PCF 053 Safety Plan - Highways Englandassets.highways.gov.uk/roads/road-projects/m25-junctions-23-27... · M25 DBFO LUS Section 5 PCF 053 Safety Plan Page 2 . Glossary. AMI Advanced

M25 DBFO LUS SECTION 5

PCF 053 Safety Plan

JOB NUMBER: 5108945 DOCUMENT REF : 5108945-ATK-1204-S5-DOC-X-0024

B For PCF sign-off PW JPD SM SM 20/7/12

A For DNCS Review PW JPD SM SM 14/5/12

- For final PSCRG agreement PW JPD SM SM 30/4/12

Originated Checked Reviewed Authorised Date

Revision Purpose Description

Distribution Record

Copy No. Copy Holder Document Revision

A B C D E

01 Business Collaborator * *

02 Atkins File Copy * *

Note: This Document will be distributed via Business Collaborator. Details of distribution can be obtained from that system

Please note that Section 2.1 of the attached Product provide the introduction and background to the project. The text has been approved by the Highways Agency Project Leader for inclusion in all the PCF Products for this project. These sections have been included for information purposes only, and will be common across the whole suit of PCF Products for the project. You do not need to review and comment on these Sections as a PCF consultee.

M25 DBFO LUS Section 5 PCF 053 Safety Plan

Page 1

Contents

Section Page

PCF Product Sign Off Sheet 2

1. Executive Summary 5

1.1 Overview 5

1.2 Details 5

2. Introduction 7

2.1 Scheme Background 7

2.2 Report Scope and Objective 8

2.3 Document Scope, History and Future Development 9

3. Safety Management System Selection 10

3.1 Process of Selecting a Safety Management System 10

3.2 Reviewing the Project Scope 10

3.3 Categorisation of Project Features 12

3.4 Implications for the Project Safety Management System 16

4. SAFETY LIFECYCLE ACTIVITIES 17

4.2 Safety Acceptance and Approvals Process 17

4.3 Defining the Safety Baseline 19

4.4 Setting the Safety Objectives for Road Users 19

4.5 Setting the Safety Objective for Road Workers 21

4.6 Risk Assessment Activities 22

4.7 Hazard Log Production 23

4.8 Achievement of Safety Objectives 24

4.9 Safety Report 25

5. Programme Management and Control 26

5.1 Management of Sub-Consultants 26

5.2 Main PCF Product Interfaces (Safety) 26

5.3 Configuration Control 26

6. Key Project Safety Roles 28

6.1 Individuals 28

6.2 Organisation 29

7. Conclusions & Recommendations 30

7.1 Conclusions 30

7.2 Recommendations 30


Page 2

Glossary

AMI Advanced Motorway Indicator

AQMA Air Quality Management Area

AST Appraisal Summary Table

ATC Automatic Traffic Count

ATM Active Traffic Management

Auxiliary Lane An additional lane at the side of the mainline carriageway to provide increased merge or diverge opportunity or additional space for weaving traffic

BAS Biodiversity Alert Site

SBB Skanska Balfour Beatty Joint Venture

BT British Telecom

ALR All Lane Running

CDM Regulations Construction (Design and Management) Regulations

Central Reserve The area that separates the carriageways of a dual carriageway / motorway exclusive of any hard strips

CM Controlled Motorway

COBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CSR Client Scheme Requirements

CWS Country Wildlife Site

D3M Dual three lane motorway

D4M Dual four lane motorway

DHS Dynamic Use of the Hard Shoulder

DfT Department for Transport

DMRB Design Manual for Roads and Bridges

DROBB Double Rail Open Box Beam (safety barrier)

EAR Environmental Assessment Report

EcAR Economic Appraisal Report

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EMMR1TAM East Midlands M1 Traffic Assessment Model

EMMR Existing Motorway Minimum Requirements

ERA Emergency Refuge Area

ERT Emergency Roadside Telephone

ES Environmental Statement

ESS Entry Stop Signal

EU European Union

Ghost Island An area of the carriageway suitably marked to separate lanes of traffic travelling in the same direction on both merge and diverge layouts.

HA Highways Agency

Headroom The minimum distance between the surface of the highway cross-section and the deflected structure

HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle

HVCB Higher Vertical Concrete Barrier

IAN Interim Advice Note

INCA INcident Cost-benefit Assessment – economics tools for calculating delays and travel time variability costs

ITR Indirect Tax Revenue

JTDB Journey Time Database

LBS Lane Below Signal; refer to terminology at the end of this list

LMVR Local Model Validation Report

LGV Light Goods Vehicle


Page 3

LWS Local Wildlife Sites

MAC Managing Agent Contractor

Mainline The carriageway carrying the main flow of traffic (generally traffic passing straight through a junction or interchange)

Maintained Headroom The minimum value of Headroom that must be preserved at all times

MHS Maintenance Hard Standing

MCDHW Manual of Contract Documents for Highway Work

MIDAS Motorway Incident and Automated Signals

MM Managed Motorway(s)

MM-ALR Managed Motorways All Lanes Running

MMDO Managed Motorways Delivery Office

MMSG Managed Motorways Steering Group

MSA Motorway Service Area

NDD HA Network Delivery and Development Directorate

NetServ HA Network Services Directorate

North facing slip roads The merge and diverge on the north side of a junction

Nose A paved area, approximately triangular in shape, between the connector road and the mainline at a merge or diverge

NRTS National Roads Telecommunications Services

NSCRG National Safety & Control Review Group

NTEM National Trip End Model

OBB Open Box Beam (safety barrier)

Overbridge A bridge that spans the road under consideration

Parallel Merge / Diverge

A layout where an auxiliary lane is provided alongside the mainline carriageway

PCF Project Control Framework

PIA Personal Injury Accident

PIE Public Information Exhibition

P4L Permanent Four Lanes

PL Project Leader

POP Police Observation Platforms

POPE Post Opening Project Evaluation

PSSR Preliminary Sources Study Report

PSCRG Project Safety & Control Review Group

PTJR Permanent Through Junction Running

PTZ Pan Tilt Zoom (CCTV)

QUADRO QUeues And Delays at ROadworks – economics programme to evaluate delay impacts during construction

Ramp Metering The control of vehicles joining the main carriageway from slip roads by the means of traffic lights or similar

RCC Regional Control Centre

RPI Retail Price Index

SAR Scheme Assessment Report

SBI Site of Biological Importance

SGAR Stage Gate Assessment Reviews

SoS Secretary of State

South facing slip roads The merge and diverge on the south side of the junction

SoW Start of Works

SPZ Source Protection Zone

SRO Senior Responsible Owner (Highways Agency)

SSD Stopping Site Distance

SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest

Taper Merge / Diverge A layout where merging or diverging traffic joins or leaves the mainline carriageway through an area forming a funnel to or flare from the mainline carriageway


Page 4

TCB Tensioned Corrugated Beam (safety barrier)

TIS Traffic Impact Study

TERN Trans European Road Network

TFR Traffic Forecasting Report

TJR Through Junction Running

TOS Traffic Officer Service

TPI Targeted Programme of Improvements

TRADS HA Traffic Information Data base, containing traffic flows for motorways and major trunk roads in England

TM Traffic Management

TMD HA Traffic Management Directorate

TUBA Transport Users Benefit Appraisal

Underbridge A bridge that carries the road under consideration

VCB Vertical Concrete Barrier

Verge Any nominally flat area between the edge of the paved width and either the start of an adjacent side or slope, in the absence of a side slope, the highway boundary or bridge parapet

VMS Variable Message Signs

VMSL Variable Mandatory Speed Limit

VOC Vehicle Operating Costs

VPH Vehicles per Hour

VRS Vehicle Restraint System

Weaving Section The length of the carriageway between a successive merge or lane gain and diverge or lane drop

WebTAG Website for Transport Analysis Guidance

Terminology Used in this PCF Product

The above terminology is in use throughout the suite of PCF Products/Reports that have been prepared for the scheme. Additionally, terminology used in this PCF Product is as follows: FWI

Fatal and Weighted Injury


Page 5

1. Executive Summary

1.1 Overview

1.1.1 This document is the Safety Plan for the M25 LUS Managed Motorway (MM) Section 5. The

document:

Describes the Safety Management System (SMS) and corresponding safety activities that

will be undertaken in order to achieve safety objectives, including a description of the

activities that have been carried out to date.

Describes how the SMS has been selected

Defines how the project Safety Objectives will be achieved

Explains how the project Safety Baseline will be defined to allow future measurement of

performance against the Safety Baseline

Provides an overview of the current highway network safety performance to assist with

the selection of Safety Objectives

Describes the project organisation, how responsibility for safety activities has been

devolved and the associated programme management and control processes

1.1.2 The application of this document will produce evidence to demonstrate that the completed project

is capable of being operated in an acceptably safe manner.

1.2 Details

1.2.1 This document defines the project as a “Type B” project for the purposes of selecting a Safety

Management System. See section 3.3 for details.

1.2.2 Taking account of the existing accident history, the likely interventions included within the project

remit and also performance of other MM projects, the Safety Objectives have been set as follows:

The safety impact of the project will be measured by comparing the “before” and “after” casualty

numbers and severities using 3 year before data (the safety baseline) and 3 year after data. The

project will meet its Safety Objective for road users if it is demonstrated for a period of three years

after becoming fully operational that:

- the average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI) casualties per year is no more than

the safety baseline, and

- the rate of FWIs per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety baseline, and

- no population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is adversely

affected in terms of safety.

There will be no specific numerical safety target set for road workers. The risk will be managed

using the test of “So Far As Is Reasonably Practical.”

1.2.3 The Safety Baseline will be defined as a “before” period measured back from the Start of Works

date and will consist of averaged 3 years of data.

1.2.4 The “after” period will be 3 years after full project opening (all links open), with annual data

checks performed to monitor indications of success in meeting the project‟s Safety Objectives.


Page 6

These annual interim data checks will include consideration of any links opened early as this may

influence the need for any remedial action elsewhere on the project.

1.2.5 During the development of this project, safety concerns will be addressed by the following

processes identified in this Safety Plan, including:

Hazard Identification

Risk Assessment

Development of a Hazard Log database

Verification and validation reports

Road Safety Audit

The use of a Project Safety Control and Review Group (PSCRG)


Page 7

2. Introduction

2.1 Scheme Background

2.1.1 In 2002, the M25 London Orbit Multi-Modal Study (ORBIT MMS) recommended the provision of

additional capacity on the M25 Junctions 5 to 7 (Section 2) and on the M25 Junctions 23 to 27

(Section 5), generally in the form of one additional lane in each direction. Subsequently, the

Advanced Motorway Signalling and Traffic Management Feasibility Study (Department for

Transport (DfT), 2008) concluded that Hard Shoulder Running (HSR) could provide a large

proportion of the benefits of widening at significantly lower cost. .

2.1.2 A scheme was developed for an option called HSR and the environmental effects of this proposal

were reported in the Stage 2 Environmental Assessment Report (2010). This scheme was further

refined as part of the Stage 3 commission but the scheme was then put on hold in the autumn of

2010 pending the government‟s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). In the spring of 2011

the schemes to upgrade the M25 in Section 2 and Section 5 were included in the government‟s

plans for transport improvements for this parliamentary session and approval for work on the

project to recommence was given.

2.1.3 In December 2011 it was announced that new guidance (subsequently issued as IAN 161/12)

should be followed whereby Managed Motorway Controlled All Lanes Running (MM-ALR) would

replace Dynamic Hard Shoulder Running with reduced number of signs, gantries and Emergency

Refuge Areas (ERAs).

2.1.4 In March 2012 the Interim Advice Note IAN 161/12 was published entitled „Managed motorways

All lanes running‟, which set out the design parameters and the associated infrastructure and

technology requirements.

Project Description

2.1.5 Section 5 of the Project is within the counties of Hertfordshire, Essex and the Greater London

Authority and located in the northern segment of the M25 starting at Junction 23 (A1(M)) and

finishing at Junction 27 (M11). This Section will incorporate existing climbing lanes and recent

improvements to two tunnels (Holmesdale and Bell Common), retaining a traditional hard shoulder

with four running lanes through the tunnels and portals.

2.1.6 The scheme being carried forward as part of this Preliminary Design assessment will be MM-ALR.

An assessment of the minimum improvements needed to deliver safe operation of hard shoulder

running, including through junction running, will provide the core element of the proposed scheme.

2.1.7 MM-ALR makes use of the existing hardshoulder to provide the additional lane capacity. This is

achieved by using a system of gantry mounted electronic signs and signals. Refuge areas1 are

provided in accordance with IAN 161/12, approximately every 2.5km where topography and road

layout permits. Outside of that required for effective operation of MM-ALR, this Project only

includes the minimum improvements to the road infrastructure (e.g. surfacing, vehicle restraint

systems, environmental mitigation and drainage improvements), that would be required to achieve

safe and legal operation of MM-ALR. A general upgrade to full standards is therefore not

envisaged.

2.1.8 New low noise surfacing will be used to replace life expired surface course in the hard shoulder

with replacement of the main running lanes and hard shoulder with a low noise surface taking

1 Refuge areas include hardened Emergency Refuge Areas, Off-Slips with hardshoulders and intra junction

hard shoulders where these are retained


Page 8

place only when the maintaining authority (DBFO) have programmed resurfacing works e.g.

where the surfacing is not fit for purpose.

2.1.9 The proposed drainage arrangements for the Project will be assessed as part of the detailed

design, in order to meet the requirements of IAN161/12, with respect to „flow path‟ of the water in

the road edge. This could comprise additional gullies & kerbs, V Channel or Slot Drains, as

identified in the Detailed Design. There may be no additional surfacing to the back of the hard

shoulder. The drainage of the ERAs will collect the water into manholes and discharge to the

existing networks where it would be attenuated using flow controls and therefore no alteration to

the drainage system would be required. However, some additional attenuation storage may be

required to accommodate additional flows from additional paved areas. All the outfalls to the

streams and rivers will remain as existing.

2.1.10 Overall, the proposed drainage system would comprise a combination of:

Kerbs and gullies, slot drains and open channels where appropriate.

The existing carrier drain system would be kept in place for the whole length of the

section, and would take the discharge from the collection drain arrangement.

2.1.11 In addition to the implementation of the MM-ALR requirements where appropriate and agreed with

the Highways Agency, an element of planned maintenance / lifecycle renewal works may be

incorporated into the overall Project scope, this will include the installation of vertical concrete

barriers and the hardening of the central reserve including any consequential amendments to the

drainage system required as part of these works.

The Overseeing Organisation

2.1.12 The Highways Agency is an Executive Agency of the DfT and is responsible for operating,

maintaining and improving the strategic road network in England on behalf of the Secretary of

State for Transport. The contact details for the Highways Agency are:

Highways Agency

Federated House

London Road

Dorking

Surrey

RH4 1SZ

The DBFO Co

2.1.13 The DBFO Co is responsible for the delivery of all M25 Projects and maintenance of the M25 for a

30 year period. Connect Plus was appointed in 2009 by the Secretary of State (SoS) for

Transport.The contact details for the Contractor are:

Connect Plus

Connect Plus House

St Albans Road

South Mimms

Potters Bar

Hertfordshire

EN6 3NP

2.2 Report Scope and Objective

2.2.1 This document is the Safety Plan for the M25 LUS MM Section 5. The document:


Page 9

Describes the Safety Management System (SMS) and corresponding safety activities that will

be undertaken in order to achieve safety objectives, including a description of the activities

that have been carried out to date.

Describes how the SMS has been selected

Defines how the project Safety Objectives will be achieved

Explains how the project Safety Baseline will be defined to allow future measurement of

performance against the Safety Baseline

Provides an overview of the current highway network safety performance to assist with the

selection of Safety Objectives

Describes the project organisation, how responsibility for safety activities has been devolved

and the associated programme management and control processes

2.2.2 The application of this document will produce evidence to demonstrate that the completed project

is capable of being operated in an acceptably safe manner.

To simplify the reading and future review of this document portions of text that are most important

to the safety performance of the scheme and require action in the future PCF stages, are

highlighted in a shaded text box.

2.3 Document Scope, History and Future Development

2.3.1 Previously consultants developing dynamic hardshoulder options produced early drafts of a

Safety Plan. These documents were not signed off and are redundant due to the change of

highway intervention now planned

2.3.2 This current version reflects the new scheme design developed based on the contents of IAN

161/12.

2.3.3 This document is a forward looking planning document and is applicable to all of the project

lifecycle stages including operations and decommissioning.

2.3.4 Similar to a number of PCF Products, the need to consider updating this Product to reflect design

changes is an ongoing activity. However in general terms modest changes to the scheme design

will not require continuous updating of this document. A Project Safety Control Review Group

(PSCRG)2

will assist and advise on such matters, but in general terms it is assumed that only a

fundamental change to the scheme design or Operating Regimes would necessitate a re-issue of

this document.

2.3.5 This document considers both road user and road worker safety of the completed project, but its

scope does not include safety aspects during construction periods.

2.3.6 A glossary of terms has been included after the document sign off sheet.

2 This group is made up of representatives from the design team (including safety specialists) and key

stakeholders, notably HA operating directorates and Network Services.


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3. Safety Management System Selection

3.1 Process of Selecting a Safety Management System

3.1.1 This section contains an assessment of the project safety management system based on the

guidance in Work Instruction WI001 contained in IAN 139/11 “Managed Motorways Project Safety

Risk Work Instructions.”

3.1.2 WI001 describes the process to be followed in order to identify the Safety Management System

(SMS) requirements that are applicable to a given project and addresses when such

requirements shall be established during the project lifecycle. The main steps involved in the

SMS selection process are as followed:

Review of the Project Scope

Categorisation of Project Features

Application of the SMS Selection Rules

3.1.3 The following sections in this chapter document the results of the SMS selection process for the

project.

3.2 Reviewing the Project Scope

3.2.1 Section 2 provides an overview of the project. It is necessary to describe in more detail here the

aspects that have the potential to have a bearing on the future risk assessments. This information

is contained in Table 3.1. This table contains information that it is specific to this scheme and

does not necessarily contain generic information that is applicable to the design of a typical MM

project or the whole MM programme.

3.2.2 Typically a MM-ALR project, incorporating permanent hard shoulder running, as set out in IAN

161 comprises or may comprise:

Advanced Direction Signs (in verge or overhead)

Gantry mounted Advanced Motorway Indicators (AMI) at gateway gantries at the scheme

start and downstream of all Entry Datum Points.

Variable message signs version 4 (MS4) and associated communications equipment

where lane signalling is provided

Pan tilt zoom CCTV coverage for the full carriageway area

MIDAS Loops

Verge cabling in a fully ducted network and cross-carriageway connections

Communications and power supply cabinets

Emergency Refuge Areas (ERAs)

Relocated carriageway markings and road studs

Limited amounts of resurfacing as required

Highways Agency‟s Digital Enforcement Cameras (HADECS)


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Table 3-1 - Local issues relevant to safety

Local Issue Notes

Junction capacity

and improvements

The Project Brief excludes works at junctions with local roads. Merge and diverge layouts can be amended within current pavement

extents although some minor increases in paved extents may be possible.

Existing assets Assets that are fit for purpose will not be replaced solely for the purpose of meeting current standards. Only if the state of the asset

would likely affect the achievability of the Safety Objectives for the project or is beyond economic repair will it be considered for

replacement.

Works in central

reserve

Such works will be avoided as far as possible to minimise future risks to road workers, to reduce costs and to bring forward

construction completion. However it is likely that a slipformed concrete barrier will be required to allow re-allocation of highway space to

avoid extensive drainage works in both verges.

Designing for

maintenance

It is the intention to provide permanent infrastructure to facilitate future lane closures e.g. remote controlled shuttered signs in verges and central reserve for MM-ALR sections. As required by the PCF process a Maintenance and Repair Strategy will be produced; this will include details of how the projects assists the HA‟s Aiming for Zero initiative for road worker safety.

Through Junction

Running (TJR)

Through junction running is required at some junctions, subject to future analysis. There is limited experience of this operational regime

but the hazards associated with it are understood and adequately covered by the generic Hazard Log.

Key issues to develop through PSCRG are:

Consideration of vehicular breakdowns in intra-junction location

Safely accommodating merging traffic where there is limited space for “overrun” at the end of a merge taper, particularly where

there is limited verge space immediately downstream of a merge.

As required by IAN161, PSCRG must endorse non-TJR options (lane gain/lane drop)

Departures from

Standard

The project will make use of IAN 161/12 and also Existing Motorway Minimum Requirements Interim Advice Note 149/11 covering changes to TD9, TD22, TD27, TD46 and IAN87. This will reduce the need to apply for Departures from Standard but will require the

designer to complete a Design Strategy Record (DSR). The PSCRG will review key issues captured on DSRs.

Lighting In line with current HA policy a strong evidence-based case for additional investment for any new lighting or replacement/relocation of

existing lighting would be required.

Existing Accident

History

An analysis of 3 year data (2008-2010) shows that Section 5 has overall lower accident rates (measured by traffic volume) than the HA

national average for motorways. An initial assessment has indicated where further investigation is warranted.

Tunnels Although the scheme extents include two tunnels, no substantive work is envisaged in the tunnels which will retain hard shoulders.


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3.3 Categorisation of Project Features

3.3.1 This section categorises the project features which helps to determine the most appropriate

Safety Management System (SMS). Table 3.2 below explains the implications of the six project

features on the selection of SMS and is used to inform Table 3.3 (the template for which comes

from IAN139/11).

3.3.2 The three possible categorisations for the overall project are set out below (and are given in IAN

139/11):

Type A: Basic safety management needs to be applied. This will be satisfied by the

application of existing standards and safety management processes, plus a brief Safety

Report will be needed.

Type B: A moderate level of safety management needs to be applied. This will include the

application of existing standards and safety management processes, where they exist.

However it will also require some additional risk assessment, plus a more detailed Safety

Report.

Type C: Rigorous safety management shall be applied. Where they exist, existing standards

and safety management processes will still be applied, but by definition, much of the project

will fall outside of existing experience. Therefore, records shall be kept of all activities

undertaken, all decisions and their justifications shall be recorded and extensive risk

assessment shall be carried out. A comprehensive Safety Report will be required.

3.3.3 It is noted that the PSCRG will in time review the designer‟s assessments of:

Any issues that are locally relevant or novel in comparison to a typical MM scheme

Design Strategy Records (DSRs)


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Table 3-2 - Feature Categorisation Summary

Feature Implications for the Project

Stakeholder

interest

The project strategy is to inform affected stakeholders rather than formally consult as the

works are within the HA boundary, therefore stakeholder impact on the project is of a more

limited nature.

Stakeholders for safety issues include:

HA Network Delivery and Development Directorate– a significant amount of liaison is

required to ensure that the scheme can be safely constructed and maintained. HA

Network Services also has a significant role in agreeing designs that do not comply

with DMRB.

Regional Control Centre/Traffic Officer Service (TOS)/Traffic Management

Directorate: the role of the regional control centres and traffic officers could change

but in a similar fashion to other areas with Managed Motorways.

Maintenance contractors who will have more equipment to maintain and reduced

access to a hardshoulder to carry out maintenance

Emergency responders who will not have access to a hardshoulder for large

proportion of the scheme length – this is a “national issue” and the scheme will

respond accordingly

Tunnel operators at Bell Common and Holmesdale unaffected as hardshoulder

retained

Local authorities whose junctions lie on the scheme length, however as no

intervention works are planned at junctions, there are no direct safety implications

envisaged

Assessed as: Type B.

Operational

experience

There is a growing UK experience of Managed Motorways on M42 and M6 in the Midlands

plus assessment of pre-opening issues on a wider programme of other “Early Delivery”

schemes.

Early experience of longer link lengths, Motorway Services operation, unlit operation,

Through Junction Running and Emergency Refuge Areas at 70mph will emerge from a

combination of M1 J10-13 and M62 J25-30 in 2013 in time for learning points to be

incorporated in operations of M25 LUS.

Controlled Motorway (VMSL) operation is now familiar on other parts of HA network

including significant portions of M25.

Permanent use of the hardshoulder and also sections without a usable width hardshoulder

occurs on small portions of the HA network, but not always with the benefits of MIDAS and

VMSL that will be in place on M25 LUS e.g. the HA sample includes M4 elevated sections,

Sections 1,3, 4 of M25 widening and M60 Birch services to J18 westbound.

The design is not dissimilar to all-purpose trunk road layouts but with the benefits of better

junction layouts, wider junction spacing, some lighting, Emergency Refuge Areas, MIDAS,

CCTV and mandatory variable speed limits.

National operating procedures already exist for roads without usable hardshoulders.

Tunnel operation at Bell Common and Holmesdale not negatively affected as hardshoulder retained at tunnels.



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Feature Implications for the Project

Technology The technology proposed for the project has been used on a significant number of

Managed Motorway projects.

Early experience of unlit operation with low light CCTV will emerge from M1 J10-13 and

M62 J25-30 in time for learning points to be incorporated.

The potential use of MS4s to show speed roundels and other driver information messages

is subject to a HA off road trial to understand driver comprehension.

There is no effect on technology design of MS4s.

HADECS speed camera version 3.0 is expected to be used if Home Office approval for the

new camera type is achieved.

Assessed as: Type A.

Standards and

legislation

The standards (including departures agreed) used on other Managed Motorway projects

should be broadly applicable to this project. New HA guidance (IAN161 and IAN 149) will

reduce the number of formal departures required from other MM schemes.

No new legislation is required; with only non-onerous amendments required to amend the

“model” Statutory Instruments prepared for other MM projects.

Non-standard issues will be scrutinised as required by the PSCRG and if necessary the

National Safety Control Review Group (NSCRG).


Impact on

Organisation

No responsibility transfer as part of the project.

Assessed as: Type A.

Project Scale This 25km scheme is to be installed at an important location on the motorway network with

extremely busy surrounding trunk road and local highway networks. This is a major scheme

that is part of a national tranche for a “lighter” MM design that also makes use of 24/7

running for LBS1. Although a number of similar HA schemes are being prepared in parallel

(e.g. M1 J28-31) there is a possibility that M25 may be the first to be operational.

Nevertheless the concept has already been analysed by HA centrally, including safety data

review and driver simulation studies.

Assessed as: Type B/C.


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Table 3.3 - Feature Categorisation Summary

Features Type A Type B

Type C

1. Stakeholder Interest

– Stakeholders

– Influence Single or few

Limited

Several

Limited

or Single or few

Significant

Many

Limited

or

Key

Significant

or Several

Major/critical

2. Operational Experience

– Extent

– Where Widespread

UK

Limited

UK

or

Some

Overseas

only

None

Neither UK nor overseas

3. Technology

– Technology experience (consider degree of innovation and criticality of

application)

Widespread Used in different

application

or Applied in part

Not previously applied

– Safety risk implications Low Medium High

4. Standards and Legislation

– Design covered by existing

standards

– Departures from standards

– Changes to legislation

All

None

None

Mostly

Some

None

No

Many

None

or

New standard

Critical departures

Yes

– HA Guidance Existing/not applicable

Relevant new guidance available Major development in relevant guidance

5. Impact on Organisation

(consider structure, responsibility,

competency, whole life impact)

No changes

Minor changes/responsibility transfer

Significant change or responsibility transfer

6. Project Scale

– Infrastructure affected

– Potential for wider roll-out Single/small

location

None/minimal

Major location/implications

Moderate

Widespread/national implications

National potential


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3.4 Implications for the Project Safety Management

System

3.4.1 Considering the results of the Project Feature Classification (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3), the M25

LUS project (Section 5) should be categorised as Type B. Of the categories two are ranked as

“A”, 3 as “B” and with one a mixture of “B” and C”, the latter only by virtue of the scheme being

self-evidently already part of a national programme that may expand if it is successful. Overall a

categorisation of Type B is appropriate.

3.4.2 The relevant advice and requirements in IAN 139/11 will be followed for a Type B project. IAN

139/11 is a comprehensive document and it is not necessary or appropriate to repeat its contents

in full here, but the main aspects are that the project will be risk assessed with the support of a

Hazard Log tool and all safety related activities will be assisted by the input and review of a

PSCRG.

3.4.3 Where the project wishes to introduce a novel design or novel operating regime the PSCRG

would need to determine if the endorsement of such proposals is within its remit or whether the

National Safety Control and Review Group should be consulted.

3.4.4 Further summary information of how the project will meet the requirements of IAN 139/11 is given

in Chapter 4.


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4. SAFETY LIFECYCLE ACTIVITIES 4.1.1 This Chapter provides a description of the safety management activities that are to be

undertaken. IAN 139/11 Work Instruction 003 guides the activities for a Type B project..

4.2 Safety Acceptance and Approvals Process Figure 4-1 – Safety Management Process

4.2.1 The safety management process for Type B projects is shown in Figure 4.1. The Safety

acceptance and approvals (see Figure 4.2) will take place in four steps as follows:

(1) Verification. The Project Executor verifies that to the best of their knowledge, the safety work demonstrates that the Project‟s safety requirements are fulfilled.


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(2) Consultation. The project undertakes consultation with identified consultees including

NetServ and operational directorates,

(3) Review and (4) Approval. Once consultation is complete, Major Projects reviews the work

done, including both that submitted by the project and the appropriate approvals provided by NetServ and operational directorates. Once Major Projects has confirmed that all necessary issues have been addressed, Approval for the project is granted.

Figure 4-2 – Safety Acceptance and Approvals Process3

3 Note: this graphic is extracted from IAN 139/11.


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4.3 Defining the Safety Baseline

4.3.1 The Safety Baseline identifies the level of safety against which the Safety Objective will be

measured (i.e. in safety terms, what the completed project will be compared to). To objectively

set an appropriate Safety Objective it is necessary to have an understanding of the safety record

of the existing motorway.


date and will consist of averaged 3 years of data. The separate post opening project evaluation

(POPE) process will source the accident data to define the Safety Baseline taking account of the

latest validated accident data at that time.

4.3.3 The HA has advised that for projects on networks that already contain MIDAS (for more than 50%

of their length) such projects should “factor up” the “before” casualty data by 10% to account for

the already realised benefits. M25 LUS Section 5 has limited MIDAS. For this reason the safety

baseline data will not include for a 10% factoring up of “before” casualty data.

4.3.4 An initial analysis of the latest available 3 year data period (2008-2010) of casualties/accidents

has shown that the M25 Section 5 has a lower than average accident rate. More detailed analysis

of any road often yields individual areas of concern and the PSCRG will be informed of any such

findings as they emerge.

4.4 Setting the Safety Objectives for Road Users

National Objectives

4.4.1 In 2011 the Government announced a national road safety framework4 that did not include

numerical objectives (targets). The Highways Agency has published its own safety framework5 for

road users and the general approach of investing in a range of interventions will continue. This

investment is envisaged to be developed to support a downward accident trend broadly similar to

the rate of accident reductions achieved between 2000 and 2010.

MM Programme Issues

4.4.2 Each MM project is a component part of the MM programme. Although the programme is

primarily aimed at reducing traffic congestion, it is anticipated that the projects will offer a

contribution to the reduction in the number of fatalities and seriously injured casualties on

motorways. The scale of the potential accident reduction is dependent on the intervention

planned.

4.4.3 A weighted index (known as Fatal and Weighted Injury (FWI) Index) that takes account of

accident severity will be used when setting the safety objective. FWI is defined as:

(Number of fatalities) + 0.1 x (number of serious casualties) + 0.01 x (number of slight casualties)

This definition reflects the approximate ratios between the monetarised costs of fatal, serious and slight casualties given in DfT‟s WebTAG (Unit 3.4.1).

4.4.4 The two key numerical indicators to be measured (before and after the scheme opens) now

suggested by the Highways Agency are:

Number of Fatal and Weighted Injury (FWI) casualties, and

Rate of FWI casualties per billion vehicle miles.

4 http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/strategic-framework-for-road-safety/strategicframework.pdf

5 http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/documents/N110040_-

_Safety_Framework_for_the_Strategic_Road_Network_2011.pdf


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If both numbers reduce 3 years after opening in comparison to the 3 years before construction

begins, then the scheme will have delivered safety benefits.

Importance of Safety Objective

4.4.5 The selection of the Safety Objective is important as it informs the safety measurement of

strategic scheme options via the Hazard Log. The Safety Objective forms a framework for

decisions around safety risk, especially for members of the PSCRG.

Data from other relevant projects

4.4.6 It is also important to understand what level of safety performance may be realistically achievable

from this type of intervention. Although not directly comparable for the design concept set out in

IAN 161/12, the currently available robust information for use of a hardshoulder is the 3 year post

opening data from the M42 ATM pilot6.

Comparing 3 Lane (3L) VMSL and 4 Lane (4L) VMSL, the

average number of PIAs has dropped from 3.17 to 2.25 per month. Overall these figures indicate

a reduction in the number of PIAs by 29% from no-VMSL to 3L VMSL and a 56% reduction from

no-VMSL to 4L VMSL. There is a 42% reduction in accidents during the peak period (when HSR

is operational) and a 62% reduction in accidents during the off-peak (when HSR is not

operational).

4.4.7 The severity index has also reduced, 4L VMSL has a severity index of 0.07, with the no-VMSL

and 3L VMSL modes of operation resulting in an index of 0.16. Over the five year period in which

no-VMSL mode data was collected, a monthly average of 0.12 fatal accidents was recorded, in

the 42months of data collection for 3L-VMSL and 4L-VMSL there have been no fatal accidents.

4.4.8 Controlled Motorway (VMSL)7 installed where MIDAS/High Occupancy Algorithm is already in

place delivers an estimated further 15% reduction in the safety risk over Triple Package. In

developing the dynamic MM programme generic safety work8 it was concluded that a realistic

goal was to deliver between 20% and 30% accident reductions for the type of interventions

planned on this project, but that figure includes the assumption that Triple Package would be

added at the same time.

4.4.9 A generic safety assessment9 for a typical MM2 scheme has recently been produced by the

Highways Agency. The expected safety benefit for a typical MM2 scheme will be in the order of

15% if no MIDAS is currently in place and 5% if MIDAS is already in place. The scheme Hazard

Log, based on the HA generic Hazard Log will allow the designers to compare the scheme

against these typically expected safety benefits.

6 M42 MM Monitoring and Evaluation, Three Year Safety Review, 292(308)MOTT, January 2011

7 TRL Ltd: Safety Benefits of the M25 Controlled Motorway: 1990 to 2006 Data.

8 Managed Motorways – Generic safety review HRG Report 718471/DOC/201 Issue B March 2009

9 MM-ALR Generic Safety Report (Final 23-03-12)


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Conclusions

4.4.10 Bearing in mind the HA advice at programme level the Road User Safety Objective will

therefore be defined as follows:

The safety impact of the project will be measured by comparing the “before” and “after” casualty numbers and severities using 3 year before data (the safety baseline) and 3 year after data. The project will meet its Safety Objective for road users if it is demonstrated for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:

- the average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI) casualties per year is no more than the safety baseline, and


- no population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is adversely affected in terms of safety.

Residual Actions

4.4.11 For the purposes of setting the Safety Baseline it is important that accident/casualty data is

updated to allow the numerical input to be made for the Safety Baseline. Whilst this Safety Plan

sets out the form of the Safety Baseline and explains how this relates to the Safety Objective, the

actual declared value of “FWI” will need to be based on casualty and traffic volumes related to

the Start of Works date – this will be done via the Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE)

process.

4.5 Setting the Safety Objective for Road Workers

4.5.1 The Highways Agency recognises that people who work on the network are a particularly

vulnerable group. The HA have a policy initiative “Aiming for Zero” which sets out a number of

strategic actions to reduce the frequency of exposure of this vulnerable group to live traffic

situations and also to reduce risks where exposure is unavoidable. The policy recognises that

responsibilities are shared between the Highways Agency as network operator, design

organisations and employers of road workers.

4.5.2 Managing risks so that they are reduced So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP) is a legal

requirement10

of the Health and Safety at Work Act and so must be used as the underpinning

Safety Objective for operatives and others who work on the network .

4.5.3 In common with other MM projects setting numerical objectives in addition to abiding by the

SFAIRP principle is not appropriate because road worker accidents are reported on an area and

company basis and not by individual motorway link lengths. In any case any absolute numbers or

accident rates, expressed by hours of work/exposure are extremely small, meaning that

numerical targets would not be of assistance in prioritising solutions. Additionally “Aiming for

Zero” in itself does not set a numerical target across the HA network. This position is re-affirmed

in “Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report”

dated 23 March 2012.



10 It is not possible to define a singular test to demonstrate reasonableness. However the scheme will

produce a CDM risk register and also a PCF Maintenance and Repair Strategy which must be agreed before

construction commences


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4.6 Risk Assessment Activities

4.6.1 The activities will include the identification / review of the following issues:

The main safety hazards and risks for different parties affected by the project

The main assumptions underpinning the risk assessment

The main decisions made about how the project design controls safety risk and the basis for

these decisions

The main residual risks associated with the project and justification for the tolerability of

these risks

Key parameters/safety risk controls to be monitored into the future.

4.6.2 The outcome of risk assessment activities will be documented within the Safety Report. The

Safety Report will summarise all safety activities reported elsewhere, following the template set

out in the PCF framework.

4.6.3 The risk assessments will consider safety hazards and risks to road users,

construction/maintenance operatives, Traffic Officers and 3rd parties. Details of the hazards, risks

and associated controls identified as part of this hazard identification and risk assessment activity

will be recorded in a Hazard Log. The PSCRG will be informed of key risk assessment activities,

including key Departures from Standard (or equivalent when using IAN 149/11 methodology).

4.6.4 For each hazard the following shall be included in the Hazard Log:

A full description of the hazard

The frequency at which the hazard will occur (frequency)

How likely it is that the hazard will lead to a collision (likelihood)

The consequences of the collision(s) that arise(s) from the hazard, including a link to the

collision(s)

Who the hazard could affect (road users, road workers or 3rd parties)

A risk assessment (using frequency/ likelihood/ consequence) with appropriate supporting

arguments and data

The assumptions underlying the risk assessments

The mitigation measures for the hazard, including any project Safety Requirements.

4.6.5 A number of other activities are defined in the PCF matrix produced by the Highways Agency.

Subsequent paragraphs below highlight those that most directly relate to in-use safety of the

improved road.

CDM Designer’s Risk Assessment

4.6.6 At each stage of the design process, designers from all disciplines can make a significant

contribution by identifying and eliminating hazards, and reducing likely risks from hazards where

elimination is not possible. Designers‟ earliest decisions fundamentally affect the health and

safety of construction work and future maintenance activities therefore it is vital to address health

and safety from the very start.

4.6.7 The identification of hazards and mitigating measures is recorded on the Designer‟s Risk

Register. The designer identifies the hazard and the measures taken by the design to eliminate or

reduce the risks to road users, operatives, and Traffic Officers and 3rd parties. It also identifies at

which stage in the project the hazard is likely to be realised i.e. construction, operation,

maintenance or decommission. The assessment identifies whether there is a significant residual

risk and how this will be communicated to the Contractor.


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4.6.8 In November 2008 Atkins adopted the 'design out risk' approach which makes use of Red,

Amber, Green lists to easily identify significant risks.

4.6.9 The CDM Risk Register is updated regularly throughout the project as the design develops.

Road Restraint Risk Assessment Process (RRRAP)

4.6.10 The RRRAP and the associated standard TD 19/06 „Requirements for Road Restraint Systems‟

describe the procedures to be followed in the design and provision of road restraint systems. The

standard introduces a risk based framework to support designers in making optimal design

choices at specific sites to minimise the risk to errant vehicles leaving the highway.

4.6.11 The RRRAP software has two main elements: risk analysis, and risk assessment. Risk analysis

enables the designer to enter information about a particular site (such as: location and hazard;

traffic speed; alignment), and the risk that each hazard may pose, to be presented in terms of the

probability of an accident/year/km and benefit/cost ratio. The software then enables various

control measures to be reviewed and their effect on the risk level and relative benefit/cost

assessed, e.g. redesign or relocation of the hazard; protection with a VRS; no protection.

4.6.12 The RRRAP will be undertaken within the detailed design stage of the project and will be subject

to the same design check and approval as other elements of the design. The output of the

RRRAP will be the selection of road restraint systems that reduce the risk to errant vehicles to an

acceptable level.

Road Safety Audit

4.6.13 Road Safety Audits will be undertaken at four stages during the project and ensure that the

project will deliver a certain level of safety performance. The Audit comprises four stages as set

out in DMRB HD19/03:

Stage 1: Completion of preliminary design

Stage 2: Completion of detailed design

Stage 3: Completion of construction

Stage 4: Monitoring

4.6.14 At each stage an Audit Report will be prepared by the Lead Auditor and if required the design

team will prepare any Exceptions Reports for HA approval.

4.6.15 A Stage 1 RSA is likely to be undertaken in Summer 2012 for the current design.

4.7 Hazard Log Production

4.7.1 A Hazard Log will be produced to record all safety hazards associated with the project and to

track all hazards that are identified in a project through to their successful resolution. Resolution

is regarded as demonstrating that necessary mitigation has been identified and subsequently

applied to the hazard.

4.7.2 A hazard log application for MM projects designed to IAN111/09 has been developed by

Highways Agency Network Services. A revised version is expected in Spring 2012 to support the

design concept of IAN 161/12. Together with project specific assessment, the generic Log will

revert to a Project Hazard Log. This Log will be regularly reviewed and updated throughout the

project life cycle. The HA‟s supporting documents explain the rationale for the „probability‟ and

„severity‟ scores that have been pre-populated in the application.

4.7.3 We have considered how the Hazard Log will be reported and communicated. The list of design

and operation requirements that underpin the hazard scores will be circulated across the project

team. For high scoring risks, documented reviews will be required to ensure that risks have been

reduced to an appropriate level. This process will be extended to include risks to on-road staff

and maintainers.


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4.7.4 The PSCRG will be invited to take part in a Hazard Log workshop once initial population of the

database is complete. This process will examine the initial Hazard Log findings and test the

robustness of the results and assumptions. Similar workshops will be reconvened as the need

arises.

4.7.5 The PSCRG will be informed of any material changes to the Log.

4.7.6 We have considered the required staff that will input to the Hazard Log. The Safety Team will

feed information to the Hazard Log from the design team as it is produced. In general it is only

“exceptions” that will be informed to the Safety Team as in the absence of information to the

contrary, the assumptions of IAN 161/09 and IAN112/08 will be used to quantify risk.

4.7.7 Although non-PSCRG stakeholders will have important views on safety, it is not considered

appropriate to invite stakeholders to hazard scoring events. Instead information will be gathered

as liaison meetings take place and information of relevance will be passed through to the safety

team. Issues that are local to the scheme will be addressed in an appropriate manner e.g.

emergency routes and parking/enforcement facilities. In liaising with stakeholders Atkins staff will

be aware that in some circumstances the requests of stakeholders could lead to the creation of

the need to manage new risks e.g. for layouts or operating procedures not set down in published

guidance.

4.7.8 Information from the Hazard log will inform the project design and feed into the verification and

validation exercise reported via the Safety Report.

4.7.9 Following the Hazard Log workshop, a report will be produced that documents the population of

the Hazard Log and describes the assumptions and design requirements. Where these design

requirements differ from HA standards and guidance these will be specifically flagged.

4.7.10 It is suggested that the post–workshop report is recognised as “The Hazard Log Report”. This will

record how the Hazard Log has been populated and verified by stakeholder input. As the Hazard

Log will continue to be updated and the scoring changed to represent the scheme design any

report would only provide a snapshot of the progress and understanding at the point of

production. The proposed „Hazard Log Report‟ will be circulated to consultees and signed-off on

this basis. The Safety Report is to be used to provide an update of any substantive changes.

4.8 Achievement of Safety Objectives

4.8.1 There will be a „verification and validation‟ section within the Safety Report, summarising the

details of any verification or validation exercise undertaken and the associated findings.

4.8.2 Verification will be carried out by making sure that the project is delivered in accordance with the

Safety Plan and by demonstrating that all the hazards in the hazard log have been mitigated to

an appropriate level.

4.8.3 Atkins (Safety Team) will review the actual project activities against the Safety Plan. If this

identifies that any activities from the Safety Plan have not been completed, or have been

completed but not in accordance with the plan, then this situation will be reported back to the HA

Project Leader and addressed as soon as practicable. In addition, any implications of non-

compliance to date will be identified and addressed through revisions to the Safety Plan or project

design as required.

4.8.4 Validation will determine whether the safety benefits anticipated by the project are being achieved

in practice and whether assumptions made within the risk assessments are correct. This will be

undertaken after an appropriate period of operation and covered through POPE activities. The

findings will also be fed back into the Safety Objectives, Safety Plan, design and/or construction

process, as appropriate.


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4.9 Safety Report

4.9.1 The Safety Report aims to summarise the evidence demonstrating that the project Safety

Objectives have been met by summarising all of the safety work that has been done in

association with the project and in doing so facilitating the safety approval of the project.

4.9.2 Typically, there will be three versions of the Safety Report, although the exact number will vary

according to the requirements of individual projects. The versions are:

Design – produced after detailed design prior to constructing the project. Confirms that the

design is capable of meeting the project Safety Objectives

As–built – updated after project is completed prior to handover into operation and

maintenance.

Final – produced after a significant period of operational experience (e.g. 1 year)11

to

demonstrate if the scheme has met its Safety Objectives

4.9.3 Further versions of the Safety Report may also be needed if:

An additional hazard is identified that needs mitigation

Other changes are made to the project to which the Safety Report relates e.g. a change in

operational regime

11 Assuming the POPE activity continues to be funded, a three year “after” POPE assessment will also be

produced


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5. Programme Management and Control

5.1 Management of Sub-Consultants

5.1.1 There are no sub-consultants engaged on safety activities for this project.

5.2 Main PCF Product Interfaces (Safety)

5.2.1 Table 5.1 describes the main PCF safety products together with indicative dates for completion.

Table 5-1 - PCF safety related products.

PCF Product Description Indicative Dates

Safety Plan Defines how the project will achieve its

stated Safety Objectives [this document]

To be signed off in May 2012.

Hazard Log

To provide a record of all hazard related

information and track all hazards that are

identified in a project through to their

successful resolution, by demonstrating that

necessary mitigation has been identified

and subsequently applied to the hazard.

Report to be signed off before 30th

November 2012 with further review

continuing until Start of Works

Safety Report

To demonstrate that the scheme will be

acceptably safe at its introduction and that

this level of safety can be maintained

through the life of the scheme. Specifically

it provides documentary evidence and an

audit trial to all stakeholders that the

solution will/has meet/met its Safety

Objectives.

Version 1 to be signed off before

construction commences

5.3 Configuration Control

5.3.1 The project safety documentation will be the Safety Report and its supporting documents. The

first production of these documents will take place in parallel with the development of the design.

As the design develops document checkers and authorisers are required to consider the possible

impact changes may have on the risk assessment and the Hazard Log score. The Project

Manager will determine if a revised document or drawing warrants a change in the scope of

safety activity or invalidates previously made safety assumptions. If new documentation is

thought to have any material impact on the hazard scores the Project Manager should make the

revised version available and directly inform the project safety leader. For example:

Relocation of ERAs or removal of an ERA from the scheme.

Changes to the operation of the motorway.

Changes to the type of camera enforcement system used.

5.3.2 Access to the Hazard Log will be controlled. The consultant Project Manager will decide who to

give read access to and who to give write access to.

5.3.3 Mitigation and risk control measures introduced by the Risk Assessment will be recorded via the

Hazard Log software. „Tasks‟ will then be created in the hazard log and allocated to the

appropriate design team for consideration and incorporation into the design. The measures


Page 27

introduced, as well as reasons for not introducing suggested mitigation, will be recorded in the

safety documentation.

5.3.4 Changes to the scheme during the design, construction and operation phases may all have an

impact on the risk assessment. There will be a requirement to keep the safety documents under

continual review. In particular, if any new hazards are identified after the project becomes

operational, or if the mode of operation changes in a way that affects any known hazards or risks,

then the risk assessment and Hazard Log will be updated to reflect these changes and any

corresponding changes to risk controls that will be introduced. Attention will also need to be paid

to any design activities undertaken by the contractor.

5.3.5 With respect to MM projects, the long-term responsibility for maintaining all such documents will

reside with HA Network Delivery and Development (NDD) who will be the owner of the project

once it commences operation.


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6. Key Project Safety Roles

6.1 Individuals

6.1.1 The individual staff responsible for review and approval of this PCF Product are listed on the

cover sheet. Key staff responsible for developing safety related PCF Products are given in Table

6.1. The experience of key individuals is appropriate for this project and has been compared

against the Highways Agency‟s requirements set out in IAN139/11 and on the HA Suppliers

Portal12.

Table 6-1 - Key staff

Role Named Individual

Qualification and

competency

1 Safety Team Leader and chair of PSCRG

Peter Whitfield

Chartered Civil Engineer with 21 years experience of road safety engineering, standards and policy. Experience of role on the M1 J28-31, M62 J25-30 and M4M5 Managed Motorway schemes, plus past member of HA Subject Matters Expert Group on Operational Safety. Peter will also represent the scheme at the HA Hub at

regular meetings.

2 Road Safety Audit Team Leader

Neil Hutchings Meeting the requirements of HD19/03, independent of the Design/Safety Team and experience of auditing the

M25 widened sections.

4 On-road and RCC operations including Maintenance and

Repair Strategy

John Paul Doherty Chartered Civil Engineer and with 10 years experience of highway engineering, standards and policy. Qualified as a road safety auditor. Experience of Safety Plan, Hazard Log and Safety Report role on the M1 J28-31, M62 J25-30 and M4M5 Managed Motorway schemes, plus responsible for Operational PCF products on M62 J25-30. This role will be supported by representatives of the DBFO

Co and it‟s maintainer.

12 Managed Motorway Schemes - NSCRG and PSCRG Remit for Organisation and Governance. Annex 2. By HRG August 2010 Issue D.


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6.2 Organisation

6.2.1 The Safety Team will be a component part of the design team. This arrangement recognises the

important role that the Hazard Log and risk assessment has as an iterative process to challenge

and inform the design and operational regimes.

6.2.2 The Road Safety Audit aspects will be performed in accordance with HD19/03 retaining

independence between the design team and audit team.

6.2.3 The PSCRG had its remit and composition formally agreed at the inaugural meeting on 20th

January 2012, with these aspects based on the advice in IAN139/11.


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7. Conclusions & Recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

7.1.1 This document defines the project as a “Type B” project for the purposes of selecting a Safety

Management System.

7.1.2 Taking account of the existing accident history, the likely interventions included within the project

remit and also performance of other MM projects, the Safety Objectives have been set as follows:

The safety impact of the project will be measured by comparing the “before” and “after” casualty

numbers and severities using 3 year before data (the safety baseline) and 3 year after data. The

project will meet its Safety Objective for road users if it is demonstrated for a period of three years

after becoming fully operational that:

- the average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI) casualties per year is no more than

the safety baseline, and


- no population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is adversely

affected in terms of safety.




date and will consist of averaged 3 years of data.

7.1.4 The “after” period will be 3 years after full project opening (all links open), with annual data

checks performed to monitor indications of success in meeting the project‟s Safety Objectives.

These annual interim data checks will include consideration of any links opened early as this may

influence the need for any remedial action elsewhere on the project.

7.1.5 During the development of this project, safety concerns will be addressed by the following

processes identified in this Safety Plan, including:

Hazard Identification

Risk Assessment

Development of a Hazard Log database

Verification and validation reports

Road Safety Audit

The use of a Project Safety Control and Review Group (PSCRG)

7.2 Recommendations

7.2.1 This Safety Plan should be referred to when undertaking risk assessments, including completion

of the Hazard Log and the Safety Report.

7.2.2 As a key safety document, this product will be reviewed by the PSCRG before moving to sign-off

stage.