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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

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Page 1: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 1

Lecture 12

THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Page 2: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 2

The ECU and the ERM

• The ECU was a weighted average of the currencies of all (initially 9, then 12) member states of the (now) European Union.

• The ERM (“exchange-rate mechanism”) was an arrangement that compelled governments to keep the exchange rate of their currencies within predetermined corridors (± 2.25% or ± 6%) relative to the ECU rate.

• Participation in the ERM was voluntary.

Page 3: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 3

The composition of the ECU (1989)

Germany (30,08%)

Portugal (0,80%)Spain (5,30%)

Denmark (2,50%)Belgium (7,60%)

Greece (0,80%)

Luxemburg (0,30%)France (18,99%)

Ireland (1,10%)

UK (12,99%)

Italy (10,14%)Netherlands (9,40%)

Page 4: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 4

The exchange-rate mechanism (ERM)

• The national currency is fixed to the ECU.

• A variation of the exchange rate within the pre-defined “corridor” is allowable.

• Once the exchange rate tends toward the margins of the “corridor”, the central bank is encouraged to intervene (“infra-marginal interventions”).

• Once the exchange rate moves out of the “corridor”, a central bank intervention is mandatory to bring it back into the “corridor”.

Page 5: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 5

The “dual solution” to the ERM

• There could be an alternative to the ERM whereby the central bank is relieved from exchange-rate interventions.

• This would protect its foreign reserves and allow it to concentrate on its primary role: combating inflation.

• The mechanism is basically the same as for the ERM, but instead of sustaining markets by supplying international reserves, deviations from the corridor are penalized by a tax: the ERND (exchange-rate normalization duty).

Page 6: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 6

The dual solution to the ERM

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 7

• The ERM is a fixed-exchange-rate regime based on an average (the ECU-rate) as a fixed target within a well-defined „corridor“.

• The ERND works– also with a „corridor“, but – with moving averages (of bilateral exchange

rates) as a flexible target (“crawling peg”).

• It is an automatic, rules-based policy that can be anticipated by market participants.

• It activates fiscal (not monetary) policies, with built-in (and not discretionary) stabilizers.

Differences with the ERM

Page 8: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 8

• not solve structural problems of a currency zone

• not sustain a policy of „leaning against the wind“, i.a. an exchange rate.

• It is suitable for smaller countries that intend to „anchor“ their currencies.

The concept is suitable, in principle, also for the dollar-euro market, but there might be an alternative: policy coordination.

The tax can not

Page 9: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 9

International monetary policy coordination

• There were two (failed) attempts to coordinate exchange-rate policies to stabilize the US dollar in the 1980s: the “Plaza” and the “Louvre” accords.

Page 10: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 10

Capital controls

• Capital controls (particularly those on outflows) are typically rejected by economists.

• Controls on capital inflows receive some support and have also been used rather successfully in some countries (Chile and Colombia).

• Reason: Capital inflows can cause an excessive lending boom, … entailing a painful reversal.

• But controls of capital inflows could also block funds for economic development. It calls for differential treatment according to maturity.

Page 11: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 11

The international policy focus is now on …

.. improving banking regulation and supervision, and on greater transparency.

Page 12: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 12

The role of a nominal anchor

• Adherence to a nominal anchor forces a monetary authority to conduct “disciplined” monetary policy.

• A priori publicized self-binding rules – imply a strong auto-commitment;– can relieve from short-term political pressures;– contribute to the predictability of policy and hence

stabilize economic behavior;– foster confidence building in monetary authorities.

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 13

The time-consistency problem

• Economic behavior is influenced by what economic agents expect monetary authorities to do in the future.

• If expectations were to remain unchanged there is the temptation to abuse this fact by attempting to boost the economy through discretionary expansionary monetary policy.

• If expectations will incorporate the expected outcome of such a policy, output will not be higher, but inflation will!

• A monetary anchor acts as self-binding rule.

Page 14: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 14

Exchange-rate targeting

• Exchange-rate targeting has a long history, including the fixing of the exchange rate to the price of gold.

• Exchange-rate targeting has clear advantages– it links the price of traded goods to that found in the

anchor country; this might contain inflation;– time-inconsistent monetary becomes less of an

option; this stabilizes price expectations;– it is a simple and transparent rule (“franc fort”);

• Exchange-rate targeting has been widely used in Europe and world-wide.

Page 15: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 15

Disadvantages of exchange-rate targeting

• Exchange-rate targeting might be create serious problems because– the country tying its currency to that of an anchor

currency can no longer respond to shocks to its own economy;

– there could also be shocks applying to the anchor country; these are fully transmitted (the case of Germany after unification);

– if the anchor country opts for inflation, countries with pegged currencies will “import inflation”

– it may present opportunities of a one-way bet for speculators (crisis of the EMS of September 1992).

Page 16: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 16

The 1992 ERM crisis: the UK and France

• France did not!• The UK did devalue

Page 17: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 17

The “cost” of pegging

• The UK had higher growth and less unemployment

• But its inflation rate increased

• France had lower growth and more unemployment

• But its inflation rate was lower

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Page 18: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 18

Exchange-rate targeting: For whom?

• Industrialized countries might have more to lose by exchange-rate targeting than to win.

• In some industrialized countries the central banks is subject to political pressure. In this case exchange-rate targeting may prove to be beneficial.

• It also encourages economic integration.

• Contrary to industrialized countries, emerging market countries may not lose much by giving up an independent monetary policy, but it leaves them open to speculative attacks.

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 19

Can speculation be averted?

The currency-board approach:

• One approach is to back the domestic currency by 100% by a foreign currency (euros, dollars).

• It means– the money supply can only expand when international

reserves of a country increase.– a strong commitment of monetary policy, which may

therefore work instantly in controlling inflation.

• Currency boards are however not immune against speculation.

Page 20: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 20

Currency boards: Examples

• Recent examples of currency boards include– Hong Kong (1983)– Argentina (1991)– Estonia (1992) and Lithuania (1994)– Bulgaria (1997)– Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998)

• Argentina had to abandon the scheme in December 2001 -- with painful social and economic repercussions.

Page 21: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 21

The CFA-zone

• The CFA franc is the common currency of 14 countries in West and Central Africa, 12 of which are former French colonies.

• The CFA franc has been pegged to the French franc since 1948. Only one devaluation has occurred during the history of the currency peg (January 1994).

• The French Treasury has the sole responsibility for guaranteeing convertibility of CFA francs into euros, without any monetary policy implication for the ECB.

Page 22: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 22

CFA-zone: operations

• While the two (regional) CFA central banks maintain an overdraft facility with the French Treasury, the amount that can be withdrawn is limited.

• Each CFA central bank must – keep at least 65 per cent of its foreign assets in its

operations account with the French Treasury; – provide for foreign exchange cover of at least 20 per

cent for demand deposits (sight liabilities); – and impose a cap on credit extended to each

member country equivalent to 20 per cent of that country's public revenue in the preceding year.

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 23

Can speculation be averted?

Dollarization:

• Another approach is to abandon a national currency altogether and to adopt a foreign currency (e.g. US dollars) instead.

• It means– a euro or dollar remains a euro or dollar, whether

inside or outside the respective currency area.– that the country adopting a foreign currency loses

potential income through seignorage.

• However a reversal to a domestic currency always remains an option.

Page 24: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 24

“Dollarization”: Examples of countries

Andorra euro (formerly French franc, Spanish peseta), own coins 1278East Timor U.S. dollar 2000Ecuador U.S. dollar 2000El Salvador U.S. dollar 2001Kiribati Australian dollar, own coins 1943Kosovo euro 1999Liechtenstein Swiss franc 1921Marshall Islands U.S. dollar 1944Micronesia U.S. dollar 1944Montenegro euro (partly "DM-ized" since 1999) 2002Monaco euro (formerly French franc) 1865Nauru Australian dollar 1914Palau U.S. dollar 1944Panama U.S. dollar, own balboa coins 1904San Marino euro (formerly Italian lira), own coins 1897Tuvalu Australian dollar, own coins 1892Vatican City euro (formerly Italian lira), own coins 1929

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 25

“Dollarization”: Exits

• Even dollarization does not guarantee a permanent monetary anchoring.

• There is need to a continuing inflow of foreign denominated capital to satisfy domestic demand for money.

• This puts severe strains on the economy.

• There is a large number of exits from a currency zone during recent years:– Numerous exits from the ruble zone after the

breakdown of the Soviet Union– the secession of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia– the breakdown of Yugoslavia.

Page 26: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 26

Monetary targeting

• As already discussed, monetary targeting became fashionable in major industrialized countries during the 1970s (Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, the UK, and the United States).

• It allows to focus on domestic considerations without regard to exchange-rate developments.

• Different aggregates were chosen– “central bank money” (Germany 1974-88)– M1 (Canada, the United States)– M2 + CDs (Japan)– M3 (UK, Germany from 1988)

Page 27: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 27

Monetary targeting

• Monetary targeting proved to be problematical because of – unreliable indicators due to shifts in the demand for

money and the introduction of new technologies (financial innovations);

– a weak relationship between monetary indicators and inflation;

– prevalence of foreign-exchange rate considerations;– speculative bubbles of stock and housing prices (Japan,

the United States); and – occasionally moral hazard and banking crises.

• Monetary targeting was thus suspended, strongly de-emphasized, if not abandoned altogether.

Page 28: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 28

Inflation targeting

• A number of countries has adopted inflation tar-geting following the lead of New Zealand (1990).– Canada (from 1991)– the UK (from 1992)– Australia (1994)– Brazil (1995)

• In 1990 the Reserve Bank of NZ became fully independent and was committed to the sole objective of price stability.

• The governor of the central bank is held accoun-table for achieving a predefined inflation goal.

Page 29: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 29

Inflation targeting: strategy

• The strategy consists of– publicly announcing a medium-term numerical

target for inflation that is well defined;– committing the central bank to price stability as the

primary (if not sole) policy goal;– an information strategy that includes several

indicators, not just monetary aggregates– increased communication with the public to render

monetary policy more transparent; and– an increased accountability of the central bank for

attaining its inflation target.

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Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 30

Inflation targeting: advantages

• Inflation targeting– enables the central bank to focus on domestic policy

objectives, but a stable relationship between money and the price level is not critical for its success;

– is highly transparent and easily understood;– increases the accountability of the central bank

because of a numerical target as a benchmark;– seems to ameliorate the effects of inflationary shocks

(introduction of a GST in Canada; exit of the British pound from the ERM in 1992). There was a one-time price adjustment, but no spiraling up of inflation.

Page 31: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 31

Inflation targeting: disadvantages

• Inflation targeting is not without problems because– inflation cannot be controlled directly and

policy outcomes occur only with a time lag;– therefore the policy cannot send immediate

signals to economic agents;– may be too rigid and limit the policy discretion

to respond to unforeseen events;– it will even out inflation, but might increase

output fluctuations.

Page 32: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 32

The two pillar strategy of the ECB

• The strategy of the ECB appears to reconcile monetary targeting with inflation targeting by scrutinizing both monetary growth and a bundle of economic indicators to assess the medium-term impact on the HICP.

• Contrary to the NZ approach, the ECB may be criticized as being less responsive to public demands for information.

• Less transparency goes hand in hand with less accountability.

Page 33: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)

Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main 33

• Thank you for attending this course

• I hope you enjoyed it

• All the best for you private and professional future, and …

• … good luck for the final exam !

That’s it !

Page 34: Paul Bernd Spahn, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main1 Lecture 12 THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2)