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Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1,pp. 37–54, 2003

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy,2002

DANIEL FLITTON

Australia’s international relations always influence Australian domestic politics.The effects are generally narrow, consigned to the margins of the politicaldiscourse. As the general public’s awareness about global threats returns, foreignpolicy is the centre of attention. Australia’s domestic politics now increasinglyinfluence Australian international relations. In a robust democracy, articulating avision for Australian foreign policy can translate into electoral success. Contestsover foreign policy are not new in Australia yet have been unusual in the past fewdecades. Bipartisan agreement has been the norm. Throughout 2002, the partytraditions in Australian foreign policy resurfaced. These trends illustrated theCoalition Government’s preference for bilateral diplomacy with ‘great and power-ful friends’. In contrast, the Labor opposition emphasised multilateral approachesthrough forums such as the United Nations (UN). The divisive themes of the 2001ballot continued to reverberate; the threat of international terrorism preoccupiedpolicy-makers, along with efforts to discourage unexpected refugee arrivals. Labor,forced to reflect on three consecutive election defeats, looked for means of productdifferentiation. With the continuing dominance of international affairs in thedomestic political arena, simply preserving a bipartisan approach to foreign policythreatened to make the opposition politically irrelevant.

Typically, the party in government dominates contests on foreign policy. Itenjoys greater access to other government’s officials, intelligence resources andpublic service skills. In the modern era, opposition parties can no longer afford tomerely follow the government’s lead. As Michael Wesley describes, a ‘new logic’now encompasses many aspects of Australian foreign policy. The domestic andinternational political realms intersect and are merged through the prism ofelectoral considerations (Wesley 2002). Allowing a government free rein on foreignpolicy only ensures that an opposition is even further behind in its prospects ofgaining power. The inter-party consensus on foreign policy did not entirelydisappear in 2002. In many areas, the two major political parties reinforced theirjoint commitment to certain objectives in Australia’s international relations. Refu-gee policy remained firmly quarantined as an area of (at times uncomfortable)agreement, along with a general commitment to economic liberalisation. Increas-ingly, however, foreign policy debates featured in the public domain. Oftenacrimonious exchanges resulted over regional relations, the appropriate response to

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/03/010037-18 2003 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771032000073632

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unrest in Zimbabwe, Australia’s accession to the International Criminal Court, acommitment to a possible United States-led war against Iraq, and, after themonstrous terrorist bombing of a Bali nightclub, Australia’s capacity to fight itsown ‘war on terror’.

Two’s company, three (or more) is a crowd

In February the government commissioned a new White Paper on foreign and tradepolicy, ‘Advancing the National Interest’, to update the earlier 1997 version ‘In theNational Interest’. (Obviously, very little creative energy went into the title). Newchallenges for Australian foreign policy stemmed from significant internationaldevelopments over the preceding five years, including the East Asian financialcrisis, the ongoing process of globalisation, independence for East Timor and theaftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Downer and Vaile 2002). Theprevious White Paper stated an assumption that ‘the national interest does notchange with a change of Government’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1997). Giventhe growing split between the government and the opposition on priorities inAustralia’s international relations, the new White Paper was not expected to containa similar disclaimer.

One analyst argued that the two major parties only provided ‘an illusion ofchoice’ on foreign policy throughout 2002 (Burchill 2002b). While this is demon-strably true on a number of issues, fundamental tensions increasingly divide eachparty’s perspective, particularly when determining the appropriate institutions topursue Australia’s interests abroad. In practice, Australia combines its internationalrelations through bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions. The govern-ment of the day decides the appropriate balance. In the bid for election, the partiesencapsulate their respective approaches under distinguishing labels. Attempting toovercome the 2001 election failure, Kevin Rudd, the new Labor spokesperson onforeign affairs, claimed the ‘radical centre’ of foreign policy. This he defined as anappropriate balance between a ‘robust approach to national security’ and acommitted, compassionate response to international obligations (Rudd 2001). Theradical centre label is no doubt an attempt to associate the Australian Labor Partywith the success of its British New Labour counterpart. Rudd’s term also contrastswith the government’s assertion of a trademark ‘pragmatic’ approach to foreignpolicy (Downer 2002c). Traditional stereotypes hold that pragmatic conservativegovernments prefer bilateral arrangements while Labor contrasts itself with a moreradical commitment to internationalism.

Of course, the debate over which approach best serves Australia’s foreign policyinterests is not solely framed through party preferences. This growing division alsoreflects a wider change in the world’s political climate. The enthusiastic embraceof internationalism after the end of the Cold War has been gradually perverted bythe selfish drive for particular interests. Yet in Australia, the emphasis on eithermultilateral or bilateral approaches would animate political disputes over the rest ofthe year. Appropriately, The Age editorialised ‘that the long era of bipartisanshipin Australian foreign policy was now effectively over’ (The Age 2002).

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Regional relations

Party disputes over foreign relations emerged early, though detecting a substantialpolicy difference initially remained unclear. Approaching his seventh year asForeign Minister, Alexander Downer began 2002 by stressing the government’s‘all-weather commitment to the region’ (Downer 2002a). The difficulties encoun-tered with Indonesia when the government pursued its hard-line against asylum-seekers had reinforced arguments that Australia had turned away from Asia. In thegovernment’s defence, Downer pointed to the dramatic regional changes during histenure and the challenges these presented for Australia’s ongoing engagement.Australia supported Indonesia’s fitful transition to democracy after the fall of theSuharto regime. Australia made a substantial contribution to the East-Asianeconomic crisis bail-out fund. Australia led the UN intervention in East Timor. Allthis, Downer claimed, illustrated the government’s regional commitment, for thegood times as well as the bad.

Labor mocked Downer’s rhetoric, arguing that it owned the intellectual policycredentials for Australia’s engagement with Asia. Rudd claimed that the govern-ment attempted to ‘camouflage the systematic deterioration in our regional relation-ships over the past half decade’ (Rudd 2002a). At the time, Rudd’s efforts weredirected towards outlining his personal vision on the importance of Australianforeign policy. The perennial challenge for any opposition is to gain credibility asan alternative government. Public exposure and policy explanation is critical. Atthis early stage in the electoral cycle, Labor focused on building profile. Ruddcondemned Downer’s ‘indifference’ to the region without offering an alternativepolicy to reinvigorate regional ties. He did not, for instance, adopt an earliersuggestion calling for the establishment of a dedicated minister for the Asia–Pacific(Burchill 2002a). And for his efforts, an old diplomat with long-standing regionalinterests counselled Rudd not to judge the government on the past but to focusupon the future (Woolcott 2002). Sniping around the margins to score politicalpoints did little to advance regional relations. Yet the substance of policy differencebetween the parties would wait until later in the year.

Indeed, when it came to a specific difficulty in relations with Australia’s mostpopulous neighbour, the opposition rallied in support of Prime Minister JohnHoward. During an early February visit to Indonesia, several prominent localpoliticians cancelled pre-arranged meetings with Howard. While he still held talkswith Indonesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the cancellations appeared adeliberate diplomatic snub. Significantly, the speaker of the Indonesian Parliament,Amien Rais initially refused to meet Howard during the visit. Rais claimed thatAustralia had displayed a clear lack of respect for Indonesian sovereignty, es-pecially over asylum-seeker returns and the independence movement in West Papua(Dodson and Murdoch 2002). Eventually, under pressure from the Indonesianadministration, Rais agreed to talk with Howard briefly during a formal banquet(Greenlees and Henderson 2002). At least this allowed an exchange of personalniceties, even if coming without particular substance.

For its part, the Australian federal opposition labelled any boycott ‘inappropri-

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ate’. This backing seemed surprising. Howard’s difficulties presented a clearopportunity to reinforce a message that the government could not effectivelyadvance Australian interests in Asia. Instead, the opposition closed in withbipartisan support. Rudd argued that whoever the elected government might be, itshould be permitted to engage Indonesia at the highest level (The Sydney MorningHerald 2002). While a magnanimous sentiment, perhaps more importantly the onetangible outcome of the visit blunted any criticism. Australia and Indonesiacommitted themselves to a memorandum of understanding on combating inter-national terrorism. Unlike the opposition, Howard displayed no inhibition, againcriticising what he claims is Labor’s historical over-exuberance for region relations.

I have realistic expectations of our association with Indonesia, the mistake thathas been made in the past in relation to Indonesia is that people have elevatedexpectations out of the relationship and those expectations are always doomedto be disappointed. But that was the error of earlier approaches. (Howard2002c)

Howard argued that ‘the to-ing and fro-ing about who talks to me and whodoesn’t has got something to do with the view that most politics are local’ (Howard2002b). Clearly, he speaks from experience. In modern Australia, foreign policy isnow more than ever an extension of domestic politics by other means.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), held at Coolum inQueensland in early March, presented the government with an opportune momentto illustrate Australia’s international leadership. CHOGM came framed against thebackground of ongoing political unrest in Zimbabwe. As Zimbabwe’s presidentialelection approached, reports of violence and intimidation persisted, strongly indi-cating that the campaign was anything but a free and fair. The controversial landredistribution policy of incumbent President Robert Mugabe persisted in thelead-up to the election, widely interpreted as an effort to divert attention from hisown political and economic failures. A majority of the Commonwealth member-states readily acknowledged the increasingly oppressive tactics of Mugabe’sgovernment. Yet most were unwilling to act formally against Zimbabwe, especiallyas the ballot was due a few days after CHOGM’s completion.

Howard was unequivocal in an early statement on the situation: ‘I deplore theviolence, I deplore the undemocratic behaviour, the interference with the rule oflaw, the interference with press freedom and all of those things that are currentlytaking place in Zimbabwe’ (Howard 2002a). Prior to CHOGM and during themeeting in March, Australia and other developed states lobbied to suspendZimbabwe from the Commonwealth in protest against the civil abuses (Henderson2002). The push for suspension failed to gather sufficient support and eventually acompromise statement was adopted. A troika of Commonwealth leaders—PrimeMinister Howard, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria’s PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo—would assess a report from a Commonwealth Observer Group

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on the conduct of the Zimbabwe election and then determine the appropriate action,ranging from collective disapproval to suspension (CHOGM 2002).

In terms of party politics, the government’s position appeared relatively uncon-troversial. The opposition’s demanded that the government do more rather thanpursue a radically alternative direction. Labor made early calls for Australia toimpose ‘smart sanctions’ against Zimbabwe, targeted specifically against Mugabe,members of his regime and non-humanitarian assistance. The Foreign Ministeragreed this presented an option, but argued that doing so too early would make itimpossible to deploy Australian observers to monitor the election (Hansard 2002a).Rudd’s participation in the observer group perhaps added special resonance toDowner’s point. After Mugabe was controversially returned to power, Howard andhis two fellow leaders imposed a one-year Commonwealth suspension on Zim-babwe. While criticised by some for not imposing sanctions, the decision repre-sented more than expected. Labor pursued the government throughout the year tounilaterally impose its own sanctions and eventually—‘better late than never’according to Rudd—Australia suspended a range of activities in Zimbabwe fromOctober (quoted in Douez 2002).

Other matters around the time of CHOGM diverted the opposition’s attention,especially the continuing revelations of the Senate Select Committee on a CertainMaritime Incident (the so-called ‘Children Overboard’ inquiry). Determining whatspecific information passed to the government during Royal Australian Navyencounters with asylum-seekers ensured that any post-election honeymoon periodwas short lived.

Perceptions abroad and politics at home

The politics of refugees continued to resonate throughout the year. AmnestyInternational’s Secretary-General Irene Khan delivered a scathing impression ofAustralia: ‘The image of Australia today is less of a carefree, sunburnt sportingnation, and more of the Tampa and its human cargo, of riots at Woomera, ofAustralian-funded detention centres on the Pacific islands’ (Khan 2002). The PrimeMinster remained convinced that the government’s aggressive stance on borderprotection did no harm to Australia’s international reputation. In fact, Howardargued the reverse. ‘Australia’s esteem and respect around the world is higher nowthan it has ever been in its history’, he enthusiastically declared (Howard 2002d).Howard claimed that other countries followed Australia’s lead in its tough approachto border protection. Indeed, the efforts by many in Europe to stop refugee arrivalssuggest that Australia is certainly not alone in its parsimonious response.

This positive ‘spin’ on events did not solely aim to divert international attention.Howard directed his comments to the domestic audience. As one commentatornoted, Howard set a task for his third term in office: to add a significant foreignpolicy dimension to his time as Prime Minister (Walker 2002). Rather than rely ona foreign affairs legacy defined by reactions to international factors (as had been thecase for intervention in East Timor), Howard looked to reinforce his personalvision of Australia in the world. This gave him a powerful weapon against the

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opposition, described by former diplomat Tony Kevin as Howard’s ‘Excalibur’, the‘magic sword to keep Labor out of government’ (Kevin 2001). Howard couldportray himself as the defender of Australia, reinforcing a nationalist mantra ofbonding by exclusion. Drawing the opposition into this uncomfortable politicalterritory exposed Labor’s internal divisions between its internationalist inclinationsand poll-driven electoral assessments. This tactic of ‘wedge politics’ was demon-strated clearly in the 2001 election. Labor’s mirror of the government’s hard-lineapproach to asylum-seekers cost it much of the progressive vote. Clearly, Howardwas willing to push the limits of the bipartisan tradition in foreign policy to see justhow far the opposition would follow.

Not all shared Howard’s positive assessment of Australia in the world. RichardButler, a former Australian ambassador to the UN, argued that the government’sapproach to a raft of international issues had ‘trashed’ Australia’s reputation in theinternational community (quoted in Stewart 2002). The opposition obviouslyagreed. Rudd claimed that Howard suffered the perils of political ‘hubris’ and thatAustralia’s recent approach to international relations had earned only ‘derision’,setting a ‘huge challenge of rebuilding our reputation’ (Rudd 2002b). Still, theopposition, and Rudd in particular, remained firmly orientated towards the task ofbuilding their alternative profile. This critique of Howard’s foreign policy revolvedlargely around matters of image, rather than particular breaks with the government.The indication of the growing foreign policy differences between the major partiescame later from a different source.

Simon Crean, the new leader of the Labor party, made his first substantial forayinto foreign policy in April. While outlining his vision for Australia’s regionalengagement and criticising the government on a range of specific decisions, asingle theme galvanised Crean’s position. He believed that ‘for some of the mostimportant global issues confronting Australia—such as people smuggling andasylum seekers—building international frameworks is the only way to go’ (Crean2002a). This followed in the Labor tradition of an internationalist approach,committing Australia to multilateral institutions and working collectively with othergovernments. Crean’s argued that the government missed considerable opportuni-ties for international solutions to foreign policy challenges by focusing almostexclusively on bilateralism.

The government made little effort to bridge this growing party divide. In a majorspeech on the future direction of Australia’s international relations, the ForeignMinister reflected a deep scepticism for international organisations. ‘(T)he multilat-eral system is not a cure all’, Downer argued. ‘Sometimes it can lead to lowestcommon denominator outcomes or outcomes that are simply not in our interests’(Downer 2002c). This message pandered to an underlying fear of losing sovereigncontrol, one well received in the Coalition’s conservative heartlands. An oppor-tunity to exploit these growing party tensions soon came about.

The International Criminal Court

The debate over whether Australia should accede to the International Criminal

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Court (ICC) brought the tensions over multilateral approaches to foreign policy intosharp focus. In 1998, an international conference in Rome created the statute tounderpin this new institution. Australia expressed its strong support from the outset.Early in 2002, the government appeared set to formally adopt the Rome Statute intoAustralian law. During a speech in March outlining the priorities for Australia’sinternational treaty negotiations, Ashton Calvert, the Secretary of the Departmentof Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), explained that ‘the government remainscommitted to ratifying the Rome Statute’ (Calvert 2002). Under the terms of thetreaty, Australia needed to ratify by 1 July to participate in the first ICC assemblyand the nomination of court officers.

By mid-year, the Australia’s commitment looked uncertain. During a visit to theUnited States (US) in June, the Prime Minister refused to guarantee that thegovernment would ratify the Rome Statute. After a meeting with members of theUS administration, he described their opposition to the ICC as ‘a very powerfulargument’ (Howard 2002e). This came despite Downer’s strong advocacy since theRome conference. Howard seized the ICC issue from his Foreign Minister in amanner reminiscent of Bob Hawke’s 1989 intervention into international negotia-tions on the Antarctic Minerals Convention. Without informing his ForeignMinister, Hawke had reversed government policy to garner environmental votes inan upcoming election. Similarly, Howard argued that he had not yet made adecision on ratifying the ICC, despite the government’s continued support for thetreaty over the preceding years. Labor quickly criticised this threatened reversal.Rudd claimed that it ‘beggars belief’ how support for the ICC could evaporate inthe last moments before ratification (quoted in Shanahan 2002).

Howard’s indecision did more than simply illustrate differences between themajor political parties. It also demonstrated the extent of divided opinion within thegovernment itself. Howard’s comments carefully straddled several political paths.First, he signalled that dissenting members in the Coalition party room would atleast be heard. Liberal MP Bronwyn Bishop had led a vocal, if belated, campaignof criticism against the ICC as a ‘sacrifice’ of Australia’s sovereignty (Bishop2002). She apparently carried the support of many in the Coalition’s ranks,including Deputy Prime Minster and National Party leader John Anderson. WhileHoward’s evident wavering gave these opponents added momentum, it also quelledany possible dissent over perceptions that senior government members had unfairlyforced through the treaty.

Second, it gave the government a chance to further wedge public opinion onissues of Australian sovereignty. Downer, who had earlier claimed that ‘I don’tmake party political points very often’ (Downer 2002b) certainly attempted to makeone in the wider context of the ICC controversy. In June, he asserted that

One of the great contrasts between the Australian Labor Party and thisgovernment is that we make our own policies. The Labor Party has no policiesand goes to Geneva and asks United Nations officials in Geneva what itspolicies should be. (Hansard 2002b)

While not a particularly sophisticated attack, it further illustrated the growing

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gap between the parties on foreign policy. The government had won considerablesupport through various debates by reinforcing Australia’s sovereignty, especiallyappealing to those conservatives who felt disenfranchised as a consequence ofglobal interdependence. Entangling the ICC in the morass of debates over Aus-tralian distinctiveness put the opposition in a difficult position. The governmentsent a not-too-subtle signal that only the Coalition could protect Australia fromthose ‘outside’, arguing that Labor hoped to surrender Australia’s independence.Pushing the issue too far might expose the double-standard evident when consider-ing the government’s enthusiastic embrace of economic globalisation, yet theopportunity to gain political capital proved irresistible.

Finally, more significantly as an aspect of the government’s approach to foreignpolicy, Howard sent a message that Australia might be willing to follow the US asone of the few countries in the world to reject the ICC outright. Greg Sheridan,foreign editor for The Australian and a fervent advocate of the US administration,interpreted this as ‘valuable’ support that should translate into other benefits in thebilateral relationship (Sheridan 2002a). He predicted that the US would persuadeHoward not to ratify the Rome Statute (Sheridan 2002b). Others, including formerLiberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, were far less sanguine. Fraser claimed thatAustralia risked its international credibility if it simply mirrored the US position(Fraser 2002; Peake 2002). In the end, Howard’s support for the US provedrhetorical rather than substantial. This undermined Sheridan’s confident predictionalong with Fraser’s hope for comprehensive Australian participation. Australiaratified the Rome Statute with an added declaration stressing the primacy of localcourts. This allayed the grievances in the government’s ranks and still allowed amomentary public contrast to foster fears concerning Labor’s internationalistposition.

Courting George W.

The corollary to traditional perspectives that Labor governments emphasise multi-lateral institutions holds that conservative governments turn the other way and driveAustralia toward great power allies. This perception often proves counterfactualwhen examining the record of particular governments. Indeed, the leaders of eachmajor party contradicted this generalisation about Australia’s relationship with theworld’s greatest power, the United States. John Howard, in an effusive momentafter addressing a joint meeting of the US Congress in Washington DC, evenbecame an advocate for his political opponents.

I know that I would be speaking on behalf of the Australian Labor Party insaying today to all of you that they share our commitment to the Americanalliance and I know that they would want me to say on their behalf that thefriendship that is felt between our two countries is felt across the political dividein Australia. (Howard 2002f)

Similarly, Simon Crean underscored his credentials in support of the Govern-ment’s relationship with Australia’s longest standing formal ally.

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The alliance continues to enjoy the support of the two main political parties inAustralia, both in government and opposition. It is one of the central planks offoreign policy bipartisanship in this country and under my leadership willremain so. (Crean 2002b)

Taken independently, these remarks suggest that preserving the US relationshipis strong area of foreign policy convergence between the two major parties.Nevertheless, tensions reflecting the stereotype of party traditions resurfacedthrough 2002. Richard Leaver explains that ‘like all coalition governments, Howardclaims to be the only true keeper of Australia’s alliance relationship with Washing-ton’ (Leaver 2002). Certainly Howard proudly declared that the ‘alliance has neverbeen stronger and has never been closer’ (Howard 2002d). As the ICC disputedemonstrated, Australia’s relationship with the US is a sub-text in the mostvociferous inter-party foreign policy debates. The possibility of a war with Iraqbecame an obvious area of dispute, exacerbated by terrorist bombings in Bali andspeculation over Australia’s policy of pre-emptive military action.

War with Iraq?

When US President George W. Bush declared Iraq a triumvirate partner in an ‘axisof evil’ at the beginning of 2002, clearly Iraq’s position in the world communitywould dominate the international political agenda (Bush 2002). As the US admin-istration expanded the axis of evil from three in February, to six in May, to apossible 60 in June, perpetual conflict seemed inevitable (Alcorn 2002; Doran2002). Iraq maintained a special status as the principal focus of US attention, thelikely next phase of its ‘war on terror’. For those in charge of Australia’sinternational diplomacy—and equally for those aspiring to take control—a possibleUS war against Iraq exposed a number of controversies.

With the US apparently determined to precipitate conflict with Iraq, the localdebate shifted to decide Australia’s response. One of the interesting misnomers inthe debate over possible war against Iraq surrounded the word ‘unilateral’. Bydefinition, this implies the US fighting alone. From early on, the Australiangovernment, along with the United Kingdom, indicated their strong support for theUS position on Iraq. The prospects of the US acting in complete isolation seemedremote. In the strictest sense, the US could claim that it acted with the support ofan international ‘coalition of the willing’. Support from the wider internationalcommunity, however, expressed through a resolution of the UN, could not beguaranteed. The practical understanding of unilateral action evolved to refer toaction taken without a UN mandate.

The Australian people, it seems, understood this semantic division and chose notto follow the government in its strong support of a unilateral war. Polling inSeptember indicated that a majority of the public opposed Australian participationin a unilateral US attack against Iraq. Equally, those surveyed strongly supportedaction provided that it was undertaken with UN authorisation (Cumming 2002).This left the government in a difficult position. As foreign policy made its

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continuing transition into the domestic political arena, the government could nothope to have issues always running in its favour.

As a rule, foreign policy debates should privilege governments. They havegreater access to information and the skills of the public service. In an unusual featfor a party in opposition, Labor showed it had better intelligence in the Iraq debate.Reflecting the public’s mood, Labor refused to declare unqualified support for theUS position. By contrast, the government, though still unclear of future US plans,pushed ahead regardless and talked up the prospects of war. The governmentsought to reiterate its national security credentials and close relationship with theUS. This earned Howard the endearment of Mark Latham, an opposition front-bencher and potential Labor leadership aspirant, as an American ‘arse-licker’(quoted in Dodson 2002). This reference had little impact on foreign policy butgave Labor (and Latham) added exposure in domestic politics. This populist appealhelped regain some traditional support lost to the Coalition through the asylum-seekers controversy.

The Foreign Minister obviously considered that Labor’s soft support for the USposition on Iraq actually presented the government an electoral opportunity. Earlier,he labelled opponents to the hard-line approach as ‘appeasers’, a careful effort toequate the opposition with historical nonfeasance in the face of aggression. TheLabor party ‘don’t think the development of weapons of mass destruction bySaddam Hussein is a serious problem’, Downer asserted (Downer 2002d). He tookthe partisan sniping even further, arguing that Simon Crean had ‘foolishly’ adoptedthe language of the Iraqis in attacking US foreign policy (Downer 2002e). Howardadded his own pressure, speculating that action against Iraq was now ‘moreprobable than not’ (Howard 2002g).

Labor criticised this as ‘Rambo rhetoric’, detrimental to Australia’s long-termnational interests (Murphy 2002). And indeed, international developments gaveLabor a fillip in its campaign. Many Australians were undoubtedly surprised todiscover that Iraq, the subject of the government’s increasing belligerence, actuallyconstituted one of the country’s largest wheat export markets. Iraq threatened toslash half its annual wheat imports from Australia, worth around $600–800 million(Barker and Bolt 2002; Wright 2002a). Initially, the government dismissed thethreat as unfortunate collateral damage during times of war. Unimpressed, theAustralian Grains Council, along with the opposition, lobbied hard for the govern-ment to reconsider its strong public condemnation of Iraq. Coupled with this, theUS adapted its Iraq policy, leaving Australia in an awkward position in the chargeto war. The Bush Administration, forced to mollify its own bellicose attitudebecause of domestic and international pressure, shifted the focus to the UN. Thisdid not end speculation of a possible unilateral attack, but certainly changed theterms of debate in Australia.

Journalist and newspaper columnist Geoffrey Barker attempted to explain thedifferences between the parties in theoretical terms. According to Barker, thegovernment offered a ‘starkly realist’ approach, focusing on the Iraqi threat and theneed for military intervention should diplomatic measures fail. In contrast, Laborrested on ‘classical liberal internationalism, focused on multilateralism, on legal

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niceties, and on the need of the international community to approve collectivemilitary action’ (Barker 2002). This is a reasonable general analysis, but Barker istoo generous if intending to equate this supposedly liberal approach with the moreprincipled position. Labor certainly demarcated its stronger preference for multilat-eral solutions. But throughout the debate, Labor carefully maintained open avenuesof retreat into realist support for the US in the event of unilateral action.

Officially, Labor tried to position itself upon a difficult dual path. The oppositionfavoured the US provided that it acted under the auspices of the UN. In an elusivepolicy line, however, Labor refused to reject supporting unilateral US action.Rudd’s equivocal explanation is illustrative of Labor’s position throughout theyear:

Speaking for myself, it would still take a lot of persuading for me to supportunilateral action, but we’d be working our way through the evidence (quoted inGrattan 2002a: emphasis added).

Labor expressed a clear liberal internationalist preference for UN procedures.Yet it was never so enamoured of these principles as to explicitly rule outsupporting the unilateral option. Indeed, in a show of bipartisan realism, theopposition joined the government in the Senate to vote down a Greens’ motiondemanding that Australia condemn any military strikes without UN authorisation(Robertson 2002). And Labor, in its own starkly realist manner, refused to allowits parliamentarians a conscience vote on Australia’s participation in a war againstIraq (Saunders 2002).

This dualism ensured that the opposition had its own internal difficulties onforeign affairs. Others in the party looked for a more definite position. Rudd’spredecessor, Laurie Brereton, argued that the party should explicitly reject unilat-eral US attacks as ‘an imperial punitive expedition’ (Brereton 2002). Of course,like any policy area, maintaining a perfectly consistent party line is almostimpossible. Government backbenchers similarly expressed their concerns about aunilateral attack, one claiming that this would put the US in ‘the same basket asthe terrorists’ (Wright 2002b). Yet given perceptions of historical party traditionsin foreign policy, Labor had more to lose through an internal split on Iraq shouldthe Coalition seek to exploit such disagreement.

Brereton’s intervention into his former portfolio area appeared to reflect theunease of many in Labor ranks about US interests. Labor assiduously pushed fora parliamentary debate on the question of Australian participation in a possible waragainst Iraq. Labor hoped to capitalise on the apparent public support for its moremeasured approach in contrast to the government’s militant enthusiasm. Yet whenthe opportunity eventually arose in September, the debate exposed considerabletensions within the party about the importance of the US relationship. As MattPrice described, ‘Labor’s anti-US genie’ escaped, a portent of considerable futuredifficulties should events force the party to choose between its dual positions’(Price 2002). Labor’s policy carried two sharp edges. Portraying the government asUS sycophants won support from those looking for an independent approach inAustralia’s international relations. Yet it risked alienating a general population

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genuinely concerned about security and hoping for continued protection from theworld’s greatest military, economic and political power.

The party’s debate about Australia’s participation in a war against Iraq reflectedpublic scepticism over the motives driving US action. Officials in the US and othersympathetic governments were eager to conflate Iraqi President Saddam Husseinwith the evil spectre of terrorism after the 11 September attacks of 2001. While nospecific details of links between Hussein and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda networkwere established in the public domain, the US continued to push for the extensionof its ‘war on terror’ into Iraq. Without clear evidence of an Iraqi terroristconnection, the US, and its Australian ally, shifted the message onto the threatspresented by weapons of mass destruction. As the year progressed, those favouringwar sought to inculcate a connection in the public mind between Iraq, weapons ofmass destruction and terrorism. Howard’s statement late in the year is an instructivedemonstration.

The ultimate nightmare must surely be the possibility of weapons of massdestruction falling into the hands of terrorist groups. That is a powerfuladditional reason why a country such as Iraq, which has previously been willingto maliciously use weapons of mass destruction, should have those weaponsdenied to it. (Howard 2002i)

Certainly, eradicating weapons of mass destruction would greatly contribute tothe prospects of world peace. But while officials highlighted the threat of terrorism,one often unmentioned factor in this equation had a continuing influence on publicimpressions–oil interests in the Middle East. Generous speculation about Iraq’s oilreserves cite an estimated 335 billion barrels, compared with the world’s largestproven reserves in Saudi Arabia of 260 billion barrels (Hartcher 2002). Oil may notbe the sole US interest in Iraq but at these levels it is certainly not incidental.

After Bali: Australia’s ‘sense of bewilderment and disbelief’

Speculation about the ‘oil factor’ may have been responsible for early cynicism ofulterior motives in Iraq. On 12 October, a new consideration brutally intruded intothe public’s perception of Australia’s place in the world. Holiday-makers on theIndonesian island of Bali became the targets of a monstrous attack, the unassumingvictims of wanton terror.

Outside visitors might have been forgiven for assuming that the Australianterritory had been attacked if relying on the front-page headlines of The Australian(‘Terror Hits Home’) and The Sydney Morning Herald (‘Terrorism Strikes Home’).In this supposedly globalised media age, national identity is never more importantthan in reporting tragedy overseas. And in Bali, it appeared terror had truly struckhome—88 Australians killed out of a total death toll of approximately 180, withmany more seriously injured.

Bipartisanship is expected during times of national crisis. Political manoeuvringsbackfire against politicians insensitive to community mourning. As the PrimeMinister described in a memorial service a few days after the bombing, the

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experience of 12 October left Australians with a ‘sense of bewilderment anddisbelief’ (Howard 2002h). This dispelled inter-party tensions for a time. Suspicionabout the perpetrators fell on a regional militant group Jemaah Islamiah (JI),believed to have connections with al-Qaeda. Accepting associated responsibility forthe attack, Osama bin Laden claimed that Australians should not have been soshocked.

We warned Australia before to join in (the war) in Afghanistan, and (against)its despicable effort to separate East Timor. It ignored the warning until it wokeup to the sounds of explosions in Bali. (BBC News 2002)

Bin Laden’s railing against Australia is difficult to judge. He acknowledgedresponsibility for the massacre in Bali along with various other terrorist relatedevents in the world over the proceeding months. This appeared typically narcissis-tic. If he did have some part in the bombing, he declared that Australians werespecifically targeted. While this contradicted the later confession of a suspectarrested in Indonesia, who expressed his desire to kill US nationals, bin Laden’sbroadcast singled out Australia more than any other US ally. Whatever theintention, events in Bali entangled Australia even more directly with SoutheastAsia. The subsequent high level of practical cooperation between Australia andneighbouring security authorities strongly contrasted with the hesitant politicalrhetoric on regional enmeshment.

As Australians travelling overseas became familiar with the now ubiquitousDFAT advice ‘to maintain a high level of personal security awareness’, the politicalparties cautiously began again to voice their perspectives on foreign policy. Asidefrom an understandable but largely unenlightening dispute over the availableintelligence information prior to the attack, terrorism in Bali became anotherelement in the ever changing foreign policy landscape. The various actors incorpor-ated these events into their particular view of Australia in the world. Severalregional governments criticised Australia over a series of household raids by localauthorities on people believed to have JI links. Australia’s continued strong travelwarnings about the dangers in Southeast Asia also sparked consternation. Againfending off accusation that his government lacked a commitment to regionalrelations, Howard argued that the criticism from other governments only reflected‘the rhetorical surface’ and that the ‘undercurrent of relations is still very good’(quoted in Riley and Green 2002). The opposition worked in support of thisassessment. The Labor leadership quickly distanced itself from the opinionsexpressed by one frontbench member that Howard ‘doesn’t like Asians’, in anattempt to avoid domestic acrimony that might further diminish Australia’s regionalreputation (Riley 2002). This contrasted strongly with the earlier reaction topersonal abuse against the Prime Minister in debates over Iraq. As a consequenceof the Bali experience, Greg Sheridan argued that the parties were forced into‘commonsense consensus that we need the deepest possible engagement withSoutheast Asia.’ (Sheridan 2002c). Though this axiomatic analysis was never reallyin serious dispute, the precise shape of that engagement remained controversial.

The suggestion from Defence Minister Robert Hill that Australia combat re-

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gional terrorism by resuming joint operations with the infamous Indonesian specialforces Kopassus bought a sceptical response from many in the community.Cooperation had been suspended because of Kopassus’s well-deserved notoriety forhuman rights violations in areas including East Timor, West Papua and Aceh.Although Hill’s speculation was not yet government policy, veteran journalist andnewspaper columnist Brian Toohey faulted Labor for not immediately and ‘bluntlyruling out’ the proposal (Toohey 2002). Rudd earlier claimed that Labor wouldwait for the detail before making a decision on resuming joint operations. He hadalso offered a fairly anodyne description of Kopassus as an institution with a‘colourful history’, rather than a brutal organisation of state terrorism (Rudd2002c). Eventually, the opposition ruled out support for military cooperation withIndonesia, but not until after the government took the opportunity to highlight thatjoint exercises with Kopassus were instigated by the former Labor government(Tingle 2002). Finding a consensus on the best method to enhance regional securityproved difficult.

Australia’s often troubled relationship with Malaysia offered a further challenge.Through a number of weeks in November, Malaysian Prime Minister MahathirMohamad criticised Australia’s travel warnings after the Bali bombings as un-reasonable. He also claimed that Australia could never be accepted in Asia whileit stood so close to the US and even declared Australia unsafe for Muslims. Thegovernment chose to ignore Mahathir’s familiar invective. Labor decided other-wise. Forgoing the usual diplomatic etiquette, Rudd instructed the Prime Ministerof Malaysia to take ‘a running jump’ (quoted in Gray 2002). No doubt Rudd feltemboldened by the earlier announcement of Mahathir’s impending retirement. Thisensured it was most unlikely that Rudd, if ever becoming Australia’s foreignminister, would deal officially with the leader so famously described as a regional‘recalcitrant’. While Rudd claimed that he spoke to defend Australia againstoutrageous slurs, the outburst was scolded by one writer as ‘schoolboy puerility,which smacks of a politician and a party seeking votes’ (Cheesman 2002). Thisunnecessarily harsh evaluation forgets the one luxury of time in opposition, tomake statements that governments likely wish to. Moreover, complications forAustralia’s regional relations did not come from Labor; the government wasperfectly capable of creating added difficulties all of its own.

Pre-emptive strikes

Foreign policy debates in Australia ended 2002 where they began, with a disputeover regional relations. Earlier in June, the Defence Minister embarked on acampaign to build support for pre-emptive military action to oppose terrorism. Hillasserted that ‘a key lesson of the events of 11 September is that when a threat isseen to be emerging, that you don’t wait for the attack before you respond’ (Hill2002a). Pre-emptive military action is a contentious element in international law.The UN Charter acknowledges a country’s right to self defence; however, this isgenerally limited to a proof of imminent attack. Hill sought to push the boundariesof acceptable self defence beyond direct threats toward anticipated risks. The

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government was determined not to entertain specific scenarios, but the argumentstied closely with similar propositions coming from the US administration as ajustification for war against Iraq. Reviving the issue late in the year, Hill arguedthat the international community must reformulate a right to self defence ‘bettersuited to contemporary realities’ (Hill 2002c). But in explaining the issues in-volved, Hill still maintained that ‘each facts circumstance is unique’ and refused tospeculate where Australia might engage in pre-emptive strikes (Hill 2002b). ThePrime Minister decided against such restraint.

During an television interview in December, Howard declared his willingness totake pre-emptive action if terrorists in a neighbouring country plotted an attack onAustralia.

I mean, it stands to reason that if you believed that somebody was going tolaunch an attack against your country, either of a conventional kind or of aterrorist kind, and you had a capacity to stop it and there was no alternativeother than to use that capacity then of course you would have to use it. (Howard2002j)

As Michelle Grattan observed, official Australian statements get ‘amplified’ inthe region (Grattan 2002b). When engaging in gratuitous speculation at an unstabletime, Howard should have prefaced his comments by noting that military actionwould only be contemplated after first exhausting all other options. By not makingany initial reference to inter-governmental cooperation, Howard prompted a pal-pable chorus of denunciation. With relations tested by earlier exchanges,Malaysia’s Prime Minister warned that any Australian infiltration into his countrywould constitute an ‘act of war’ (Kerin and Eccleston 2002). Both the PhilippinesNational Security Advisor and the chair of Indonesia’s parliamentary ForeignAffairs Committee warned such ‘arrogant’ suggestions threatened to alienateAustralia from the region (Baker and Forbes 2002; Kerin and Price 2002). This leftthe government in the awkward position of trying to retrospectively argue that itwas not contemplating unilateral military action.

Locally, the comments also proved divisive. Labor criticised the government’scombative attitude as harmful for regional collaboration. Rudd revived an earlierbarb from the government’s record of troublesome regional experiences, arguingthat the comments on pre-emptive strikes represented a ‘new Howard Doctrine’ forAustralia to act as the US deputy (Rudd 2002d). Rudd wanted to know, quiterightly, if the government would accept the inverse of its pre-emptive principle andallow foreign intervention in Australia. In turn, the government once more stressedits nationalist credentials. Howard lambasted his opponents for a lack of patrioticspirit.

Isn’t it interesting that once again we have a classic operation of the Labor Partydoctrine that whenever there is a difference between a position taken by theleader of the government in Australia and some spokesman from anothercountry, Australia is always wrong in their eyes … The reality is that, when itcomes to standing up for Australian interests, you can always rely on the

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Australian Labor Party to take the point of view of those who would criticisethis country. (Hansard 2002c)

This rather empty struggle of rhetorical largesse again demonstrates the evergrowing foreign policy divergence between the parties. The government assertedthat international law must catch up with the ‘new reality’, where old ideas ofinterstate conflict are marginalised by the threat of modern terrorism (Howard2002j). The opposition stressed ‘a collective responsibility, a common solution tofight terror’ (Crean, quoted in AAP 2002). While foreign affairs continue todominate the political discourse, such divisions will become increasingly familiar.

Conclusion

The extent to which arguments on foreign affairs throughout 2002 actually translateinto policy differences can only be measured after the next change in government.The realities of office may constrain a newly elected party, negating any transform-ation in Australia’s foreign policy. Moreover, the differences between the govern-ment and the opposition are not always clear beyond the symbolic political fracas.Yet matters of emphasis can be all important in foreign policy. If trends continuein their present form, and the Coalition persistently favours bilateral actions whileLabor stresses the need for a multilateral approach, the differences between theparties will become more pronounced. By the time of the next election, Australiansmight be presented with a clear choice on the future direction of the country’sforeign policy.

While international issues continue to dominate public interests, the majorpolitical parties will stress their own perspectives, individual skills and exclusivesolutions. Open debate mounds even further pressures onto Australia’s foreignrelations. These are political challenges to overcome, not to be feared. To do lessthan take a party to task over issues of such community importance undermines thevalue of Australian democracy.

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