Parliamentarized Presidentialism: A New Model in Executive-Legislative Relations

8/8/2019 Parliamentarized Presidentialism: A New Model in Executive-Legislative Relations

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Since no parliamentary systems exist in Latin American, Linzs hypothesisthat

parliamentary systems are more likely to lead to democratic consolidation than presidential

oneshas not been directly tested in the region. The Bolivian case, however, offers the

possibility of testing Linzs hypothesis. Although nominally a presidential system, Bolivias

electoral system uses a single fused ballot that combines legislative and executive elections into

a single vote choice for voters. Similarly, although a simple majority can directly vote the

president into office, when no simple majority exists, the Bolivian executive is selected by the

legislature. Multipartism, reinforced by use of proportional representation, has ensured that

Bolivian presidents are chosen by the legislature after intense coalition building negotiations.

These parliamentary features make the Bolivian system a unique hybrid referred to by

Ren Antonio Mayorga (1997) as parliamentarized presidentialism. 1 Further, several authors

credit Bolivias unique political system for democratic stability under very difficult conditions

(e.g. Mayorga 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992; Gamarra 1997b, Valenzuela 1993). Comparing

Bolivia to presidential systems, such as Ecuador and Peru, suggest that Linzs hypothesis is

correctpresidential systems are less likely to lead to consolidated democracies than

parliamentarized systems.

While many scholars point to Bolivia as a special case (Linz 1990b; Linz 1994; Sartori 1994;

Jones 1995), it has received very little attention in the academic literature. In part, this paper is

an effort to explore the implications of the Bolivian case only hinted at by previous authors. Astudy of the Bolivian case accomplishes two different, but related goals. First, evidence from

Bolivia highlights the importance of simple institutions that balance the need for flexibility and

stability. Second, learning from the successes (and failures) of Bolivias democratization may

provide a model for future constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening democratic

institutions in the region.

A study of the Bolivian model emphasizes two important points. First, the use of a fused

ballot is the key variable in Bolivias political system. This subtle difference distinguishesparliamentarized presidentialism from other hybrid or mixed systems. Bolivias system is

1 Eduardo Gamarra uses the term hybrid presidentialism to describe Bolivias political system(Gamarra 1997a; Gamarra 1997b; Gamarra 1996). Matthew Shugart and John Carey use the termassembly-independent (Shugart and Carey 1992, 26, 78-85). The term parliamentarizedpresidentialism, however, more clearly describes the system than does assembly-independent anddistinguishes it from other dissimilar hybrid systems. Hence, I adopt the term coined by Juan Linz(Linz 1994, 85-86 n91) as used by Ren Antonio Mayorga.

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thus parliamentarized, unlike 1932-73 Chile (which also allowed the legislature to elect a

president in the absence of a majority). Bolivias system is also still more presidential than post-

1996 Israel (in which prime ministers are elected by direct popular election). 2 That a subtle

difference, such as ballot structure, can have profound consequences for the political system

implies that constitutional engineers may achieve substantive system changes with only minor

institutional changes. Second, Bolivias system functions to a large degree on the basis of

informal coalition-building rules. Political lites have adopted a set of informal rules that have,

since 1985, produced stable ruling coalitions.

Evidence from the Bolivian case is extremely relevant for other Latin American democracies.

Bolivia demonstrates that a presidential system can be modified to limit some of the problems

typically associated with presidentialism while avoiding the political instability that might

follow a more dramatic switch to pure parliamentarism. The inclusion of parliamentarized

presidentialism into our typology of democratic systems both enriches our understanding of

(formal and informal) political institutions and provides constitutional engineers with more

reform options. After nearly two decades in operation, the Bolivian model may now be mature

enough to serve as a model for other new democracies especially those seeking to modify

their presidential constitutions and avoid the perils of presidentialism.

Juan Linz and Presidentialism

The recent debate over the merits of presidential democracy was sparked by Juan Linzs

essay Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? which was

circulating in manuscript form as early as 1985. The basis of Linzs argument was the

observation that presidential democracy had a high rate of failure or breakdown. Along with

this came the parallel observation that most long-standing democracies were parliamentary, not

presidential (with the notable exception of the United States). Although the argument appears

2 Chiles system was not fully parliamentarized since it did held separate elections for theexecutive and the legislature. The ability of the legislature to elect a president did not eliminate theproblem of dual legitimacy and did not offer strong coalition-building incentives. Israels parliamentarysystem is also not fully presidentialized despite the separate election of the executive. The Israeliprime minister is still subject to a vote of confidence. Bolivias system is substantially different from both of these, as subsequent sections of the paper will illustrate.

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on the surface to be a condemnation of presidentialism tout court in favor of parliamentarism,

Linz is careful to point out that he [does] not argue that any parliamentary system is ipso facto

more likely to ensure democratic stability than any presidential system (1990b, 84).

Linzs argument is based on a dichotomous contrasting of presidentialism and

parliamentarism, especially with regards to their correlation with stability and consolidation.

This leads him to subsequently develop the two ideal-type systems he later evaluates. Several

scholars (e.g. Valenzuela 1993; Fabbrini 1995; Stepan and Skach 1993) joined Linz in

condemning presidentialism. Other scholars (e.g. Horowitz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart

1997b; Shugart and Carey 1992) have criticized Linz for oversimplifying the dichotomy between

presidentialism and parliamentarism and for exaggerating the dangers of presidentialism while

too readily dismissing problems with parliamentarism. Some of Linzs critics point out that

differences between and among presidential systems are significant and that other variables

especially electoral systemshave dramatic consequences for the way presidential democracies

operate (e.g. Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fern ndez 1998).

Essentially, Linz argues that the historically poor performance of presidentialism as a

regime typethe observation that most long-standing democracies are not presidentialis

based on the central characteristics of presidentialism itself. He defines a presidential system as

one in which an executive with considerable constitutional powers is elected by the people

for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence (1990a, 52).

Elsewhere, Linz characterizes presidentialism by its two most prominent features: (a) dual

legitimacy and (b) [temporal] rigidity (1994, 6). Presidentialism is marked by dual legitimacy

because both the executive and the legislature are elected independently, giving each a claim to

direct democratic legitimacy. Presidentialism is also marked by rigidity because terms of office

are set for a specific length of time, during which the executive cannot dissolve the legislature

and the legislature cannot easily remove the executive. Linz argues that these two

distinguishing characteristics of presidentialism are weaknesses by themselves and lead to otherstructural problems that make democratic stability and consolidation more difficult. Although

democratic stability and democratic consolidation are not synonymous, it is clear that stability

the durability of democratic norms such as elections, among other thingsis a necessary

condition for consolidation.

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First, the direct election of the executive and the separate election of the legislature gives

each a competing claim to legitimacy. Since each is popularly elected, no democratic principle

can decide who represents the will of the people (Linz 1994, 7). Linz further argues that the

single-person nature of the presidential office makes presidents more likely to see themselves as

representing the nation-at-large, while viewing the legislature as representing special or

parochial interests. Presidents are more willing to challenge legislatures and use decree

powers using their popular mandate as political leverage. Thus, presidentialism is based on

executive-legislative conflict, which is very dangerous for new democracies. This conflict

systematically contributes to impasses and democratic breakdowns (Stepan and Skach 1993,

19). A crucial danger is that, in countries that desperately need effective governments, the

military may decide to act as poder moderador (Linz 1994, 7). Another danger, however, is that

presidents rely on their decree powers to brush aside legislative opposition, producing what

Guillermo ODonnell (1994) termed delegative democracy. In contrast, parliamentarism has

only one source of legitimacy since the only legitimate institution is parliament [and] the

governments authority is completely dependent upon parliamentary confidence (Linz 1990a,

52).

Second, the fixed terms of office of both the executive and the legislature, coupled with their

mutual independence from each other, introduces the problem of temporal rigidity. This

breaks the political process into discontinuous, rigidly demarcated periods, leaving no roomfor the continuous readjustments that events may demand (Linz 1990a, 54). Linz further argues

that this lack of flexibility is especially problematic during periods of transition to democracy

and consolidation (1994, 9). Presidentialism is rigid because it does not allow for early

elections when new governments are needed or demanded. What is more, most presidential

systems have proscriptions against presidential reelection. Governments that are popular and

effective cannot constitutionally extend their mandates; voters are forced to choose new

leadership. In contrast, parliamentary regimes can more easily replace ineffective governmentswithout producing a political crisis and they can extend the mandates of effective governments.

Third, Linz argues that the divided nature of power in presidential systems and the lack of

reelection make both accountability and identifiability more difficult. Identifiability, the ability

for voters to predict what cabinets will look like, is limited since presidents are free to select

their cabinets, making it difficult for voters to make a priori calculations about government

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teams. Accountability suffers because there is no way to hold accountable a president who

cannot be presented for reelection (Linz 1994, 12). Accountability also suffers because

presidentialism encourages executives and legislatures to play the blame game (Linz 1990b,

89). Presidents are also not accountable to their own parties or the legislature, since there is no

vote of confidence (Linz 1994, 13-14). In contrast, parliamentary systems provide greater

degrees of identifiability since voters can often recognize potential government teams.

Accountability is reinforced both by making executives subject to a vote of confidence and

greater cooperation between executives and legislatures they rise or fall together.

Fourth, presidentialism has majoritarian and winner-take-all tendencies. By its very

nature, the office of the president is a one-person office, which raises the stakes in presidential

election and inevitably increases the tensions and the polarization (Linz 1994, 19).

Subsequently, the one-person office of chief executive reduces presidential politics to a zero-

sum game and encourages winners to exaggerate their mandates. This majoritarian tendency

produces a less-than-democratic style of politics marked by few cooperative strategies and

authoritarian presidents. In contrast, parliamentary systems rely on collegial cabinets and

encourage more consociational democracies (Lijphart 1999; Linz 1994).

Fifth, presidentialism is marked by an increase personalization of politics and the increased

probability that political outsiders will win office. In delegative democracy, presidential

elections tend to become highly personalized affairs divorced from party programs or identities.This is especially problematic for new democracies, where party identities and policy platforms

are still not fully formed, making voters more susceptible to populistic appeals. The logic of the

one-person office of president also encourages candidates to campaign independently of

political parties and to present themselves as above politics. Presidents come to power with

very little support from their own party or without a political party to speak of. Presidents who

win election on the basis of their own individual charisma are less willing to deal with political

insiders and more prone to see themselves as messianic, national saviors. The consequence isdelegative democracy. In contrast, parliamentarism is less personalized and relies on strong

party discipline and identity.

Linzs argument consists of two distinct parts: (a) the negative evaluation of presidentialism

as a regime type and (b) the positive evaluationand subsequent recommendationof

parliamentarism as more likely to lead to democratic consolidation. Both arguments have been

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criticized. Most of the criticism has been against Linzs condemnation of presidentialism (e.g.

Horowitz 1990; Jones 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a). Although often accepting many of

Linzs criticisms of presidentialism, several scholars criticized Linzs argument that

presidentialism is necessarily inimical to democratic consolidation. They point out that

presidential systems are quite varied, that different combinations of formal and informal rules

radically alter the prospects for democratic consolidation, and that presidentialism ( qua ideal-

type) should not be blamed for democratic failures. In short, the bulk of the criticism is simply

that Linz relies on an ideal-type of presidentialism and does not adequately differentiate

between different types of presidential systems. Other critics also point out to weaknesses in

parliamentarism that make the system problematic for new democracies. Such scholars do not

promote parliamentarism, but rather other institutional solutions, such as changing electoral

laws, to renovate presidentialism (e.g. Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fern ndez 1998). Finally, even

some scholars who agree with Linzs condemnation of presidentialism are hesitantfor a

variety of reasonsto recommend that new democracies adopt parliamentarism (e.g. Sartori

1997; Sartori 1994; Lijphart 1999).

The Perils of Presidentialism?

Although many of the defenses of presidentialism have been half-hearted, some scholars

have pointed to advantages presidential democracy has over parliamentarism (e.g. Mainwaring

and Shugart 1997a; von Mettenheim 1997). Most, however, accept many of Linzs criticisms of

presidentialism and recognize that ideal-type or pure presidentialism should be blunted by

other measures. Still, some scholars have focused on the methodological weakness of Linzs

argument against presidentialism (e.g. Horowitz 1990; Nohlen 1998b). Other scholars have

called attention to other important variablesmostly electoral laws and the executives

legislative powersthat influence presidentialisms democratic character and performance (e.g.

Jones 1995; Nohlen and Fern ndez 1998; Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox and Morgenstern 2001).

Some of the sharpest criticisms against Linzs argument are methodological. Donald

Horowitz (1990) and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart (1997a) point out that much of the

anti-presidential literature is prone to selection bias. Presidentialism has been most common in

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regions with little history of democracy, poorly institutionalized political party systems, and

low levels of socioeconomic development. In contrast, parliamentarism has been most common

in Europe, with its longer experience with and slow evolution towards democracy, more

institutionalized party systems, and (perhaps most importantly) higher levels of socioeconomic

development. In short, the breakdown of democracies in developing countries could be

accounted for by any of several variables other than presidentialism. The presidential systems

that broke down shared too many other features in common. Horowitz also points out that the

history of parliamentarism has also been spotted in Europe. Both the Weimar and the pre-war

Italian parliamentary democracies collapsed. Democracy in both countries was restored only

after their fascist governments were defeated and the Western Allies imposed new democratic

constitutions. They also criticize Linz for failing to account for the failures of parliamentarism

before the Second World War (in Europe) and after (in the developing world).

Dieter Nohlen (1998b) raises a parallel methodological criticism. He points out that Linzs

argument rests on the use of counterfactuals that hypothesize what might have happened

and lead to a methodologically weak argument, departing from the belief that parliamentarism

would have led to something different, [and] faults presidentialism for what happened (1998b,

88). Nohlen also points out that Linz does not adequately deal with anomalous casessuch as

Venezuela, Colombia, or Costa Ricain which presidential democracy survived the turbulent

1960s and 1970s. Nohlen instead offers the hypothesis that the success of parliamentarism inEurope after the Second World Warand of presidential democracy in Venezuela, Colombia,

and Costa Ricawas a result of political learning and not of any systemic features. The

collapse of democracy and the rise of fascism in inter-war Europe taught political lites and

voters important lessons about the dangers of parliamentary politics. Subsequently, both lites

and voters (but especially lites) overcame the shortcomings of their political system by

adopting consociational strategies. Similarly, Nohlen looks at the recent history of Latin

America and the widespread survival of presidential democracy with optimism and suggeststhat presidential democracies are also able to provide venues for political learning.

Other scholars argue that Linz unfairly misrepresented presidentialism by focusing on the

American prototype. Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern (2001) argue that Linzs argument

suffers from the use of ideal-types and does not distinguish between the variety of subtypes of

presidentialism currently in practice. Differences between presidential systems are significant

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and make discussion of any ideal-type of presidentialism problematic since claims developed

from one type are not generalizeable to the category as a whole. Matthew Shugart and John

Carey (1992) call for the development of more careful typologies of presidential systems. They

demonstrate that most presidential systems bear little resemblance to the American version

from which Linz bases much of his criticism. Working from these more differentiated

typologies, subsequent works such as those by Mark Jones (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart

(1997b), and Carey and Shugart (1998) demonstrate that some forms of presidentialism may be

less problematic than others.

Most scholars, however, agree with the main thrust of Linzs criticisms of presidentialism

especially the issues of dual legitimacy and rigidity. Those who criticize Linz, however, argue

that the problems produced by dual legitimacy and rigidity are not inevitable. Rather, they

depend on other factors such as electoral systems, party systems, and the mix of legislative and

executive powers. The problems of dual legitimacy and rigidity are most acute when

governments are headed by presidents without legislative majorities or near-majorities. Under

such circumstances, democracy suffers from lack of effective governance. The outcomes may be

diverse. Some states may muddle through, as Ecuador has done for the last two decades

(Isaacs 1996; Barczak 1997). Other states, however, may develop more authoritarian tendencies,

or democradura, such as Peru under Alberto Fujimori. Still, the probabilities of divided

government and ineffective governance can be blunted through institutional reforms. Jones (1995) demonstrates that electoral systems have a significant effect on producing

executives with legislative majorities or near-majorities. Rather than radical reforms to

parliamentarize Latin American democracies, Jones recommends electoral systems designed

to encourage moderated multipartism. Such measures include plurality elections for the

president (rather than second-round runoff formulas), medium-sized multimember districts

with proportional representation, and concurrent legislative and presidential elections.

Similarly, Shugart and Mainwaring argue that the nature of the party system, in particular thenumber of parties, makes a fundamental difference in how presidential systems function (1997,

394). The success of presidential democracy depends in great part on the degree of party system

fragmentation and party discipline, just as parliamentary democracies rely on stable and

disciplined party systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) also argue that electoral systems are a

crucial factor in determining the success or failure of presidential democracies. Like Dieter

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Nohlen (1998a), these scholars argue for smaller-scale institutional changes that would

renovate presidentialism by adopting electoral systems that help reduce polarized

multipartism and produce legislative majorities.

Finally, several scholars have taken Linz to task for his claim that the style of politics is

significantly different (i.e. less democratic) in presidentialism than in parliamentarism. Grace

Ivana Deheza (1998) takes up Linzs charge that presidentialism encourages winner-take-all

strategies. She points to evidence that South American presidential democracies have significant

consociational tendencies; in a study of nine South American presidential systems, 56 percent of

governments were coalition governments (1998, 156). Deheza also discovered that coalition

parties are awarded significant shares of ministerial and cabinet posts in comparison to the

presidents party. She concludes that the ability of presidential systems to build stable and

effective coalitions depends more on the institutional combinations, the party systems, the

relationships established by the parties forming the government and that the formation of

accords and coalition governments in multiparty systems reduce the conflicts that can emerge

among the parties, generating cooperative forms of government (1998, 169).

Other scholars have pointed out that presidentialism does not necessarily suffer from

winner-take-all politics, as Linz contends. One of the criticisms of presidentialism is that its

divided government often leads to governments that rule by executive decree rather than

through the legislature. There is evidence, on the contrary, that presidential systems are nomore prone to use executive decrees than are parliamentary systems (e.g. Carey and Shugart

1998b; Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Carey and Shugart (1998a) argue

that decree powers should be more carefully disaggregated and considered among their

different dimensionsespecially differentiating between reactive and proactive decree powers.

Carey and Shugart (1998a) point out that presidential systems vary significantly on the different

types of decree and other legislative powers available to executives. Interestingly, Della Sala

and Krepel (1998) point out that in Italyone of the signature parliamentary systemsexecutives routinely use decree powers to enact legislation.

The Virtues of Parliamentarism?

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The second half of Linzs argument, that parliamentarism is a system better suited for

democratic consolidation, has also not gone uncriticized. As Giovanni Sartori (1994) points out,

even if presidentialism is not well-suited for new democracies, it does not necessarily follow

that parliamentarism must be better suited. Like Sartori, Horowitz (1990) points out that Linzs

argument rests on the counterfactual argument that parliamentary systems would have

performed better where presidentialism failed. Horowitz and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a)

point out, however, that a look at the historical evidence of all democratic systemsnot just the

successful onesreveals that parliamentary systems failed just as often as presidential systems

do. This is especially the case in underdeveloped countries with little previous experience with

democracy. Horowitz also points out that only twenty-five years ago scholars advanced the

argument that the inherited Westminster style of parliamentary democracy was responsible for

much of the authoritarianism then emerging in English-speaking Africa (1990, 74).

The criticisms that Horowitz raises still fundamentally agree with Linzs primary reasons to

criticize presidentialism. Like nearly all participants in the institutionalist debate, Horowitz

agrees that democratic stability is desirable. Simply standing the test of time is not a sufficient

condition for democratic consolidation, but it is a necessary condition. Without a repeated

pattern of elections and the other formalities of democracy, it is impossible to establish any

deeper sense of democracy. Horowitz also agree that it is right to worry about winner-take-all

outcomes and their exclusionary consequences (Horowitz 1990, 79). Extreme winner-take-allmajoritarianism and zero-sum politics only hinder democratic consolidation. Critics point out

that parliamentarism itself is highly majoritarian; for example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a)

point out that parliamentary systems have a tendency towards powerful executives who head

legislative majorities. In such cases, a disciplined majority party leaves the executive virtually

unconstrained between elections. Here, more than in any presidential system, the winner takes

all (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 453).

The advantages of presidentialism that Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) and vonMettenheim (1997) point out offset the weaknesses of parliamentarism. Mainwaring and

Shugart argue that presidentialism offers voters a greater variety of choices since they can vote

for both the executive and the legislature. Contrary to Linz, Mainwaring and Shugart also argue

that presidentialism offers voters a greater degree of identifiability and accountability, since it is

much more difficult for voters in parliamentary systems to hold parties accountable when they

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are members of grand coalitionslet alone to predict what kind of coalitions are possible. Such

a problem would be more acute in new democracies. Finally, they argue that legislative

independence in presidentialism makes the system more stable and effective than

parliamentarism, since legislators can act on legislation without worrying about immediate

consequences for the survival of the government, issues can be considered on their merits rather

than as matters of confidence (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 462). Von Mettenheim also

points to several advantages presidentialism has over parliamentarism. For one, the separation

of powers doctrine provide[s] both moral grounds and institutional settings for reconciling

plebescitarian, populist, and nationalist appeals since separately elected executives and

legislators must balance different political demands. More fundamentally, von Mettenheim

argues that the separation of powers theory is still relevant today and should be more

carefully included in analysis of institutional design.

Arend Lijphart is critical of majoritarian tendencies in both parliamentary and presidential

systems. Lijphart is especially critical of the Westminster style of parliamentarism because it

too is clearly majoritarianperhaps even more majoritarian than most presidential systems. He,

of course, prefers to distinguish between consociational and majoritarian democracies (e.g.

Lijphart 1984; 1999). Consociational systems revolve around grand coalitions that include all or

nearly all relevant political groups and actors. These coalitions are based upon informal

agreements between political lites, rather than on formal institutional rules. These informalrules, however, were often adopted only after decades of conflictual and unstable politics; they

were not created overnight. Because these systems are based on informal, rather than formal

institutions, consociationalism is also possible in presidential democracies. Lijphart has often

pointed to Colombia and Venezuela as examples of Latin American presidential systems that

adopted consociational rules. Subsequently, although Lijphart (1994b) joins Linz in condemning

presidentialism for being prone to majoritarianism, he argues that not all presidential systems

are necessarily majoritarian nor that all parliamentary systems escape the same vice.It is important to briefly note that consociationalism also suffers from its own weaknesses.

As a regime type, consociationalism is prone to rigidity if coalitions are fixed too concretely and

allow governments to remain in the same hands over time. Similarly, the fixed, grand coalitions

of consociationalism can damage the legitimacy of democracy both if new groups are excluded

and if elections become essentially meaningless. If voters know that changes (even large ones)

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in election results do not alter governments, they may become cynical and lose faith in the

practice of democracy. Even if this is not important in established democracies (but the example

of Austria suggests that it is), the practice of meaningful elections is crucial in new democracies.

In countries with histories of manipulated or fa ade elections (or with no history of elections at

all), consociational practices many not be clearly distinguishable from the authoritarian past.

Citizens in new democracies need to learn to value democratic elections as a means for political

(and policy) change. Finally, in newly established democracies, the relevant groups and actors

may not yet be established. A premature consociational pact could also lock in some group(s)

dominant in the early stages of democratization as the price for electoral democracy. 3 Thus,

consociationalism could actually serve a conservative function in new democracies and may

unnecessarily prolong the influence of hard-liners or authoritarian lites.

Lijpharts proposal in favor of consociationalism comes close to making institutions

essentially meaningless; it is also much more lite driven. If successful democratic consolidation

rests on lite consensus, and if consensus is possible in any institutional framework (from

parliamentarism to presidentialism), then the debate over which system to adopt is no longer

critical. Lijphart still sees formal institutional design as playing a significant role in democratic

consolidation, however (e.g. Lijphart and Waisman 1996). Incentives must be sought that

encourage coalition building. Lijpharts 1994 article in the Linz and Valenzuela volume, The

Failure of Presidential Democracy, essentially argues that parliamentarism ison the wholemore amenable to consociational democracy than is presidentialism.

Perhaps the best argument for rejecting parliamentarism for new democracies comes from

Sartori (1997, Ch. 6). Despite joining Linz in criticizing presidentialism, Sartori (1994) rejects

parliamentarism as a solution for new democracies. Instead, he recommends a mixed system

similar to that of the French Fifth Republic. Sartoris criticism of parliamentarism rests mainly

on the systems dependence on parliamentary fit parties. These types of party systems are

lacking in Latin America. Parliamentary fit parties are strongly institutionalized and disciplinedpolitical parties that are able to hold together in supporting the government (generally a3 For example, both Colombias National Front and Venezuelas Punto Fijo bipartisan power-

sharing accords essentially locked in the two dominant parties in each country at the expense of latergroups. The development of the guerrilla war in Colombia and Venezuelas recent political instabilityhas been blamed on these consociational strategies that guaranteed that no other social groups orpolitical parties could challenge the status quo. See Gaviria (1998), Hartlyn and Dugas (1999), Hoskinand Murillo (1999), Levine and Crisp (1999), McCoy (1999).

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coalition) that is their appointee (Sartori 1997, 102). Without parliamentary fit parties, a switch

to parliamentarism could easily lead to unstable and short-lived governments. Such a situation

is clearly dangerous for new democracies, where citizens and lites alike may not easily

distinguish between a government and a regime crisis, as Horowitz (1990) demonstrates. More

to the point, in an underdeveloped country with no history of democracy there may not be a

difference between these two distinct forms of crisis.

Sartoris argument that Latin America (and other new democracies) lack parliamentary fit

parties is crucial. As S. M. Lipset (2000) points out, political parties are indispensible for

democracy. Democracies need strong disciplined parties for various reasons. Disciplined parties

with clear ideologies and policy platforms make electoral politics more identifiable and

accountable. Voters can more clearly predict government teams and policies when parties are

disciplined and adopt predictable policies. Disciplined parties also allow for depersonalization

of politics since parties develop long term strategies and seek to develop future party leaders.

Conversely, legislators from disciplined parties have greater incentives to work with executives

since their future electoral success depends on collective efforts to successfully implement

policy. Without disciplined parties, voters cannot easily hold governments accountable in

future elections.

Hybrid Systems and the French Model

Because presidentialism and parliamentarism are both open to criticism, some scholars have

recommended hybrid or mixed systems instead. Sartori (1994) begins his criticism of Linz

by emphasizing that parliamentarism and presidentialism do not exhaust the universe of types

of democratic systems. Pointing to cases such as Bolivia and France, Sartori points out the

possibility of constitutional designs that are neither presidential nor parliamentary. Still,

Sartori obviously has the French system in mind and he only discusses Bolivias system in

passing. Since the French system is markedly different than Bolivias system of

parliamentarized presidentialism, it should be briefly discussed.

The French system of can be described as a twin-engine model. Also known as premier-

presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992), this system is both presidential and parliamentary

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marked by a dual executive. The head of government is the premier or prime minister, selected

by the parliament. The head of state is the president, chosen by direct popular election. In

theory, the two engines of premier-presidentialism are able to switch on and off as needed to

provide the stability of presidentialism while maintaining the greater flexibility of

parliamentarism. Critics of this system (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Suleiman 1994), however,

point out that it is prone to many of the same shortcomings that plague pure presidential

systems.

The separate election of the head of state means that the system also suffers from the

problem of dual legitimacy. Similarly, because the president is elected for a fixed term, the

system is no more immune to rigidity than pure a presidential system. In new democracies,

especially, these problems can become accentuated. More importantly still, premier-

presidentialism is a more complicated system than either presidentialism or parliamentarism.

Citizens in countries with little experience with democracy may not be able to understand

clearly a political system with two separate engines, each of which can take over the direction of

government and each of which has separate a basis of legitimacy. Similarly, in countries with

weak party systems, the struggles between the president and prime minister could just as likely

lead to delegative democracy as could struggles between the executive and the legislature in

presidential systems. Finally, the different claims to power of each engine can prove

destabilizing. Under such conditions, the role of the military as poder moderadoris dangerouslylikely.

Premier-presidentialism has been adopted by many East European countries, such as

Russia, to less than promising results. Russias political system has been dominated by its

president, both under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Sartori himself recognizes that if the

Russian system is a premier-presidential system, it is an ill conceived-one (1997, 139 n. 9). The

Russian experiencealong with that of other East European premier-presidential systems

suggests that new democracies are ill-suited for this type of system. If premier-presidentialismin new democracies operates like a presidential system, with strong executives who use decree

powers to overcome parliamentary opposition, then proposing premier-presidentialism as a

solution to the perils of presidentialism seems unpromising.

Part of the problem may lie in the nature of premier-presidentialism itself. Suleiman (1994)

actually considers the French system a presidential system and argues that the success of

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premier-presidentialism had less to do with the system itself than with other factors. He argues

that the dual executive system does not function in a predetermined way and can lead to

either cohabitation (when president and prime minister get along), moderated conflict, or

even competing legitimacies (Suleiman 1994, 139). The separate, independent democratic

legitimacy each executive has can lead to divisive political struggles if the president and the

prime minister represent different political parties or coalitions. Even in the French system, the

division of powers between both branches of government are rather unclear. In the hands of

strong-willed executives (such as a Yeltsin), the power to disband the cabinet and rule by decree

would be a strong temptation. Under such conditions, premier-presidentialism is just as prone

to delegative democracy (and for the same reasons) as presidential systems in which strong

executives lack legislative majorities. In sharp contrast to Sartoris optimism, Suleiman warns

that the 1958 French constitution is a delicate instrument that should be emulated with

extreme caution (1994, 160).

I agree with the argument that mixed systems may serve new democracies better than

pure systems. But I also hold that a key element necessary for successful democratic

consolidation is simplicity. The virtues of simplicity include transparency and ease of operation.

Voters can quickly learn how to govern themselves via their representatives if they can clearly

see how their votes translate into governments and policies. The French system, for all its

advantages, is a complicated system and may prove unwieldy if adopted by new democracies.If hybrid systems offer the best possibility to balance the needs for stability and flexibility, we

should look to the case of Bolivia, which offer another model of a mixed political system. The

study of Bolivias system of parliamentarized presidentialism does more than merely help us fill

in the gaps in our typology of political systems and regime types. The Bolivian model is

instructive because it led to democratic consolidation in a least-likely scenario. Parliamentarized

presidentialism balances the need for stability and flexibility without the bulkiness of two

engines that must somehow cohabitate.

The Bolivian Model

Since democratization Bolivias political lite have employed the system of parliamentarized

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presidentialism. This system is as substantially different from premier-presidentialism as it is

from pure presidentialism or parliamentarism. The system is defined by a combination of

formal institutions and informal rules whose three key features are: (a) fused-ballot list

proportional representation, (b) legislative election of the executive, and (c) informal

consociational rules that produce majority legislative coalitions. The first two features are

formal institutional frameworks, although only the legislative election of the executive is clearly

stipulated in the constitution (Article 90). This system is clearly not fully presidential due to

the fused ballot and election of the executive by the legislature. Neither is the system fully

parliamentary, since the legislature cannot call for a vote of confidence. Once elected, the

president tends to act like a prime ministereven though nominally holding formally

presidential powers.

First, the backbone of parliamentarized presidentialism is the electoral system. The

combination of list proportional representation (PR) with a fused ballot is the key institutional

constraint defining Bolivias political system. It is commonly understood that PR electoral

systems are associated withand tend to reinforcemultiparty systems (Duverger 1954;

Lijphart 1994a). Subsequently, legislative seats in countries with PR systems tend to be divided

among several parties, with none gaining a majority. For this reason, critics of presidentialism

point out the dangers of combining independent elections for the executive with proportional

representation elections for the legislature since they tend to produce executives withoutlegislative majorities.

The Bolivian case is an exception, however, because of its fused ballot. The highly simple

structure of the Bolivian ballot fuses the election of the executive and legislature into one

singular vote choice, resembling ballots in pure parliamentary systems. When voting,

Bolivian citizens receive a simple multi-color, multi-sign ballot that has the name of each

presidential candidate along with the names, signs, and colors of their party. Voters are then

given a pencil and simply asked to mark the box for their presidential candidate. Seats in thelower and upper chambers of the legislature are then given out in proportion to vote shares for

this single vote choice. If a candidate wins a majority of the vote, he or she is automatically

chosen as president.

Second, if no presidential candidate wins by direct popular vote, the newly elected

legislature meets to elect the president as stipulated in Article 90 of the constitution. Before

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1994, the Congress chose from among the top three candidates; after 1994, Congress now

chooses from among the top two. This provision, of course, was originally meant to apply only

if no candidate wins a clear, absolute majority. The realities of Bolivias multiparty system,

however, have meant that this provision has been used to select every president since 1982 (a

total of five). There is no indication that any presidential candidate will win an absolute

majority in future elections. 4

Third, during the congressional election stage, informal coalition rules play a pivotal role.

The electoral system constrains voters and politicians by reinforcing a competitive multiparty

system. Article 90 provides a selection rule if no candidate wins by direct election. But this

provision does not stipulate how the legislature should select a president. After all, the

legislature could merely elect a compromise candidate, producing a president with no

legislative majority. Since 1985, however, Bolivias political parties have adopted coalition-

building strategies used to select presidents. In exchange for votes for their presidential

candidate, parties receive cabinet positions and concessions to adopt specific policy platforms,

along with a general share in the government agenda and state patronage. These coalitions are

also loosely consociational in the sense that member parties use the cabinetor even

paraconstitutional bodies 5from which to set policy jointly, often after intense intra-coalition

negotiations. These coalitions, however, are also not consociational in the sense that Lijphart

would use; they are not so inclusive that they eliminate the important role of a democraticopposition or eliminate competition from the political system.

Finally, it seems clear that voters understand the informal rules used by political lites to

form coalition governmentsalthough this requires further empirical evidence. Over time, two

clearly marked poles have formed marked by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario

(MNR, National Revolutionary Movement) on the one hand and a firm alliance between Accin

Democr tica y Nacionalista (ADN, Democratic National Action) and Movimiento de la Izquierda

Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left). Other parties have emerged to play4 The largest vote share for any candidate (38.7%) was won by Siles Zuazos UDP in 1980. Since

then, vote shares have been spread between the largest parties. In 1997, B nzer Su rezs ADN was thefront-runner with only 22.3%.

5 For example, the 1989-93 MIR-ADN Acuerdo Patriotico (AP) coalition government wasgoverned primarily through the Comit del Acuerdo Patriotico(Committee of the Patriotic Accord). JaimePaz Zamora (head of MIR) was president of the republic; Hugo B nzer Su rez (head of ADN) waschairman of the committee and was often referred to as the co-president.

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king-maker roles, although some have consistently aligned themselves to one of the major

parties.

Although the 1994 constitutional reforms introduced important changes to the political

system, there is no indication that they significantly affected parliamentarized presidentialism.

Since 1994, Congress is now restricted to selecting the president from among the top two (rather

than three) candidates. The practice of building coalitions has gone largely unaffected; the

reform may instead have helped streamline the process. The changes to the electoral system,

introducing a German-style multi-member proportional system (MMP), also do not seem to

have affected the dynamics of parliamentarized presidentialism. Scholars recognize that this

electoral system is fundamentally a type of proportional representation (Lijphart 1999; Jones

1995a). Although multi-member proportional systems allow for direct, first-past-the-post

election of representatives for half of the lower house in single-member districts, the system is

still a proportional representation system since the other half of the seats in the lower house are

apportioned to reflect total votes. A final change was the extension of the electoral cycle to five

years from four. As with the other changes, there is no indication that it significantly altered the

dynamic of parliamentarized presidentialism.

Because the Bolivian model uses a fused ballot from which both the legislative and the

executive offices are filled, the system does not face the problems of dual legitimacy. Just as in

pure parliamentary systems, parliamentarized presidentialism produces an executive whose basis of legitimacy is intimately connected to that of the parliament. The system retains

presidential aspects, however, since the types of powers each branch of government hold are

substantively separated. The president does not have the constitutional power to dismiss the

legislature; the legislature, for its part, does not have the ability to call a vote of confidence.

Subsequently, the set term limits for both branches of governmentwhich are concurrentgive

the system a degree of stability that might not have been possible if Bolivia had adopted a pure

parliamentary system.The system has positively affected Bolivian political life and contributed to democratic

consolidation. Since 1982, the highly fragmented party system has given way to a more

moderate multipartism. At the same time, other stipulations of the electoral law have combined

to encourage and help enforce party discipline and the institutionalization of the current party

system. Bolivias electoral law stipulates that legislative seats belong to party members, not to

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individuals. This helped parties enforce discipline over their members, since renegade

legislators could be legally removed from their seats by their parties simply by being dismissed

from the party. Such provisions, reinforcing the system of parliamentarized presidentialism,

have helped consolidate not only Bolivias democracy, but its party system as well. Bolivias

political parties are now more disciplined and parliamentary fit than they were in 1982.

Parliamentarized Presidentialism in Practice

The difficulty of the transition process demonstrates the importance of political learning.

While the formal institutional structure of parliamentarized presidentialism remained the same,

it took Bolivias political lites from 1978 until at least 1985 to fully understand the importance

of informal coalitions rules. One could argue, of course, that Bolivias political lites could have,

in time, learned to use any system. One could also argue that some other political system might

have functioned better from the beginning. Such criticisms are as difficult to deflect as they are

to test. I argue, however, that parliamentarized presidentialism has served Bolivia better, in the

long run, than any of the three other systems. Both pure presidentialism and premier-

presidentialism would have been plagued by dual legitimacy, while the uncertainties of the

transition era would have led to unstable parliamentarism. In the final analysis,

parliamentarized presidentialism supported democratic consolidation under extremely hostile

conditions.

Bolivia made its democratic debut in 1982. Although several civilian governments ruled

throughout its history, none of these would qualify as democracies using Robert Dahls criteria

for polyarchy (Dahl 1971). The constitution this first democratic government inherited had been

written in 1967 during the military government of Ren Barrientos, though it had never been

implemented. The transition to democracy began as early as 1978, when then-dictator Hugo

Bnzer Su rez stepped down in favor of elections. Although elections were held in 1978, 1979,

and 1980, no presidential candidate won a majority; this set off a period of extreme political

crisis that lasted until the last military junta was replaced in 1982.

The unwillingness of politicians to select a president after the 1979 and 1980 elections

largely due to Bolivias political lite failure to use the 1967 constitutions provision for

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congressional election of the presidentproved costly. Military hard-liners used the political

confusion as excuse to launch coups (often with the help of congressional factions) against the

fragile interim civilian governments. Much of the learning process involved politicians

recognizing and exploiting the implications of Article 90 of the constitution, which calls for the

legislature to elect the president if no candidate wins a simple majority. Since Bolivias

democratic history began with a highly fragmented multiparty system and a fused-ballot list

proportional representation electoral system, no presidential candidate was able to (or has yet)

won an absolute majority of votes. It was not until 1982, however, that congressional election of

the chief executive was formally instituted. 6

The 1979 and 1980 elections failed to produce a majority, even though the Unidad

Democr tica y Popular (UDP, Democratic and Popular Union) won a plurality each time. When

civilian government was finally restored in 1982, Congress chose to elect the plurality winner.

The UDP, however, was a loose pre-electoral coalition and did not bargain with other

parliamentary parties. Subsequently, while Siles Zuazo faced a divided opposition, he lacked a

legislative majority with which to effectively govern. As the economic crisis of the early 1980s

spiraled out of control, the UDP front began to unravel. Finally, in 1985, Siles Zuazofaced

with no legislative support and unable to govern effectivelycalled for early elections.

The 1985 general election was a turning point in Bolivias political history. Not only did it

mark the first peaceful transition of power by ballot, it marked the beginning of presidentializedparliamentarism. B nzer Su rezs Accin Democr tica y Nacionalista (ADN, Democratic and

Nationalist Action) won a plurality of votes (32.8 percent) in the popular ballot but was unable

to gain a majority of the seats in the National Congress. Most political actors were uneasy about

allowing the former dictator to hold presidential power so soon after the return to democracy.

The potential stalemate was ended peacefully when Congress implemented Article 90 and

chose the second-runner, Paz Estenssoro as president. Knowing that no other parties would

support the ADN candidate, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, NationalistRevolutionary Movement) campaigned to gain the support of the other parties in the legislature

for its candidate, Paz Estenssoro.

6 The election of Siles Zuazo in 1982 was substantively different than the congressional election of the caretaker governments of Walter Guevara Arce (1979) and Lydia Gueiler Tejada (1980). Both of thelater were elected explicitly to oversee new elections, not to govern as chief executive. It was not until1982 that Bolivias political lite agreed to elect the chief executive in parliament.

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Shortly after his election, however, Paz Estenssoro made a political pact with the ADN. This

pact, known as Pacto por la Democracia (Pact for Democracy) ensured the new president a

legislative majority. In exchange, Paz Estensorros government adopted most of the economic

policies favored by the ADN. This coalition lasted the four years of Paz Estenssoros

government and ensured the implementation of the governments orthodox economic program.

Although the 1982-85 Siles Zuazo government was a coalition government of sorts, the MNR-

ADN government was the first true coalition government. The UDP was a loose electoral

alliance of left-of-center parties and lacked any sort of party discipline. As the economic crisis

deepened, Siles Zuazos coalition disintegrated in the legislature, leaving him without the

ability to govern. In contrast, both Paz Estenssoro and B nzer Su rez were able to discipline

their parties and maintain the uneasy MNR-ADN alliance.

The next political regime was installed in 1989 after the candidate of the Movimiento de la

Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left), Jaime Paz Zamora, was

chosen over front-runner Gonzalo S nchez de Lozada (MNR) and runner-up B nzer Su rez

(ADN). Bnzer Su rez threw his partys support behind the third place MIR to prevent MNR

from taking the presidency for a second consecutive term. In exchange, ADN was granted

several cabinet and ministerial posts. The two parties signed the Acuerdo Patriotico (AP,

Patriotic Accord) which outlined their co-government.

At first, the MIR-ADN alliance seemed strange. The ADN was a right-of-center party, while

MIR was the Bolivias last important left-of-center party. Conventional wisdom would have

suggested another alliance between ADN and the centrist MNR, or between MNR and MIR. But

the MIR-ADN alliance soon developed into what now seems to be perpetual alliance between

the two parties. Since 1989 ADN and MIR have consistently joined together as either opposition

or government. At the end of their first co-government, the two parties formed a new single

electoral front (AP) for the 1993 general elections. Results of the 1993 electoral configuration

were dismal, suggesting that partisans in both parties preferred to retain their own independentidentities. Nevertheless, both parties continue to work closely together. Although both parties

differ on the left-to-right spectrum, they agree on the new key issues of centralization and

nationalization of the economy. While the MNR has, since 1985, embraced more pluralist or

decentralized policies, ADN and MIR have jointly continued to embrace the more traditional

direction of Bolivian domestic and foreign policy.

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The 1993 general elections returned the MNR to the presidency when S nchez de Lozada

gained the parliamentary support of two new parties: the Unidad C vica Solidaridad (UCS,

Solidarity Civic Union) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre(MBL, Free Bolivia Movement). The

1993-97 MNR-led government was the first indication of a new balance of power in Bolivian

politics. Campaigning against B nzer Su rez, the ADN-MIR candidate, the MNR formed a

formal coalition with the indigenous Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberacin

(MRTKL, Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation). This MNR-MRTKL electoral

front presented Bolivia with the first significant Aymara candidate, Victor Hugo C rdenas, for a

major political party. As with the MIR-ADN alliance, this new pluralist pole seems to hold

MNR, MRTKL, and MBL together. The MNR-MRTKL alliance is the strongest, since the two

have since campaigned together as one electoral front in the 1997 elections (although MRTKL

still campaigns independently in local elections).

Bnzer Su rez was elected after the 1997 general elections. A dramatic rise in support for the

two new populist parties, UCS and Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA, Conscience of the

Fatherland), spread the vote into five fairly even blocks. B nzer Su rezs coalition government

(known as la Mega) was a supermajority comprising of ADN, MIR, UCS, CONDEPA, and the

small Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR, New Republican Force). 7 The Mega has proved unwieldy,

however, since as many as five political parties must coordinate against an opposition

dominated by the large MNR, which is still closely supported by MBL. Within a year, tensions

within la Mega caused a crisis as CONDEPA and UCS demanded more power within the

coalition. 8 In his August 1998 state-of-the-union address, B nzer Su rez formally dismissed7 NFR was part of the official ADN-NFR-PDC electoral front. The small Partido Democr tico

Cristiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) has not campaigned independently since 1985. Since then ithas been incorporated de facto(when not explicitly) into the ADN electoral lists. The NFR is headed bythe popular alcalde (mayor) of Cochabamba (Bolivias third largest city), Manfred Reyes Villa. Villa wasa onetime member of ADN, but formed his own personalist party to become Cochabambas alcalde.Despite being a small pre-electoral ally, NFR has special privileges with la Mega.

8 CONDEPA was the more troublesome of the two. Posturing for greater power within thegovernment coalition, CONDEPA voted against the government proposal to eliminate the BonoSolidario (BONOSOL), the national pension plan created by the S nchez de Lozada government, lessthan a month before the 6 August 1998 state-of-the-union address. Tensions were even high shortlyafter the election when CONDEPA demanded the prefecture of Santa Cruz, Bolivias mosteconomically dynamic department, as part of the coalition agreement. This resulted in mass protestsfrom cruce os, since CONDEPA had gained only 2.13 percent of the departmental vote. Another sourceof tension was the election of the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. ADN and MIRhad agreed, as senior coalition partners, to alternatively hold these positions. Both UCS and CONDEPA

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CONDEPA from the government coalition. Subsequently, the ADN-led government no longer

holds a supermajority in the Chamber of Deputies. The short-lived grand coalition of 1997-98

might have taught Bolivias political lites a valuable lesson. The power of a supermajority to

enact legislation is diminished if intra-coalition disputes prevent the development of a coherent

government program. The smaller version of la Mega is now more able to implement policy

with a legislative majority.

Parliamentarized Presidentialism and Democratic Consolidation

Parliamentarized presidentialism was perhaps the most important contributing factor in

Bolivias democratic consolidation. While other variables, such as political will, are also

important, the institutionalist argumentthat political institutions shape incentives and

significantly affect outcomesis a powerfully convincing one. Glancing at two countries with

similar conditions, Ecuador and Peru, we can more clearly see how the unique institutional

design of parliamentarized presidentialism helped Bolivia avoid the problems that continue to

plague its two Andean neighbors.

The Bolivian model also provides opportunities for what I term political learning. By

increasing accountability and identifiability, reducing the negative effects of multipartism, and

encouraging moderated competition, parliamentarized presidentialism allowed Bolivias

citizens and political lites to quickly learn the operation of their democracy. The central

features distinguishing parliamentarized presidentialism, fused ballot proportional

representation and formal separation of the executive and legislature with concurrent, fixed

terms, also combine to reduce the chief dangers of pure parliamentarism and presidentialism.

Fused ballots eliminate the problem of dual legitimacy found in presidential (and premier-

presidential) systems. The development of fixed terms and the lack of a legislative vote of

confidence provision avoids the instability that could accompany a switch to pure

parliamentarism. Instead, Bolivias political system of parliamentarized presidentialism

encourages bargaining and a style of coalition building flexible enough to provide broad basis

of legitimacy to governments, while also providing incentives for coalitions to hold together

demanded that their candidates be considered for these important positions.

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and govern effectively for full terms.

Bolivias party system has moved away from the polarized, fragmented party system of the

past. Today, Bolivia has fewer political parties than in the hectic 1978-85 period. These parties

have also developed a remarkable degree of discipline. Party leaders have been able to enforce

coalitions, due greatly in part to the laws regulating political parties. These stipulate that parties

hold legislative seats, not individuals. Subsequently, legislators who decide to vote against their

party can be easily removed from office by simply being officially expelled from the party. In

such cases, their party-designated suplente (alternate) takes the vacant seat. The electoral

system also encourages a more moderate form of multipartism. As predicted by Jones (1995),

the use of medium-sized district magnitudes has reduced the number of relevant political

parties by introducing a high effective threshold. In the process, extremist parties have been

marginalized to the point where many no longer campaign in national electionsthough they

often still campaign in local elections. Thus, the extreme left and right of the political spectrum

has been truncated, leaving only centrist parties.

The reduction in the number of parties, and especially the virtual elimination of extremist

parties, has also contributed to moderated competition and a reduction of zero-sum politics.

The normalization of coalition-building strategies has meant that parties recognize the need to

tone down campaign rhetoric in anticipation of seeking potential coalition partners immediately

after the election. As politics has become centripetal, parties have developed cohesive policyplatforms that seek to distinguish each other from competitors. At the same time, parties have

learned to develop amicable relations with one another; friendly relations make alliances more

likely. With increased party discipline, party leaders are also better able to enforce coalition

voting, thus also increasing levels of trust between parties. Parties that are unreliable coalition

partners may be rejected in future coalition agreements in favor of parties that demonstrate

more discipline and loyalty.

Bolivian political coalitions are formed at two levels: pre-election and post-election. Someparties have formed perpetual alliances during elections. These have usually involved smaller

parties such as MRTKL (allied to MNR) or PDC (allied to ADN) which have simply merged into

the larger partys electoral lists and formally aligned themselves to the larger parties. Of course,

these parties still retain their individual identities and campaign separately for local offices.

Post-electoral coalitions are made after election between parties (or groups of parties) agreeing

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to share power in government. The adoption of the German-style multi-member proportional

electoral system may introduce a new level of coalition bargaining. Since voters can now vote

for the traditional party list and the new single-member district representative, the same type of

electoral campaign arrangements and strategies developed there might soon also be more

formally adopted in Bolivia. If so, this could only reinforce cooperative behavior between

parties.

The adherence to cooperative behavior among moderately competitive and disciplined

parties has increased accountability and identifiability in Bolivias political system. Since parties

are closely disciplined, voters are able to easily place blame or praise for policy outcomes.

Similarly, Bolivias political parties have developed more depth, hoping to develop future

leaders. The major parties have especially developed second tiers of leadership within their

parties. Up and coming party members are given highly visible ministerial posts or other

positions from which to develop both expertise and visibility. These are expected to replace

outgoing party leaders and stand as future presidential candidates. Since reelection (to any

office) is prohibited, parties have developed future candidates groomed for succession.

Although no such candidate has yet to win an election, it was often clear from the very early

days of the government administration who these candidates would be. The end result is that

voters are easily able to identify potential government teams from within the party itself and

from the subsequent coalitions. Voters who cast a ballot for ADN, for example, must be awarethat their party will most likely make an alliance with MIR, but not MNR. Subsequently, voters

can anticipate as easily as in a parliamentary system the identities of potential ministers and top

level bureaucrats who will be chosen if their presidential choice was elected.

Although it is difficult to directly test the claim that Bolivias institutional design

significantly contributed to democratic stability and consolidationor the converse claim that

another institutional design would have hindered democracya consideration of two similar

cases, Ecuador and Peru, provides strong counterfactual evidence. These two Andean countries,like Bolivia, are among the most underdeveloped in South America and lack any real history of

democracy. Both are also members of the third wave and began their democratization

experience (1978-80) with multiparty systems and PR electoral systems. The different paths that

these countries have taken help demonstrate the unique advantages of the Bolivian model.

Both Ecuador and Peru use a majority run-off formula to elect their president instead of

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congressional election, as in parliamentarized presidentialism. The combination of a second-

round runoff for the president combined with a separate election for the legislature meets Linzs

expectations for presidential systems. Both regimes are plagued by problems of dual legitimacy

and the manufactured majorities for presidents. In Peru, this combination led to the election of a

political outsider, Alberto Fujimori, who was unable to cooperate with an opposition-

dominated legislature. Shortly after his election, Fujimori simply disbanded the legislature with

support from the militaryintroducing the term presidential coup to our political

vocabulary.

In Ecuador, on the other hand, democracy has managed to survive (though only barely)

despite the lack of effective governments. Ecuadorian presidents are elected with little party

support, which soon disintegrates due to lack of party discipline. Coalition governments are

very difficult to implement, since party discipline is so low that a soccer term cambio de

camisetas (change of shirts) is commonly used to describe how politicians change parties while

in office (Barczak 1997). Finally, the addition of midterm elections means that Ecuadorian

presidents must try to cobble together piecemeal coalitions every two years or on an issue-by-

issue basis. That Ecuadorian democracy has managed to limp along for two decades is, in my

opinion, nothing short of a miracle. I suggest, however, that adoption of a form of

parliamentarized presidentialism would dramatically improve Ecuadors chances of building

effective governments and finally consolidating its democracy. If Bolivia had a presidentialsystem, there is no reason to believe that the outcome would have been similar to Ecuador (less

likely) or Peru (more probable).

Similarly, I argue that a parliamentary system would have been an obstacle to democratic

consolidation in Bolivia. With newly emerging political parties, parliamentarism would have

been extremely chaotic. The use of a vote of confidence would have been further debilitating.

Evidence from Bolivias 311 municipal governments is instructive. The electoral system used for

municipal governments is similar to that used for national elections. Voters choose from partylists headed by the partys choice for alcalde. From this single vote, the municipal councils seats

are proportionally distributed among parties. In the event that no party wins a majority,

coalition governments are formed. Municipal governments, however, do use a constructive vote

of confidence. The use of the constructive vote of confidence (which is a mild form of the vote

confidence) has proved problematic in Bolivias municipal governments (Rojas Ortuste 1998).

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Many of the more parliamentarized municipal governments have been unstable, as they

change alcalde on a yearly basis. We can expect that the introduction of a vote of confidence

(constructive of otherwise) might lessen democratic stability and effective governance.

Conclusion

We must, of course, be careful in drawing overly broad conclusions about Bolivias

democratic consolidation from the little evidence we have about its political institutions. We

need more research and data on the development of Bolivias political system and its operation.

There is no reason to believe that Bolivias model of parliamentarized presidentialism was

eitherthe

cause of democratic consolidation or that it made consolidation inevitable. Democraticconsolidation is a complicated process that involves several variables. If anything, the

Ecuadorian case demonstrates that political willthe sheer desire to make democracy work and

maintain civilian governmentcan go a long way. The Bolivian case does suggest, however,

that those seeking to reform presidential constitutions should at least seriously consider

parliamentarized presidentialism. Countries with little experience with democracy and weakly

institutionalized party systems would, I believe, benefit from such a constitutional system. The

Bolivian system is simple to operate, and requires few drastic changes away from either a

presidential system or a parliamentary one. Countries that currently use a presidential system

could be easily parliamentarized by adopting congressional election of the president and a

fused ballot.

It is also important to distinguish the Bolivian model as a general type and as a species.

Although Bolivia offers us the only operating example of parliamentarized presidentialism, I do

not expect that all of its specific institutional features are essential to parliamentarized

presidentialism as a type. What is most important are legislative election of the executive (the

parliamentary element) and the lack of a vote of confidence (the presidential element).

Thus, we see that the Bolivian system is a true hybrid, unlike premier-presidentialism, which

is rather a subtype of presidentialism, as Suleiman (1994) argues. I do not wish to argue that all

of the particular specifics of the Bolivian system should be adopted by other new democracies.

Different countries have different needs that must also be considered. What this paper offers is

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merely the suggestion of a frame upon which to build the machinery of democratic

institutions.

Finally, it is important to remember that parliamentarized presidentialism, in a multiparty

context, requires adopting informal coalition building rules. I do not claim that these informal

arrangements follow necessarily (or even easily) from the institutional framework of

parliamentarized presidentialism. After all, it took Bolivias political lites several years to learn

how to work together to build government coalitions that could effectively govern. But a further

lesson that the Bolivian case provides is a lesson in coalition building for future democracies. If

other new democracies adopt parliamentarized presidentialism, I hope they can avoid similar

costly mistakes.

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