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PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: DALGARNO, WILKINS, LEIBNIZ
The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy
VOLUME 54
Managing Editor:
SIMO KNuuTrILA, University of Helsinki
Associate Editors:
DANIEL ELLIOT GARBER, University of Chicago RICHARD SORABfl, University of London
Editorial Consultants:
JAN A. AERTSEN, Thomas-Institut, Universitiit zu Koln ROGER ARIEw, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH, University of Waterloo MICHAEL AYERS, Wadham College, Oxford
GAIL FINE, Cornell University R. J. HANKINSON, University of Texas JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University
PAUL HOFFMAN, University of California, Riverside DAVID KONSTAN, Brown University
RICHARD H. KRAUT, Northwestern University, Evanston ALAIN DE LIBERA, Universite de Geneve JOHN E. MURDOCH, Harvard University DAVID FATE NORTON, McGill University
LUCA OBERTELLO, Universita degli Studi di Genova ELEONORE STUMP, St. Louis University
ALLEN WOOD, Stanford University
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGES IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: DALGARNO, WILKINS,
LEIBNIZ
by
JAAPMAAT
University 0/ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
lt....
" Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
ISBN 978-94-010-3771-6 ISBN 978-94-007-1036-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1036-8
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2004 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 2004
No part of trus work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording
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3.342 An unseren Notationen ist zwar etwas wi llkiirlich , aber das ist nicht willkiirlich: DaB, wenn wir etwas willkiirlich bestimmt haben, dann etwas anderes der Fall sein muB. (Dies hangt von dem Wesen der Notation ab.)
3.3412 Eine besondere Bezeichnungsweise mag unwichtig sein, aber wichtig ist es immer, daB diese eine mogliche Bezeichnungsweise ist. Dnd so verbalt es sich in der Philosophie iiberhaupt: das Einzelne erweist sich immer wieder als unwichtig, aber die Moglichkeit jedes Einzelnen gibt uns einen AufschluB iiber das We sen der Welt.
-Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Abbreviations Preface
Chapter 1 Introduction
CONTENTS
xi Xlll
Chapter 2 The Background 7
2.1 Anewera 7
2.2 Aspects of the intellectual context 10
2.2.1 Attitudes towards language 10 2.2.2 The biblical tradition 12 2.2.3 Philosophical grammar 13 2.2.4 The logical tradition 14
2.3 Plans and projects: universal writing 16
2.3.1 A real character and the myth of a universal writing· 16 2.3.2 Schemes for a universal writing 23
2.4 Proposals for a philosophical language 27
Chapter 3 Dalgarno: the Art of Signs 31
3.1 Introduction 31
3.2 A universal character and a philosophical language 38
3.2.1 The problem posed by the subtitle 38 3.2.2 From shorthand to universal writing 39 3.2.3 From writing to language 42 3.2.4 The character and the language of Ars Signorum 44
3.3 The emergence of the philosophical language 47
3.3.1 The early scheme versus Ars Signorum 47 3.3.2 From mnemonics to predicaments 48 3.3.3 The debate concerning the radicals 54 3.3.4 The particles and the 'great change' 59
Vll
V111
3.4 The lexicon of the philosophical language 62
3.4.1 Introduction 62 3.4.2 The first elements of signs 62 3.4.3 The predicamental series 65 3.4.4 The classificatory scheme 70 3.4.5 The lexicon of radical words 76 3.4.6 An analogical conformity between thing and sign 83 3.4.7 The largest part of the lexicon 91
3.5 The grammar of the philosophical language 101
3.5.1 Logical form as a basis for the grammar 101 3.5.2 The part of speech 103 3.5.3 The compromise between logical form and
inflectional system 110 3.5.4 Syntax 117 3.5.5 The particles 119 3.5.6 The philosophical language in practice 125
3.6 Concluding remarks 129
4. Wilkins: the Art of Things l35
4.1 Introduction l35
4.2 Aims and Principles 145
4.2.1 A useful invention 145 4.2.2 The defects of existing languages 149 4.2.3 Principles 154 4.2.4 A character and a language 158
4.3 The tables 163
4.3.1 The predicamental method 163 4.3.2 Genus, difference, species and
the numerical arrangement 165 4.3.3 The number of categories and the
convenience of the institution 172 4.3.4 Opposition and affinity 174 4.3.5 An encyclopedic lexicon 177 4.3.6 Taxonomy 181 4.3.7 Scope of the tables 182 4.3.8 The overall scheme 186 4.3.9 The tables of transcend enta Is 193
IX
4.3.10 The tables of substance 202 4.3.11 The tables of accident 212
4.4 The lexicon 217
4.4.1 Radical words 217 4.4.2 Signa ad placitum 223 4.4.3 Compound words 225
4.5 Natural grammar 230
4.5.1 Aims 230 4.5.2 The parts of speech 231 4.5.3 Integrals and their derivations 233 4.5.4 Grammatical particles 244 4.5.5 Syntax 248 4.5.6 Orthography and orthoepy 249 4.5.7 Practice 251
4.6 Concluding remarks 255
5. Leibniz: the Art of Thinking 267
5.1 Introduction 267
5.2 The art of combinations 271
5.2.1 Combinatorics and its applications 272 5.2.3 Combinatorics vs. division: 'use IX' 275 5.2.4 Combinatorics vs. division: 'use X' 278 5.2.5 The extemporary essay 284 5.2.6 Use XI: a universal writing 289 5.2.7 The alphabet of human thoughts 293
5.3 Plan and purpose of the philosophical language 297
5.3.1 The English connection 297 5.3.2 An amazing invention 300 5.3.3 The calculus and the primitives 308 5.3.4 The elusive nature of the primitives 313 5.3.5 The analytical theory of truth 319 5.3.6 Method 323 5.3.7 A note on terminology 329 5.3.8 A language and a writing system 330
x
5.4 Words, ideas, things
5.4.1 The difficulty posed by Hobbes 5.4.2 Leibniz's solution in the Dialogue 5.4.3 Leibniz and Locke 5.4.4 Language and thought 5.4.5 Language and things
5.5 Preliminary studies
5.5.1 A method for coining words 5.5.2 Definitions 5.5.3 Rational grammar
5.6 Leibniz, Wilkins, Dalgamo
5.6.1 Wilkins 5.6.2 Dalgamo
6 Concluding remarks
References
Index
331
332 335 340 346 356
364
365 370 378
382
382 387
391
395
407
ABBREVIATIONS
AS Ars Signorum (Dalgarno 1661)
CM Cram & Maat 200 I
DA C Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria (Leibniz 1666)
Essay Chapter 4: An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (Wilkins 1668)
Essay Chapter 5 (unless otherwise stated): An Essay concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1689)
NE Nouveaux essais sur I' entendement humain (Leibniz 1765 [1703-1704])
MCV! Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis (Leibniz 1684)
References to Wilkins's radical words in chapter 4 are according to the following pattern: 'rad. 29.6.7' refers to the radical word listed in Wilkins's tables under the 29th genus, 6th difference, 7th species.
For abbreviations in references see the reference section, page 395f.
Xl
PREFACE
This book discusses three linguistic projects carried out in the seventeenth century: the artificial languages created by Dalgamo and Wilkins, and Leibniz's uncompleted scheme. It treats each of the projects as selfcontained undertakings, which deserve to be studied and judged in their own right. For this reason, the two artificial languages, as well as Leibniz's work in this area, are described in considerable detail. At the same time, the characteristics of these schemes are linked with their intellectual context, and their multiple interrelations are examined at some length. In this way, the book seeks to combine a systematical with a historical approach to the subject, in the hope that both approaches profit from the combination.
When I first started the research on which this book is based, I intended to look only briefly into the seventeenth-century schemes, which I assumed represented a typical universalist approach to the study of language, as opposed to a relativistic one. The authors of these schemes thought, or so the assumption was, that almost the only thing required for a truly universal language was the systematic labelling of the items of an apparently readily available, universal catalogue of everything that exists. How amusingly naive these writers were. And Leibniz, although physically present in the seventeenth century, belonged to a different intellectual realm, alongside men like Boole, Frege and von Neumann, and hence could be largely left out of the picture. Of course, I cannot blame anybody but myself for these assumptions, but it is also true that I did not invent them myself.
As soon as I had so much as opened the first book on the subject by a seventeenth-century author, I found that I had been the one who was being naive. This author argued at length against the possibility of representing knowledge in a unified way, pointing at the multiplicity of perspectives from which any single thing may be viewed, and appear differently. And ultimately, this author added, even if such a representation were possible, it would still be incompatible with the principles on which a rational language was to be built. This author, I wish I could say it is needless to say, was George Dalgamo, the first person in the seventeenth century to produce a complete artificial language. It became clear to me that his writings were full of remarkable insights and that there were ob-
Xlll
XIV
vious similarities with the supposedly distinct sphere in which Leibniz's ideas were to be found. It also became apparent that Dalgarno's project differed in many respects from that of Wilkins, although modem commentators usually treated Dalgarno's scheme as a modest precursor of Wilkins's grand language.
As my fascination with the diversity and sophistication of seventeenth-century linguistic ideas grew, I gladly gave up the original line of investigation. I now felt that the various linguistic schemes, and the theorizing underpinning them, were well worth a separate study. The authors of these schemes addressed a number of issues concerning the nature of language and notation, the representation of knowledge, the make-up of our cognitive faculties, the conditions of successful communication, which are as relevant today as they were then. I believed, and still do, that their specific solutions, although perhaps full of apparent weaknesses, may serve to reveal something about these issues. It also seemed obvious that no such study could afford to omit Leibniz's work. For it had become clear that his programme, and therewith the intellectual sphere in which he has long been recognized as a pioneer, was firmly rooted in the seventeenth century. While carrying out my new plan, I got convinced that scrutinizing the details of the various linguistic schemes was a prerequisite for any account capable of doing justice to the richness and relevance, as well as to the specific characteristics of the seventeenth-century agenda. This book results from this conviction.
An earlier version of this book was completed several years ago. It was originally written as a PhD-thesis, and printed in the ILLCdissertation series. In preparing it afresh for publication, I did not make substantial changes to the contents, with the exception of a slight expansion of the introduction. I did insert a few remarks which I hope may elucidate the argument and deleted some others which no longer seemed appropriate. For the rest, I corrected mistakes wherever I could and made a number of stylistic revisions aimed at enhancing clarity. And I added this preface.
Updating the references was more laborious than usual because of two major publishing events in the field partly covered by this book. First, the fourth volume of the sixth series of the Academy edition of Leibniz's work appeared at the same time that the original version of this book was completed. Secondly, Dalgarno's unpublished manuscripts, frequently referred to in chapter 3, have in the mean time been published in Cram & Maat 2001. Chapter 3 of the present book covers much the same ground as the introduction in Cram & Maat 200 I, but differs in containing more analysis and argument, as well as more discussion of secondary literature.
xv
Not long after I decided to change my plan, I had the good fortune to meet David Cram, who had been arguing for the difference between Dalgamo's and Wilkins's schemes years before I had even heard of them. I am very grateful to David for his help and encouragement, and for sharing his vast knowledge of both the seventeenth century and general linguistics. I also owe thanks to a number of people who have in one way or another helped me start, finish or improve this work, including Renate Bartsch, Els Elffers, Arnold van der Goot, Karel van der Leeuw, Michiel Leezenberg, Jan Noordegraaf, Robert van Rooy, Heinrich Schepers, Martin Stokhof, Pierre Swiggers, Allard Tamminga, Frank Veltman, Gerard de Vries.
And I thank RHltta, Thijs, Sjoerd, for everything.
