Peralta and Gildo Full Text

8/2/2019 Peralta and Gildo Full Text

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G.R. No. 173793. December 4, 2007.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO M. GLINO, accused-appellant.

Witnesses; The matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best left to thediscretion of the trial judge.As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial

judge. In People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996), the Court aptly held: Settled is the rulethat the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, areaccorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing thewitnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angryflush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulousmutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance,the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone,the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or fullrealization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.

Criminal Law; Murder; Conspiracy; There is conspiracy when two or more persons come toan agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it, and proof of

the agreement need not rest on direct evidenceproof that accused acted in concert, eachof them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support aconviction.Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin Baloes who inflicted the fatalstab, accused-appellant cannot escape culpability. Their obvious conspiracy is borne by therecords. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerningthe commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not reston direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of accused indicating a commonunderstanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is notnecessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicitagreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegalobjective is to be carried out. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them doing hispart to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a conviction. In

conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. The act of oneis the act of all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow.

Tersely put, each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.

Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that denialis the weakest of all defensesit easily crumbles in the face of positive identification byaccused as the perpetrator of the crime.We sustain the RTC and the CAs rejection ofaccused-appellants defense founded on denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled thatdenial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identificationby accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Here, no less than two eyewitnesses in Villarueland victim Virginia positively and categorically named Glino as one of the Boji couplesassailants. Their identification of accused-appellant was unwavering, made in a simple and

straightforward manner. Corollarily, they had no ill motive to testify falsely against Glino.Upon the other hand, other than his bare denial, no corroborating evidence was put forth tosubstantiate accused-appellants disparate account of the incident.

Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; The essence of the qualifyingcircumstance of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on anunsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself; There istreachery even if the victim had a verbal exchange with accused and his companion wherethe assault was sudden, swift and unexpected.That treachery or alevosia was present isincontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected


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attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance todefend himself. It is employed to ensure the commission of the crime without theconcomitant risk to the aggressor. The rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treacherymay still be appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of danger to his person.What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendereddefenseless and unable to retaliate. Concededly, victim Domingo was caught unaware thatan attack was forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with accused-appellant and

Baloes, the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of the passengers inside thejeepney, including Domingo, thought all along that the tension had ceased and that Glinoand Baloes were about to alight. Domingo was overpowered by accused-appellant Glinoand Baloes, who took turns in stabbing the hapless victim. By all indications, Domingo waswithout opportunity to evade the knife thrusts, defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, thefinding of treachery stands on solid legal footing.

Same; Same; Rudiments of Proving Intent to Kill in Crimes against Persons; An essentialelement of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attemptedstage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously withthe infliction of injuries.An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in theirconsummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim

immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specificintent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while generalcriminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. In People v. Delim, theCourt had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving intent to kill in crimes againstpersons. It may consist in: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, locationand number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before,at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the circumstances underwhich the crime was committed; and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as aresult of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

Same; Same; Physical Injuries; Right to be Informed; An accused may be convicted ofslight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder,

inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses whencarried out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime ofhomicide or murderintent to killis not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offenseof less serious physical injuries is tenable, considering that the latter offense is necessarilyincluded in the former. The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and formpart of those constituting the felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be convicted ofslight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder,inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses whencarried out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime ofhomicide or murderintent to killis not required in a prosecution for physical injuries.

Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicablewhen the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where themaximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.The Indeterminate Sentence Lawfinds no application in both cases. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that thelaw is not applicable when the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to those whose maximum term ofimprisonment is less than one year.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


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The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.

REYES, J.:

BEWARE of drunk passengers. They pose danger to life and limb. Merely talking to them ortelling them to sit properly can be fatal, as what happened to one of two victims in the caseat bar.

The present law prohibits and punishes only drunk driving. There is no law banning a drunkperson from riding a public vehicle, or the latters driver from allowing a person whoappears to be drunk to board a public conveyance.A drunk passenger or one under the influence of liquor or drug poses a veritable peril to theother passengers. He is prone to react irrationally and violently, due to lack or diminution ofself-control. Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be avoided, and the riding publicduly protected, if the potential danger posed by drunk passengers can be addressedproperly.It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it may deem properto repress and which is not punishable by law, to report to the Chief Executive, through theDepartment of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should bemade the subject of legislation.3 We leave it to the authorities concerned to do the needful

as they see fit.MAG-INGAT sa mga lasing na pasahero. Silay mapanganib. Ang kausapin o sabihan lamangsila na umupo nang maayos ay maaari mong ikasawi. Ganito ang sinapit ng isa sadalawang biktima sa kasong ito.Ang kasalukuyang batas ay nagbabawal at nagpaparusa lamang sa pagmamaneho nglasing. Walang batas na nagbabawal sa taong lasing na sumakay sa pampublikongsasakyan, o sa drayber na payagan ang taong sa kilos ay lasing na sumakay sapampublikong sasakyan.Ang pasaherong lasing o sino man na nasa impluwensya ng alak o droga ay may dalangpanganib sa ibang pasahero. Malamang na sila ay kumilos nang walang katwiran o manakitdahil sa kabawasan ng pagwawari o pagpipigil sa sarili. Maiiwasan ang walang kabuluhangpagkitil ng buhay at pagkapinsala, at ang mga namamasahe ay mapangangalagaan laban

sa panganib, kung itoy mabibigyan ng karampatang lunas.Tungkulin ng hukuman, kung alam nito na ang isang gawa ay marapat supilin at hindi paipinagbabawal ng batas, na ipagbigay-alam sa Pangulo, sa pamamagitan ng Kagawaran ngKatarungan, ang mga dahilan na pinaniniwalaan ng hukuman kung bakit ang nasabinggawa ay dapat maging layon ng pagsasabatas. Ipinapaubaya namin sa kinauukulangmaykapangyarihan kung ano ang dapat gawin.Before the Court is an appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)4 of the 2000 Rules on CriminalProcedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, from the Judgment5 of the Court ofAppeals (CA) affirming in toto the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Las PiasCity, Metro Manila, convicting accused-appellant Conrado Glino of murder and attemptedmurder for the senseless killing of Domingo Boji and the stabbing of his wife, Virginia Boji.

The FactsOn November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 p.m., in Moonwalk, Las Pias City, husband and wifeDomingo and Virginia Boji hailed a passenger jeepney bound for Alabang-Zapote Road. Thecouple sat on the two remaining vacant seats on opposing rows of the jeepney. Virginiaseated herself on the vehicles left side while Domingo occupied the vacant seat at theright row.Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia alighted. Accused-appellant ConradoGlino took her place. He was reeking of liquor. As the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginianoticed accused-appellant inching closer to her. His head eventually found its way onVirginias shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought accused-appellants attention and asked him to sit


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properly, citing adequate space. Accused-appellant angrily replied, Oh, kung ayaw mongmay katabi, bumaba ka, at magtaxi ka! Virginia decided to ignore his snide remarks. Shethen turned her back on him.Accused-appellant, however, persisted in violating Virginias personal space, leaning on thelatters shoulders. It was at this point that Domingo decided to tell Glino to sit properly.Accused-appellant arrogantly retorted, Anong pakialam mo? Domingo reasoned out thathe is Virginias husband. Domingo further said, Kasi lalasing-lasing ka, hindi mo naman

kaya!Marvin Baloes, who, it turned out, was Glinos equally drunk companion, cursed Domingo.Baloes then provokingly asked the latter, Anong gusto mo? Domingo replied, Wala akongsinabing masama. After the heated verbal tussle, accused-appellant and Baloes appearedto have calmed down, confining themselves to whispering to one another.When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to the driver and told himthat he and Glino were about to alight. As the jeepney ground to a halt, Baloesunexpectedly drew an improvised knife and stabbed Domingo iN the chest. Accused-appellant then unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife (balisong) and joined Baloes in stabbingDomingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack, Domingo failed to offer any form ofresistance to the duos vicious assault. In all, Domingo sustained nine stab woundsthroughout his body.

Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants. She tightly embraced Domingo.Virginias efforts, however, all went for naught as accused-appellant Glino and Baloes wereunrelenting. When the senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied fromincised wounds in her fingers.

The other passengers of the jeepney scampered for the nearest exit immediately after thefirst blow was struck. Some of them had to resort to jumping from the vehicles window toavoid harms way.Accused-appellant Glino and Baloes attempted to flee the scene of the crime and rantowards Camella Center. Baloes, however, fell down to the ground due to intoxication.Glino, unmindful of his companion, was able to run a distance of 45 meters before he wasapprehended by traffic enforcers Alvin Cristobal and Ruben Ramirez. The two traffic aides,who were the first to respond to the crime scene, caught sight of the slow-moving jeepney

and of the passengers jumping off it. With the help of a concerned motorist, they were ableto pin Baloes and Glino to the ground. They later turned the two suspects over to thepolice, who arrived shortly thereafter.Subsequently, Virginia and Domingo were brought to the University of Perpetual Help, RizalMedical Center in Las Pias City. Domingo was, however, pronounced dead after a fewminutes. Domingos chest wound proved mortal.On November 18, 1998, accused-appellant Glino and Baloes were indicted for murder forthe death of Domingo Boji and attempted murder for the stabbing of Virginia Boji. Theaccusatory part of the Information for murder reads:Criminal Case No. 98-1310:

That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring andconfederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each other, withintent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiablecause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab withbladed weapons one Domingo Boji y Daza, suddenly and without warning hitting him on thedifferent parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab woundswhich directly caused his death.CONTRARY TO LAW.

The indictment for attempted murder bears the following accusation:Criminal Case No. 98-1311:


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That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring andconfederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping and aiding eachother, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any

justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, andstab with bladed weapons one Virginia Boji y Revillas, suddenly and without warning,

thereby commencing the commission of murder directly by overt acts but did not performall the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence byreason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,because the injury inflicted to Virginia Boji y Revillas was not sufficient to cause her death.CONTRARY TO LAW.On June 15, 1999, accused Marvin Baloes succumbed to cardio-pulmonary arrest while ondetention. Consequently, his name was dropped from the information. Pre-trial commencedwith respect only to accused-appellant Glino. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Peoples evidence, which essayed the foregoing facts, was principally supplied byEnrique Villaruel, Virginia Boji, SPO2 Wilfredo Dalawangbayan and Alvin Cristobal.Villaruel testified that he was a co-passenger of the spouses Boji in the jeepney where thegruesome stabbing incident took place. Villaruel was then on his way home to Anabu I,

Cavite. He witnessed the crime as it unfolded. According to him, accused-appellant Glinoand Baloes both stabbed Domingo; that accused-appellant was armed with a Batangasknife while Baloes used an improvised knife; that the improvised knife was left on the floorof the jeepney as accused-appellant and Baloes fled the scene of the crime.Virginia narrated that she distinctly saw Baloes stab Domingo in the chest area. Glino wasblocking her path, preventing her from giving aid to her husband. When Domingo wasabout to fall down from where he was seated, she embraced him. As she was holdingDomingo, a knife was thrusted into her, wounding her in the hands.On cross-examination, she disclosed she did not see who between accused-appellant andBaloes caused her wounds; that she saw accused-appellant Glino stab her husband; thatthey met accused-appellant and Baloes only in the jeepney.SPO2 Dalawangbayan testified that he was the investigator assigned to handle the case

involving accused-appellant and Baloes. The two suspects were turned over to him bytraffic aides Cristobal and Ramirez. Likewise turned over to him was a bladed weapon, a 12-inch improvised knife, confiscated from the person of Baloes.At the hospital, he found Domingo in critical condition. He later learned that the victimexpired shortly after his visit. Virginia suffered from incised wounds in her right hand. Afterconcluding his investigation, he prepared a report.Cristobal narrated that he is a traffic aide assigned at the Casimiro and BF Resortintersection in Las Pias City. On the night in question, he noticed a slow-moving passenger

jeepney creeping onto the sidewalk. Moments later, the jeepneys passengers werejumping out of its windows.Suspecting a robbery, he and his partner Ramirez immediately gave chase. A man withbloodied clothes, later identified as Baloes, ran away from the vehicle but fell to the ground

shortly after. Another man, accused-appellant Glino, was able to run for more than fiveminutes before they caught up with him. He and Ramirez later executed a PinagsamangSinumpaang Salaysay.Upon the other hand, the trial court summed up accused-appellants defense, anchored onplain denial, in the following tenor:

The evidence for the defense consists mainly of the lone testimony of accused ConradoGlino, who testified that he is the same accused in this case for murder. He did not knowthe other accused Marvin Baloes prior to November 15, 1998 whom he knew only at the UIfor the first time. On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he was inside the


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passenger jeepney which he boarded at Equitable, Las Pias City near Moonwalk to gohome at Imus, Cavite. He did not have any companion. He rode on a passenger jeep boundto Zapote. He could not recall the number of people inside the jeepney because the seatswere all occupied. He occupied the right side seat of the driver at the middle of the seat onthe right side. Then he saw the victim was stabbed by accused Baloes. He knew the nameof Baloes while they were detained at the UI. He did not know who was stabbed. Thestabbing took place between the areas of Casimiro and Uniwide. The person stabbed died.

He was there watching while the person was being stabbed by Baloes who was seated alsoat the right side inside the jeep but seated at the rear most portion of the jeep. The personstabbed seated at the left seat inside the jeep and seating also at the rear portion of the

jeep. Baloes stabbed the person in his body, started at the chest, stomach and other partsof the body. He did not know how many times Baloes stabbed the victim. There was anargument between Baloes and the wife of the victim prior to the stabbing incident. Theyhad an argument for a short period of time which he did not know what it was about. Theywere at the vicinity near Uniwide when the argument started. He would not know how longthe argument lasted and would not recall the statements of the lady. He said they werehaving an argument because the lady seating beside Baloes and after that lady was only apassenger away from him. Victim said to Baloes while pointing his finger Tumigil ka dyan,susuntukin kita. Then Baloes suddenly drew a bladed weapon and stabbed him. Together

with other passengers, they alighted from the vehicle because he was afraid. He waited foranother passenger jeep so he could go home. He was not able to go home because he wasarrested by the police. He could not estimate how many minutes lapsed after he was ableto go down that jeep when he was arrested as he had no wrist watch, but that was for ashort period of time. Ramirez, the not so tall police officer, arrested them and they werebrought to the UI after he and Baloes were immediately handcuffed using only 1 handcuff.Baloes hurriedly went down and ran away after the incident, going back towards Moonwalk.He was not arrested at the same place where Baloes was arrested. He denied the testimonyof Mrs. Boji that he and Baloes had an argument inside the jeepney they were ridingregarding some space and requested that he move a bit which caused the commotionresulting to this incident. While they were having an argument, he was seated inside the

jeep and he just looked at them. He denied having argued with Mrs. Boji and said that none

argued with him. He knows that Baloes died already (TSN, 1 September 2004).On cross-examination, he declared that his complete name is Conrado Montes Glino. Hermothers name is Juliana Montes Glino. He denied knowing the middle name of co-accusedMarvin, Montes Baloes. Shown a copy of the Information where it appeared that the middlename of Marvin Baloes is also Montes, he agreed that the middle name is Montes. His placeof residence is Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. Baloes did not tell him while they were underthe custody of the police that he is also a resident of Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. He didnot ask Baloes where he was from while they were together at the UI. But he admitted thaton November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he and Baloes were on board oneand the same jeepney bound for Zapote; that while the jeep was near Uniwide Metro Mall,there was an untoward incident that took place inside the jeep; that in that incident, acertain Domingo Boji was stabbed to death. He did not know that Virginia Boji was also

stabbed and wounded. He would not know how many the passengers were in that jeepneyas he failed to count, but there were many passengers. Both seats at the back wereoccupied by passengers, but he did not notice if the seat in front of the jeepney was alsooccupied. There was a commotion when Domingo was stabbed. He immediately alightedthe vehicle because he was afraid and waited for another jeepney to transfer to anotherbound to Zapote.He admitted that among the passengers, only he and Baloes were arrested by the policeofficers because he was pointed to by the witness as the assailant of Domingo Boji. Untilthe time of hearing, no one among the jeepney passengers were arrested for the death ofDomingo and injury inflicted to Virginia Boji. His co-accused, in this case, Marvin Baloes is


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already dead. He has no other co-accused except Baloes. He came to know her before shetook the witness stand and positively identified him as the assailant. When he was arrestedby the police officers, he shouted why they arrested him and the police said that he had togo with them and just explain at the police precinct. He did not resist when the policeofficers arrested him. He was forced to go with them because they handcuffed him. He waswaiting for a ride as he would transfer to another jeepney in going home. It was PO Ramirezwho arrested him. He did not file a case against Ramirez for arresting him without a valid

reason because he was at the detention cell nor seek for help in filing a case againstRamirez because he did not know how as that was the first time he had a case. He had planto file the case against Ramirez who brought him at the UI before PO1 Dalawangbayan.

They were not investigated nor interrogated. He stayed at the UI for one week, then he wastransferred at the Las Pias City jail. He told the police investigator, PO1 Dalawangbayan,that it was Baloes who stabbed and killed Domingo Boji but that was not included in theincident. PO1 Dalawangbayan did not do anything when he told him that he was notincluded in the stabbing incident because the one who was talking only was Virginia Boji.He did not ask PO1 Dalawangbayan to enter his statement in the blotter. Before he wastransferred to the city jail of Las Pias City, he was brought to the City Prosecutors Officefor inquest (TSN, 22 September 2004).RTC and CA Dispositions

On November 22, 2004, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction, disposing asfollows:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Conrado M. Glino GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of Murder and Attempted Murder and hereby sentenced as follows:1. In Criminal Case No. 98-1310, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and itsaccessory penalty and indemnify the heirs of Domingo Boji y Daza the sum of P50,000.00;2. Criminal Case No. 98-1311, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 4 years and 2months of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayormedium as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and payVirginia Boji y Revillas the sum of P101,549.00 actual damages and the sum of P100,000.00moral damages;3. And to pay the costs in both cases.

Accused-appellant elevated his conviction to the CA by way of an intermediate review,conformably with the ruling in People v. Mateo.34 On May 26, 2006, the CA affirmed theRTC judgment in full. The fallo of the CA decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated November 22, 2004 of theRegional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-1310 and 98-1311 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Issues

Undaunted, accused-appellant interposed the present recourse.

On September 13, 2006, We resolved to require the parties to submit their respectivesupplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty (30) days from notice.In a Manifestation dated November 13, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General, forplaintiff-appellee, opted to dispense with the filing of a supplemental brief. Accused-appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office, hoists the same lone error he raised beforethe appellate court, viz.:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THEPRIVATE COMPLAINANTS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT STAB HERHUSBAND AND THAT SHE DID NOT SEE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT STABBED HER.In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that the identity of the assailant was


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not firmly established. The evidence, he argues, points to Baloes, who died even before thetrial began, as the perpetrator of Domingos killing and Virginias stabbing. In thealternative, accused-appellant submits that he is guilty of homicide and attemptedhomicide only, not murder and attempted murder, due to the absence of the qualifyingcircumstance of treachery.

Our Ruling

We first tackle the conviction for murder.Positive IdentificationAccused-appellant makes capital of Virginias identification of Baloes as the person whostabbed her husband, Domingo. According to him, the trial court gravely erred in rejectinghis defense that he was an innocent bystander. He insists he was not acquainted withBaloes. They met each other only when they were both tagged by the police as the personsresponsible for the melee.We are unconvinced. The witnesses for the People were consistent in the identification ofaccused-appellant as one of two assailants who mortally stabbed Domingo. Villaruel, a keyeyewitness for the prosecution, testified thus:Q:

Mr. Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening of November 15, 1998, do youremember where you were then?A:

Yes, Sir.Q:Where were you at that time?A:I was at the corner of Angela Village in Alabang, Zapote Road waiting for a ride.Q:While you are waiting there, waiting for a ride at the said place, do you remember whathappened next, if any?A:

So when I was able to take a ride a jeepney in the road going to Baclaran, that is the timethat I witness the incident.Q:And then, by the way, where were you going at that time, Mr. Witness?A:I was on my way going on at Anabu I, Cavite.Q:Mr. Witness, after you took a ride in a passenger jeepney going to on your way home, doyou remember what happened next, if any?A:When I boarded the jeepney, the jeepney has no vacancy, so I just hang-on at the back ofthe jeepney.

Q:And then, what else happened after that, if you remember?A:When we are already traveled a short distance, one of the passenger alighted, sitted (sic)on the left side.Q:And, what happened next, after you are able to take a sit inside the passenger jeepney.After one of the passenger alighted?A:After a while, another passenger alighted on the right seat of the jeepney.


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Q:What else happened after another passenger alighted from the said jeepney?A:And then, that is the time that I noticed that the two male persons moved closely to thewoman, who is sitted in front of me.Q:And then, what happened next, after you noticed two men moved closely to a woman, in

front of yours?A:One of the male passengers, who moved closely to the woman, little bit lay down his headon the shoulder of the woman.Q:And, what the woman do after this male passenger lay down his head on the shoulder ofthe woman?A:I saw that the woman is avoiding the male passenger, and one of my seatmates on myright side spoke and asked the male passenger to sit properly.Q:And what did this male passenger do after the man sitted before you told him to sit

properly?A:He answered and said ANONG PAKIALAM MO!Q:And what was the reaction of the man sitted beside you, when the male passenger saidANONG PAKIALAM MO!?A:And that, and he answered that because that woman were you lying is my wife.Q:And what did the male passenger do after the said man introduced himself as the husbandof the female passenger?A:

NAGMURA PO.Q:What else happened after the male passenger coursed him?A:And then the other male passenger who moved closely to the woman told that KASI,LALASING-LASING KA HINDI MO NAMAN KAYA.Q:And what else happened after that?A:

The man sitted beside me thought that it was already okay, but it is not, because the twomale persons, who moved closely to the woman, were companions, were together and oneof them asked to alight from the vehicle.

Q:And what happened next after one of the two male persons, who moved closely to thewoman, told to alight?A:Now, we thought that they are going to alight from the vehicle but when they stood up,they talked to one another and suddenly stabbed the male passenger, sitted beside me.Q:Who among these two male passengers stabbed the man sitted beside you?A:

The one who stabbed is the one who pacified the incident that happened before and the


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second stabbed was made by the other male passenger.Q:How many times did these two male passengers stabbed the man, who was sitted besideyou?A:I cannot count but I know it is many times.Villaruels account of the incident dovetails significantly with that of Virginia:

Q:Madam Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening of November 15, 1998, do youremember where you were then?A:

Yes, Sir.Q:Where were you at that time?A:We were at Moonwalk.Q:

You said we, who are your companions at that time?A:

My husband, Sir.Q:Who is your husband?A:Domingo Boji, Sir.Q:Why were you there at the said place during that particular date and time with yourhusband?A:We bought fish.Q:And, after you bought fish, do you remember what happened next, if any?

A:And then after that my husband stopped a jeepney bound to Alabang Zapote.Q:What happened next, after your husband stopped a passenger jeepney bound for Zapote?A:

Then we boarded a jeepney, with one vacant seat on the right and one on the left.Q:And where did you seat when you boarded a passenger jeepney?A:On the left side, Sir.Q:And how about your husband, where did he seat?

A:On the right side, Sir.Q:And then, while you were then on board of the said passenger jeepney, at that time, do youremember what happened next, if any?A:While we are on board of the jeepney and the jeepney is on motion, seated on my right sideis a lady.Q:And how about on your left side, do you know who was sitting?


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A:A lady also, Sir.Q:And what else happened after that?A:And then, after a while, the lady on my right side alighted.Q:

And then, what happened next, after the lady sitting on your right side alighted from thejeepney?A:Suddenly, who is drunk get near to me.Q:And how did you come to know that this man, who went near beside you, was drunk?A:Because he smells liquor.Q:And then what happened next after this man, you claimed drunk, seated beside you?A:And then he leaned on my shoulder.

Q:And what did you do after this man on your shoulder?A:I asked him to move away, considering that there is still a space.Q:And what was the reaction of this man?A:He got mad at me and he said OH, KUNG AYAW MONG MAY KATABI, BUMABA KA, AT MAG-

TAXI KA.Q:And what did you do after this man got mad at you and ordered you to alight from the said

jeepney?

A:So I turned my back to him.Q:And what happened next after you turned your back to him?A:And again he leaned on my shoulder.Q:What happened next after this man leaned again on your shoulder?A:And he was accosted by my husband.Q:How did your husband accosted this man?

A:My husband asked him to sit properly, and he said that I am his wife.Q:And what was the reaction of this man?A:His companion got mad.Q:Where was the companion of the drunk man seated, who got angry?A:Beside the man, who is drunk.


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Q:And then what else happened?Court:

This man, who was leaning on your shoulder, and the man, who got mad, was seated sideby side?A:

Yes, Your Honor.Q:What did this companion of the man, seated beside you, tell you, if any?A:He answered my husband and asked what do you want.Q:And what was the reply of your husband?A:My husband answered I did not say anything wrong.Q:What was the reply of this companion of the man seated beside you?A:

None, Sir.Q:What else happened, while you were there on board of the said passenger jeepney?A:While we are still on board on the jeepney approaching the place of Casimiro Village, andthe jeepney moves slowly, the companion of this drunk man asked thedriver to stopbecause they will alight.Q:And then what happened after that, after the companion of this drunk man ordered thedriver to stop?A:When this man asked his companion, the drunk man, to alight from the vehicle, and I am

seated, while I am looking down and I noticed, I looked to them they are going to alight thevehicle I noticed that they suddenly stabbed my husband. And the two persons announcedHOLDAP ITO. And when I look to them, I saw that they stabbed my husband.Court Interpreter:As the witness demonstrating while it seems that she was stabbed on the downward thrustand the husband was stabbed on the chest.Q:Who are these man, you are referring to, who stabbed your husband?A:

The one who died already, Marvin.Q:

Who was this Marvin, the one seated beside you or the companion of the drunk man?A:

The other man, Sir.Q:Did you notice how many times Marvin stabbed your husband?A:When I look again, I noticed that only once because the knife is still on the chest of myhusband.Court:


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Where was your husband seated in relation to your seat?A:In front of me, Your Honor, on the other side.Q:And what did you do when you saw Marvin stabbed your husband?A:None, Sir, I am just looking to nothing.

Q:And after Marvin stabbed your husband, do you remember what happened next, if any?A:Because Conrado is blocking me, he is in front of me, it seems that they are gambling to aknife to one another.Q:And then, what else happened after that?A:And then, when I looked at them again, I saw that my husband seems to fall from where hewas seated, so I embraced, then another stab came in hit my hands.39As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to the testimoniesof witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial judge.40 In People v. Quijada,41 the

Court aptly held:Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility ofwitnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage ofobserving the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or false-hood, suchas the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or thetremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtiveglance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneeringtone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or fullrealization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.

The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in the ponencia of now Chief JusticeReynato Puno in People v. Ave:x x x It is an established rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate

courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best positionto ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actualobservation of the witnesses manner of testifying, demeanor, and behavior in court. x x xVerily, compared to appellate magistrates who merely deal and contend with the cold andinanimate pages of the transcript of stenographic notes and the original records broughtbefore them, the trial judge confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and theirrespective witnesses. He personally observes their conduct, demeanor and deportmentwhile responding to the questions propounded by both the prosecutor and defense counsel.Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the opportunity to pose clarificatory questions tothe parties. Elsewise stated, when a trial judge makes his findings as to the issue ofcredibility, such findings, especially if affirmed by the CA, bear great weight, at times evenfinality, on the Court.43 We see no cogent reason to depart from these settled doctrines.

Conspiracy

Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin Baloes who inflicted the fatal stab,accused-appellant cannot escape culpability. Their obvious conspiracy is borne by therecords. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerningthe commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not reston direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of accused indicating a commonunderstanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an


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explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which anillegal objective is to be carried out. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of themdoing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support aconviction.45 In conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed thevictim. The act of one is the act of all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participantsdeliver the fatal blow. Tersely put, each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of thecrime committed.

The acts of accused-appellant Glino and Baloes before, during and after the killing ofDomingo are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia categorically narrated that while Baloes wasstabbing Domingo, accusedappellant Glino was blocking her path, effectively preventingherfrom rendering aid to her husband.47 Accused-appellant later joined Baloes in stabbingDomingo with a Batangas knife.

Lame Denial

Too, we sustain the RTC and the CAs rejection of accusedappellants defense founded ondenial. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. Iteasily crumbles in the face of positive identification by accused as the perpetrator of the

crime.49 Here, no less than two eyewitnesses in Villaruel and victim Virginia positively andcategorically named Glino as one of the Boji couples assailants. Their identification ofaccused-appellant was unwavering, made in a simple and straightforward manner.Corollarily, they had no ill motive to testify falsely against Glino.50 Upon the other hand,other than his bare denial, no corroborating evidence was put forth to substantiateaccusedappellants disparate account of the incident.

Treachery

Accused-appellant next argues that he should be made liable for homicide only. He claimstreachery did not attend the killing of Domingo.

That treachery or alevosia was present is incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying

circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on an unsuspectingvictim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. It is employed to ensurethe commission of the crime without the concomitant risk to the aggressor. The rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treachery may still be appreciated even though the victimwas forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the attack was executed ina manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.Concededly, victim Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was forthcoming. Althoughhe had a verbal exchange with accused-appellant and Baloes, the assault was sudden, swiftand unexpected. All of the passengers inside the jeepney, including Domingo, thought allalong that the tension had ceased and that Glino and Baloes were about to alight. Domingowas overpowered by accused-appellant Glino and Baloes, who took turns in stabbing thehapless victim. By all indications, Domingo was without opportunity to evade the knife

thrusts, defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery stands on solid legalfooting.

No Attempted Murder ButLess Serious Physical Injuries

We now proceed to calibrate accused-appellants liability for the incised wounds sustainedby Virginia. Both the trial court and the appellate court found Glino liable for attemptedmurder. The RTC and the CA are in agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as well.An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or


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attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before orsimultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which theprosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intentis presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.54In People v. Delim,55 the Court had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving intent tokill in crimes against persons. It may consist in: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2)the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the

malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) thecircumstances under which the crime was committed; and (5) the motives of accused. Ifthe victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is betrayed by the conduct of accused-appellant and his co-assailant Baloes before, at the time of, and immediately after thecommission of the crime. In her testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that shewas shocked and was initially unable to come to Domingos succor as the first blow wasstruck; that as Domingo was about to fall down from where he was seated, she embracedhim; that she tried to shield him from further attacks; that when the assault ceased, herfinger was gushing with blood.If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vitalpart of her body. They did not. The nature and location of her wound militates against the

finding of their intent to kill. According to the physician whoexamined her immediately afterthe incident, Virginia suffered from an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.58Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that the wound on Virginia was inflictedduring her attempt to shield Domingo from accused-appellants and Baloes knife thrusts. Itbears stressing that Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at its peak.Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.

The wound required medical attendance, and rendered Virginia incapable of labor, for aperiod of ten (10) to thirty (30) days.59 Clearly, accused-appellant Glino should be heldliable for less serious physical injuries only, and not attempted murder.Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offenseof less serious physical injuries is tenable, considering that the latter offense is necessarily

included in the former.The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constitutingthe felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be convicted of slight, less serious orserious physical injuries in a prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the inflictionof physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried out to its utmostdegree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the crime of homicide or murderintent to killis not required in a prosecution for physical injuries.PenaltiesArticle 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes murder in this wise:Article 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provision of Article 246, shallkill another, shall be guilty of Murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to deathif committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, oremploying means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or affordimpunity;

There being no averment of mitigating nor aggravating circumstance63 that attended thekilling of Domingo, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article63(2) of the RPC.On the other hand, Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes less seriousphysical injuries in the following manner:

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries.Any person who shall inflict upon another


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physical injuries not described in the preceding articles but which shall incapacitate theoffended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for thesame period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayor.Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty ofarresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) should be imposed in its medium period(between 2 months and 1 day to 4 months).

The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in both cases. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the law is not applicable when the penalty imposed isdeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to thosewhose maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.

Damages

We have arrived at the award of damages. When death results due to a crime, the heirs ofthe victim are entitled to the following damages: (1) civil indemnity; (2) actual orcompensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperatedamages.66Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the murder victim without need of

further proof.67 Under current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity exdelicto is in order.We sustain the award of actual damages in the amount of P101,549.00. The heirs of thevictim Domingo were able to prove during the trial, with proper receipts, that they incurredthe said expense.

The trial court and the CA, however, blundered a bit in awarding P100,000.00 as moraldamages. Prevailing jurisprudence dictates that in murder, an award of moral damages inthe amount of P50,000.00 is sufficient.68 For the less serious physical injuries inflicted onVirginia Boji, moral damages in the sum of P10,000.00 is warranted.69

The heirs of the victim Domingo Boji are likewise entitled to an additional award ofP25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages since the People clearly established treachery inthe prosecution for murder.70 Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 should also

be awarded to Virginia Boji in the separate conviction for less serious physical injuries.71When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic,an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.72WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED in that, in Criminal Case No. 98-1310,accused-appellant Conrado Glino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder forthe killing of Domingo Boji and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its accessorypenalties. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00as civil indemnity, P101,549.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages.In Criminal Case No. 98-1311, accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical Injuries for wounding Virginia Boji and he issentenced to suffer the straight penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the

victim the sums of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 by way ofexemplary damages.SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales** and Chico-Nazario,JJ., concur.Judgment modified. [People vs. Glino, 539 SCRA 432(2007)]


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL.,defendants, ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEOPERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO LARITA, defendants-review.

Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.J. R.Nuguid for defendants-review.

PER CURIAM:

In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of thepresent automatic review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, AngelParumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants1

charged therein with multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced to death,to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the victims, namely, Jose Carriego,Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to pay his correspondingshare of the costs.

The information recites:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa,

province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabovenamed accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final

judgments, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, withevident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there,willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz,also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them withice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflictingupon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.

That the aggravating circumstance ofquasi-recidivism is present in the commission of thecrime in that the crime was committed after the accused have been convicted by final

judgments and while they are serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.

Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:

1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;

2. That the crime was committed by a band;

3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;


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4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;

5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have been broken;

6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act;

7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of

their duties.

Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the chargeagainst one of the accused2 for lack of evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case,the charges against six of the accused3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution toestablish a prima facie case against them. One of the defendants died4 during thependency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted eight5 of the remainingdefendants.

As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary atMuntinglupa arrayed themselves into two warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO",the former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised mainly ofprisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rockedtime and time again by bloody riots resulting in the death of many of their members andsuspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent clashes between the contendinggroups, prison officials segrerated known members of the "Sigue-Sigue" from those of the"OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisonersconfined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of fourbrigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates fromVisayas and Mindanao, from whom the "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in4-A.

It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were

preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled,causing a big commotion. The fight was, however, quelled, and those involved were ledaway for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to theirrespective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg.1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, wheremany members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined. The timely arrival ofthe guards forced the invading inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later,another riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of theirdoor and then rampaged from one brigade to another. The invading prisoners from 4-A,mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, aninmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more

inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death before theycould be brought to the hospital.

Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b)contusion and hematoma of the back of the neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) fivepunctured wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal hemorrhagefrom multiple fatal wounds in the chest.


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Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm.in depth; (b) two penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c)lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) severalbruises at the right and left lower extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary to internalhermorrhage in the abdomen.

Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c)

wound on the upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds in the chest, twoof which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three puncturedwounds on the left hand. Cause of death: fractured skull.

Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that while hewas taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego, who was at the time the representative of theprisoners confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near thedoor of their brigade; that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as theinvading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded into 4-B; that he and Carriego took hold oftheir clubs and stood at the end of the passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his clubto Andres Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away,Factora clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora turned up the

face of his fallen victim and struck him again in the face; that while Carriego was in thisprostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora, repeatedlystabbed him.

The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito Marayoc andAvelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses identified Factora,Peralta and Dosal as the assailants of Carriego.

From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C. According toOscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A rushing toward theirbrigade; that among the invading inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help fromthe inside provided by Visayan prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, AngelParumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Laritaand Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their companies instructed the Visayans toleave their cell and ordered the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan,another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita,Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C,

Jose Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well addedgrim details. He declared that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was beatenand stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, PedroCogol and Eilel Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, inreadiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also confinedin 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.

The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the invading"OXO" members and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog likeCarriego and Barbosa. Halili testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya takeSantos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying,"Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;" that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as theystabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of Barbosa, SantosCruz was brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cellonly to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near the fire escape wherehe was clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and


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Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect to the killing ofSantos Cruz, and both mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.

The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:

"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalrybetween the two organizations. All those who were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and

Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and well known as members if not sympathizers of the SigueSigue, while the accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if notsympathizers of the Oxo organization. These three killings were sparked by the commotionthat happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners werepreparing to go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that occurred in the plazaproduced a chain reaction among the members and followers of the two organizations. Theinmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells andtried to invade Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and theirsympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced to retreat by the timely arrival ofthe guards who sent them back to their building. When the members of the Oxo in BuildingNo. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for members of the Sigue Sigueor their sympathizers who were confined with them in the same building. As the evidence

of the prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of Building No. 4led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories and with the help of theircompanions succeeded in bolting the door of the different brigades, and once theysucceeded in bolting the doors of the different brigades, they went inside and tried tosegregate the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemiesthey clubbed and stabbed them to death ...

Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta neverthelessclaims self-defense. He testified that on the morning of the riot he was attacked by Carriegoand Juan Estrella near the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the chapelwith some companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head; that he was able to parrythe second blow of Carriego and then succeeded in squeezing Carriego's head with hishands; that forthwith he whipped out an improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego severaltimes; that when he (Peralta) was already dizzy due to the head wound he sustained fromthe clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then became unconscious, and whenhe regained consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.

Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution witnesseswho saw him actively participate in the killing of the three victims pointed to him as theaggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one ofthe assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an alleged"Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked him, knowing fully well that Building No. 4was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered. Anent the killing

of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to offer any explicit defense to rebut theinculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino who saw himparticipate in the killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identifiedhim as one of the murderers of Santos Cruz.

For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defensein exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espinoand Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith ensued;that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the latter to go away as "I willbe the one to kill that person (Dosal);" that with a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the


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head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him again, he got hold of his icepick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the latter fell.

Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and Espinowho saw him participate in the killing of Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed SantosCruz in self-defense when the latter together with his companions supposedly invadedDosal's brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire escape

near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which islocated in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was seen in 4-C, whichhe does not deny, since he was an inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. Withrespect to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he didnot offer any evidence in his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauzaidentifying him as one of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espinoimplicating him in the death of Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.

Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of hisco-accused who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did not hitBarbosa anymore because the latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused whoactually killed the three victims. Again, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which

were accorded full credence by the trial court, expose the guilt of Factora beyondreasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony was corroborated byMarayoc, it was Factora who started the mass assault by clubbing Carriego treacherously.Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one of the killers of Barbosa,while at least three prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, sawFactora participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in thekilling, which is clear index of voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and fearallegedly engendered by his co-accused.

Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory device ofalibi. Parumog testified that he did not participate in the killing of the three inmatesbecause he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees forinvestigation after the fight in the plaza; that he was implicated in the killing by theprosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their request to testify against hisco-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that hedid not know about the killing until he was informed that three inmates had died; that onthe day in question he was brought to the police trustee brigade for investigation after theincident in the plaza; that he was escorted back to his brigade only in the afternoon. Lunalikewise disclaims any knowledge of the killing and asserts that for the entire duration ofthe riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).

The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the positivetestimonies of prosecution witness identifying them as participants in the killing of Barbosa

and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the killers ofBarbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Haliliand Espino testified that they saw Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino,Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlanand Halili declared that Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary.The defense of alibi is generally weak since it is easy to concoct. For this reason, courtsview it with no small amount of caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clearand satisfactory evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were really confined in


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the police trustee brigade for investigation on the day of the incident, there should havebeen a record of the alleged investigation. But none was presented. The testimony of Lunathat throughout the riot he stayed in his cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did noteven help his cellmates barricade their brigade with tarimas in order to delay if not preventthe entry of the invading inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner."

The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification

by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, thedefense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which depends almost entirely on thecredibility of witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which thetrial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless patently inconsistentwithout evidence on record, be accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissingthe alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail over thepositive testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate directly in the execution ofthe conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz."

The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the commissionof the murders. The resolution of this issue is of marked importance because upon itdepends the quantity and quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of theappellants.

For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particularemphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the scope andextent of the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandateof applicable law.

Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerningthe commission of a felony and decide to commit it.9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime

except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason,10

rebellion11

andsedition.12 The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense inthe Philippines.13 An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtheranceof their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquilityof the public remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of a commonscheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracyassumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Instressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante andBarreto14 opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to

commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, neverthelessthe existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance,when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence,of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation inthe commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracybecause in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all .15 The foregoing rule isanchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a


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criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally orcollectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in lawresponsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."16 Although it isaxiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more personsagree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, donein furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability uponthe conspirators is clearly explained in one case18 where this Court held that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking intoconsideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, forthe commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must thereforein view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, beregarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equallyresponsible ...

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in thecommission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches byreason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to theactual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.

Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could bedrawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moralascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry outthe conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution ofthe crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is inthis light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rulefor collectivizing criminal liability.

The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversationand rape committed in furtherance of a common design.

The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer whomisappropriates public funds or public property under his trust.19 However, in the classiccase ofPeople vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipalpolicemen, all of whom were not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided amunicipal treasurer in the malversation of public funds under the latter's custody, wereprincipally liable with the said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By reasonof conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not similarly situated with the former in relation tothe object of the crime committed. Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private partydoes not act independently from the public officer; rather, he knows that the funds of which

he wishes to get possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstractthem by circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer'sunfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of accomplishing a deedwhich by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a socialcrime."21 In an earlier case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary whoconspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation of public fundswas adjudged guilty as co-principal in the crime of malversation, although it was notalleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the funds misappropriated were not in hiscustody but were under the trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.


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In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but alsoof the separate and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He mayhave had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only once but his liability includes thatpertaining to all the rapes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs.Villa,23 this Court held that

... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at Consolacion's

house to the consummation of the offense of rape on her person by each and everyone ofthem, it clearly appears that they conspired together to rape their victim, and thereforeeach one is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also thatcommitted by the others, because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by each oneof the defendants with the offended was consummated separately and independently fromthat had by the others, for which each and every one is also responsible because of theconspiracy.

The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where theappellant Teofilo Anchita was convicted of forcible abduction with double rape for havingconspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although hehimself did not actually rape the victim. This Court observed:

We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual assault ... theaccused inserted his fingers in the woman's organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out oflewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is immaterial; it was bothmaybe. Yet, surely, by his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.

With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so muchso that "any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band,shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it beshown that he attempted to prevent the same."25 In this instance, conspiracy need not beproved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly established. Nevertheless, the liabilityof a member of the band for the assaults committed by his group is likewise anchored onthe rule that the act of one is the act of all.

Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positiveevidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy.27 Since by it nature, conspiracyis planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence.28 Consequently,competent and convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy.According to People vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies are generally proved by a number ofindefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to beaccomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object,one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with aview to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they

were engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as elucidated in People vs.Carbonel30 the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy maybe inferred from "proofs of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparentlyindicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or morepersons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, eachdoing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected andcooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment,a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among to concert means isproved ..." In two recent cases,31 this Court ruled that where the acts of the accused,collectively and individually, clearly demonstrate the existence of a common design toward


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the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.

Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, toestablish conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement tocommit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted inconcert pursuant to the same objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there isconvincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in

furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.

Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that onceconspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the commondesign are liable as co-principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates fromthe ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators inconsummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and forthe consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.

However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it mustbe established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either byactively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistanceto his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moralascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy.

The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three categoriesenumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is also aprincipal is that while the former's criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a generalrule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.

In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who wasconvicted by the trial court of robbery with homicide as a conspirator, on the ground thatalthough he may have been present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and made,"Robles uttered not a word either of approval or disapproval. There are authorities to theeffect that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, withoutany active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In a morerecent case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants, said:

There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent notonly from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even thedecision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation inthe first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one whoexplained the location of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets andthe points thereof through which entrance and exit should be effected), such participationand involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as aconspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime

punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which,however, do not include robbery.

Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense. Since inconspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of the conspirators is liablefor all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if theconspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting theircommon design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three murders and shall suffer thecorresponding penalty for each offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:


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... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneouslyindeed but successively, inasmuch as there was, at least, solution of continuity betweeneach other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said crimes. This courtholds that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the frequentlyreiterated doctrine that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the conspiratorsmust answer for the acts of the others, provided said acts are the result of the commonplan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the penalty that should be imposed upon

each of the appellants for each of their crimes should be the same, and this is the deathpenalty ... (emphasis supplied).

In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon eachof the conspirators for the three murders committed was not carried out due to the lack ofthe then requisite unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.

In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission ofeleven murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:

Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under thecircumstances of the case, but they fall short of the required number for the imposition ofthis punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each appellant isguilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be sentencedto life imprisonment for each crime, although this may be a useless formality for in no casecan imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis supplied.)

In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life imprisonmentfor each of the accused was modified by this Court on appeal on the ground that "inasmuchas their (the conspirators') combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons, theyshould be sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua) for each of the threevictims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressedthat once conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is not only solidary(all co-principals) but also multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed infurtherance of the conspiracy. It can also be said that had there been a unanimous Court inthe Masin and Macaso cases, multiple death penalties would have been imposed upon allthe conspirators.

Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. Anaccused who was charged with three distinct crimes of murder in a single information wassentenced to two death penalties for two murders,39 and another accused to thirteen (13)separate death penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears to beno legal reason why co

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