Departingfrom all established norms, ruses of peace agreements were employed as part of real-politick to conserve combat potential and realize expansionist agenda. Similarly, theimmoral treatment and violence against women is a startling departure from the pastwhere namus (honor) of women has been held as an important cardinal of Pakhtunwali.The presence of this adulteration in Swat alone where war was waged against an urbanpopulation incapable of defending itself unlike typical tribals indicates the morbidity ofrelativity of moral ideals. The Taliban’s accession to power outside the traditionalbounds of FATA broke them free for exploitation and the plunder.

The rent seeking by Taliban was built around the existing tribal norm. It assumedcritical element in their interactions with state and non-state functionaries using vio-lence as a capital. The latter aspect not only transmutes it into a criminal categoryespecially entailing wide spread extortionist practices, but sets it apart from precedencein tribal history where strict adherence to egalitarianism never allowed mutual exploita-tion. It may be noted that while economic determinism emerges strongly in above dis-cussion, none of the writers have referred to grievance or discontent as fundamentalconstituent of conflict. The lavish lifestyles of the Taliban leadership and pecuniary sus-tenance of large groupings explain this propensity. Resource mobilization based oncriminal proceeds made it possible to achieve a demonstrated level of success.

Even though the greed is closely coupled with rent seeking, it has been more a func-tion of opportunity at popular level such as seen during sheltering stage of foreign mili-tants in FATA. The role of foreign fighters in the entire conflict syndrome has been that ofspoilers. They have been particularly instrumental in exacerbating the violence in a bid toretain benevolence of their benefactors. Since the instability was always favorable tothem to survive, therefore, persistence and spread of conflict through whatever meanshas been in their interest. Their opposition to peace deals is consequently understandable,suggesting targeted segregation to keep future peace process, if any, from faltering.

Conclusion

This paper has looked at the Taliban-led violence in Pakistan employing multiple theor-etical frameworks. It has indeed been a risky attempt to relate theory with a realitywhich is in flux. The given evidence supports the hypotheses to a large degree. Thatsaid, the generalization of the tenets of pakhtunwali and name of shari’a used by theTTP across the board would warrant a further probe. That should not presupposethat non-TTP militancy or other tribal criminals engaged in organized violenceadhere to a moral code of conduct. Finally, given the worsening situation in Afghani-stan, the government of Pakistan will be well advised to keep its options open to meetcontingencies including non-lethal methods for conflict resolution. A professionalapproach is however called for to avoid engaging in spurious peace deals with thefate similar to the past.

Notes1. See Chapter 2– Al-Baqara, verse 178, Al-Quran.2. This writer is of the opinion that generally tribes are conscious of the salient contradictions

between rawaj and Islam. The more moderate and informed tribal families in FATA and

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especially those settled in urban areas however renounce these traditions. For further details,read Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’sFederally Administered Tribal Areas, CAMP 2011; The Economist (2006) Special report,Pushtunwali: Honour among them; Muhammad Ali Baba Khel, SWARA: Women as Prop-erty, Peshawar: Aurat Foundation, 2003.

3. A civil war is defined by Bosker and Ree as an armed conflict between an internationallyrecognized state and (mainly) domestic challengers able to mount an organized militaryopposition to the state. A war must have caused more than 1000 deaths in total andwithin at least a three-year period.

4. Baituallah was the first chief of the TTP hailing from Meshud tribe of South Waziristan. Heretained that position until his death during August 2009. Maulvi Nazir who belonged toAhmed Zai Waziri tribe of South Waziristan succeeded Nek Muhammad in June 2004, tolead Waziri Taliban. All three were killed by drone attacks.

5. Fakir of Ipi who was born and also died in North Waziristan, belonged to the Tori Khel sub-tribe of Wazirs. He is buried in the Gorvek area situated close to Dwa Toi, a smallhamlet along the Pakistan–Afghan border.

6. Gul Bahadur is the dominant Taliban leader from Uthman Zai tribe of North Waziristan. Heis generally known for his pro-government stance. There have been unconfirmed reports ofhis killing by drone attack during January 2015.

Notes on contributorMuhammad Feyyaz holds M.phil. degree in peace and conflict studies from National DefenceUniversity, Islamabad, and a master’s in war studies from Quaid-e- Azam University, Islama-bad. As a former soldier, he has served in the tribal areas of Pakistan for nearly two years.Has studied mediating disputes from Harvard Law School, management of group conflictfrom USIP, Washington, DC and terrorism studies course from NATO-Centre for Excel-lence-defence against terrorism, Turkey. Feyyaz is also the country coordinator for TerrorismResearch Initiative (TRI) for Pakistan. He teaches at the School of Governance and Society, Uni-versity of Management and Technology, Lahore Pakistan.

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