DIGESTSCITY OF DUMAGUETE v. PHIL PORTS AUTHORITY

Mayor Felipe Remollo filed an application for ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND with IMPROVEMENTS under the Property Registration Decree with the Dumaguete RTC.Republic of the PH; Director of LandsCity of Dumaguete

Not in OCEAN possession

MOTION TO DISMISS

RTC lacked JD over the case, as Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership.

Foreshore land which is not registerableOPPOSITION TO OPPOSITORs MOTION TO DISMISS

Swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, and City has been in OCEAN possession

Property not bound by any part of the sea

RA 1899 authorized chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them

REPLY/REJOINDER TO OPPOSITION TO OPPOSITORs MOTION TO DISMISS

No factual legal basis for the claim of petitioner that subject property is reclaimed land. Petitioner sought OR of its title over the property acquired through alleged continuous possession under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 and not RA 1899

RTC: Granted motion to dismiss

1. Cannot be applied for since lot is foreshore land2. No formal declaration from executive that land is no longer needed for public use or special industries3. Did not consult with Sec of Finance and Sec of Public WorksCity of DumaguetePPA

MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Dismissal was premature and tantamount to a denial of right to due process; has yet to present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application

2. Engr. Dorado did not testify that the subject property was a foreshore lot at the time petitioner occupied and possessed the same1. Petitioner violated 15.4 15.5 and 15.6. Petitioner did not set its MT for hearing even when the said Motion could not be considered as non-litigable. 2. RTC could not hear the MR ex parte as they are prejudicial to the rights of respondent3. Failure to comply with 13.11 of the ROC when it did not attach to the MR a written explanation why it did not resort to personal service of said motionHence MR is a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect and did not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal; RTC decision has acquired finality.

RTC: Initially agreed that petitioner violated Rules 15 and 13 but after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioner, RTC issued another Order setting aside its September 2007 Order (mere scrap of paper).

PPA filed MR; denied by RTC:

Adjoining lots are already titled and bound by a City Road; not foreshore land

PPA filed 65 with CA; granted and set aside RTC Orders

City of Dumaguete filed for Petition for Review assailing CA decision

SC:

1. RTC did not commit GADALEJ when it set aside the order of dismissal of the case.

a. Goldloop Properties v. CA: Filing of MR did not stop running of the period of appeal because of absence of a notice of hearing required by Rule 15. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, RTC had to disregard it. However, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executor judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals concerned therein. Technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case; after all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities.

b. Samoso v. CA: The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal.

c. The MR and Supplemental MR cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of procedural rules.

2. RTC dismissal of the case for lack of JD is patently erroneous

a. Act 496 provides that JD over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon CFIs of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was situated

b. PRD still vested applications for land registration with the CFI

c. BP 129: CFI ( RTC

3. Did not comply with 13.11 = no written explanation why service or filing was not done personally

a. Maceda v. Encarnacion de Guman vda de Magpantay, citing Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort: A Court has discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with. Personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the ff less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard; (2) procrastinating from claiming the parcel or not claiming it at all. Exercise of discretion must necessarily consider practicability of personal service.

b. Musa v. Amor: Personal service would not be practicable since distance between CA and Donsol, Sorgon clearly warrants service by registered mail. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous.

c. Counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete while Counsel for Reposndent holds office in QC. Personal service of pleadings clearly not practicable

4. Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15

a. GR: Notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. If not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. The motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period.

b. Peculiar Circumstances ( PNB v. Paneda

i. Even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the courts taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the existence of said pleading. Records reveal that notices in the Motion were addressed to the respective counsels of private respondents and were furnished with copies of the same.

c. Petitioner furnished respondent copies of his MR and the Supplemental MR. RTC, in issuing its Order, was able to consider the arguments presented by both sides = substantial compliance by petitioner with rules on notice of hearing for its MR and Supplemental MR

BACELONIA v. CA

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES after a vehicular accident. Petitioners were defendants as operators of the school shuttle service while Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Carino were the owner and driver of the cargo truck. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages arising from their co-defendants. They entered into a compromise which led to the dismissal of the complaint in this case between them.

Upon termination of testimony of the second witness for the complainants, petitioners filed a motion to be dropped as defendants on the ground that a compromise agreement had already been entered into by the parties in the second civil case, as Roxas-Cu and Carino explicitly admitted sole responsibility for the vehicular accident by entering into the compromise agreement.

RTC: DENIED MOTION TO BE DROPPED AS DEFENDANTSJanuary 31, 2000: Petitioners filed an MR of RTCs order denying their motion to be dropped as defendants and set the date of hearing thereof on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 AM. They also filed a SEPARATE MOTION TO CANCEL THE HEARING for PRESENTATION of EVIDENCE for the defense earlier scheduled on FEBRUARY 3, 2000 so that their MR on Feb 15 may not be rendered MOOT and ACADEMIC.

RTC: Denied the MR.

Petitioners ( CA through petition for certiorari ( DENIED

Questioned order of RTC was interlocutory and could not be assailed in a petition for certiorari

Res judicata did not apply insofar as the claim in Civil Case was concerned

IMPORTANT RATIO:

1. MR of the trial court reso on Jan. 10, 2000 was filed on Jan. 31, 2000, the date and time of hearing thereof set on February 15, 2000 at 8:30. 15.5 provides that the notice of hearing shall be addressed to all the parties concerned and shall specify the date and time of the hearing which must not be later than 10 days after the filing of the motion.

2. The scheduled hearing of the said MR was beyond the period specified by the ROC which was not later than 10 days after filing of the motion

3. Motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of 15.5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.

4. Mandatory character of 15.5 becomes specially significant in this case considering the claim of PRs that petitioners have been engaging in dilatory tactics.

a. Compromise agreement was already interposed by the petitioners as one of the special and affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint for damages in the earlier civil case

b. No longer legally possible for petitioners to file the Motion to Exclude in the earlier case

5. Defense ( Motion to Exclude based on Compromise Agreement that did not even bind the complainants ( MR + Motion to Cancel Scheduled Hearing

PNR v. RUSTIA Rustias were co-owners of two parcels of land. 70 years ago PNR took possession of about 6,658 sq.m. to build railroad tracks. No expropriation suit was ever initiated, neither was just compensation ever paid. PNR did not replace the property.

Rustias went to the Ombudsman and it was only then that PNR tendered an offer. Offer was inadequate and unsatisfactory.

Rustias filed a COMPLAINT FOR PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES. PNR admitted it took possession of the properties without filing an expropriation suit.

RUSTIASPNR

Fair market value 2 P250/sqmBased on estimate of a reputable appraisal company, only P7/sqm

RTC: In favour of PNRs rate, with 12% pa interest from 1938

PNRRUSTIAS

MR as to interest rate

Opposed MR with advance notice of appeal as it divested the RTC of its jurisdiction to act on both motions. MT was a mere scrap of paper since (1) the notice of hearing therein was addressed to the clerk of court and not to its counsel and (2) it did not include any explanation why personal service was not made on itMR with advance notice of appealAcceptance of PNRs rate without any evidence presented to support it

Advance notice of appeal as having been filed simultaneously with the MR in the event the latter was denied.

RTC: Dismissed petitioners MR; granted respondents MR and ruled technical infirmities therein were not fatal to render it a mere scrap of paper

PETITIONER filed another MR while RESPONDENTS prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution. MR was denied and issued a writ of execution.PETITIONER filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

CA ruled in favour of petitioner.

Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with SC on the ff grounds:

1. Respondents MR was merely a scrap of paper because

a. Notice of hearing was addressed to the trial courts clerk of court and not to its counsel

b. No explanation as to why respondents did not personally serve the MR on it. Rules mandate that a motion should be addressed to all parties concerned

SC: Petition FAILS

1. Issues raised by petitioner became moot when Rustias filed in the RTC an Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Advance Notice of Appeal, which included a notice of hearing addressed to petitioners counsel and manifestation that the notice was served on said counsel by registered mail due to distance between counsels offices.

2. Pronouncement that a motion not directed to the parties is fatally defective and that a motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rules 14 and 15 is a worthless piece of paper because of a number of cases where technicality was set aside when necessary to render justice to the litigants.

US v. RUIZ

US had a naval base in Zambales pursuant to the Military Bases Agreement. It invited bids for repairs of its offender system and the shoreline. Eligio de Guzman and Co submitted bids and it received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name its bonding company. The company complied with the requests.

De Guzman filed a complaint against the US Govt, alleging the US had accepted its bids because A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to the US bidding practices

Company received a letter from the US Navy stating that De Guzmans company did not qualify because (1) of a previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall; and (2) contract had been awarded to third parties.

Complaint is for specific performance to order defendants to allow plaintiff to perform work on the projects and for damages; also asked for writ of Prelim Injunction to restrain defendants from entering into contracts with 3rd parties for work on the projects

Defendants entered their special appearance for purpose of questioning KD of the court over the subject matter (acts and omissions of individual defendants as agents of defendant US)

Defendants filed a MOTION TO DISMISS. (DENIED)

Defendants filed for PROHIBITION to restrain perpetually the proceedings in the case for lack of jurisdiction.

SC: PETITION MERITORIOUS

1. Principle of independence and equality of States provide that a State is exempt from being sued in the court of another State without the formers consent or waiver.

2. Rules of International Law have evolved. Because activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish between

a. Sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)

b. Proprietary acts (jure gestionis)

c. State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii

3. Respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity but held that contract for repair of wharves or shoreline is not a governmental function although it may partake of a public nature or character.a. Lyons Inc: When a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ( Misplaced

b. In Lyons the plaintiff brought suit to collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The Court sustained the lower court who dismissed the action for damages because of failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. Statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and therefore obiter.

4. Restrictive application of State immunity proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities, or economic affairs. Only applies to business contracts, not where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

a. In this case projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the PH

5. Correct test for application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia v Lopez

a. Syquia: Contract of lease for use of three apartment buildings by US military officials

b. RPI was the US Government and any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid by the US Government; it is an action against the US Govt

c. Contracts were jure imperii not jure gestionis

Makasiars dissent:

1. When US Govt confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for repairs, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of an ordinary citizen.

2. Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation by unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by the US, through its agency, should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability.

SEAFDEC v. RUIZ: 1. RP became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC. It is an intergovernmental organization which enjoys functional independence and freedom from the control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

2. Jovito Salong and Pedro Yap: IOs are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, so they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated

3. Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984: An international organization is immune from local jurisdictionPHILVILLE VS JAVIER

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; Dec. 13, 2007

NATURE

Instant petition for review on certiorari

FACTS

- This case traces its antecedents to a verified complaint filed by Mercedes Javier, herein respondent with the RTC for damages and injunction. Impleaded as defendant was PHILVILLE Development and Housing Corporation (PHILVILLE).

- The complaint alleges that spouses Crisanto (now deceased) and Javier have been tenant-cultivators of

a 5.5 hectare parcel of rice land owned by Felimon Emperado, a holder of a free patent.

- Sometime in 1977, PHILVILLE proposed to buy the land for conversion into a housing subdivision.

Spouses Javier, PHILVILLE and Emperado then entered into a Kasulatan ng Pagsasalin at Kusang Loob na Pagsusuko. Among the terms agreed upon by the parties was that the Javiers would be given a 2,000 square meter lot as a disturbance compensation. However, instead of giving them a single lot measuring 2,000 sq.m. what they received were 2 separate lots of 1,000 sq. m. each located far apart. This prompted Mercedes tosue PHILVILLE for damages.

- In its answer, PHILVILLE specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and raised the following

affirmative and special defenses: (1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (2) it does not allege

that the parties resorted to conciliation proceedings before the barangay; and (3) plaintiff is estopped

from filing the complaint.

- Mercedes filed a motion for leave of court to amend her complaint. In her attached amended complaint,

she alleged that the Kasulatan did not express the true agreement of the parties and that the sale is

void as it was executed within the 5-year prohibitive period from the issuance of the free patent.

- The trial court denied the motion, holding that the proposed amendment is inconsistent with the cause

of action in the original complaint; and that the proposed amendment is the subject of another civil

case between the same parties pending before another branch of the trial court.

- PHILVILLE moved to dismiss the original complaint alleging that the plaintiff had filed a protest with the

Land Management Bureau seeking the revocation of the free patent issued to Emperado and the reversion of the land to the public domain.

- the trial court granted PHILVILLEs motion to dismiss

- Mercedes filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order but it was denied. This prompted her to

interpose an appeal to the CA which reversed the order and remanded the cast to the trial court.

- PHILVILLE filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.ISSUE

WON the motion to dismiss should be deniedHELD YES.Ratio Section 1, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court then applicable provides:

SEC. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or

suit; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations; (g) That the complaint states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; (j) The suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Rafor, this Court interpreted within the time for pleading to mean within the time to answer.

Reasoning Under Section 1, Rule 11, the time to answer is 15 days after service of summons upon the defendant. In the instant case, we note that PHILVILLEs motion to dismiss the complaint was filed after it had filed its answer.

- The only exceptions to the rule, as correctly pointed out by the CA, are: (1) where the ground raised is lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter; (2) where the complaint does not state a cause of action; (3) prescription; and (4) where the evidence that would constitute a ground for the dismissal of the complaint was discovered only during the trial. None of the foregoing grounds is present in PHILVILLEs motion to dismiss. LACAP v. LEE

Victor Facundo mortgaged two parcels of land to Monte de Piedad Savings Bank. In 1981, the Sps Lacap assumed to pay Facundos mortgage obligation to the bank. They failed to pay and the bank foreclosed. They bought the same at the auction.

Bank allowed spouses to stay under a lessor-lessee agreement. Spouses introduced improvements worth P500,000 after relying on banks assurance the property would be sold back to them. On May 1996, their representative went to pay the rent but the bank refused to accept saying it was sold to another person.

They called the bank, the VP of which told them to submit a written offer for P1.1M. They complied the following day but the bank turned down the offer. On June 1996, they received a letter demanding they vacate the premises because it was owned by respondent Jouvet Lee.

Lacaps instituted a case for CANCELLATION OF SALE AND DAMAGES WITH AN APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

Respondent filed a COMPLAINT FOR UD against the lacaps in the Davao MTC.

DAVAO MTC: In favour of Lee

Lacaps APPEALED to DAVAO RTC, which affirmed the MTC decision, with modification that Lee should reimburse Lee for the improvements introduced on the premises.

Respondent filed an MR praying for deletion of order to reimburse the Lacaps. MR granted by the Davao RTC.

Petitioner filed an MR. Denied. Appealed to the CA. Ground:

1. Serious errors of fact and law in entertaining the complaint for UD despite lack of JD considering the issue recovery of the right to possess was the subject matter of an AP which was properly cognizable by the RTC.

CA: Dismissed Lacaps petition

1. MTC had JD over the case as the complaint sufficiently alleged possession was unlawfully withheld from Lee and that petitioners refused to vacate

2. Petitioners argument that respondents ownership was assailable due to banks violation of its promise to first offer the subject property to them was an issue the CA could not touch upon as it was the subject matter of a separate case filed before the Davao RTC.

3. Petitioner NOT builders in good faith as their payment of rentals to the bank was an indication they were lessees. Art. 1678 not Art. 448 shall govern.

Lacaps filed petition for CERTIORARI (45)

Lacaps:

1. The Courts a quo erred in oversimplifying the issue in the case. Since they were questioning the title of the respondent over the subject property, the case for unlawful detainer was no longer limited to the question of possession but also involved the question of ownership. Courts should not have evaded ruling on the issue of ownership as a pre-req to determination and resolution of issue of physical possession.

2. Anchors claim on Sec. 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine issue of possession.

3. They question Lees ownership on the ground that the bank failed to offer them the subject property, making respondents title defective.

SC:

1. Defense of ownership contemplated by said rule refers to a asituation where defendants either claim ownership of subject property or attributes said ownership to another person other than the plaintiff. It does not apply where the defendants merely question the validity of the title of the plaintiff. Petitioner spouses must anchor the legality of their material possession of the property on a claim of title in order for the court to be able to touch on the legality of the issue of ownership.a. They do not claim ownership over the subject premises to support their right to possess the property in their reply.b. They do not claim having a better right to the property by way of transfer of title through one of the modes of transferring ownership. c. Alleged violation of their right of priority or first opetion to buy the premises is not the defense of ownership contemplated in Sec. 16.2. Cases they cited are inappropos.a. Oronce: maintained ownership over property by claiming contract of sale w/ assumption of mortgage was an equitable mortgageb. Refugia v. CA: defendants claimed title over the subject property by contending they paid for the purchase of the property3. Petitioners admit they do not own the subject parcels of land. As third persons to the contract of sale between the bank and respondent, they are only questioning the validity of the transfer of title to respondent.4. Supposed issue of ownership cannot be ruled upon by the courts a quo is because the same is also the subject of a separate pending case for cancellation of sale filed by the petitioners themselves against the respondent before the Davao RTC.5. By questioning the ownership of respondent, petitioners are raising a defense that serves at the main COA in the complaint for the cancellation of sale.a. This is prohibited by the rule on the alleged litis pendencia.b. To ask the courts a quo to rule on the alleged defense of ownership is to pre-empt the ruling of Davao RTC Branch 13.6. A party is prohibited from splitting his cause of action for the reason that it will unnecessarily clog the court dockets, waste the time and money of the parties, and perpetrate an abuse of the legal system by filing cases of the same nature in the hope of insuring a favourable judgment.Arthur Del Rosario and Alexander Del Rosario v Hellenor Donato and Rafael Gonzaga

G.R. No. 180595; March 5, 2010; Abad

[Adopted with modifications]

Doctrine: The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks. Judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of.Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.I. Facts

In January 2002, Philip Morris Products, Inc. wrote to the NBI for assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. In response, Hellenor Donato (NBI agent) conducted surveillance work and confirmed that storage and sale of such cigarettes were being conducted in the house of Alexander del Rosario at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision.

Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the RTC of Angeles City on March 5 but the warrant was not issued until a week later on March 12. NBI agents led by Rafael Gonzaga conducted the search, which yielded no fake cigarettes. Petitioners Del Rosario filed a COMPLAINT FOR P50 million in DAMAGES with Branch 62 of the RTC of Angeles City against respondents and 2 more NBI agents.

The respondents ANSWERED the complaint with a MOTION TO DISMISS on the grounds of:

a) failure to state a cause of action;

b) forum shopping; and

c) immunity from suit.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. MR was also denied.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which granted the petition and annulled the RTC order. It held that:

In alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant, without stating the facts making the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and

The plaintiffs were guilty of forum-shopping as they should have filed their claim for damages through a MOTION FOR COMPENSATION with the court that issued the search warrant.

CA denied the MR, hence this Petition for Review.

II. Issues-Held

WON the complaint failed to state a cause of action:

No, the allegations of the Del Rosarios in their complaint do not state a cause of action.

The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks. Judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of.Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action. (NOTE: The portions of the COMPLAINT quoted in the decision are reproduced in the Appendix.) Essentially, all that the Plaintiffs allege is that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained a search warrant against them. The evidence to support such allegation was the fact that no fake cigarettes were found contrary to the agents sworn statements in getting the warrant. But the Court held that judicially ordered search that fails to yield illicit articles does not itself render the order unlawful. There is no allegation that respondent NBI agents fabricated testimony to obtain the search warrants. The allegation that the warrants were illegally obtained was merely a conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, the assumption does not extend to conclusions of law. Statements of conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. The allegation that the search warrant was served in a malicious manner was also insufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law. The broad assertion that the search was conducted in plain view of members of the community does not support their claim of malicious enforcement as there is nothing inherently wrong with enforcing search warrants in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the respondents are not present during the search, the rules require the presence of two residents of the same locality.WON the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum-shopping:

No, the Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant.

The CA relied on AM 02-1-06-SC governing search and seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. However, the warrant in this case was not issued under such rule as Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of trademark.

Instead, Philip Morris sought the assistance of NBI for the apprehension and prosecution of those reportedly selling fake cigarettes. In turn, NBI applied for a search warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule does not provide for the filing of counterclaims against those who have improperly sought the issuance of a search warrant. The Del Rosarios have the right to seek damages in a separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant, unfortunately in this case, their complaint as worded failed to state a proper cause of action.

WON the NBI agents wrongfully included Arthur del Rosario in the warrant since he neither owned nor resided in the premises subject of the warrant:

No, the rules do not require respondents in search warrants to be residents of the premises searched.

WON the procedural issues raised by the petitioners have any merit:

No, due to the holding of the CA that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Objections:

Failure of NBI agents to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days

Resort to special civil action of certiorari to challenge the denial of their Motion to Dismiss

Propriety of including their Motion to Dismiss in their answer

CAs grant of a 15-day extension to file a petition for certiorari

Being represented by private counsel rather than the OSG

The Court finds no sufficient reason to dwell on these objections due to the rulings on the principal issues and it finds on errors in the disposition of the CA of the same.

Petition DENIED and Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the case is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that such dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE

APPENDIX

2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x.

x x x x

2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no `fake Marlboro cigarettes and their packaging' were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis considering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.

2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and searches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.

x x x x

3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the such warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of the community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly built and maintained over the years.

x x x x

3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the subject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in the sale of fake merchandise.MARAMAG v. MARAMAG The Heirs of Loreto Maramag filed against respondents a PETITION FOR REVOCATION and/or REDUCTION of INSURANCE PROCEEDS for being void and/or inofficious, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner were legitimate wife and children while respondents are the concubine and illegitimate children, and both Insular and Grepalife.Legit familyInsurance Companies

Illegitimate children only entitled to legitime of the legitimate children, thus, proceeds released to Odessa and to the other children were inofficious and should be reduced

Petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes

COMMENT

Issue raised by insurance companies were purely legal

Designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or a donation and is subject to provisions of Art. 752 and 772.INSULAR

Loreto misrepresented his wife and illegitimate children as his legitimate wife and children. It disqualified Eva as a beneficiary.

Complaint/petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary because Loreto revoked her designation

GREPALIFE

Eva was not designated as a beneficiary. Claims filed by the illegit children were denied because Loreto misrepresented his age in his insurance application form.

Case was premature, there being no claim filed by legitimate family of Loreto

Law on succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear

MOVED the issues raised in their respective answers be resolved first

RTC: MTD granted with respect to children; case proceeds as to concubine

1. NCC 2011 provides contracts of insurance are governed by special laws. Insurance Code is principal law on insurance. Only in case of deficiency in the Insurance Code should the NCC be resorted to.2. Art 53 of IC: Insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name for whose benefit is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. Since defendants are named as primary beneficiaries, and no showing that plaintiffs were also included as beneficiaries, insurance proceeds must be paid to defendants.

3. Law on testamentary succession does not apply. Beneficiary in a contract of insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. Insurance indemnity does not partake of a donation. Cannot be considered as an advance of the inheritance which can be subject to collation.

4. Cause of action only against Eva as a concubine, as NCC 2012 provides that a person forbidden from receiving any donation under NCC 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him. Insurance contract remains valid but indemnity must go to legal heirs and not the concubine.

INSULAR and GREPALIFE filed MRs

1. Petition failed to state a cause of action2. Proceeds were divided among the 3 children as the remaining named beneficiaries.3. Grepalife: Premiums paid had already been refundedPetitioners comment:

1. Whether the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action must be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, such that defenses of Insular and Grepalife would be better threshed out during trial.RTC: Granted I & Gs MRs, case was dismissed against them

1. It is only in cases where there are no beneficiaries designated or when the only designated beneficiary is disqualified that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured2. Distribution of the insurance proceeds governed by IC, provisions of NCC are irrelevant and inapplicable

3. Matter of Loretos misrepresentation was premature; appropriate action may be filed upon only denial of the claim of the named beneficiaries for the insurance proceeds by Grepalife

APPEALED TO CA; DISMISSED for LACK of JD (pure question of law)

APPEALED TO CA

a. In determining the merits of a MTD for failure to state a cause of action, may the Court consider matters which were not alleged in the Complaint, particularly the defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer

b. In granting an MR of an MTD for failure to state a COA, did not the RTC engage in examination and determination of what were the facts and their probative value, or the truth thereof

c. Are members of the legitimate family entitled to proceeds of insurance for the concubine?

SC:

1. Grant of MTD was based on RTCs finding that petition failed to state a COA, as provided for in Rule 16.1(g)

2. COA is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a COA when it contains 3 elements:

a. Legal right of the plaintiff

b. Correlative obligation of the defendant

c. Act/omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right

d. If any of these elements is absent, complaint becomes vulnerable to MTD based on 16.1(g)

3. GR: The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, Court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. Exceptions:

a. Falsity of allegations is subject to judicial notice

b. Allegations are legally impossible

c. Allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence

d. By the record or document in the pleading, allegations appear unfounded; or

e. There is evidence which has been presented to the Court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case

4. Evident from face of the omplaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favourable judgment in light of Art. 2011 which expressly provides insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws i.e. the Insurance Code

a. Sec. 53 of IC provides that it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive, or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon maturation of the policy

i. Exception: Where insurance contract was intended to benefit 3rd persons

SANTIAGO v. DE LOS SANTOS

Luis Santiago applied for registration of a parcel of land. He attached documents indicative of the land being public in character, thus lending support to the opposition of the Director of Forestry and the Director of Lands, and Pacita de los Santos. Judge Cecilia Munoz Palma dismissed the suit. Santiago applied for registration of title over a parcel of land in San mateo, Rizal. It was opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and by Mrs. Pacita V. De Los Santos. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the property applied for is a portion of the public demain which was leased to De Los Santos under a Pasture Lease Agreement.

Santiago requested that the registration case be calendared for hearing in view of the fact that a portion of the said parcel of land subject of the registration has already been released by the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes as evidenced by its August 10, 1961 order. Attached were documents which proved that the subject land was part of the public domain. His claim was anchored in OCEAN possession.

Irlanda v. Pitarque: JBL Reyes, in Joes Radio and Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp: An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored.

New counsel extricated him from his predicament by insisting on the MTD filed by DLS was not entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the registration.

SC: No purpose for presenting evidence because he could not prove OCEAN possession Juanito Santiago, Luis son, was one of the lessees of the timber area sought to be registered. Lease was cancelled for failure of the lessee to make the improvements and comply with the terms and conditions of the lease contract.

Goodyear Philippines, Inc. v Anthony Sy and Jose Lee

G.R. No.154554; 09 Nov 2005; Panganiban, J.Digest by Dudday

FACTS

1. 30 Apr 1986: Goodyears 6-wheeler Isuzu vehicle which it owned since 1983 was hijacked. It made a report to the PNP which issued an alert alarm over the vehicle as stolen. The same vehicle was recovered in 1986 as well.

2. 12 Sep 1996: Goodyear sold the vehicle to Anthony Sy, who later sold it to Jose Lee on 29 Jan 1997. Lee, however, was not able to register the vehicle in his name due to a certification from the PNP that it was stolen. The facts showed that PNP failed to lift the alert alarm over the vehicle when it was recovered. The vehicle was impounded and Lee was criminally charged. Because of this, Lee filed an action for rescission of the contract plus damages against Sy (original complaint).

3. Sy informed Goodyear about the denial of Lees registration because of the alarm, so Goodyear requested the PNP to lift the stolen vehicle alarm status.

4. Notwithstanding the grant of the request, Sy still filed a third-party complaint against Goodyear in connection with the original complaint. Sys theory was that Goodyear breached its warranty over the vehicle.

5. Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the 3rd party complaint failed to state a cause of action, and even if it did, such cause of action was already extinguished.

6. RTC dismissed the 3rd party complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action since it did not show that the vehicle did not belong to Goodyear when the latter sold it to Sy. The mere fact that PNP failed to remove the vehicle from alert status as a stolen vehicle does not make Goodyear less of the owner thereof. Hence, Goodyear, the 3rd party defendant, is not guilty of any breach resulting from any flaw in the title over the subject vehicle.

7. CA reversed RTC and declared that the 3rd party complaint stated a cause of action. It stated that Goodyear failed to make good the warranty that the vehicle is free from all liens, encumbrances and legal impediments ,in the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Sy; and that Goodyear impaired Sys right to protect and enforce the warranty when the vehicle was refused registration because of the non-lifting of the alert status.

8. Hence, Goodyear filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE

Whether a cause of action was stated in the 3rd party complaint [No]

RESOLUTION AND RATIO

The 3rd party complaint does not state a cause of action against Goodyear.

Cause of Action act or omission by which a party violates the right of another

Elements of Cause of Action

a. Legal right of the plaintiff

b. Correlative obligation of defendant to respect that legal right

c. Act or omission of defendant that violates such right

Test to determine whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action: Admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? To answer the question above, only the material allegations in the complaint, the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, and admissions in the record may be considered by the Court; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters are not considered.

In the present case, the third element (act or omission of defendant that violates such right) is missing. The third party complaint did not allege any act or omission that Goodyear had committed in violation of Sys right to the subject vehicle or that had proximately caused injury or prejudice to Sy. No connection was laid out between the owners sale of the vehicle and its impounding by the PNP that makes Goodyear liable to Sy. Neither was there any breach of its obligation to uphold the warranties covering the sale.

Goodyear was indisputably the owner of the vehicle when the same was sold to Sy in 1996. The mere fact that the police did not lift the alert status did not make petitioner less of an owner. The Deed of Sale attached to the third party complaint stated that Goodyear was the absolute owner of the vehicle when it was executed. There was no contrary assertion made in the complaint regarding the matter.

The first warranty that the vendor has a right to sell the thing at the time that its ownership is passed on to the vendee, was not breached as proven by the fact that Sy was able to enjoy the legal and peaceful possession of the thing. In fact, he was also able to sell the thing to another person (Lee). The impoundment of the vehicle was a result of the PNPs failure, a fault not caused by Goodyear.

The second warranty, that the thing shall be free from any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the vendee, was not breached as well. There was no claim, liability or some other right attached to the vehicle that would lessen its value. The impoundment, as well as the denial of its registration, is not the hindrance or obstruction in the contemplation of the law. Besides, even if there was a breach of the implied warranty, no notice of any breach had been given by Sy to Goodyear within a reasonable time, nor within the time for filing an action for damages for breach of implied warranties (6 months from delivery of the thing sold).

Petition granted. CA decision reversed, RTC decision dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, reinstated.

BALO v. CA Private reposndent Josefina Garrido filed a COMPLAINT FOR JUDICIAL PARTITION of REAL PROPERTIES and ACCOUNTING WITH DAMAGES against petitioners Ulpiano Balo et al before the Letre RTC. She alleges she and petitioners are co-owners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. Owned by grandparents ( Ulpiano Sr and Maximino ( petitioners and Josefina Garrido, daughter of Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao.Josefina GarridoBalos

After death of her grandfather, petitioners took possession of the real properties without her consent. She requested a fair and equal partition of the properties. They refused.MTDFailure of complaint to state COA. She failed to alleged legitimacy, which is fatal considering NCC 992. To allow plaintiff to inherit from the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate parent of his father.

Not shown the estate of the spouses of Eugenio and Maria have been settled and its obligations have been paid

Properties enumerated in the complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria, which petitioner Ulpiano repurchased

RTC: DENIED MTD

1. Complaint clearly states Eugenio and Maria had two children and that plaintiff is Maximinos daughter.

2. Complaint annexes 13 tax decs in the name of Eugenio Balo Sr. She prayst for partition in accordance with Art. 982. No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the facts pleaded therein. Improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for decision on the motion. COURT IS NOT PERMITTED TO GO BEYOND AND OUTSIDE OF THE ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT FOR DATA OR FACTS. Allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences.

MR (DENIED) ( CA (DISMISSED)

ISSUE: Whether allegations in the complaint were sufficient to support a cause of action for partition may be found in private respondents complaint (YES)

1. In a MTD for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.a. Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers: Test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint

b. Galeon v. Galeon: If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance, but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the to deny the MTD and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense.

2. 8.1 provides that complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. In her claim, she asserted that

a. The parcels of land were owned by her grandparents and that they had two children

b. She is the daughter of Maximino Balo

c. That petitioner Ulpiano took possession of the real properties immediately after the death of plaintiffs grandfather

d. That Ulpiano et al refuse to have the property partitioned

3. Insistence that private respondent prove her legitimacy shall not succeed

a. Briz v. Briz: Proof of legal acknowledgement is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition (Siguiong v. Siguiong). And the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father or mother (Capistrano v. Fabella).

4. In partition proceedings, dismissal prior to answer is premature

a. Roque v. IAC: In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved.

5. Vda de Daffon: Action for partition filed by plaintiffs was met by a MTD filed by defendants based on grounds of failure of complaint to state a cause of action, waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.

6. Prescription: The MTD filed by petitioners did not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in an MTD only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed, otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.

HEIRS of YPON v. RICAFORTE aka GAUDIOSO YPONDOCTRINE: The Court held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession. If filed in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, complaint shall be dismissed.Petitioners: Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon

Respondents: Gaudioso Ypon, allegedly Magdaleno Ypons only son and heir, and the Register of Deeds of Toledo CityAction: a. Complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance with damagesb. Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45Court:

RTC Dismissed complaint on ground of lack of cause of action

Facts:

1. Petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance with damages after Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte aka Gaudioso Ypon executed an affidavit of self-adjudication and transferring all the parcels of land of Magdaleno to himself. Magdaleno died intestate and childless, thus petitioners were his collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.2. In his answer, GY alleged he is Magdalenos lawful son, as evidenced by a certificate of live birth, two letters from Polytechnic School, and his passport. By way of affirmative defense, he claimed a. petitioners had no COA against himb. complaint fails to state COAc. case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest as it was not shown petitioners were real heirs3. RTC dismissed complaint becausea. No cause of action against GYb. Though plaintiffs established their relationship to Magdaleno in a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean they could automatically be considered compulsory heirsc. Gaudioso successfully established filiation through documentary evidenceISSUES:Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC of the complaint was proper (NOOO)

If the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants Petitioners alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA: The Court held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession Litam, et al. v. Rivera: the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action Exceptions: The need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon; or When a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. While a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.