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HUMAN ARCHITECTURE

Journal of the Sociology of Self-

A Publication of OKCIR: The Omar Khayyam Center for Integrative Research in Utopia, Mysticism, and Science (Utopystics)

I

NTRODUCTION

In “

Le Nègre et Hegel

,”

1

Franz Fanon fa-mously argues that the Hegelian dialecticsof recognition between master [

Herr

] andslave [

Knecht

]

2

does not fully apply to therelation between white, colonial Master

and black, colonized Slave. A central reasonfor the divergence, according to Fanon, isthe way in which racism functions, withinthe colonial context, to prevent the possibil-ity of fully reciprocal recognition. Evaluat-ing the significance of Fanon’s engagementwith Hegel, Fanon scholar Nigel Gibsonwrites that “Fanon’s introduction of raceinto the master/slave dialectic is a pro-found though largely overlooked originalcontribution developed in the context of

1

This text is a section of the penultimatechapter of Franz Fanon,

Peau noire, masques blanc

(Editions de Seuil: Paris, 1952), 195-200. [Fanon,

Black Skin, White Masks

, trans. Charles LamMarkmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 216-222.] These will hereafter be cited as “Pn” and“BS.” The translation given here is often myown. I have tried to consistently translateFanon’s “

le nègre

” as “the negro,” and his “

leNoir

” as “the black.”

Phillip Honenberger is a Ph.D. student in Philosophy at Temple University. His current research focuses onthe inter-continental history of philosophy in the modern period, including German, French, British, Amer-ican, African and Caribbean sources. From the author: Sincere thanks are due to Lewis Gordon, withoutwhom I could never have learned enough about Franz Fanon (and how to most productively read FranzFanon) to write this paper, and Vincent Beaver, without whom I’d not have stumbled upon the article byEthan Kleinberg.

“Le Nègre et Hegel”Fanon on Hegel, Colonialism, and the

Dialectics of Recognition

Phillip Honenberger

Temple University––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

[email protected]

Abstract: In a well-known chapter of Peau noire, masques blanc [1952], Franz Fanon argues thatthe Hegelian master-slave dialectics does not apply to the relation between white, colonial mas-ter and black, colonized slave. Some scholars have suggested that Fanon misreads Hegel andthus fails to distinguish the colonial dialectics from the Hegelian. In this article I argue thatFanon’s reading of Hegel is accurate and insightful, and that Fanon effectively articulates thecolonial situation as one in which, because of racism and the suspension of armed struggle, thevery initiation of the dialectics of recognition has been elided.

2

G. W. F. Hegel,

Phänomenologie des Geistes

(Hamburg: Verlag Von Felix Meiner, 1952), 143[Hegel,

Phenomenology of Spirit

, trans. by A. V.Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),113.] Hereafter cited as PhG and PhS, respective-ly.

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the postwar “Hegel” renaissance inFrance.”

3

Historian of French philosophyEthan Kleinberg, however, is less sanguineabout the originality and success of Fanon’sreading of Hegel, and charges that “in hisattempt to distance the colonial slave fromthe Hegelian Slave, Fanon actually paral-lels Hegel’s movements.”

4

If Kleinberg iscorrect, then Fanon’s colonial dialectics re-iterates aspects of the Hegelian dialectics,mistakenly supposing that they are not in-cluded within Hegel’s theory.

5

Thus,Fanon’s “attempt to distance himself fromHegel” in “

Le Nègre et Hegel

” would actu-ally result in his analysis’s “subsequentsubsumption into the dialectic.”

6

But, as Iwill argue, such a reading underestimatesthe depth of Fanon’s interpretation of He-gel, as well as the subtlety of Fanon’s ac-count of the very different colonialdialectics.

F

ANON

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In the

Herrschaft und Knechtschaft

sec-tion of the

Phänomenologie des Geistes

, Hegelexamines three possibilities of relation be-tween two consciousnesses. As is charac-teristic of Hegel’s dialectical method, thesethree possibilities are presented as a pro-gressive sequence. They include: (1) non-recognition, where each consciousnesstreats the other as a mere thing; (2) a fight tothe death, where each consciousness recog-nizes the other as an absolute threat to itsown autonomy; and (3) submission of oneconsciousness to the other, which leads tomaster-slave relations. This last stage in-cludes the following sub-stages: (a) the ap-pearance that the slave’s recognition of themaster will secure the master’s certainty ofhis own autonomy, (b) the realization thatsuch certainty cannot be gained from theslave’s recognition, and (c) the slave’s pro-gressive realization of freedom both as anindividual consciousness and in relation tothe natural world.

Fanon’s text presents three ways inwhich the colonial dialectics and the Hege-lian dialectics diverge. First: According toFanon, there has never been a true strugglebetween colonial master and slave.

7

ThusFanon writes that “One day the white mas-ter recognized,

without conflict

, the blackslave” (Pn 196/ BS 217). This means thatthe Hegelian dialectics of recognition havenever really been set in motion in the colo-nial context. Second, the colonial masterdoes not want recognition from the slave,but rather work (Pn 199/ BS 220). Becausethe black slave is, according to the colonialmaster’s racism, not even fully human, itwould be absurd for him to seek recogni-tion from the slave. Thirdly, in the colonial

3

Nigel C. Gibson,

Fanon: The PostcolonialImagination

(Oxford/ Cambridge: Polity Press,2003), 30. Cited as “Gibson 2003” hereafter. Gib-son also notes that “[w]hile Alexandre Kojeve’sinfluential reading of Hegel is part of the con-text, Fanon’s critique of Hegel is original,” andthat “[r]ather than simply dismissing Hegel as aphilosopher of imperialism, [Fanon] engagesthe methodological core of this key thinker ofEuropean modernity—the dialectic.” (Gibson2003: 30).

4

Ethan Kleinberg, “Kojève and Fanon: TheDesire for Recognition and the Fact of Black-ness” in Tyler Stovall and Georges Van Den Ab-beele, eds.,

French Civilization and Its Discontents:Nationalism, Colonialism, Race

(Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2003), 115-128, p. 116. Cited as“Kleinberg 2003” hereafter. Though Kleinbergclaims to be comparing Kojève’s Hegel withFanon’s Hegel, there are few differences be-tween Kojève’s Hegel and Hegel himself that aresignificant for our analysis here.

5

Though Kleinberg admits that “Fanon iscorrect in his diagnosis of an incompatibility be-tween the Hegelian system and the colonial sys-tem,” he argues that “this becomes explicit not inhis critique of the dialectic, but in his phenomeno-logical investigation into ‘the Fact of Blackness’.”(Kleinberg 2003: 116). Thus, on Kleinberg’s read-ing, the interpretation of Hegel presented in “

LeNègre et Hegel

” alone is still suspect.

6

Kleinberg 2003: 116.

7

Again, this claim must be read in historicalcontext. It may be that a true struggle

did

occursubsequent to that time (say, in the Algerian rev-olution), a point which would not threaten thelegitimacy of Fanon’s analysis.

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dialectics, the slave cannot achieve his free-dom through labor upon the object. Rather,he focuses his attention on the (impossible)project of becoming like the Master—thatis, becoming white.

8

Fanon’s “

Le Nègre et Hegel

” focuses onthe first of these three divergences—thelack of mutual recognition at the outset ofthe colonial dialectics. The text begins:

Man is human only to the extent towhich he tries to impose his exist-ence on another man in order to berecognized by him. As long as hehas not been effectively recognizedby the other, it is this other that willremain the theme of his action. It ison this other, it is on the recognitionof this other, that his human valueand reality depend. It is this otherin which the meaning of his life [

lesens de sa vie

] is condensed. (Pn 195-6/ BS 216)

Though the expression is somewhatmore voluntaristic than Hegel’s, this pas-sage is likely an interpretation of the secondstage of Hegel’s dialectics of recognition,where the two consciousnesses recognizeeach other as potential rivals for the statusof absoluteness, and thus each seeks to im-pose itself on the other. Fanon seems to bebringing in resources from elsewhere inHegel when he implies that (a) this momentis a pre-requisite of one’s humanity andthat (b) the achievement of this humanityrequires mediation through the conscious-ness of the other.

9

In any case, Fanon claimsthat reciprocal recognition has not occurredbetween white and black:

There is not an open conflict between

white and black. One day the White Master,

without con-flict

, recognized the Negro slave.But the former slave wants to

make him-self recognized

(Pn 196/ BS 217).Thus, the lack of conflict at the basis of

the dialectics between black and whitemeans that the former slave (the black) hasnot had a chance to prove his or her human-ity. Having presented his main thesis,Fanon proceeds to the first step of his argu-ment, a sketch of the reciprocity that lies atthe foundation of the Hegelian dialectics.

Fanon highlights the lack of such reci-procity as a defining feature of the colonialdialectics. Fanon’s interpretation, however,relies on Hegel’s account of the transitionfrom simple consciousness to self-con-sciousness, a development marked in He-gel’s text by the transformation of Life[

Leben

] into Self-consciousness [

Selbstbe-wusstsein

] in the immediately precedingsection of the

Phänomenologie

(entitled “TheTruth of Self-Certainty” [“

Die Wahrheit derGewißheit seiner selbst

”]). There Hegel artic-ulates the difference between merely natu-ral

life

and specifically human

self-consciousness

in terms similar to Fanon’s:“Self-consciousness achieves its satisfac-tion only in another self-consciousness.”

10

For Hegel as for Fanon, the distinction be-tween “merely living” [

nur lebendige

]

con-sciousness and a living

self

-consciousness[

lebendiges Selbstbewußtsein

] is to be foundin the fact that a “self-consciousness existsfor a self-consciousness.”

11

In other words,as Fanon puts it, “[i]t is in the degree towhich I go beyond my own immediate be-ing [

mon être-là immédiat

] that I apprehendthe existence of the other [

l’ètre de l’autre

] as

8

As Fanon puts it, “In Hegel, the slaveturns away from the master and turns towardthe object. Here the slave turns toward the mas-ter and abandons the object” [“

Chez Hegel, l’es-clave se détourne du maître et se tourne vers l’objet.Ici, l’esclave se tourne vers le maître et abandonnel’objet

.”] (Pn 199/ BS 221).

9

Especially Hegel’s summary of the transi-tion from “consciousness” to “self-conscious-ness,” in the immediately preceding section ofthe

Phänomenologie

, “

Die Wahrheit der Gewißheitseiner selbst

.” See the analysis of the followingfew paragraphs of this paper.

10

“

Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Be-friedigung nur in einem andern Selbstbewußtsein

.”(PhG 139/ PhS 110)

156 PHILLIP HONENBERGER

HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, V, SPECIAL DOUBLE-ISSUE, SUMMER 2007

a natural and more than natural reality.”12

Fanon then raises the possibility that“[t]he other… can recognize me withoutstruggle” (BS 219), and he cites Hegel in de-fense: “The individual who has not stakedhis life, may, no doubt, be recognized as aperson, but he has not attained the truth ofthis recognition as an independent self-con-sciousness.”13 Because Fanon follows thispassage with the claim that “historically,the Negro steeped in the inessentiality ofservitude was set free by his master,” itseems that Fanon is here concerned to lo-cate the colonial dialectics at the precisepoint where, in the Hegelian dialectics, anindividual [Individuum] has been recog-nized as a person [Person] without beingrecognized as an independent self-conscious-ness [selbständigen Selbstbewußtseins]. If so,Fanon would be highlighting a possibility

that Hegel himself did not further explore.This kind of recognition would seem to pre-vent the progress of the dialectic, andwould represent a falling-back upon theterms of a relation between conscious-nesses where one does not recognize theother as an independent self-conscious-nesses. It is precisely this possibility thatFanon associates with the colonial dialec-tics.

THE COLONIAL DIALECTICS

In the second half of “Le Nègre et Hegel,”Fanon shifts from a close-reading of He-gel’s text to an elucidation of the thesis thatthere is a lack of reciprocal recognition inthe colonial context. This is Fanon’s exposi-tion of the alternate dialectics of colonialmaster and slave. Here three forces havecombined to prevent the Hegelian dialec-tics from being set in motion.

First, the black slave has neglected tofight for his independence. Thus, Fanonwrites that “[h]istorically, the black,plunged in the inessentiality of his servi-tude, was freed by the master. He did notfight for freedom” (Pn 198/ BS 219). Sec-ondly, the white master grants the blackslave his political freedom out of generosityrather than political necessity. Fanonwrites: “One day a good white master whohad influence said to his friends, ‘Let’s benice to the negroes…’” (Pn 198/ BS 220).Third, at the foundation of both of thesemoments is a paternalistic racism that inprinciple cannot be eliminated through thenew political freedom of the slave. This rac-ism is present even behind the apparentlygenerous “gift” of freedom to the formerblack slaves. This is the meaning of the ap-parently paradoxical claims that (1) “[t]henegro is a slave who has been permitted toadopt the attitude of master” and (2) “[t]heWhite is a master who has permitted hisslaves to eat at his table” (Pn 198/ BS 220).

Because of racism, the true relation be-

11 Describing the transition from a con-sciousness of life to a consciousness of conscious-ness, Hegel writes: “Life [Leben] points tosomething other than itself, viz. to conscious-ness [Bewu‚tsein], for which Life exists as thisunity, or as genus” (PhG 138/ PhS 109). And:“The differentiated, merely living, shape [nurlebendige Gestalt] does indeed… supercede its in-dependence in the process of Life [Prozesse desLebens], but it ceases with its distinctive differ-ence to be what it is. The object of self-conscious-ness [der Gegenstand des Selbstbewußtsein],however, is equally independent in this negativ-ity of itself; and thus it is for itself a genus, a uni-versal fluid element in the peculiarity of its ownseparate being; it is a living self-consciousness[er ist ein lebendiges Selbstbewußtsein]” (PhG 140/PhS 110). And finally: “A self-consciousness ex-ists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in factself-consciousness; for only in this way does theunity of itself in its otherness become explicit forit (PhG 140/ PhS 110).

12 “C’est en tant que je dépasse mon être-là im-médiat que je réalise l’être de l’autre comme réaliténaturelle et plus que naturelle” (Pn 196/ BS 217).

13 Cited in BS 219. Hegel’s original Germanreads: “Das Individuum, welches das Leben nichtgewagt hat, kann wohl als Person anerkannt wer-den; aber es hat die Wahrheit dieses Anerkanntseinsals eines selbständigen Selbstbewußteins nicht erre-icht.” (PhG 144/ PhS 114). And Jean Hyppolite’sFrench translation, from which Fanon quotes,reads: “L’individu qui n’a pas mis sa vie en jeu peutbien être reconnu comme personne, mais il n’a pasatteint la vérité de cette reconnaissance d’une con-science de soi indépendante.” (Pn 197-8)

“LE NÈGRE ET HEGEL” 157


tween white and black can remain that ofmaster and slave, respectively, regardlessof their apparent equality at the legal, polit-ical and even economic level. Fanon’s colo-nial dialectics is thus understandable as adescription of the stunted possibilities ofaction from a former slave who finds him-self in a situation constituted by these threeforces: namely, (1) has been set free, (2) with-out a struggle, (3) into a racist social world.

After having been set free, for the mostpart “the Black contented himself withthanking the White, and the most brutalproof of this fact is the impressive numberof statues erected all over France and thecolonies, showing white France strokingthe kinky hair of this brave negro whosechains had just been broken” (Pn 198/ BS220). On the other hand, it is sometimes thecase that the recently freed slave seeks astruggle. Such occasions, however, arequickly dissolved:

When it does happen that the negrolooks fiercely at the White, theWhite tells him: “Brother, there isno difference between us.” And yetthe negro knows that there is a dif-ference. He wants it. He wants thewhite man to turn on him andshout: “Damn nigger” [<<Salenègre>>]. Then he would have thatunique chance—to “show them…”

But most often there is noth-ing—nothing but indifference, or apaternalistic curiosity. (Pn 199/ BS221)

Thus, the possibility of initiating any-thing like the Hegelian dialectics of recog-nition within the situation constituted bythese three anti-dialectical forces is stillnull. The former slave may yearn to “makehimself recognized,” but such yearning isnecessarily in vain.14

Fanon further notes the way in which,in their sudden introduction to a world

constituted by this newly dictated “free-dom,” the former slaves remain merely“acted upon” in a different way: “The up-heaval reached the Black from without. TheBlack was acted upon. Values [valeurs] thathad not been created by his actions, valuesthat had not resulted from the systolic tideof his blood, danced in a colored whirlaround him” (Pn 198/ PS 220). The “val-ues” [valeurs] of which Fanon speaks in thepassage are undoubtedly the classicalFrench ones, such as “freedom” and“equality.” Fanon’s point here is subtle: No-tions such as that of democratic politicalfreedom, which arose in a European con-text, are systematically related to other Eu-ropean notions which, considered as awhole, are different from the defining con-cepts of traditional, pre-colonial African so-cieties. This is not to say that Europeanvalues are incompatible with the traditionalones; rather, they are completely foreign. Inthe wake of colonialism, however, the tra-ditional values have been all but destroyed,both physically and symbolically. What re-mains is a system of valuation (the Euro-pean system) foreign to the traditionalsocieties, which nonetheless asserts itself asuniversal.15 Thus, a bit further in this sec-

14 Fanon’s diagnosis should not be identi-fied with an outright fatalism. There are truepossibilities for liberation, according to Fanon,but they require a deeper break with the termsof the post-colonial situation than is allowablewithin a simple search for recognition. Oftenenough, it requires violence. See “ConcerningViolence,” in Franz Fanon, The Wretched of theEarth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York:Grove Press, 1969), 35-106.

15 In another article, Fanon provides a sug-gestion about how this problem must ultimatelybe resolved. See his essay “Racism and Culture,”in Franz Fanon, Towards the African Revolution(New York: Grove Press, 1969), 31-44, esp. 44:“The end of race prejudice begins with a suddenincomprehension. The occupant’s spasmed andrigid culture, now liberated, opens at last to theculture of people who have really become broth-ers. The two cultures can affront each other, en-rich each other. … [U]niversality resides in thisdecision to recognize and accept the reciprocalrelativism of different cultures, once the colonialstatus is irreversibly excluded.”



tion Fanon writes that “the negro knowsnothing of the cost of freedom, for he hasnot fought for it. Occasionally he hasfought for Liberty and Justice, but alwayswhite liberty and white justice, that is tosay, the values [valeurs] secreted by themasters” (Pn 199/ PS 220-1). Thus, insofaras the black slave is free, he is free merely atthe level of his white mask. He is a beingthat is apparently free but really still subser-vient. Fanon goes on to highlight the trag-edy of this situation when he compares thefreedom of the former slave with the free-dom of a white youth:

The former slave, who can retrievein his memory neither the strugglefor liberty nor the anxiety for liber-ty of which Kierkegaard speaks,sits unmoved in the face of theyoung White who plays and chantson the tightrope of existence. (Pn199/ PS 221)

The cause of this lack of freedom in theformer slave is twofold. On the one hand,there is no memory of struggle in theformer slave’s consciousness. Thus, theslave himself cannot be certain of his ownabsolute value. On the other hand, the rac-ism inherent in the colonial and “post”-co-lonial world prohibits the simple inclusionof blacks’ Liberty into Liberty full-stop.

It is the confluence of these three mo-ments within the situation in the FrenchAntilles—namely, (1) lack of struggle onthe part of the slaves, (2) a gift of “freedom”from the side of the masters, and (3) a rac-ism which permeates relations betweenformer masters and slaves—that explainswhy the Hegelian dialectics have here beenpre-verted into a colonial “anti”-dialec-tics.16

DOES FANON MISREAD HEGEL?

Kleinberg criticizes Fanon’s reading ofHegel on three points: (1) Fanon’s claimthat in the colonial situation, but not for He-gel, there has not been reciprocal recogni-tion at the outset of the struggle, (2) Fanon’sclaim that whereas Hegel’s master wantsrecognition, the colonial master merelywants work, and (3) Fanon’s claim that thecolonial slave cannot, like Hegel’s slave,achieve his eventual independencethrough labor. On all three counts, how-ever, Kleinberg underestimates the depthof Fanon’s understanding of Hegel, as wellas the subtlety of Fanon’s account of the co-lonial dialectics.

Kleinberg claims it is a mistake when“Fanon assumes that there is a reciprocalrelationship of recognition in Hegel, whichis not present in the colonial relationshipbetween the white master and the blackslave,” since even on Hegel’s account recip-rocal recognition is impossible (Kleinberg2003: 118). In doing so, however, Kleinbergoverlooks the fact that, at the outset of theHegelian dialectic, the equality of the twoconsciousnesses as consciousnesses is as-sumed. Hence, while this initial reciprocityis unstable and will lead the dialectic on-wards to further stages, it is nonethelesstrue that the Fanonian “assumption” of areciprocal relationship at the outset of theHegelian dialectic is not unjustified. Fanoncould hardly have made himself clearer onthis point than when he writes that “[i]l y a,à la base de la dialectique hégélienne, une réci-procité absolue qu’il faut mettre en évidence”[“There is, at the base of the Hegelian dia-lectic, an absolute reciprocity that must beemphasized”] (Pn 196/ BS 217).

In other words: By jumping from thebeginnings of the Hegelian dialectic (whichserve as the focus of Fanon’s analysis) to itsfurther developments in his attempt to ana-lyze the adequacy of Fanon’s reading,Kleinberg’s criticism refers to movements

16 The term and concept of “anti-dialectics”is borrowed from Sekyi-Otu. See Ato Sekyi-Otu,Fanon’s Dialectics of Experience (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 47-55.



within the dialectic that, if Fanon is right,have not yet come to pass within the colo-nial context. Furthermore, even if there is anapparent parallel between the two cases—apossibility whose significance is negatedonce the dehumanizing role of racismwithin the colonial dialectics is under-stood—this parallel cannot be the result ofthe same dialectical process since, as Fanonnotes, the initial conditions of the colonialsituation and the Hegelian situation do notcorrespond.

Fanon’s reading implies that, in He-gel’s account, unlike in the colonial situa-tion, the master expects recognition fromthe slave, whereas in the colonial situationsuch recognition (given by the slave to themaster) is not even desired. But Kleinbergwrites that

the [Hegelian] Master is not satis-fied with the recognition of a Slavewho has not proven to be fully hu-man and thus [the Hegelian Mas-ter] continues in search ofvalidation. Thus, contrary toFanon’s assertion, there is no recog-nition [between Hegelian masterand slave] possible with or withoutstruggle. At this stage of the dialec-tic, for Hegel, like for Fanon, thereis no reciprocity or recognition.(Kleinberg 2003: 119)

According to Kleinberg, for both Hegeland Fanon “the relationship of the Master tothe Slave is the same: ‘What he wants fromthe slave is not recognition but work’”(Kleinberg 2003: 119). But Fanon ratherthan Kleinberg has the correct reading ofHegel here. Describing the master’s rela-tionship to the slave, Hegel writes that

The lord is consciousness that ex-ists for itself… [I]t is a conscious-ness existing for itself which ismediated with itself through an-other consciousness, i.e. through a

consciousness [that is, the slave’s]whose nature it is to be bound upwith an existence that is indepen-dent, or thinghood in general. Thelord puts himself into relation withboth of these moments, to a thing assuch, the object of desire, and to theconsciousness for which thinghoodis the essential characteristic [i.e.,the slave’s consciousness]… Here,therefore, is present this moment ofrecognition, viz. that the other con-sciousness sets aside its own being-for-self, and in so doing itself doeswhat the first does to it. (PhG 146/PhS 115-116)

Of course, this relation between thetwo does not ultimately allow for true rec-ognition, as a further turn in the dialecticreveals: “But for recognition proper the mo-ment is lacking… The outcome is a recogni-tion that is one-sided and unequal.”17

Nonetheless, the Hegelian master does ini-tially expect recognition from the slave, justas Fanon’s reading suggests.18 Otherwise,how could one make sense of Hegel’s sub-sequent claim that “this object [that is, theslave] does not correspond to its Notion,”

17 Hegel continues: “In this recognition theunessential consciousness [i.e., the slave con-sciousness] is for the lord the object [Gegen-stand], which constitutes the truth of hiscertainty of himself. But it is clear that this objectdoes not correspond to its Notion, but ratherthat the object in which the lord has achieved hislordship has in reality turned out to be some-thing quite different from an independent con-sciousness. What now really confronts him isnot an independent consciousness, but a depen-dent one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary,his truth is in reality the unessential conscious-ness [that is, the slave consciousness] and its un-essential action” (PhG 147/ PhS 116-117).

18 More precisely we should say that “it isexpected” that the master will achieve recogni-tion in this way, since, while this section of thePhänomenologie discusses transitions out of ap-pearances and into realities, it does not alwaysdo so in terms of the appearances to the con-sciousnesses involved. But this point is a rathertechnical one.



and that it “in reality turn[s] out to be some-thing quite different from an independentconsciousness” (PhG 147/ PhS 116-7)? Suchformulations indicate that, from the van-tage point of a prior expectation, this slavishconsciousness appeared to be able to pro-vide a basis for the master’s own sense ofabsolute worth. According to Fanon, how-ever, it is precisely this expectation thatcould not arise within the colonial dialec-tics. This is what Fanon means when hewrites that “[f]or Hegel there is [an origi-nal] reciprocity; here [i.e., in the colonial sit-uation] the master laughs at theconsciousness of the slave.”19 The fact thatthe Hegelian master’s attempt at achievingrecognition from the slave also fails, accord-ing to a further stage of the Hegelian dialec-tics, has no bearing on the adequacy ofFanon’s own account, which emphasizesthe differences in initial conditions betweenthe Hegelian and the colonial situation.

What is at the root of the error in thesetwo mistaken criticisms of Fanon? As iswell-known, dialectical arguments involveopposite and even contradictory stages. AsKleinberg himself writes, the Hegelian“battle for recognition is a paradox.”20 Anysuccessful study of the dialectics thereforerequires careful attention to the precisestage at which the analysis in question isbeing carried out. In other words: if thecontext of analysis is the Hegelian dialec-tics as a whole, then it is just as true to saythat each of the two consciousnesses mustacknowledge the potential absoluteness ofthe other—as claims Fanon—as it is to saythat one (the Master) cannot acknowledgethe potential absoluteness of the other (theSlave)—as Kleinberg seeks to counselFanon—since Hegel himself says both atdifferent stages of the dialectics. Alterna-tively, if the context of analysis is one or an-

other specific stage of the dialectics, then itis unfair to bring in the results of laterstages as counter-arguments to claimsmade about the stage under direct consid-eration.

Finally, Fanon claims that the colonialslave, unlike the Hegelian slave, does notachieve his liberation through work butrather focuses on the desire of becominglike the master. Kleinberg writes that

[w]hen Fanon claims in his foot-note that ‘the [colonial] slave here isin no way compatible with the [He-gelian] slave who loses himself inthe object and finds in his work thesource of his liberation,’ one mustask ‘Why?’

When Fanon continues that‘the Negro wants to be like theMaster,’ we can respond that forKojève, too, the slave wants to belike the Master in overcoming hisfear of death and moving towardSelf-Consciousness. (Kleinberg2003: 120)

19 “[L]e maître ici diffère essentiellement de ce-lui décrit par Hegel. Chez Hegel il y a réciprocité, icile maître se moque de la conscience de l’esclave. Il neréclame pas la reconnaissance de ce dernier, mais sontravail” (Pn 199/ BS 220).

20 This point is echoed by Fanon scholar Ni-gel Gibson and by Hegel himself. Gibson writes,“The process appears contradictory because themaster/slave dialectic starts with the idea ofgenuine reciprocity, though it does not come tofruition there but only begins its journey. It is thefailure to attain reciprocity that drives the dia-lectic on” (Gibson 2003: 33). And Hegel opensthe section on Herrschaft und Knechschaft withthe following (the first line of which Fanon him-self uses as the opening of “Le Nègre et Hegel”):“Self-consciousness [Selbstbewußtsein] exists inand for itself when, and by the fact that, it so ex-ists for another [für ein anderes]; that is, it existsonly in being acknowledged [Anerkanntes]. TheNotion of this its unity [Einheit] in its duplica-tion [Verdopplung] embraces many and variedmeanings [vielseitige und vieldeutige Ver-schränkung]. Its moments, then, must on the onehand be held strictly apart, and on the otherhand must in this differentiation [Untersc-heidung] at the same time also be taken andknown as not distinct [nicht unterschieden], or intheir opposite significance [oder immer in ihrerentgegengesetzten Bedeutung]” (PhG 141/ PhS111).



Nigel Gibson, however, anticipatesKleinberg’s criticism and responds to itwhen he writes that

One could argue that Hegel’s slavealso wants to emulate the master.However, for the Black slave to belike the master means somethingquite different, namely, looking likethe master—in other words, be-coming White. This internalizationof the desirability of being White,Fanon notes, is “a form of recogni-tion that Hegel had not envisaged.”[BS 63] (Gibson 2003: 37)

Thus, it is the existence of racismwithin the colonial dialectics which prohib-its the productive development of the He-gelian dialectics in this direction. Anotherway to put this point is that no matter howeffective or creative the black slave may be-come in his or her labor upon the object,21

he or she will—so long as the existing racistsocial structure remains in place—still beblack, and hence be (according to the logicof the racist colonial social structure) noth-ing more than a “machine-animal-human,”rather than simply a human.22

CONCLUSION

It is wrong to suppose that Fanon seri-ously misreads Hegel in “Le Nègre et Hegel.”Rather, Fanon effectively juxtaposes the pe-culiar features of the colonial master-slaverelation to the outlines of Hegel’s classicalmodel. He does this by pointing to a basiclack of recognition between blacks and

whites, itself predicated on three factors: alack of armed struggle by blacks, a “gift” offreedom given to blacks by whites, and anentrenched anti-black racist ideology. 23

On the one hand, the issue of the con-nection between Fanon and Hegel mayseem an obscure and merely scholastic one,especially in comparison with the largerproblems of domination, freedom and

21 One may take this excellence to any ab-surd degree one wishes—superpowers, etc.—and it is clear that racism can still function as atrump card, introducing radical doubt into therecognition of humanity of even the most pro-ductive and creative of former slaves. Let any-one who attempts to establish the inferiority of arace on the basis of “empirical inquiry” considerthis thought-experiment before beginning their“research.”

22 Incidentally, one could argue that, perFanon’s analysis, it is the humanity of racist Eu-ropeans that is ultimately thrown into questionby the racist suspension of the dialectics of rec-ognition. Since, as Fanon puts it, “[m]an is hu-man only to the extent to which he tries toimpose his existence on another man in order tobe recognized by him,” the European colonial-ist’s decision to seek not recognition but ratherwork from the slave results in the exclusion ofthe colonialist from the Hegelian dialectics aswell. If the European colonizer shirked his orher humanity by refusing to recognize the blackslave, then it follows that, in response, the blackslave may legitimately refuse to recognize thewhite master’s humanity, and thus pursue vio-lence as a means of re-establishing politicalequality. Fanon expresses this point especiallydramatically at the conclusion of his essay on“The ‘North African Syndrome’,” in Toward theAfrican Revolution, trans. pp. 3-16: “Don’t pushme too far. Don’t force me to tell you what youought to know, sir. If YOU do not reclaim theman who is before you, how can I assume thatyou reclaim the man that is in you?... If YOU donot sacrifice the man that is in you so that theman who is on this earth shall be more than abody… by what conjurer’s trick will I have to ac-quire the certainty that you, too, are worthy ofmy love?” Such violence is hardly aimed atachieving recognition from the other, however.In fact, insofar as it is, Fanon would perceive itas misguided. See also “Concerning Violence”in Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 35-106.

23 It would also be wrong to suppose thatFanon’s reading of the Hegelian Master-Slavedialectic imputes racism to the dialectic itselfconsidered as a theoretical artifact. Fanon’s pri-mary point about the Hegelian Master-Slave di-alectic is only that it is not sufficient to fullydescribe the relevant features of the colonial sit-uation (for the reasons elucidated above). Hispoint is not that Hegel’s dialectics are in them-selves wrong (nor Eurocentric nor racist—though I suppose it is possible that they are thesethings). In this sense, Fanon is best read as point-ing out and analyzing features of the Master-Slave relation, within the colonial situation, thatHegel himself had not studied or considered(For a contrary view, see Kleinberg 2003: 122).



truth with which both Hegel and Fanonmade it their life’s work to wrestle. On theother hand, both Fanon’s and Hegel’sprojects involved careful study and critiqueof the recorded wisdom of those who hadcome before them, as evidenced in Fanon’scase by the very existence of his He-gelschrift. If we continue to be interested in“Le Nègre et Hegel”, as scholars, thinkers, ac-tivists or just human beings, it is likely be-cause a human being’s actions, thoughtsand words are somehow inseparable, justas all humans are, at some level, also insep-arable. Thus, when we read Fanon readingHegel, we follow Fanon in the attempt tobetter grasp the nature of ourselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fanon, Franz. 1952. Peau noire, masques blanc. Edi-tions de Seuil: Paris. [Fanon, Black Skin,White Masks. Charles Lam Markmann,trans. New York: Grove Press, 1967.]

Fanon, Franz. 1968. Les damné de la terre. Paris: F.Maspero. [The Wretched of the Earth. Con-stance Farrington, trans. New York: GrovePress, 1968.]

Fanon, Franz. 1969. Pour la révolutione africaine:écrits politiques. Paris: F. Maspero. [FranzFanon, Towards the African Revolution. Haa-kon Chevalier, trans. New York: GrovePress, 1969.]

Gibson, Nigel C. 2003. Fanon: The Postcolonial Imag-ination. Oxford/ Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. 1952. Phänomenologie des Geistes.Hamburg: Verlag Von Felix Meiner. [Phe-nomenology of Spirit. A. V. Miller, trans.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.]

Kleinberg, Ethan. 2003. “Kojève and Fanon: TheDesire for Recognition and the Fact ofBlackness” in Tyler Stovall and Georges VanDen Abbeele, eds. French Civilization and ItsDiscontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race.Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Sekyi-Otu, Ato. 1996. Fanon’s Dialectics of Experi-ence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-sity Press.

Turner, Lou. 1996. “On the Difference between theHegelian and Fanonian Dialectic of Lord-ship and Bondage,” in Lewis R. Gordon, T.Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T.White, eds. Fanon: A Critical Reader.Oxford/ Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 134-151.

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