PAX EUROPÆA - Peter Gowan

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134new left review 33may june 2005

Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century

Fourth Estate: London 2005, 8.99, paperback

170 pp, 0 00 719531 1

PAX EUROPA

Peter Gowan

REVIEWS

Mired ever deeper in the disaster of occupied Iraq, Downing Streets one

remaining strategic hope has been to rally domestic forces around a Blairite

Europeanism. With the 2005 election out of the way, Blair could repack-age himself through British chairmanship of the g8 and the euto link up

with those on the British centre-left yearning for a Europeanist alterna-

tive to America under Bush. Mark Leonards tract, Why Europe Will Run

the 21st Century, would have been an ideal intellectual support for such a

turn. It manages to combine a clarion call to build Europe as a progres-

sive alternative to Bushs America with an artful defence of both Atlanticism

and neoliberalism.

In style, Leonards book is reminiscent of Will Huttons The World WereIn. Huttons critique of the current American business model is a good

deal more trenchant than Leonards, but the latter makes a more ambitious

claim for the potential effectiveness of euEuropeanism as an alternative

kind of international politics to Washingtons recent militarism. Leonards

efforts to rebrand the current eu as a progressive force for social demo-

crats are ingenious, and unlike most well-informed books on the eu, the

text is lively, bristling with bright, new slogans for those eager to promote

this version of Europe.

Leonards title about Europe running the twenty-first century shouldnot be taken too seriously. Though he tweaks the noses of American neocons

with chapter headings such as The Project for a New European Century, his


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real claim is more modest. While the us, he argues, is not well configured

as a state for coping with the post-Cold War world,euEurope has hit upon a

big idea for preserving the global dominance of the Atlantic alliance. The key

to this lies in the politics of cosmopolitan liberalism. At face value, the case

for it is a coherent one. Capitalism has triumphed throughout the world andall capitalist classes share a common interest in preserving that victory. The

main challenge they face now comes from below rather than from outside,

in the form of a bloc of hostile states. Second, though, capitalism comes in

many varieties, and clashes of interest between capitalisms are endemic;

each seeks to shape both the internal political economies of the others and

the international rules of the game to their own advantage. Atlantic politi-

cal dominance over the capitalist world and its regimes therefore remains

hugely important and free-market fantasies about the end of power poli-tics on a level global playing-field are just that. At present, the rules and

regimes of the world economy are still those dictated by the Atlantic powers

to serve their interests.

The world-order problem can thus be formulated as that of providing

global institutional regimes which are perceived to be universalist but which

are, in detailed reality, accented towards ensuring outcomes favouring the

continued dominance of the Atlantic world. This, for Leonard, is the over-

whelmingly important task of Europe and the ustoday. And to achieve this,

the useumust both refashion the international institutions and restruc-ture their own modus operandi in global politics. Bodies such as the unsc

or natoare too obviously Atlantic-centred. Bushite efforts to dominate the

world by dividing states along friendenemy lines should cease. Leonard is

sympathetic to Ivo Daalder and James Lindsays suggestion of an Alliance

of Democratic States, a unwhose membership would be selected by the

us. But rather than a grand design, he looks forward to the incremental

emergence of a new world of regions. Not, to be sure, of autarchic blocs,

but of overlapping clubs, inclusive of the new rising capitalist centres likeChina, India and Brazil, that will promote global development, regional

security and open markets. A rule-governed world with American power

behind it, as Leonard explains. Coercion should be focused on interven-

ing within states, against forces from below which seek to challenge the

(Atlantic-written) rules of the international capitalist order. State sover-

eignty is the enemy here. The unCharter should be reworked along liberal

cosmopolitan lines, allowing sovereignty to be violated by the international

community where states are judged to be reneging on their commitment

to the liberal capitalist order. But the Atlantic states themselves must alsocommit to playing by the rules.

Here, of course, we have Blairs so-called doctrine of the international

community, outlined in his 1999 Chicago speech, which Leonard has


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repackaged as the essence of Europeanism. He has some justification for

this, given the support the project enjoys both in Brussels and in other

European capitals. And the world order it enjoins does indeed fit with the

current eus mode of operation. It formulates international legal rules that

bind its member states to commitments concerning their own domesticbehaviour and external trade policies. It then demands that others accept

these same rules if they want to enjoy close relations with the eu. Presented

as based uponindeed, the embodiment ofliberal norms, in reality these

are a thicket of positive laws for particularist capitalist interests. But in form

at least, the eumodel is one that asks others only to abide by rules which it

applies to itself.

There is some truth in Leonards argument that the us state is

not well configured for operating in this way. It is not simply that BushRepublicanism is bitterly hostile to such cosmopolitan institution-building;

the entire American postwar elite has been formed around the idea that the

usis the preserver of the political basis on which the whole legal and insti-

tutional order of the capitalist world rests. It therefore cannot be bound by

the rules which its own power politics has built. The Washington elite has

also grown accustomed to telling its allies what to do, rather than engaging

in collegial management of international affairs. It has thus been impatient

with Europeanist efforts to use the end of the Soviet threat to assert a more

independent voice on the world stage. The political culture in Washingtonremains largely one in which the task of allies is to follow; America sees

furthest and knows best, and the capitalist world needs oneAmerican

centre, not a committee of powers to manage its affairs.

But the Atlantic gap is not as wide as some believe. Leonard speaks

glowingly of Clintons foreign policy, and his book positively drips with

endorsements (wonderful, fascinating, refreshing, lucid, exhilarating, fluid

[sic]) from the likes of Robert Kagan, Philip Bobbitt and Joseph Nye. The

fact is that the Bush Administrations attempt to use 9/11 as an opportunityto rebuild usdiscipline over its allies and to impose a unipolar American

political order on the world has been stymied by the virulence of the resist-

ance in Iraq. Washington is currently on the back foot. They need European

help and they are getting it. Leonards project, as he explains, will enhance

American power.

The rhetoric of a new European hegemony relies, of course, on down-

playing the importance of military statecraft in contemporary international

relations. Having announced that the usuk invasion of Iraq in violation

of international law was a counter-productive way of trying to assert glo-bal hegemony, Leonard simply drops the subject of the political uses of

military power as if they didnt matter. He has to. Were he to admit the

obvious fact that they matter a great deal, his case for European leadership


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in the twenty-first century would collapse. Even in Europes own backyard,

the Eastern Mediterranean, American military power ensures that it is

Washington, not Brussels, that shapes the security environment. The same

is true in spades for the Pacific Rim. For the fantasy of European global

dominance to be sustained, such unpalatable facts must be ignored.By the same token, Leonard shrinks from grappling with the realities

of Western Europes political subordination to the usduring the Cold War,

its liberation from protectorate status when the Soviet Bloc collapsed and

Washingtons subsequent efforts to resubordinate it through a series of

political-military manoeuvrings focused around the conflicts in Yugoslavia.

Leonard shields his eyes from the embarrassing truth about Washingtons

operations in the Balkans during the early 1990s: its determination to

destabilizeeu

efforts to broker a deal over Bosniacalling for an independ-ent unitary state there, in the full knowledge that this would kindle a civil

warand then to blood the new natowith a war against the Yugoslavia

of Miloevic. natos significance for American military-political power in

Europe simply does not figure in Leonards analysis. Not that he is any

sort of pacifist, as his excitement about Blairs calls for a land invasion of

Yugoslavia goes to prove. Leonard looks forward eagerly to a militarized

eu, ableinternational law having been rewrittento enforce the rules of

the Atlantic order on recalcitrant nations. Already, the euis given credit for

sweeping strategic victories. In one of his more fervid flights, even the occu-pation of Iraq is acclaimed as a triumph for Europethanks to whom the

transatlantic relationship has survived, the unhas been brought on board

and (no mention of the Iraqi insurgents) a putative invasion of Iran and

Syria has been rendered impossible, at least for several years.

Nevertheless, it is worth asking how seriously we should take the argu-

ment that the eu is a major force in international politics today. By throwing

a customs union wall around the European market and introducing a dense

tangle of behind-the-border regulation within it, theeu

states have indeedprovided themselves with a powerful diplomatic armoury for economic state-

craft. They can use these instruments to open other markets or close their

own, for the advantage of their capitals; they can also use economic pressure

for collective political goals. Yet if this enables the euto be roughly in the

same league as the usin trade terms, when it comes to shaping the rules of

global economic life only the uscan exploit the huge extra privileges which

dollar dominance provides. It has been the us, far more than the eu, that

has used its market-access powers to generate significant degrees of trade

dependency in the other main regional economic centre, East and SoutheastAsiasupplementing the leverage which its military-political presence in

that region brings.


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Leonard claims, notwithstanding, that the euhas established an enor-

mous sphere of influence for itself in the international political economy.

This Eurosphere consists of a hundred-odd countries for whom the euis

the largest trading partner, source of bank credit, foreign direct investment

and development assistance. Rashly, he provides the actual list of Eurospheredenizens. Leaving aside the devastated societies of post-Communist Russia

and half a dozen ciscountries, we have a roll-call of Sub-Saharan African

countries, plus the Arab states and Israel. The notion that Europe is a giant

in the contemporary Arab world is not worth considering. There is no coher-

ent eupolitics, leave alone an independent stance on its problems in the

face of American and Israeli efforts to bait and humiliate the region; nor

the slightest indication that euEurope has the capacity to deliver a viable

development strategy. Instead, Washington has succeeded in generatingacute tensions within Western Europe between its Islamic populations and

governments incapable of repudiating the usIsraeli alliances operations in

the Middle East.

Western Europes claims to influence in Africa are somewhat better

founded. From the Maghreb southwards across Africa, the eu, and more

particularly France and Britain, have been shaping powers for fifty years

(and more than fifty years before that). The recordruined economies, civil

strife, catastrophic social provisionspeaks for itself. In exchange for these

countries economic dependence on the eu, the latter is seeking to exportits European valuesHuman Rights, Democracy and Good Governance

(hrdgg, for short). But not even the remorselessly upbeat Leonard claims

that the result of this exchange is likely to be a triumphant rise of an eu-led

Euro-African bloc. Indeed, at the present time, China is the most dynamic

diplomatic and economic influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, causing some

anxiety in Western Europe since it engages in serious business without

values being tagged on as conditionalities.

Leonard makes much of theeu

s ability to re-engineer the post-Communist societies of East Central Europe since the early 1990s. Like

many other euapologists, he would have us believe that the arrival of lib-

eral democracy in these states was in large measure thanks to Brusselss

pressure and surveillance. In fact, the populations and elites of these socie-

ties alike embraced the idea of liberal-democratic pluralist politics from the

start of the 1990s. What these populations did not embrace was the kind

of capitalism which the eu(and World Bank) offered them. The resulting

destruction of economic assets put enormous strains on some of the demo-

cratic political systems. Only the prospect of eventual membership of the euclub prevented the destabilization of the region in the late 1990s. Leonard

seems to think the resulting capitalism was not only good for West European

business, but good for the populations of Eastern Europe as welleven


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declaring that Poland has been modernizing its economy at an astonishing

pace. A trip to any provincial Polish city would show how much support

there is for this idea.

Behind such efforts to talk up the importance of the eu as a mighty

force in the international political economy lies a deeper unresolved ten-sion in Leonards argument. On the one hand he claims that power-political

muscleespecially market-access poweris vital to the eus economic suc-

cess. He then tries to argue that the eus reshaping activities inside other

political economies are good for the targets of this process as wellthat the

victories of the eumake the losers winners too. Only the crassest free-market

ideology could square that circle. Rather than address this contradiction in

his economic thinking, Leonard changes the subject and claims that the eu

benefits the victims of its restructuring by informing them with its values.The fact is that the eu operates as a strongly mercantilist caucus and

its directorates are renowned for their ruthless assertion of West European

business interests in their economic diplomacy. It is precisely this harsh

reality which makes neighbouring states, whether rich or poor, so eager to

join the club that writes the economic rules. Since the start of the 1990s the

euhas rather successfully masked this mercantilist reality with its hrdgg

diplomacy and its so-called aid programmes, at least as far as its own popu-

lations are concerned. It has managed to brand itself as the worlds most

consistent campaigning organization for the aforementioned hrdgg, andas having the best headline figures for aid. But what it is not capable of doing

is furnishing a socio-economic development path for its neighbourhood,

whether in the Western Balkans, the former Soviet Republics or in Africa,

that could provide stable foundations for liberal-democratic capitalisma

problem which Leonard cannot bring himself to confront.

The American historian of the eu, John Gillingham, has a good term for

the apologetics for the euas a political and economic system: bafflegab.

Leonard produces some fine examples. The role of Jean Monnet is here moremystified than ever. True, Monnets actual integration projects were scarcely

successes: the Coal and Steel Community quickly faded and Monnets pet

idea of Euratom rather than the eec was also a mistake. But his central role,

Leonard explains, was methodological. In the words of one of the Founding

Fathers devoted disciples:

Whenever Monnet attacked a new problem he would gather a bunch of peo-ple around him . . . He would begin a sort of non-stop Kaffeeklatch. It could goon sometimes for a period of one or two weekshours and hours a day . . .

Monnet would remain silent, occasionally provoking reaction, but not sayingmuch . . . Then gradually, as the conversation developedand it often tookseveral days or even a week before this happenedhe began venturing a littlestatement of his own.


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The causal mechanism behind the eu is none other than Monnets gen-

ius (an obligatory term in bafflegab). This produced what Leonard calls

a European invisible hand that allows an orderly European society to

emerge from each countrys national interest. In short, the driving forces

of the euremain a mystery. Nor may we ask where the euis going or whatits logic is. As Leonard explains: To this day, Europe is a journey with no

final destination, a political system that shies away from the grand plans

and concrete certainties that define American politics. Its lack of vision

is the key to its strength. Inevitably, however, the eu turns out to be yet

another network community, structured on the business model of a Visa

card, or the internet.

All this to prepare us for the trickiest point that Leonard has to get across

to his social-democratic readership: an explanation of why theeu

does nothave a responsible, democratic government for managing the affairs within

its jurisdiction. Why, in other words, does the eus parliamentary election

not produce an executive authority with legislative initiative? Leonards solu-

tion is nothing if not ingenious: a democratic system of government would

involve copying the Americans. As he explains:

The Convention [drawing up a suggested European Constitution] recognizedthat aping the American Constitution by creating a directly elected Presidentof the Commission or a European Parliament with the power to elect a

European executive or initiate legislation would destroy the things that makeEurope work.

Leonard offers no serious answer to the question why a democratic system

would destroy the things that make Europe work. Indeed, by claiming that

the eus social politics are profoundly social-democratic he deepens the mys-

tery. To find an answer we must turn to the core of the new eus political

economy. That core is double-barrelled: it consists of the so-called Single

Market programme on the one hand, and the peculiar form of EuropeanMonetary Union on the other. Leonard manages to complete his entire book

without engaging with either of these two mechanisms at all. Yet their logic

has been to destroy the social compromise between capital and labour that

was the distinctive feature of postwar Europe, and which the euproject since

the mid-1980s has been dedicated to undermining. The Single Market sets

up regime competition in which states can engage in a race to the bottom in

deregulating labour markets. European Monetary Union enables the ecbto

engage in a deflationary monetary policy and to sabotage government efforts

to use fiscal policy for economic revival. And the patentindeed, openlyacknowledgedgoal behind this is to drive through economic reform;

in other words, to overthrow the postwar social-democratic compromise.

The two mechanisms together ensure that national governments within


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Euroland lose their capacity to steer their economies. Leonards claims for

a social-democratic political economy in the euare simply false; since the

mid-1980s, the euproject has been carried forward under the sign of Hayek.

Such claims rely largely upon ignoring the real dynamics of policy change,

while using the phrase Social Democracy in a Blairite sense of equality ofopportunity and state spending on (increasingly privately run) health and

education systems. On that definition Europe is social democraticbut

then so is America. Leonard dubs his social democratic eu policy para-

digm a Stockholm consensus (wisely ignoring the Swedish repudiation of

the eus form of monetary union). But Seattle Consensus would have been

just as apt.

Since the French turn in the mid-1980s, the business and political elites

of Western Europe have been filled with hope that Europe can revive again,after almost half a century of subordination. Their hopes have focused,

firstly, on rolling back the class compromise forced upon them by defeat

in the Second World War and by the challenge of Communist and Soviet

victories; and secondly, on reviving Western Europes international role as a

more independent actor under American leadership. The Soviet blocs col-

lapse gave a great fillip to both prongs of this revival strategy. The Delorsian

rhetoric of social cohesion was cast aside in favour of a draconian form of

monetary union and races to the bottom in the so-called single market. And

there were high hopes that the eucould become a genuine partner of the usin the Atlantic alliance, as natos official rhetoric claimed, rather than the

subaltern protectorate it had actually been.

On one side, Washington has worked unremittingly to bring the West

Europeans back into line and to ensure that the euremains nothing but a

market regime; on the other side, continental European labourabove all in

Francehas increasingly grasped what the new euproject is all about. The

result is now a mess. Washington has managed to render the euincapable

of cohesive international action withoutus

permission, using its transmis-sion belts of influence through London, Rome and Warsaw. Meanwhile the

eus popular authority has been progressively undermined by the fact that it

is an undemocratic elite oligarchy, run by the mandarins of member states

and big business for neoliberal goals.

Leonards book appeared after Washington and London blundered into

their Iraq debacle. The timing should have been good: Washingtons barbaric

yet ineffective occupation of Iraq offered euEurope what seemed like another

chance. But instead of seizing it, the Giscardians fell flat on their faces in the

French referendum thanks to their determination to ensure that a so-calledconstitution did not include the one thingrepresentative democracythat

could destroy the things that make Europe work. Poor Mark Leonards

claims for a great European revival are already hopelessly outdated. The fact


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of the matter is that elites on both sides of the Atlantic were presented with

the world on a plate by the nomenklaturas of Communist Eastern Europe

at the start of the 1990s. But they have not yet found a way of turning

that gift into a stable world order that anchors both their joint dominance

and their co-operation.

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PAX EUROPÆA - Peter Gowan