11) Ariate vs. Pp ( dead man not competent to testify as the place was not illuminated and attack was from behind)Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The dead man/declarant must have been competent to testify had he survived. “The victim was attacked under cover of darkness and he was attacked from behind by his assailant. The crime happened along the road. Now it was claimed that when the victim was attacked the place was not properly illuminated and that the assailant attacked him from behind. After the attack, one of the victim’s family members rushed to the victim and the victim allegedly made a dying declaration identifying the alleged assailant. The victim died. During the trial the witness who heard the declaration testified. But it was established during the trial that the place was not properly lighted and the assailant came from behind. So the SC said if the assailant came from behind then obviously the victim was not in a position to identify the assailant. So even if the victim were alive, even if he survives and testifies, his testimony would not have had any value at all because he was not in a position to observe or identify the assailant. And so the SC said one of the requisites for dying declaration is: the victim, had he been alive, should himself be competent to testify. Otherwise, no dying declaration. (You can cross-examine him but not as to the truth of the declaration. Maybe you can cross-examine him as to the circumstances of him hearing the declaration. You can assail his perception on that respect. Because he can claim that “I was there when the dying declaration was made; I heard it myself.”

21)Ferrer v. de Ynchausti (daybook content disproves Rosa as child of deceased – admissible)Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. Isabel married twice and begot 2 and 3 children respectively When she died one of her supposed children Rosa(1 st marriage) died . Heirs of Rosa claimed latter was left ouf from the estate of Isabel. Other children denied Rosa was child of Isabel, presented evidence : a Day Book kept and prepared by brother of Rosa. Entry tending to prove that Rosa was merely delivered to Isabel of unknown parents. Ramon Jr. dead already so def presented Joaquin plus the day book. Held: The supreme court said that even if it is hearsay, it is admissible under Sec. 40, 2nd part. The day book partakes of the nature of a family book or chart which falls under the same category as family bible, family portrait or the so called family possessions.

22)In Re Mallari (Lic to practice law cancelled coz not Fil Cit. Presented witness testifying common rep that his lola not married so not chinese)IN MATTERS OF GENERAL OR PUBLIC INTEREST. He is a lawyer. He passed the bar. After sometime of practicing law, his license to practice law was cancelled by the SC because the SC found him to be NOT a Filipino citizen. His parents were found to be Chinese nationals. Under the Constitution, only Filipino citizens can practice law. Years after, Atty. Mallari moved to reopen the case. He introduced newly discovered evidence. One of the pieces of evidence introduced by Atty. Mallari was consisted of testimony of residents of the same community where his parents resided and these witnesses uniformly testify based on common reputation that the mother of Atty. Mallari’s father meaning, the lola of Atty. Mallari was unmarried. Meaning, she was not married to anyone and that she was a tagalog-speaking woman. Proceeding from the finding that she was a tagalog-speaking woman, the SC concluded that she must be a Filipino. The SC deduced and made a conclusion that she must be a Filipino. Now under the Constitution, a child born to a Filipino mother or father is a natural born Filipino. So the license of Atty. Mallari was reinstated because of Common Reputation. Those witnesses of course had no personal knowledge of the citizenship but because of the existing reputation in the community to the effect that his lola was unmarried and was a tagalog-speaking woman, the SC took it to mean that indeed the mother of Florencio Mallari’s father was a Filipino and therefore Atty. Mallari’s father was a Filipino and Atty. Mallari also is a Filipino.

28) Wallen Maritime v. NLRC, (For assaulting officer, Joselito and Julios terminated. Log book not official record)

Joselito and Julius were terminated by petitioner on the ground of assaulting a superior officer, who is an apprentice of a ship. After returning to the Philippines, Joselito filed complaints for illegal dismissal with the POEA. POEA and NLRC ruled that the dismissal was illegal and without just and valid cause. The certified true copy of the official logbook was not given weight because the alleged entries therein were only handpicked and copied from the official logbook of the M/V Fortuna. There is no way of verifying the truth of the entries and they really appeared on the dates mentioned. The pages in the official logbook where they actually appeared should have been reproduced. There were no other documentary evidence to support the alleged official logbook like a police report by Japanese authorities. The copy of the alleged official logbook was not authenticated. Even if the logbook were to true, Joselito was not accorded due process. No record of warnings or investigations conducted were presented. Petitioner assailed the decision of the POEA and NLRC in not admitting and giving weight to the ship captain’s logbook. SC ruled that the ship captain's logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head. A copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule. For the exception to apply, an investigation of the incident which led to the dismissal should be conducted before dismissal. Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook should be supported by the facts gathered at the investigation. In this case, because no investigation was conducted by the ship captain before repatriating private respondent, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified and authenticated lest an injustice result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in question. Moreover, a copy of the official entry from the logbook itself should be presented . In this case, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of documents. What was offered in evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from what could be the logbook because by their format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.

29)Northwest Airlines v. Chiong, (bumped off so lost job opp. No show based on Passenger manifest. Entrant not shown to be dead or unable to testify)This involves an overseas contract worker who was called to fly abroad to perform a job abroad. And so on the designated date of his flight he went to the airport and approached the check-in counter only to be refused boarding. He missed his flight and he missed his job opportunity. And so Mr. Chiong filed a breach of contract against the airlines. By way of defense, the airlines argued that Mr. Chiong was a no-show during his flight. So there was factual issue of whether or not Mr. Chiong really arrived at the airport and approached the check-in counter. Two conflicting factual versions. During the trial, the airlines in order to prove that Mr. Chiong did not show up at a designated time and place, presented a passenger manifest and a passenger name record of the airlines and this was testified to by the supervisor on duty. Of course the entrant, those officers and employees responsible in the recording of the entries in the passenger manifest and passenger name record were not presented in court. Someone else testified other than the entrant and therefore it’s hearsay. When objected on this ground, the airline company argued that it is an exception to hearsay under Entries in the Course of Business. SC ruled against the airline. SC said for this exception to apply, the proponent must show that the entrant is either dead or unable to testify which the airline failed to prove in this case. There was no showing that the employees and officers responsible to the recording of the entries in the passenger manifest and passenger name record were dead or unable to testify.

33)Barcelon v. Com. of BIR (tax def, B said prescribe. BIR not yet. NOA served to B, presented their record custodian- hearsay no personal knowledge)This involved an action initiated by the BIR against Barcelon Roxas Securities for collection of deficiency income tax. By way of defense, Barcelon Roxas Securities argued that the BIR’s action for deficiency income tax has already prescribed. In an effort to prove that the action has not yet prescribed, BIR claimed that the notice of the assessment was served on Barcelon Roxas on certain date through registered mail. To prove this allegation, BIR presented their record custodian who testified to the BIR’s record book which contains the list of the names of the taxpayers, the nature and the amount of their liabilities, the date, the notices of the assessments were made and so on and so forth. This was identified by the record custodian. Now objected to under hearsay evidence rule, BIR argued that it was admissible hearsay under official record.

The SC rejected the argument holding that for entries in the official record to be admissible, it’s important that the entrant of the entries must have either personal knowledge of the facts therein stated or acquired the facts through official information . But it was established that the entrant, the record keeper, had no personal knowledge of the facts therein stated particularly the fact that the notice of assessment was served and the date it was served and it was established that he was not the one who caused the mailing of the notice of assessment. SC said, it could have been different if the post office testified as to the fact of the mailing. So since the entrant, the one responsible for the recording of this entry record book of the BIR, acquired the information neither from personal knowledge nor from official information the evidence was inadmissible.

36.Tan v. CA,When the witness is not dead but unable to testify, SC said that the unavailability of the witness to testify must be due to some compelling grave cause that makes him unavailable to be present his testimony. Grave case may include physical infirmity, mental inability, and old age resulting to loss of memory. In this case, mere refusal of the witness to testify is not a justification for invocation of this exception. The fact that he turn hostile is not a justification. Also his mere refusal. These witnesses can be compelled to testify through service of subpoena. It must be due to some grave case that disabled him to testify again.

38)Gen. Avelino Razon v. Tagitis, Involving a petition for the issuance of writ of Amparo which involves petition for production of victims of enforced disappearance. The respondents are the law enforcement agency of the government, usually the military. So given the nature of the proceedings, the SC took noted to the natural tendencies of the witnesses to not testify against the military So the SC said that in this kind or proceeding, evidence which is otherwise inadmissible may be admissible as long as the totality of the evidence will result to a reasonable basis for the court to act on the writ of Amparo. In this case, the evidence which was proposed to be admitted, was a triple hearsay. Source of the information submitted it to someone else. And this someone else related to another. And to another. The SC said that this info is triple hearsay but because of the nature of the writ, may be admissible. So long considered along with other admissible evidence, so as to satisfy the court of the basis of the grant of writ.

39)Mallari vs. People

40)People v. Estenzo, (counsel of accused proposed procedure that they will file only affidavits subject to cross, prosecutor opposed and SC agrees with Pros- testimony must be oral an in court)

Accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted the present petition. Should the said procedure be allowed? SC ruled that the procedure should NOT be allowed. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. SECTION 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing.- In superior courts the testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all questions put to the witness and his answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled must be stated, or if a witness declines to answer a question put, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made by the official stenographer or stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings. Also, it enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.. Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness in testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.

41) People v. Molo, Automatic review of the death sentence with imposed on September 3, 1976 upon Dominador Molo for the murder of Venancio Gapisa on 9 April 1976 at Sitio Dacotan, Barrio Tambac, Romblon. Venancio was asleep when Molo hacked him. DOA hospital due to hemmorage caused by such. TC convicted Molo based on the testimony of Gapista corroborated by testimonies of Alejandro Gapisa and Roman Mangaring about the antemrtem statements of victim in identifying the accused. Molo recidivist so qualified. Molo now wants acquittal because according to him no proof beyond reasonable doubt. he argues that while proof of motive is unnecessary if the evidence of Identification is convincing —there is, he claims, a total want of motive on appellant's part, as admitted by the victim's wife and son. 2. Identification of the appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. , Molo contends that his Identity as the assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt, because of — (a) alleged inconsistencies and incredible assertions in Simeona's testimony; (b) physical conditions which rendered it impossible for her to recognize Molo; (c) her alleged admission that she pointed to Molo as the assailant because he was a hated criminal in their locality; and (d) that the so-called dying declarations should not have been accorded credence, because the victim could not have Identified his assailant. 1. WON there was proof of motive on Molo’s part. Motives need not be shown where there is positive identification by wife and deceased himself. 2. WON Molo’s identity was properly established. WON the inconsistencies between Simeona's statement given to the police and her testimony in court weakens the credibility of her testimony. Re the contention that his Identity as assailant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

(a) That there are inconsistencies and incredible assertions in Simeona's testimony. . Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of material consequence as to affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses

(b) (b) That conditions rendered it impossible for Simeona to recognize accused-appellant because the banana plants obstructed the light cast by the moon. - Simeona had no difficulty in recognizing the accused, considering that their house was only elevated by two steps and at the time she saw him through the dilapidated burl wall he was already at the foot of the stairs.

(c) (c) That Simeona pointed to the accused as the killer because he was a hated criminal in the locality. No basis(d) Re the dying declarations. Appellant claims that the same should not be accorded credence because the victim could not have recognized his assailant,

since as testified by Simeona he was asleep when attacked. Again this is inaccurate. – only at the beginniings tageIt appears that Molo is an incorrigible criminal with clearly anti-social proclivities against which the community has the need if not the right, to defend itself. Where, as in this case, the reformative end of punishment seems to have failed in amending his criminal tendencies — the imposition of the supreme penalty, is not only justified by the facts of this case, but is required as a measure of social defense. Judgment affirmed.

42. Ysmael v. Hashim, 48 Phil. (18 March 1927)Defendant. Hashim executed a chattel mortgage in favor of said plaintiff; defendant failed to pay and so the chattel mortgage was foreclosed and sold; Defendant Hashim has been indebted to the Hashim Commercial & Trading Company, Ltd., a limited co-partnership; that the plaintiff has demanded payment from the defendants and now asks judgment against them. The plaintiff also prayed for a writ of attachment of the property of the defendants, which prayer was granted. Hashim admits all of the allegations of the complaint and consents to the rendition of the judgment inconformity therewith. The defendant Afife AbdoCheyban denies all other allegations contained in the complaint and set up as a special defense that the action is the result of a conspiracy between Hashim and his relations, the stockholders is Juan Ysmael & Co.,Inc., to defraud her of the alimony granted her in a civil case. She also alleges that she has suffered damages in the sum of P20,000.- CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount demanded under the first cause of action, but dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show that the credit upon which said cause of action is based had been legally assigned to it.Issues: WON the trial court erred in prohibiting appellant from inquiring into the details of the account set forth In Exhibit 3 and in preventing defendant and appellant from presenting proofs in support of the allegations of her answer and special defenses.WON the trial court erred in refusing to receive the testimony of the defendant N. T. Hashim, that of A. T. Hashim, and that of K. N.Hemady in the former action. RULING1. YES The court below undoubtedly erred in denying the defendant-appellant the opportunity to inquire into the sources of the entries found in the plaintiff's books of account in relation to the indebtedness of the defendants; the fact that such sources might have been examined in civil case No. 19569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot be regarded as a bar to a reasonable inquiry into the character of the debt in the present case. The issues in the two cases are entirely different; the former case dealt with the validity of a chattel mortgage, while in the present case, we are dealing with the amount of the defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiff. For much the same reasons, the defendant-appellant should have been permitted to present evidence in support of her special defense of conspiracy. In an action upon a book account, the defendant debtor should be given the opportunity, if he so desires, to inquire into the source of the entries found in the plaintiff's books of account in relation to the indebtedness. 2. NO The defendant offered in evidence testimony given in an earlier case by members of the plaintiff firm. In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to the action or their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the laying of a foundation and without the witnesses having testified in the case at bar. But the purpose of the offer of the testimony was evidently to impeach the testimony of the same witnesses in the present case and if so, a foundation should have been laid by calling the attention of the witnesses to the former statements so as to give them opportunity to explain before the statements were offered in evidence.

43. People v. Resabal, 50 Phil. 780 (1927)Facts: In the early morning of April 25, 1926, one Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte, form the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung, as appears from the death certificate. Hence, a criminal case for murder was filed against the accused. The trial court ruled against the accused and adjudged that he is guilty of murder. However, the accused alleges that the trial court erred in not ignoring Glicerio Orit's testimony, and in not acquitting him on the ground of reasonable doubt.Glicerio Orit testified that on the morning of April 25, 1926, the accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter, and on arriving at said house, the accused went into the ground, approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a half in height, opened it and looked in. At that moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of 15 brazas heard an explosion. Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz, to the effect that early in the morning of that day he was awakened by the noise of an explosion and saw his uncle Primo Ordiz vomiting blood and unable to speak. Issue:Whether or not Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution, and because of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial. Ruling: We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the Government, does not prevent this witness from telling the truth in this case, especially in the absence of proof showing the interest he might possibly have in testifying against the accused. Neither is the apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused.   The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony. Thus, the prosecution proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused.

44)People v. Hon. Rivera ( Arson. Witness Lee was asked to be recalled but cannot be rep so TC ordered testimony be stricken off record)Wilfredo Sembrano is charged of arson, it is the prosecution's theory that he wilfully caused the fire in the early morning of May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed the second and third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by Juanita L. Tan, Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability was Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath. LEE testified on DIRECT examination, that he saw Sembrano run out of the VIP room where the fire started and refused to heed LEE’s call for stop when he tried to stop him. Lee took the witness stand again on April 26, 1987 during which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect examination, was again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step down. 2 Months after LEE’ s testimony before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense counsel was substituted by a new counsel Atty. Eduardo Rodriguez. Who moved for the recall of Benjamin on the ground that there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded (sic) by the other defense counsel who conducted cross. TC granted. The prosecution failed to produce Benjamin, already exerted all their efforts in producing BENJAMIN LEE, These efforts met with no success. Lee terminated emp and moved elsewhere. Pro moved to dispense recall but denied. TC ordered testimony of Lee be stricken off record. ISSUE: WON: The RTC gravely abused its discretion in allowing the recall of BENJAMIN LEE in the present case . Yes.The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness. In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on nothing more than said movant's general claim that certain questions — unspecified, it must be stressed — had to be asked. In doing so, it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously, and gravely abused its discretion.2.WON: The RTC gravely abused its discretion in striking out the testimony of BENJAMIN LEE out of the records of the case . Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this effect by the defense and thus without according the prosecution a prior opportunity to show why the striking out should not be decreed. More importantly, the striking out was directed without any showing whatever by the defense of the indispensability of further cross-examination, what it was that would have been elicited by further cross-examination rendering valueless all that the witness had previously stated. It should be stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination and recross-examination by former counsel of the accused Sembrano. Obviously the latter was satisfied that there had been sufficient cross-examination of the witness. Absence of cross-examination may not therefore be invoked as ground to strike out Lee's testimony (as being hearsay). And there is no showing whatever in this case that it was the prosecution that placed the witness beyond the reach of the Court, much less of the expected nature or tenor of his additional testimony which, because not presented, would necessarily cause the evidence earlier given by Lee to become hearsay or otherwise incompetent, and therefore, amenable to being stricken from the record.

45)Bartolome v. IAC, (Ancient Docs -3rd req missing so not ancient. So must be proven by competent witness not Dominador)

The land in question was first declared as his by Epitacio Batara under a tax declaration. Epitacio married Maria Gonzales and they begot 2 children: Catalina and Pedro. Pedro died without an issue while Catalina married Bartolome and they begot 5 children, one of which is Resurreccion. They all left Laoag entrusting the lot to their cousin, Doroteo Bartolome. Sometime after, a cadastral proceeding was instituted and Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Barnabe, filed a claim in such Cadastral claim claiming ownership over the lot in question through inheritance from Doroteo. Likewise, Resurreccion filed an answer in the same case claiming ownership thereto by inheritance from her Grandfather and Grandmother, Epitacio and Maria Gonzales. Eventually, the case was without progress and they both migrated to different places thus both leaving and entrusting the property to Maria Bartolome, the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome. Thereafter, Maria Bartolome filed a motion to admit intervention alleging that she and her co-heirs were excluded by Ursula in the latter’s claim of the property. But Ursula filed a motion to amend her answer claiming that the property was absolutely owned by her by virtue of inheritance from her husband Bernabe. To buttress her claim, she presented in 1983, 3 Deeds of Sale; one of which appeared to be executed in 1917. The RTC held that the lots found in the Deeds of Sale presented were defective as the vendors were not real owners. IAC, however, reversed the RTC and held that the deeds of sale presented by Ursula were ancient documents and that Ursula was in continuous possession of the lot. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4. RULING: No, the provisions on ancient documents are NOT applicable in the instant case because the element “unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion” is absent in the instant case as the 4th page of Exhibit 4, which allegedly contained the signatures of Maria Gonzales and herein Ursula, were lost during the Japanese occupation. And as it is held, an incomplete document is akin to, if not worse than, a document with altered contents. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: "SEC. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given." Herein, the first 2 requirements are present but the third one lacking. Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. However, the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents. Thus, all these negate the conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient document. Necessarily, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 do not fall within the purview of Section 21. The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same must be excluded. Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would substantially be infirm. Under Article 834 of the old Civil Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, "shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment." And, until it had been ascertained by means of the liquidation of the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the conjugal property remained after all the partnership obligations and debts had been paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could not assert any claim of right or title in or to the community property which was placed in the exclusive possession and control of the husband as administrator thereof. Hence, in the absence of proof that the estate of Epitacio Batara had been duly settled, Maria Gonzales had no right to sell not even a portion of the property subject of Exhibit 4.aThe eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square meters is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Epitacio Batara who are herein represented by Resurreccion Bartolome while the remaining area of Lot No. 11165 is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome.

46) Aznar v. Citibank, 519 SCRA 287 (28 March 2007)Petitioner Aznar, a known businessman, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank. On July 17,1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left for their Asian tour. The plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his groups were purchased using his credit card. During their tour, Aznar used his credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, but the said credit card was not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards. On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour.He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card.To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card.To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case and On Novembe 25, 1998, Aznar’s motion for reconsideration was granted by Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City.Citibank filed an appeal with the CA. On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal.The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474 was set aside and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City was reinstated. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic document and constitutes electronic evidence. Held: The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored. Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" . As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner. While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the supreme court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said suffering.

47)Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro,Respondent, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro filed an application for land registration of two parcels of land. This action was opposed to by the Heirs of Vicente claiming absolute ownership and seeking the dismissal for the registration over the parcels of land and the commercial building thereon and improvements. Respondent alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased the subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Sale dated December 9, 1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. She also presented as evidence an Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of Pacifico.Petitioners claim on the one hand that the lots in question were owned by their father, Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots since 1906.MTC: Dismissed. Teodoro won.

RTC: Affirmed in toto. CA: Dismissed. “…had the Court intended to include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19”ISSUE: WON the certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court—certification by the consul, v-consul etc. RULING: The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. (SC agreed with CA) PETITIONERS assailed that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court, does not include documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit forum shopping.Petitioners relied on the Lopes case invalidating an uncertified notarial document. The rule applied in Lopez, which was decided prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,[35] was Section 25, Rule 132, to wit: Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record - An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, xxx the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25, Rule 132 became Section 24, Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the deletion of the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein," which was substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19." Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides: Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are private. In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made applicable to all public or official records without any distinction because the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear under Section 24, Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132. Petitioners question the validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the CA, RTC and MTC found, these documents are all notarized. It is settled that a notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject documents will not suffice to overcome the presumption of their regularity considering that they are all notarized. To overthrow such presumption of regularity, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, which petitioners failed to present. ON LATE FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF NON FORUM SHOPPING ISSUE: (this is not under evidence na topic na but may be of help ) SC: The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated filing of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping was substantial compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94. There was no showing of intention to violate the rules with impunity. Justice over mere technicalities. ON PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY: SC: physical occupation of the commercial building which they erected on the disputed property does not necessarily prove their ownership of the subject lots. SC AFFIRMED CA.

48) Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, (ancient doc rule applicable)Fishpond owned by Lacsa, upon her death, two child with husbands entered into extrajudicial partition, adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra.But another deed was executed on the same fishpoind in Pampanga dialect. Guevara sold fishpond to Songco. TC the fishspond belong to the spouses having inherited from their mom. Heirs of Lacsa . the application of the lower courts of the ancient document rule on the questioned document entitled According to petitioners, the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta"cannot qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. Issue: Whether or not the ancient document rule applies in this case that would uphold the validity of the documents and would prove that the heirs of Songco are the legal owners of the subject property. Ruling:Yes. The "ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given. We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17 The first document was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of General Services. Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents. Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion. Hence, further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required and there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903 Notarial Law. SC: The subject property lawfully belongs to the heirs of Songco.

49)Interpacific Transit v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)

50)PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)

51)Catuira v. CA, G.R. No. 105813, 12 September 1994 – page 81 transcriptOn 8 June 1990, two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for having issued two (2) checks in payment of her obligation to private complainant. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence)Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner also argued that even if the testimony of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.Trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. In a similar move, the appellate court rejected her petition and sustained the trial court in its denial of the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner contended that it was error for respondent appellate court to declare that petitioner's objection was not done at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time such testimony is presented and the records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object only came when the prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after it has rested its case. ISSUE: Is the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered at the time the witness is called to testify, as required in Sec. 35, in relation to Sec. 34, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence? RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court: While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of the complaining witness upon calling her to testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer was made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the petitioner on the ground invoked. For, she should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first offered upon calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was waived.

52)Vda. deOñate v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

This is an action for specific performance filed by Eulalia Marcita Taguba, in her capacity as administratix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba, against Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate (petitioner) to execute a public document of sale in favor of the deceased and her heirs.Petitioner and the deceased entered into a contract to sell over Lot No. 1571 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four monthly installments, which the latter has made a full payment in this manner: P2,250.00 (January 1976), P750.00 (February 1976), P1,000.00 (March 1976), and P1,000.00 (July 1976) marked as Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and “F-3”, respectively. However, parties failed to reduce their contract into writing. Eulalia demand to execute a public document of sale for the said transaction which petitioner refused to do. Thus, the present action. The trial court ruled in favour of Eulalia which was affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioners, by petition for review, contended that the appellate court erred when it took cognizance of the plaintiff’s evidence, all showing the varying amounts paid by Leonor Taguba to Elvira Maro Vda. de Oñate, which had been marked but never formally submitted in evidence as required by the Rules of Court.Issue: Whether the appellate court erred when it considered the Exhibits which have not been formally offered? Ruling: Section 34 of Rule 132 of the rules of Court provides that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.Hoewever, the Court, in another case, relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: FIRST, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, SECOND, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the case at bench, these requisites have been satisfied. The evidence in question, the Exhibits, were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. In fact, the payment of P5,000.00 was admitted by herein petitioners in the same pre-trial. Eulalia Taguba identified the said exhibits in her testimony which was duly recorded. Herein subject exhibits were also incorporated and made part of the records of the case.The decision appealed was affirmed by the Supreme Court

53)Hrs. of Santioque v. Hrs. of Calma, Basis of claim of Right over the Property by the Heirs of CalmaThe Governor General granted a homestead patent over a 20. 9740 ha. Parcel of land located in Barrio Tibog, Tarlac. On the basis of such patent an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds. The title was cancelled by TCT No. 13287 which was subsequently cancelled by TCT No. 19181 under the names of Agatona, Fabian, Emilio and Demetria, all surnamed Calma. The parties executed a Contract of Lease in favor of spouses Lope A. Akol, who then executed an Assignment of Leasehold Rights under the Contract of Lease in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC). Fabian Calma died intestate. The Heirs executed a Deed of Partition over the property. Thus, TCT No. 19181 was cancelled by TCT No. 71826 in the names of Agatona, Emilio, Demetria and Fabian. Basis of claim of Right over the Property by the Heirs of Santioque A 20.564 ha parcel of land located in Tibag, Tarlac and identified as Lot No. 3844 was declared for taxation purposes under the name of Emilio Santioque but the declaration did not bear the name and signature of the declarant.Santioque died intestate. His children filed a complaint in the RTC of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of title, recoveyance, with damages over a piece of land located in Tibog, Tarlac. The heirs claimed that on March 31, Emilio was awarded Homestead Patent No. 18577 over a lot in Tibag, Tarlac City; that said lot was identified as Lot No. 3844; that OCT No. 1112 was issued to Emilio on April 21, 1932 and from then had enjoyed full ownership and dominion over said lot and prior to this, when Felimon (heir of Emilio) went to the Register of Deeds of Tarlac and discovered that the lot covered by OCT No. 1112 was already registered in the name of the Calmas. The Heirs of Calma filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that: 1. action has prescribed and was barred by laches; 2. claim has been abandoned; and 3. complaint stated no cause of action. Court denied the motion.Felimon testified for the plaintiffs and admitted that they had no copy of OCT No. 1112, the Register of Deeds likewise has no record of the said title nor TCT No.19181. He discovered from said office that the subject lot was covered by TCT No. 19181 under the name of the heirs of Calma, which title was then cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 71286. The heirs of Calma demurred to plaintiff’s evidence and sought its dismissal on the ground that the latter failed to establish a preponderance of evidence to support their ownership over the property. Trial Court issued an order granting the demurrer and dismissed the complaint.Felimon wrote to the Director of NBI requesting assistance in investigating the disappearance of the copy of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac of OCT No. 1112 and TCT no. 13287. Attached to the letter were certifications and investigation reports of the LRA. The Heirs of Santioque did not present the said documents to the trial court but included the same in their appellant’s brief.CA affirmed the appealed decision. It did not give probative weight to the certifications and other documents submitted by the heirs of Santioque as their authenticity had not been established and the signatories therein were not presented for cross examination.Issues: 1.Whether the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of respondents; Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would ordinarily have to do so, if it is shown by plaintiff’s evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought. Petitioners, as plaintiffs were obliged to prove their claim in their complaint that their father Emilio applied for and was granted the homestead patent and that OCT 1112 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of said patent. Petitioners had the burden of proof to present evidence on the fact in issue to establish their claim by their own evidence as required by law. More so, where, as in this case, on the face of TCT No. 19181 under the names of the respondents, it was derived from TCT No. 13287, which in turn cancelled OCT No. 1112 issued on April 21, 1932 on the basis of a homestead patent. It must be stressed that the original certificate of the title carries a strong presumption that the provisions of law governing the registration of land have been complied with. The OCT enjoys a presumption of validity. Petitioners failed to prove the material allegations in their complaint that Emilio applied for and was granted Patent No. 18577 and that OCT No. 1112 was issued on the basis thereof.

2.W/N the CA was incorrect in not giving credence to the certifications which petitioners submitted before it on the ground that the said documents were not presented in the TC.NO. The appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the certifications which petitioners submitted before it on the ground that the said documents were not presented in the trial court. Petitioners, thus, failed to prove the authenticity of said documents because they failed to present the government officials who certified the same. It is well settled that courts will consider as evidence only that which has been formally offered, otherwise, the opposing party would be denied due process of law. Thus, the Court explained in one case that

A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.Petitioners, however, contend that they could have presented the said documents during the rebuttal stage of the proceedings before the trial court. It bears stressing, however, that a plaintiff is bound to introduce all evidence that supports his case during the presentation of his evidence in chief. A party holding the affirmative of an issue is bound to present all of the evidence on the case in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of rebuttal. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.Generally, rebuttal evidence is confined to that which explains, disproves, or counteracts evidence introduced by the adverse party. It is not intended to give a party an opportunity to tell his story twice or to present evidence that was proper in the case in chief. However, the court for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. This is usually allowed when the evidence is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.It is true that petitioners failed to adduce rebuttal evidence because respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence. However, petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence under Rule 37, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure after the trial court granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint.

54)People v. Libnao, 395 SCRA 407 (30 January 2003)Intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.So at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Arceo held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Gamotea, PO3 Ferrer and SPO3 Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as Libnao and her co-accused Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center. They brought with them the black bag.Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory and found to be marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Nunga testified that she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. As for Libnao, she did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus. The incident was recorded in the company’s logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was Libnao.After trial, the court convicted Libnao and her co-accused Nunga, for violation of the DDA, on the basis of the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution, which were not formally offered in evidence.Thus, Libnao appealed the judgment of the TC. In her appeal, she assigned an error committed by the TC for gravely abusing its discretion when it appreciated and considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law.ISSUE: WON the documentary and object evidence not formally offered in this case is admissibleHELD: ADMISSIBLE! Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.

55)Victorias Milling Company v. Ong Su,This is a petition to review the decision of the Director of Patents in Inter Partes Case No. 304 entitled "Victorias Milling Company, Inc., petitioner, versus, Ong Su" dated August 15, 1967 denying the petition to cancel the certificate of registration issued by the Philippine Patent Office on June(sic) 20, 1961 in favor of Ong Su covering the trademark(sic) "VALENTINE" and design and used on refined sugar.The Director of Patents denied the petition because the trademarks were dissimilar. Whether there is reasonable likelihood of purchaser confusion between the trademarks “VICTORIAS” and “VALENTINE.” Whether there was error in preventing the admission of the testimonies of Ong Su and Ernesto Duran as rebuttal witnesses for petitioner and is a denial of due process. The petitioner sought to present Ernesto T. Duran as rebuttal witness to prove that there was a confusion among consumers or buyers of sugar caused by the alleged sorority of the "Victorias" and "Valentine" trademarks. The presentation of Ernesto T. Duran as rebuttal witness was objected to by counsel of the respondent on the ground that the evidence sought to be elicited from Duran did not directly contradict the testimony of witness Chicane. The objection was sustained by the hearing officer whose ruling was subsequently concurred by the Director of Patents. Counsel for the petitioner made the following formal offer of proof: ATTY. GONZALEZ: Your Honor please, in view of the ruling of the Honorable Director your Honor please on the admissibility of certain items of evidence, which resolution dated February 21, 1966 was received by undersigned counsel for the petitioner on February 22, 1966, said resolution was setting the hearing of this case for this morning, I wish to state, I wish to register my exception, my respectful exception to said resolution. In view of the resolution not permitting me to present Mr. Ernesto Duran, my proposed witness whom I attempted to present at the last hearing, I wish to offer as proof the following items on the testimony of witness Duran. Now as he would go shopping with his parents and that sometime in the month of February 1963 he went to the Aranque market, and while he was buying groceries he saw a shelf with five (5) lbs. bag of sugar with the bag and package he thought was VICTORIAS. Witness Duran will further testify that he went to the shelf and pointed to the bag of sugar and he said: Isang supot(sic) ng Victorias(sic). That the sugar was taken by the shopkeeper and when he went home he found out that the sugar was marked VALENTINE. He(sic) went on again on another time later and saw that the shelf was still filled with five (5) pounds (lbs,) bag VALENTINE sugar. The shelf also has bags of VICTORIAS sugar side by side with VALENTINE sugar, that the package of VALENTINE looked so much alike will VICTORIAS sugar that he was misled into pointing to VALENTINE and asked for VICTORIAS.HEARING OFFICER: What is that, is that supposed to be the testimony of witness Duran? ATTY. GONZALEZ: Yes, your Honor, I am offering as proof of what the witness Duran would have testified. Since this office has ruled that I cannot present him an offer of proof is being made for purposes of putting on record what he would have testified to on record in accordance with the Rules of Evidence. 11Having made the foregoing formal offer of proof, the petitioner cannot complain that it was denied procedural due process.The proposed testimony of Ernesto T. Duran that in February 1963 he went to Arangue market and bought one bag of sugar which he thought was "Victorias" and when he went home he found out that the sugar was marked "Valentine" is not sufficient evidence that the two trademarks are so similar that buyers of sugar are confused. The words "Victorias" and "Valentine" are not similar in spelling and do not have a similar sound when pronounced. Even the diamond designs are different. The diamond design of the trademark "Valentine" has protruding fines at the comers. Even an illiterate person can see the difference between the two diamond designs.

There is no evidence that the respondent Ong Su had obtained the registration of his trademark "Valentine" and design by means of fraud. The said trademark was registered in the Philippines Patent Office before the petitioner registered its trademark.

56)Abarquez v. People, (i) Equipoise Rule – when an act or circumstances is susceptible with two interpretations, the one consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, the one consistent with innocence should be upheld. A crime involving a violent confrontation between two groups. While one person was attacking another, the friend of the attacker was restraining the friend of the person being attacked. Two interpretations:Guilt - The act of restraining was to prevent the other from helping his friend therefore being an accomplice to the crime. Innocence - It was to keep him from harms way. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. Hence, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other consistent with guilt, the former should prevail, for then the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction

57)Heirs of Reyes v. CA, 519 SCRA 250 (28 March 2007)(ii) Actor’s Rule - where the testimonies of witnesses on one and the same factual issue are inconsistent with each other, the testimony of the witness whose action is more connected to the point at issue should be given more credence. Thus, as between the carpenter and the tenant, the latter should be given more credence, being more closely connected to the point at issue, that is, whether the improvements are found on the litigated lot. For while a carpenter would not concern himself with the title of the property, a lessee would normally look into the title of the property leased, including its precise location and boundaries.