PETER N. GOLDER and GERARD J. TELLIS*

Several studies have shown that pioneers hove long-lived market share odvan-tages and are likely to be market leaders in their product categories. However,that research has potential limitations: the reliance on a few established databases,the exclusion of nonsurvlvors, and the use of single-informant self-reports for datacollection. The authors of this study use an alternate method, historical analysis, toavoid these limitations. Approximately 500 brands in 50 product categories areanalyzed. The results show that almost half of market pioneers fail and their meanmarket share is much lower than that found in other studies. Also, early marketleaders have much greater long-term success ar»d enter an average of 13 years» . . - : • after pioneers.

Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic orMarketing Legend?

The subject of order of market entry is critical to firms'survival and success. Pioneering new markets is expen-sive and risky, but also potentially very rewarding. Ifpioneers have advantages in supplies, costs, informa-tion, product quality, product line breadth, distribution,and long-term maricet share (Robinson and Fomell 1985),firms may benefit from early entry. In contrast, if laterentrants can leapfrog pioneers with superior technology,positioning, or brand names, firms could be better offentering late (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Thus,the extent and nature of pioneering advantages need tobe more fully understood.

Several studies have shown that pioneers have long-lived market share advantages (Bond and Lean 1977;Lambkin 1988; Parry and Bass 1990; Robinson 1988;

*Pelcr N. Colder is a docloral candidate and Gerard J. Tellis isAssociate Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration,University of Southern California.

The authors deeply appreciate the advice, encouragement, and valu-able contributions of Gary Frazier. especially during the conceptualphase of the research- They thank Robert Fisher, Jeff Inman, MikeKamins, Dennis Rook, William Robinson, Avu Sankaralingam, DaveStewart, and participants al a USC seminar for their comments on aprevious draft of the article. The article also benefited from the com-ments of Barton Weitz and four anonymous JMR reviewers. The au-thors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the MarkelingScience Institute and Univerisly of Southern Califomia Graduate Schoolof Business Administration and the generous provision of data bySimmons Market Research Bureau.

Robinson and Fomell 1985; Urban et al. 1986; Whitten1979). Some researchers have interpreted these studiesas showing that first entrants often become market lead-ers. The cumulative evidence led Scherer (1985) to con-clude that pioneer advantage is a general phenomenon.Though current research overwhelmingly supports theadvantages of pioneering, three major concems remain.

First, two of the main databases used for past re-search, PIMS and ASSESSOR (Urban et al. 1986), havea sampling bias from including only survivors (Day andFreeman 1990). The exclusion of pioneers that have failedmay overstate the advantage of pioneers. Indeed, as timepasses after a pioneer has failed, successful firms in thesame market may come to regard themselves as pi-oneers.

Second, PIMS and ASSESSOR data rely on self-reports of single informants to classify pioneers. In thePIMS data, an informant in each business classifies it asone of the pioneers, an early follower, or a late entrant.In the ASSESSOR data, an informant in each firm pro-vides the year it entered the market. Though surveys forthese data may have at times contacted more than oneinformant, they did not collect multiple measures to as-sess reliability and validity. Such self-reported data bysingle informants present a potential measurement prob-lem. Respondents, especially if newer employees, maynot be well informed about the order of market entry,especially of older products that have existed for decadesor longer. Self-perception bias may lead respondents in

158

Journat of Markeling ResearchVol. XXX (May 1993). 158-70

PIONEER ADVANTAGE 159

dominant firms to classify themselves as pioneers. Thisbias may be one reason why 52% of firms in the PIMSdata classify themselves as pioneers, including multiplecompetitors in the same product category (Buzzell andGale 1987; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).

Third, the PIMS defmition of "pioneer" is inconsis-tent with the term's use by researchers. PIMS defmespioneers as "one of the pioneers in first developing suchproducts or services" (Buzzell and Gale 1987, p. 260).PIMS does nol identify the ftrst firm in each product cat-egory even though the researchers who used the PIMSdata conceptually define a pioneer as the first entrant ina market. Therefore, PIMS data are capable of deter-mining only an early entry advantage, not a pioneer ad-vantage. This distinction is critical and not pedantic. Forexample, if certain early entrants can dominate marketsby entering after pioneers in order to leam from the pi-oneers' mistakes, it would be inappropriate to classifytheir advantage as pertaining to the pioneer.

Researchers have advocated using new data and re-search methods to study pioneer advantage {e.g., Lie-berman and Montgomery 1988). Different approachescan compensate for some of the limitations of previousresearch. Our study has three primary objectives.

1. To estimate the rewards of pioneers after controlling forsurvival bias by studying successful and unsuccessful pi-oneers. The study examines rewards in three areas: suc-cess rate, markel share, and market leadership.

2. To demonstrate the use of a new method for studyingthis phenomenon, historical analysis.

3. To provide an objective measure of the true pioneer orfirst entrant in each product category by using this method.

In accomplishing these objectives, we hof>e to providenew insights on pioneering and order of entry. Previousstudies (Robinson and Fomell 1985; Urban et al. 1986)addressed order-of-entry effects among only survivingbrands. We examine the performance of both failed andsurviving pioneers. In addition, we compare their per-formance with that of early and current market shareleaders.

We first present the definitions, background, andmethod of the study. Then we report and discuss the re-sults. We close with conclusions and implications.

DEFINITIONS

We defme four key terms used in the study.

—Inventor is the firm(s) that develops patents or importanttechnologies in a new product category.

—Product pioneer is the first firm to develop a workingmodel or sample in a new product category.

—Market pioneer is the first finn to sell in a new productcategory.

—Product category is a group of close substitutes such thatconsumers consider the products substitutable and dis-tinct fTom those in another product category.

More than one firm may be an inventor in a productcategory because many ideas and processes may be in-

volved in a completely new product. We provide a sep-arate classification for product pioneers because they arenot always the same as the market pioneer, but are im-portant players in new markets.

Our definition of "market pioneer" is consistent withthat of "pioneer" or "first mover" in other studies.Schmalensee (1982, p. 350) defined a pioneer as "thefirst appearance" of a brand in "a distinctly new prod-uct" category. Robinson and Fomell (1985, p. 305) de-fined a market pioneer as "the first entrant in a new mar-ket" and Urban et al. (1986) defined the pioneer as thefirst product to enter the market. Lieberman and Mont-gomery's (1988) review concluded that the standard def-inition for identifying pioneers based on market entrywas appropriate. We use an operational definition formarket pioneers that is the same as the conceptual def-inition. In contrast, other researchers operationalizedmarket pioneers as early entrants that survive. Thus, ourstudy addresses a slightly different issue. Because ourstudy is primarily about market pioneers, we use the term"pioneer" alone to mean "market pioneer."

Product category has long been considered a some-what ambiguous concept (Day, Shocker, and Srivastava1979). Determining separate product categories is anempirical issue that may be resolved only in retrospectafter the category develops. Our definition is consistentwith research that has taken a customer orientation indetermining product categories (Day, Shocker, and Sri-vastava 1979; Loken and Ward 1990; Ratneshwar andShocker 1991; Sujan and Bettman 1989).

The example of mainframe computers may clarify howour definitions apply. Much of the early research wasdone during World War II and many firms can be con-sidered inventors. The product pioneer is widely re-garded to be the ENIAC developed at The University ofPennsylvania. The market pioneer is Remington-Rand,which sold a Univac to the Census Bureau in 1951. IBMentered in 1953 with a sale to the govemment researchfacility at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and had estab-lished dominance by 1955 (Shurkin 1984).

BACKGROUND

This section summarizes the theories and evidence forand against a pioneer advantage. Our purpose is not todevelop new theory or evaluate current theories, butmerely to provide a background for our research.

Theories of Pioneer Advantage

We classify the theories that support pioneer advan-tage by whether the advantage is based on consumers orproducers.

Consumer-based advantages relate to the benefits thatcan be derived from the way consumers first choose andthen repurchase the product. Three of these theories havebeen fairly well developed. First, Schmalensee (1982)argues that when consumers successfully use the firstbrand in a new product category, they will favor it overlater entrants because they know with certainty that it

160 JOURNAL OF AAARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1993

woAs. This reasoning is similar to the argument thatconsumers develop stable preferences for early entrants(Bain 1956). Second, Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989)use a slightly different rationale by applying learningtheory to explain pioneer advantage. This theory arguesthat the pioneer influences how consumers evaluate at-tributes in the product category and that the pioneer maybecome the standard for the product category. Third, Lane(1980) shows how firms that enter early and position nearthe center of the market can receive higher profits. Fur-ther, he shows how first entrants can earn large profitsand still prevent further entry. Finally, a pioneer can "lock-in" consumers in categories that have high switching costs.Some of these consumer-based advantages may also ap-ply to resellers (Alpert. Kamins, and Graham 1992).

Producer-based advantages refer to the benefits de-rived from the supply of the product, and are based onthe concept of barriers to entry (Bain 1956). Robinsonand Fomell (1985) and Urban et al. (1986) consider themto be major causes of pioneer advantage. For example.economies of scale and learning could lead to lower costsfor pioneers. Other important advantages are technolog-ical leadership (Gilbert and Newberry 1982; Liebermanand Montgomery 1988; Spence 1981) and preemption ofscarce assets (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Pres-cott and Visscher 1977; Schmalensee 1978; Spence 1977).Staying at the forefront of technology enables pioneersto consistently have better products than competitors.Also, when only a limited number of suppliers are pres-ent, long-term agreements can prevent them from sup-plying later entrants. Karakaya and Stahl (1989) reviewseveral other barriers to entry that contribute to the pro-ducer advantages of pioneers.

Evidence for Pioneer Advantage

The evidence for pioneer advantage comes from threesources: PIMS data, other private data, and the business

press. The majority of studies supporting pioneer ad-vantage are based on PIMS data (Lambkin 1988; Lamb-kin and Day 1989; Parry and Bass 1990; Robinson 1988;Robinson and Fomell 1985). Table 1 summarizes theirfindings. Note that the maritet share of pioneers is con-sistent across all types of goods and firms. The weightedaverage maricet share of pioneers is 29%. For consumergoods (Parry and Bass 1990; Robinson and Fomell 1985).5ie weighted average market share is also 29%. The cu-mulative evidence from the PIMS data leaves little doubtof a substantial market share reward from pioneering.Similarly, the PIMS data also show that pioneers tendto be market leaders. Seventy percent of market leadersare pioneers, and almost half of all pioneers are marketleaders (Buzzell and Gale 1987).

Three studies on pioneering have used other privatedata. Urban et al. (1986) demonstrated a strong pioneeradvantage by using the ASSESSOR data. They foundthat the second firm to enter the market would obtainonly 71% as much market share as the pioneer, and thethird firm to enter would obtain only 58% as much. Us-ing the assumptions in their article. Urban et al. (1986,p. 654) estimated the market share of pioneers to be 43.6,35.7. or 30.8% with three, four, or five brands in a cat-egory. Their own database includes an average of 3.6brands per category. They also point out the possibilityof the pioneer failing after a second firm enters. How-ever, they state, "We are not aware of the existence ofthis situatiOTi in the categmes we studied" (p. 655). Bondand Lean (1977) carded out a longitudinal analysis oftwo prescription drug markets and found pioneers havea long-lived market share advantage. Whitten (1979)analyzed seven subcategories of the cigarette market toreach a similar conclusion.

One study reported in the business press {AdvertisingAge 1983) has often been used as evidence of pioneeradvantage (e.g.. Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989). This

Table 1PIONEERS' MARKET SHARE ADVANTAGE IN THE PIMS DATA

Study

Robinson and FomeM (1985)Consumer goods (n = 371)

Robinson (1988)Industrial goods (n = 1209)

Parry and Bass (1990)Concentrated industry

Consumer goods in = 437)Industrial goods (n = 994)

Nonconcentrated industryConsumer goods (n = 156)Industrial goods (n = 293)

Lambkin (1988)Start-up firms (n = 129)Adolescent firms (« - 187)

Pioneer

29

29

3433

1214

2433

Market share

•: Earlyfollower

XI-

\ • 14- -

' a i " • ' "26

T ""• _'

' • • ' ' •

M •'' -19

Uueerarani

12

15 ., ^ .

aft

-\13

Advantagepioneer -late entrant

17

14

1713

66

-^^ 1420

PIONEER ADVANTAGE 161

study compares the ranks of market share leaders in 25product categories in 1923 with their ranks in 1983 (seeTable 2). Of these 25 leaders in 1923, 19 were still first,four were second, one was third, and one was amongthe top five in 1983.

Theories Against Pioneer Advantage

The literature suggests at least seven reasons why pi-oneers may be at a disadvantage, some of which havebeen better developed as theories. Lieberman and Mont-gomery (1988) review four factors: free-rider effects, shiftsin technology, shifts in customer needs, and incumbentinertia. Additionally, improper positioning, changing re-source requirements, and insufficient investments mayprevent the pioneer from capturing market leadership.We briefly review each of these factors.

First, free-rider effects are present when a late entrantcan acquire the same technology at a lower cost. Fersht-nian, Mahajan, and Muller (1990) show that under someconditions, final market shares do not depend on orderof entry because of information diffusion among firms.Similarly, a late entrant can also acquire more produc-tive labor than the pioneer (Guasch and Weiss 1980).Second, good opportunities for successful late entry oc-cur with technological discontinuities (Yip 1982). Lateentrants can capture market leadership by implementingsuperior technology to produce a better or cheaper prod-uct before the pioneer. Third, shifts in consumers' tastesalso provide opportunities for late entrants better posi-tioned for such shifts than pioneers. For instance, since

Table 2MARKET SHARE RANK OF BRANDS: 1923 VS 1983 AS

PUBLISHED IN ADVERTISING AGE ( ]983)

Brand 1923 rank 1983 rank

Swift's Premium baconKellogg's com flakesEastman Kodak camerasE>el Monie canned fruitHershey's chocolatesCrisco shorteningCarnation canned milkWrigley chewing gumNabisco biscuitsEveready flashtighl batteriesGold Medal flourLife Savers mint candiesSherwin-Williams paintHammermill paperPrince Albert pipe tobaccoGillette razorsSinger sewing machinesManhattan shirtsCoca-Cola soft drinksCampbell's soupIvory soapLipton teaGoodyear tiresPalmolive toilet soapColgate toothpaste

the mid-1800s, new leaders have emerged in the soft drinkcategory as the preferred flavor has changed from lemonto ginger ale to cola. Fourth, incumbent inertia may de-ter a pioneer from making the investments necessary toremain a market leader. Such inertia may be profit-max-imizing for a pioneer if the return on investment frommarket leadership is below that available elsewhere. Inthis case, the best strategy for a pioneer is to steadilyharvest maricet share (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).

Fifth, late entrants may gain an advantage by posi-tioning at the "ideal point" in attribute space if the pi-oneer has not done so and its costs of repositioning arehigh. Such a situation may occur if the ideal point be-comes apparent only after the product is widely intro-duced. Sixth, pioneers may not have long-lived advan-tages if they are unable to adapt successfully to change.This situation occurs when the pioneer's competenciesfail to meet the changes in demand, competitive threats,or the environment (Abeil 1978). Seventh, pioneers maynot be willing or able to commit the resources to succeedin new markets. For example. Chandler (1990) showshow the firm that commits resources for large-scale pro-duction, not necessarily the pioneer, tends to lead themarket.

Evidence Against Pioneer Advantage

Scattered evidence, some of it indirect, may supportsome of the preceding theories. Some studies have notexamined pioneer advantage specifically and others havenot covered a broad cross section of goods. Therefore,the findings can be considered only suggestive of a pi-oneer disadvantage.

Glazer (1985) examined newspapers in Iowa from 1836to 1976. He found that in successful markets, first en-trants survived longer than second entrants, but in allmarkets first entrants survived as long as second en-trants. Another study examining ](X) successes and I(X)failures found that the advantages of being "first-in" werealmost equally balanced by the many pitfalls and dis-advantages (Cooper 1979). In a convenience sample ofFrench industrial products, Lilien and Yoon (1990) foundlower market shares for first and second entrants andhigher market shares for third and fourth entrants. A casestudy found six markets in which pioneers were suc-cessful and six maricets in which pioneers were unsuc-cessful (Schnaars 1986). Another study found that lateentry by brand extensions was successful (Sullivan 1991).Finally, using PIMS data, Moore, Boulding, and Good-stein (1991) questioned some conclusions about the ef-fect of pioneering on market share by treating pioneeringas endogenous rather than exogenous. Similarly, usingreverse regression. Van Honacker and Day (1987) sug-gest th^ picmeer market share advantages may result fromsuperior performance rather than time of entry.

Summary

The preceding review describes several theories for andagainst pioneer advantage. However, the empirical evi-

162 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1993

.-4:

dence strongly favors a pioneer advantage. Studies thatspecifically examine order-of-entry effects all supportsome pioneer advantage. In particular, they show thatpioneers are more likely than late entrants to (1) havehigh market share, (2) succeed, or (3) be market leadersin their product categories.

However, as explained previously, these studies havethree limitations that may qualify their conclusions: (1)a bias toward studying only surviving firms, (2) a single-informant's self-reported measure of order of market en-try, and (3) the use of the PIMS defmition of "one ofthe pioneers" to mean the pioneer or first entrant in amarket. The source of these problems is the use of largecross-sectional databases (e.g.. PIMS, ASSESSOR) thatmay not have been designed to study order-of-entry ef-fects. Indeed, authors have specifically called for alter-nate methods to avoid these limitations. We adopt onesuch method for our study.

METHOD

Our study method is historical analysis, which we ex-plain in terms of rationale, procedure, and sampling.

Rationale

Historical analysis is a method that is probably bestsuited to analyzing the rewards of order of market entry,especially because the records of nonsurvivors are sparee.It is a process of assembling, critically examining, andsummarizing the records of the past (Gottschalk 1969).This method of inquiry has been used sparingly in busi-ness research, though most notably by Chandler (e.g.,1990). The records of the past used in our study are allpublicly available, published sources of information.

The primary advantage of historical analysis is that itfocuses on information collected at the time the newproduct category was emerging. The approach providesa prospective look at pioneering because information isbased on records written as the product category devel-oped. In contrast, surveys or interviews with current sur-vivors may be considered retrospective because the re-spondents report on events that occurred decades orcenturies previously. To do so, respondents rely on per-sonal recall or the oral tradition of the firm being sur-veyed.

A second advantage of historical analysis is that it canuse multiple narratives of neutral observers such as re-porters, experts, and students of the market. In contrast,surveys tend to rely on self-reports of one or two infor-mants in the firms being studied. Thus, the historicalapproach is more likely to collect data that are factualrather than interpretive.

Researchers have often called for historical analysis inmarketing (Nevett 1991; Savitt 1980). The approach isparticularly well suited for the chronological dimensionin research on pioneering. On the basis of their literaturereview, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) emphasizethe need for new data for studying pioneering. Robinsonand Fomell (1985) note that the static nature of their cross-

sectional analysis precludes consideration of importantevents that occur over time. Aaker and Day (1986) foundthat the techniques of historians would provide usefulinsights and generalizations for the analysis of growthmarkets. Urban et al. (1986) suggest that historical datawould be useful in research on pioneering.

ProcedureWe sought information on 17 key variables in each

product category: the firms classified as product pioneer,market pioneer, early leader, and current leader; parentcompany, date of market entry, and current market shareof each firm in these four classifications; and durationof leadership of pioneers. We also recorded informationon many other related variahles, events, and firms.

The sources covered for our study are myriad and areof two types: periodicals and books. First, we collectedusable information from 450 articles in 25 different pe-riodicals, though several hundred more articles were ex-amined. Two of the most helpful and commonly usedperiodicals were Business Week and Advertising Age.Second, we collected usable infonnation from 125 booksand examinied about 125 more. These books tend todocument individual product categories and brands. Manywere written by university professors and contain ref-erences to periodicals going back hundreds of years. Oneof the reasons for examining so many sources is to findarticles written close to the time each event occurred.Another reason is to corroborate as many sources as pos-sible.

Some degree of uncertainty is inherent in the historicalmethod because the researcher may face evidence that isdiverse, complicated, and sometimes contradictory (Nevett1991). Therefore, we used four criteria in evaluating andaccepting information (see Gottschalk 1969 for a primer).

1. Competence: Is the informant able to report correct in-formation?

2. Objectivity: Is the informant willing to report correct in-fomiaiion (i.e., no vested interest)?

3. Reliability: Is the informant a trusted source of accurateinformatioti?

4. Corrofwration: Is there confirmatory evidence from asimilar source? .

The competence criterion is satisfied by relying onhighly regarded sources that were written or based oninformation written at the time each firm made an im-portant move in the product category. The objectivitycriterion is satisfied by relying on sources of informationthat were written hy disinterested third parties. The re-liability criterion is satisfied by using infonnation fromsources that have been well respected for a long time.For example, the top five periodicals used in our studyare Advertising Age. Business Week, Consumer Reports,Dealerscope Merchandising, and Forbes. The longevityand continued respect for these periodicals attest to theirreliability. A list of all sources used in the study is avail-able from the authors. The corroboration criterion is sat-

PIONEER ADVANTAGE ]63

isfied by using infonnation from multiple data sourcesfor each product category.

As an illustration of the effectiveness of the methodused in our study, consider the following quotations fix>mFinancial World about a company in the restaurant busi-ness:

—"World's biggest chain of highway restaurants" (May 20,1964, p. 5).

—"Pioneer in restaurant franchising" (April 5, 1967, p. 6).—"Most strongly entrenched factor and highest quality in-

vestment" (April 5, 1967. p. 6).—"Most fabulous success story in restaurant chains" (Sep-

tember 8, 1965, p. 5).

These statements probably bring McDonald's to mind.Indeed, if written today they probably would be describ-ing McDonald's. However, these statements were writ-ten in the 1960s and they refer not to McDonald's, butto Howard Johnson's restaurants. Because restaurantfranchising was developing in the 1960s, infonnationabout this market was collected from publications writ-ten in the 1960s. Thus, the prospective approach of his-torical analysis can be more insightful and accurate thanthe retrospective approach of surveys or interviews con-ducted today.

Sampling . , "=*

The data for our study come from three sequentialsamples containing a total of 50 product categories. Be-cause the results of the first sample were surprising, weselected two more samples on entirely different princi-ples to validate the findings. In addition, the differentsamples enable us to determine how sampling affects theresults.

Sample 7 is a selective sampie based on three criteria.First, the sample includes only consumer goods. Sec-ond, it covers only recent product categories because ofthe easier availability of information on them. Third, thesample contains both new product categories (e.g., mi-crowave ovens) and extensions of existing product cat-egories (e.g., light beer). We found 17 product cate-gories satisfying these criteria.

Sample 2 consists of 12 categories from the 25 in theAdvertising Age report of long-term leaders (see Table2). These 12 were chosen because they are distinctiveand new within recent history. The other 13 categories,which are too old for identification of the market pi-oneers, are analyzed separately in Table 3.

Sample 3 consists of seven product categories, eachof which contains a widely acknowledged market pi-oneer such as Xerox and Polaroid. (Samples I and 2 alsocontain a few widely acknowledged pioneers such asApple, Pampers, and Singer.)

Thus, by definition, sample 2 and especially sample3 are more favorable lo the null hypothesis that pioneersare successful.

RESULTS

Table 3 contains the main data obtained from exten-sive analysis of historical records. The product pioneer,market pioneer, current market leader, and year of entryare reported separately for samples 1,2, and 3. Becauseof limited information on the 14 supplementary cate-gories, we report only the long-lived market leader andpioneer or early entrant. Tables 4 through 6 summarizethe perfonnance of pioneers in terms of failure rate, mar-ket share, and market leadership for the 36 product cat-egories in samples 1, 2, and 3. This section merely high-lights the results reported in the tables and contrasts themto those of prior studies; we try to explain the differencesin the discussion.

Failure Rate

By "failure" we mean the end of sales in the categoryunder the brand name with which it entered. We use"success" and "survival" as antonyms for failure. Table4 shows the failure rate of market pioneers to be 47%.TTiis high failure rate is not due to old categories; notethat the rate is similar for categories starting before andafter World War II. In contrast, other researchers claimthat the failure of market pioneers does not alter theirfindings or that no pioneers failed in the categories stud-ied (Urban et al. 1986). Table 4 shows some differencesin failure rates across classes. The failure rate is lowerfor sample 3 because that sample was chosen specificallyto include only well-known pioneers. The failure rate isalso more than twice as high for durable than for non-durable goods. This finding can be attributed to moretechnological change in durable goods categories. Over-all, our finding of a 47% failure rate suggests that thesurvival bias could be a potential problem in past studiesand should be considered in future work.

Market Share

Table 5 shows mean market share of pioneers to be10%. For product categories starting after World War II,average market share of pioneers is only 1%. Marketshare is higher for nondurable goods, probably becauseof their lower failure rate. The market share of pioneersis much higher for sample 3, which contains some fa-mous pioneers. Most important, our finding of an av-erage market share of 10% for pioneers is substantiallylower than the 30% market share found by several re-searchers from the PIMS data (Table I) and also by Ur-ban et al. (1986) from the ASSESSOR data. Indeed, eventhe market share advantage of about 15 percentage pointsfor pioneers over late entrants in the PIMS data is higherthan the mean market share of pioneers in our data. Thesefigures mn contrary to the prevalent belief of a dominantand long-lived market share reward for pioneers.

Market Leadership

In the rest of the article, we use the term "leader"alone for the market share leader. Table 6 shows that the

164 J O U R N A L O F M A R K E T I N G RESEARCH, M A Y 1 9 9 3

-^ .-••'.' '•~^'' . .^'^ Table 3CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLES 1 THROUGH 3 AND SUPPLEMENTARY CATEGORIES

(date of firm's market entry in parentheses)

Category

Sample I1. Video recorders

2. Microwave ovens

3. Dishwasher

4. Laundry dryers

5. Facsimile tnachines

6. Personal computer

7. Camcorder

8. Color TV set

9. Wine cooler

10. Laundry detergent

11. Disposable diapers

12. Frozen dinners

13. Liquid dishwashingdetergent

14. Light beer

15. Diet cola

16. Liquid laundrydetergent

17. Dandruff shampoo

Sample 218. Cereal

19. Cameras

- 20. Canned fniil

21. Chocolate

22. Vegetable shortening

23. Canned milk

24. Chewing gum

25. Rashlight batteries

26. Safety razors

27. Sewing machine

28. Soft drinks

29. Tires

Product •. t ; ,.pioneer

Ampcx(1956)Raytheon(1946)Crescent Washing Machine Co.(1900)Canlon clothes dryer(1925) • . J - ' ' 'Xerox(1964) ^ - -;,MITS(1975)Sony, JVC(1982) • V. -Bell Labs(1929)Califomia Cooler(1979)

Reychler 'i :•

(1913)Chux(1950)Swanson(1946)Liquid Lux(1948)Trommer's Red Letter(1961)Kirsch's No-cal cola(1952)Wisk , i- p . -kr(1956)Fitch's(1919)

• - .

Granula - '•'^(1863) _, j_^Daguerrotype ' '-•(1839)Ubby. McNeill, Libby(1868)Whitman's(1842) 'Crisco " J(1911) - - - ;Borden(1856)Black Jack/ American Chicle(1871)Bright Star(1909) -2 ^.Star(1876)

- Elias Howe(1842)Vemors(1866)Hartford Rubber Works(1895)

Markeipioneer

Ampex(1963)Amana(1966)Crescent Washing Machine Co.(1900)Canlon clothes dryer(1925)Xerox(1964)MITS(1975)Kodak/Matsushita(1984) " ^RCA(1954)Califomia Cooler • ' '(1981}

Dreft(1933)Chux(1950)Swanson(1946)Liquid Lux *"(1948)Trommer's Red Letter(1961)Kirsch's No-cal ct^a , . ,(1952) ;Wisk .^ . ' -'•(1956) -' '•Filch's • •-

(1919)r '

Granula(1863) •Daguerrotype(1839)Libby, McNeill, Libby(1868)Whitman's(1842)Crisco(1911) . -:Borden(1860)Black Jack/ American Chicle(1871)Bright Star(1909) : ,Star .....( 1 8 7 6 ) - ' • .4 firms(1849) -t * -Vemors " - K(1866)Hartford Rubber Works(1895)

Current leader

RCA/Matsushita(1977)GE/Samsung(1979)GE(1935)Whirlpool(1950)Sharp(1982)IBM(1981)RCA/MatsushiU(1985)RCA/Thomson(1954)Seagram, Baitles &Jaymes(I9S4)Tide(1946)P&G/Pampers and Luvs(1961)StoufTer(1956)Ivory Liquid(1957)Miller Lite(1975)Diet Coke(1982)Uquid Tide(1984)Head & Shoulders(1961)

Kellogg(1906)Kodak(1888)Del Monte(1891)Hershey(1903)Crisco(191!)Camation(1899)Wrigley(1892)Eveready(1920)Gillette(1903)Singer(1851)Coca-Cola(1886)Goodyear(1898)

PIONEER ADVANTAGE 165

Table 3 (Continued)

CategoryProductpioneer

Marketpioneer Current leader

Sample 330.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

Copy machines

Telephone

Instant photography

Cola

Video games "''

Rubber

Personal stereo

Supplementary Caiegories

38.

39.

40.41.42.43.44.45.

46.

47.

48.

49.50.

Bacon

Crackers

Flour ;.i. V

Mint candyPaintPaperPipe tobaccoShirtsSoup

Soap •

Tea

Toothpaste

BeerToilet tissue

3M Thermofax(1950)Ries (1865)Gray (1876)Bell (1876)Archer(1853)Coca-Cola(1886)Magnovox Odyssey(1973)Goodrich(1869)Panasonic(1970)

Long-livedmarket leader

Swift (1887)

Nabisco (1890s)

Gold Medal (1880)

Life Savers (1913)Sherwin Williams (1870)Hammermill (1898)Prince Albert (1907)Manhattan (1857)Campbell (1897)

Ivory (1879) . •

Upton (1893)

Crest (1955) " "

Annheuser-Busch (1852)Scott (1890)

3M Thermofax(1950)Bell(1877)

Dubroni(1864)Coca-Cola(1886)Magnovox Odyssey(1973)Goodrich(1869)Panasonic(1970)

Xerox(1959)AT&T (Bell)(1877)

Polaroid(1947)Coca-Cola(1886)Nintendo(1985)Goodyear(1898)Sony(1979)

Pioneer/early entrant

Largest hog packers sold from Cincinnati prior lo Civil War,Armour largest in Chicago in 1870s

Cracker bakery in Massachusetts in 1792; first brand to becomeNo. 1 for N^isco was Uneeda, and Ritz later became No. 1

Largest flour mills in New York Cily and Chesapeake Bay areain 1700s

Large-scale U.S. production from mid-I800sPaints have been sold for hundreds of yearsRittenhouse Mill in Philadelphia in 1690Bull Durham, Lone Jack, and Killickinnick brands since 1860sReady-made clothing in U.S. since late 1700sSoup dates back hundreds of years; Campbell dominated market

with condensed soupsSoap dates back hundreds of years; Pears since 1789; Colgate

Cashmere Bouquet since 1872Sold in Boston by two dealers in 1690; forerunner of Great

Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) formed in 1859Colgate dominated market before P&G entered with Gteem

(1952) and CrestBrewery in North America in 1637First sold by Joseph Gayetty in 1857; Chaimin (1957) is current

leader

market pioneers are currenl leaders in only 11% of the36 categories. The rate is much lower after World WarII and much higher for sample 3 because of the famouspioneers. Our fmding of an average of 11% of pioneers

Table 4FAILURE RATE OF

ClassTotalPre WW IIPost-ww irDurable goodsNondurable goodsSample 1Sample 2Sample 3

No. offailures

17107

125962

PIONEERS

No. ofcases

362016181817127

i -

Failurerate (%)

4750446728535029

being leaders contrasts with PIMS data, which indicatethat almost half of pioneers are market leaders (Buzzelland Gale 1987).

Duration of Leadership

Market pioneers are de facto market leaders upon en-try. In most product categories, however, this leadershipdoes not appear to last very long. We analyzed the 16post-World War II product categories because pertinentinformation was available for them. In this group, mar-ket pioneers maintained market leadership for an averageof 12 years. However, the median period of leadershipis only five years. A few product categories made theaverage much higher than the median. The lower figureis more representative of the typical period of leadershipbecause the mode is also five years. This short periodof leadership is even less attractive when we consider

• ' 1 .

166

Jt Table 5 • -MARKET SHARE OF PIONEERS (1990)

Class

TotalPre-WW II •• • 'Post-WW II *Durable goodsNondurable goodsSample 1 'Sample 2 .,t "Sample 3

Meanmarket

share (%)

137 ^7

136

1021

No. ofcases

ad4 W

11

17

that the product category often has not achieved signif-icant sales levels in the initial years of leadership.

Nature of Leadership

The proposition of a long-lived market share leader-ship for pioneers is supported in only four of the 50product categories studied. However, detailed analysisof these four categories shows that attributing currentmarket position to market pioneering can be supportedunambiguously in only one instance, Crisco shortening.In the other three categories the effect of being first inthe market is less clear. For instance, Coca-Cola "en-tered the market as one of thousands of exotic medicinalproducts belonging to the nationwide patent medicine in-dustry" (Louis and Yazijian 1980, p. 14). Coca-Colaoriginally contained two stimulants, kola nut extract withcaffeine and coca leaves with cocaine. These addictiveingredients probably contributed as much to repeat pur-chase behavior as any other factor posited by theoriessupporting a pioneer advantage. In color television sets,RCA still has the highest market share but General Elec-tric sold its color TV set business to Thomson Electron-ics of France because it was not profitable enough. Fi-nally, in the telephone product category. Bell was ableto dominate the market only after reaching a settlementwith Western Union for patent infringement. This set-tlement called for Bell to pay 20% of its revenues toWestern Union for 17 years.

TotalPre-WW IIPost-WW IIDurable goodsNondurable goodsSample 1Sample 2Sample 3

TableLEADERSHIP OF

No. ofleaders

431221 ^

^ 12

6PIONEERS

No. ofcases

362016181817127

Percentage ofleaders

11IS6

It1168

29

JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1993

In all of the other 46 categories, the pioneers eitherfailed or are not leaders, or leaders were inconectly clas-sified as pioneers. This conclusion may seem surprising,but an example demonstrates the insights provided byour research method. Most people think of Xerox as thepioneer in copying machines, but consider the followingquotation from an article about Xerox's entry into copy-ing {Business Week, September 19, 1959, p. 86).

Office copying is a field where Haloid (Xerox)will find plenty of competition. Most of the 30 orso copying machine manufacturers are already in itwith a variety of products and processes—includingsuch strong competition as Minnesota Mining & Mfg.Co. (Themio-fax), Eastman Kodak (Verifax), andAmerican Photocopy Equipment Co. (Apeco).

DISCUSSION

We first explain our results in comparison with thefindings of previous research, then report some resultsabout "early leaders" and cite some important limita-tions and directions for future research.

Comparison With Previous Research

Our findings indicate that the rewards of pioneeringare less than those found in previous research. The dif-ference may be due to three important factors: (I) thesampling of nonsurvivors, (2) the operational definitionof the pioneer, and (3) the historical method. A consid-eration of these factors suggests that our results comple-ment rather than contradict past findings.

First, a key difference between our study and priorstudies is our sampling of all firms, both survivors andnonsurvivors. By so doing, we found a failure rate of47% for pioneers, which is closer to the failure rate of33 to 35% found in the Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1982)study of new products. The substantially lower marketshare of pioneers (10%) we found is due partially to thehigh number of failed market pioneers with an effectivemarket share of zero. To determine the effect of failedpioneers, we calculated the average market share of onlysurviving pioneers and found it to he 19%. This figureis closer to the approximately 30% market share foundby Robinson and Fomell (1985) and Urban et al. (1986).Other factors such as definition and measurement maycontribute to the remaining 11-percentage-point differ-ence in mean market share.

Second, our operational defmition of pioneer is dif-ferent from that used in previous studies (even thoughthe conceptual definition is the same). We operational-ized pioneer as the first entrant. Urban et al. (1986) op-erationalized pioneer as the earliest survivitig brand inthe ASSESSOR database, and Robinson and Fomell(1985) operationalized pioneer as "one of the pioneers. . . " among current survivors (the PIMS measure), Asa result, our study addresses the success of first entrantswhei^as the other two studies address the effects of orderof entry among survivors. However, these two databases

PIONEER ADVANTAGE 167

may not include all surviving brands in a category. Hence,the two approaches address slightly different though im-portant aspects of pioneering. One may even suggest anonlinear relationship from these studies: first entrantsand late entrants do not fare as weli as early (surviving)entrants.

Third, the identification of pioneers is a potentialproblem in some prior studies. For example. Urban etal. (1986) identify Miller Lite as the first entrant in lightbeer whereas Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989) point outthat Miller Lite was not the first entrant. We found thatTrommer's Red Letter was the pioneer and entered 14years before Miller Lite. We were unable to ascertaincompletely the extent of misidentification because of theproprietary nature of the PIMS and ASSESSOR data.Misidentification is probably due to reliance on self-re-ports instead of a thorough historical analysis of eachproduct category.

For example, many people consider Goodyear (in-stead of Goodrich) to be the pioneer in rubber and tiresbecause Charles Goodyear discovered the process forvulcanizing rubber. However, the Goodyear companybearing his name was founded decades after his deathand decades after the entry of Goodrich. More recently,Apple Computer has been considered the pioneer in per-sonal computers. The popular press perpetuates this im-age and Apple's advertising builds on this belief. How-ever, closer analysis indicates that Apple was precededby MITS and entered the personal computer market alongwith dozens of other personal computer companies (Frei-berger and Swaine 1984).

Thus, self-reports may be unreliable. As time passesand history fades, a respondent within a successful anddominant firm may consider it to be one of the pioneers,if not the pioneer. Time clouds the facts and successfeeds the legend. We suspect that some surveys may havewrongly identified the early leader as the pioneer. Topursue this hypothesis, we analyzed the performance ofearly leaders.

Early Leaders

We define the early leader as the firm that is the mar-ket share leader during the early growth phase of theproduct life cycle. Table 7 indicates the performance ofthese firms. Note that early leaders are currently leadersin more than half of the product categories studied andhave very low failure rates (8%). Most interestingly, theirmarket share of 28% is very close to that obtained formarket pioneers in PIMS and ASSESSOR data. Suchsimilarities lead one to suspect that self-report surveysor inconsistent definitions may wrongly classify earlyleaders as pioneers. The success, leadership, and stabil-ity of early leaders may also explain the persistent mar-ket share stability indicated in the Advertising Age report(Table 2).

How close are early leaders to pioneers? We find thatearly leaders enter product categories many years afterthe market pioneer. In the product categories studied,

Table 7CHARACTERISTICS OF EARLY MARKET LEADERS

Class

TotalPre-WW IIPost-WW 11Durable goodsNondurable

goodsSample 1Sample 2Sample 3

Failurerate (%)

S106

11

668

14

Marketshare (%}

28352030

26213042

Percentage

leaders

53604461

44475071

No.of

cases

36201618

1817127

early leaders entered 13 years after market pioneers. Thetime lag was 19 years in pre-World War II product cat-egories and five years in post-World War II categories.Similarly, current leaders entered 20 years after marketpioneers. The time lag was 26 years in pre-World WarII categories and 11 years in post-World War II cate-gories. These time lags are not trivial. In the quest toenter and dominate markets, firms time their entry verycarefully, often striving to be first by months or a fewyears. Hence, these early leaders should not be classifiedas pioneers.

Why are early leaders so successful? The reason maybe their ability to spot a market opportunity and theirwillingness to commit large resources to develop themarket. Indeed, in many of the categories we studied,the start of the growth phase in the product life cyclemay well be attributed to the market-building efforts ofthese early leaders. Our finding is similar to Chandler's(1990) for industrial goods, where long-term survival andsuccess were due more to the commitment of adequateresources to large-scale production than to entering first.

Limitations

Our study has several limitations that future researchshould address. Most important, the study does not con-sider the impact of the marketing mix (e.g., advertising,price, promotion, product quality, distribution) and man-agerial effectiveness. These variables may explain whysome pioneers have succeeded while others have failed.Separation of these effects would reveal the true rewardsof pioneering, if any. However, it is interesting to notethat inclusion of additional variables in Urban's modelreduces the order-of-entry penalty: " . . . order effectparameter is —0.61 when it is the only independent vari-able, —0.53 when the positioning variable is added, —0.43when the advertising variable also is appended, and -0.48with all the variables" (Urban et al. 1986, p. 651). Sim-ilarly, Robinson and Fomell's (1985, p. 310) descriptivestatistics indicate that pioneers have 29% market share.However, after inclusion of several additional variablessuch as relative product quality, relative price, numberof competitors, and relative advertising and promotion.

168 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1993

the effect of pioneering on market share is actually neg-ative (though not significant; p. 312). Historical researchmay be necessary to determine the true pioneer, butscanner panel data may be able to separate the effects oforder of entry from those of marketing mix.

Another limitation is our use of a customer-orienteddefmition of product category. Though that defmition isalways arbitrary (Day, Shocker, and Srivastava 1979),Table 3 reveals that our product categories are all plau-sible. We have chosen to identify pioneers in distinctiveproduct categories rather than in narrow subcategories.We believe this approach is necessary, as otherwise thetheory of pioneer advantage would not be falsifiable—the leader of each subcategory could be considered itspioneer. Also, note that the rewards of pioneering arenot any stronger in the lower level categories we con-sidered (numbers 13 through 17 in Table 3). However,because the identification of pioneers is contingent ondetermining product categories, an interesting directionfor future research would be to incorporate work onproduct categorization (e.g., Loken and Ward 1990;Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991; Sujan and Bettman 1989).Future research could also consider issues relating tocontinuous and discontinuous innovation. There may beinstances in which a new technology is sufficiently im-proved that a new category is formed. Pioneers that con-tinue with the old technology may not be as successfulas pioneers that adopt the new technology. Determiningan appropriate method for categorizing product-marketsover time may help to resolve the discrepancies betweenour findings and those of previous studies.

One may wonder to what extent category selectiondrives the results. Concern about this issue led us to drawthree sequential samples. Whereas sample 1 was chosenon certain objective criteria, samples 2 and 3 are in-creasingly biased in favor of finding a pioneer advan-tage. Sample 2 is from the Advertising Age report, whichwas based on a select 25 categories exhibiting long-termshare stability. Sample 3 consists of well-known pi-oneers. A comparison of results across samples in Tables4 through 6 shows that the results are certainly not dueto choosing categories unfavorable to pioneers. More-over, if all 50 categories had been selected randomly,the results may have been more unfavorable to pioneers.Similarly, the exclusion of the 14 old categories (Table3) from sample 2 biases the results in favor of fmdingsuccessful pioneers because the market pioneers haveprobably failed in these 14 categories. In addition, wechose only well-established categories. The costs and risksof pioneering unsuccessful product categories are likelyto be even higher. Future research could extend this workto other categories and explore differences across cate-gories.

Another question is how sensitive even these resultsare to survival bias. Actually, we cannot be certain thata survival bias is not still present in these data. For ex-ample, some other firms may well have entered the mar-ket before the firm we identified as the market pioneer.

However, such other firms are more likely to have failedthan to have succeeded, because a surviving pioneer wouldvery likely have publicized that fact and early commen-tators would have noted it. Hence, a potential bias, ifany, would underscore the findings because it would leadto the discovery of more unsuccessful market pioneerswith 0% market share. An additional potential limitationof our study is that some of the data could be inconectbecause historical records are not 1(X)% accurate. How-ever, our use of corroborating evidence wherever pos-sible mitigates this concern. Also, because of the largenumber of categories and the fairly consistent findingsacross subcategories and classes, a few errors would notalter the main conclusions. In addition, we performed asensitivity analysis using syndicated data from SimmonsMarket Research Bureau. The main results presented hereare robust to this alternate source of data (Golder andTellis 1992).

Finally, classifying pioneers as failures on the basis ofmarket exit may produce some bias. For example, somediscontinued brands might have become successful if analtemative marketing approach had been applied. Alter-natively, some brands may remain on the market ux) long,causing "failure" to be recorded later than it should be.Understanding and clarifying these issues is another areafor future research.

If pioneers do not have rewards as great as previouslybelieved, what motivates firms to rush a product to mar-ket? The answer is probably expected profits. Even ifthe probability of long-term market dominance is small,the payoff when it occurs may be so large that it maymore than compensate for the risks. In addition, by def-inition all pioneers have the opportunity to collect mo-nopoly profits for some period. Our entire analysis fo-cuses on market share, not profits (similar to most otherreseareh on pioneering). Market pioneers that failed mayvery well have realized a good return on investment orachieved their profit goals. Also, surviving market pi-oneers with low market share could still be profitable.The issue of financial rewards to pioneers is an importantarea for future researeh. Similarly, a financial analysisof the profitability of market leaders is also important.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Though several studies show that market pioneers havesome long-term advantages, their findings are qualifiedby problems of survival bias, imprecise definition of thepioneer, and self-reports of single informants from thesampled firms. We use a historical analysis of 50 cate-gories to assess the rewards of pioneering while avoidingthese limitations. Our main results, subject to the limi-tations of our study, follow.

1. The mean markel share of pioneers is 10%, much lowerthan the 30% from the PIMS and ASSESSOR data. Ouranalysis shows that about half of this difference is dueto our sampling both survivors and nonsurvivors, and therest is probably due to our identification of pioneersthrough historical records (rather than by survey).

PIONEER ADVANTAGE 169

2. Forty-seven percent of market pioneers fail. In compar-ison, other researchers have found no pioneers that failed,or have not considered the survival problem to be seri-ous.

3. Eleven percent of pioneers are cuiTent market leaders.In comparison, PIMS data indicate that almost half ofpioneers are market leaders.

4. Our results about maritel pioneers are in spite of oursampling categories that are more favorable to pioneers.The results are not very sensitive to the age of the cat-egory. Indeed, pioneers are market leaders usually foronly 5 to 10 years. The rewards of pioneering are strongerfor nondurable goods.

5. Early market leaders that have a higher market share,success rate, and market leadership than pioneers entermarkets aUiut 13 years after the market pioneers.

Our findings have three important implications, butthey should be viewed cautiously because past successor failure does not automatically imply future outcomes.First, the findings underscore the need for carefully re-searching the problem of pioneering, preferably with ex-tensive historical analysis. Second, they suggest the im-portance of continuous innovation within the productcategory. This approach enabled many later entrants tobecome successful and may help pioneers defend againstnew entrants. For example, Gillette has maintained lead-ership in the safety razor market by constantly innovat-ing even at the cost of cannibalizing its older brands.

Third, our results suggest that being first in a newmarket may not confer automatic long-term rewards. Analtemative strategy worth considering may be to let otherfirms pioneer and explore markets, and enter after learn-ing more about the structure and dynamics of the market.Indeed, early leaders who entered an average of 13 yearsafter the pioneer are more likely than pioneers to leadmarkets today. The reason is that the early leaders en-tered decisively and committed large resources to build-ing and leading the market. An example by Liebermanand Montgomery (1988) underscores this point. Mat-sushita's nickname, maneshita denki (meaning "elec-tronics that have been copied") reflects its strategy. Thecompany generally lets Sony innovate and then takes aposition based on manufacturing and marketing skills.

Actually, markets evolve over a number of years, newtechnologies emerge, and leading companies occasion-ally make mistakes. The logic of success is not to befirst to enter the market, but to strive for leadership byscanning opportunities, building on strengths, and com-mitting resources to serve consumers effectively. Theevolution of products repeatedly shows that each firmthat was not able or willing to commit the resources nec-essary for market leadership was passed by another firmthat was able and willing. This trend has happenedthroughout history and it will continue.

REFERENCES

Aaker, David A. and George S. Day (1986), "The Perils ofHigh-Growth Markets," Strategic Management Journal, 7(September-October), 409-21.

Abell, [>erek F. (1978), "Strategic Windows," Journal ofMarketing, 42 (July), 21-8.

Advertising Age i\9^'i), "Study: Majority of 25 Leaders in 1923Still On Top" (September 19), 32.

Alpert, Frank H., Michael A. Kamins, and John L. Graham(1992), "An Examination of Reseller Buyer Attitudes To-ward Order of Brand Entry," Journal of Marketing, 56 (July),25-37.

Bain, Joe S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition. Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bond. R. S. and D. F. Lean (1977), "Sales, Promotion, andProduct Differentiation in Two Prescription Drug Markets."Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1982), New Product Managementfor the J980's. New York: Booz. Allen & Hamilton.

Buzzell, Roben D. and Bradley T. Gale (1987), The PIMSPrinciples: Linking Strategy to Performance. New Ywk: TheFree Press.

Carpenter. Gregory S. and Kent Nakamoto (1989), "Con-sumer Preference Formation and Pioneering Advantage,"Journal of Marketing Research, 26 (August), 285-98.

Chandler, Alfred D. (1990). "The Enduring Logic of Indus-trial Success," Harvard Business Review, 68 (March-April),131-9.

Cooper, Robert G. (1979), "The Dimensions of Industrial NewProduct Success and Failure," Journal of Marketing, 43(Summer), 93-103.

Day, George S. and Jonathan S. Freeman (1990), "Burnoutor Fadeout: The Risks of Early Entry Into High TechnologyMarkets." in Strategic Management in High TechnologyFirms, Michael W. Lawless and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, eds.Greenwich. CT: JAI Press, Inc., 43-65.

, Allan D. Shocker, and Rajendra K. Srivastava (1979),"Customer-Oriented Approaches to Identifying Product-Markets," Journal of Marketing, 43 (Fall). 8-19.

Fershtman, Chaim. Vijay Mahajan, and Eitan Muller (1990),"Market Share Pioneering Advantage: A Theoretical Ap-proach," Management Science, 36 (August). 900-18.

Freiberger. Paul and Michael Swaine (1984), Fire in the Vat-ley: The Making of the Personal Computer. Berkeley CA:Os borne/McGraw-Hill.

Gilbert. R. J. and D. M. G. Newbeny (1982), "PreemptivePatenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Eco-nomic Review, 72 (June), 514-26.

Glazer, A. (1985). "The Advantages of Being First," Amer-ican Economic Review, 75 (June), 473-80.

Golder. Peter N. and Gerard J. Tellis (1992). "Do PioneersReally Have Long-Term Advantages: A Historical Analy-sis," Marketing Science Institute Working Paper. Boston:Marketing Science Institute.

Gottschalk, Louis R. (1%9), Understanding History: A Primerof Historical Method. New York: Knopf.

Guasch, J. L. and A. Weiss (1980), "Adverse Selection ofMaricets and the Advantages of Being Late." QuarterlyJournal of Economics. 94 (May). 453-66.

Karakaya. Fahri and Michael J. Stahl (1989), "Barriers to En-try and Market Entry Decisions in Consumer and IndustrialGoods Markets." Journal of Marketing, 53 (April), 80-91.

Lambkin, Mary (1988), "Order of Entry and Performance inNew Markets." Strategic Management Journal, 9 (Sum-mer), 127-40.

and George S. Day (1989), "Evolutionary Processesin Competitive Markets: Beyond the Product Life Cycle,"Journal of Marketing, 53 (July), 4-20.

170 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, MAY 1993

Lane, W. J. (1980). "Product Differentiation in a Market WithEndogenous Sequential Entry," Bell Journal of Economics,11 (Spring), 237-60.

Lieberman, Marvin B. and David B, Montgomery (1988)."First-Mover Advantages," Strategic Management Journal.9 (Summer), 41-58.

Lilien, Gary L. and Eunsang Yoon (1990), "The Timing ofCompetitive Market Entry: An Exploratory Study of NewIndustrial Products," Management Science, 36 (May), 568-85.

Loken, Barbara and James Ward (1990), "AUemaiive Ap-proaches to Understanding the Determinants of Typicality."Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (September), 111-26.

Louis, J. C. and Harvey Yazijian (1980), The Cola Wars. NewYork: Everest House.

Moore, Michael J.. William Boulding, and Ronald C. Good-stein (1991). "Pioneering and Market Share: Is Entry TimeEndogenous and Does It Matter?" Journal of Marketing Re-search, 28 (February), 97-104.

Nevett, Terence (1991). "Historical Investigation and thePractice of Marketing." Journal of Marketing, 55 (July),13-23.

Pany, Mark and Frank M. Bass (1990), "Wben To Lead orFollow? It Depends," Marketing Letters, 1 (November), 187-98.

Prescott, E. and M. Visscher (1977), "Sequential LocationAmong Firms Witb Foresight," Bell Journal of Economics,8 (Autumn), 378-93.

Ratneshwar, S. and Allan D. Shocker (1991). "Substitution inUse and the Role of Usage Context in Product CategoryStructures," Journal of Marketing Research, 28 (August),281-95.

Robinson, William T. (1988). "Sources of Market PioneerAdvantages: The Case of Industrial Goods Industries,"Journal of Marketing Research, 25 (February), 87-94.

and Claes Fomell (1985), "Sources of Market PioneerAdvantage in Consumer Goods Industries," Journal of Mar-keting Research, 22 (August), 305-17.

Savitt. Ronald (1980), "Historical Research in Marketing,"Journal of Marketing, 44 (Fall). 52-8 .

Scherer. F. M. (1985), "Editorial: Post-Patent Barriers to En-try in the Phannaceutical Industry," Journal of Health Eco-nomics, 4 (March), 83-7.

Schmalensee, Richard (1978), "Entry Deterrence in the Readyto Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry." Bell Journal of Econom-ics, 9 (Autumn), 305-27.

(1982), "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pi-oneering Brands," American Economic Review, 72 (June).349-65.

Schnaars. Steven P. (1986). "When Entering Growth Markets,Are Pioneers Better Than Poachers?" Business Horizons, 29(March-April), 27-36.

Shurkin. Joel N. (1984). Engines ofthe Mind: A History ofthe Computer. New York: Norton,

Spence, M. (1977). "Entry, Capacity, Investment, and Oli-gopolistic Pricing." Bell Journal of Economics, 8 (Autumn),534-44.

(1981), "The Leaming Curve and Competition," BellJournal of Economics, 12 (Spring), 49-70.

Sujan, Mita and James R, Beitman (1989), "The Effects ofBrand Positioning Strategies on Consumers' Brand and Cat-egory Perceptions: Some Insights From Schema Research,"Journal of Marketing Research, 26 (November). 454-67.

Sullivan, Mary (1991). "Brand Extension and Order of En-try," Marketing Science Institute Working Paper, ReportNumber 91-105, Boston: Marketing Science Institute.

Urban. Glen L., Theresa Carter, Steven Gaskin, and ZofiaMucha (1986). "Market Share Rewards to Pioneering Brands:An Empirical Analysis and Strategic Implications." Man-agement Science, 32 (June), 645-59.

Van Honaeker, Wilfried R, and Diana Day (1987). "Cross-Sectional Estimation in Marketing: Direct Versus ReverseRegression," Marketing Science. 6 (Summer). 254-67.

Whitten, Ira T. (1979), "Brand Performance in the CigaretteIndustry and the Advantages of Early Entry," Washington,DC: U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

Yip, George S. (1982), Barriers to Entry. Lexington, MA:Lexington Books/D.C. Heath and Company.

_^.. Repnm No JMR9OIIO3

• * • *

' ^ ' ' a- -.•

..ir*S