Philosophy Get Started

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Epistemology in Islamic philosophy

Muslim philosophers agree that knowledge is possible. Knowledge is the

intellect's grasp of the immaterial forms, the pure essences or universals that

constitute the natures of things, and human happiness is achieved only

through the intellect's grasp of such universals.

They stress that for knowledge of the immaterial forms, the human intellect

generally relies on the senses. Some philosophers, such as Ibn Rushd and

occasionally Ibn Sina, assert that it is the material forms themselves, which

the senses provide, that are grasped by the intellect after being stripped of

their materiality with the help of the divine world.

However, the general view as expressed by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina seems to

be that the material forms only prepare the way for the reception of theimmaterial forms, which are then provided by the divine world. They also

state that on rare occasions the divine world simply bestows the immaterial

forms on the human intellect without any help from the senses. This

occurrence is known as prophecy. While all Muslim philosophers agree that

grasping eternal entities ensures happiness, they differ as to whether such

grasping is also necessary for eternal existence.

1. Nature of knowledge

Muslim philosophers are primarily concerned with human happiness and itsattainment. Regardless of what they consider this happiness to be, all agree

that the only way to attain it is through knowledge. The theory of

knowledge, epistemology, has therefore been their main preoccupation and

appears chiefly in their logical and psychological writings. Epistemology

concerns itself primarily with the possibility, nature and sources of

knowledge. Taking the possibility of knowledge for granted, Muslim

philosophers focused their epistemological effort on the study of the nature

and sources of knowledge. Their intellectual inquiries, beginning with logic

and ending with metaphysics and in some cases mysticism, were in the main

directed towards helping to understand what knowledge is and how it comes

about.

Following in the footsteps of the Greek philosophers, Muslim philosophers

consider knowledge to be the grasping of the immaterial forms, natures,

essences or realities of things. They are agreed that the forms of things are


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either material (that exists in matter) or immaterial (existing in them). While

the latter can be known as such, the former cannot be known unless first

detached from their materiality. Once in the mind, the pure forms act as the

pillars of knowledge. The mind constructs objects from these forms, and

with these objects it makes judgments. Thus Muslim philosophers, like

Aristotle before them, divided knowledge in the human mind into

conception (tasawwur), apprehension of an object with no judgment, and

assent (tasdiq), apprehension of an object with a judgment, the latter being,

according to them, a mental relation of correspondence between the concept

and the object for which it stands. Conceptions are the main pillars of assent;

without conception, one cannot have a judgment.

In itself, conception is not subject to truth and falsity, but assent is.However, it should be pointed out that tasdiq is a misleading term in Islamic

philosophy. It is generally used in the sense of 'accepting truth or falsity', but

also occasionally in the sense of 'accepting truth'. One must keep in mind,

however, that when assent is said to be a form of knowledge, the word is

then used, not in the broad sense to mean true or false judgment, but in the

narrow sense to mean true judgment.

In Islamic philosophy, conceptions are in the main divided into the known

and the unknown. The former are grasped by the mind actually, the latter

potentially. Known conceptions are either self-evident (that is, objects

known to normal human minds with immediacy such as 'being', 'thing' and

'necessary') or acquired (that is, objects known through mediation, such as

'triangle'). With the exception of the self-evident conceptions, conceptions

are known or unknown relative to individual minds.

Similarly, Muslim philosophers divided assent into the known and the

unknown, and the known assent into the self-evident and the acquired. Theself-evident assent is exemplified by 'the whole is greater than the part', and

the acquired by 'the world is composite'. In Kitab at-tanbih 'ala sabil as-

sa'ada (The Book of Remarks Concerning the Path of Happiness), al-Farabi

calls the self-evident objects: 'the customary, primary, well-known

knowledge, which one may deny with one's tongue, but which one cannot


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deny with one's mind since it is impossible to think their contrary'. Of the

objects of conception and assent, only the unknown ones are subject to

inquiry. By reducing the number of unknown objects one can increase

knowledge and provide the chance for happiness. But how does such

reduction come about?

2. Sources of knowledge

In Islamic philosophy there are two theories about the manner in which the

number of unknown objects is reduced. One theory stresses that this

reduction is brought about by moving from known objects to unknown ones,

the other that it is merely the result of direct illumination given by the divine

world. The former is the upward or philosophical way, the second the

downward or prophetic one.

According to the former theory, movement from the known objects of

conception to the unknown ones can be effected chiefly through the

explanatory phrase (al-qawl ash-sharih). The proof (al-burhan) is the method

for moving from the known objects of assent to the unknown ones. The

explanatory phrase and proof can be either valid or invalid: the former leads

to certitude, the latter to falsehood.

The validity and invalidity of the explanatory phrase and proof can be

determined by logic, which is a set of rules for such determination. Ibn Sinapoints out that logic is a necessary key to knowledge and cannot be replaced

except by God's guidance, as opposed to other types of rules such as

grammar for discourse (which can be replaced by a good natural mind) and

meter for poetry (which can be replaced by good taste).

By distinguishing the valid from the invalid explanatory phrase and proof,

logic serves a higher purpose, namely that of disclosing the natures or

essences of things. It does this because conceptions reflect the realities or

natures of things and are the cornerstones of the explanatory phrase and proof. Because logic deals only with expressions that correspond to

conceptions, when it distinguishes the valid from the invalid it distinguishes

at the same time the realities or natures of things from their opposites. Thus

logic is described as the key to the knowledge of the natures of things. This


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knowledge is described as the key to happiness; hence the special status of

logic in Islamic philosophy.

3. Logic and knowledge

We are told that because logic deals only with the known and unknown, it

cannot deal with anything outside the mind. Because it is a linguistic

instrument (foreign in nature to the realities of things), it cannot deal with

such realities directly, whether they exist in the mind or outside it, or are

external to these two realms of existence. It can only deal with the states or

accidents of such realities, these states comprising links among the realitiesand intermediaries between the realities and language. Logic therefore deals

with the states of such realities, as they exist in the mind. Such states are

exemplified by 'subject' or 'predicate', 'universality' or 'particularity',

'essentiality' or 'accidentality'. In other words, logic can deal with realities

only in that these realities are subjects or predicates, universal or particular,

essential or accidental and so on.

Because the ultimate human objective is the understanding of the realities,

essences or natures of things, and because the ultimate logical objective is

the understanding of conceptions, logicians must focus on the understandingof those conceptions that lead to the understanding of the essences if they

intend to serve humanity. Ibn Sina points out that since the essences are

universal; such expressions are also universal in the sense of representing

universal conceptions such as 'human being', not in the sense of being

universal only in expression, such as 'Zayd'. A universal expression can be

applied to more than one thing, as the last two examples show, but one must

keep in mind Ibn Sina's distinction between these two types of universal

expressions: the former represents reality, although indirectly, the latter does

not. It is only the former with which the logician should be concerned.

4. The role of the mind

All Muslim philosophers believe that above the senses there is the rational

soul. This has two parts: the practical and theoretical intellects. The

theoretical intellect is responsible for knowledge; the practical intellect


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concerns itself only with the proper management of the body through

apprehension of particular things so that it can do the good and avoid the

bad. All the major Muslim philosophers, beginning with al-Kindi, wrote

treatises on the nature and function of the theoretical intellect, which may be

referred to as the house of knowledge.

In addition to the senses and the theoretical intellect, Muslim philosophers

include in their discussion of the instruments of knowledge a third factor.

They teach that the divine world contains, among other things, intelligences,

the lowest of which is what al-Kindi calls the First Intellect (al-'aql al-

awwal), better known in Arabic philosophy as the 'agent intellect' (al-'aql al-

fa''al), the name given to it by falab, or 'the giver of forms' (wahib as-suwar).

They contend that the world around us is necessary for the attainment of

philosophical knowledge. Some, such as Ibn Bajja, Ibn Rushd and

occasionally Ibn Sina, say that the mixed universals in the imagination thathave been derived from the outside world through the senses are eventually

purified completely by the light of the agent intellect, and are then reflected

onto the theoretical intellect.

Al-Farabi's and Ibn Sina's general view, however, is that these imagined

universals only prepare the theoretical intellect for the reception of the

universals from the agent intellect that already contains them. When

expressing this view, Ibn Sina states that it is not the universals in the

imagination themselves that are transmitted to the theoretical intellect but

their shadow, which is created when the light of the agent intellect is shed onthese universals.

This is similar, he says, to the shadow of an object which is reflected on the

eye when sunlight is cast on that object. While the manner in which the

universals in the imagination can prepare the theoretical intellect for

knowledge is in general unclear, it is vaguely remarked by al-Farabi and Ibn

Sina that this preparation is due to the similarity of these universals to the

pure universals, and to the familiarity of the theoretical intellect with the

imagined universals owing to its proximity to the imagination. In otherwords, the familiarity of this intellect with what resembles its proper objects

prepares it for the reception of these objects from the agent intellect.

5. Philosophical and prophetic knowledge


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The prophetic way is a much easier and simpler path. One need not take any

action to receive the divinely given universals; the only requirement seems

to be the possession of a strong soul capable of receiving them. While the

philosophical way moves from the imagination upward to the theoretical

intellect, the prophetic way takes the reverse path, from the theoretical

intellect to the imagination. For this reason, knowledge of philosophy is

knowledge of the natures of things themselves, while knowledge of

prophecy is knowledge of the natures of things as wrapped up in symbols,

the shadows of the imagination.

Philosophical and prophetic truth is the same, but it is attained and expressed

differently. Ibn Tufayl'is the best illustration of the harmony of philosophy

and religion. The so-called double truth theory wrongly views these two

paths to knowledge as two types of truth, thus attributing to Ibn Rushd a

view foreign to Islamic philosophy. One of the most important contributionsof Islamic philosophy is the attempt to reconcile Greek philosophy and Islam

by accepting the philosophical and prophetic paths as leading to the same

truth.

Muslim philosophers agree that knowledge in the theoretical intellect passes

through stages. It moves from potentiality to actuality and from actuality to

reflection on actuality, thus giving the theoretical intellect the respective

names of potential intellect, actual intellect and acquired intellect.

Some Muslim philosophers explain that the last is called 'acquired' becauseits knowledge comes to it from the outside, and so it can be said to acquire

it. The acquired intellect is the highest human achievement, a holy state that

conjoins the human and the divine realms by conjoining the theoretical and

agent intellects.

Following in the for al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja and Ibn Rushd believe that the

theoretical intellect is potential by nature, and therefore disintegrates unless

it grasps the eternal objects, the essential universals, for the known and the

knower are one. Ibn Sina rejects the view that the theoretical intellect is

potential by nature. He argues instead that it is eternal by nature because

unless it is, it cannot grasp the eternal objects.

For him, happiness is achieved by this intellect's grasping of the eternal

objects, for such grasping perfects the soul. Muslim philosophers who


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believe that eternity is attained only through knowledge also agree with Ibn

Sina that knowledge is perfection and perfection is happiness.

Is There a God? Metaphysics

The question whether there is a God is one which is decided on verydifferent grounds by different communities and different individuals. The

immense majorityof mankind accepts the prevailing opinion of their owncommunity. In the earliest times of which we have definite history

everybody believed in many gods.

It was the Jews who first believed in only one. The first commandment,

when it was new, was very difficult to obey because the Jews had believed

that Baal and Ashtaroth and Dagon and Moloch and the rest were real gods

but were wicked because they helped the enemies of the Jews.

The step from a belief that these gods were wicked to the belief that they

did not exist was a difficult one. There was a time, namely that of Antiochus

IV, when a vigorous attempt was made to Hellenize the Jews. Antiochus

decreed that they should eat pork, abandon circumcision, and take baths.

Most of the Jews in Jerusalem submitted, but in country places resistance

was more stubborn and under the leadership of the Maccabees the Jews at

last established their right to their peculiar tenets and customs. Monotheism,

which at the beginning of the Antiochan persecution had been the creed of

only part of one very small nation, was adopted by Christianity and later by

Islam, and so became dominant throughout the whole of the world west ofIndia.

From India eastward, it had no success: Hinduism had many gods;

Buddhism in its primitive form had none; and Confucianism had none from

the eleventh century onward. But, if the truth of a religion is to be judged by

its worldly success, the argument in favor of monotheism is a very strong

one, since it possessed the largest armies, the largest navies, and the greatest

accumulation of wealth. In our own day this argument is growing less

decisive.It is true that the un-Christian menace of Japan was defeated. But the

Christian is now faced with the menace of atheistic Muscovite hordes, and it

is not so certain as one could wish that atomic bombs will provide a

conclusive argument

on the side of theism. But let us abandon this political and geographical way

of considering religions, which has been increasingly rejected by thinking


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people ever since the time of the ancient Greeks. Ever since that time there

have been men who were not content to accept passively the religious

opinions of their neighbors, but endeavourer to consider what reason and

philosophy might have to say about the matter.

In the commercial cities of Ionia, where philosophy was invented, there

were free-thinkers in the sixth century B.C. Compared to modern free-

thinkers they had an easy task, because the Olympian gods, however

charming to poetic fancy, were hardly such as could be defended by the

metaphysical use of the unaided reason.

They were met popularly by Orphism (to which Christianity owes much)

and, philosophically, by Plato, from whom the Greeks derived a

philosophical monotheism very different from the political and nationalistic

monotheism of the Jews. When the Greek world became converted to

Christianity it combined the new creed with Platonic Metaphysics and sogave birth to theology.

Catholic theologians, from the time of Saint Augustine to the present day,

have believed that the existence of one God could be proved by the unaided

reason. Their arguments were put into final form by Saint Thomas Aquinas

in the thirteenth century. When modern philosophy began in the seventeenth

century, Descartes and Leibniz took over the old arguments somewhat

polished up, and, owing largely to their efforts, piety remained intellectually

respectable.

But Locke, although him self a completely convinced Christian undermined

the theoretical basis of the old arguments, and many of his followers,

especially in France, became Atheists. I will not attempt to set forth in all

their subtlety the philosophical arguments for the existence of God. There is,

I think, only one of them which still have weight with philosophers that are

the argument of the First Cause. This argument maintains that, since

everything that happens has a cause, there must be a First Cause from which

the whole series starts.

The argument suffers, however, from the same defect as that of the elephantand the tortoise. It is said (I do not know with what truth) that a certain

Hindu thinker believed the earth to rest upon an elepha nt. When asked what

the elephant rested upon, he replied that it rested upon a tortoise. When

asked what the tortoise rested upon, he said, "I am tired of this. Suppose we

change the subject." This illustrates the unsatisfactory character of the First-

Cause argument.


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Nevertheless, you will find it in some ultra - modern treatises on physics,

which contend that physical processes, traced backward in time, show that

there must have been a sudden beginning and infer that this was due to

divine Creation. They carefully abstain from attempts to show that this

hypothesis makes matters more intelligible.

The scholastic arguments for the existence of a Supreme Being are now

rejected by most Protestant theologians in favor of new arguments which to

my mind are by no means an improvement. The scholastic arguments were

genuine efforts of thought and, if their reasoning had been sound, they

would have demonstrated the truth of their conclusion. The new arguments,

which Modernists prefer, are vague, and the Modernists reject with contempt

every effort to make them precise. There is an appeal to the heart as opposed

to the intellect.

It is not maintained that those who reject the new arguments are illogical,

but that they are destitute of deep feeling orof moral sense. Let us nevertheless examine the modern arguments and see

whether there is anything that they really prove. One of the favourite

arguments is from evolution. The world was once lifeless, and when life

began it was a poor sort of life consisting of green slime and other

uninteresting things. Gradually by the course of evolution, it developed into

animals and plants and at last into MAN. Man, so the theologians assure us,

is so splendid a Being that he may well be regarded as the culmination to

which the long ages of nebula and slime were a prelude. I think the

theologians must have been fortunate in their human contacts. They do not

seem to me to have given due weight to Hitler or the Beast of Belsen. If

Omnipotence, with all time at its disposal, thought it worth while to lead up

to these men through the many millions of years of evolution, I can only say

that the moral and aesthetic taste involved is peculiar.

However, the theologians no doubt hope that the future course of evolution

will produce more men like themselves and fewer men like Hitler. Let us

hope so. But, in cherishing this hope, we are abandoning the ground of

experience and taking refuge in an optimism which history so far does not

support. There are other objections to this evolutionary optimism. There isevery reason to believe that life on our planet will not continue forever so

that any optimism based upon the course of terrestrial history must be

temporary and limited in its purview.

It has been one of the defects of theologians at all times to over-esti-mate the

importance of our planet. No doubt this was natural enough in the days


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before Copernicus when it was thought that the heavens revolve about the

earth. But since Copernicus and still more since the modern exploration of

distant regions, this pre - occupation with the earth has become rather

parochial. If the universe had a Creator, it is hardly reasonable to suppose

that He was especially interested in our little corner. And, if He was not, His

values must have been different from ours, since in the immense majority of

regions life is impossible.

There is a moralistic argument for belief in God, which was popularized by

William James. According to this argument, we ought to believe in God

because, if we do not, we shall not behave well.

The first and greatest objection to this argument is that, at its best, it cannot

prove that there is a God but only that politicians and educators ought to try

to make people think there is one. Whether this ought to be done or not is

not a theological question but a political one.

The arguments are of the same sort as those which urge that children should

be taught respect for the flag. A man with any genuine religious feeling will

not be content with the view that the belief in God is useful, because he will

wish to know whether, in fact, the re is a God.

It is absurd to contend that the two questions are the same. In the nursery,

belief in Father Christmas is useful, but grown-up people do not think that

this proves Father Christmas to be real. Since we are not concerned with

politics we might consider this sufficient refutation of the moralistic

argument, but it is perhaps worthwhile to pursue this a little further.

It is, in the first place, very doubtful whether belief in God has all Many of

the best men known to history have been unbelievers. John Stuart the

beneficial moral effects that are attributed to it. Mill may serve as an

instance. And many of the worst men known to history have been believers.

Of this there are innumerable instances. Perhaps Henry VIII may serve as

typical.

However that may be, it is always disastrous when governments set to work

to uphold opinions for their utility rather than for their truth. As soon as this

is done it becomes necessary to have a censorship to suppress adverse

arguments, and it is thought wise to discourage thinking among the young

for fear of encouraging "dangerous thoughts." When such mal-practices are

employed against religion as they are in Soviet Russia, the theologians can


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see that they are bad, but they are still bad when employed in defence of

what the theologians think good. Freedom of thought and the habit of giving

weight to evidence are matters of far greater moral import than the belief in

this or that theological dogma.

On all these grounds it cannot be maintained that theological beliefs should

be upheld for their usefulness without regard to their truth. There is a

simpler and more naive form of the same argument, which appeals to many

individuals. People will tell us that without the consolations of religion they

would be intolerably unhappy. So far as this is true, it is a coward's

argument. Nobody but a coward would consciously choose to live in a fool's

paradise.

When a man suspects his wife of infidelity, he is not thought the better of

for shutting his eyes to the evidence. And I cannot see why ignoringevidence should be contemptible in one case and admirable in the other.

Apart from this argument the importance of religion in contributing to

individual happiness is very much exaggerated.

Whether you are happy or unhappy depends upon a number of factors. Most

people need goodhealth and enough to eat. They need the good opinion of

their social milieu and the affection of their intimates.

They need not only physical health but mental health. Given all these things,

most people will be happy whatever their theology. Without them, most

people will be unhappy, whatever their theology. In thinking over the people

I have known, I do not find that on the average those who had religious

beliefs were happier than those who had not.

When I come to my own beliefs, I find myself quite unable to discern any

purpose in the universe, and still more unable to wish to discern one. Those

who imagine that the course of cosmic evolution is slowly leading up to

some consummation pleasing to the Creator, are logically committed

(though they usually fail to realize this) to the view that the Creator is notomnipotent or, if He were omnipotent, He could decree the end without

troubling about means.

I do not myself perceive any consummation toward which the universe is

tending. According to the physicists, energy will be gradually more evenly

distributed and as it becomes more evenly distributed it will become more


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useless. Gradually everything that we find interesting or pleasant, such as

life and light will disappear -- so, at least, they assure us. The cosmos is like

a theatre in which just once a play is performed, but, after the curtain falls,

the theatre is left cold and empty until it sinks in ruins. I do not mean to

assert with any costiveness that this is the case.

That would be to assume more knowledge than we possess. I say only that it

is what is probable on present evidence. I will not assert dogmatically that

there is no cosmic purpose, but I will say that there is no shred of evidence

in favor of there being one. I will say further that, if there be a purpose and if

this purpose is that of an Omnipotent Creator, then that Creator, so far from

being loving and kind, as we are told, must be of a degree of wickedness

scarcely conceivable. A man who commits a murder is considered to be a

bad man. An Omnipotent Deity, if there be one, murders everybody.

A man who willingly afflicted another with cancer would be considered a

friend. But the Creator, if He exists, afflicts many thousands every year with

this dreadful disease.

A man who, having the knowledge and power required to make his children

good, chose instead to make them bad, would be viewed with execration.

But God, if He exists, makes this choice in the case of very many of His

children. The whole conception of an omnipotent God, whom it is impious

to criticize, could only have arisen under oriental despotisms where

sovereigns, in spite of capricious cruelties, continued to enjoy the adulation

of their slaves.

It is the psychology appropriate to this outmoded political system which

belatedly survives in orthodox theology. There is, it is true, a Modernist

form of theism, according to which God is not omnipotent, but is doing His

best, in spite of great difficulties. This view, although it is new among

Christians, is not new in the history of thought. It is, in fact, to be found in

Plato. I do not think this view can be proved to be false. I think all that can

be said is that there is no positive reason in its favour.

Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of skeptics todisprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is,

of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars

there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody

would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that

the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.


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But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it

is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should

rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such

a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every

Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to

believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the

doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the,

Inquisitor in an earlier time.

It is customary to suppose that, if a belief is widespread, there must be

something reasonable about it. I do not think this view can be held by

anyone who has studied history.

Practically all the beliefs of savages are absurd. In early civilizations there

may be as much as one percent for which there is something to be said. In

our own day.... But at this point I must be careful. We all know that there are

absurd beliefs in Soviet Russia. If we are Protestants, we know that there areabsurd beliefs among Catholics.

If we are Catholics, we know that there are absurd beliefs among

Protestants. If we are Conservatives, we are amazed by the superstitions to

be found in the Labour Party. If we are Socialists, we are aghast at the

credulity of Conservatives. I do not know, dear reader, what your beliefs

may be, but whatever they may be, you must concede that nine -tenths of the

beliefs of nine -tenths of mankind are totally irrational. The beliefs in

question are, of course, those which you do not hold. I cannot, therefore,

think it presumptuous to doubt something which has long been held to

be true, especially when this opinion has only prevailed in certaingeographical regions, as is the case with all theological opinions.

My conclusion is that there is no reason to believe any of the dogmas of

traditional theology and, further, that there is no reason to wish that

they were true. Man, in so far as he is not subject to natural forces, is

free to work out his own destiny. The responsibility is his, and so is the

opportunity.

Deductive Reasoning

In deductive reasoning, an argument is made based on two facts, or

premises. If the premises are true, then it should follow that the conclusion

of the argument must also be true.


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You hearDEDUCTIVE arguments, both good and bad, made all the time.

In magazines, you read, If you use Brand X detergent your clothes will not

get clean. But our detergent works much better. Use our detergent and your

clothes will get clean. On television, you hear a politician saying, High

taxes are putting people out of work. Tax cuts are a better policy. Tax cuts

will give people jobs.At home, most people can remember a parent telling

them, if you do not finish your supper, you will not get dessert.

Understanding how these arguments work, and do not work, will help you to

do two things. One, you will learn how to use deductive reasoning to

construct your own strong arguments. Getting your point across accurately

and forcefully will be easier. And two, you will be able to tell when

someone elses argument is weak. You cant be influenced or persuaded by

faulty reasoning when you recognize it and see its flaws. On the other hand,

you will also be able to determine when someone has a strong argument thatyou should be influenced by.

What Is Deduction?

Deduction is the process of reasoning from two general Premises or things

that are known, to a specific Conclusion. These three parts are:

A.Major premise.Minor premise.B.conclusion .

For instance, we know, A that dogs have four legs, and we know, B that

Fido is a dog. Therefore, since A and B are true, we can conclude with

certainty that, C, Fido has four legs. From this example, you may see that a

deductive

Argument is sound when the premises are true, and the conclusion logically

follows from the premises

Qualities of a Deductive Argument

It has two premises that provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion

by providing support for it that is so strong that, if the premises are true, it

would be impossible for the conclusion to be false. It is described by the terms valid and invalid; when the premises are

correct, and the conclusion that follows is correct, the argument is said

To be valid. If either or both premises are incorrect, the argument is invalid.

It is based on rules, laws, principles, or generalizations, as opposed to

inductive arguments (see Lesson 14), whose major premises are based on

observations or experiences


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Two Forms ofDeductive Argument

There are two common ways in which deductive arguments are expressed:

syllogisms and conditionals nA fact is an objective statement whose truth

can be verified. For example, Saturn is one of the nine planets in the solar

system. You can do some research to determine that Saturn is, indeed, one

of the nine planets in the solar system.

Ask yourself, is the statement always true? If the answer is yes, then it is a

fact. An opinion is a subjective statement that is based on personal beliefs.

For example, Saturn is the most beautiful planet in the solar system. We

know this is based on a personal belief because of the word beautiful,

which is a subjective and therefore open to debate. Ask yourself; is the

statement true for everyone? If the answer is no, it is an opinion.

Deductive reasoning takes two premises, which may be rules, laws,

principles, or generalizations, and forms a conclusion based upon them. In

order to be valid, a deductive argument must have premises that are true and

a conclusion that logically follows from those premises, without trying to go

beyond them. When you understand how these arguments work, you will

know how to construct your own strong arguments. You will also avoid

being influenced or persuaded by fault deductive reasoning when you

recognize it and see its flaws.

In Short,

Not all deductive reasoning is reasonable. It may be flawed factually,

meaning all or part of it is untrue. Or, it may be flawed logically, and contain

a fallacy. It is important to be able to recognize logical fallacies so they do

not persuade or mislead you. Some of the most common of these fallacies

are slippery slope, false dilemma, circular reasoning, and equivocation


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