Policy Brief 063

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Policy Brief 063 |February 2014

The material presented here is drawn fromFAC research on China and Brazil in AfricanAgriculture, supported by DFID and the UKEconomic and Social Research Council.

Is there a Difference Between Aidand Cooperation?

The terms aid and cooperation are oftenused interchangeably in development circles,but the latter expression tends to be used morefrequently by the Brazilian and Chinesegovernments to describe their relationship with

African partners, as it evokes the ideas ofmutuality and shared goals, rather than thepossible insinuation of dependencyrelationships associated with the word aid. Byusing the term cooperation they also seek todistinguish themselves from traditional Westerndonor definitions of aid, that generally does notallow for a mixture of aid, trade and investmentsin achieving goals.

Africa is important to both Brazil and China.According to the most recent UNCTAD statistics,Sub-Saharan Africas food and agricultureexports to China stood at just under $5 billionin 2012, compared with Brazil which accountedfor just $0.27 billion in the same year 3. Chineseinvestments in African agriculture have beenreported to stand at $82 million in 2012 (up from

$30 million in 2009)4

, but a similar breakdownin Brazilian FDI into agriculture specifically isnot currently available. Lastly, both countrieshave been providing support in agriculturaltechnologies and methods drawing on their owndevelopment experiences, in a bid to accelerateeconomic growth and reduce poverty.

Brazilian cooperation moves toinclude trade and investment

Until recently, the Brazilian Cooperation

Agency (ABC) defined its approach todevelopment cooperation along the same linesas that used by the Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development (OECD)Development Assistance Committee. This statedthat it would not seek to commercial profitsfrom its engagements with African partners.More recently, however, Brazilian PresidentDilma Rousseff announced plans for ABC to

become a commercial cooperation [agency]that supports investments in Latin Americaand Africa (June 2013) 5. This would effectivelyallow for trade and investments to be madealongside cooperation projects (e.g. by sellingBrazilian tractors).

The mutual benefits in Chinascooperation

The Chinese definition of developmentcooperation has always recognised the inclusionof commercial interests. Furthermore,cooperation is expressly described as havingmutual benefits, which means China expectsto benefit directly or indirectly from anycooperation activity, including aid. In practice,this means aid can either be tied directly to

commercial interests, or it can form part of abroader relationship.

The Beijing Declaration from the FifthMinisterial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2012 encapsulatesthe variety of Chinese development cooperationpractices as follows:


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Building on the achievements we havemade, we will deepen our cooperation in trade,investment, poverty reduction, infrastructurebuilding, capacity building, human resources

development, food security, hi-tech industriesand other areas, and elevate our cooperationto a higher level. 6

Rationales for DevelopmentCooperation

Brazils socio-economic affinities,first-hand experience, and

historical ties

Brazil argues that its developmentcooperation is guided by principles of jointdiplomacy based on solidarity, no interferencein domestic issues of partner countries, demand-driven action, acknowledgement of localexperience, no imposition of conditions, and(until this year) no association with commercial

interests (ABC 2011: 3). These principles areclaimed to distinguish Brazilian cooperation,particularly with their focus on horizontalrelationships and more transferable experiences.

For example, the former Director of ABC,Minister Marco Farani stated:

Because of similarities in social and

economic realities and challenges...,partner countries can absorb knowledgeresulting from exchanging experienceswith Brazil, which are more easily adaptedand applied to real cases if compared totraditional solutions offered by traditionalpartners. (...) Affinities of historical, ethnic,cultural, linguistic and economic natureas well as shared heritage and aspirationsfavour the expansion and realization ofsouth-south cooperation and contributeto its success. 7

Despite stressing the large African heritagein Brazil, it is not clear that those communitiesare drawn upon in any specific way to shapeAfrica-Brazil cooperation initiatives. Lusophone

countries however receive the greatest share ofBrazilian cooperation projects and finance,reflecting linguistic ties.

Brazilian actors also often stress a process ofmutual learning8. Yet, in reality, Braziliandevelopment actors are not actively seeking tolearn methods that might be applied backhome; as such the learning process is still mainlyunidirectional.

Brazils agricultural developmentpolicy: Contradiction orcomplementarity?

Here in Brazil the government has tofinance both agribusiness and familyagriculture and we are proud to do thisbecause we understand the importance

both sectors have in Brazilian economy. 9

- Former President, Lula da Silva

This dichotomy of Brazilian models is reflectedin development cooperation approaches.However, it can also involve a tension betweenone model of agricultural developmentprioritising smallholder production systems,and another driven essentially by capital-

intensive and large-scale commercial farminginterests. The cooperation programmespearheaded by Brazils Ministry of AgrarianDevelopment (MDA) is tightly associated withthe former, whereas most (though by no meansall) of the cooperation activities of the BrazilianEnterprise for Agricultural Research (Embrapa)are associated with the latter. These institutionstherefore present conflicting narratives of bestfarming practices based on their respectiveexpertise.


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Yet questions are raised about theappropriateness of such technology transfersby Brazil or China. Too often local contexts inAfrica are not taken into account, and failuresof past programmes perhaps most notablyfarm mechanisation are being repeated.The wider critique of technology transfer, and

the need to enhance farmer participation intechnology design and delivery has largely notbeen incorporated.

Joint Scientific research Programmes:Collaboration for new knowledge

Brazil

Brazil has established a number of agriculturaljoint-research projects between Brazilianand African institutions under what it terms

structural cooperation. The collaborations aimto move beyond one-off training events andexchanges towards a longer-term relationshipcentred on building capacity of local researchsystems. One such project was in Ghana whereEmbrapa worked with local microbiologists todevise a biological fertiliser capable of doubling

cowpea production at a much cheaper cost thanregular fertilisers15.

Projects are generally still few but growing,most noticeably through the AgriculturalInnovation Marketplace16 . Brazils mostambitious structural cooperation project yetsits within ProSavana in Mozambique (seebelow) where Embrapa intends to work withlocal agricultural research groups to fosteragricultural development.

Mechanisation is used in the harvesting of legumes in Brazil. Brazilian technology transfers

involve Brazilian agricultural machinery.

FAO/

FloritaBotts/UNFAO


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China

At the Fourth Ministerial FOCAC meetingin 2009, the China-Africa Science andTechnology Partnership Programme (CASTEP)was established under Chinas Ministry ofScience and Technology (MOST).Since then,China has conducted 115 joint research anddemonstration projects with African countries17.

Other collaborations include the cooperativeeducational programmes between Chineseand African universities involving a mutualexchange of visiting scholars and informationsharing in the form of exchange of researchresults18. Some of these relationships werecemented in the 4th FOCAC meeting when itwas decided to partner 20 African universitieswith 20 Chinese universities known as the20+20 Cooperation Plan.

Education and training: Building anew generation of professionals andboosting African capacity

Brazil

Training courses for researchers andpractitioners from Africa are an importantcomponent of Embrapas contribution to

development cooperation. One-off courses aregiving way to a more structured and strategictraining programme coordinated by the recentlyestablished Centre for Strategic Studies andTraining on Tropical Agriculture (CECAT). Thisincludes training not only on technicalagriculture subjects from no-till planting topost-harvest but also on agriculturaleconomics, sociology, policy and institutions.

Agricultural technology demonstration by Chinese experts

FAO/

RobertoFaidu

tt


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Brazil also offers a number of scholarships forstudents at undergraduate and postgraduatelevels, which was shown to make up 10% of itscooperation expenditures from 2005-2009 (US$

139 million).

China

Chinese short-term courses aim to transfersuccessful knowledge (e.g. on policies, farmingmethods, etc.) and promote Chinese agriculturaltechnology in the form of: 1) training in the hostcountries for farmers, producers and officials,

usually through the ATDCs: 2) inviting relevantAfrican officials for training courses in China atuniversities and research institutes. Accordingto pledges made in the previous four FOCACmeetings, China will have invited 63,000 Africanofficials and professionals for short-term trainingcourses between 2003 and 2015. This ranksChina just below Germany and Japan in overallquantities of short-term training courses.

Longer term training includes highereducation scholarships for African students atall levels in Chinese institutions, as well thespecial case of the Ethio-China PolytechnicCollege built in Addis Ababa in 2003. No fewerthan 400 Chinese staff have gone over since itsinception to train both students and theirteacher in agricultural sciences.

Compared to most OECD countries, the levelof investment in scientific support and training,both longer and shorter term, is considerable,and rising.

Investments: State support for privateinvestors

Brazil

Brazilian companies agricultural investmentsin Africa have been criticised for their focus on

biofuels that take up land, labour and capitalthat could otherwise be used for crops thatimprove food security19.

Brazil however has also supported foodsecurity efforts. ProSavana is Brazils largestcooperation project abroad and is taking placein Mozambique with the aim of transformingthe countrys savannah into highly productiveagricultural region, drawing on Brazils ownexperience in the Cerrado. The project isexpected to cover 14 million hectares of landalong the Nacala corridor, and leverage

investment from Brazilian and Japanese sources,alongside the Brazilian technology andknowledge transfers. The Nacala Fund has beenset up within ProSavanas programme tofacilitate these investments.

This programme has been heavily criticisedgiven the focus on large-scale commercialagriculture, potentially benefiting Brazilian

agribusiness, and the apparent neglect of small-scale farming20.

China

Chinese investment in Africa is increasingrapidly (by 20.5% between 2009 and 2012). Itcovers 49 countries in a wide range of sectorsby a diversity of actors including SOEs, private

enterprises and individuals. Total Chineseinvestment in Africa through 2003 was US$490million, rising to US$2.52 billion by 2012 fromover 2000 enterprises21. While agriculture canbe calculated at only 5.7 percent of the total in2012, this is still a significant rise from 3.1 percentin 2009, and has been identified as a core focusfor future investments 22.

Chinese agricultural investments have alsobeen confused as land grabs used for cultivationand export back to China. However, increasingevidence is proving this to be untrue 23. In


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Ethiopias case our research found that Chinasinvestors in land tended to be small-scaleentrepreneurs, producing vegetables for sale tolocal Chinese businesses such as restaurants and

hotels 24.

The relationship between the state andbusiness in development cooperation is wellestablished in Brazil ian and Chineseengagements in Africa. This approach is nowbecoming more popular among OECD countries,including the UK. As a central component of NewAlliance efforts, lessons on the benefits and

dangers of such a strategy could be drawn fromBrazil.

Conclusion: Lessons from Brazil andChina

A new paradigm for developmentcooperation is often hailed resulting from theexperiences of Brazil and China. While we must

be wary about the rhetoric of horizontalinteraction, mutual learning and non-interference,there are some important lessons emerging:

The combination of aid, trade and investmentas part of development cooperation opensup opportunities for greater private sectorengagement in development. However thereare challenges with this model, as

development cooperation can be seen assimply supporting the export of agribusinessand technology, representing a new form ofcolonialism. The negotiation of mutual benefithas to be one that takes place on a levelplaying field. Some African countries havebeen more successful at this than others. Thisrequires a clear developmental vision foragriculture in the country, and the exertionof influence in cooperation initiatives.

Technology transfer has become a new focusfor cooperation relationships. This revives oldexperiences and debates about howeffectively technology travels from its site of

development to new destinations, as well asthe role of users in the development anddissemination of technology. Past experiencewith technology transfer programmes has notbeen positive. It remains to be seen whetherthe Brazilian and Chinese initiatives, that focuson very similar efforts (including farmmechanisation, new seeds etc.) fare better.There are important opportunities for lesson

learning, and sharing of experience, includingwith long-established organisations like theCGIAR.

Training and scientific exchange is anothermajor focus of Chinese and Brazilian efforts.These are now having a major influence onthe building of capacity of African research,extension and implementation agencies,

largely in government. Due to structuraladjustment policies over many years, suchagencies have lost capacity dramatically, andsuch training, exchange and support activitiesare widely welcomed. However, questions areraised on the focus of curricula, and theprioritisation of support, and whether thesemeet African needs. Most OECD cooperationprogrammes do not emphasises training and

exchange, despite the high demand andneed. Learning lessons from Brazilian andChinese experiences will be important ifAfrican state capacity for agriculturaldevelopment is to be rebuilt.

Building on these three core lessons will beimportant as the New Alliance develops, andseeks to coordinate with Brazilian and Chineseinitiatives in Africa.


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Institution Acronym Description

Department of Aid

to Foreign Countries DAFC

This is the department nominally in charge ofChinas aid. However, in reality it is dependenton MOFCOM (below) for approvals, and aid is

backed by many other institutions, workingeither independently or in collaboration withDAFC.

Ministry ofCommerce

MOFCOM

Ministry responsible for the funding of mostcooperation projects through their own DAFC,or through other ministries such as thosedescribed below.

Ministry ofAgriculture MoA

Includes an international cooperation depart-

ment responsible for the establishment andoversight of agricultural projects.

Ministry of Scienceand Technology

MOSTIncludes an international cooperation depart-ment that supports agricultural technologyefforts in cooperation projects.

China Export-Import Bank

China EXIMResponsible for the assessment of projectswith concessional loans, and the allocationand recovery of loans.

China DevelopmentBank

CDB

Mission to improve Chinese competitiveness andthe well-being of Chinese people. Also providesnon-concessional loans to Africa and managesthe CAD Fund (below).

China AfricaDevelopment Fund

CAD Fund

Established in 2006 to promote the develop-ment of Sino-African commercial ties. It has astrategic agreement with the China State FarmAgribusiness Corporation to establish a joint

company to make agriculture investments, butaccording to Brautigam and Tang (2012) thesehave not yet materialised.

China

The list below covers the main actors in bothcountries agricultural cooperation with Africa.There are many other state owned enterprises,learning institutions, and private companies

that have been subcontracted or co-operatedwith on projects, however this list seeks topresent the most important.


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Institution Acronym Description

BrazilianCooperation Agency

ABCABCs mandate is restricted to technical coopera-tion, which represents only a fraction of Brazilsdevelopment cooperation activities abroad andhas no mandate to distribute financial resources.

Ministry of ExternalRelations of Brazil

ItamartyThe ministry within which ABC sits as a depart-ment. It has control over ABCs budget and signsoff on its agenda.

Brazilian AgriculturalResearchCorporation

Embrapa

The dominant agricultural cooperating institu-

tion with 8,200 employees including 2,600researchers. Has an international cooperationdivision, with about 50 staff on: technical coop-eration, structural projects and scientificcooperation.

Ministry of AgrarianDevelopment

MDAMinistry for the development of large scalefarming in Brazil

Ministry of Social

Development

MDSMinistry set up in the mid-90s to support small-

holder and family farming efforts

The Chamber ofCommerce

CAMEXResponsible for the promotion of Braziliancompanies abroad. ABC has engaged it for agri-cultural machinery in projects.

BrazilianDevelopment Bank

BNDES

Mainly motivated by commercial objectives forBrazilian companies, BNDES is a key ally andresource for major Brazilian corporations suchas Odebrecht (construction and agribusiness),

which are active in many African countries.

Brazil


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End Notes

1. US Government, 2012: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/18fact-sheet-g-8-action-food-security-and-nutrition

2. UK Government, 2012: https://www.gov .uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205883/new-alliance-factsheet.pdf

3. UNCTAD Statistics, merchandise trade matrix ofSub-Saharan Africas exports to China and Brazil,including SITC 0,1,2 (excluding SITC 27 & 28)

4. China-Africa Economic Trade and Cooperation, (ChinaGov. State Council, 2013): http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/29/c_132673093.htm

5. O Estado do Sao Paolo, 15 June, 2013: http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,dilma-quer-agencia-de-comercio-para-fortalecer-balanca-,1042690,0.htm

6. Beijing Declaration from the 5th Ministerial Conferenceof FOCAC: http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t954245.htm

7. ABC (2010) Dilogo Brasil-frica em SeguranaAlimentar, Combate Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural.Agncia Brasileira de Cooperao, Braslia.

8. See, for example, www.valor.com.br/arquivo/388309/ministro-diz-que-acordos-com-africa-serao-bons-tambem-para-o-brasil (accessed 27 March 2013).

9. President Lulas opening speech at the Dilogo Brasil-frica em Segurana Alimentar, Combate Fome eDesenvolvimento Rural, www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgN4qtLLqGk (minutes 39-40), (accessed 27March 2013).

10. Buckley, Lila, (2013) China and Brazil in African

Agriculture, IDS Bulletin 44.4, Brighton: IDS

11. Zhou Enlais eight principles of foreign aid: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm

12. White, Lyal & Tatiana Cyro Costa. 2009. BiofuelTechnology Transfer in IBSA: Lessons for South Africaand Brazil SAIIA Policy Briefing 7, Emerging Powers

Programme

13. http://www.africanfarming.net/event-news/kenya-hosts-brazil-in-eastern-africa-expo-2013

14. Tang, Xiaoyang [], (2013). The evolution andeffects of Chinese agricultural aid to Africa []InternationalRelations Theory[]

15. http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/06/18/ghanaian-research-bodies-develop-biological-fertilizer/

16. http://www.africa-brazil.org/site/


18. King, Kenneth. 2013. Chinas Aid and Soft Power inAfrica: The case of education and training. James Currey:Surrey. P37

19. Thaler, Kai. 2013. Brazil, biofuels and food security inMozambique - Kai Thaler in Agricultural Developmentand Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indianand Brazilian Investments. Zed Books: London,pp145-158.

20. Chichava et al. 2013. Brazil and China in MozambicanAgriculture: Emerging Insights from the Field, IDSBulletin 44.4, Brighton: IDS


22. Ibid.

23. Brautigam, Deborah and Sigrid-Marianella StensrudEkman. 2012. Rumours and Realities of ChineseAgricultural Engagement in Mozambique AfricanAffairs, issue 111/444, 28 May, pp483-492

24. Alemu, Dawit and Ian Scoones. 2013. Negotiating NewRelationships: How the Ethiopian State is Involving Chinaand Brazil in Agriculture and Rural Development, IDSBulletin 44.4, Brighton: IDS


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Acknowledgements:

This Policy Brief was written by Henry Tugendhat for theFuture Agricultures Consortium.The series editors areBeatriceOuma andPaul Cox.Further information about this series of Policy Briefs at: www. future-agricultures.org

The Future Agricultures Consortium aims to encourage critical debate and policy dialogue on the future of agriculture inAfrica. The Consortium is a partnership between research-based organisations across Africa and in the UK.Future Agricultures Consortium Secretariat at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE UK T+44 (0) 1273 [email protected]

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from Future Agricultures Briefings in their own publications. In return, the Future

Agricultures Consortium requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.

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The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect official policies of the British

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Policy Brief 063