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Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry
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John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE
Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations
WRGC August 19, 2014
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A Short Quiz
The NTSB “10 Most Wanted List” is
A. Candidates for the next NTSB Chairman
B. Best restaurants in DC
C. Board Advocacy Priorities
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A Short Quiz
The NTSB 2014 budget is
A. $55 Million
B. $87.5 Million
C. $103 Million
D. $137 Million
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A Short Quiz
The PHMSA 2014 budget is
A. $45 Million
B. $118.6 Million
C. $210 Million
D. $260.5 Million
Hazmat Division
Pipeline Division
2014 budget
Administration’s 2015 proposal
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The NTSB Board MembersAugust 2014
Hon. Christopher A. Hart Acting Chairman
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt
Hon. Mark R. Rosekind
Hon. Earl F. Weener
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Natural Gas Pipeline Accidents
Cleburne, Texas
Sissonville, West Virginia
Birmingham, Alabama
Manhattan, New York
Enterprise Products Operating, LtdNatural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire Cleburne, TexasJune 7, 2010
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Accident Summary
• 36-inch diameter carbon steel
• 1050 psig MAOP
• 950 psig Operating pressure
• 3rd Party damage
• 1 Fatality
• 6 Injuries
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Improper pipeline locate work
• Two parallel pipelines – 30 feet apart
• November 2009 locate tickets for electric utility design phase− Energy Transfer pipeline marked
− Enterprise pipeline not marked
• Only one pipeline on survey map
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Improper pipeline locate work
• June 2010 locate tickets for construction− Energy Transfer pipeline marked
− Enterprise pipeline not marked on three attempts to find the construction site
• Ticket closed – “all clear”
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Improper pipeline locate work
• Second ticket issued three days later− Locator and contractor presumed it was
a duplicate of first
• Ticket closed – “all clear”
Locator never surveyed the right-of-way on four visits
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Improper pipeline locate work
Accident date• Marked Energy Transfer pipeline
• Mowed right-of-way
• Contractor moved dig marker to increase distance from the marked pipeline…
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Improper pipeline locate work
DIRECTLY ABOVE THE UNMARKED ENTERPRISE PIPELINE
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The NTSB Probable Cause
• Contractor power auger punctured the unmarked buried pipeline
• Contributing factors− No permanent pipeline markers
− Pipeline locator did not mark pipeline before excavation work
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Closeout Actions
• Enterprise Products Ltd. improved the locate ticket procedure and technician training
• Final Accident Brief issued September 9, 2013− No recommendations issued
Columbia Gas TransmissionPipeline RuptureSissonville, West VirginiaDecember 11, 2012 12:41 pm
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Accident Summary
• 20-inch diameter carbon steel, 0.281 inch wall thickness
• 1,000 psig MAOP
• 929 psig Operating pressure
• Installed 1967
• “Not piggable”
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Pipeline Integrity Management
• Three parallel, interconnected lines− 30-inch diameter in HCA
− 26-inch diameter in HCA
− 20-inch diameter (not in HCA)
• Interstate highway does not count
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The NTSB Probable Cause
• External corrosion of the pipe wall − deteriorated coating
− ineffective cathodic protection
• Corrosion not detected− Not inspected or tested since 1988
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Contributing Cause
• Rocky backfill degraded corrosion protection
• Shutdown delay− SCADA alarms and alerts
configuration delayed controller response
− No automatic shutoff or remote control valves
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Key Findings
• Automatic SCADA trend data alerts would improve recognition of system problems
• Line would have required integrity management had highway proximity to pipeline been included in HCA decisions
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NTSB Recommendations
• Columbia Gas Transmission− Implement a process for determining
alarm and alert setpoints and response actions
− Provide system trend data and assign alarm function to critical trend variations
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NTSB Recommendations
• PHMSA− Add principal arterial roadways such
as interstate highways to “identified sites” for HCA determination
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Columbia Gas Corrective Actions• Conducted inline inspections on the
non-HCA 20-inch pipeline
• Performed close interval survey
• Reassessed the pipeline coating using AC and DC voltage gradient testing
• SCADA instrument upgrades on looped systems
Ongoing Investigations
Birmingham, Alabama Manhattan, New York
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Birmingham, Alabama• Alagasco
• December 17, 2013 2:30 am
• Cast iron distribution line (1951)
• 25 psig MAOP
• 19 psig operating
• 1 Fatality
• 4 injuries
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Manhattan, New York (Harlem)• Consolidated Edison
• March 12, 2014 9:30 am
• 8-inch cast iron/plastic distribution line (1890 / 2011)
• 8 in wc MAOP, 6 in wc operating
• 8 Fatalities
• 48 injuries
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Test Your Alertness - Just Before Lunch!
My closing comment on the NTSB annual budget quiz was:
It is Not Enough!
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John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE
Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations
