Past and Present 1995 Stewart 170 97

TENZING'S TWO WRIST-WATCHES: THECONQUEST OF EVEREST AND LATE

IMPERIAL CULTURE IN BRITAIN1921-1953

In 1953 a British expedition succeeded in climbing Everest, theworld's highest mountain. In Britain the Everest triumph wasviewed as a symbolic event which revealed significant thingsabout contemporary British culture, about the values which hadbeen conventionally associated with Britain's rise to world powerin the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and about theBritish identity in the modern world. News of the expedition'ssuccess reached London on the morning of Queen Elizabeth IPscoronation, a coincidence which enabled commentators and edit-orial writers to present the Everest achievement as a culminatingmoment of an empire which had begun in North America in thereign of the first Elizabeth. An editorial in the Spectator declaredthat "the central Elizabethan virtues were courage and enter-prise . . . There is not the slightest sign that the creative energiesof the British people are any less now than they have been in thepast four hundred years". An article in The Times proceeded onthe same lines, proposing that "seldom since Francis Drakebrought the Golden Hind to anchor in Plymouth Sound has aBritish explorer offered to his Sovereign such a tribute of gloryas Colonel John Hunt and his men are able to lay at the feet ofQueen Elizabeth for her Coronation day".1

The 1953 expedition came at the end of a long series of Britishattempts on Everest over the previous thirty years. A reconnais-sance expedition to explore the routes to the mountain and pos-sible climbing lines was made in 1921, followed by the first directclimbing attempt in 1922, while the next expedition, in 1924,became famous because of the disappearance of George Malloryand Andrew Irvine near the top of the mountain. There werefour further expeditions in the 1930s, all beset by bad weatherand difficult climbing conditions. These seven expeditions allapproached Everest from the northern or Tibetan side. Following

1 "To the Long Reign", Spectator, 5 June 1953, p. 718; The Times, 2 June 1953.

at Jawaharlal N

ehru University on A

pril 21, 2013http://past.oxfordjournals.org/

Dow

nloaded from

http://past.oxfordjournals.org/

TENZING'S TWO WRIST-WATCHES 171

World War II and the new willingness of Nepal to allow foreignersinto its national territory, expeditions were set in train from thesouth. The British sent out a reconnaissance in 1951 before theirfinal success in 1953. All these expeditions were funded andorganized by the Everest Committee, drawn jointly from theRoyal Geographical Society and the Alpine Club, and received,in the inter-war years, sustained assistance from the India Officein London and from the (British) Government of India. Theleader of the 1953 party, Colonel (later Sir John) Hunt, describedthat enterprise as "an expensive sponsored expedition of nationalimportance",2 and his description can be applied to the entireseries of nine expeditions from 1921 to 1953. No other countrycame close to matching the British obsession with Everest.

Because it was seen to have "national importance", the con-quest of Everest was not merely a climbing affair but was, frombeginning to end, replete with symbolism for the expeditionmembers, for the British officials who supported the variousefforts and for the British public as they watched the dramaunfold. From the packed audiences in British cinemas whowatched the film Conquest of Everest in 1953-4 to the packed hallsat lecture- and picture-shows in the 1920s and 1930s, it wasevident that the Everest challenge struck a nerve in the Britishpeople. In 1922 George Mallory, perhaps now the most famousmember of the first three expeditions, while on a RoyalGeographical Society speaking tour, reported that "the publicinterest is immense. A crowd was turned away from the FreeTrade Hall in Manchester which seats about 3000".3 The attemptsto climb Everest over a period of thirty years can therefore beread in cultural terms, as a way of gaining insight into the shapingof the British imperial identity from the apparently secureEdwardian period to the era of decolonization. When the Everestproject was first discussed as an official undertaking in the 1890sBritain was at the height of its imperial power; by the time successwas achieved in 1953 Britain had, during World War II, sufferedcatastrophic defeat by the Japanese at its strategic Asian bastionof Singapore, faced the conquest of Burma and the prospect of a

2 John Hunt, The Ascent of Everest (London, 1953), p. 249.'Royal Geographical Society, London, Everest Expeditions (hereafter R.G.S.,

E.E.), box 3, George Mallory to Francis Younghusband, Mobberley, Cheshire, 14Jan. 1922.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from


172 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 149

Japanese invasion of India, and finally conceded the independenceof India and Pakistan in 1947.

This article analyses how the attempt to climb the world'shighest mountain was a matter of some moment for the British,in terms of denning Britain's culture in these last decades ofimperial prominence and the unravelling of the imperial worldafter 1945. The narrative of this great adventure was presentedin ways which provided reassurance that imperial values andvalour were still alive. The public presentation of the Everestenterprise drew attention to British characteristics which wereseen to be unique, characteristics moulded in decades of colonialexperience dealing with the geography and peoples of the Indianempire and its frontiers, and by the role of British explorers inthe Victorian and Edwardian period from Africa to Antarctica.At the final moment of triumph, however, this master narrativewas called into question by the image created, first in Nepal andIndia, and then in the world press in general, of Tenzing Norgay,the Sherpa sirdar who reached the top with Edmund Hillary. IfEverest had been climbed during the early attempts in 1922 or1924 there would have been an unambiguous imperial celebration;by 1953 the old imperial verities were struggling to survive, andthe complacent imperial narrative about Everest was undermined.

I

The very name of the world's highest mountain ensured that itwas of peculiar iconic significance for the British. George Everesthad been surveyor-general of India and superintendent of theGreat Trigonometrical Survey of India from 1830 to 1843. TheSurvey of India had been established in 1800 by the East IndiaCompany to map the subcontinent. The backbone of this enter-prise was the Great Trigonometrical Survey, which was designedto describe the meridional arc from Cape Comorin on the southerntip of India to the Himalayas. From that line cutting through theheart of India the country was to be mapped by throwing out aseries of triangulations. A history of the Survey published in 1870contained an opening map showing all the major triangles sur-veyed up to that time, with bold lines drawn from the mostnortherly stations to the high peaks of the Himalayas.4 These

4 J. T. Walker, Account of the Operations of the Great Trigonometrical Survey ofIndia: The Early Operations of the Survey, 1800-1830 (Dehra Dun, 1870). I have usedthe copy in the India Office Library, London (hereafter I.O.L.).

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



giant peaks were finally being drawn into the world of westernmeasurement.

In an intriguing analysis of early East India Company mappingin India, the geographical scholar Matthew Edney has drawnattention to the connection between the physical activity of map-ping and the placing of an imperial culture over India. He beginsby asking why the East India Company was prepared to spendso much money on mapping, and why, in spite of appallinglydifficult conditions, surveyors and mappers like Everest took suchpains to do a meticulous job that would stand the test of time.The actual results of the Great Trigonometrical Survey at thetime it was undertaken did not justify the expense, but Edneyargues that the Survey represented a cultural assertion about theBritish presence in India. The continued existence of the Survey:

stemmed not from its utility but from its embodiment of cultural andsocial values. It struck a cultural nerve in providing the image of a systemof uniformity, accuracy and precision in accordance with contemporaryEnlightenment concerns with rationality and progress held by the directorsand administrators of the EIC.

The Great Trigonometrical Survey, Edney concludes, has as muchto tell us about mapping and empire as about mapping andtechnical cartography, for it "was undertaken to create a uniformmap of India, a key symbol signifying not only British politicaland imperial control but also British cultural superiority overIndian irrationality and mysticism".5

As a counterpoint to the compelling case that western-stylemapping imposed a controlling imperial framework on the colon-ized world, it is worth pointing out that the Survey of India madea sustained effort to designate mountains and other physical fea-tures by local names. For example, in 1921 Arthur Hinks, thesecretary of the Royal Geographical Society, complained aboutGeorge Mallory's penchant for naming Tibetan mountains afterBritish personages.6 There were two great exceptions to the localname rule. One was the world's second highest mountain, K2,which retained its technical Survey designation (Karakorumrange, peak number 2) because, located thirty miles up the barrenBaltoro glacier, there was apparently no local name. The other

5 Matthew H. Edney, "Mapping and Empire: British Trigonometrical Surveys inIndia and the European Concept of Systematic Survey, 1799-1843" (Univ. ofWisconsin Ph.D. thesis, 1990), pp. 1-7, 12.

6R.G.S., E.E., box 3, Arthur Hinks to Ruth Mallory, R.G.S., Kensington Gore,London, 3 Oct. 1921.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



was, of course, Everest, whose height was measured at a timewhen Tibet and Nepal were both closed to Europeans and localname-finding was problematic.7 Whatever final judgements aremade about mapping and surveying as an aspect of imperialimposition on the subcontinent, the upshot was that in the caseof Everest the very name tied the mountain into the context ofthe Raj and of official efforts for control in India. The name itselfconveyed a sense of possession or, at least, a sense of Britishhistorical presence, which could not be the case for any otherforeign expedition, or indeed for any other foreign public whotook an interest in climbing the mountain.

If the name of the mountain itself had such significance, theBritish perception of Everest as having special associations forthem was intensified by the imperial provenance of the Everestexpeditions. Discussions took place as early as 1899 at the veryhighest level of the Government of India in correspondencebetween the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, and Colonel (later Sir Francis)Younghusband, who was to play a central role in the formationof the Everest Committee and in the launching of the first expedi-tions. Younghusband had made his name as an explorer of innerAsia when he trekked from China to India in 1887 by way ofKashgar and the difficult Mustagh pass through the Karakorumrange.8 His military career culminated in his leadership of theBritish column which invaded Tibet in 1904, reached Lhasa andforcefully negotiated a treaty that opened up Tibet to Britishtrade and diplomacy. Younghusband, both as a traveller and asan officer in the Indian Army, was one of the key players in the"Great Game" between Britain and Russia for influence inCentral Asia.9 Writing to Younghusband from the Viceregal

7 Everest: The Best Writing and Pictures from Seventy Years of Human Endeavour,ed. Peter Gillman (Boston, 1993), p. 12. Everest's height was computed in 1852.Kenneth Mason points out that "the name Mount Everest was not given to this peakuntil 1865 when all efforts to find a local name had been fruitless": K. Mason, Abodeof Snow: A History of Himalayan Exploration and Mountaineering (London, 1955),p. 73. As the British discovered once relations with Tibet were forced open in 1904,the Tibetan name for Everest was Chomolungma (or Chomolungma).

8 Captain Frank Younghusband, C.I.E., The Heart of a Continent: A Narrative ofTravels in Manchuria, across the Gobi Desert, through the Himalayas, the Pamirs andChitral, 1884-1894 (London, 1896).

9 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (NewYork, 1992), pp. 447-58, 469-70, 507-18. The most recent biography is PatrickFrench, Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer (London, 1994). In areview of the latter book, Philip Marsden observes that Younghusband was "a figurewho so completely embodies his time — its virtues, its absurdities, its convictions

(com. on p. 175)

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



Lodge in Simla in July 1899, Curzon raised the question of aBritish attempt on Everest. "We have on our northern border",he wrote, "the greatest mountains in the world and yet owing tovarious obstacles or reasons we know next to nothing of them. Ishould like to see a thoroughly competent party sent out to ascendor attempt the ascent of Kangchenjunga or of Mount Everest".10

Just prior to his return to England in 1905, Curzon again drewattention to this project and linked the proposal to perceivedBritish exploratory prowess in the modern era. "It has alwaysseemed to me a reproach", he observed to Douglas Freshfield,president of the Alpine Club, "that with the two highest moun-tains in the world for the most part in British territory we, themountaineers and pioneers par excellence of the universe, makeno sustained and scientific attempt to climb to the top of eitherof them".11

Nothing came of these discussions between 1899 and 1914,partly because the Royal Geographical Society was then preoccu-pied with Antarctic exploration, especially the expeditions ofCaptain Robert Falcon Scott in his race for the South Pole, partlybecause of a debate within the Society about the scientific meritof climbing mountains,12 and partly, of course, because of theoutbreak of the Great War. But after the war the Everest projectfinally got under way, largely through the efforts of FrancisYounghusband. As an article in the Calcutta newspaper TheEnglishman noted, "but for him there can be no doubt therewould have been no Everest expedition".13 Younghusbandbecame president of the Royal Geographical Society in 1919 and,in his own words, he "determined to make this Everest venturethe main feature of [his] three years presidency".14 From the

(n. 9 com.)

and frailties — that on occasions he comes across almost as a caricature": P. Marsden,"Behind the Moustache", Times Lit. Suppl, 21 Oct. 1994, p. 32. It is precisely thesecharacteristics that make him so interesting and useful for delineating the conventionalcultural assumptions of his day.

10I.O.L., European Manuscripts (hereafter MSS. EUR), Fl 11/181, Curzon toYounghusband, Simla, 9 July 1899.

"I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F111/183, Curzon to Douglas Freshfield, Viceroy's Camp,India, 24 Feb. 1905.

12 Ibid., George Taubman Goldie to Curzon, R.G.S., Kensington Gore, London, 7,29 June 1905.

"I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/529, Englishman [Calcutta], 3 Aug. 1921.141.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/520, Younghusband notes for R.G.S. centenary; Ian

Cameron, To the Farthest Ends of the Earth: The History of the Royal GeographicalSociety, 1830-1980 (London, 1980), p. 168.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



outset, he viewed the project as a national enterprise that wouldhave to be organized on a large scale and required co-operationfrom the Government of India. "For such enterprises as climbingMt. Everest, or reaching the Pole, expeditions on a big scale arenecessary", he declared, and added, with evident satisfaction,that "we have been assured of the cordial co-operation of theGovernment of India".15 The secretary of state for India, EdwinMontagu, reciprocated by confirming the appropriateness of sucha venerable body as the Royal Geographical Society, with its linksto government and its standing as a national institution, assumingresponsibility for the project. "A task of such magnitude andgeographical importance", he wrote to the Society's president,"if it is to be undertaken at all, should be entrusted to qualifiedBritish explorers acting under the highest geographical auspicesof the British Empire".16

The Everest Committee was formed in January 1921 followingthe success of the Government of India in obtaining permissionfrom Tibet, which at this time was reluctant to allow any foreignexpeditions because of the fear that these would be precursors tofurther European influence. Britain maintained diplomatic linkswith Tibet through the Government of India political agent sta-tioned in the princely state of Sikkim — an arrangement that hadbeen one of the outcomes of Younghusband's Lhasa negotiationsin 1904 — and the then agent, C. A. Bell, made a personal requestof the Dalai Lama to permit a British expedition. In December1920 Bell reported to Delhi that during a trip to Lhasa he hadsecured the long-awaited permission. The communications withthe Tibetans clearly conveyed the impression that the expeditionwas officially sanctioned by the British imperial authorities. Themessage sent by Lhasa to the local governors (jongpens) throughwhose territory the British expedition would travel informedthem that "the British government has deputed a party of Sahibsto see Cha-mo-lung-ma mountain".17 The news was sent on toLondon with assurances from the commander-in-chief, India and

15I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/520, Younghusband notes for R.G.S. centenary;L/P&S/10/777, The Times, 11 Jan. 1921; Cameron, To the Farthest Ends of the Earth,pp. 168-9.

161.O.L., L/P&S/10/777, Edwin Montagu to governor-general of India, India Office,London, 17 Jan. 1919.

"R.G.S., E.E., box 1, C. A. Bell to Younghusband, Lhasa, 24 Dec. 1920; I.O.L.,L/P&S/10/777, C. A. Bell, political officer on special duty in Tibet, Lhasa, 20 Apr.1920.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



the governor of Bengal that they would do everything "to assistat this end".18

The organization and character of the seven inter-war expedi-tions ensured that the attempts on Everest remained at this levelof quasi-official enterprise that was, as Curzon had clearly anticip-ated, a proving-ground of British institutions and traits associatedwith the culture of empire. All the expeditions were large onesrun on military lines, with officers in charge and Gurkha N.CO.sto supervise the porters. The context can be nicely illustratedfrom the discussions which led to the choice of General CharlesBruce of the Gurkhas as the leader of the 1922 and 1924 expedi-tions. Bruce's name had first come up in this connection as earlyas 1905, when Douglas Freshfield advised Curzon that "one wantssome kind of military authority over the coolies" and recom-mended Bruce because of his knowledge of the Himalayan peoplesand his travels in the region. "Bruce's knowledge of the Gurkhasand their dialects", he added, "makes him the one man whocould get natives to work at over 20,000 feet".19 A RoyalGeographical Society press release on Bruce noted that "no onehas a finer capacity for handling Himalayan people".20

Much of the interaction between expedition members and theporters had a military cast, as can be seen, for example, whenIrvine noted in his diary in 1924 that he was "trying the messtent and drilling the coolies to pitch it quickly".21 This was setin the broader context of the special skills that the British, throughtheir experience of colonial rule, had developed in commandingnative peoples. As Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Norton, the leaderof the 1924 attempt, observed, "it is a curious psychological factthat there are men on the spot who could climb Everest withoutturning a hair. Yet the Sahib — so physically inferior in thisrespect — has come thousands of miles to give him a lead".22

Younghusband made the imperial context even more explicit,

la R.G.S., E.E., box 1, Earl of Ronaldshay to Younghusband, Calcutta, 17 Feb.1921, H. T. Morshead, Survey of India, Mussoorie, 4 Aug. 1920, statement issuedby Army Headquarters, Simla, 28 Feb. 1921.

"I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F111/183, Douglas Freshfield to Curzon, Athenaeum, PallMall, London, 31 Mar., Forest Row, Sussex, 12, 28 June 1905, Campden Hill,London, 18 Oct. 1906.

"R.G.S., E.E., box 16, R.G.S. press release, 21 Nov. 1921.21 The Irvine Diaries: Andrew Irvine and the Enigma of Everest, 1924, ed. Herbert

Carr (Goring, 1979), p. 76.^I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/115, E. F. Norton to Younghusband, Darjeeling,

2 Aug. 1924.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



pointing out that generations of military officers like himself andBruce had been born in the hill-stations of northern India fromKashmir to Bengal and, by the habit of firm but kindly authority,were transforming the local peoples. Writing in the wake of the1921 and 1922 expeditions, he explained that:

Englishmen have taken these men on to the very highest mountain andhave persuaded them to carry a tent to no less than 27,000 feet. . . Theyhave shown these men what they are capable of doing and have madethem proud of themselves . . . Love of high adventure was overcomingthe old craven dread.23

The expeditions' physical assault on Everest was accompanied bythe self-image that British officers and climbers were contributingto the moral uplift of the local peoples.

This view of the expeditions was reinforced by the overlappingsocial strata from which the cumbers and other expedition mem-bers came, which were, in addition to the Indian Army officersetting, uniformly public-school and English upper-middle-classin composition. This reflected the dominant strand in Britishmountaineering culture since the formation of the Alpine Clubin 1857.24 Until World War II the English mountaineering worldremained very much the preserve of the professional and uppermiddle classes and university men, with a sprinkling of aristocrats.As Wilhelm Lehner pointed out in his comprehensive and com-parative account of climbing in the Alps published in 1924, theBritish came to the mountains "as complete lords and masters"

231.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/473, Younghusband, undated MS. lectures.24 On the social composition of the Alpine Club, see The Alpine Club Register,

1857-1890, ed. Arnold L. Mumm, 3 vols. (London, 1923-8); Arnold Lunn, Switzerlandand the English (London, 1944), pp. 131-2, 153-6. According to Lunn, the Clubblackballed A. F. Mummery, who pioneered modern rock-climbing techniques, partlybecause he was "a tanner by trade", and he was elected only when a member riggedthe ballot in his favour; as confirmation of the Club's traditional outlook, Lunn furtherclaims that it was "with perhaps one exception, the last Club to abandon [black-balling]" when electing new members: ibid., pp. 155, 250-1. Cumbers from working-class backgrounds began to form clubs only after the Second World War, a usefulmarker of which was the Rock and Ice Club formed in Manchester in 1951 byclimbers such as Don Whillans and Joe Brown: John Cleare, Mountaineering (Poole,1980), pp. 110-11. For a more recent analysis of the origins and development ofmountaineering in Victorian Britain which is informed by current scholarly under-standings of the cultural constructions of sport, see Peter Hansen, "Albert Smith, theAlpine Club and the Invention of Mountaineering in Mid-Victorian Britain", Jl Brit.Studies, xxxiv (1995), pp. 300-24. Hansen, who is completing a book-length study ofmountaineering and modern British culture from the foundation of the Alpine Clubto the conquest of Everest, has provided me with much useful advice in the writingof this article. His work on this subject is seminal.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



("als fertige Herrenmenschen").25 Michael Ward, a member ofthe 1953 expedition, recalled climbing with Colin Kirkus in the1930s and wondering why such a fine climber was never evenconsidered for the Everest expeditions. While there was certainlysome question about his skills, Ward thought that the explanationwas related to the class traditions of English climbing. "Themountaineering Establishment of this period", he commented,"did not like his background — Liverpool, non-publicschool. . .".26

Mallory's nurturing at Winchester, Cambridge and Charter-house reflected this tradition. His young companion in death in1924, Andrew Irvine, was raised in a "comfortable professional-class home . . . [with] a long garden . . . big enough to take atennis court, croquet lawn, orchard, kitchen garden, and bosk-age . . .". Irvine was a Shrewsbury and Oxford man. He hadrowed for his school at the Henley Peace Regatta, and when hewent into residence at Merton for the Hilary term of 1922 he"was at once given a place in the Oxford Boat to row at 2 againstCambridge". Throughout the march across Tibet in 1924, Irvineand the team kept up to date with news of that year's BoatRace.27 What is more, the qualities of character associated withsuch backgrounds by those within the culture were regarded asessential for participation in the Everest expeditions. In thatsetting, the games ethic of public schools was very much a partof the imperial mentality.28 An insight into this mentality can begained from the letter Mallory wrote recommending G. H.Bullock for a place on the Everest expedition. Bullock was aWykehamist who had been introduced to climbing in the pre-war years by R. L. G. Irving, a master at Winchester. Mallory(also a Wykehamist, and later a master at Charterhouse) toldYounghusband that he had known Bullock at Winchester, where"he was a very good scholar and a very good runner, the bestlong distance runner that anyone remembered in my time, good

25 Wi lhe lm L e h n e r , Die Eroberung der Alpen ( M u n i c h , 1924), p p . 5 4 0 - 1 .26 Michael W a r d , In this Short Span: A Mountaineering Memoir ( L o n d o n , 1972) ,

p . 36.27 Irvine Diaries, ed. Ca r r , p p . 20 , 3 1 - 6 , 3 8 , 75 -9 .28 O n this t h e m e , see J. A. M a n g a n , The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of

the Diffusion of an Ideal ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1986); J. A. M a n g a n , Athleticism in theVictorian and Edwardian Public School (Cambr idge , 1981).

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



at all games and stolid, a tough sort of fellow who never lost hishead but would stand any amount of knocking about".29

The connection between imperial traditions and the gamesethic of public schools and Oxbridge was very evident as HughRuttledge assessed his team for the 1933 attempt. In his officialaccount of the expedition, Ruttledge once again linked the Everestmatter to imperial traditions. In this reading of the connection,Ruttledge posited that the British experience of seafaring hadsomehow prepared them to invent the modern sport of climbingin the 1840s and 1850s. Their Alpine Club had been the first tobe founded and now they were the first nation to try to climbEverest. "Their long apprenticeship to the sea", Ruttledgebelieved, "taught them to face the convulsions of nature in aspirit of adventure and enquiry. When travel brought themamong the mountains, they wished to explore, to test themselvesagainst difficulties, to enlarge the boundaries of science . . . theymade a sport of this new experience, and Switzerland became'The Playground of Europe' ". When providing brief sketchesof the members of the 1933 team, Ruttledge included their sport-ing prowess at school and university. J. L. Longland had earned"a Blue for pole-jumping at Cambridge"; of T. A. Brocklebank,who had been initiated into climbing at Eton, Ruttledge thoughtthat "the fact that he stroked the winning Cambridge boat onthree occasions gave promise of determination and stayingpower".30

Ruttledge's reference to scientific goals is a reminder that inthe context of empire the values associated with the games ethicwere enriched by other aspects of the colonial enterprise. All theinter-war Everest expeditions included a scientific dimension,which was welcomed as another sign of their seriousness of pur-pose and their respected status. As he prepared to lead the 1922effort, Bruce was reminded by Arthur Hinks, secretary of theEverest Committee, that "there is great interest in getting new

BR.G.S., E.E., box 3, George Mallory to Francis Younghusband, The Holt)Godalming, 31 Mar. 1921.

30 Hugh Ruttledge, Everest, 1933 (London, 1934), pp. 8, 25, 50-1, 60. Another signof the imperial setting within which the Everest expeditions were undertaken wasthe sight which greeted the 1933 party when they reached Yatung, inside the Tibetanborder. "At Yatung", Ruttledge remarked, "there is a garrison of Indian infantry toprotect the trade-route which, since the Lhasa expedition of 1904, we have held asfar as Gyantse; and the sepoys play football and hockey on a small, comparativelylevel space of ground". The expedition members used this ground to play polo:ibid., pp. 66-7.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



strains of hardy wheat, barley and other things . . .".31 Eachofficial expedition volume had detailed appendices on the floraand fauna of the Everest region, on geology and entomology, andon the physiological impact on humans of high altitude.32 Plants,seeds, birds and insects were sent back to Kew Gardens and theBritish Museum in a manner that reflected long-standing practicesin R.G.S.-supported exploration, and the scientific traditionsassociated with colonial expansion.33 The sporting dimension andthe scientific exploration of the natural world were togetherviewed as characteristic of the British approach to suchenterprises.

The high government involvement beginning with Curzon, themilitary cast of the expeditions, their resonances with the gamesethic and public-school values, their perceived role in lifting upnative peoples, their ties to colonial science and exploration —all these features enable us to situate the Everest project withinthe prevailing conventions of empire. One more aspect of theinter-war expeditions intensified these linkages to the imperialmentality, the deaths of Mallory and Irvine in 1924. The fate ofthe Charterhouse master and the young Oxford rowing blue soclose to the top of Everest was treated in a romantic fashion. Thetwo were portrayed as examples of English manhood who hadsacrificed their lives for their country's cause, and were seen asexemplars of a tradition of high-minded explorers and adven-turers. Speaking at the R.G.S. centenary celebrations in 1930,Younghusband, who had been so instrumental in getting theexpeditions under way, explicitly placed the Everest project inthis perspective: "The British people are born adventurers. Theylove to go forth into the far corners of the earth. So from thestart it [the Society] fulfilled a national need". Mallory belongedto this tradition. He was a man of "imagination . . . [and]daring . . . [who] could imagine the thrill his success would cause

31 R.G.S., E.E., box 18, Arthur Hinks to Charles Bruce, R.G.S., Kensington Gore,London, 16 Feb. 1922.

32 The 1921 reconnaissance expedition which launched the Everest expedition hadsections on natural history, geology and the scientific equipment used by the party,and on the mammals, birds and plants collected: Lieut.-Col. C. K. Howard-Bury,D.S.O., Mount Everest: The Reconnaissance, 1921 (London, 1922), pp. 281-350.

33 On this issue, see Lucile Brockway's assessment of the role of Kew in the empire:L. Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal BotanicGardens (New York, 1979).

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



among all fellow-mountaineers; the credit it would bring toEngland".34

In this setting, the deaths of Mallory and Irvine were viewedin a way which suggested they had chosen to sacrifice themselvesin a glorious national cause, much as Scott had done inAntarctica in 1912. E. F. Norton, the leader of the expedition onwhich they perished, agreed with The Times' appreciation of thetwo climbers, which "emphasized the fineness of the cumbers'death and the certainty that they themselves could hardly havechosen a better end".3S Frank Smythe, who was on three of thefour 1930s expeditions, and who was beginning to make a reputa-tion and a living writing mountain travel books, rememberedMallory and Irvine in these terms. During his attempt onKangchenjunga in 1930, as he looked westward towards Everest,Smythe directly connected their fate with that of anotherBritish hero:

Nature decrees that man shall ever war against the elemental powers ofher Universe. If man were to acknowledge defeat, he would descend inthe scale of hie and sink once more to the animal. But there has beengiven to him that "something" which is called the "Spirit of Adventure".It was this spirit that sustained Captain Scott and his companions, andMallory and Irvine.36

This idealization of Mallory and Irvine, and this placing ofthem within imperial traditions of exploration, adventure andsacrifice, provided yet another association which gave the Britisha sense of precedence when it came to climbing the world'shighest mountain. To the Survey of India and the naming ofEverest, and the Curzonian concern that the British had a specialresponsibility to be the first to scale it, was now added theromantic association that the last resting-place of Mallory andIrvine was high on the mountain, perhaps on the summit itself.In 1931 Admiral Sir William Edmund Goodenough, president ofthe Royal Geographical Society, reminded the secretary of statefor India of this new dimension to the matter of Everest: "The[Everest] Committee feel that the fact that two bodies of ourcountrymen lie still at the top or very near it, may give thiscountry a priority in any attempt that may be made to reach the

341.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/520, Younghusband notes on R.G.S. centenary; FrancisYounghusband, The Epic of Mount Everest (London, 1926), p. 277.

35I.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/115, E. F. Norton to Francis Younghusband, DonkaLa, Tibet, 19 July 1924.

36 F. S. Smythe, The Kangchenjunga Adventure (London, 1930), pp. 16-17.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



summit and they are anxious that this may be recorded".37

General Bruce, the leader of the first two expeditions, returnedto India in 1937 to use his reputation in Lhasa to win permissionfor yet another attempt. "Nothing of its sort", reported theLiverpool Daily Post, "remains so to catch the imagination asthese repeated attempts to capture the crowning physical strong-hold of the earth".38

By the 1930s some internal doubts, and fears of foreign rivalspre-empting the British on Everest, began to filter into R.G.S.and Government of India circles. From inside the climbing com-munity, individuals like Frank Smythe and G. I. Finch began toquestion the merit of using large, military-style expeditions onEverest. Smythe argued that they were too cumbersome andunable to adapt quickly enough to changing weather and climbingconditions, as the German disasters on Nanga Parbat in the early1930s confirmed. Finch's observations were all the more tellingbecause he had been a member of the 1922 expedition. In aninterview with the Morning Post published in October 1936, heargued that the series of failures in 1922, 1924, 1933 and 1934had led to "the present position [, which] is that we are beginningto make ourselves look very ridiculous". He went on to criticize"the military method of Staff control" and called for smallerparties composed entirely of pure climbers, rather than ofclimbers whose other skills as scientists or geographers or militarymen had led to their inclusion. Everest "is now a climbing job,and that job should be in the hands of climbers".39 Smythe, whohad led a small party to a successful ascent of Kamet in 1931,joined in this line of attack, telling J. C. Walton at the IndiaOffice that "the record of large Himalayan expeditions is one ofalmost unmitigated failure", and scouted the possibility ofbypassing the Everest Committee altogether and sending out asmall private party instead. In his reply, however, Waltonemphasized that the India Office and the Government of Indiawould continue to support expeditions organized "by the MountEverest Committee or some similar organisation, so long as suchan organisation is in existence".40

" I . O . L . , L/P&S/12/4242, Admiral Sir William E d m u n d Goodenough to WilliamWedgwood Benn, R .G.S . , Kensington Gore , London , 23 Mar . 1931.

3 8 1 .O .L . , L/P&S/12/4244, Liverpool Daily Post, 22 Jan. 1937.39 Ibid., Morning Post, 17 Oct. 1936.40 Ibid., Frank Smythe to J. C. Walton, no sender's address, 20 Aug. 1936, J. C.

Walton, memorandum of conversation with Smythe, 28 Aug. 1936.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



In taking this line, Walton revealed how the Everest projectwas seen in R.G.S. and government circles as something morethan a climbing matter. It had been launched in a particularinstitutional and cultural setting, and it was hoped that thoseinstitutional and those cultural assumptions would be vindicatedby success. Back in 1924, Arthur Hinks, the long-serving secret-ary of the Everest Committee, had voiced similar concerns toF. M. Bailey, the political agent in Sikkim, when rumours hadstarted to circulate about a possible American attempt on Everest."I mention it to you", Hinks wrote to Bailey, "as a matter uponwhich we are keeping our eyes open. I have a kind of feelingthat you would not look too favourably upon this or any otherattempt to go behind the backs of the [Everest] Committee".41

The key to this way of thinking was that the climbing of Everest,because of all the imperial and institutional associations that hadnow accumulated round it, had become a matter involving Britishnational prestige. Even Captain Finch, while critical of theCommittee's methods, still thought that getting first to the topof Everest was "an issue of National and Imperial importance".42

This view of what Everest had come to mean for the Britishsense of their identity was nicely summed up by Sir Percy Coxwhen he was secretary to the committee in the 1930s. Writing toSamuel Hoare, secretary of state for India, to explain his fearsthat foreign expeditions might begin attempts on Everest, Coxset out the issues at stake and in so doing showed clearly thatEverest remained much more than just a climbing enterprise:

Owing to the number of assaults which have been made upon the mountainin the past exclusively by British expeditions, the final conquest of themountain has become practically a national ambition, and . . . correspond-ingly it would be a national humiliation were the final ascent to be allowedto pass to the nationals of any other country by reason of any slackeningof interest on our part or lack of vigilance in our quest for the opportunityfor the despatch of another expedition.43

Cox was assured, as Walton had pointedly told Smythe, that theIndia Office and the Government of India would continue tosupport the officially sanctioned expeditions organized under theauspices of the Geographical Society from the hallowed precincts

41 R.G.S., E.E., box 14, Arthur Hinks to F. M. Bailey, R.G.S., Kensington Gore,London, 8 Dec. 1924.

42 I . O . L . , L /P&S/12/4244, Morning Post, 17 Oct . 1936.431.O.L., L/P&S/l 2/4242, Sir Percy Cox to Sir Samuel Hoare, R.G.S., Kensington

Gore, London, 25 May 1934.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



of Kensington Gore. In a statement issued on behalf of the EverestCommittee on 16 June, 1936, Cox declared that "the conquestof Mount Everest has become in a sense a national enterpriseupon which all hearts have been set".44

II

The sense that national interests were at stake, combined withthe fear that in spite of all the British attempts since 1921 aforeign expedition might conquer Everest first, led to the 1953expedition being the largest and most elaborately planned assaultof all. The British were acutely aware that this might be then-last chance to prove themselves on Everest. They could no longeruse their position as the imperial power in India and Sikkim tomake exclusive arrangements for access to the mountain. TheTibet route was in any event closed to westerners following theChinese invasion in 1951. Everest could now be approached onlythrough Nepal, which gave Britain no special consideration. TheBritish did secure permission to mount a small reconnaissanceexpedition in 1951, but it was the Swiss who won the chance tomount the first full-scale assault from the southern side in then-two expeditions in 1952, the first of which came very near tosuccess. It was now "a race against time with the Swiss" andother foreign expeditions to secure permission for furtherattempts on the mountain.45 The choice of leader reflected theconcern in the Everest Committee. Eric Shipton, who preferredsmall expeditions that lived off the country and who had led the1951 reconnaissance, was moved aside so that Colonel John Huntcould organize and lead a climactic British assault on the moun-tain. The 1953 expedition was therefore very much in the tradi-tion of the big, military-style, national-purpose expeditionsmounted since 1921. In the official account of the expedition,Hunt put the enterprise squarely in the tradition of Britishexploration in the heyday of empire when he observed that

441.O.L., L/P&S/12/4244, J. C. Walton, memorandum of conversation with Smythe,28 Aug. 1936; 1VP&S/12/4245, statement by Sir Percy Cox, Daily Telegraph,16 June 1936.

45R.G.S., E.E., box 66, Sir Laurence Kirwan, comments on the introduction tothe Shipton books, 6 Mar. 1986. Kirwan served as secretary to the R.G.S. from 1945to 1975.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



"organizing a major expedition, whether it be to the Himalaya,the polar regions or darkest Africa, is a formidable business".46

The British were finally successful in 1953, and the timing wasexquisitely appropriate for imperial themes, as news of the con-quest arrived in London on the morning of Queen Elizabeth IPscoronation. As we have noted, this led to comparisons with thefirst Elizabethan adventurers; but the evidence in this article hassuggested that such ways of reading the Everest endeavour hadbeen present from the beginning. Black-wood's Magazine describedthe Everest triumph as "a Coronation gift for Her Majesty, anda message to all the world that strength and courage lived on inthe British stock". For those cynics who derided such interpreta-tions of the conquest, Blackwood's had little patience: "The fore-bears of such carpers may have asked the same question whenDrake sailed round the world, when Cook made his voyages,when Scott, a few days after Amundsen, reached the South Pole.The list might be lengthened, but we know the answer: the newElizabethans gave it at the end of May". The Spectator and TheTimes, as we have seen, held forth in the same vein, drawingexplicit parallels between Everest and the historical exploits ofFrancis Drake and the founding venturers of the first Elizabethanempire.47

Such a reading of Everest continued in the spirit of Curzon,Younghusband, Bruce, Hinks and Cox and the other notablesconnected to the R.G.S. and to the Everest Committee since itsinception. Another theme in 1953 — that the success provedsomething about British science and technology — can also betraced back to the origins of the plans to climb Everest. Withinthe Geographical Society there had always been criticism ofclimbing mountains without an accompanying scientific pur-pose.48 As noted earlier, this led to all the early expeditions havinga scientific dimension, as botanists, entomologists, geologists andsurveyors went along. The link was updated and evenstrengthened in some ways in 1953, because getting to the top ofEverest was now presented as a scientific as much as a climbingchallenge. As The Times argued in the wake of the Swiss failure

46 H u n t , Ascent of Everest, p . 2 1 .47 " C o m m e n t " , Blackwood's Mag., cclxxiv (1953) , p . 190; for the c o m m e n t s of the

Spectator and The Times, see n. 1 above.T O . L . , MSS. EUR7F111/183, George Taubman Goldie to Curzon, R.G.S.,

Kensington Gore, London, 7, 29 June 1905.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



in 1952, "in all the history of adventure there can have been fewprizes quite so tantalizingly unattainable as the conquest ofEverest, surrounded as the mountain is by a kind of invisiblebarrier which perhaps only science can demolish".49 The needfor specialized equipment, including oxygen apparatus, scien-tifically designed clothing and specially prepared food packageslay at the root of this view of the Everest challenge.

When Hunt answered questions about the expedition's success,he took pains to emphasize that the intelligent accumulation andapplication of scientific and technical knowledge had been a keyfactor. The Times sounded the same note: "The final assault hasbeen accompanied by long and arduous training; by intense studyin laboratories of the facts observed in action; by careful studyon the part of climbers themselves of the counsel science had togive; and by the daily guidance of the specialists accompanyingthe party". Two months after the climb, the British exhibit atthe International Trade Fair in Vienna featured Everest as thecentre-piece and presented British companies which had madeproducts for the expedition.50 The twin themes of traditionalimperial values and new scientific/technological competency werejoined in the editorial already quoted from the Spectator, whichmade the case that "a nation that can still produce men whoclimb to the top of Everest, who give one example after anotherin Korea of the highest military virtue, and who invent and flythe best passenger aircraft in the world, is certainly not lackingin imagination and flair".51

These celebratory interpretations of the climb's significancewere comforting in the troubled post-war world as Britain'sposition as a great power and her economic future were in doubt.But there were also some problematic developments in 1953which raised questions about this somewhat self-satisfied view-point. The first problem, of course, was that neither of the twoclimbers who reached the top was British. This aspect of thingswas fairly easily dealt with at the time. In the early 1950s, andwith the post-war mood of solidarity, the New Zealander EdmundHillary was placed in the broad category of British Empire-

49 The Times, 25 Ju ly 1952.50 Ibid., 2 , 9, J u n e , 26 Aug . 1953; Daily Telegraph, 17 J u n e 1953. See also H u n t ,

Ascent of Everest, apps. 1-9, pp. 235-87, which provide details on the planning andscientific side.

51 "To the Long Reign", p. 718.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



Commonwealth subject, which indeed was true, and so contrib-uted another imperial dimension. Tenzing's case was moredifficult, and we will turn to that in more detail in a moment,but it is worth noting on this issue that Hunt's emphasis on thesuccess being attributable to a total team effort deflected attentionfrom questions about the precise nationality of the summit rope.52

The troubling problem was Tenzing's place in all this. Thefirst inkling of an alternative reading of the Everest triumphoccurred as the British expedition marched back to the Nepalesecapital, Kathmandu. As the party approached the city, the heroof the moment was not Hillary or Hunt, or any British memberof the expedition, but Tenzing. It was not simply a question ofaccording Tenzing an important role; he was portrayed as thedominant figure in the conquest. Posters were displayed showingthe triumphant and strong Tenzing "on top of the mountainplanting with one hand a Nepalese flag and with the other haulingup an exhausted Hillary to join him on the summit".53 Huntwrote in astonishment to L. P. Kirwan, secretary of the EverestCommittee, that Tenzing "was literally treated as a god".54

British members of the expedition, including Hunt and Hillary,were pushed into the background.55 In his letter to Kirwan, Huntsuggested:

[Tenzing] appears to have been "got at" by local politicians — we arepretty sure the Communist Party is behind it — whose motives were twofold (a) to make use of the Everest success to enhance Nepalese national-ism, particularly at the expense of India (b) to discredit the Britishexpedition as a whole and stir up trouble between Europeans andOrientals.56

Watching these unanticipated developments from Delhi, theacting British high commissioner reported to his masters inLondon that "it was even presented that Tenzing's feat wasessentially a racial triumph of Asian over European".57

52 H u n t was part icularly effective in India in emphasizing the team effort: PublicRecord Office, London (hereafter P . R . O . ) , F . O . 371/106880/F2061/54, P. W. J.Buxton , British High Commission, to Commonwea l th Relat ions Office (confidential),Delh i , 1 July 1953; F . O . 371/106880/F2061/61, G. H . Middle ton to Viscount Swinton,Delh i , 3 July 1953.

53 The Times, 22 June 1953. The Times cor respondent was James Morris .54 R .G .S . , E .E . , box 67 , John H u n t to L. P. Ki rwan , British embassy, K a t h m a n d u ,

23 June 1953.55 The Times, 22 J u n e 1953.56 R.G.S., E.E., box 67, Hunt to Kirwan, 23 June 1953." P.R.O., F.O. 371/106880/F2061/61, Middleton to Swinton, 3 July 1953.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



These images of a powerful Tenzing leading the way to thetop of Everest were transformed when the members of theexpedition arrived back in London. Initially there was some doubtwhether Tenzing would even return with the British team, asHunt had told him that if he came to London, his wife and familycould not travel at the expense of the Everest Committee. Thiscondition led Tenzing to decide not to go. Hunt then worriedthat his non-appearance would be misinterpreted, and changedthe proposal so that Tenzing could visit England "without condi-tions, should [he] desire to do so in a month or two". But thepressure of Tenzing's fame had already pushed things beyondthe careful bounds Hunt was trying to maintain on behalf of theCommittee, as the Daily Express, in Hunt's somewhat ruefulwords, "invited the whole Tenzing party to go to England attheir expense".58 In London Tenzing remained a celebrity, butin the imperial capital a new image of the Sherpa was fashionedquite at odds with that promoted in Kathmandu.

The image in London was of a loyal and likeable Asian naifwho could not have played the leading role assigned to him bythe crowds in Nepal. This naivety (in western eyes) was summedup in newspaper photographs which showed Tenzing happilywearing two wrist-watches. The press reported that Tenzing"appeared somewhat bewildered by his reception" and that "thepuzzled Sherpa" wore "a watch on each wrist". The two-wrist-watch motif became a familiar identifier in stories about Tenzingin these first days in London. The Glasgow Herald, for example,pointed out in its report that Tenzing was "wearing cottonbreeches and his two wrist-watches".59 Tenzing's place began tobe established as the team arrived at London airport. There wasa huge crowd on hand. F. C. Gillam, the press and informationofficer for British Overseas Airways, reported to the RoyalGeographical Society that "I never remember having seen solarge a gathering of Press, radio and film people at LondonAirport — not even on royal occasions".60 As the Pathe film newscrew prepared for its airport interviews, it drew up a list ofquestions for Hunt, Hillary and Tenzing. Hunt and Hillary were

58 R.G.S., E.E., box 67, Hunt to Kirwan, 23 June 1953.MR.G.S., E.E., box 85, Daily Telegraph, 4 July 1953, News Chron., 4 July 1953,

Glasgow Herald, 4 July 1953; cf. Daily Herald, 4 July 1953, Daily Mirror, 4 July 1953,Daily Sketch, 4 July 1953.

60 R.G.S., E.E., box 69, F. C. Gillam to L. P. Kirwan, London airport, 6 July 1953.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



to receive six questions each, including one which lawyers mightcall leading: "What are your comments on the empty argumentswho was first to the top?" (for Hillary), and "What is your viewover the controversy as to who got to the top first?" (for Hunt).Tenzing was to be allotted two questions, neither of which tookup this issue. He was to be asked whether he "would like toclimb Everest again" and about his previous mountaineeringexperience, perhaps to draw out a contrast between Tenzing'stechnical skills and those of the British climbers.61 This questioncertainly had echoes of Hunt's comment earlier in the controversyover whether Hillary or Tenzing had reached the top first, thatTenzing was a good climber only "within the limits of hisexperience".62

Subsequent images accentuated the impression of Tenzing'snaivety and lack of sophistication (by western standards). On3 July, the Evening News described how "Tenzing- shook handswith everyone, including the police". He was also portrayed asawestruck by London: "All my life I have heard of London, nowI want to see it for myself". A Daily Sketch article on 4 July toldof Tenzing "shaking hands with everyone in sight including somescores of policemen" and noted again that "he displayed hisbright new wrist-watches to all", while, as we have already seen,the Daily Telegraph remarked on his apparent bewilderment athis reception. The News Chronicle reported that when the teamwas received at Buckingham Palace and the Queen shook handswith Tenzing "he beamed at her and bowed. The Duke pattedhis shoulder and said: 'Well done' ".63 The cumulative impact ofthese news stories and accompanying photographs was completelyopposite to the image of Tenzing first given life at Kathmandu.There Tenzing had been a strong, heroic figure, depicted onbanners as the dominant actor in the Everest drama. In Londonhe was admired and praised, but kept in his place as a supportingfigure who deserved a pat on the back. Tenzing's simplicity, his

61 Ibid., notes on discussion at London airport regarding arrangements for receptionof British Everest expedition, Pathe News list of questions for Hillary, Hunt andTenzing.

"P .R .O . , F.O. 371/106880/F2061/61, Middleton to Swinton, 3 July 1953. Huntwas quoted as saying that Tenzing "was not the equal of more experienced Alpinemountaineers" and emphasizing that the climb was a "team success": R.G.S., E.E.,box 85, Daily Mail, 16 June 1953.

63 R.G.S., E.E., box 85, Evening News, 3 July 1953, Evening Standard, 4 July 1953,Daily Sketch, 4 July 1953, Daily Telegraph, 4 July 1953, Daily Mail, 17 July 1953.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



awe, his clothes and his two wrist-watches all conveyed the imageof an Asian innocent who could not have played the leading rolein the conquest of Everest. The wrist-watches were emblematicof the ingenious and technically advanced western world whoseplanning and know-how had been the basis for success, a worldin which Tenzing was a bewildered child.64

A standard orientalist interpretation of all this may seem inorder at this stage of the narrative and analysis. It could well beproposed that the two-wrist-watch Tenzing was invented inLondon to counter the heroic image of the Sherpa blazoned inKathmandu, and so undermine any possibility that this Asianclimber could capture the world recognition the British had cometo expect since they had first tried to climb Everest in 1921-2.But in this case the evidence will not bear the weight of theory.To begin with, the controversy over Tenzing had as much to dowith rivalry between Nepal and India as between Asia andEurope. The Nepalese opposition nationalists who were behindthe Kathmandu demonstrations on the climber's behalf wishedto claim him as one of their own as part of their campaign againstwhat they saw as excessive Indian influence in Nepal. For theirpart, nationalist commentators in India wished to claim Tenzingas an Indian because, like many Sherpas, he had spent most ofhis life in Darjeeling, where since the late nineteenth centurySherpas had lived and been recruited for Himalayan expeditions.65

It is perhaps worth pointing out in this context that a recentstudy of Sherpa culture and history has argued that the presenceof the British in Darjeeling, and the wage economy thus madeavailable to Sherpas from the 1860s onwards, helped the Sherpasresist the tax pressures from the Rana regime in Kathmandu,accumulate enough money to maintain a good deal of autonomy

64 In has recently been observed that "from 1884 to 1913, Greenwich Mean Timecolonized the globe": Peter Kemp, "Resurrection or Decadence? Guides to the Post-War British Novel", Times Lit. Suppl., 12 Nov. 1993, p. 25. During the 1924 Everestexpedition, after bad weather had driven the party back to the base camp near theRongbuk monastery, they were received and blessed by the head lama. While theysat down "the whole damn lot of coolies came in turn doing three salaams . . . thenpresented their offerings and were similarly blessed. After that Norton presented apicture on silk worth £10 — and a wrist watch to the lama": Irvine Diaries, ed. Carr,p. 102. Clearly there is a lot more to be said on the significance of wrist-watches ascultural message-bearers.

65 P.R.O., F.O. 371/106880/F2061/47, Ambassador Christopher Summerhayes toForeign Office (private and confidential), Kathmandu, 24 June 1953.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



in their local region of Solo-Khumbu, protect their culture andeven endow and build new monasteries.66

Beyond the Nepalese-Indian dimension to the original contro-versy, it is significant to note that Tenzing was encouraged to goto London by the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, andhis minister of education, Maulana Azad. "You should know",reported an official of the British high commission in Delhi, "thatTenzing's decision to fly to London with the British members ofthe expedition is the result of considerable pressure, not onlyfrom the Nepalese Ambassador here but from leading Indiansincluding Maulana Azad and Nehru himself".67 The trip toLondon, therefore, cannot be presented as a device engineeredby the British. Indeed, as we have seen, it was initially doubtfulthat Tenzing would come back with the party at all. Finally,throughout the receptions in India, Hunt, sometimes speaking influent Hindustani, took pains to emphasize the team aspect ofthe climb, to include Tenzing, and to portray the entire endeavouras "a joint achievement of Britons and Asians".68

A one-dimensional orientalist interpretation will also not workbecause Tenzing did not remain encapsulated in the child-like,two-wrist-watch image. Interestingly, he escaped it even withinthe domestic British setting, as his visit was used to commentupon political and social changes taking place in post-war Britain.For example, the News Chronicle ran "The Tensing Story" overseveral days and strayed far from the Everest climb. Tenzing'srole was seen as symptomatic of the breaking down of classbarriers that had long been part of British life. Up to this time,ran the argument, a line had been drawn between Asian andEuropean, just as it had been between social classes in Britain.That feature of society "sprang from the British prejudice thatit was right and proper that amateur cricketers should leave thepavilion by one gate and the professionals by another, that thereshould be separate messes for officers and other ranks, that Jackwas as good as his master — at a distance". The culminatingpiece in the series came on 7 July, and essentially had nothing todo with Everest: Tenzing's story was run as a means of endorsing

66 She r ry B. O r t n e r , High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of SherpaBuddhism (Princeton, 1989), pp. 24, 105-9, 159-67.

67 P.R.O., F.O. 371/106880/F2061/54, Buxton to Commonwealth Relations Office(confidential), Delhi, 1 July 1953.

68 Ibid.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



change in Britain. "Better times are dawning for Tensing", ranthe commentary. "Poverty is behind him. He is to have a houseof his own, paid for by public subscription in India. He will neveragain have to ask for loans for his children's education . . . Hehimself has entered the Government service as director of its newMountaineering Institute in Darjeeling . . .".69 In this manner,Tenzing's celebrity status in the London of July 1953 was used,not as marker of Asian backwardness, but as an opportunity bycritics of the pre-1945 system in Britain to laud governmentsupport for housing and education and the anticipated end of theclass exclusiveness which was deemed to have been damaging toBritish society. Tenzing was used to welcome the emerging worldof Butskelhsm in 1950s Britain.

Beyond the British setting, in the international arena, Tenzingalso escaped categorization as a dependent and secondary figure,a loyal Asian native who followed the orders and footsteps of thesahibs. His visit to France and Switzerland, where he metRaymond Lambert, his friend from the 1952 Swiss expedition,enabled him to be seen as genuine climber in his own right andequal to Europeans, like Lambert, as a public figure.70 His rela-tionship with the Swiss and French climbers, empty as it was ofimperial and Raj associations, is a further obstacle to an orientalistreading, at least in the stereotyped sense of posing a somewhatmonolithic dichotomy between the West and Asia. None of thisis to deny the obvious point that the entire relationship of Britainto India, and the matter of Everest within that larger relationship,are pervaded by the unconscious ideological models that EdwardSaid and other scholars have so illuminatingly delineated: clearly,many of the images of Tenzing in London have multiple oriental-ist resonances in terms of western power versus Asian weakness,western sophistication versus Asian simplicity. It is rather tosuggest that derivative scholarship often deploys one-dimensionalapplications of such scholarly constructs as orientalism, and thatwe have here a case that is much more interesting once alternativereadings are brought out.

The major vehicle of Tenzing's escape from the subservient,two-wrist-watch image was the Sherpa's own account of his life,

WR.G.S., E.E., box 85, Geoffrey Murray, "The Tensing Story", News Chron., 3,4, 6, 7 July 1953 (quotations from 6 and 7 July).

70 Tenzing Norgay, After Everest: An Autobiography by Tenzing Norgay Sherpa, asTold to Malcolm Barnes (London, 1977), pp. 45-6, 81, 166-7, 170.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



in the course of which he made a surprising critique of some ofthe British values and attitudes he had discovered, not only duringthe 1953 expedition, but in the course of a lifelong associationwith British and other European climbers in the Himalayas. Inthe section of his autobiography devoted to Everest, Tenzingcontrasted the treatment of the Sherpas by the Swiss in 1952 withthat received from the British in the following year. "There weredifficulties almost straight away", he noted, beginning with thehousing of the Sherpas in a garage, formerly a stable, in theBritish embassy grounds. These quarters had no toilet facilitiesand the Sherpas expressed their displeasure by using the road infront of the garage as a latrine, a protest which "made theEmbassy staff really angry". On the march into base camp,Sherpas complained of their separate food allocation from theBritish team members and the decision not to allow the Sherpasthe customary right of retaining used clothing and equipmentonce the expedition had ended.

These incidents led Tenzing to ruminate about the relationsbetween the Sherpas and the British and what this revealed aboutthe latter. He thought that the Sherpas' long experience of inter-action with Europeans, going back over fifty years, gave then-observations a unique authority. In his view, the imperial mental-ity was at the root of the difficulties. He wrote:

It is still true that the English in general are more reserved and formalthan the men of most other countries whom I have known; and especiallythis is so, I think, with people not of their own race. Perhaps this isbecause they have so long been rulers in the East, or perhaps it is onlysomething in their own nature. But it is a thing which we Sherpas havehad much chance to observe, since we have climbed, in recent years, withmen of so many nations. With the Swiss and the French I had been treatedas a comrade, an equal, in a way that is not possible for the British. Theyare kind men; they are brave; they are fair and just, always. But always,too, there is a line between them and the outsider, between sahib andemployee, and to such Easterners as we Sherpas, who have experiencedthe world of "no line", this can be a difficulty and a problem.71

It is possible that this critique was coaxed out of Tenzing byJames Ramsey Ullman, the American mountain writer whohelped him compose his autobiography, with his commonplaceAmerican distaste for British imperialism. Hunt, and L. P.Kirwan at the Royal Geographical Society, certainly thought thatUllman was not to be trusted on this score. Kirwan wrote a

" Tenzing Norgay, Man of Everest: The Autobiography of Tenzing, Told to JamesRamsey Ullman (London, 1955), pp. 224-5, 230-2, 234-5.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



worried letter to Hunt in July 1954 explaining that he had had along talk with Ullman and had been:

appalled at the mass of incorrect information he seemed to have acquiredfrom Tenzing [, which] mainly gives the impression of the terrific effortsthat Tenzing had to make to stop the arrogant British from makingcomplete fools of themselves but how he finally succeeded in getting usto the top of the mountain.72

But this sharply negative portrayal of the British is not the onepresented in the published version. Tenzing praises Hunt and theexpedition's team effort, and makes sure that the readers knowthat it was Hillary who led the final summit pitch.73 The fact thatTenzing was so fair to the British achievement suggests that thecomments he left in did indeed reflect his considered view of theimpact of the imperial experience on English attitudes towardsthe Sherpas.

Ill

The preceding analysis shows how an apparently autonomousevent, the climbing of Everest in 1953, was rich in symbolicsignificance. The entire sequence of Everest expeditions from1921 to 1953 was a great signal sender in British culture. Thisreading of the Everest conquest, and its meanings for the British,complements the recent cultural approach to the British empireassociated with the series edited by John MacKenzie and pub-lished by Manchester University Press, particularly in showingthe persistence of imperial tropes into the years after World WarII and the ways in which aspects of British nationalism and culturewere influenced by the empire throughout the period from the1870s to the 1950s.74 The approach taken here also connects withmore general scholarly work on the construction of the Britishidentity since the eighteenth century. In a suggestive article,Linda Colley has proposed that the British nationalism whichemerged in the struggles against France between 1688 and 1815

72R.G.S., E.E., box 67, L. P. Kirwan to John Hunt, R.G.S., Kensington Gore,London, 12 July 1954. .

73 Tenzing, Man of Everest, pp. 233, 239, 267-8.74 John MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Opinion,

1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984); J. MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture(Manchester, 1985); J. MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and the Natural World(Manchester, 1990); Mangan, Games Ethic and Imperialism; Mangan, Athleticism inthe Victorian and Edwardian Public School.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from



was sustained in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentiethcenturies by denning Britishness against the "otherness" of over-seas cultures, opportunities for which were readily available inthe multitude of imperial encounters round Britain's colonialworld.75 The Everest saga provides an apt illustration of this. Asthe British organized expeditions and revealed their thinkingabout Everest, from Curzon's ruminations in 1899 to the finalsuccess in 1953, they constantly returned to themes about beingBritish: the British were uniquely skilled and experienced asadventurers and explorers, they had a particular expertise indealing with native peoples and earning their respect, theybrought useful scientific knowledge to hitherto unenlightenedparts of the world, they handled adversity and even failure withfortitude, and used such moments (Scott's death in the Antarctic,Mallory's death on Everest) to heighten national resolve. WhenNorton learned of the public reaction to Mallory's death in thenewspapers, he wrote to Younghusband: "the stiffening of publicopinion exactly confirms what I anticipated: it is so typical of ourattitude as a people".76 Linked to these commonly acceptedunderstandings about being British was a faith that such nationalinstitutions as the Royal Geographical Society, the officer class inthe British and Indian armies and the public school system wouldcontinue to produce leaders with the requisite character forachieving success in far-flung places.

A master historical narrative was built on the foundations ofsuch a view of the British position in the world. This can be seenin the easy manner in which continuities between Drake, Cookand modern exemplars of the spirit of imperial adventure wereturned to throughout the 1899-1953 engagement with Everest.The Royal Geographical Society and the Everest Committee triedto maintain control of the Everest narrative, partly, to be sure,for practical fund-raising reasons (to retain the money from film

75 She has written of the need to explore "the ways in which Britons dennedthemselves against a real or imaginary Other, against the outside": Linda Colley,"Britishness and Otherness: An Argument", Jl Brit. Studies, xxxi (1992), p. 311; seealsoL. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992). Throughoutthe period of the Everest expeditions, the British denned themselves against mountainand landscape, against the local peoples who helped to carry their equipment, againstTibetans and Nepalese who thought that gods lived at the top of Everest and againstreal and potential interlopers into a British world of adventure and exploration —one within which a particular definition of Britishness was to be validated throughthe "conquest" of the last great geographical challenge facing humans.

761.O.L., MSS. EUR/F197/1 IS, Norton to Younghusband, Darjeeling, 2 Aug. 1924.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from


TENZDSfG'S TWO WRIST-WATCHES 197

rights and The Times contract) but also to keep the Everest storyappropriate to the issues of national identity involved. The wholething must be kept, as Arthur Hinks insisted at the very outset,"on a high level".77 All the official accounts from 1921 to 1953,therefore, presented the expeditions in an appropriately seriousvoice because of their perceived national significance. Tenzingcaught the essence of this orientation when he remarked of Hunt'sbook on 1953 that "his is an official account, he is writing as anEnglishman for Englishmen".78

This is where Tenzing's significance comes in. His voice wasthe first challenge to the master narrative written by Englishmenfor Englishmen about the Everest adventure. Sherpas had beenparticipating in Himalayan expeditions since the 1890s, but theyhad no voice to narrate their experiences and views untilTenzing's celebrity status allowed him to move on to the worldstage. Tenzing provided an alternative reading to the introspect-ive national narrative which had informed British writing about,and perceptions of, the Everest expeditions. In this context, theculminating moment for the British on Everest, the final conquestof the world's highest mountain on the borderlands of theirformer empire in India, signified the end of the era of unchal-lenged imperial narratives. Tenzing's entry into the picturemarked the transition from the old imperial world, in whichbrave natives worked loyally for the British sahibs, to the newworld in which previously subaltern figures like Tenzing becamecelebrities in their own right and began to communicate theirhistories in their own voices. Tenzing was a harbinger of the newsocial, cultural, political and nationalist forces that were under-mining the imperial world-view that had seemed such an enduringfeature of the British identity for Younghusband and Curzonwhen they had first discussed the climbing of Everest at theViceregal Lodge in Simla.

Michigan State University Gordon T. Stewart

77 R .G.S . , E .E . , box 3 , Ar thu r H inks to A. F . Wollaston, R .G.S . , Kensington Gore ,London , 8 Sept. 1921.

78 Tenz ing , Man of Everest, p . 230.

at Jawaharlal N



Dow

nloaded from


Documents

Past and Present 1995 Stewart 170 97