Perspectives on Bringing International Visibility to Civil Society Issues in the Black Sea Region

Brian TomlinsonCPDE

Black Sea NGO Forum, 8th edition November 2-3, 2015, Tbilisi, Georgia

1. Introduction

1. Introduction and appreciation

2. Global contestation resulting in closing space for CSOs

3. Effective strategies to reverse these trends

4. Internationalizing attention to closing civic space What opportunities can the Global Partnership for Effective

Development Cooperation (GPEDC) The role and contributions of the Civil Society Platform for Effective

Development (CPDE)

2

2. Global contestation resulting in closing space for CSOs (1)

CSOs are central actors in democratic development and realization of political rights CSOs are expressions of diverse citizens interests, mediating relationships between citizens and the

state; protected by the rights of freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.

Strong global recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right, distinct from the state in Busan and the GPEDC, where governments committed to put in place the enabling conditions that maximizes CSOs contribution to development. Established important global norms related to CSOs; CSOs themselves committed to improving their own effectiveness as development actors consistent with the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness.

But CSO recognition rather weakly acknowledged in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development -- CSOs were deeply engaged in proposals for the SDGs and are seen to be key to their implementation, and for follow-up and review mechanisms. But no recognition as development actors in their own right.

Since 2011, in increasing numbers of countries CSOs have experienced a backlash, with a wide range of legal, regulatory, judicial, and political measures aimed at shrinking the space for CSOs as independent actors. Maina Kiai – 6 of 7 people live in countries where freedom of expression is constrained Since 2012, approximately 50 countries approved laws restricting CS through more than 90 laws

In many countries the issue is not just restrictions on selected human rights or policy oriented CSOs, but is part of a larger move to put in place a more authoritarian relationship between government and its citizens. The research and case studies prepared for this Forum amply demonstrate this changing dynamic in the

affected countries in the Black Sea region 3

4

2. Global contestation resulting in closing space for CSOs (2)

Understanding some of the conditions that have resulted in closing space … The period since 2010 has been one of numerous popular mobilizations and citizen

challenges to political regimes – research documents large scale social and political mobilizations in between 70 and 80 countries in these past five years.

Push back by regimes, which fear their own populations, are deliberate efforts to limit the momentum of movements that can draw in diverse social and political interests, with the aim to marginalize organized expression of peoples’ voices.

Increased securitization of the state in its relationships with its citizens (Canada – small scale terrorist attacks on parliament leads to draconian legislation giving government and its police/intelligence services power to severely limiting citizens’ rights).

Growing levels of intolerance in many societies with the rise of different forms of fundamentalisms (religious, free market, nationalism, xenophobia, etc.) – authoritarian governments manipulation of nationalism to further geo-political ends – e.g. Russia and conflict in eastern Ukraine – using sophisticated media strategies popularizing nationalist, socially conservative authoritarian political models challenging western “decadence”.

Includes, but not limited to deliberate strategies to disarticulate civil society. The latter build on mistrust, creating disunity among CSOs – funding competing GONGOs, targeted attacks on “foreign agents,” attack on individual leaders, force CSOs to become less transparent (reinforcing popular perceptions propagated through media hype and mis-information)

5

3. Effective strategies to reverse these trends … (1)

Measures to restrict civil society proliferating, despite increased attention to these issues by CSOs, by sympathetic governments and through UN human rights and other multilateral bodies (e.g. work of the Special Rapporteur on freedoms of association and free and peaceful assembly, Community of Democracies).

Why might we be loosing ground … Has the sector (civil society and human rights organizations) become too

professionalized? Driven also by donor fixation with log frames and immediate results? Is there too much concentration on changing specific laws and regulations, rather than

initiatives to broaden the legitimacy and trust in CSOs, and deepening their relationships to constituencies?

Is restricting civil society space a casualty of wider deliberate geo-political strategies to strengthen authoritarian nationalist regimes and their spheres of influence, and challenge various forms of “western-oriented” democratic regimes within each region (some more susceptible to external pressures than others)?

6

3. Effective strategies to reverse these trends … (2)

Deepen socio-political connections: Rekindle synergies between human rights defenders and organizations and movements/initiatives addressing immediate social and economic issues facing populations … Break out of institutional silos, with multi-stakeholder partnerships, sustained engagement

with broader coalitions (e.g. links with students in Chile, with workers and middle class economic discontent in Brazil, etc.), and new actors (e.g. partnering with local governments in some countries) – situating the issues of CSO enabling conditions within the pre-occupations of broader social movements.

Defend courageous local leadership resisting social/ethnic intolerance, but also demonstrate this resistance through modeling inclusive civil society organizations and coalitions that avoid isolating those under threat and attack.

Take advantage of global and regional initiatives to profile civil society space – CIVICUS and its Day for Civil Society Action; global monitoring of civil society space by GPEDC; regional initiatives through the Black Sea NGO Forum.

Study and learn strategies from past successes in anti-apartheid and anti-colonialism, popular resistance movements in Central and South America, but also Solidarity in Poland and other like-minded inclusive movements for change in this region.

Improve CSO legitimacy as citizens’ voices through deliberate measures for strong CSO accountability and transparency. Do CSO practices play into social suspicion and mistrust? Not just more information, but also peer accountability frameworks, innovative cross-sectoral forums for open dialogue with other actors (private sectors, faith communities, multi-ethnic organizations etc.). How might these function in difficult environments?

7

3. Effective strategies to reverse these trends … (3)

Should we focus on specific organizational capacities relevant in a world where civic action is under threat? What organizations should be targeted? Not just human rights/media organizations, but also those that continue to represent

constituencies, large or small, undertaking service delivery (which is still acceptable to most governments).

CSOs should focus on on-going and deliberate strategies to build societal trust over the longer term. Will be country specific and responsive to particular political cultures.

Donors (both official and INGOs) should shape funding modalities and practices in ways that maximize flexibilities in their relationships with CSOs under threat. Need to learn how to work and accept greater levels of risk (perhaps with less money,

smaller grants, retooling projects), with increased levels of informality and “under the radar” actions.

Through trusted intermediaries able to work from safe spaces in other countries but with connections to affected organizations and communities.

8

4. Internationalizing attention to closing civic space … (1)

Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC – Taking advantage of Busan (November 2011) global/government commitment to an enabling environment for CSOs.

Implementing the Second Round of Country-Level Monitoring for aid & development effectiveness commitments (Indicator Two: Progress on enabling environment for CSOs) Indicator Two undertaken in multi-stakeholder processes for data gathering and

verification (November to March) CPDE Focal Points in 45 countries engage with government coordinator for monitoring Will countries undertake indicator two in a voluntary process? GPEDC’s Joint Support Team uses evidence to develop Progress Report for the 2016

second High Level Meeting for the GPEDC to be held in Nairobi in late November 2016.

CPDE developing evidence for Indicator Two through members of CPDE Working Groups on Enabling Environment and on CSO Development Effectiveness Drawing together existing global and national sources of evidence for comprehensive

country level data, synthesized for major trends and recommendations: co-branded by participating members of the Working Groups (January to March)

9

4. Internationalizing attention to closing civic space … (2)

GPEDC indicator framework and the indicators for the SDGs GPEDC and Agenda 2030: SDGs “means of implementation” commitments weak on Busan

issues of aid and development effectiveness – development effectiveness agenda and principles mentioned in AAAA, but not substantially addressed in Agenda 2030.

What is the future for indicator two on enabling environment in the context of global and national indicators for the SDGs now under development in the UN system?

Stakeholders in GPEDC have common goal in maintaining the progress in commitments to aid and development effectiveness, made from Accra to Busan, by maintaining the integrity of the GPEDC monitoring framework, including indicator two.

UNDP and OECD in the Joint Support Team for the GPEDC put forward proposals for Goal 17 on inclusive partnerships in a Co-Chairs paper in recent Bangkok meeting on SDG indicators, but also stress intention to continue to develop its monitoring framework in ways that complement the SDG objectives and indicators.

GPEDC Steering Committee appointed an experts Monitoring Advisory Group to propose revisions to GPEDC’s ten indicator framework:

Review each indicator, including indicator two, in terms of continued relevance to what is intended to measure, feasibility in data collection, and usefulness in promoting dialogue and behaviour change.

Report to GPEDC Steering Committee in March and July 2016: Propose a revised monitoring framework and country process, in synergy with SDG review framework, to November GPEDC High Level Meeting.