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478 From Socrates to Cinema
7. Discuss the following passage from the
Koran: "0 Prophet! urge the believers towar;
if there are twenty patient ones of you they
shall overcometwo hundred, and if there are
a hundred of you they shall overcome a
thousand of those who disbelieve, because
they are a people who do not understand"
(8.65).
ARISTOTLE
HAPPINESS AND VIRTUE
ristotle claims that the virtues are those characteristics that enable human beings to
live well in communities. Virtue is the ability tobe reasonable in our actions, desires,
and emotions. Anyone who manages their skills and their opportunities well is
considered virtuous. According to Aristotle, all human beings seek happiness, and being
virtuous makes us happy-it enables us to achieve ast~te of well-being (eudaimonia) .
Eudaimonia refers to the objective character of one's life rather than to a particular
psychological state. Aristotle believed that as human beings we are happy ifwe perform our
human "function" well and that our function~s to act in accordance with reason.,Furthermore,
it is reason that controls our emotions and-other nonrational indicators like the desire for
pleasure, so that we avoid both eXCe~~'and"deficiency,and thus act virtuously. In addition,, < - . , ' I
individual eudaimonia requires prop~tsocial institutions as well as good character.
~"Consequently,ethics, for Aristotle, is taken to be a branch of politics. However, unlike Jeremy
Bentham (1748~1832),who famously equates happiness solely with "pleasure and the absence
of pain," Aristotle does not equate happiness with pleasure, nor with honor or wealth. Rather,
happiness is an activity of the soul in accordancewith virtue. Right habits are acquired by living
well, and these habits are, in fact, virtues. These virtues are the best guarantee ofa happy life.
Aristotle distinguishes between two types of virtues: moral and intellectual. Intellectual
virtues may be taught, whereas moral virtues must be lived in order tobe learned. Moral virtue
comes from habit and generally isa state of character that represents a mean between the vices
of excess and deficiency. This concept of moderation, or the Golden Mean, is at the heart of
Aristotle's virtue theory. Courage, for example, is presented as a virtue that represents a mean
between the extremes of rashness (an excess) and cowardice (a deficiency). While the moral
virtues are important to the achievement of a state of well-being, it is the intellectual virtues
found in the activity of contemplation or reason that produce the most perfect happiness.
Nevertheless, while the contemplative life is the ultimate happy life, Aristotle says that it does
not hurt tohave friends, money, and good looks.
Aristotle's virtue ethics (aswell asConfucius's) emphasizes the whole person rather than
individual actions. Critics of virtue ethics argue that people turn to ethics to answer questions
about the morality of action. When people are facedwith a concrete moral problem, they want
to know what to do, not what kind of character they should cultivate over a lifetime. Virtue
ethics does not answer common moral questions such as "What should I do now in this
situation?" One might respond to this criticism of virtue ethics by saying that this is the wrong
question to ask. "What would a virtuous or decent person do now in this situation?" is the
right question. Ifone asks the question in thisway, then virtue ethics can provide a response.
Aristotle (384-322 B.CE.) is one of the most influential philosophers from Greek
antiquity. Born in Stagyra, Macedonia, he is often called the "Sagirite." He was the son of
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'come a
because
erstand"
Of Morality and Art
Nicomachus, a physician to the king, At age eighteen, he entered Plato's Academy; where
studied for nearly twenty years. After Plato's death, when a rival was selected to head
Academy, Aristotle leftAthens for the island of Lesbos. Around 343, he became the tutor of
young Alexander the Great, son ofKing Philip ofMacedon, a position he held for three years
In335, Artistotle returned to Athens to found his own school, the Lyceum, which w
often called the Peripatetic School because Aristotle was in the habit of walking around
courtyard of the school when he lectured. Upon Alexander's death in 323 B.C.E., an
....Macedonian feelings were on the rise in Athens, so Aristotle chose to leave Athens so tAthenians might not "sin twice against philosophy" (the first "sin" being the trial of Socrate
It is often said that Aristotle "knew everything," and the wide range of his writings seem
confirm this. His works investigate many topics including logic, astronomy, biology, politi
ethics, rhetoric, drama, the soul, God, and physics. The following selection is from
Nichomachean Ethics, a work in which he summarizes the ethics of fourth-century B.C
Athenians and puts forth his own ethical theory.
~ingsto
desires,
well is
L being
rticular
rmour
ermore,
sire for
idition,
araeter.
Jeremy
ibsence
Rather,
{living
life.
illectual
lvirtue
levices
teart of
a mean
~moral
virtues
piness.
it does
. ~Our discussion will be adequate if ite has as rmich
clearness as the subject-matter admits of,· for
precision is not to be sought fq/· a . l i k t i ~·fualldiscussions, any more than in all the products of
the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which
political science investigates, admit of much
variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they
may be thought to exist only by convention, and
not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar
fluctuation because they bring harm to many
people; for before now men have been undone by
reason of their wealth, and others by reason of
their courage. We must be content, then, in
speaking of such subjects and with such premises
toindicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in
speaking about things which are only for the most
part true and with premises of the same kind toreach conclusions that are no better. In the same
spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be
received; for it is the mark of an educated man to
look for precision in each class of things just so far
as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently
equally foolishto accept probable reasoning froma
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician
scientificproofs.
Now each man judges well the things he
knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so
the man who has been educated ina subject is a
good judge of that subject, and the man who has
received an all-round education is a good judge in
general. Hence a yOllilg man is not a proper
er than
estions
want
Virtue
in this
wrong
, is the
mse,
Greek
son of
hearer of lectures on political science; for he
inexperienced in the actions that occur inlife,
its discussions start from these and are ab
these; and, further, since he tends to follow
passions, his study will be vain and unprofitab
because the end aimed at is not knowledge
action. And it makes no difference whether he
young inyears oryouthful in character; the def
does not depend on time, but on his living, a
pursuing each successive object, as pass
directs. For to such persons, as to the incontine
knowledge brings no profit; but to those w
desire and act in accordance with a ratio
principle knowledge about such matters will be
great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort
treatment to be expected, and the purpose ofinquiry, may be taken as our preface.
Let us resume our inquiry and state, inview
the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit a
at some good, what it is that we say politi
science aims at and what is the highest of
goods achievable by action. Verbally there is v
general agreement; for both the general run
men and people of superior refinement say tha
is happiness, and identify living well and do
well with being happy; but with regard to w
happiness is they differ, and the many do not g
the same account as the wise. For the former th
it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasu
wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from
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480 From Socrates to Cinema
another-and often even the same man identifies
itwith different things, with health when he is ill,
with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of
their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim
some great ideal that is above their compre-
hension. Now some thought that apart from these
many goods there is another which is self-
subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as
well. Toexamine all the opinions that have been
held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to
examine those that are most prevalent or that
seemtobe arguable....
Letus, however, resume our discussionfromthe
point at which we digressed. Tojudge from the
lives thatmen lead,most men, and men ofthemost
vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to
identify the good, or happiness, v,;ith pleasure;
which is the reason, why they love the life of
enjoyment. For there are, we .may say, three ~
prominent types of life-that just menti(~n~d,the~
political, and thirdly the contemplative . li fe, Now.'
the mass ofmankind are evidently quite:slaxi~hitt
their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts,'
"but they get some ground for their view from the
fact that many of those in high places share
the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the
prominent types of life shows that, people of
superior refinement and of active disposition
identify happiness with honour; for this is,
roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But
it seems too superficial to be what we are looking
for, since it is thought to depend on those who
bestowhonour rather than onhimwho receivesit,
but the good we divine tobe something proper to
a man and not easily taken from him. Further,
men seem to pursue honour in order that theymay be assured of their goodness; at least it is by
men of practical wisdom that they seek to be
honoured, and among those who know them, and
on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then,
according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
And perhaps one might even suppose this to be,
rather than honour, the end of the political life.
But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for
possession of virtue seems actually compatible
with being asleep, or with life-long inactivity,and,
further, with the greatest sufferings and
misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one
would call happy, unless he were maintaining a
thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the
subject has been sufficiently treated even in the
current discussions. Third comes the contem-
plative life,which weshall consider later.
The life of money-making is one undertaken
under compulsion, and wealth isevidently not the
good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and
for the sake of something else. And so one might
rather take the afore-named objects to be ends; for
they are loved for themselves. But it is evident
that not even these are ends; yet many arguments
havebeen thrown away in support of them....
Let us again return to the good we are seeking,
and ask what it can be. It seems different in
different actionsand arts; it is differentin medicine,
in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What
then is the goodofeach?Surelythat forwhose sake
everytlling else is done. Inmedicine this is health,
in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any
other sphere something else, and inevery action
and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this
that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore,
if there is an end for all that we do, thiswill be the
good achievable by action, and if there are more
than one, these will be the goods achievable
by action.
So the argument has by a different course
reached the same point; but we must try to state
this even more clearly. Since there are evidently
more than one end, and we choose some of these
(e.g., wealth, flutes, and in general instruments)
for the sake ofsomething else, clearly not all ends
are final ends; but the chief good is evidently
something finaL Therefore, if there is only one
final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if
there are more than one, the most final of these
will be what we are seeking. Now we call thatwhich is in itself worthy of pursuit more final
than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake
of something else, and that which is never
desirable for the sake ofsomething elsemore final
than the things that are desirable both in
themselves and for the sake of that other thing,
and therefore we call final without qualification
that which is always desirable in itself and never
for the sake ofsomething else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is
held to be; for this we choose always for itself and
never for the sake of something else, but honour,
pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose
indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted
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en in the
contem-
from them we should still choose each of them),
but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
judging that by means of them we shall be happy.
Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for
the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything
other than itself ....
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is
the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer
account of what it is, is still desired. This might
perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the
function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a
sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all
things that have a function or activity, the good
and the "well" is thought to reside in the function,
so would it seem to be for man, if he has a
function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner
certain functions or activities, and has man none?
Is he born without a function? rOr as eye, hand,
foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has
a function, may one lay 'it down -that rAan
similarly has a function apart from a!.tt~ese? What
then can this be? Life seems to be COl_Il'hjtii{.eveno
plants, but we are seeking what is peculian to
man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition
and growth. Next there would be a life of
perception, but it also seems to be common even
to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There
remains, then, an active life of the element that
has a rational principle; of this, one part has such
a principle in the sense of being obedient to one,
the other in the sense of possessing one and
exercising thought. And, as "life of the rational
element" also has two meanings, we must state
that life in the sense of activity is what we mean;
for this seems to be the more proper sense of the
term. Now if the function of man is an activity of
soul which follows or implies a rational principle,
and if we say "a so-and-so" and "a good so-and-
so" have a function which is the same in kind,
e.g., a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so
without qualification in all cases, eminence in
respect of goodness being added to the name of
the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to
play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to
do so well): if this is the case, [and we state the
function of man to be a certain kind of life, and
this to be an activity or actions of the soul
implying a rational principle, and the function of
a good man to be the good and noble performance
of these, and if any action is well performed when
dertaken
y not the
.eful and
ne might
ends; for
; evident
'guments
en . .. .
seeking,
ferent in
nedicine,
se. What
iose sake
is health,
e, in any
ry action
:e of this
herefore,
illbe the
lie more
hievable
t course
, to state
vidently
of these
.urnents)
all ends
vidently
mlyone
g, and ifof these
call that
or e final
the sake
s never
ore final
oth in
er thing,
fication
id never
1else, is
tself and
honour,
choose
resulted
O f M orality an d A rt 4
it is performed in accordance with the appropriat
excellence: if this is the case.] human good tur
out to be activity of soul in accordance wi
virtue, and if there are more than one virtue,
accordance with the best and most complete.
But we must add "in a complete life." For o
swallow does not make a summer, nor does o
day; and so too one day, or a short time, does n
make a man blessed and happy ....
We must consider it, however, in the light n
only of our conclusion and our premises, but al
of what is commonly said about it; for with a tr
view all the data harmonize, but with a false o
the facts soon clash. Now goods have be
divided into three classes, and some are describe
as external, others as relating to soul or to bod
we-call those that relate to soul most properly a
truly goods, and psychical actions and activiti
we class as relating to soul. Therefore our accou
must be sound, at least according to th
view, which is an old one and agreed on
. philosophers, It is correct also inthat we identi
the end with certain actions and activities; for th
it falls among goods of the soul and not amon
external goods. Another belief which harmonize
with our account is that the happy man lives w
and does well; for we have practically define
happiness as a sort of good life and good actio
The characteristics that are looked for
happiness seem also, all of them, to belong
what we have defined happiness as bein
For some identify happiness with virtue, som
with practical wisdom, others with a kind
philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one
these, accompanied by pleasure or not withou
pleasure; while others include also extern
prosperity. Now some of these views have be
held by many men and men of old, others by
few eminent persons; and it is not probable th
either of these should be entirely mistaken, b
rather that they should be right in at least som
one respect or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtu
or some one virtue our account is in harmony; f
to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it make
perhaps, no small difference whether we place t
chief good in possession or in use, in state of min
or in activity. For the state of mind may ex
without producing any good result, as in a m
who is asleep or insome other way quite inactiv
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482 FromSocratesto Cinema
but the activity cannot; for one who has the For this reason also the question is asked,
activity will of necessity be acting, and acting whether happiness is to be acquired by learning
well. And as ill the Olympic Games it is not the or by habituation or some other sort of training, or
most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned comes in virtue of some divine providence or
but thosewho compete (forit is some ofthese that again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the
are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness
will, thenoble and good things ill life. should be god-given, and most surely god-given
Their life is also ill itself pleasant. For pleasure of allhuman things inasmuch as it is the best. But
is a state'of soul, and to each man that which he is this question would perhaps be more appropriate
said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g.,not only is a to another inquiry: happiness seems, however,
horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of
spectacleto the lover of sights,but alsoill the same virtue and someprocess oflearning or training, to
way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice be among the most god-like things; for that which
and ill general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best
Now for most men their pleasures are ill conflict thing in the world, and something god-like and
with one another because these are not by nature blessed.
pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find It will also on this view be very generally. r
pleasant the things that are 9 Y nature pleasant; and shared; for all who are not maimed as regards
virtuous actionsare such, so that thesea~epleasant the~irpotentiality for virtue maywill it bya certain
for such men aswell as ill their own nature. Their' kind of study and care. But if it is better to be
life, therefore,has no further need ofpleasure a; C l, happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that
sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasun;Ci:r('~;th'e facts should be so, since everything that
itself. For, besides what we have said, the man' -, depends on the action of nature is by nature as
who cfoesnot rejoiceill noble actions is not even good as it can be, and similarly everything that
good; sinceno one would call a man just who did depends on art or any rational cause, and
not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who especiallyif itdepends on the best ofall causes.To
did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly ill all entrust to chancewhat is greatest and most noble
other cases.If this is50, virtuous actionsmust be ill would be a very defectivearrangement.
themselves pleasant. But they are also g o o d and The answer to the question we are asking is
noble, and have each of these attributes in the plain also from the definition of happiness; for it
highest degree, since the good man judges well has been said tobe a virtuous activityofsoul, of a
about these attributes; hisjudgment is such as we certain kind, Of the remaining goods, some must
have described. Happiness then is the best, necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness,
noblest, andmost pleasant thing intheworld. . . . and others are naturally co-operatjve and useful
Yetevidently, as we said, it needs the external as instruments. And this will be found to agree
goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy,to with what we said at the outset; for we stated the
do noble acts without the proper equipment. In end of political science to be the best end, and
many actions we use friends and riches and political science spends most of its pains on
political power as instruments; and thereare some making the citizens to be of a certain character,
things the lack of which takes the lustre from viz. good and capableofnoble acts.
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor
for the manwho isvery ugly in appearance or ill- horse nor any other of the animalshappy; fornone
born or solitary and childless is not very likely to of them is capable of sharing ill such activity.For
be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less this reasonalsoa boyis not happy; for heisnot yet
likely ifhe had thoroughly bad children or friends capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys
or had lost good children or friends by death. As who are called happy are being congratulated by
we said, then, happiness seems toneed this sort of reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is
prosperity ill addition; for which reason some required, as we said, not only complete virtue but
identify happiness with good fortune, though also a complete life, since many changes occur ill
others identify it with virtue. life, and all manner of chances, and the most
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sked,
:ning
19 , or
:e or
f the
iness
;iven
:.But
iriateever,
lit of
19 , to
rhich
best
and
Tally
ards
dain
:0 be
that
that
re as
that
and
~s.To
table
19 is
for it
, ofa
must
ness,
seful
1 9 r e e
ithe
and
: nor
none
: For
it yet
boys
d by
e re IS
~but
u r i n
most
prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old
age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and
one who has experienced such chances and has
ended wretchedly no one callshappy....
Since happiness is an activity of soul in
accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider
the nl'l-tureof virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see
better the nature ofhappiness ....
"Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual
and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes
both its birth and its growth to teaching (for
which reason it requires experience and time),
while moral virtue comes about as a result of
habit.... From this it is also plain that none of the
moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing
that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to
its nature. For instance the stone which by nature
moves downwards cannot be habituated tomove
upwards, not evert if one tries to train it by
throwing it up ten thousand times; nor call.fire b~
habituated tomove downwards, nor cari anything
else that by nature behaves in one waY:-:J.J~'U;ained
to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor
e " contrary tonature do the virtues arise in us; rather
we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are
made perfect by habit. ...
Wemust, however, not only describe virtue as
a state of character, but also say what sort of state
it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or
excellence both brings into good condition the
thing ofwhich it is the excellence and makes the
work ofthat thing be donewen; e.g., the excellence
of the eye makes both the eye and its work good;
for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see
well. Similarly the excellenceofthe horse makes a
horse both good in itself and good at running and
at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of
the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case,
the virtue ofman alsowill be the state ofcharacter
which makes a man good and which makes him
do his own work well.
How this is to happen we have stated already,
but it will be made plain also by the following
consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In
everything that is continuous and divisible it is
possible to take more, less, or an equal amount,
and that either in terms of the thing itself or
relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate
between excess and defect. By the intermediate in
the object I mean that which is equidistant from
Of Morality and Art 483
each of the extremes, which is one and the same
for all men; by the intermediate relatively to
us that which is neither too much nor too little-
and this is not one, nor the same for all. For
instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the
intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for
it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount;
this is intermediate according to arithmetical
proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is
not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for
a particular person to eat and two too little, it does
not follow that the trainer will order six pounds;
for this also is perhaps too much for the person
who is to take it, or too little-too little for Milo,
too much for the beginner in athletic exercises.
The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a
master of any art avoids excess and defect, but
seeks the intermediate and chooses this-the
intermediate not in the objectbut relatively to us.
If is thus, then, that every art does its work
well-by looking to the intermediate and judging
its works by this standard (so that we often say of
good works of art that it is not possible either to
take away or to add anything, implying that
excess and defect destroy the goodness of the
works of art, while the mean preserves it; and
good artists, as we say, look to this in their work),
and if, further, virtue is more exactand better than
any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have
the quality of aiming at the intermediate. Imean
moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with
passions and actions, and in these there is excess,
defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both
fear and confidence and appetite and anger and
pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt
both too much and too little, and inboth cases not
well; but to feel them at the right times, with
reference to the right objects, towards the right
people, with the right motive, and in the right
way, is what is both intermediate and best,
and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with
regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and
the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with
passions and actions, in which excess is a form
of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate
is praised and is a form of success; and being
praised and being successful are both charac-
teristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of
mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is
intermediate.
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Wemust, however, not only make this general
statement, but also apply it to the individual facts.
For among statements about conduct those which
are general apply more widely, but those which
are particular aremore genuine, sinceconduct has
to do with individual cases, and our statements
must harmonize with the facts in these cases.We
may take these cases from our table.With regard
to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the
mean; of the people who exceed,he who exceeds
Virtue,then, is a state of character concernedwith in fearlessness has no name (many of the states
choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to have no name), while the man who exceeds in
us, this being determined by a rational principle, confidenceis rash, and hewho exceedsin fearand
and by that principle by which the man of falls short in confidenceis a coward. With regard
practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a to pleasures and pains~not all of them, and not
mean between two vices, that which depends on so much with regard to the pains=-the mean is
excess and that which depends on defect; and temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons
again it is a mean because the vices respectively deficientwith regard to the pleasures arenot often
fall short of or exceed what "is right in both found; hence such persons also have received no
passions and actions, while virtue both 'finds and' nailie. Butlet us call them "insensible." •
chooses that which is intermediate."Hence _ i n , Withregard to givingand taking ofmoney the
respect of its substance and the definitionwhti;:1y".·~;rnean is liberality,theexcess and the defectprodi-
states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard r o ' , . galny and meanness. In these actions people
what is'best and right an extreme. exceedand fall short incontraryways; theprodigal
But not every action nor every passion admits exceedsin spending and fallsshort in taking,while
of a mean; for some have names that already the mean man exceedsin taking and falls short in
imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, spending.... Withregard tomoney there arealso
and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; other dispositions-c.amean, magnificence(for the
for all of these and suchlike things imply by their magnificentman differsfrom the liberalman; the
names that they are themselves bad, and not the former dealswith large sums, the latter with small
excessesor deficienciesof them. It is not possible, ones),and excess,tastelessness,and vulgarity,and
then, ever to be right with regard to them; one a deficiency,niggardliness; these differ from the
must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or statesopposed toliberality...
badness with regard to such things depend on Thatmoral virtue is a mean, then, and in what
committing adultery with the right woman, at the sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two
right time, and in the right way, but simply to do vices, the one involving excess, the other defi-
any of them is to go wrong. Itwould be equally ciency;and that it is such because its character is
absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly; to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in
and voluptuous action there should be amean, an actions, has been sufficientlystated. Hence also it
excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is
would be a mean of excess and of deficiency,an no easy task to find the middle, e.g., to find the
excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. middle of a circleis not for everyone but for him
But as there is no excess and deficiency of who knows; so,too, anyone canget angry~that is
temperance and courage because what is inter- easy~or give or spend money; but to do this to
mediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the the right person, to the right extent, at the right
actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor time, with the right motive, and in the right way,
any excess and deficiency;but however they are that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore
done they are wrong; for in general there is goodness isboth rare and laudable and noble....
neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor If happiness is activity in accordance with
excessand deficiencyof amean. virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in
484 From Socrates to Cinema
Again, it ispossibleto failinmanyways(forevil
belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the
Pythagoreansconjectured,and good to that of the
limited), while to succeed is possible only in one
way (forwhichreasonalsoone iseasyand theother
difficult-i-to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult);
for these reasons also, then, excessand defect are
characteristicofvice,and themeanofvirtue;
.. .
For men are good inbutone way, but bad inmany.
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ral
ts.
ch
ch
accordance with the highest virtue; and this will
be that of the best thing ill us. Whether it be
reason or something else that is this element
which is thought tobe our natural ruler and guide
and to take thought of things noble and divine,
whether it be itself also divine or only the most
divine .element in us, the activity of this in
accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect
happiness. That this activity is contemplative we
have already said.
Now this would seem to be in agreement both
with what we said before and with the truth. For,
firstly, this activity is the best (since not only is
reason the best thing in us, but the objects of
reason are the best of knowable objects); and,
secondly; it is the most continuous, since we can
contemplate truth more continuously than we
can do anything. An1 we think happilless has
pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of
philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest
of virtuous activities; at all events the pursclJofit "
is thought to offer pleasures ma rv e ll ou sf or " £ :q e if,(
purity and their enduringness, and it is t o ' be I
e'xpectedthat those who knowwill pass their time
more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the
self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong
most to the contemplative activity: For while a
philosopher, as well as a just man or one
possessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries
of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with
things of that sort the just man needs people
towards whom and with whom he shall act justly;
and the temperate man, the brave man, and
each of the others is in the same case, but the
philosopher, even when by himself, can
contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is;he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-
workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient.
And this activity alone would seem to be loved
for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart
from the contemplating, while from practical
activities we gain more or less apart from the
action. And happiness is thought to depend on
leisure; for we arebusy that we may have leisure,
and makewar that we may live in peace. Now the
activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in
political or military affairs, but the actions
concerned with these seem to be unleisurely.
Warlike actions are completely so (for no one
chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake
ra s
its
life
rd
he
ds
:es
in
Cld
rd
lot
is
ns
en
ClO
he
li-
le
;al
ile
ill
so
he
he
ill
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.at
>" 0
fi-
is
in
it
is
fte
m
is
to
ht
L Y ,
re
th
in
Of Moralit y and Art 485
of being at war; anyone would seem absolutely
murderous if he were to make enemies of his
friends ill order to bring about battle and
slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also
unleisurely, and-apart from the political action
itself-aims at despotic power and honours, or at
all events happiness, for him and his fellow
citizen-a happiness different from political
action, and evidently sought asbeing different. So
if among virtuous actions political and military
actions are distinguished by nobility and
greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an
end and are not desirable for their own sake, but
the activity of reason, which is contemplative,
seems both to be superior in serious worth and to
aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its
pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the
activity), and the self-sufficiency; leisureliness,
unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man),
and all the other attributes ascsibed to the
supremely happy man are evidently those
connected with this activity; it follows that this
will be the complete happiness of man, if to be
allowed a complete term of life (for none of the
attributes ofhappiness is incomplete).
But such a lifewould be too high for man; for it
is not ill so far as he is man that he will live so, but
ill so far as something divine is present ill him;
and by so much as this is superior to our
composite nature is its activity superior to that
which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If
reason is divine, then in comparison with man,
the life according to it is divine in comparison
with human life. But we must not follow those
who advise us, being men, to think of human
things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, butmust, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal,
and strain every nerve to live in accordance with
the best thing in us; for even if itbe small in bulk,
much more does it ill power and worth surpass
everything. This would seem, too, tobe each man
himself, since it is the authoritative and better part
of him. Itwould be strange, then, if he were to
choose not the lifeofhis selfbut that ofsomething
else. And what we said before will apply now;
that which is proper to each thing is by nature
best and most pleasant for each thing; for man,
therefore, the life according to reason is best and
pleasantest, since reason more than anything else
isman. This lifetherefore is also the happiest.
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466 From Socrates to Cinema
But in a secondary degree the life in inso far ashe is a man and liveswith anumber of
accordancewith the other kind ofvirtue ishappy; people, he chooses to do virtuous acts; he will
for the activitiesin accordancewith this befit our thereforeneed suchaids to living a human life.
human estate. Just and brave acts, and other But that perfect happiness is a contemplative
virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, activity will appear from the following
observing our respective duties with regard to consideration as well. We assume the gods to be
contracts and services and all manner of actions above all other beings blessed and happy; but
and with regard topassions; and allofthese seem' what sort ofactionsmust we assignto them?Acts
tobe typicallyhuman. Someofthem seemevento of justice?Willnot the gods seem absurd if they
arise from the body, and virtue of character tobe make contracts and return deposits, and so on?
in many ways bound up with the passions. Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers
Practical wisdom, too, is linked to virtue of and running risksbecause it isnoble to do so? Or
character, and this to practical wisdom, since the liberal acts? Towhom will they give? It will be
principles of practical wisdom are in accordance strange if they are really to have money or
with the moral virtues and rightness in morals is anything 'Of the kind. And what would their
in accordance with practical wisdom. Being temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless,
connected with the passions also., the moral since they have no bad appetites? If we were to
virtues must belong ta t our,compositenature; and run through them all, the circumstancesof action
the virtues ofour compositenature arehuman; so, ~ would be found trivial and unworthy of gods.
therefore, are the life and the happiness. which ~ Still, everyone supposes that they live and
correspond to these. The excellenceof the p;;<!~o_n.,therefore that they are active;we cannot suppose
is a thing apart; we must be content to , s · a y - .t)liis··k them to sleep like Endymion, Now if you takemuch about it, for to describe it preciselyis a task I away from a living being action, and still more
§7eaterthan our purpose requires. Itwould seem, production, what is left but contemplation?
however, also to need external equipment but Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses
little, or less than moral virtue does. Grant that all others in blessedness, must be contemplative;
both need the necessaries;and do so equally,even and of human activities, therefore, that which is
if the statesman's work is the more concerned most akin to this must be most of the nature of
with the body and things of that sort; for there happiness,
will be little difference there; but in what they Thisisindicated, too,by the fact that the other
need for the exerciseof their activities there will animals have no share in happiness, being
be much difference. The liberal man will need completely deprived of such activity. For while
money for the doing of his liberal deeds, and the the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of
just man too will need it for the returning of men too in so far as somelikenessofsuch activity
services (forwishes are hard to discern, and even belongs to them, none of the other animals is
people who are not just pretend to wish to act happy, since they in no way share in contem-justly);and thebravemanwill needpower ifhe is plation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as
to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to contemplation does, and those to whom contem-
his virtue, and the temperate man will need plation more fully belongs are more truly happy,
opportunity; forhow elseiseither he or any of the not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the
others to be recognized? It is debated, too, contemplation; for this is in itself precious.
whether the will or the deed is more essential to Happiness, therefore, must be some form of
virtue, which is assumed to involve both; it is contemplation.
surely clear that its perfection involves both; but But, being a man, one will also need external
for deeds many things areneeded, and more, the prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficientfor
greater and nobler the deeds are, But the man the purpose of contemplation, but our body also
who is contemplating the truth needs no such must be healthy and must have food and other
thing, at least with a view to the exercise of his attention. Still, we must not think that the man
activity; indeed they are, one may say, even who is tobehappy willneedmany things or great
hindrances, at all events tohis contemplation;but things, merely because he cannot be supremely
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lumber of
I; he will
.n life.
smplative
following
cds to be
Ippy; but
iem? Acts
rd if they
.d so on?
; dangers
Io so? Or
[t will be
lOney or
uld their
tasteless,
~were to
of action
of gods.
live and
: suppose
you take
;till more
nplation? e '
surpasses
mplative;
which is
nature of
the other
;S , being
~orwhile
id that of
h activity
nimals is
contem-
so far as
L contem-
ly happy,
ue of the
precious.
form of
Lexternal
ficient for
oody also
md other
the man
;sor great
upremely
happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency
and action do not involve excess, and we can do
noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even
with moderate advantages one can act virtuously
(this is manifest enough; for private persons are
thought to do worthy acts no less than despots-
indeed even more); and itis enough thatwe should
have somuch as that; for the life of the man who is
active in accordance with virtue will be happy. ...
D ISCUSS ION QUE ST IONS
1. According toAristotle, what ishappiness? Do
you agree with him? Explain.
2. What is the connection between virtue and
happiness according to frlstotle? Would
Of Morality and Art 4
Confucius agree with this? Why
why not? What is the difference between th
views?
3. Aristotle says that a life of pleasure is suita
for beasts. Why does he believe this? Wha
wrong with a life ofpleasure?
4. Aristotle asserts that the philosopher will
happier than anyone else. Do you agree whim? Why or why not?
5. Is Aristotle's moral theory compatible w
human nature? Why or why not?
6. In what sense does equality play a r
in Aristotle's ethics? It is possible
-everyone to be happy? Or only some peop
Is this a strength or weakness of Aristotl
~ position?
IMMANUEL KANT ,_; , .~ . - ' : .. _ . .e
THE CATEGORICAL' IMPERATIVE
or Immanuel Kant, a human will governed by reason is a good will, and the good w
is the only thing that is good without qualification. The human will experiences t
laws of reason as commands issued by reason to act in various ways. Kant calls the
commands "imperatives." There are two general kinds of imperatives: hypothetical a
categorical. If an action iscommanded asbeing necessary for bringing about some further en
the imperative is hypothetical. If an action is commanded as being good without qualificatio
the imperative is categorical. Categorical imperatives are unconditional; our obedience
them is unqualified. Kant formulates the categorical imperative as follows: act only accordi
to that rule by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. F
Kant, you should perform only those actions that conform to rules that you could will to
adopted universally. If you were to lie, for example, you would be following the rule "It
permissible to lie." This rule could not be adopted universally because it would be se
defeating: People would stop believing one another, and then itwould do no good to l
Therefore,you should not lie.
Kant also distinguishes several types of duties. P er fe ct d utie s consist of actions who
maxims can consistently be neither conceived nor willed by us to be universal laws of natur
Impe rf ec t d ut ie s consist of actionswhose maxims could become universal laws of nature, but i
impossible for us to will that their maxims should be universal laws of nature since such a w
would be in conflict with itself.Togetherwith a distinction between duties to oneself and tho
to others, this yields four fundamental duties. The first is perfect duty to oneself=fhis type
duty would preclude suicide. The second is perfect duty to othera=-this type of duty wou
preclude insincere promises. The third is imperfect duty to oneself-e-this type of du
precludes not developing one's natural potential. The fourth is imperfect duty to others=-th
type of duty precludes refusing help to those inneed.
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488 From Socrates to Cinema
At its core, Kant's moral theory contains three basic ideas: (1) Humans are rational beings,
capable of thinking about the choices they face and selecting among them on the basis of reasons;
(2) humans have an infinite worth or dignity-vthat is, humans are "ends-in-themselvesv=-and
this sets them above all merely conditionally valuable things in the world; and (3) humans, as
rational ends-in-themselves, are the authors of the moral law, so that their obedience to duty is
not an act of submission but an act of autonomy. These three ideas are more apparent in another
of Kant's.formulations of the categorical imperative: act so that you treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.Kantian ethics is a nonconsequent ia l i s t (or deontological) moral theory in that it maintains
that the morality of an action depends on factors other than consequences. One of the major
flaws in Kant's ethical theory is' that it fails to provide guidance when duties conflict. Another
is that acts that Kant condemns as universally wrong, such as lying, seem justified~perhaps
even morally requlred=-in some situations (for example, lying to protect individuals from
capture by evil people who will hurt or even kill them). The following selection is from
F un dam en ta l P rin cip le s of the Metaphysics o f Mora ls , whi0 was first published in 1785.
A biographical sketch of Immanuel Kant appears inchapter 2.
Nothing canpossiblybe conceivedin theworld,"~;~;.: ~d does not permit us to regard them aseven out of it, which can be called good, without' absolutely good. Moderation in the affectionsand
qualification,except a GoodWill.Intelligence,wit, passions, self-control,and calmdeliberation arenot
judgment, and the other talents of the mind, only good in many respects but even seem to
however they may be named, or courage, constitute part of the intrinsicworth ofthe person;
resolution, perseverance, as qualities of but they are far from deserving to be called good
temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable without qualification,although they have been so
in many respects; but these gifts of nature may unconditionally praised by the ancients. For
also become extremelybad and mischievous if the without the principles of a good will, they may
will which is to make use of them, and which, becomeextremelybad; and the coolnessofa villain
therefore,constituteswhat is calledcharacter, is not not only makes him far more dangerous; but also
good. It is the samewith the g if ts o f f or tun e. Power, directly makes him more abominable inour eyes
riches, honour, even health, and the general well- than hewouldhave beenwithout it.
being and contentment with one's conditionwhich A good will is good not because of what it
is called happiness, inspire pride, and often perform or effects, not by its aptness for thepresumption, if there is not a good will to correct attainment of some proposed end, but simply by
the influence of these on the mind, and with this virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself,
also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and and considered by itself is to be esteemed much
adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not higher than all that can be brought about by it in
adorned with a single feature of a pure and good favour of any inclination, may, even of the sum-
will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen
pleasure to an impartial rational spectator.Thus a that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the
good will appears to constitute the indispensable niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature,
condition even ofbeing worthy ofhappiness. this will should wholly lack power to accomplish
There are even some qualities which are of its purpose, ifwith its greatest effortsit should yet
serviceto this goodwill itself,and may facilitateits achievenothing, and there should remain only the
action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the
value, but always presuppose a good will, and this summoning of allmeans in our power), then, like
qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them, a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a
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ieings,
asons:
'-and
ms, as
luty is
[lother
ther in
ntains
major
nother
erhaps
i from
i from
1785.
em as
TIS and
are not
sem to
oerson:
:l good
ieen so
s. For
y may
villain
ut also
rr eyes
vhat it
or the
ply by
l itself,
. much
)y it in
e sum-
tappen
or the
nature,
mplish
uldyet
nly the
JUt the
en . Iike
ttl as a
thing which has its whole value in itself Its
usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor
take away anything from this value.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie
in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle
of action which requires to borrow its motive from
this expected effect For all these effects-
agreeableness of one's condition, and even the
.promotion of the happiness of others---could have
been also brought about by other causes, so that for
this there would have been no need of the will of a
rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the
supreme and unconditional good can be found.
The pre-eminent good which we call moral can
therefore consist in nothing else than t h e c once p ti on
o f law in itself, wh i ch . c e rt ai n ly is only possib le in a
r a ti ona l b e ing , in so far as this conception, and not
the expected effect determines the will. This is a
good which is alreadypresent in the person who
acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it fo
appear first in the result _ ~
But what sort of law can that be, th~~e~Ii.~eptwn
of which must determine the will, even without
paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in
order that this will may be called good absolutely
and without qualification? As Ihave deprived the
will of every impulse which could arise to it from
obedience to any law, there remains nothing but
the universal conformity of its actions to law in
general, which alone is to serve the will as a
principle, i.e., Iam never to act otherwise than so
that I ould a lso w ill tha t m y m axim should b ecom e a
universal law. Here, now, it is the simple
conformity to law in general, without assuming
any particular law applicable to certain actions,
that serves the will as its principle, and must so
serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a
chimerical notion. The common reason of men in
its practical judgments perfectly coincides with
this and always has in view the principle here
suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I
when in distress make a promise with the
intention not to keep it? Ireadily distinguish here
between the two significations which the question
may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is
right, to make a false promise? The former may
undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed
that it is not enough to extricate myself from a
present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but
itmust be well considered whether there may not
O f M orality an d A rt 489
hereafter spring from this lie much greater
inconvenience than that from which I now free
myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, th
consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that
credit once lost may be much more injurious to
me than any mischief which Iseek to avoid a
present, it should be considered whether itwould
not be more pruden t to act herein according to
universal maxim, and to make it a habit to
promise nothing except with the intention o
keeping it. But it is soon dear to me that such
maxim will still only be based on the fear o
consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing
to be truthful from duty, and to be so from
apprehension of injurious consequences. In the
first case, the very notion of the action already
implies a law for me; illthe second case, Imust
first look about elsewhere to see what results may
be combined with it which would affect myself.
For to deviate from the principle of duty i
beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to
my maxim of prudence may often be very
advantageous to me, although to abide by it i
certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an
unerring one, to discover the answer to this
question whether a lying promise is consistent
with duty, is to ask myself, Should Ibe content
that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty
by a false promise) should hold good as a
universal law, for myself as well as for others?
And should Ibe able to say to myself, "Everyone
may make a deceitful promise when he finds
himself in a difficulty from which he cannot
otherwise extricate himself"? Then Ipresently
become aware that while Ican will the lie, Ican by
no means win that lying should be a universal
law. For with such a law there would be no
promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege
my intention in regard to my future actions to
those who would not believe this allegation, or if
they over-hastily did so, would pay me back in
my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as i
should be made a universal law, would
necessarily destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching
penetration to discern what Ihave to do in order
that my will be morally good. Inexperienced in
the course of the world, incapable of being
prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask
myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim
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490 From Socrates to Cinema
should be a universal law? If not, then itmust be something else that iswilled (orat least which one
rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage might possibly will). The categorical imperative
accruing from it to myself or even to others, but would be that which represented an action as
because it cannot enter as a principle into a necessary of itself without reference to another
possible universal legislation, and reason extorts end, i.e.as objectivelynecessary.
fromme immediate respect for such legislation.I Since every practical law represents a possible
donot indeed asyet discern onwhat this respect is action as good, and on this account, for a subject
based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at who is practically determinable by reason,
least Itlnderstand this, that it is an estimation of necessary,all imperativesareformulaedetermining
the worth which far outweighs allworth of what an action which is necessary according to the
is recommended by inclination, and that the principle of a will good in some respects. If now
necessity of acting from pure respect for the the action is good only as a means to s om e th in g
practical law is what constitutes duty, to which else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is
every other motive must give place, because it is conceived as good in its elf and consequently as
the condition ofawill being good i n i ts el f, and the being necessarily the principle of a will which of
worth ofsuch awill is above everything. . .. itselfconforms to reason, then it is ca t egor ica l. . ..
. . . Everything in nature works according to When Ivconceive a hypothetical imperative, in
laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of general Ido not know beforehand what it will
acting according to th e C on ce ptio n of laws, that is contain-untilIamgiven the condition. Butwhen I
according to principles, i.e., have a tuill. Sincethe ~onceivea categorical imperative, Iknow at once
deduction of actions from principles requires what it contains. For as the imperative contains
reason, the will is nothing but practical rea~6n:"If"';kbesides the law only the necessity that the maxims
reason infallibly determines the will, then the shall conform to this law, while the law contains
actions of such a being which are recognized as no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing
objectively necessary are subjectively necessary but the general statement that the maxim of the
also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that action should conform to a universal law, and it is
only which reason independent on inclination this conformity alone that the imperative properly
recognizesaspracticallynecessary,i.e.,as good.But represents asnecessary.
if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine There is ... but one categorical imperative,
the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective namely, this; Act only on that m axim w hereb y tho u
conditions (particular impulses) which do not canst at the same time will tha t it should b ecam e a
always coincidewith the objectiveconditions; in a u n iv er sa l l aw .
word, if the will doesnot i n i ts el f completelyaccord Now if a11imperatives of duty can be deduced
with reason (which is actually the casewith men), from this one imperative as from their principle,
then the actions which objectivelyare recognized then, although it should remain undecided
as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the whether what is called duty is not merely a vain
determination of such awill according toobjective notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what
laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the we understand by itand what thisnotionmeans.
objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly Since the universality of the law according to
good is conceived as the determination of the will which effects are produced constitutes what is
of a rational being by principles of reason, but properly called nature in the most general sense
which the will from its nature does not of (asto form), that is the existenceofthings sofar as
necessity follow, it is determined by general laws, the imperative
The conception of an objectiveprinciple, in so of duty may be expressed thus; Act as if t he ma xi m
far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a of thy a ctio n w ere to b ecom e b y th y w ill a u nio ersa l laio
command (of reason), and the formula of the o f na tu r e.
command is calledan Imperative. . . . Wewill now enumerate a few duties, adopting
Now all imperatives command either hypo- the usual division ofthem into duties to ourselves
thetically or categorically. The former represent the and to others, and into perfect and imperfect
practical necessity of a possible action asmeans to duties.
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ich one
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1. A man reduced to despair by a series of
misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so
far in possession of his reason that he can ask
himself whether itwould not be contrary to
his duty to himself to take his own life. Now
he inquires whether the maxim of his action
could become a universal law of nature. His
"maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a
principle to shorten my life when its longer
duration is likely to bring more evil than
satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether
this principle founded on self-love can
become a universal law of nature. Now we
see at once that a system of nature of which it
should be a law to destroy life by means of
the very feeling whose special nature it is to
impel to the improvement of life would
contradict itself, and therefore" could not exist
as a system b f nature; hence that maxim
cannot possibly exist as a universal law d f
nature, and consequently would 4Jewholfy
inconsistent with the supreme ffu1Ciple·-of
all duty.
r' 2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to
borrow money. He knows that he will not be
able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will
be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to
repay it in a definite time. He desires to make
this promise, but he has still so much
conscience as to ask himself: Is it not
unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get
out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose,
however, that he resolves to do so, then the
maxim of his action would be expressed thus:
When Ihink myself in want of money, Iwill
borrow money and promise to repay it,although Iknow that Inever can do so. Now
this principle of self-love or of one's own
advantage may perhaps be consistent with
my whole future welfare; but the question
now is: Is it right? I change then the sugges-
tion of self-love into a universal law, and state
the question thus: How would it be if my
maxim were a universal law? Then I see at
once that it could never hold as a universal
law of nature, but would necessarily contra-
dict itself. For supposing it to be a universal
law that everyone when he thinks himself in
a difficulty should be able to promise
Of Morality and Art 491
whatever he pleases, with the purpose of no
keeping his promise, the promise itself would
become impossible, as well as the end that
one might have in view in it, since no one
would consider that anything was promised
to him, but would ridicule all such statements
as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with
the help of some culture might make him a
useful man in many respects. But he finds
himself in comfortable circumstances, and
prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to
take pains in enlarging and improving his
happy natural capacities. He asks, however,
whether his maxim of neglect of his natural
gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to
indulgence, agrees also with what is called
duty. He sees then that a system of nature
" could indeed subsist with such a universal
law although men (like -the South Sea
islanders) should let their talents rest, and
resolve . to devote their lives merely to
idleness, amusement, and propagation o
their species-in a word, to enjoyment; but he
cannot possibly will that this should be a
universal law of nature, or be implanted in us
as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational
being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be
developed, since they serve him, and have
been given him, for all sorts of possible
purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees
that others have to contend, with great
wretchedness and that he could help them,
thinks: What concern is it of mine? Let
everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, oas he can make himself; Iwill take nothing
from him nor even envy him, only Ido not
wish to contribute anything to his welfare or
to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt if
such a mode of thinking were a universal law
the human race might very well subsist, and
doubtless even better than in a state in which
everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or
even takes care occasionally to put it into
practice, but, on the other side, also cheats
when he can, betrays the rights of men, or
otherwise violates them. But although it is
possible that a universal law of nature might
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492 From Socrates to Cinema
exist in accordance with that maxim, it is
impossible to will that such a principle should
have the universal validity of a law ofnature.
For a will which resolved this would contra-
dict itself, inasmuch as many cases might
occur in which one would have need of the
love and sympathy of others, and in which,
by such a law of nature, sprung from his own
will, he would deprive himself of all hope ofthe aid he desires....
We have thus established at least this much,
that if duty is a conception which is to have any
import and real legislative authority for our
actions, itcan onlybe expressed in categorical, and
not at all in hypothetical, imperatives. We have
also, which is of great importance, exhibited
dearly and definitely for every practical app'li-
cation the content of the categorical imperative,
which must contain the principle of all dirty if
there is such a thing at all. We have not yet,
however, advanced so far as to prove il priori that
there actually is such an imperative, that there is a
practical lawwhich commands absolutely of itself,
and without any other impulse, and that the
following ofthis law isduty....
Now Isay: man and generally any rational
being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will,
but in all his actions, whether they concern
himself or other rational beings, must be always
regarded at the same time as an end. All objectsof
the inclinations have only a conditional worth; for
if the inclinations and the wants founded on them
did not exist, then their object would be without
value. But the inclinations themselves being
sources ofwant are sofar fromhaving an absolute
worth for which they should be desired, that on
the contrary, it must be the universal wish of
every rational being to be wholly free from them.
Thus the worth of any object which is to b e
acquired by our action is always conditional.
Beings whose existence depends not on our will
but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are non-
rational beings, only a relative value as means,
and are therefore called things; rational beings, on
the contrary, are called persons, because their very
nature points them out as ends in themselves, that
is as something which must not be used merely as
means, and 50 far therefore restricts freedom of
action (and is an object of respect). These,
therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose
existence has a worth fo r us as an effort of our
action, but objective ends , that is things whose
existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for
which no other can be substituted, which they
should subserve merely as means, for otherwise
nothing whatever would possess a bs olu te w orth ;
but if all worth were conditioned and thereforecontingent, then there would be no supreme
practical principle of reason whatever.
If then there is a supreme practical principle or,
in respect of the human will, a categorical
imperative, it must be one which, being drawn
from the conception of that which is necessarily
an end for everyone because it is an a n e nd in itse lf,
constitutes an objective principle of will, and can
therefore serve as a universal practical law. The
foundation of this principle is: rational nature exis ts
es an dd in itself. Man necessarily conceives.his
• L own eXistenceas being 59: So far then this is a
: · ·"S!iVjecffue principle of human actions. But every
other rational being regards its existence similarly,
just on the same rational principle, that holds for
me: so that it is at the same time an objective
principle, from which as a supreme practical law
all laws of the will must be capable of being
deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative
will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity ,
whether in thine ow n person or in th at o f any other, in
every case as an end w ith al, never as m ea ns o nly ....
The conception of every rational being as one
whichmust consider itselfas giving all the maxims
of its will universal laws, so as to judge itselfand
its actions from this point of view-this conception
leads to another which depends on it and is very
fruitful,namely, that ofa k in gd om o f e nd s.
Bya kingdom Iunderstand the union ofdifferent
rational beings in a systemby common laws. Now
since it is by laws that ends are determined as
regards their universal validity; hence, if we
abstract from the personal differences of rational
beings, and likewise from all the content of their
private ends, we shall be able to conceiveall ends
combined in a systematic whole (including both
rational beings as ends in themselves, and also
the special ends which each may propose of
himself), that is to sa>"we can conceivea kingdom
of ends, which on the preceding principles is
possible.
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se,
lseIlIT
ise
for
.ey
is e
th;
irene
or,
:al
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ily
~lf,
an
he
et s
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Of Morality and Art 493
For all rational beings come under the law that
each of them must treat itself and all others never
merely as means, but in every case at the same time
as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic
union of rational beings by common objective
laws, i.e., a kingdom which may be called a
kingdolYl,of ends ....
3. Kant believes that animals have no moral
rights because they are not ends-in-themselves.
Why aren't animals ends-in-themselves? Do
you agree with Kant's position? Discuss.
4. The Golden Rule says that you should do
unto others as you would have them do unto
you. What is the difference between the
Golden Rule and the categorical imperative?
Explain.
5. What is the major benefit of Kant's moral
theory? What is its major weakness? Inwhat
sense would you call your own moral beliefs
Kantian? Where do your views differ from
Kant's?
D ISC USSIO N Q UE ST IO NS
1. What does it mean to treat people as "ends in
themselves"? What does it mean to treat others
"merely as a means"? Explain the difference.
2. Why does Kant believe that the good will is
the only thing that is good without qualifica-
tion? Do you agree with him? Can you think
of anything else that might. be good without
qualification? How might Kant respond to
your choice?
~6. Compare and contrast the approach to
morality found in the Bible with Kant's
approach. What are their similarities and
differences?
Stingo (PeterMact- l i co l l . rnoves to New YorkCity shortly after World War II in hopes of achieving suc-
cess as a writer. Ata Brooklyn boardinghouse, he meets Sophie Zawistowska (Meryl Streep), a Polish-
Catholic immigrant and Holocaust survivor, and Nathan (Kevin Kline), her Jewish lover. Stingo
befriends the couple and enters into their erratic world, where he witnesses Nathan's maniacal mood
swings and verbal abuse of Sophie. Later, Stingo receives a call from Nathan's brother, Larry Lawndale
(Stephen D. Newman), who reveals that Nathan is not really the successful Pfizer research biologist he
claims to be; instead, he holds a minor position in Pfizer's library and suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.
Sophie is unaware of Nathan's lies or his illness, and it soon becomes apparent to Stingo that Sophie has
some secrets of her own. As Nathan's illness progresses, he becomes frighteningly unpredictable, and
Stingo, who has fallen in love with Sophie, attempts to rescue her by taking her out of town.
On their brief trip, Stingo learns about the choice that Sophie had to make on the night the Nazis sent
her to Auschwitz with her children. Sophie reveals that she was ordered by an SSdoctor (Karlheinz Hackl)
to select one of her children to live and the other one to die. He said that ifshe did not choose one of them,
he would send both to the gas chambers. Sophie pleaded with him to no avail, and at the last moment she
tearfully told the Nazis to take her youngest child, her littlegirl, away to die. After revealing her terrible se-
cret to Stingo, Sophie and Stingo make love, but he awakens in the morning to find a note from her saying
that she has gone back to Nathan. The movie ends when Stingo returns to the boardinghouse in hopes of
finding Sophie. Instead, he discovers that she and Nathan have committed suicide together.
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494 From Socrates to Cinema
The movie is based on the best-sell ing autobiographical novel by Will iam Styron. Meryl Streep won an
Oscar for her performance asSophie.
D ISC USSIO N Q UE ST IO NS
1. If you wereSophie, would you choose one of your children to live and another to die if the only
other alternative was having both die? On what basis would you morally justify your response?f
2. If presented with a choice like Sophie's, what would a Kantian do? Why?
3. Would proponents of the Koran and the Bible handle Sophie's choice in the same way?Why or why not?
4. Consider the following dialogue between Sophie and an SSDoctor:
SSDOCTOR "You may keep one of your children."
SOPHIE "I beg your pardon!"
SSDOCTOR "You may keep one of your children. The other one must go."
( -
SOPHIE "You mean, I have to choose?'~ . ~55 DOCTOR "You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a-privilege, a choice."
SOPHIE "I can't choose! I can't choose!"
-. ,"'_·1;'-
SSDOCTOR "Be quiet! Choose! Or I'll send them both over there! Make a choice!"
SOPHIE "Don't make me choose! ] can't!"
SSDOCTOR "]'11send them both over there. Shut up! Enough! I told you to shut up! Make a choice!"
SOPHIE "Don't make me choose! ] can't!"
SSDOCTOR "Take both children away!"
SOPHIE "Take my little girl! Take my baby! Take my little girl !"
The SSdoctor sayschoosing is a "privilege." Is he right? Why or why not?
5. Some might argue that choosing between her children places some moral responsibility uponSophie for the death of her little girl , whereas not having a choice places no moral responsibil ity for
the death of her children upon her. Evaluate this claim. How would a Kantian respond to i t?
6. Consider the following exchange between Wanda (Katharina Thalach), a leader in the Resistance,
and Sophie:
WANDA "All we ask of you is to translate some stolen Gestapo documents."
SOPHIE "I can't. I cannot endanger my children."
WANDA "Your children could be next."
SOPHIE "No. No. I do not want to get involved."
If you were Sophie, would you translate the documents? How would you morally justify your response?
Compare your response to those of a Kantian and proponents of the Bible and the Koran.
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ly
t?
.e,
;e?
Of Morality and Art 495
7. Consider the following dialogue between Sophie and a fellow prisoner in the shower (Eugeniusz
Priwieziencew):
PRISONER "Will you help the Resistance?"
SOPHIE "But what can I do?"
PRtSbNER "Emmi Hoess has a radio. Her room. is under her father's office ... where you will work.
Myou could get the radio ... bring it down here, I could smuggle it out."
SOPHIE "Sure, sure. Igive you the radio ... you smuggle it out, and I get shot for stealing it."
PRISONER "That's why you' must make Hoess trust you."
SOPHIE "But how?"
PRISONER "He is a man ... and you are awoman ... "
SOPHIE "Of course! Bald, starvinq_,stinking of germicides. Wry impressive!"
PRISONER "You're wrong. You look German. You speakcultured German. You'll be working with
him alone ... and he's an unhappy man." •
~, - .
If you were Sophie, would you help th,i t'reslsti:fn;te by making Hoess a "happy" man? How would
you morally justify your response? Compareyour response to a Kantian response.
8. Consider this discussion between Dr. Lawndale and 5tingo:
DR. LAWNDALE "This, uh, ... biologist business is my brother's masquerade. He has no degree of
any kind. All that is a simple fabrication. The truth is he's quite mad."
STINGO /lChrist!"
DR. LAWNDALE "It's one of those conditions where weeks, months, even years go by without man-
ifestations, and then pow! Oh, he has a job at Pfizer in the company library, ... where he can do ...
without bothering anyone, and occasionally he does a I i ttle research for one of the legitimate biolo-
gists on the staff .... I'm not sure Nathan would forgive me if he knew that I told you. He made me
swear never to tell Sophie. She knows nothing."
STINGO "What can I do?/I
DR. LAWNDALE "If he could stay off the drugs, he might have a chance."
STINGO "The drugs ... what is he on?"
DR. LAWNDALE "Benzodrine-cocaine. You didn't know?"
STINGO "No, I did not."
DR. LAWNDALE /II don't want to sound like I'm asking you to spy, but if you could simply keep tabs
on him and report back to me by phone from time to time, letting me know how he's getting on. I'm
sorry to have to involve you this way./I
STINGO "I don't think you understand ... I love them both-they're friends of mine."
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496 From Socrates to Cinema
Could a Kantian morally justify Stingo's lying to Sophie about Nathan's medical condition and job
status? Why or why not? Compare the Kantian response with a response from a Confucian and a
proponent of the Koran. Which response do you prefer, and why?
9. Which of the following approaches to morality is closest to that practiced by Sophie during and after
the war: [udeo-Christianity (the Bible), Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam law (the Koran), virtue theory
(Aristotle), or Kantianism? Why?
JOHN STUART M ILL
UTILITARIANISM
ohn Stuart Mill explains morality in terms of the principle of utility, or the greatest-
happiness principle. According to the principle of utility, we should attempt to produce
the greatest balance of happiness qver unhappiness. However, in this selection, Mill
seeks to differentiate his brand of utilitarianism from that of his predecessor ana mentor,
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the "fathel'~'e'0f.utilitarianism. ArouIld the age of fourteen, Mill
discovered the philosophy of Bentham,' WhOSE;works gave him "a creed, a doctrine, aphilosophy ... a religion."
One of the major differences between Bentham's utilitarianism and Mill's is that
Bentham's is based on considerations regarding the quantity of pleasure or pain (intensity,
duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity, purity, and extent), whereas Mill's is focused on the
quality of pleasure or pain, distinguishing the higher human pleasures from the lower human
pleasures. Whereas Bentham's utilitarianism made the criterion of ethics the production of the
greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain, Mill makes a distinction between
"higher pleasures," which are of more value, and "lower pleasures," which are of lesser value.
Milt then, unlike Bentham, distinguishes between happiness and mere sensual pleasure. "It is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied," said Milt "better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Whereas Bentham tells us to maximize the sum of pleasure,
Mill tells us to maximize the sum of higher pleasure. Consequently, Mill's utilitarianism is
sometimes called e ud aim on is tic u tilita ria nism (e ud aim on ia is Greek for "happiness") to
distinguish itfrom Bentham's h e do n is tic u til it ar ia n ism ( he do n e is Greek for "pleasure").
In general, utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist (or teleological) moral theory in that
it attempts to locate the morality of actions in their nonmoral consequences. In addition to
eudaimonistic and hedonistic utilitarianism, utilitarianism may be divided into act and rule
utilitarianism. Ac t u ti li ta r ia n ism judges the rightness or wrongness of an action on a case-by-
case basis according to the utilitarian principle. Rule u t il it a rian ism uses the utilitarian principle
to judge moral rules, not individual actions, by examining the effects on overall happiness of
rules. There are some problems with rule utilitarianism, not only because it is far from clear
how to apply the principle to rules but also because rules that allow for exceptions seem better
than those that do not, and making exceptions threatens to reduce rule utilitarianism to act
utilitarianism. The following is a selection from Mill's Utili tarianism (1863). A biographical
sketch of Mill appears in chapter 1.
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an d job
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Of Moralit y and Art 497
. . . The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle,
holds that actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
.intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To
give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the
theory, much more requires to be said; in particular,
what things it includes: in the ideas of pain and
pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open
question. But these supplementary explanations do
not affect the theory of life on which this theory of
morality is grounded-namely, that pleasure, and
freedom from pain, are the only thlngs desirable as
ends; and that allIdesirable things (which are as
numerous in the utilitarian as in any othen scheme)
are desirable either for the pleasure inherent l:n
themselves, or as a means to the promotion.eof
pleasure and the prevention ofpain. . " . I ,
,,' Now, such a theory of life excites inmany minds,
and among them illsome of the most estimable in
feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose
that life has (as they express it) no higher end than
pleasure---no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and
groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to
whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very
early period, contemptuously likened; and modern
holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the
subject of equally polite comparisons by its
German, French, and English assailants.
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always
answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who
represent human nature in a degrading light; since
the accusation supposes human beings to be
capable of no pleasures except those of which swine
are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge
could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer
an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were
precisely the same to human beings and to swine,
the rule of life which is good enough for the one
would be good enough for the other. The
comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is
felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's
pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conception
of happiness. Human beings have faculties more
elevated than the animal appetites, and when once
made conscious of them, do not regard anything a
happiness which does not include their
gratification. I do not, indeed; consider the
Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in
drawing out their scheme of consequences from theutilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient
manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements
require to be included. But there is no known
Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to
the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and
imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much
higher~ value as pleasures than to those of mere
sensation, It must be admitted, however, that
utilitarian writers ill general have placed the
superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly
in the greater permanency; safety, uncostliness, etc.
of the former-that is, in their circumstantial
advantages rather than illtheir intrinsic nature. And
on all these points utilitarians have fully proved
their case; but they might have taken the other, and,
as it may be called, higher ground, with entire
consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle
of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds o
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than
others. Itwould be absurd that while, in estimating
all other things, quality is considered as well as
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be
supposed to depend on quantity alone.
If Iam asked, what Imean by difference o
quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure
more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure,
except its being greater inamount, there is but one
possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one
which all or almost all who have experience o
both give a decided preference, irrespective of any
feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the
more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by
those who are competently acquainted with both,
placed so far above the other that they prefer it
even though knowing it to be attended with a
great amount of discontent, and would not resign
it for any quantity of the other pleasure which
their nature is capable of, we are justified in
ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority
ill quantity, so far out-weighing quantity as to
render it, in comparison, of small account.
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498 From Socrateso Cinema
Nowit is anunquestionablefact that thosewho being whose capacitiesof enjoyment are low, has
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable the greatest chanceof having them fully satisfied;
ofappreciatingand enjoying,both, do give amost and a highly endowed being will always feelthat
marked preference to the manner of existence any happiness which he can look for,as the world
which employs their higher faculties.Fewhuman isconstituted, isimperfect.Buthecanlearn tobear
creatureswould consent tobe changedinto anyof its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and
the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest they will not make him envy the being who is
allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent - indeed unconscious of the imperfections,but only
human being would consent to be a fool, no because he feelsnot at all the good which those
instructed person would be an ignoramus, no imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human
person of feeling and consciencewould be selfish being dissatisfiedthan a pig satisfied;better to be
and base, even though they should be persuaded Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if
that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion,it is
satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. because they only know their own side of the
They would not resign what they possess more question. .The other party to the comparison
thanhefor themost completesatisfactionofall the knowsboth sides.
desires which they have in commonwith him. If Itmaybe objected,that many who are capable
they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of of the higher pleasures, occasionally,under the
unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it influence of temptation, postpone them to the. ~theywould exchangetheirlot for almostany other, lower. But this is quite compatible.with a full
however undesirablein their own eyes.Abelpg of ~ appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the
higher facultiesrequiresmore tomakehin;fhappy,--;;;higher. Men often, from infirmity of character,
is capable probably of more acute suffering, and I make their election for the nearer good, though
~ertainlyaccessibleto itatmorepoints, than oneof they know it to be the less valuable; and this no
an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities,he less when the choice is between two bodily
can never reallywish to sink intowhat he feels to pleasures, than when it is between bodily and
be a lower grade of existence.Wemay give what mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the
explanation we please of this unwillingness; we injury of health, though perfectly aware that
may attribute it to pride, a name which is given health is the greater good. It may be further
indiscriminatelyto some of the most and to some objected, that many who begin with youthful
of the least estimable feelings of which mankind enthusiasmfor everythingnoble, as they advance
are capable;we may refer it to the love of liberty in years sink into indolence and selfishness.But I
and personal independence, an appeal to which do not believe that those who undergo this very
waswith the Stoicsone ofthemost effectivemeans common change, voluntarily choose the lower
for the inculcationof it; to the love of power, or to description of pleasures in preference to the
the love of excitement, both of which do really higher. I believe that before they devoteenter into and contribute to it; but its most themselves exclusively to the one, they have
appropriate appellationisa senseofdignity,which already become incapable of the other. Capacity
all human beings possess in one form or another, for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very
and in some, though by no means in exact, tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile
proportionto theirhigherfaculties,and whichis so influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and
essentiala part ofthe happiness of those inwhom in the majority of young persons it speedily dies
it is strong, that nothing which conflictswith it away if the occupationsto which their position in
could be, otherwisethan momentarily,an objectof lifehas devoted them, and the societyinto which
desire to them. Whoever supposes that this it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping
preferencetakes placeat a sacrificeof happiness- that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their
that the superior being, in anything like equal high aspirations as they lose their intellectual
circumstances,is not happier than the inferior- tastes, because they have not time or opportunity
confounds the two very different ideas, of for indulging them; and they addict themselves to
happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately
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low, has
atisfied:
feel that
e world
tobear
ble; and
: who is
but only
ch thoseI human
ter to be
. And if
.ion, it is
= of the
aparison
capable
ider the
l to the
h a full
r of the
haracter,
though
I this no
I bodily
lily and
s to the
ar e that
further
(outhful
advance
ss. ButI
his very
e lower
to the
devote
~y have
=apacity
, a very
hostile
tee: and
lily dies
sition in
a which
keeping
,se their
ellectual
ortunity
ielves to
berately
prefer them, but because they are either the only
ones to which they have access, or the only ones
which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It
may be questioned whether anyone who has
remained equally susceptible to both classes of
pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred
the)ower; though many, in all ages, have broken
down in an ineffectual attempt to combineboth.
. From thisverdict ofthe only competent judges,
Iapprehend there canbe no appeal. On a question
which is the best worth having of two pleasures,
or which of two modes of existence is the most
grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral
attributes and from its consequences, the
judgment of those who are qualified by
knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the
majority among them, must be admitted as final.
And there needs to be the lesshesitation to accept
this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures,
since there is no other tribunal to be referred \0even on the question of quantity. Whilt~eans <ire
there of determining which is the a<;utesf;of ¥ \ . v a
pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable
,.' sensations, except the general suffrage of those
who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor
pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always
heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to
decide whether a particular pleasure is worth
purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except
the feelings and judgment of the experienced?
When, therefore, those feelings and judgment
declare the pleasures derived from the higher
faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the
question ofintensity, to those ofwhich the animal
nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is
susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the
same regard.
Ihave dwelt on this point, asbeing a necessary
part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or
Happiness; considered as the directive rule of
human conduct. But it is by no means an
indispensable condition to the acceptance of the
utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the
agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest
amount of happiness altogether; and if it may
possibly be doubted whether a noble character is
always the happier for its nobleness, there can be
no doubt that it makes other people happier, and
that the world in general is immensely a gainerby
it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its
OfMorality and Art 49
end by the general cultivation of nobleness o
character, even if each individual were onl
benefited by the nobleness ofothers, and his own
so far as happiness is concerned, were a shee
deduction from the benefit. But the ba
enunciation of such an absurdity as this las
renders refutation superfluous.
According to the Greatest Happiness Principl
as above explained, the ultimate end, wit
reference to and for the sake of which all othe
things are desirable (whether we are considerin
our own good or that of other people), is a
existence exempt as far aspossible frompain, an
as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point o
quantity and quality; the test of quality, and th
rule for measuring it against quantity, being th
preference felt by thosewho in their opportunitie
ofexperience, towhich must be added their habi
of self-consciousness and self-observation, a
best furnished with the means of comparison
This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion
the end of human action, is necessarily also th
standard of morality; which may accordingly b
defined, the rules and precepts for huma
conduct, by the observance ofwhich an existenc
such as has been described might be, to th
greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind
and not to them only, but, so far as the nature o
things admits, to thewhole sentient creation....
The objectors to utilitarianism cannot alway
be charged with representing it in a discreditabl
light. On the contrary, those among them wh
entertain anything like a just idea of i
disinterested character, sometimes find fault wit
its standard as being too high for humanity. The
say it is exacting too much to require that peopl
shall always act from the inducement o
promoting the general interests of society.But th
is to mistake the very meaning of a standard o
morals, and confound the rule of action with th
motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell u
what are our duties, or by what testwemay know
them; but no system of ethics requires that th
solemotive of all we do shall be a feelingof duty
on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all ou
actions are done from other motives, and rightl
so done, if the rule of duty does not condem
them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism tha
this particular misapprehension should bemade
ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitaria
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500 FromSocrates to Cinema
moralists have gone beyond almost all others in It has already been remarked, that questions of
affirming that the motive has nothing to do with ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the
the morality of the action, though much with the ordinary acceptation of the term. Tobe incapable
worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow- of proof by reasoning is common to all first
creature from drowning does what is morally principles; to the first premises of our knowledge,
right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of as well as to those of our conduct. But the former,
being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the being matters of fact,may be the subject of a direct
friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if appeal to the faculties which judge of fact~
his object be to serve another friend to whom he is namely, our senses, and our internal conscious-
under greater obligation. But to speak only of ness. Can an appeal be made to the same faculties
actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct on questions of practical ends? Or by what other
obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of faculty iscognizance taken of them?
the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as Questions about ends are, in other words,
implying that people should fix their minds upon questions about what things are desirable. The
so wide a generality as the world, or society at utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable,
large. The great majority of good actions are and the only thing desirable as an end; all other
intended not for the benefit of the world, but for things being oniy desirable as means to that end.
that of individuals, of which the good of the What ought to be required of this doctrine----what
world is made up; and the thoughts of the most conditions is,it to requisite that the doctrine should
virtuous man need not on these occasions travel • fulfil~to make good its claimtobebelieved?
beyond the particular persons concerned, except TEe only proof capable of being given that an
so far as is necessary to assure himself that irr" ~"~;Objetts visible, is that people actually see it. The
benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that 'onlyproof that a sound is audible, is that people
is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of hear it: and so of the other sources of our
anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, experience. Inlike manner, I apprehend, the sole
according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of evidence it is possible to produce that anything is
virtue: the occasions on which any person (except desirable, isthat people do actually desire itIfthe
one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to
on an extended scale, in other words to be a itself were not, in theory and in practice,
public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever
these occasions alone is he called on to consider convince any person that it was so. No reason can
public utility; in every other case, private utility, be given why the general happiness is desirable,
the interest or happiness of some few persons, is except that each person, so far as he believes it to
all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence be attainable, desires his own happiness. This,
of whose actions extends to society in general, however, being a fact, we have not only all the
need concern themselves habitually about solarge proof which the case admits of, but allwhich it is
an object. In the case of abstinences indeed-of possible to require, that happiness is a good: that
things which people forbear to do from moral each person's happiness is a good to that person,
considerations, though the consequences in the and the general happiness, therefore, a good to
particular case might be beneficial-it would be the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made
unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and
consciously aware that the action is of a class consequently one of the criteria ofmorality.
which, if practiced generally, would be generally But ithas not, by this alone, proved itself to be
injurious, and that this is the ground of the the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by
obligation to abstain from it. The amount of the same rule, necessary to show, not only that
regard for the public interest implied in this people desire happiness, but that they never
recognition, is no greater than is demanded by desire anything else....
every system of morals, for they all enjoin to Wehave now then, an answer to the question,
abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to of what sort of proof the principle of utility is
society. . . . susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated
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Of Morality and Art 501
, of
the
ble
irst
ge,
ier,
ect
t-
us-ies
:let
fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless
for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it
as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that
to desire anything, except in proportion as the
idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and
metaphysical impossibility.
ds,
neile,
aer
nd ,
hat
lid
is psychologically h·ue-if human nature is so
constituted as to desire nothing which is not either
a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we
can have no other proof, and we require no other,
that these are the only things desirable. If so,
happiness is the sale end of human action, and the
promotion of it the test by which to judge of all
humanrconduct: from whence it necessarily
follo,ws that it must be the criterion of morality;since a part is included illthe whole. 1. What is Mill's principle of utility? What does
And now to decide whether this is really so; he mean by "utility"? Does he mean the same
whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but thing as Bentham? Explain.
that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the 2. How does Mill explain the fact that some
absence is a pain; we have evidently arrived at a people choose lower pleasures over higher
question of fact and experience, dependent, like pleasures? Do you agree with his assessment?
all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only 3 How does Mill prove the princi 1 f utility?. peo .be determined by practiced self-consciousness D j. with hi f? E pl .o yuu agree 1 s proo. x am.and self-observation, assisted by obse-rvation ofothers. I believe that these" sources of evidence, 4. What are some objections that might be raised
impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a against Mill's eudaimonistic utilitarianism?
thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and ~ How might he respond to them? '
thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely _.,,; 5. Both Mill arid Aristotle utilize concepts of
inseparable, or rather two parts of the sin-rie "happiness" in their moral theories. What arephenomenon; in strictness of language, two their similarities and differences? Which do
different modes of naming the same psychological you prefer, and why?
D IS CU SS IO N QUE ST IO NS
an
.he
pIeur
ole
~isthe
to
Ic e ,
"er
ian
ile,
:to
lis,
the
tis
hat
Former University ofAustin philosophy professor David Gale (KevinSpacey) is sentenced to death for
the rape and murder of his leukemia-stricken colleague Constance Harraway (Laura Linney). Ironi-
cally, both David and Constance were also leading activists for Death Watch, a group opposed to
capital punishment inTexas.A week before his execution, David asks to speak with journalist BitseyBloom
(Kate Winslet) to tell his story. Bitsey and her intern, Zack Stemmons (Gabriel Mann), fly to Texas to cover
the story, and, as the interviews progress, Bitsey learns more than she bargained for. First,David reveals to
Bitsey that he thinks someone is framing him because the method of death that he mentioned once in an
article was used to kill Constance. Furthermore, the murderer left a tripod in the room with Constance's
body, which David feels was intended to taunt him since he knows that evidence of the real crime exists
somewhere. Later,Bitsey finds a mysterious "death tape" in her motel room that shows Constance dying by
the method that David had previously mentioned to her.
Afterfinding the tape, Bitsey and Zack go on a desperate search for the truth. Bitsey notes that the tape
shows Constance struggling only as she runs out of air; she does not struggle from the beginning as she
would if someone put her in this position against her will. Bitsey believes this means that Constance killed
on,
to
de
d
be
by
at
er
on,. is
ed
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502 From Socrates to Cinema
herself. Furthermore, Bitsey arrives at the conclusion that Dusty Wright (Matt Craven), a death penalty oppo-
nent and dose friend of Constance, was supposed to release a more complete version of the tape showing
that Constance killed herself, thus proving Death Watch's point that an innocent man can be sentenced to
death. Bitsey and lack believe that Dusty is a zealot who was supposed to release the tape soon after David's
sentencing but held onto it over the years because he believes that an innocent man being put to death is more
politically powerful than an innocent man almost being put to death. Bitsey and lack raid Dusty's house and
find the original tape that shows Constance putting the bag over her own head. Bitsey then races against time
to getthe video to the authorities before David is put to death. However, she is too late and arrives only tofind out that David has been executed via lethal injection. What Bitsey does not bargain for is subsequently
receiving an extended tape labeled "Off the Record." This version shows that David was aware of the cir-
cumstances surrounding Constance's death and that he even played a role in the plan himself.
D ISC USSIO N Q UE ST IO NS
1. How far would you be willing to go to support your beliefs or principles] Would you, like David and
Constance, sacrifice your life to prove that innocent persons.can be executed? Why or why not?
2. Would a utilitarian be able to justify Constance's actions? Why or why not?t
3. Would a utilitarian be able to justify David's actiqns? Why or why not?
4. Is it ever morally justifiable to sacrifice ¥o"ur own-life in an effort to save innocent persons"? Compare
Kantian and util itarian responses to th~s.,qtJefitioQ;Which do you prefer, and why?,,- . I
5. Consider the following dialogue between David and Bitsey:
DAVID "Constance was murdered by what is known as the Secure Tot Method. You're handcuffed,
forced to swallow the key; your mouth is taped, and a bag is sealed around your head, and you're left
there to suffocate. The Secure Tot did it to Romanians when they wouldn't inform or confess. Sometimes
the bag was ripped off your head at the last moment to give you a second chance; otherwise, you died
knowing that the key to yourfreedom was inside of you the entire time. It's a cheap but effective method.
The problem is I o nce mentioned it in an article that Iw rote. Prosecution never knew that."
BITSEY "Someone's framing you?"
DAVID "Oh, it's more than that. There was a tripod."
BITSEY "Right~facing her body. Back on the record?"
DAVID "Yes. The tripod had no fingerprints on it. That means that somebody brought it there, set itup, wiped it dean and left it. Why? It's as if they wanted me to know that somewhere out there is a
record of exactly what happened that afternoon. As if they wanted me to die knowing that the key to
my freedom is out there somewhere."
BITSEY "Maybe you're being paranoid."
DAVID "Ms. Bloom, I used to be the state's leading death penalty abolitionist, and now I'm on death
row. Doesn't that strike you as a little odd?"
BITSEY "Any idea who they are?"
DAVID "No, but I've got someone working on that=someone I'm relying on to prove my innocence."
BITSEY "Belyeu's hired a detective?"
DAVID "A journalist. She has to help me. You know I'm innocent."
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oppo-
owing
:ed to
'avid's
more
e and
ttime
nly to
iently
e cir-
BITSEY "No, that's how she thought.Come 91\/hink about it! This Woman lived for Death Watch. If
she's gonna die anyway, why not die for it? 11)3t 's vyhythe tripod was here to record proof-undeniableproof! That's why we got the video!"
lACK "So a dead woman put the tape in your room?"
BITSEY "No, of course not. Imean, she needed help-someone to keep it, release it-someone ded-
icated to the cause-someone she could trust."
Of Morality and Art 503
BITSEY "No-no, I don't."
What is the meaning of "innocent"? Do you think David is an "innocent" man? Why or why not? Is
the meaning of "innocence" in David's case the same as the meaning of "innocence" in the case of
a person falsely convicted of a murder and put to death for that crime? Discuss.
6. Consider the following dialogue between lack and Bitsey:
ZACK "Why make it look like a murder?"
~. -.
BITSEY "I don't know. It's so calculated. She's handcuffed, taped at the mouth, the gloves, the tripod."
lACK "Why, Bitsey? Why fake your own murder? It doesn't make sense. The woman's a bleeding
heart abolitionist. Why frame an innocent man? Why send Gale to the chair, for what?"
BITSEY "What?"
and lACK "Well, she had to know some innocent jerk would take the fall."
BITSEY "Oh my God, lack. That's it. That's why-to prove it'lhappens. To have absolute proof that ther
system convicts inpocents."
lACK "Get outta here!"pare
ffed,
left
irnes
died
:hod.Do David and Constance succeed in absolutely proving their point that innocent persons are
executed? Why or why not?
7. Consider the following exchange between Bitsey and lack:
BITSEY "Dusty's a bullhorner, a zealot who's OD'd on too many good causes. You know, the original
plan was probably to release the tape after Gale's conviction; you know, after a year or so-It would
et it force him to dry out, give him back his dignity. So Dusty Wright is sitting on this tape, waiting, and he'sis a the only one who knows about it. So good 01 ' Dusty starts to think that an erroneous execution is a lot
y to more politically useful than a last-minute save."
lACK "Because a last-minute save would only prove the system works."
BITSEY "Almost martyrs don't count-Dusty's thinking: 'What's one murder if it stops thousands?'"
eathlACK "'So, I release the tape only after the execution.'"
BITSEY "Which means he must have the original somewhere."
If you were Dusty, would allow David to be executed, or would you step in at the last moment and
make him an "almost martyr"? Morally justify your response. Do you agree with the reasoning attrib-
uted to Dusty: "What's one murder if it stops thousands?"
ce."
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504 From Socrates to Cinema
J AMES RACHELS
EGOISM AND MORAL SKEPTICISM
ames Rachels distinguishes between two types of egoism: psychological and ethical.
P sy ch olo gic al e go is m is the view that all people are selfish in everything they do.
According to the psychological egoist, the only motive from which any of us ever acts is
s elf- in te re sj: .·E th ic al e go is m , unlike psychological egoism, is a normative view about howpeople ought to act. The ethical egoist believes that we have no obligation to do anything
except what is in our own self-interest. According to the ethical egoist, whatever we do in our
own self-interest, regardless of its effect on others, is morally justified. In this selection, Rachels
lays out a number of difficulties with both types of egoism.
James Rachels (1941~2003) was university professor at the University of Alabama,
Birmingham, where he had taught since 1977. He received his B.A. from Mercer College and
his PhD. from the University of North Carolina. He also taught at Duke University, the
University of Richmond, New York University, and the University of Miami. He is the author
of T he E nd o f L ife : E utha na sia an d M ora lity (1986), C reated from Anim als: The M oral Im plica tions o f
Darwinism (1991), C an E thics P rovide Answ ers? Al1 d O ther E ssays in M oral P hilosophy (1997) and
The E lements o f Moral P hilosophy (4th ed., 2(02). The following selection is from A New
In tr od uc tio n to P h il os op hy (ed. Steven M. Cahn, ~971~,'~;"
Our ordinary thinking about morality is full of
assumptions that we almost never question. We
assume, for example, that we have an obligation
to consider the welfare of other people when we
decide what actions to perform or what rules to
obey;we think that we must refrain fromactingin
ways harmful to others, and that we must respect
their rights and interests as well as our own. We
also assume that people are in fact capable of
being motivated by such considerations, that is,
that people are not wholly selfish and that they do
sometimes act in the interests of others.
Both of these assumptions have come under
attack by moral skeptics, as long ago as by
Glaucon in Book II of Plato's Republ ic . Glaucon
recalls the legend of Gyges, a shepherd who was
said to have found a magic ring in a fissure
opened by an earthquake. The ring would make
its wearer invisible and thus would enable him to
go anywhere and do anything undetected. Gyges
used the power of the ring to gain entry to the
Royal Palace where he seduced the Queen,
murdered the King, and subsequently seized the
throne. Now Glaucon asks us to imagine that
there are two such rings, one given to a man of
virtue and one given to a rogue. The rogue, of
course, will use his ring unscrupulously and do
anything necessary to .increase his own wealth
and power.Hewill recognizeno moral constraints
on his conduct, and, since the cloak of invisibility
will protect him from discovery, he can do
anything he pleases without fear of reprisal. So
therewill be no end to the mischief hewill do. But
how will the so-called virtuous man behave?
Glaucon suggests that he will behave no better
than the rogue: "No one, it is commonly believed,
would have such ironstrength ofmind as to stand
fast in doing right or keep his hands off other
men's goods, when he could go to the market-
place and fearlessly help himself to anything he
wanted, enter houses and sleep with any woman
he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his
pleasure, and in a word go about among men
with the powers of a god. He would behave no
better than the other; both would take the same
course." Moreover, why shouldn't he? Once he is
freed from the fear of reprisal, why shouldn't a
man Simplydo what hepleases, orwhat he thinks
isbest forhimself?What reason is there forhim to
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meal.
r do.
ICtsis
how
thing
IIour
chels
lama,
~and
" the
rthor
ms o]
land
New
an of
I e , of
id do
realth
mints
bility
tl do
tl . So
). But
lave?
Jetter
eved,stand
other
rrket-
19 he
rman
It his
men
re no
same
he is11't a
links
imto
continue being "moral" when it is clearly not to
his own advantage to do so?
These skeptical views suggested by Glaucon
have come to be known as p s yc ho log ic a l e go ism and
e th i ca l e go ism , respectively. Psychological egoism is
the view that all men are selfish in everything that
they do, that is, that the only motive from which
anyone ever acts is self-interest. On this view, even
wheiJ.men are acting in ways apparently calculatedto benefit others, they are actually motivated by
the belief that acting in this way is to their own
advantage, and if they did not believe this, they
would not be doing that action. Ethical egoism is,
by contrast, a normative view about how men
ought to act. It is the view that, regardless of how
men do in fact behave, they have no obligation to
do anything except what is in their own interests.
According to the ethical egoist, a person is always
justified in doing whatever is in his own interest,
regardless of the effect on others. ' t,
Clearly, if either of these views is correct, then "-
"the moral institution of life" (to use Butief.'gwell..;;'• . I
turned phrase) is very different than what we ,"normally think. The majority of mankind is
grossly deceived about what is, or ought to be, the
case, where morals are concerned.
II
Psychological egoism seems to fly in tile face of the
facts. We are tempted to say, "Of course people act
unselfishly all the time. For example, Smith gives up
a trip to the country, which he would have enjoyed
very much, in order to stay behind and help a friend
with his studies, which is a miserable way to pass
the time. This is a perfectly clear case of unselfish
behavior, and if the psychological egoist thinks that
such cases do not occur, then he is just mistaken."
Given such obvious instances of "unselfish
behavior," what reply can the egoist make? There
are two general arguments by which he might try to
show that allactions, including those such as the one
just outlined, are in fact motivated by self-interest.
Let us examine these in turn:
A. The first argument goes as follows. If we
describe one person's action as selfish, and
another person's action as unselfish, we are
overlooking the crucial fact that in both cases,
assuming that the action is done voluntarily, th e
agen t is m ere ly do ing what he m ost w ants to do . If
Smith stays behind to help his friend, that only
Of Morality and Art 505
shows that he wanted to help his friend more than
he wanted to go to the country, And why should
he be praised for his "unselfishness" when he is
only doing what he most wants to do? So, since
Smith is only doing what he wants to do, he
cannot be said to be acting unselfishly.
This argument is so bad that it would not
deserve to be taken seriously except for the fact that
so many otherwise intelligent people have beentaken in by it. First, the argument rests on the
premise that people never voluntarily do anything
except what they want to do. But this is patently
false; there are at least two classes of actions that are
exceptions to this generalization. One is the set of
actions which we may not want to do, but which
we do anyway as a means to an end which we want
to achieve; for example, going to the dentist in order
to stop a toothache, or going to work every day in
order to be able to draw our pay at the end of the
month. These cases may be regarded as consistent
with the spirit of the egoist argument, however,
since the ends mentioned are wanted by the agent .
But the other set of actions are those which we do,not because we want to, nor even because there is
an end which we want to achieve, but because we
feel ourselves u nd er a n o blig atio n to do them. For
example, someone may do something because he
has promised to do it, and thus feels obligated, even
though he does not want to do it. It is sometimes
suggested that in such cases we do the action
because, after all, we want to keep our promises; so,
even here, we are doing what we want. However,
this dodge will not work: IfIhave promised to do
something, and if Ido not want to do it, then it is
simply false to say that Iwant to keep my promise.
Insuch cases we feel a conflict precisely because we
do not want to do what we feel obligated to do. Itis
reasonable to think that Smith's action falls roughly
into this second category: He might stay behind, not
because he wants to, but because he feels that his
friend needs help.
But suppose we were to concede, for the sake
of the argument, that all voluntary action is
motivated by the agent's wants, or at least that
Smith is so motivated. Even if these were granted,
itwould not follow that Smith is acting selfishly
or from self-interest. For if Smith wants to do
something that will help his friend, even when it
means forgoing his own enjoyments, that is
precisely what makes him unselfish. What else
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506 From Socrates to Cinema
could unselfishness be, if not waning to help unselfish man precisely the one who does derive
others? Another way to put the same point is to satisfaction from helping others, while the selfish
say that it is the object of a want that determines man does not? If Lincoln "got peace of mind"
whether it is selfish or not. Themere fact that I am from rescuing the piglets, does this show him to
acting on my wants does not mean that I am be selfish, or, on the contrary, doesn't it show him
acting selfishly; that depends on what it is that I to be compassionate and good-hearted? (If a man
want. If I want only my own good, and care were truly selfish, why should it bother his
nothing for others, then I am selfish; but if I also conscience that others suffer-much less pigs?)
want other people tobe well-offand happy, and if Similarly,it isnothing more than shabby sophistry
I act on that desire, then my action is not selfish. to say, because Smith takes satisfaction in helping
Somuch for this argument. his friend, that he is behaving selfishly: If we say
B. The second argument for psychological this rapidly, while thinking about something else,
egoism is this. Since so-called unselfish actions perhaps it will sound all right; but if we speak
always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the slowly,and pay attention to what we aresaying, it
agent, and since this sense of satisfaction is a sounds plain silly.
pleasant state of consciousness.Jt follows that the Moreover, suppose we ask why Smith derives
point of the action is really to achieve a pleasant satisfactionfromhelping hisfriend. Theanswer will
state of consciousness, rather than to bring about be, it isbecauseSmithcares for him and wants him
any good for others. Therefore, the action is to succeed.If Smith did not have these concerns,
"unselfish" only at a superficial level of'analysis.. then~he would take no pleasure in assisting him;
Smith will feel much better with himself fat andthese concerns,as v,rehave already seen, are the
having stayed to help his friend-if he had go~e ~-";masks of unselfishness; not selfishness. Toput the
to the country, he would have felt terrible about . point more generally: If we have a positiveattitude
it=-and., that is the real point of the action. toward the attainment of some goal, then we may
According to a well-known story, this argument derive satisfactionfrom attaining that goal. But the
was onceexpressed byAbraham Lincoln: object ofour attitude is t he a tt a inment of t ha t g oa l; and
we must want to attain the goal before we can find
any satisfaction ill it. We do not, ill other words,
desiresomesortof "pleasurable consciousness"and
then try to figure out how to achieve it; rather, we
desire all sorts of different things-money, a new
fishing-boat, to be a better chess-player, to get a
promotion in our work, etc.-and because we
desire these things, we derive satisfaction from
attaining them. And so, if someone desires the
welfare and happiness of another person, he will
derivesatisfactionfromthat; but this doesnot mean
that this satisfaction is the object of his desire, or
thathe is inanyway selfishon accountofit.
It is a measure of the weakness of psycho-
logicalegoism that these insupportable arguments
are the ones most often advanced in its favor.
Why, then, should anyone ever have thought it a
true view? Perhaps because of a desire for
theoretical simplicity: In thinking about human
conduct, it would be nice if there were some
simple formula that would unite the diverse
phenomena of human behavior, under a single
explanatory principle, just as simple formulae in
physics bring together a great many apparently
Mr. Lincoln once remarked to a fellow-passenger on
an old-time mud-coach that all men were prompted
by selfishness in doing good. His fellow-passenger
was antagonizing this position when they were pass-
ing over a corduroy bridge that spanned a slough. As
they crossed this bridge they espied an old razor-
backed sow on the bank making a terrible noise be-
cause her pigs had got into the slough and were in
danger of drowning. As the old coach began to climb
the hill, Mr. Lincoln called out, "Driver, can't you stopjust a moment?" Then Mr. Lincoln jumped out, ran
back, and lifted the little pigs out of the mud and wa-
ter and placed them on the bank When he returned,
his companion remarked: "Now Abe, where does self-
ishness come in on this little episode?" "Why, bless
your soul, Ed, that was the very essence of selfishness,
Ishould have had no peace of mind all day had I gone
on and left that suffering old sow worrying over those
pigs. I did it to get peace of mind, don't you see?"
This argument suffers from defects similar to
the previous one. Why should we think that
merely because someone derives satisfaction from
helping others this makes him selfish? Isn't the
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different phenomena. And since it is obvious that The last two paragraphs show (a ) that is it false
self-regard is an overwhelmingly important factor that an actions are selfish, and (b ) that it is false
in motivation, it is only natural to wonder that all actions are done out of self-interest. And it
whether all motivation might not be explained in should be noted that these two points can be
these terms. But the answer is clearly No; while a made, and were, without any appeal to putative
great many human actions are motivated entirely examples of altruism.
or in part by self-interest, only by a deliberate The third confusion is the common but false
distortiorr.'of the facts can we say that all conduct assumption that a concern for one's own welfare
is so motivated. This will be clear, I think, if we is incompatible with any genuine concern for thecorrect three confusions which are commonplace. welfare of others. Thus, since it is obvious that
The exposure of these confusions will remove the everyone (orvery nearly everyone) does desire his
last traces of plausibility from the psychological own well-being, it might be thought that no one
egoist thesis. can really be concerned with others. But again,
The first is the confusion of selfishness with this is false. There is no inconsistency in desiring
self-interest. The two are clearlynot the same. IfI that everyone, including oneself an d others, be
see a physician when Iam feeling poorly, Iam well-off and happy. Tobe sure, it may happen on
acting in my own interest but no one would think occasion that our own interests conflict with the
of calling me "selfish" on account of it.Similarly, interests or others, and in these caseswe will have
brushing my teeth, working hard at my job, and to make hard choices. But even in these cases we
obeying the law are all in my self-interest but ~might 'sometimes opt for the interests of others,
none ofthese areexamples ofselfish conduct This ~especiallywhen the others involved are our family
isbecause selfishbehavior isbehavior that ignores ..: or friends. But more importantly; not all cases are
the interests of others, in circumstances in:which -',< like this. Sometimes we are able to promote the
their interests ought not to be ignored. This ' welfare of others when our own interests are not
concept has a definite evaluative flavor; to call involved at all. In these cases not even the
someone "selfish" is not just to describe his action strongest self-regard need prevent us from acting
but to condemn it. Thus, you would not call me considerately toward others.
selfish for eating a normal meal in normal Once these confusions are cleared away, it
circumstances (although it may surely be inmy seems to me obvious enough that there is no
self-interest); but you would call me selfish for reason whatever to accept psychological egoism.
hoarding food while others about are starving. On the contrary, if we simply observe people's
The second confusion is the assumption that behavior with an open mind, we may find that a
every action is done either from self-interest or great deal of it is motivated by self-regard, but by
from other-regarding motives. Thus, the egoist no means all of it; and that there is no reason to
concludes that if there is no such thing as genuine deny that "the moral institution of life" can
altruism then all actions must be done from self- include a place for the virtue ofbeneficence.
interest. But this is certainly a false dichotomy.
Theman who continues to smoke cigarettes, even
after learning about the connection between
smoking and cancer, is surely not acting fromself-
interest, not even by his own standards-self-
interest would dictate that he quit smoking at
once-s-and he is not acting altruistically either. He
is, no doubt, smoking for the pleasure of it, but all
that this shows is that undisciplined pleasure-
seeking and acting from self-interest are very
different. This is what led Butler to remark that
"ThetlUngtobe lamented is, not that men have so
great regard to their own good or interest in the
present world; for they have not enough."
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Of Morality and Art 507
III
The ethical egoist would say at this point, "Of
course it is possible for people to act altruistically,
and perhaps many people do act that way-s-but
there isno reason why they should do so.Aperson
is under no obligation to do anything except what
is inhis own interests." This is really quite a
radical doctrine. Suppose Ihave an urge to set fire
to some public building (say, a department store)
just for the fascination ofwatching the spectacular
blaze:According to this view, the fact that several
people might be burned to death provides no
reason whatever why I should not do it. After all,
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SO B From Socrates to Cinema
this only concerns their welfare, not my own, and among philosophical writers=-the argument that
according to the ethical egoist the only person I ethical egoismis at bottom inconsistent because it
need think of is myself. cannot be universalized. The argument goes like
Some might deny that ethical egoism has any this:
such monstrous consequences. They would point Tosay that any action or policy of action is right
out that it isreally to my own advantage not to set (or that it ought to be adopted) entails that it is
the fire-for, if Ldo that Imay be caught and put right for anyone in the same sort ofcircumstances.I
into prison (unlike Gyges, Ihave no magic ring cannot, for example, say that it is right forme to lie
for protectidn). Moreover, even if Icould avoid to you, and yet object when you lie to me
being caught it is still to my advantage to respect (provided, of course, that the circumstances are
the rights and interests of others, for it is to my the same).Icannot hold that it is all right for me
advantage to live in a society in which people's to drink your beer and then complain when you
rights and interests are respected. Only in such a drink mine. Thisisjust the requirement that we be
society can Ilive a happy and secure life; so, in consistent in om evaluations; it is a requirement
acting kindly toward others, Iwould merely be of logic. Now it is said that ethical egoismcannot
doing my part to create and maintain the sort of meet this requirement because, as we have
society which it is to my advantage to have. already seen, the-egoist would not want others to
Therefore, it is said, the egoist would not be such act in the same way that he acts. Moreover,
a bad man; he would be as kindly and considerate suppose he di d advocate the universal adoption of
as anyone else, because he would see that It is to .egoistlt: policies: he would be saying to Peter,
his own advantage tobe kindly and considerate. . L "Youought topmsue your own interests even ifit
Thisis a seductive line of thought, but it seems -'---~ean6 destroying Paul"; and he would be saying
to me mistaken. Certainly it is to everyone's' to Paul, "Youought to pursue yom own interestsadvantage (including the egoist's) to preserve a even if it means destroying Peter." The attitudes
stable society where people's interests are expressed in these two recommendations seem
generally protected. But there is no reason for the clearlyinconsistent---heis urging the advancement
egoist to think that merely because he will not of Peter's interest at one moment, and
honor the rules of the social game, decent society countenancing their defeat at the next. Therefore,
will collapse. For the vast majority of people are the argument goes, there is no way to maintain
not egoists, and there is no reason to think that the doctrine of ethical egoism as a consistent view
theywill be converted by his example-especially about how we ought to act. We will fall into
if he is discreet and does not unduly flaunt his inconsistencywhenever we t ry.
style of life. What this line of reasoning shows is What are we to make of this argument? Arewe
not that the egoist himself must act benevolently, to conclude that ethical egoism has been refuted?
but that he must encourage others to do so. He Sucha conclusion,Ihink, would be unwarranted;
must take care to conceal from public view his for Ithink that we can show, contrary to this
own self-centered method of decision-making, argument, how ethical egoism can be maintainedand urge others to act on precepts very different consistently, Weneed only to interpret the egoist's
from those onwhich he iswilling to act. position in a sympathetic way.Weshould say that
The rational egoist, then, cannot advocate that he has inmind a certain kind of world which he
egoism be universally adopted by everyone. For would prefer over all others; itwould be a world
he wants a world in which his own interests are in which his own interests were maximized,
maximized; and if other people adopted the regardless of the effects on other people. The
egoistic policy of pursuing their own interests to egoist's primary policy of action, then, would be
the exclusion of his interest, as he pursues his to act in such away as tobring about, asnearly as
interests to the exclusion of theirs, then such a possible, this sort ofworld. Regardless ofhowever
world would be impossible. Sohe himselfwill be morally reprehensible we might find it, there is
an egoist, but he will want others tobe altruists. nothing inconsistent in someone's adopting this as
This brings us to what is perhaps the most his ideal and acting in away calculated to bring it
popular "refutation" of ethical egoism current about. And if someone did adopt this as his ideal,
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ment that
because it
goes like
then he would not advocate universal egoism; as
we have already seen, he would want other
people to be altruists. So if he advocates any
principles of conduct for the general public, they
will be altruistic principles. This would not be
inconsistent; on the contrary, itwould be perfectly
consistent with his goal of creating a world in
his own interests are maximized. To be
he would have to be deceitful; in order tosecure the good will of others, and a favorable
hearing for his exhortations to altruism, he would
have to pretend that he was himself prepared to
accept altruistic principles. But again, that would
be all right; from the egoist's point of view, this
would merely be a matter of adopting the
necessary means to the achievement of his goal-
and while we might not approve of this, there is
nothing inconsistent about it. Again, it might be
said, "He advocates one thing, but does another.
Surely that's inconsistent." But itis not; for.what h€
advocates and what he does are both calculated as
means to an end (the same end, we ro.ight.~ote);
and as such, he is doing what is rationally requiredin each case. Therefore, contrary to the previous
argument, there is nothing inconsistent in the
ethical egoist's view. He cannot be refuted by the
claim that he contradicts himself.
Is there, then, no way to refute the ethical
egoist? If by "refute" we mean show that he has
made some logical error, the answer is that there is
not. However, there is something more that can be
said. The egoist challenge to our ordinary moral
convictions amounts to a demand for an
explanation of why we should adopt certain
policies of action, namely, policies in which the
good of others is given importance. We can give
an answer to this demand, albeit an indirect one.
The reason one ought not to do actions that would
hurt other people is: Other people would be hurt.
The reason one ought to do actions that would
benefit other people is: Other people would be
benefited. This may at first seem like a piece of
philosophical sleight-of-hand, but it is not. The
point is that the welfare of human beings is
something that most of us value for its own sake,
and not merely for the sake of something else.
Therefore, when further reasons are demanded for
valuing the welfare of human beings, we cannot
point to anything further to satisfy this demand. It
is not that we have no reason for pursuing these
on is r ight
that it is
istances. I
r me to lie
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'{hen you
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Of Moralit y and Art 509
policies; but that our reason is that these policies
are for the good of human beings.
So if we are asked, "Why shouldn't I set fire to
this department store?" one answer would be,
"Because if you do, people may be burned to
death." This is a complete, sufficient reason which
does not require qualification or supplementation
of any sort. If someone seriously wants to know
why this action shouldn't be done, that's thereason; If we are pressed further and asked the
skeptical question, "But why shouldn't I do
actions that will harm others?" we may not know
what to say-but this is because the questioner
has included in his question the very answer we
would like to give; "Why shouldn't you do
actions that will harm others? Because doing
those.actions would harm others."
The egoist, no doubt, will not be happy with
this, He will protest that we may accept this as a
reason, but he does not. And here the argument
stops; There are limits to' what can be
accomplished by argument, and if the egoist really
doesn't care about other people---if he honestlydoesn't care whether they are helped or hurt by
his actions-then we have reached those limits. If
we want to persuade him to act decently toward
his fellow humans, we will have to make our
appeal to such other attitudes as he does possess,
by threats, bribes, or other cajolery. That is all that
we,can do.
Though some may find this situation dis-
tressing (we would like to be able to show that the
egoist is just wrong); it holds no embarrassment for
common morality. What we have come up against
is simply a fundamental requirement of rational
action; namely, that the existence of reasons for
action always depends on the prior existence of
certain attitudes in the agent. For example, the
fact that a certain course of action would make the
agent a lot of money is a reason for doing itonly if
the agent wants to make money; the fact that
practicing at chess makes one a better player is a
reason for practicing only if one wants to be a
better player; and so on. Similarly, the fact that a
certain action would help the agent is a reason for
doing the action only if the agent cares about his
own welfare, and the fact that an action would
help others is a reason for doing it only if the
agent cares about others. In this respect ethical
egoism and what we might call ethical altruism
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510 From Socrates to Cinema
are in exactly the same fix: Both require that the
agent care about himself, or about other people,
before they canget started.
So a nonegoist will accept "It would harm
another person" as a reason not to do an action
simply because he cares about what happens to
that other person. When the egoist says that he
does no : accept that as a reason, he is saying.
sOI]1€thingquite extraordinary. He is saying thathehas no affection for friends or family, that he
never feels pity or compassion, that he is the sort
of person who can look on. scenes of human
miserywith complete indifference,so long ashe is
not the one suffering. Genuine egoists, people
who really don't care at all about anyone [other]
than themselves, are rare. It is important to keep
this in mind when thinking about ethical egoism;
it is easy to forget just how fundamental tohuman
psychological makeup the feelingof sympathy is.
Indeed, aman without any sympathy at all~ould ~
scarcely be recognizable as a man; and -that is ., 3.
what makes ethical egoism such a diStu'rbiJ;tg.;;,
doctrine in the first place. !.
IV
Thereare, ofcourse,many differentways inwhich
the skeptic might challenge the assumptions
underlying our moral practice. In this essayI have
discussed only two of them, the two put forward
byGlaucon in the passage that I cited fromPlato's
Republ ic . It is important that the assumptions
underlying our moral practice should not be
confused with particular judgments made within
that practice. Todefend one is not to defend the
other. We may assume-quite properly, if my
analysis has been correct-that the virtue of
beneficence does, and indeed should, occupy an
important place in "the moral institution of life";
and yet we may make constant and miserable
errorswhen it comes tojudging when and inwhat
ways this virtue is tobe exercised.Evenworse, we
may often be able to make accurate moral
judgments, and know what we ought to do,
but not do it. For these ills, philosophy alone is
not the cure.
D ISC U SSIO N QUEST IO N S
1. What exactly is the differencebetween ethical
egoism and psychological egoism? Why is
thisdistinction important?
Whf does Rachels believe that "selfishness"
is not the same as "self-interest"? How does
be use this distinction to refute psychological
egoism?
How convinced are you by Rachels's
argument against the notion that every action
is done either fromself-interestor from other-
regarding motives? Can you think of a
counterargument?
What is Rachels's best argument against
ethical egoism?Why is it a strong argument?
Defend your position.
Some say that egoism undermines the moral
point of view, that is, the impartial attitude of
one who attempts to see all sides of an issue
without being committed to the interests ofa
particular individual or group. Do you agree
with this claim? Why or why not? Is it an
important lineofcriticism?Discuss.
2.
4.
5.
Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas) is a Wall Street trader
with great wealth and power. He spends his days bend-
ing and breaking the law in order to increase his hold-
ings. Gekko manipulates small investors in order to make a
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ccupyan
1of life";
riiserable
d in what
erse, we
te moral
It to do,
. alone is
en ethical
Why is
fishness"
[ow does
hological
Rachels's
ry action
im other-
nk of a
against
:gument?
he moral
ttitude of
an issue
rests of a
'au agree
Is it an
4.
~. 5 .
6.
7.
B .
9.
------ . -- --------
O f M orality an d A rt 51
financial profit. He thinks little about taking companies away from their stockholders through ruthless and
sometimes il legal means. Gekko acts as a mentor to a young stockbroker, Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen), who is
hungry for success. To impress Gekko, Fox passes along some inside information from his father, which puts
his father's company in jeopardy. Eventually, Fox comes to believe that Gekko's trading techniques are im-
moral as well as illegal.
Whi Ie Oliver Stone clearly believes that Gekko's actions and much of the capitalist trading mentality of
Wall Street are immoral, Gekko justifies his actions with statements like "Nobody gets hurt," "Everybody's
doing it," "Who knows except us?" and "There's something in this deal for everybody" Gekko's credo is
"Greed is good," and he builds an entire system of values around it. Stone's target in Wall Street is less the
bending and breaking of laws by Wall Street insiders and more a system of values based on greed. Michael
Douglas won an Oscar for his portrayal of Gordon Gekko.
D ISC USSIO N Q UEST IO NS
1.
2.
3.
Is Wall Street a criticism of egoism or a defense of egoism""?Defend your view.
Are Gekko's actions "selfish" or "self-interested"? Both? -Neither? Defend your view.
Ge.kko. morally justifies his adions in the film by saying t~ing~ like, "Nobody gets hurt," "Everybody's
doing It,/I "who knows except us?" and "T~ere's something In this deal for everybody." Are any of
these good reasons to do what he c;joes? ~
Is it wrong to use "Nobody will know . eX.c;:~ptus" as a justification for immoral activities? Why or
why not? . "
Can greed ever be good as Gekko says? Can it be the center of a theory of morality? Or is greed
always immoral? Defend your view.
Could a utilitarian justify Gekko's actions? A Kantian? Explain your view.
Why, according to Aristotle, is greed not a virtue? Do you agree with him?
What would Confucius say about greed and the actions of Gekko?
Imagine you are faced with greedy corporate executives like Gekko. Assume for the sake of
argument that you believe greed is not good. How would you persuade them of this? Would you
ultimately be able to convince them? Why or why not?
CAROL GILLIGAN
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
arol Gilligan argues that women have a moral voice or perspective that is distinc
from that of men. A woman's moral perspective is by nature more personal an
contextual than the natural moral perspective of a man. Whereas men are motivate
more by impartial and abstract principles regarding duty, women are motivated more by
sense offeeling, caret and responsibility.
Gilligan contends that women's moral development and their mature approach to mora
questions can be at times quite different from those of men. Gilligan criticizes Lawrenc
Kohlberg's theory of moral development. According to Kohlberg, a person's moral abilitie
develop in stages. In the first stage, the preconoeni ional stage, we follow authority to avoi
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512 From Socrates toCinema
punishment. In the second stage, the conventional stage, we desire acceptance by a group and
follow conventional moral standards. Inthe third and final, stage, the p o st co n ve n ti on a l s ta g e, we
question conventional standards and base our ideas of morality on universal moral principles
of human welfare, justice, and rights. When Kohlberg's theory is applied to women, it turns
out that women are, on average, lessmorally developed than men. While many men continue
tomove up to the postconventionallevel of impartial principles, women aremore likely to stay
at the lower conventional level ofpersonal attachments and loyalties.
Gilligan proposes an alternative model of moral development that reflects women'sdistinctive moral perspective. Women alsodevelop in three stages for Gilligan. The first stage is
caring for self only, the second is caring for others only, and the third is a balance between
caring for self and others=-recognition that caring for others depends on caring for self.
According to Gilligan, women develop by discovering better ways of caring for themselves and
others. Women faced with moral decisions focus on relationships and viewmorality in terms of
taking care of these relationships. Men faced with moral decisions focus on following moral
rules and principles. Consequently, the ideals of caring and responsibility play a more central
role in the moral orientations ofwomen, while the "rights" perspective plays amore central roler
in the moral orientation? ofmen. Gilligan concludes that existing moral theories embody amale
bias and fail to take specific aCCQlU1tf women's mora1 orientation. According to Gilligan,
women's morality is not inferior to that cfmen. The virtues of caring and responsibility are
needed to ensure that society does not become.a..collection of isolated individuals who guard
their individual rights and justice but who are lonely, unattached, and uncaring .•"Carol Gilligan (1936-) taught at Harvard University for over thirty years and in 1997
became Harvard's first professor of gender studies. In 2002, she became university professor at
New York University. She received an A.B. in English from Swarthmore College in 1958, an
M.A. in clinical psychology from Radcliffe College in 1960, and a Ph.D. in social psychology
from Harvard University in 1964.In1967,she began teaching atHarvard with the psychologist
Erik Erikson, and in 1970,she became a research assistant for Lawrence Kohlberg, whose views
on moral development she would go on to criticize. She is the author of In a D ifferen t V oice :
P syc ho lo gic al T he or y a nd W om en 's D ev elo pm e nt (1982), M app ing th e M ora l D om ain (1988t Making
Connec t ions (1990),Wom en , C irls , a nd P sych oth era py: R efra min g R esista nce (1991),M eeting a t the
C ro ssro ad s: W om en 's P syc ho lo gy a nd G irls' D evelo pm en t (1992), Betw een V oice a nd S ilen ce : W om en
a nd G ir ls , R ac e a nd R ela tio ns hip s (1995),and T he B irth o f P le asu re (2002 ). The following selection
is from her most famous book, In a D iffe re nt V oice .
Inthe second act of T he C he rr y O rc ha rd , Lopahin, a
young merchant, describes his lifeofhard work and
success.Failing to convinceMadame Ranevskaya to
cut down the cherry orchard to save her estate, he
will go on inthe next act to buy ithimself. He is the
self-made man who, inpurchasing the estatewhere
his father and grandfather were slaves, seeks to
eradicate the "awkward, unhappy life" of the past,
replacing the cherry orchard with summer cottages
where coming generations "will see a new life." In
elaborating this developmental vision, he reveals
the image of man that underlies and supports his
activity: "At times when I can't go to sleep, I think:
Lord, thou gavest us immense forests, unbounded
fields and the widest horizons, and living in the
midst of them we should indeed be giants"-at
which point, Madame Ranevskaya interrupts him,
saying, "You feel the need for giants-They are
good only in fairy tales, anywhere else they only
frightenus."
Conceptions of the human life cycle represent
attempts to order and make coherent the
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roup and
' s tage , we
Jrinciples
1, it turns
continue
!lyto stay
women's
5tstage is
between
for self.
elves and
terms of
ng moral
re central
mtral role
iya male
Gilligan,
bility are
ho guard
i in 1997
ofessor at
1958, an
ychology
chologist
ise views
e nt V oic e:
) , M a ki ng
ing a t the
e: Women
selection
pports his
!p , Ihink:
nbounded
ing in the
ants"-at
:upts him,
-They are
they only
represent
srent the
unfolding experiences and perceptions, the
changing wishes and realities of everyday life. But
the nature of such conceptions depends in part on
the position of the observer. The brief excerpt from
Chekhov's play suggests that when the observer is
a woman, the perspective may be of a different sort.
Different judgments of the image of man as giant
imply different ideas about human development,
different ways of imagining the human condition,different notions ofwhat is of value in life.
At a time when efforts are being made to
eradicate discrimination between the sexes in the
search for social equality and justice, the differences
between the sexes are being rediscovered in the
social sciences. This discovery occurs when theories
formerly considered. to be sexually neutral in their
scientific objectivity are found instead to reflect a
consistent observational and evaluative bias. Then
the presumed neutrality of science, like that of
language itself, gives way to the recognition that'the
categories of knowledge are human constructions.
The fascination with point of vlew'·-{1)at;;,has
informed the fiction of the twentieth century and" the corresponding recognition of the relativity of
judgment infuse our scientific understanding as
well when we begin to notice how accustomed we
have become to seeing life through men's eyes.
A recent discovery of this sort pertains to the
apparently innocent classic The Elements of Style, by
William Strunk and E. B . White. The Supreme
Court ruling on the subject of discrimination in
classroom texts led one teacher of English to
notice that the elementary rules of English usage
were being taught through examples which
counterposed the birth of Napoleon, the writings of
Coleridge, and statements such as "He was an
interesting talker. A man who had traveled all overthe world and lived in half a dozen countries,"
with "Well, Susan, this is a fine mess you are in" or,
less drastically, "He saw a woman, accompanied by
two children, walking slowly down the road."
Psychological theorists have fallen as innocently
as Strunk and While into the same observational
bias. Implicitly adopting the male life as the norm,
they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine
cloth. Itall goes back, of course, to Adam and Eve--
a story which shows, among other things, that if you
make woman out of a man, you are bound to get
into trouble. In the life cycle, as in the Garden of
Eden, the woman has been the deviant.
Of Moralit y and Art 5
The penchant of developmental theorists
project a masculine image, and one that appea
frightening to women, goes back at least to Freu
who built his theory of psychosexual developme
around the experiences of the male child th
culminate in the Oedipus complex. In the 192
Freud struggled to resolve the contradictions pos
for his theory by the differences in female anatom
and the different configuration of the young giearly family relationships. After trying to fit wom
into his masculine conception, seeing them
envying that which they missed, he carne instead
acknowledge, in the strength and persistence
women's pre-Oedipal attachments to their mothers
developmental difference. He considered t
difference inwomen's development to be responsib
for.what he saw aswomen's developmental failure
Having tied the formation of the superego
.conscience to castration anxiety, Freud consider
women to be deprived by nature of the impetus
a clear-cut Oedipal resoluti~n. Consequentl
women's superego-the heir to the Oedip
complex-was compromised: it was never "inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of
emotional origins as we require it to be in men
From this observation of difference, that "for wom
the level of what is ethically normal is different fro
what it is in men," Freud concluded that wom
"show less sense of justice than men, that they a
less ready to submit to the great exigencies of li
that they are more often influenced in th
judgments by feelings of affection or hostility."
Thus a problem in theory became cast as
problem in women's development, and t
problem in women's development was located
their experience of relationships. Nancy Chodoro
attempting to account for "the reproduction witheach generation of certain general and near
universal differences that characterize masculi
and feminine personality and roles," attribut
these differences between the sexes not to anatom
but rather to "the fact that women, universally, a
largely responsible for early child care." Becau
this early social environment differs for and
experienced differently by male and fema
children, basic sex differences recur in personali
development. As a result, "in any given socie
feminine personality comes to define itself
relation and connection to other people more th
masculine personality does."
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514 From Socrates to Cinema
Inher analysis, Chodorow relies primarily on experience themselves as less differentiated than
Robert Stoller's studies, which indicate that boys, as more continuous with and related to the
gender identity, the unchanging core of external object-world, and as differently oriented
personality formation, is "with rare exception totheirinner object-worldaswell."
firmly and irreversibly established for both sexes Consequently; relationships, and particularly
by the time a child is around three." Giventhat for issues of dependency, are experienced differently
both sexes the primary caretaker in the first three by women and men. For boys and men,
years of lifejs typically female, the interpersonal separation and individuation are criticallytied to
dvnamicsj.-of gender identity formation are gender identity since separation from the motherdifferent for boys and girls. Female identity is essential for the development of masculinity.
formation takes place in a context of ongoing For girls and women, issues of femininity or
relationship since "mothers tend to, experience feminine identity do not depend on the
their daughters as more like, and continuous achievement of separation from the mother or on
with, themselves." Correspondingly, girls, in the progress of individuation. Sincemasculinity is
identifying themselves as female, experience defined through~separation while femininity is
themselves as like their mothers, thus fusing the defined through attachment,male gender identity
experience of attachment with the process of is threatened b.y intimacy while female gender
identity formation. In contrast, "mothers expe- identity is threatened by separation. Thus
riencetheir sons as a male opposite," and boys, in males tend to have difficulty with relationships,
defining themselves as masculine, separate their • while females tend to have problems, with
mothers from themselves, thus curtailing "their' individuation. The quality of embeddedness in
primary love and sense of empathic tie." Cons~--'""-~;soeMlnteraction and personal relationships
quently, male development entails a "more 'that .characterizes women's lives in contrast to
emphatic individuation and a more defensive men's, however, becomes not only a descriptive
firming of experiencedegoboundaries." For boys, differencebut alsoa developmental liabilitywhen
but not girls,"issues ofdifferentiationhavebecome the milestones of childhood and adolescent
intertwinedwith sexualissues." development in the psychological literature are
markers of increasingseparation. Women's failure
to separate thenbecomesby definition a failure to
develop.
The sex differences in personality formation
that Chodorow describes in early childhood
appear during the middle childhood years in
studies of children's games. Children's games are
considered by George Herbert Mead and Jean
Piaget as the crucible of social development
during the school years. In games, children learn
to take the role of the other and come to see
themselvesthrough another's eyes.Ingames,they
learnrespect for rules and cometo understand the
ways rules canbemade and changed.
Janet Lever, considering the peer group to be
the agent of socialization during the elementary
school years and play to be a major activity of
socialization at that time, set out to discover
whether there are sex differences in the games
that children play.Studying 181fifth-grade,white,
middle-class children, ages ten and eleven, she
observed the organization and structure of their
playtime activities. She watched the children as
Writing against the masculine bias of
psychoanalytic theory, Chodorow argues that the
existence of sex differences in the early
experiences of individuation and relationship
"does not mean that women have 'weaker' ego
boundaries than men or are more prone to
psychosis." It means instead that "girls emerge
from this period with a basis for 'empathy' built
into their primary definition of selfin a way that
boys do not." Chodorow thus replaces Freud's
negative and derivative description of female
psychologywith a positive and direct account of
her own: "Girls emerge with a stronger basis for
experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's
own (or of thinking that one is so experiencing
another's needs and feelings). Furthermore, girls
donot define themselves in terms ofthe denial of
preoedipal relational modes to the same extent as
do boys. Therefore, regression to these modes
tends not tofeelasmuch abasic threat totheir ego.
Fromvery early;then, because they are parented
by a person of the same gender . . . girls come to
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d than
to the
riented
cularly
erently
men,
tied to
notherulinity,
iity or
n the
. or on
inityis
nity is
lentity
~ender
Thus
iships,
with
.ess in
nships
.ast to
riptive
.when
.escent
re are
failure
lure to
nation
dhood
ars in
Lesare
IJean
pment
Llearn
to see
5, they
nd the
to be
entary
rity of
scover
games
hite,
n , she
f their
ren as
they played at school during recess and in
physical education class, and in addition kept
diaries of their accounts as tohow they spent their
out-of-school time. From this study, Lever reports
sex differences: boys play out of doors more often
than girls do; boys play more often in large and
age-heterogeneous groups; they play competitive
games more often, and their games last longer
than girls' games. The last is in some ways the.most interesting finding. Boys' games appeared to
last longer not only because they required a
higher level of skill and were thus less likely to
become boring, but also because, when disputes
arose in the course of a game, boys were able to
resolve the disputes more effectively than girls:
"During the course of this study, boys were seen
quarrelling all the time, but not once was a game
terminated because of a quarrel ana no game was
interrupted for more than seven minutes. In the
gravest debates, the final word was always, to~
'repeat the play,' generally followed by achorus or
'cheater's proof.?" In fact, it seemed th~t'thi!;boys
enjoyed the legal debates as much as they did the,
• game itself, and even marginal players of lesser
size or skill participated equally illthese recurrent
squabbles. In contrast, the eruption of disputes
among girls tended to end the game.
Thus Lever extends and corroborates the
observations of Piaget in his study of the rules of
the game, where he finds boys becoming through
childhood increasingly fascinated with the legal
elaboration of rules and the development of fair
procedures for adjudicating conflicts, a fascination
that, he notes, does not hold for girls. Girls, Piaget
observes, have a more "pragmatic" attitude
toward rules, "regarding a rule as good as long as
the game repaid it."
Girls are more tolerant in their attitudes
toward rules, more willing to make exceptions,
and more easily reconciled to innovations. As a
result, the legal sense, which Piaget considers
essential to moral development, "is far less
developed in little girls than inboys."
The bias that leads Piaget to equate male
development with child development also colors
Lever's work. The assumption that shapes her
discussion of results is that the male model is the
better one since it fits the requirements for
modern corporate success. In contrast, the
sensitivity and care for the feelings of others that
Of Morality and Art 515
girls develop through their play have little market
value and can even impede professional success.
Lever implies that, given the realities of adult life,
if a girl does not want to be left dependent on
men, she will have to learn toplay like a boy.
To Piaget's argument that children learn the
respect for rules necessary for moral development
by playing rule-bound games, Lawrence Kohlberg
adds that these lessons are most effectivelylearned through the opportunities for role-taking
that arise in the course of resolving disputes.
Consequently, the moral lessons inherent in girls'
play appear to be fewer than in boys.' Traditional
girls' games like jump rope and hopscotch are
turn-takjng games, where competition is indirect
since one person's success does not necessarily
signify another's failure. Consequently, disputes
requiring adjudication are less likely to occur. In
fact, most of the girls whom Lever interviewed
claimed that when a quarrel broke out, they
ended the game. Rather than elaborating a system
of rules for resolving disputes, girls subordinated
the continuation of the game to the continuation
of relationships .
Lever concludes that from the games they play,
boys learn both the independence and the
organizational skills necessary for coordinating
the activities of large and diverse groups of
people. By participating illcontrolled and socially
approved competitive situations, they learn to
deal with competition in a relatively forthright
manner-to play with their enemies and to
compete with their friends-all in accordance
with the rules of the game. Incontrast, girls' play
tends to occur in smaller, more intimate groups,
often the best-friend dyad, and in private places.
This play replicates the social pattern of primary
human relationships in that its organization is
more cooperative. Thus, it points less, in Mead's
terms, toward learning to take the role of "the
generalized other," less toward the abstraction of
human relationships. But it fosters the devel-
opment of the empathy and sensitivity necessary
for taking the role of "the particular other" and
points more toward knowing the other as
different from the self.
The sex differences illpersonality formation in
early childhood that Chodorow derives from her
analysis of the mother-child relationship are
thus extended by Lever's observations of sex
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51 (j. From Socrates to Ci nema
men, men have, in their theories of psychological
development, as in their economic arrangements,
tended to assume or devalue that care. When
the focus on individuation and individual
achievementextends into adulthood andmaturity
is equated with personal autonomy, concernwith
"It is obvious," VirginiaWoolfsays, "that the relationships appears as a weakness of women
values ofwomen differveryoftenfromthe values rather than asa human strength.
which havebeen made by the other sex."Yet,she The discrepancy between womanhood and
adds, "itis themasculinevalues that prevail."As a adulthood is nowhere more evident than in the
result, women come to question the normality of studies on sex-role stereotypes reported by
their feelings and to alter their judgments in Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and
deference to the opinion of others. In the Rosenkrantz. The repeated finding of these
nineteenth-century novels written by women, studies is that the qualities deemed necessary for
Woolf sees at work "a mind which was slightly adulthood-the - capacity for autonomous
pulled fromthe straight and made to alter its clear thinking, clear decision-making, and responsible
vision in deference to external authority" rThe action-are those associatedwith masculinity and
same deference to the valm(s and opinions of considered undesirable as attributes of the
others can be seen in the judgments of twentieth- fe~e self: The stereotypes suggest a splitting
century women. The difficultywomen experience•• of love and work that relegates expressive
infinding or speakingpublicly in their ownvoices, > capaCitiesto women while placing instrumental
emerges repeatedly in the form of qualification- ~'-frbili'fiesn the masculine domain. Yet looked at
and self-doubt,but alsoin intimationsofa divided '£rom'a different perspective, these stereotypes
judgmeht, a public assessment and private reflecta conception of adulthood that is itself out
assessmentwhicharefundamentallyatodds. of balance, favoring the separateness of the
Yet the deference and confusion that Woolf individual self over connection to others, and
criticizes in women derive from the values she leaning more toward an autonomous life ofwork
sees as their strength. Women's deference is than toward theindependence oflove and care.
rooted not only in their social subordination but The discovery now being celebrated by men
also in the substance of their moral concern. in mid-life of the importance of intimacy,
Sensitivity to the needs of others and the relationships, and care is something that women
assumption of responsibility for taking care lead have known from the beginning. However,
women to attend to voices other than their own because that knowledge in women has been
and to include in their judgment other points of considered "intuitive" or "instinctive," a function
view. Women's moral weakness, manifest in an of anatomy coupled with destiny, psychologists
apparent diffusion and confusion ofjudgment, is haveneglectedtodescribeits development. Inmy
thus inseparable fromwomen's moral strength, an research, I have found that women's moral
overriding concern with relationships and development centers on the elaboration of that
responsibilities.The reluctanceto judge may itself knowledge and thus delineates a critical line of
be indicative of the care and concern for others psychologicaldevelopment in the lives of both of
that infuse the psychology of women's the sexes. The subject of moral development not
development and are responsible for what is only provides the final illustration of the
generallyseenasproblematic in itsnature. reiterative pattern in the observation and
Thus women not only define themselves in a assessment of sex differencesin the literature on
contextofhuman relationshipbut alsojudge them" human development, but also indicates more
selves in terms of their ability to care. Women's particularly why the nature and significance of
place in man's life cyclehas been that of nurturer, women's development has been for so long
caretaker, and helpmate, the weaver of those obscured and shrouded inmystery.
networks of relationships on which she in turn The criticism that Freud makes of women's
relies. But while women have thus taken care of sense of justice, seeing it as compromised in its
differences in the play activities of middle
childhood. Together these accounts suggest that
boys and girls arrive at puberty with a different
interpersonal orientation and a different range of
socialexperiences.
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;ical
ents,
!hen
dual
rrity
with
refusal ofblind impartiality;. reappears not only in
the work of Piaget but also in that of Kohlberg.
While in Piaget's account of the moral judgment
of the child, girls are an aside, a curiosity towhom
he devotes four brief entries in an index that omits
"boys" altogether because "the child" is assumed
to be male, in the research from which Kohlberg
derives' his theory, females simply do not
exist. Kohlberg's six stages that describe thedevelopment of moral judgment from childhood
to adulthood are based empirically on a study of
eighty-four boys whose development Kohlberg
has followed for a period of over twenty years.
Although Kohlberg claims universality for his
stage sequence, those groups not included in his
original sample rarely reach his higher stages.
Prominent among those who thus appear tobe
deficient in moral development when measured
by Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments
seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage l;
sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in ~
interpersonal terms and goodness is equated-with;
helping and pleasing others. This conception of ,~goodness is considered by Kohlberg and Kramer
to be functional in the lives of mature women
insofar as their lives take place in the home.
Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women
enter the traditional arena of male activity will
they recognize the inadequacy of this moral
perspective and progress like men toward higher
stages where relationships are subordinated to
rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles
ofjustice (stages five and six).
Yetherein lies a paradox, for the very traits that
traditionally have defined the 1/goodness" of
women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs
of others, are those that mark them as deficient inmoral development. In this version of moral
development, however, the conception ofmaturity
is derived from the study of men's lives and
reflects the importance of individuation in their
development. Piaget, challenging the common
impression that a developmental theory is built
like a pyramid from its base in infancy, points out
that a conception of development instead hangs
fromits vertex ofmaturity, the point toward which
progress is traced. Thus, a change in the definition
ofmaturity does not simply alter the description of
the highest stage but recasts the understanding of
development, changing the entire account.
and
l the
by
and
these
y for
nous
LSible
rand
the
itting
ssive
rental
ed at
typesI f out
[ the
. and
work
re o
men
macy,
omen
vever,
been
action
ogists
Inmy
moral,f that
ine of
oth of
nt not
f the
and
lie on
more
nce of
I long
imen's
. in its
OfMoralityand Art
~en one begins with the study ofwomen and
derives developmental constructs from their lives,
the outline of a moral conception different from
that describedby Freud, Piaget, orKohlbergbegins
to emerge and informs a different description of
development. In this conception, the moral
problem arises from conflicting responsibilities
rather than fromcompeting rights and requires for
its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextualand narrative rather than formal and abstract. This
conception of morality as concerned with the
activity of care centers moral development
around the understancling of responsibility and
relationships, just as the conception of morality
as fairness ties moral development to the
understanding ofrights and rules.
This,differentconstruction of themoral problem
by women may be seen as the critical reason for
their failure to develop within the constraints of
Kohlberg's system. Regarding all constructions of
responsibility as evidence of a conventional moral
understanding.Kohlberg defines the highest stages
ofmoral development as deriving froma reflectiveunderstanding of human rights. That the morality
of rights differs from the morality of responsibility
in its emphasis on separation rather than
connection, in its consideration of the individual
rather than the relationship as primary, is
illustrated by two responses to interview questions
about the nature ofmorality. The first comes froma
twenty-five-year-old man, one of the participants
in Kohlberg's study:
[W hat d oes th e w ord m ora lih j m ean to you ?] Nobody in
the world knows the answer. I think it is recognizing
the right ofthe individual, the rights ofother individ-
uals, not interfering with those rights. Act as fairly asyou would have them treat you. I think it is basically
to preserve the human being's right to existence. I
think that is the most important. Secondly, the human
being's right to do as he pleases, again without inter-
feringwith somebody else's rights.
[H ow h ao e yo ur view s 011 m ora lity c ha ng ed s in ce th e
las t i n te rv iew?] I think I ammore aware of an individ-
ual's rights now. I used tobe looking at it strictly from
my point of view, just for me. Now I think I ammore
aware ofwhat the individual has a right to.
Kohlberg cites this man's response as illustrative
of the principled conception of human rights that
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518 FromSocratesto Cinema
exemplifies his fifth and sixth stages. Commenting
on the response, Kohlberg says, "Moving to a
perspective outside of that of his society, he
identifies morality with justice (fairness, rights, the
Golden Rule), with recognition of the rights of
others as these are defined naturally or
intrinsically. The human being's right to do as he
pleases without interfering with somebody else's
rights.is' a formula defining rights prior to social
legislation. "
The second response comes from a woman
who participated in the rights and responsibilities
study. She also was twenty-five and, at the time, a
third-year law student:
[W hat led you to change, do you think?] Just seeing
moreoflife,just recognizingthat there arean awful lot
of things that are common among people. There are
certain things that you come to learn promote abetter
lifeand better relationships and more personal fulfill-
ment than other things that in general tend to do the
opposite, and the things that promote these things,
you would callmorally right.
This response also represents a personal recon-
struction of morality following a period of
questioning and doubt, but the reconstruction of
moral understanding is based not on the primacy
and universality of individual rights, but rather
on what she describes as a "very strong sense of
[ Is t h er e r ea llu s om e c or re ct s ol uti on t o m or al p ro bl em s, o r being responsible to the world." Within this
is e ve ry bo dy 's o pi nio n e qu al ly r ig ht ?] No, I don't think construction, the moral dilemma changes from
everybody's opinion is equally right. I think that in how to exercise one's rights without interfering
some situations there maybe opinions that are with the rights of others to how "to lead a moral
equally valid, and one could conscientiously adopt IHe which includes obligations to myself and my
one of several courses of action. But there are other family and people in general." The problem then
situations inwhich I think there are right and w. ro n g · . : -.;becomes one of limiting responsibilities without
answers, that sort ofinhere inthenature of existence;' abandoning moral concern. When asked to
\If all individuals here who need to live with each describe herself, this woman says that she values
other to live. Weneed to depend on each other, and "having other people that I am tied to, and also
hopefully it is not only aphysical need but a need of having people that I am responsible to. I have a
fulfillment in ourselves, that a person's life is en- very strong sense of being responsible to the
riched by cooperating with other people and striving world, that I can't just live for my enjoyment, but
to live in harmony with everybody else, and to that just the fact of being in the world gives me an
end, there are right and wrong, there are things obligation to do what I can to make the world a
which promote that end and that move away from it, better place to live in, no matter how small a scale
and in that way it is possible to choose in certain that may be on." Thus while Kohlberg's subject
cases among different courses of action that obvi- worries about people interfering with each other's
ously promote or harm that goal. rights, this woman worries about "the possibility
[I s there a tim e in the past tohen you would have of omission, of your not helping others when you
t ho u gh t a b ou t t he se t hi ng s d if fe re fl tl y? ] Oh,yeah, I think could help them."
that I went through a timewhen I thought that things The issue that this woman raises is addressed
were pretty relative, that I can't tell you what to do by Jane Loevinger's fifth "autonomous" stage of
and you can't tell me what to do, because you've got ego development, where autonomy, placed in the
your conscience and I've gotmine. context of relationships, is defined as modulating
[When was that?] Whenlwasinhighschool.Iguess an excessive sense of responsibility through the
that it just sort of dawned on me that my own ideas recognition that other people have responsibility
changed, and because my own judgment changed. for their own destiny. The autonomous stage in
I felt I couldn't judge another person's judgment. But Loevinger's account witnesses a relinquishing of
now I think even when it is only the person himself moral dichotomies and their replacement with "a
who is goingtobeaffected,I say it iswrong to the ex- feeling for the complexity and multifaceted
tent it doesn't coherewith what I know about human character of real people and real situations."
nature andwhatI know about you, andjust fromwhat Whereas the rights conception of morality that
I think is hue about the operation of the universe, I informs Kohlberg's principled level (stages five
could say I think youaremaking amistake. and six) is geared to arriving at an objectively fair
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st seeing
awful lot
lhere are
e a better
lal fulfill-
to do the
things,
I recon-
dod of
etion of
rimacy
rather
ense of
n this
from
rfering
moral
dmy
rn then
ithout
ed to
values
nd also
have a
to the
n t, but
me an
orld a
a scale
subject
other's
sibility
en you
ressed
age of
in the
lating
gh the
sibility
age in
ing of
ith "a
aceted
tions."
that
s five
ly fair
or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which
all rational persons could agree, the responsibility
conception focuses instead on the limitations of
any particular resolution and describes the
conflicts that remain.
Thus itbecomes clear why a morality of rights
and noninterference may appear frightening to
women in its potential justification of indifference
m id unconcern. At the same time, it becomes clear.why, from a male perspective, a morality of
responsibility appears inconclusive and diffuse,
given its insistent contextual relativism. Women's
moral judgments thus elucidate the pattern
observed in the description of the developmental
differences between the sexes, but they also
provide an alternative. conception of maturity by
which these differences can be assessed and their
implications traced. The psychology of women
that has consistently been described as distinctive
in its greater orientation toward relationships and
interdependence implies a more contextual mode
ofjudgment and a different moral understanding.
Given the differences in women's conceptions of
• self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a
different point of view and order human
experience interms ofdifferent priorities.
The myth of Demeter and Persephone, which
McClelland cites as exemplifying the feminine
attitude toward power, was associated with the
Eleusinian Mysteries celebrated in ancient Greece
for over two thousand years. As told in the
Homeric Hymn to Demeter, the story ofPersephone
indicates the strengths of interdependence,
building up resources and giving, that McClelland
found in his research on power motivation to
characterize the mature feminine style. Although,
McClelland says, "it is fashionable to conclude
that no one knows what went on in the Mysteries,
it is known that they were probably the most
important religious ceremonies, even partly on the
historical record, which were organized by and
for women, especially at the onset before men by
means of the cult of Dionysus began to take them
over." Thus McClelland regards the myth as "a
special presentation of femine psychology." It is,
aswell, a life-cyclestory par excellence.
Persephone, the daughter of Demeter, while
playing in a meadow with her girlfriends, sees a
beautiful narcissus which she runs to pick. As she
does so, the earth opens and she is snatched away
O f M orality an d A rt 519
by Hades, who takes her to his underworld
kingdom. Demeter, goddess of the earth, so
mourns the loss of her daughter that she refuses
to allow anything to grow. The crops that sustain
life on earth shrivel up, killing men and animals
alike, until Zeus takes pity on man's suffering and
persuades his brother to return Persephone to her
mother. But before she leaves, Persephone eats
some pomegranate seeds, which ensures that shewill spend part of every year with Hades in the
underworld.
The elusive mystery of women's development
lies in its recognition of the continuing importance
of attachment in the human life cycle. Woman's
place ! n man's life cycle is to protect this
recognition while the developmental litany
intones the celebration of separation, autonomy,
individuation, and natural rights. The myth of
Persephone speaks directly to the distortion in
this view by reminding us that nilfcissism leads to
death, that the fertility of the earth is in some
mysterious Way tied to the continuation of
the mother-daughter relationship, and that the life
cycle itself arises from an alternation between the
world ofwomen and that of men. Only when life-
cycle theorists divide their attention and begin to
live with women as they have lived with men will
their vision encompass the experience of both
sexes and their theories become correspondingly
more fertile.
D ISC USSIO N QUEST IO N S
1. What is the difference between "amorality of
rights" and "a morality of responsibility"?
What is the significance of this distinction for
Gilligan?
2. Why does Gilligan find the male ethic inade-
quate? Do you agree with her? Can the same
inadequacies be found in the female ethic?
Defend your view.
3. Gilligan compares the moral development of
male and female children. What is her
position? What difficulties does she have
with Freud's notion of moral development?
Why does she find Chodorow's view more
compelling? Doyou agree?
4. To what extent should moral development
playa role inmoral theory? What role would
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you suppose that moral development has ill
the ethical positions of Confucius, Aristotle,
Kant, and Mill?
5. To what extent are the moral theories of
Kant, Aristotle, and Mill moralities of
"rights"? Towhat extent are they moralities
of "responsibility"? What do you think
Gilliganwould say?
6. Is there a natural connection between one's
moral outlook and one's sex? Defend your
view. Respond to possible criticisms by
Gilligan.
520 From Socrates to Cinema
T
ono Brtko (lozef Kroner) works as a carpeqter in assmall Slovakian town during the Second World
War. His nagging wife (Hana Sllvkova) thinks he should be improving their position in the world, and
her fascist brother (Frantisek Zvarfk) agreesjadvlsing Tono to join forces with the occupying troops.
To appease his wife and brother-in-law, Tono takes a!job as the "Aryan comptroller" for a Jewish-owned but-
tor-shop on Main Street. To his dismay, he finds that the owner, Rosalie Lautmann (Ida Karninska), a deaf
elderly woman, has gone bankrupt. Tone's dreams of prestige are quickly dashed, and his frustration is com-
pounded by Rosalie's deafness. Communicating with her is virtually impossible, and Rosalie remains in a
dream world, unaware of the gravity of the war.
Rosalie's Jewish friends bribe Tono to pose as her new assistant instead of her boss. Tono agrees, and
slowly the two build a close friendship. Rosalie treats the carpenter with a kindness and respect he does
not find in his own family. But troubles arise when an edict is passed demanding the deportation of the
town's Jewish citizens. As the names are called off in the town square, Rosa Iie's name is mysteriously ab-
sent. Tono faces a moral dilemma. He must decide whether to protect his friend and risk arrest for harbor-
ing a Jew or obey the law and report her. As the Jews gather for deportation in front of the shop, Tono panics.
He tries to force Rosalie to join them, but she realizes what is happening and attempts to escape. In a mo-
ment of panic, Tono pushes his friend into a cupboard and locks it, waiting until the troops have passed.
When he opens the cupboard to release her, he finds that Rosalie has died. Tono then takes his own life
The Shop on Main Street was first shown in the United States at the New York Film Festival, where it re-
ceived a standing ovation. It won an Oscar for Best Foreign Film in 1965. The film is based on the short
novel by Ladislav Grosman.
D IS CU SSIO N QUE ST IO NS
1. Did Tono do the right thing? Should he have obeyed the law and reported Rosalie to the authorities?
Defend your response.
2. Compare and contrast what a Kantian, a utilitarian, and a virtue theorist would do in Tone's
situation. Which response do you prefer? Why? How do their responses compare to your own?
3. Gilligan presented us with a male ethic of duty and rights and contrasted it with a female ethic of
care and responsibility. Is Tone's situation one in which an ethic of abstract principles comes into
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Of Morality andArt 5
ou think conflict with an ethic of care and compassion? Is the conflict presented as "genderless" in this
movie? If so, could i t be used as a criticism of Gilligan's position?
4. Why do you think that Tono killed himself? Out of guilt? Out of frustration with morality? What, if
anything, do we learn about morality through his suicide?
5. How do we balance our desire for care and compassion for others in peril with our obligations as
citizens of a state? Can you think of other stories or films that present situations similar to that of
Tono? How do they compare?
6. Give a Confucian analysis of the moral character of Tono. Would Confucius consider Tono a
superior man? Why or why not?
7. From the moral pointof view of the Bible and the Koran, did Tono do the right thing by lying to the
authorities in order to protect Rosalie? Why or why not?
een one's
efend your
ticisms by
URSULA K. LEGUIN
THE ONES WHo WALK AWAY FROM OMELAS
:ond World
'world, and
ring troops.
owned but-
ka) , a deaf
ion iscom-
rnains in a
, ~melas, a mythical civilization in.which its inhabitants bask in their seemingly perfe
lives, has a dark secret lur~g beneath its utopian facade. The happiness of t
inhabitants of Ornelas relies' on the misery and anguish of a single child. While macitizens ofOmelas visit the "being" in its small, damp cellar and appreciate its suffering, others a
horrified that a single person must suffer-even if this suffering is for the sake of an ent
civilization. Moreover, those who sympathize with the child realize that even if it were allowed
leave the cellar, any attempts to reintroduce it into society would be unsuccessful. The narrat
elaborates, "Even if the child were released, it would not get much good out of its freedom: a lit
vague pleasure of warmth and food, no doubt, but little more. It is too degraded and imbecile
know any real joy." Nevertheless, there are a few inhabitants who remain deeply disturbed by t
misery that this individual must suffer. Those people choose to leave the city and never return.
Ursula K. Le Guin (1929-) is best known for her science-fiction and fantasy tales, writin
that have been described as "philosophy disguised as science fiction." Born Ursula Kroeber, s
received a B.A. from Radcliffe College in literature, an M.A. from Columbia University; and
Fulbright Scholarship to study in France, where she met her husband, Charles Le Guin. ill197
she won the National Book Award for her children's book T he F ar th es t S h or e, the third volumeher Earthsea series. Le Guin has also contributed important essays on fantasy fiction, femini
issues, and other topics, some of which can be found in D ancing at the E dge of the W orld (1989), a
has written numerous collections of poetry. Her books include T he L eft H an d o f D a rk ness (1969\ T
D isp osse sse d: A n A mb ig uo us U to pia (1974), The Eye of the Heron (1978), The C om pa ss Rose (1 98
Alw ays C om ing H om e (1985), U nlo ckin g th e A ir a nd O th er S to rie s (1996), Th e O ther W ind (2001), a
Chan g in g P la n es ( 20 03 ) . "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas" was published in 1973.
agrees, and
ect he does
arion of the
e ri ou sl y a b-
for harbor-
ana panics,
ie, In a mo-
ave passed.
i own life
where it re-
m the short
authorities?
) in Tone's
own?
ale ethic of
comes into
With a clamor of bells that set the swallows
soaring, the Festival of Summer came to the city.
Ornelas,bright-towered by the sea. The rigging of
the boats in harbor sparkled with flags. In the
streets between houses with red roofs and paint
walls, between old moss-grown gardens a
under avenues of trees, past great parks a
public buildings, processions moved. Some w
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522 From Socrates to Cinema
decorous: old people in long stiff robes of mauve the stock exchange, the advertisement, the secret
and grey, grave master workmen, quiet, merry police, and the bomb. YetI repeat that these were
women carrying their babies and chatting as they not simple folk, not dulcet shepherds, noble
walked. In other streets the music beat faster, a savages, bland utopians. They were not less
shimmering of gong and tambourine, and the complex than us. The trouble is that we
people went dancing, the procession was a dance. have a bad habit, encouraged by pedants and
Children dodged in and out, their high callsrising sophisticates, of considering happiness as
like theswallows' crossing flights over the music -something rather stupid. Onlypain is intellectual,
andff{~ singing. All the processions wound only evil interesting. This is the treason of the
towards the north side of the city,where on the artist: a refusal to admit the banality of evil and
great water-meadow called the Green Fields boys the terrible boredom ofpain. 1 £ you can't lick 'em,
and girls, naked in the bright air, with mud- join 'em. Ifit hurts, repeat it. But to praise despair
stained feet and ankles and long, lithe arms, is to condemn delight, to embrace violence is to
exercised their restive horses before the race. The losehold of everything else.Wehave almost lost
horsesworeno gear at all but a halter without bit. hold; we can-nolonger describe a happy man, nor
Their manes were braided with streamers of make any celebration of joy. How can I tell you
silver, gold, and green. They flared their nostrils about the p'eopleofOrnelas?Theywere not naive
and pranced and boast~d to one another; they and happy children-though their children were,
Were vastly excited, the horse being the only ip fact,-happy. They were mature, intelligent,
animal who has adopted our ceremonies as his passionate adults whose liveswere not.wretched.
own. Far off to the north and west the mountains 0 miracle! But I wish I could describe it better.I
stood up half encirclingOmelas on her bay.- ''T h e ' - --''WishI could convinceyou. Ornelas sounds in my
air of morning was so clear that the snow stili words like a city in a fairy tale, long ago and far
croWningthe EighteenPeaks burned with white- away, onceupon a time. Perhaps it would be best
gold fire across the miles of sunlit air, under the if you imagined it as your own fancy bids,
dark blue of the sky.Therewas just enough wind assuming itwill rise to the occasion,for certainly1
to make the banners that marked the racecourse cannot suit you all. For instance, how about
snap and flutter now and then. In the silence of technology?1think that therewould be no carsor
the broad green meadows one could hear the helicopters in and above the streets; this follows
music winding through the city streets, farther from the fact that the people of Ornelasare happy
and nearer and ever approaching, a cheerfulfaint people.Happinessisbasedona just discrimination
sweetness of the air that from time to time ofwhat is necessary,whatis neither necessarynor
trembled and gathered together and broke out destructive, and what isdestructive. Inthemiddle
into the great joyousclangingof thebells. category, however-that of the urmecessary
Joyous! How is one to tell about joy? How but undestructive, that of comfort, luxury,
describe the citizens ofOrnelas? exuberance, etc.-they could perfectly well haveThey were not simple folk, you see, though centralheating, subway trains,washing machines,
they were happy. Butwe do not say the words of and all kinds of marvelous devices not yet
cheer much any more. All smiles have become invented here, floating light-sources, fuelless
archaic.Givena description suchas this onetends power, a curefor the common cold. Or they could
tomake certain assumptions. Given a description have none ofthat: it doesn't matter.As you like it,
such as this one tends to look next for the King, I incline to think that people from towns up and
mounted on a splendid stallion and surrounded down the coast have been coming in to Ornelas
by his noble knights, or perhaps in a golden litter during the last days before the Festival on very
borne by great-muscled slaves. But there was no fast little trains and double-decked trams and that
king. They did not use swords, or keep slaves. the train station of Ornelas is actually the
Theywere not barbarians. I do not know the rules handsomest building in town, though plainer
and laws of their society,but I suspect that they than the magnificent Farmers' Market. But even
were singularly few. As they did without granted trains, I fear that Ornelas so far strikes
monarchy and slavery,so they also got onwithout some of you as goody-goody. Smiles, bells,
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~secret
:ewere
noble
o t less
at we
.ts and
ss as
lectual,
of the
vil and
ck'em,
:lespair
:e is to
ost lost
an, nor
-u you
t naive
1were,
lligent,
etched.
letter. I
:inmy
md far
e best
r bids,
tainly I
about
cars or
follows
happy
illation
lry nor
middle
:essary
luxury,
1 1 have
chines,
ot yet
uelless
r could
like it,
JP and
)melas
n very
ad that
ly the
plainer
it even
strikes
bells,
parades, horses, bleh, If so, please add an orgy. If
an orgy would help, don't hesitate. Let us not,
however, have temples from which issue beautiful
nude priests and priestesses already half in
ecstasy and ready to copulate with any man or
woman, lover Of stranger, who desires union with
the deep godhead of the blood, although that was
my.first idea. But really itwould be better not to
have any temples in Ornelas-at least, not
manned temples. Religion yes, clergy no. Surely
the beautiful nudes can just wander about,
offering themselves like divine souffles to the
hunger of the needy and the rapture of the flesh.
Let them join the processions. Let tambourines be
struck above the copulations, and the glory of
desire be proclaimed upon the gongs, and (a not
unimportant point) let the offspring of these
delightful rituals be beloved and looked after by
all. One thing Iknow there is none of in Ornelas is
guilt But what else should there be? Ithought a tfirst there were no drugs, but that is puritanical:
For those who like it, the faint insistentsweetnei9"S
of drooz may perfume the ways of the city, !droozJ
,.. which first brings a great lightness and brilliance
to the mind and limbs, and then after some hours
a dreamy languor, and wonderful visions at last of
the very arcana and inmost secrets of the
Universe, as well as exciting the pleasure of sex
beyond all belief; and it is not habit-forming. For
more modest tastes Ihink there ought to be beer.
What else, what else belongs in the joyous city?
The sense of victory, surely, the celebration of
courage. But as we did without clergy, let us do
without soldiers. The joy built upon successful
slaughter is not the right kind of joy; it will not do;
it is fearful and it is trivial. A boundless and
generous contentment, a magnanimous triumph
felt not against some outer enemy but in
communion with the finest and fairest in the souls
of all men everywhere and the splendor of the
world's summer: this is what swells the hearts of
the people of Ornelas, and the victory they
celebrate is that of life. I really don't think many of
them need to take drooz.
Most of the processions have reached the
Green Fields by now. A marvelous smell of
cooking goes forth from the red and blue tents of
the provisioners. The faces of small children are
amiably sticky; in the benign grey beard of a man
a couple of crumbs of rich pastry are entangled.
O f M orality an d A rt 523
The youths and girls have mounted their horses
and are beginning to group around the starting
line of the course. An old woman, small, fat, and
laughing, is passing out flowers from a basket,
and tall young men wear her flowers in their
shining hair. A child of nine or ten sits at the edge
of the crowd, alone, playing on a wooden flute.
People pause to listen, and they smile, but they do
not speak to him, for he never ceases playing and
never sees them, his dark eyes wholly rapt in the
sweet, thin magic of the tune.
He finishes, and slowly lowers his hands
holding the wooden flute.
As if that little private silence were the signal,
all at once a trumpet sounds from the pavilion
near the starting line: imperious, melancholy,
pierciag. The horses rear on their slender legs, and
some of them neigh in answer. Sober-faced, the
young riders stroke the horses' necks and soothe
them, whispering, "Quiet, quiet, there my beauty,
my hope .... tt They begin to form in rank along
the starting line. The crowds along the racecourse
are like a field of grass and flowers in the wind.
The Festival of Summer has begun.
Do you believe? Do you accept the festival, the
dty, the joy? No? Then let me describe one more
thing.
In a basement under one of the beautiful public
buildings of Ornelas, or perhaps in the cellar of
one of its spacious private homes, there is a room.
It has one locked door, and no window. A little
light seeps in dustily between cracks in the
boards, secondhand from a cob-webbed window
somewhere across the cellar. Inone corner of the
little room a couple of mops, with stiff, clotted,
foul-smelling heads, stand near a rusty bucket.
The floor is dirt, a little damp to the touch, as
cellar dirt usually is. The room is about three
paces long and two wide: a mere broom closet or
disused tool room. Inthe room a child is sitting. It
could be a boyar a girl. It looks about six, but
actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps
it was born defective, or perhaps it has become
imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect. It
picks its nose and occasionally fumbles vaguely
with its toes or genitals, as it sits hunched in the
comer farthest from the bucket and the two mops.
It is afraid of the mops. It finds them horrible. It
shuts its eyes, but it knows the mops are still
standing there; and the door is locked; and
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524 From Socrates to Cinema
nobody will come.The door is always locked;and done, in that day and hour all the prosperity and
nobody ever comes, except that sometimes-the beauty and delight of Ornelas would wither and
child has no understanding of time or interval- be destroyed. Those are the terms. Toexchangeall
sometimes the door rattles terribly and opens, and the goodness and grace of every lifein Ornelas for
a person, or severalpeople, are there.One of them that single,small improvement: to throwaway the
may come in and kick the child tomake it stand happiness of thousands for the chance of the
up. The others.never come close,but peer in at it happiness of one: that would be to let guilt within
with frightened, disgusted eyes. The food bowl thewalls indeed.
and the water jug are hastily filled, the door is The terms are strict and absolute; there may
locked, the eyes disappear. The people at the door not evenbe a kind word spoken tothe child.
never say anything, but the child, who has not Often the young people go horne in tears, or in
always lived in the tool room, and can remember a tearless rage,when they have seen the child and
sunlight and its mother's voice, sometimes faced this terrible paradox. They may brood over
speaks. "I will be good," it says. "Please let me it for weeks or years. But as time goes on they
out. I will be good!"They never answer.The child begin to realize.that even if the child could be
used to scream for help at night, and cry a good released, it would not get much good of its
deal, but now it only makes a kind of whl,!Ung, freedom: a little vague pleasure of warmth and
"eh-haa, eh-haa," and it spea~s less and lessoften. food, no doubt, but littlemore. It is too degraded
It is so thin there are no calves to its legsjits belly and imbecile to know any real joy. It has beent
protrudes; it lives on a half-bowl of cornmeal and • afraid too long ever tobe free of fear.Its habits are
grease a day. It is naked. Its buttocks and thighs' > too ~uncouth for it to respond to humane
are a mass of festered sores, as it sits in its owri ~·";tre~i.tment.ndeed, after so long itwould probably
excrementcontinually. .be wretched without walls about it to protect it,
Thef all know it is there, all the people of and darkness for its eyes, and its own excrement
Ornelas. Some of themhave come to see it, others tosit in. Their tears at thebitter injustice dry when
are content merely to know it is there. They all they begin to perceive the terrible justice ofreality
know that it has to be there. Some of them and to accept it. Yetit is their tears and anger,the
understand why<and some do not, but they all trying of their generosity and the acceptance of
understand that their happiness, thebeauty of their their helplessness, which are perhaps the true
city,the tenderness of their friendships, the health source of the splendor of their lives. Theirs is no
of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the vapid, irresponsible happiness. They know that
skill of their makers, even the abundance of their they, like the child, are not free. They know
harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, compassion. It is the existence of the child, and
depend wholly on thischild's abominablemisery. their knowledge of its existence, that makes
This is usually explained when they are possible the nobility of their architecture, the
between eight and twelve, whenever they seem poignancy of their music, the profundity of their
capable of understanding; and most of those who science.It is because of the child that they are so
come to see the child are yOlmgpeople, though gentle with children. They know that if the
often enough an adult comes, or comes back, to wretched one were not there snivelling in the
see the child. Nomatter how well the matter has dark, the other one, the flute-player, could make
been explained to them, these young spectators no joyful music as the young riders line up in
are always shocked and sickened at the sight. their beauty for the race in the sunlight ofthe first
They feel disgust, which they had thought morning ofsummer.
themselves superior to. They feel anger, outrage, Now do you believe in them? Are they not
impotence, despite all the explanations. They more credible? But there is onemore thing to tell,
would like to do something for the child. But and this is quiteincredible.
there is nothing they can do. If the child were At times one of the adolescent girls or boys
brought up into the sunlight out of that vile place, who go to see the child does not go home to weep
if it were cleaned and fed and comforted, that or rage, does not, in fact, go home at all.
would be a good thing, indeed; but if it were Sometimesalso aman or woman much older falls
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iperity and
ither and
(change all
Dmelas for
v away the
ice of the
uilt within
there mayild.
ears, or in
!child and
irood over
!s on they
I could be
iod of its
irmth and
,degraded
has been
habits are
I humane
iprobably
protect it,
excrement
dry when
~ofreality
anger, the
eptance of
i the true
teirs is no
mow that
ley know
child, and
at makes
cture, the
y of their
ley are so
rat if the
ng in the
ruld make
ine up in
ofthe first
they not
lngto tell,
s or boys
.eto weep
le at all.
older falls
silent for a day or two, and then leaves home.
These people go out into the street, and walk
down the street alone. They keep walking, and
walk straight out of the city of Ornelas, through
the beautiful gates. They keep walking across the
farmlands of Ornelas. Each one goes alone, youth
or girl, man or woman. Night falls; the traveler
.must pass down village streets, between the
. houses with yellow-lit windows, and on out into
the darkness of the fields. Each alone, they go
west or north, toward the mountains. They go on.
They leave Ornelas, they walk ahead into the
darkness, and they do not come back. The place
they go towards is a place even less imaginable to
most of us than the city of happiness. Icannot
describe it at all. Itis possible that itdoes not exist.
But they seem to know where they are going, the
oneswho walk away fromOmel"as.( .
D ISCUSSION QUEST IONSr- = _ ._ : . _ . 'I~~
1. If you were a citizen of Ornelas, would youstay or walk? Explain and justify your
decision.
2. Can the suffering of one child to ensure the
happiness of an entire society be morally
Of Morality and Art 5
justified by a utilitarian? A Kantian?
Buddhist? If so, how? Ifnot, why not?
3. Does it make a moral difference that
child lives in the society that benefits fro
its suffering? What if the child lived halfw
across the world? Would the same numb
of people walk away from Ornelas? Wou
you feel the same about the conditions
which this society's happiness is founded
the child lived halfway around the worl
Explain.
4. Why do you think Le Guill adds
following to her story: "Even if the child we
released, it would not get much good out
Its freedom: a little vague pleasure ofwarm
and food, no doubt, but little more. It is t
degraded and imbecile to know any real jo
How does this affect the way you feel abo
Ornelas? Explain.
S. Le Guin tells us that the 2hilclren of Orne
are fully aware of the suffering of the chi
but she makes a point of saying that thowho stay in Ornelas do not feel guilty. Is
possible to constantly feel guilty about t
misery of others? Explain and g
examples.
4.3 WHAT IS THE NATURE ANDVALUE OF ART?
PLATO
ART, IMITATION, AND MORALITY
n TheRepublic , Plato presents his views on the intrinsic nature of art and the role of art in t
ideal state through dialogue between Socrates and a number of other characters. Pla
argues that art ought tohave a positive influenceonits audience, and when itdoes not ex
this type of influence, itmust be censored. For Plato, not even the great poets Homer and Hesi
are beyond censorship. Furthermore, art ismerely an imitation of an imitation--something w
much stronger ties to the world ofappearances than the world ofreality and truth.
In the selection from Book II, Plato explains why the censorship of art is especia
important for children, that is, those who are just forming their character and are much mo
amenable to taking in the "desired impression." Therefore, we should keep them away fro
stories that contain "ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wi
them to have when they are grown up." Plato says that children "cannot judge what