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Payload – System Corruption z Data destruction z Chernobyl virus z First seen in 1998 (Windows 95 and 98 virus) z Infects executable files and corrupts the entire file system when a trigger date is reached (deletes data by overwriting the first megabyte of the HDD with zeros) z More than one million computers were affected on April 26, 1999 z Klez z First seen in October 2001 z Mass mailing worm infecting Windows 95 to XP systems z On trigger date, causes files on the hard drive to become empty z Ransomware z Encrypts the user’s data and demands payment in order to access the key needed to recover the information z PC Cyborg Trojan (1989) z Gpcode Trojan (2006) access the

Payload – System Corruption - KOCWcontents.kocw.net/KOCW/document/2014/Chungang/hurjunbeom/10.pdf · Payload – System Corruption ... zSpamming zSniffing traffic ... Anti-Virus

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Page 1: Payload – System Corruption - KOCWcontents.kocw.net/KOCW/document/2014/Chungang/hurjunbeom/10.pdf · Payload – System Corruption ... zSpamming zSniffing traffic ... Anti-Virus

Payload – System Corruption

Data destruction Chernobyl virus

First seen in 1998 (Windows 95 and 98 virus) Infects executable files and corrupts the entire file system when a trigger date is reached (deletes data by overwriting the first megabyte of the HDD with zeros) More than one million computers were affected on April 26, 1999

Klez First seen in October 2001 Mass mailing worm infecting Windows 95 to XP systems On trigger date, causes files on the hard drive to become empty

Ransomware Encrypts the user’s data and demands payment in order to access the key needed to recover the information PC Cyborg Trojan (1989) Gpcode Trojan (2006)

access the

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Payload – System Corruption

Real-world damage Causes damage to physical equipment

Chernobyl virus rewrites BIOS code used to initially boot the computer (BIOS chip should be re-programmed or replaced)

Stuxnet worm Targets specific industrial control system software

E.g., Centrifuges used in Iranian uranium enrichment program were strongly suspected as the target

There are concerns about using sophisticated targeted malware for industrial sabotage

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Payload – System Corruption

Logic bomb Code embedded in the malware that is set to “explode” when certain conditions are met (e.g., particular date or day, particular version of software, presence or absence of certain devices)

Code fragment

if data is Thursday the 17th;

shutDown_computer();

Code fragment

Code fragment

if data is Thursday the 17th;

shutDown_computer();

Code fragment

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Payload – Attack Agents

Bot, zombie, or drone Malware that subvert the computational and network resources of the infected systems Takes over another Internet attached computer and uses that computer to launch or manage attacks

Botnet Collection of bots (hundreds or thousands of computers) capable of acting in a coordinated manner under control of an attacker (botmaster) Upon infection, new bot “phones home” to rendezvous w/ botnet command-and-control (C&C) Botmaster uses C&C to push out commands and updates

This type of payload attacks the integrity and availability of the infected system

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Constitute the Great Modern Threat of Internet security

Why botnets rather than worms? Greater control Less emergent Quieter Optimal flexibility

Why the shift towards valuing these instead of seismic worm infection events?

$$ Profit $$

Payload – Attack Agents

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Payload – Attack Agents

Uses of Bots Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks Spamming Sniffing traffic Keylogging: steal financial/email/social network accounts Spreading new malware Installing advertisement add-ons and browser helper objects (BHOs)

E.g., clicks are executed each time the victim uses the browser Attacking Internet replay chat (IRC) networks

Clone-attack – the victim is flooded by service requests from thousands of bots or channel-joins by these cloned bots

Manipulating online polls/games Since every bot has a distinct IP address, every vote will have the same credibility

Which of these cause serious pain for infected user? None. Users have little incentive to prevent

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Remote Control Facility

Distinguishes a bot from a worm Worm propagates itself and activates itself Bot is initially controlled from some central facility

Typical means of implementing the remote control facility is on an IRC server

All bots join a specific channel on this server and treat incoming messages as commands More recent botnets use covert communication channels via protocols such as HTTP Distributed control mechanisms use peer-to-peer protocols to avoid a single point of failure

Once a communication path is established, the control module can activate the bots

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Payload – Information Theft

Payloads where the malware gathers data stored on the infected system

Common target: user’s login and password credential E.g., Banking, gaming

These attacks target the confidentiality of the information

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Payload – Information Theft Keyloggers and Spyware

Keylogger Captures keystrokes on the infected machine to allow an attacker to monitor the sensitive information Bypasses protection over encrypted communication channel (e.g., HTTPS, POP3S) Typically uses some form of filtering mechanism that only returns information close to keywords (“login”, “password”) In response to keylogger, some banking switched to using a graphical applet to enter information such as passwords

Spyware Subverts the compromised machine to allow monitoring of a wide range of activity on the system (e.g., Zeus banking Trojan)

Monitoring history and content of browsing activity Redirecting certain Web page requests to fake sites Dynamically modifying data exchanged between the browser and certain Web sites of interest

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Payload – Information Theft Phishing

Phishing – exploits social engineering to leverage the user’s trust by masquerading as communication from a trusted source

Include a URL in a spam e-mail that links to a fake Web site that mimics the login page of a banking, gaming, or similar site Suggests that urgent action is required by the user to authenticate their account Attacker exploits the account using the captured credentials

Spear-phishing More dangerous variant E-mail claiming to be from a trusted source But recipients are carefully researched by the attacker E-mail is crafted to specifically suit its recipient, often quoting a range of information to convince them of its authenticity Greatly increases the likelihood of the recipient responding

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Payload – Stealthing

Payload that hides its presence on the infected system and provides covert access to the system

This type of payload attacks the integrity of the infected system

Backdoor, Rootkit

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Payload – Stealthing Backdoor

Also known as a trapdoor

Secret entry point into a program allowing the attacker to gain access and bypass the security access procedures

Maintenance hook is a backdoor used by programmers to debug and test programs

Difficult to implement operating system controls for backdoors in applications

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Payload – Stealthing Backdoor

Consider the following fragment in an authentication program:

userid = read_userid();

password = read_password();

if userid is “257u h4fk0q”

return ALLOW_LOGIN;

if userid and password are valid

return ALLOW_LOGIN

else return DENY_LOGIN

userid = read_userid();

password = read_password();

if userid is “257u h4fk0q”

return ALLOW_LOGIN;

if userid and password are valid

return ALLOW_LOGIN

else return DENY_LOGIN

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Payload – Stealthing Rootkit

Set of hidden programs installed on a system to maintain covert access to that system with root privilege

Provides access to all the functions and services of the OS Alters the host’s standard functionality in a malicious and stealthy way

Add or change programs and files, monitor processes, send and receive network traffic, and get backdoor access on demand

Hides by subverting the mechanisms that monitor and report on the processes, files, and registries on a computer

Make it difficult to determine that the rootkit is present, and to identify what changes have been made

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Rootkit Classification

Persistent Memory based User mode

Kernel mode Virtual

machine based

External mode

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Rootkit Classification

Persistent Activates each time the system boots Easier to detect as the copy in persistent storage can potentially be scanned

Memory based Cannot survive a reboot Harder to detect as it is only in memory

User mode Intercept calls to APIs and modifies returned result

E.g., when an application performs a directory listing, the return result don’t include entries identifying the rootkit

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Rootkit Classification

Kernel mode Intercept calls to native APIs in kernel mode Rootkit can hide the presence of a malware process by removing it from the kernel’s list of active processes

Virtual machine based Rootkit installs a lightweight virtual machine monitor, and then runs OS in a virtual machine above it Rootkit then transparently intercept and modify states and events occurring in the virtualized system

External mode Malware is located in BIOS or system management mode, where it can directly access hardware

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Malware Countermeasure Approaches

Ideal solution to the threat of malware is prevention

Four main elements of prevention Policy, awareness, vulnerability mitigation, threat mitigation

Countermeasure to worm, virus, some trojans Vulnerability mitigation

Ensure all systems are as current as possible, with all patches applied Set appropriate access controls on the applications and data

Countermeasure to social engineering attack Appropriate user awareness and training

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Malware Countermeasure Approaches

If prevention fails, technical mechanisms can be used to support the following threat mitigation options

Detection Determine that the infection has occurred and locate the malware

Identification Identify the specific malware that has infected the system

Removal Remove all traces of malware virus from all infected system

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Anti-Virus Software Location

1. On each end system Host-based scanners Gives the software the maximum access to information on the malware behavior and the smallest overall view of malware activity

2. On an organization’s firewall and IDS Perimeter scanning approaches Gives the anti-virus software access to malware in transit over a network connection providing a larger scale of view of malware activity

3. In a distributed configuration Distributed intelligence gathering approaches Gathers data from a large number of both host-based and perimeter sensors, relays this intelligence to a central analysis system to defend against malware attack

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Host-Based Scanners – Generations of Anti-Virus Software

First generation: Simple scanners Requires a malware signature to identify the malware Limited to the detection of known malware

Second generation: Heuristic scanners Uses heuristic rules to search for probable malware instances (looks for code fragments that are often associated with malware) Another approach is integrity checking using checksum

Third generation: Activity traps Memory-resident programs that identify malware by its actions rather than its structure in an infected program Need only to identify the small set of actions indicating malicious activity

Fourth generation: Full-featured protection Packages consisting of a variety of anti-virus techniques used in conjunction Include scanning and activity trap components and access control capability

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Host-Based Scanners – Generic Decryption (GD)

Enables the anti-virus program to easily detect complex polymorphic viruses and other malware while maintaining fast scanning speeds

Recall that polymorphic virus decrypts itself to activate

In order to detect virus structure, executable files are run through a GD scanner which contains the following elements:

CPU emulator Virtual computer that interpret instructions in an executable file Underlying processor is unaffected by programs interpreted on the emulator

Virus signature scanner Scan target code looking for known malware signatures

Emulation control module Control the execution of the target code

The most difficult design issue with a GD scanner is to determine how long to run each interpretation

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Host-Based Scanners – Host-Based Behavior-Blocking Software

Integrates with the operating system of a host computer and monitors program behavior in real time for malicious action

Blocks potentially malicious actions before they have a chance to affect the system Blocks suspicious software in real time so it has an advantage over anti-virus detection techniques such as fingerprinting or heuristics

Limitations

Because malicious code must run on the target machine before all its behaviors can be identified, it can cause harm before it has been detected and blocked

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Perimeter Scanning Approaches

Typically included in e-mail and Web proxy services running on an organization’s firewall and IDS May also be included in the traffic analysis component of an IDS May include intrusion prevention measures, blocking the flow of any suspicious traffic Limited to scanning malware content as it does not have access to any behavior of it

Ingress monitors

Located at the border between the enterprise network

and the Internet

One technique is to look for incoming traffic to unused

local IP addresses

Egress monitors

Located at the egress point of individual LANs as well as at the border between the enterprise

network and the Internet

Catch the source of malware attack by

monitoring outgoing traffic for signs of scanning or other

suspicious behavior

Two types of monitoring software

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Perimeter Scanning Approaches – Worm Countermeasures

Considerable overlap in techniques for dealing with viruses and worms

Once a worm is resident on a machine anti-virus software can be used to detect and possibly remove it

Because worm propagation generates considerable network activity, perimeter network activity and usage monitoring can form the basis of a worm defense

Worm defense approaches include: Signature-based worm scan filtering Filter-based worm containment Payload-classification-based worm containment Threshold random walk (TRW) scan detection Rate limiting Rate halting

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Perimeter Scanning Approaches – Worm Countermeasures

1. Signature-based worm scan filtering Generates a worm signature, which is then used to prevent worm scans from entering/leaving a network/host Vulnerable to polymorphic worms

2. Filter-based worm containment Similar to signature-based filtering But focuses on worm content rather than a scan signature

3. Payload-classification-based worm containment Network based technique that examines packets to see if they contain a worm Does not generate signatures but looks for control and data flow structures that suggest an exploit

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Perimeter Scanning Approaches – Worm Countermeasures

4. Threshold random walk (TRW) scan detection Exploits randomness in picking destinations to connect to as a way of detecting if a scanner is in operation

5. Rate limiting Limits the rate of scan-like traffic from an infected host

E.g., limiting the number of new machines a host can connect to and the number of IP addresses a host can scan in a window of time, detecting a high connection failure rate

6. Rate halting Immediately blocks outgoing traffic when a threshold is exceeded either in outgoing connection rate or in diversity of connection attempts

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Distributed Intelligence Gathering Approaches – Digital Immune System

Two major trends in Internet technology have an increasing impact on the rate of virus propagation

Integrated mail systems (e.g., MS Outlook) Mobile program systems (e.g., Java, ActiveX)

Digital immune system Virus protection developed by IBM, refined by Symantec Provide rapid response time so that malware can be stamped out almost as soon as they are introduced

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Digital Immune System

Suspect program

prescription

prescription

Prescription includesRegular anti-virus updates

Encrypted sample

prescription

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Worm Countermeasure Architecture

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Summary

Types of malicious software (malware) Terminology for malicious software Propagation

Viruses – infected content

Worms – vulnerability exploit

Spam e-mail/trojans – social engineering

Payload System corruption

Attack agent – Zombie, bots

Information theft – keyloggers, phishing, spyware

Stealthing – backdoors, rootkits

Countermeasures Prevention

Detection, identification, removal

Host based scanners / behavior blocking software

Digital immune system

Type( a(malTermTTerm