Cabinet decision-making in Hungary Péter Horváth

Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops

Uppsala, 13-18 April 2004 Workshop No 10 "The Process of Decision-Making in Cabinets in Central-Eastern and

Southern Europe"

Contact Address Horváth Péter Department of Politics Horváth Péter University of Sheffield Rétköz u. 6. 3/43. Elmfield, Northumberland Road Budapest – 1118 Sheffield – S10 2TU Hungary Tel.: +44-114-222 1699 Tel.: +36-1-246 1181

Email.: horvath.peter@chello.hu

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Cabinet decision-making in Hungary 1. Framework for cabinet functioning: political competition This paper seeks to provide a new approach to an explanation of cabinet functioning and decision-making. Main thesis of the paper the major determinant of cabinet functioning is party competition. Mainstream cabinet studies in Western Europe have so far neglected this aspect. As a country-study or a country chapter or a comparative work they approach cabinets in an institutional- constitutional way mainly (see e.g. Madgwick 1991; Blondel–Müller-Rommel 1997). Another part of the literature studying cabinet or wider domain of political executive applies network analysis (Burch-Holliday 1996, Smith 1999) or public choice (Dunleavy 1991). There can be found some comparative works that include parties into the study of cabinet. However, the role of parties and cabinet functioning are subordinated to a functionalist (e.g. efficiency and coherence-capacity in Weller-Bakvis-Rhodes 1997) or a combined functionalist-structuralist logic (Blondel-Thiébault 1988; Blondel–Müller-Rommel 1993). This approach seems to believe the essence of politics and cabinet functioning can be found in structures and cabinets must perform a function (representation, efficiency, policy making, etc.). Neither cabinet studies of the new democracies have brought a new approach and have renewed the subfield. They seem to follow the mainstream West European literature applying either an institutional and structuralist-functionalist (Blondel–Müller-Rommel 2001; The Management of Decision Making ...) or a policy approach inspired by rational choice (Goetz 2001). Therefore it seems cabinet studies are dominated by neighbouring social science disciplines which have influenced and fertilised political science. While law (classical constitutional institutionalism), sociology (structuralism, functionalism, network analysis) and economics (rational and public choice) provide an explanation for cabinet functioning it is only political science which has not made its own contribution to the problem. There is no genuine political science interpretation of cabinet decision-making, based on a political explanation. This is the direction this paper tries to depart. A genuine political science explanation of cabinet decision-making must be based on a subject matter of and autonomous approach by political science of its own. It is democratic theory. In searching for an interpretation which can distinguish political science from other disciplines democratic theory can provide an autonomous and own and a more powerful explanation of cabinet functioning than other disciplines. For this reason it is believed major determinant of cabinet decision-making is party competition. A theoretical background of this approach is provided by Schumpeter’s democratic theory (Schumpeter 1976). For it, the essence of contemporary democracy is competition of parties for political leadership; a goal function of parties’ behaviour is a competition for political leadership. Cabinet functioning results from the nature of its component element and their own logic of functioning. It follows the process of governing is of a secondary importance to and a by-product of the competition. Main point of reference for parties in cabinet decision making is not representation (Andeweg 1993, 24) or a tension between representation and efficiency (Blondel-Malova 2004, 1) but political competition. Similarly as political democracy is superior and condition economic and societal democracy (Sartori 1999, 14-17), competition is superior and condition efficiency and representation. In addition to this, in Hungary, as a special characteristic of East-European party systems, political competition is more fierce than in Western Europe. The stakes (policy, rules of the

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game) are higher than in Western Europe, competition is also more adversarial and intense and conflictual (Mair 1997, 193-198). Political competition is manifested in party and coalition politics. For the sake of simplicity, by party politics is meant intra-party politics and by coalition politics or coalition play is meant inter-party politics. The former refers to changing power relationships within a party, the prime minister having a pivotal role in Hungary, especially within the prime minister’s party and to changing his or her and cabinet ministers’ intra-party power positions. The latter refers to changing power relationships between/among coalition partners, especially between the prime minister and a coalition partner. It is also believed major characteristic of intra-party politics is that parties are not unitary actors. Competition takes place among party members too, in a form of competition for party leadership (Schumpeter 1976, 283). Parties are not unitary actors; leadership competition produces intra-party divisions. It is believed, cabinet functioning is influenced by a combination of party and coalition politics. Cabinet decision-making takes place within this framework of complex and changing power relationships. In short, this paper tries to explain cabinet functioning and decision-making on the basis of political competition. Political conditions influencing Hungarian cabinets in 1994-2003 (Horn, Orbán, Medgyessy) will analysed and compared (see Table 1). Table 1 Cabinets formed in Hungary since , 1990-April 2004 Date of

formation Prime

minister Mechanism

of formation

Party composition

Party strength in seats N(%)a

Size and type of coalition

Free rider

Date of

termination

Mechanism of

termination 23 May

1990 Antall, József

First democratic

general election

MDF FKGP KDNP

165 (42.75) 44 (11.40) 21 (5.44)

230 (59.59)

Surplus majority

KDNP 12 Dec 1993

Death of prime

minister

21 Dec. 1993

Boross, Péter

Parliamentary vote

MDF FKGP KDNP

136 (35.60) 36 (9.42) 24 (6.28)

196 (51.30)b

Majority No 28 June 1994

Regular general election

15 July 1994

Horn, Gyula

Regular general election

MSZP SZDSZ

209 (54.15) 70 (18.13)

279 (72.28)

Surplus majority

SzDSz 18 June 1998

Regular general election

6 July 1998

Orbán, Viktor

Regular general election

FIDESZ FKGP MDF

148 (38.34) 48(12.44) 17(4.40)

213 (55.18)

Surplus majority

MDF 15 May 2002

Regular general election

27 May 2002

Medgyessy, Péter

Regular general election

MSZP SzDSZ

178 (46.11) 20 (5.18)

198 (51.30)

Majority No n.a. n.a.

Notes: a: Total number of parliamentary seats is 386. b: On 21 December 1993, when the Boross cabinet was formed, 382 seats were filled.

2. Cabinet structure and co-ordination: evolution of support institutions and mechanisms Cabinet structure and decision-making in Hungary is one-level and centralised into cabinet meeting. Cabinet structure and main co-ordination mechanisms are as follows: 1. cabinet meeting, 2. cabinet committees, 3. sub-cabinet/government committees, 4. government commissioners, 5. meeting of the departmental ministries’ administrative state secretaries, 6. the PMO, 7. Party and coalition co-ordination.1

1 Sub-cabinet committees and government commissioners and the fortnight meetings of the political state secretaries (June 1991-September 1994) do not play part in a day-to-day functioning and decision-making.

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Support institutions and mechanisms serving effective decision-making in cabinet meetings have gradually evolved between 1990-2003. Most important of these, cabinet committees, and party and coalition co-ordination will be presented in this section. 2. 1. Cabinet committees

Number, size and policy distribution of cabinet committees Cabinets in Hungary are not highly fragmented; their mean number of cabinet committees is four in 1990-2004 (Table 2). In concert with European practice (Mackie-Hogwood 1985, 20), cabinet committees for economic affairs and defence policy exist in every cabinet during the whole period. They are the most stable element of committee structure, irrespectively of the political character of a cabinet of the day. The other stable element is the so-called Government Committee since 1994. This committee consists of the prime minister, minister-representative of the coalition partners and other dominant ministers (foreign, interior, finance). Less stable committees are ones for human resources (youth and education affairs, human resources) and European integration. They are more subject to government change. A pattern can be observed from 1994 that it is an MSzP-SzDSz cabinet that tends to establish these committees for human resource and integration. A mean committee size is 7 ministers in 1990-2004 (Table 2). Personal concentration of cabinets into cabinet committees is 0.86 (Table 3). Therefore it can be stated almost each minister tends to be a member in at least on of the cabinet committees. Table 2 Names, size and numbers of cabinet committees (July 1990 – March 2004) Government Economic

Affairs National Security

Youth Policy

Human Resources

Policy

European Integration

Youth Affairs and Education Policy

Σ

1990 7 6 8 3 1991 4 6 8→7 3 1992 4 6 7 7 4 1993 9 9 9

Human Resources and Youth Policy 3

1994 4 7 4 3 1995 4 8 4 3 1996 4 8 4 5→6 4 1997 4→6 8 4 7 4 1998 7→8 4 6 3 1999 8 4 6 3 2000 8 4 6 3 2001 8 4 6 3 2002 5 5→6 5 9 7 5 2003 5 8 5 9 7 5 2004 5 8 5 9 7 5

Mean

6

7

6

8

7

8

7

4

Note: Two numbers for a cabinet committee mean its size changed during the year. Dates in bold indicate cabinet committees of a new cabinet. Source: collated by the author on the base of cabinet standing orders and other cabinet resolutions. Table 3 Changing personal concentration of cabinets, 1990-2003

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00 01 02

03 Mean

15/18 14/20 16/21 18/18 12/14 13/15 14/16 14/17 11/17 11/18 11/18 11/18 16/16 18/18

0.83

0.7

0.76

1.0

0.86

0.87

0.88

0.82

0.65

0.61

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.86Note: As on 31 December of each year. Personal concentration is the number of ministers with cabinet committee membership divided by the total number of ministers. Years in bold indicate a new cabinet. Source: collated by the author on the base of cabinet standing orders and other cabinet resolutions

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Role of cabinet committees As mentioned above cabinet structure and decision-making are centralised into cabinet meeting. Cabinet committees do not act on the behalf of the cabinet as whole. They can not make a decision in the name of whole cabinet.2The Government Committee and the Committee for Economic Affairs, however, are more important in cabinet functioning than the other ones. The Government Committee is a kind of “super-committee” due to its membership and role in decision-making. It is always chaired by the prime minister and comprises the most important ministers (coalition or due to the portfolio). In addition, political co-ordination among cabinet members before a cabinet meeting takes place here. The Committee for Economic Affairs, always chaired by the minister of finance3, has a gate-keeper status in cabinet decision-making. Each cabinet proposal on economic policy is discussed and decided here. A proposal can not get to a cabinet meeting without the Committee’s approval, and its decisions tend to be accepted by the cabinet meeting without a change (Körösényi-Tóth-Török 2003, 449). The Committee’s role was the strongest in 1995-97 when short-term decisions on economic policy-making (e.g. spending budget reserves) was in the hand of the Committee. 2.2. Party and coalition co-ordination The period of 1994-2003 saw a gradual evolution of a web of sophisticated mechanisms of party and coalition co-ordination (political co-ordination, in short) supporting cabinet decision-making. However, functioning of these co-ordination mechanisms is subject to changing power relationships. In 1994-98 a formal coalition committee was established. In 1998-02 co-ordination was based on bilateral talks within the cabinet since each party’s leader became minister. This was, however, complemented by additional mechanisms as follows: 1. The so-called Small Cabinet (1999-01): regular meetings between the prime minister and the two party leader-ministers of the coalition partners (justice – Ibolya Dávid, MDF; agriculture – József Torgyán, FKGP). 2. Bilateral meetings between prime minister Orbán and minister Torgyán before a cabinet meeting 3. “The Six” – informal circle of influential decision-makers of the Fidesz and the cabinet. It includes four core members, party leaders with a cabinet (Orbán, Kövér) or a parliamentary post (Áder, Szájer). Four other members are also party leader (Deutsch, Várhegyi, Pokorni) and/or cabinet member (Stumpf), they role change over time. 4. Informal cabinet meetings, held monthly in general (at least in the first year) and in the country. They were a kind of team-building practice, involving the ministers’ family occasionally. Between 1998 and December 2001 there were 19 such informal meetings (A Miniszterelnöki Hivatal Évkönyve 2001, 107). 5. Meetings between the prime minister and a subgroup of ministers (PMO, interior, secret services) after almost each cabinet meeting. 6. Fortnight meetings between the prime minister and another subgroup of ministers (PMO, economic affairs, finance). 7. Meetings between the minister of PMO and the leaders of parliamentary groups of coalition parties. This meeting was held one day before a cabinet meeting but focused on the cabinet’s activity in the parliament. (Debreczeni 2002 377-382; Stumpf 1999, 329-330) 2 The only exception was the Committee for European Integration for a short period in 1998. 3 The only exception was the period of 1998-02 when it was chaired by the minister of economic affairs.

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From 2002-03 co-ordination has been working in the most informal way since 1994, it is not regulated in the coalition agreement or in any formal way. 1. Major mechanism is bilateral meetings of prime minister Medgyessy and the party leader of the SzDSz (Gábor Kuncze), who is not a cabinet member. They are accompanied by the party leader of the MSzP (foreign affairs minister Kovács) and leader of the parliamentary group (Ildikó Lendvai). 2. “Council of Gods” (similar to “The Six”) - weekly meetings of the prime ministers with MSzP party leaders, including Kovács, Lendvai and Speaker Katalin Szili. They are accompanied by minister of the PMO and private secretary of the prime minister. 3. One MSzP and one SzDSz political state secretary in the PMO (Szekeres, Horn) are responsible for co-ordination between the coalition parties. (Népszabadság 03.02.2004) 3. Cabinet functioning in Hungary: the effect of party politics and coalition politics How are decisions made? Taking the effect of political competition into account, how does these co-ordination structures and mechanism work? Influenced by party and coalition politics how does a cabinet function and how are cabinet decisions made? Main point of this section is that moving towards a prime ministerial dominance is a common tendency characterising each cabinet’s functioning.

3.1. The Horn cabinet

The MSzP (Hungarian Socialist Party), the major government party, was not a united but a highly factionalised party, a conglomerate of rival groups competing with each other for party leadership. They included all the four major idealtypes of intra-party groups4, and comprised groups of opposite political interests [e.g. employees (Trade Unionists 1-3) versus business and employers interests (Business Interests 1-3)]. In addition to high factionalisation, the MSzP was divided along two cross-cutting dimensions of economic policy (supply versus demand side) and relationship with the coalition partner (pro- versus anti-coalition)5. Intra-party groups had been aligned along these two dimensions, creating a politically highly divided party with very complex intra-party power relationships (Figure 1).

4 Factions, tendencies, single-issue alliances, and non-alignment (Webb 2000, 171-174). 5 The anti-coalition stance came from the fact the two-party coalition was an over-sized one, with the SzDSz as free-rider.

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As to the relationship with the coalition partner a written coalition agreement limited the prime minister’s power in decision-making. It had institutionalised for the SzDSz (Alliance of Free Democrats) a veto power over decision-making by requiring consultation and the party’s consent. The veto of the SzDSz extended to standing orders and policy plan of the cabinet, all cabinet decrees and parliamentary proposals, and cabinet resolutions on international relations, national means and debt, budget, exchange and defence policy. It can be stated, the SzDSz got a veto over cabinet structure and functioning, and the government’s general public and personnel policies. The coalition agreement also established a separate body, Coalition Conciliation Council (CCC), for conflict management. Due to a combined effect of party and coalition politics Horn governed against continuous leadership challenges in his party and he sought to widen his room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the SzDSz as well. He governed, especially from the beginning in July 1994 till March 1996, under continuous intra-party leadership challenge (Figure 2).

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Figure 2 Changing approval rate of the coalition parties, the Opposition, andPrime Minister Horn (July 1994 - April 1998)

0

20

40

60

80

1994Jul

Oct 1995Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1996Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1997Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1998Jan

Apr

SZDSZ MSzP Opposition Horn

Notes: a Marked points of time on Horn’s dataline indicate a leadership challenge. b The marked point on the Opposition’s line: before 97 Jan: FKGP, from 97 Jan: Fidesz. Source: Approval rate: www.szondaipsos.hu; leadership challenge: collated by the author. This was due to the fact he belonged to neither of the party factions that made him to maneuver among the factions in order to hold party leadership and prime ministership. His main tactics was he played the factions off against each other in order to stay in power.6Against the SzDSz, Horn mainly used a tactics of going public without consultation. In order to reduce the influence of SZDSZ he proposed new ideas (on policy, personnel, governmental structure), falling on the domain of coalition consultation, by airing them publicly, without prior consultations with the coalition partner. Reactions by the SZDSZ was also going public - voice and protest and demanding CCC talks. However, the point for the prime minister in proposing new ideas was not their substantive content, they rather had an instrumental role in coalition play. By proposing new ideas Horn tried to be in a permanent offensive and to produce coalition crisis situations. He tried to make the SzDSz to agree or to oppose to resist and to refuse his ideas. This tactics was suitable for a dual political aim. If agrees, the SzDSz follows the prime minister’s policy line, if disagrees, they are presented in the political public sphere as a “trouble-maker”. Hence through coalition conflicts Horn tried to damage the public image of the SzDSz, which would reduce its approval rating, and as a result its room for manoeuvre in coalition politics.7With a decreasing approval rate of SzDSz, Horn sought to sideline the CCC. He tried to reduce coalition conciliation to informal bilateral meeting (with the minister of interior, a party leader and negotiator/spokesman of the SZDSZ as a coalition partner in the cabinet, or with the party leader of SzDSz who was not cabinet member), or simply not to consult the coalition partner. In 1994-1998, major dimension of competition among the coalition partners was the cabinet’s economic policy, and party politics and coalition play took place subordinated to this 6 Horn made concessions from time to time and counter-balanced factions with each other to stay in a positional centre. His main method was he made personal and non-formal agreement with opinion-leaders of factions. He approached and treated platforms depending on whether his own interest was best served by strengthening or weakening of a platform. He made sure no one of the factions could use him as their leader or supporter (Kóczián-Weyer 1997, 206). 7 Horn’s tactics could rely on dominant elements of political thinking in Hungary, political culture and political thinking of which are characterised by strong anti-party sentiments (Körösényi 1998, 21-40). Refusal of “quarrelsome parties” and “quarrel among parties” by the voters and the political public sphere, a reaction expected by Horn, was an external communicative barrier on the (re)actions of SzDSz.

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dimension. A division resulting from the competition, however, was not between the MSzP and the SzDSz, but within the MSzP divided along economic policy. Since government functioning is determined by political competition, cabinet decision-making was linked to the changing line of economic policy (accompanied by changing person of finance minister). For this reason three political cycles can be observed in decision-making of the Horn cabinet: 1. deadlock (July 1994 - March 1995), 2. policy dictatorship of the minister of finance (March 1995 - March 1996)8, 3. prime ministerial dominance (March 1996 – July 1998). Deadlock - July 1994 - March 1995 This cycle of deadlock was a result of equilibrium of political forces. The cabinet’s supply side economic policy-making was a monopoly of the minister of finance (László Békesi) belonging to the party’s liberal faction. They were backed by the SzDSz due to a mutual support.9 They were blocked, however, by the prime minister and almost all the party factions left of the liberals, especially by the Trade Unionists.10 In addition, party leadership of Horn was also challenged in the run up to the party conference in October. It can be stated the role of cabinet meetings was legalisation and finalisation of decisions made elsewhere. Major cabinet decisions were made in the CCC and in the Council of Interest Conciliation11. Issues such as the budget and tax revenues of 1995, an amendment to the budget of 1994 were decided in the CIC, which reflected the realisation of the trade union’s political will. The period also saw the highest number of coalition talks during the cabinet’s life Cabinet meetings and functioning were characterised by sharp divisions among MSzP ministers. The minister of finance (Békesi) was strongly opposed by the ministers of labour (Magda Kósáné Kovács) and welfare (Pál Kovács) coming from various factions and having divergent economic policy preferences. Their main tactics to block Békesi was bilateralism, i.e. they approached and tried to persuade the prime minister about policy issues in private meetings. Another method used by Kovács was “getting Békesi stabbed by Horn” (Kóczián-Weyer 1997, 89). The minister of welfare let his own apparatus to make an agreement with the Ministry of Finance but he submitted his own proposals, formerly disputed, to cabinet meeting and applied for the support of Horn at the cabinet meeting itself. The minister of welfare (with trade union leader Sándor Nagy) as an MP also submitted a bill (pension increase) to bypass Békesi as gate-keeper to economic policy. In cabinet meetings Horn took sides with the ministers of labour and welfare vis-a-vis Békesi (Kóczián-Weyer 1997, 68-70, 81 and 88-89).

8 The terms minister as policy dictator and ministerial policy dictatorship are borrowed from Laver-Schofield (1990, 111 - cited by De Winter-Andeweg-Dumont 2002, 6; Müller-Strøm 2003, 116). 9 His monopoly came from fact there were no alternative economic policy and minister of finance in the MSZP. During the coalition bargain, Békesi’s precondition to accept the post of finance minister, offered him by Horn, was a coalition with the SzDSz to counter-balance his own intra-party opponents. The SzDSz also made his ministership a precondition of its participation in a prospective coalition (Kóczián-Weyer 1997, 49-66). 10 The reasons for the prime minister’s opposition were his demand side policy preference and that Békesi was a potential candidate for the prime ministerial post during the run up to the election. To counter-balance Békesi, Horn, among others, tried to establish an alternative centre for economic policy strategy in the PMO. The powerful position of the Trade Unionists was based on they were leaders of the largest trade unions and MSzP members at the same time, who made an election agreement with the party. The union leaders run on the MSzP list of candidates (e.g. Sándor Nagy, leader of the largest union MSZOSZ, was third on the national list after Horn and Békesi) and joined its parliamentary group after government formation. Their built-in influence came from they represented around half of the employees in Hungary (see data: Körösényi 1998, 170, 4. táblázat) 11 The CIC was an extra-cabinet tripartite decision-making forum of corporative character, comprising the representatives of the government, the employers and the employees organizations.

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Policy disagreements among cabinet members coupled with an equilibrium of political forces led to delayed or no-decisions (or to sinking cabinet decisions and Békesi by ministers in the parliament). The deadlock was finally broken by Békesi who quit the cabinet in January 1995. Policy dictatorship of the minister of finance - March 1995 - March 1996 This political cycle can be characterised as a policy dictatorship of the minister of finance. With appointing a non-party member (Lajos Bokros) minister of finance Horn took economic policy out of party competition and placed it outside of the influence of the MSzP and the SzDSz. Despite a strong alliance between the prime minister and the minister of finance Horn continued to govern under the most serious leadership challenge (August-November 1995). His survival was due to the divided character of the MSzP itself. The competing factions could not come to an agreement on the person of a new prime minister. Despite an external support of the SzDSz for a prime ministerial change, neither the possible candidates (Speaker Zoltán Gál and Magda Kósáné Kovács) nor the factions volunteered to trigger a leadership challenge, and they also lost the momentum for change by early 1996 (Kóczián-Weyer 1997, 211-212). A third challenger who offered not just a personal but a policy alternative to Horn was out-maneuvered by the prime minister himself. Sándor Nagy (Trade Unionists 2) had not only his own faction’s support but also that of the Hajós group, a cross-faction single-issue alliance.12 The way Horn out-maneuvered him was he offered Nagy various cabinet and senior government posts (minister of industry and trade, deputy prime minister for economic planning, (super)minister of economic affairs, Head of PMO’s Secretariat for Economic Policy), which required coalition consent but which were vetoed by the SzDSz. By his recurring and failed offers Horn exposed Nagy to repeated defeats. The defeats put Nagy on the defensive and narrowed his room for maneuver. As a result his image as a challenger was damaged by early 1996 as well. Horn’s method against Nagy, however, was also a suitable method in the coalition play vis-a-vis the SzDSz. Giving offers to Nagy and making the SzDSz to reject his proposals, Horn continued to make coalition conflicts and damage the public image of SzDSz, and to narrow its room for manoeuvre.13

Supported by the prime minister, Bokros enjoyed a wide room for manoeuvre and great autonomy in the cabinet. He captured control over policy making, and rest of the cabinet members were sidelined in cabinet decision-making and functioning. His decisions became cabinet’s decisions. Three ministers, including Békesi’s former political opponent, the ministers of labour and welfare, resigned because of supply side policy dictatorship of Bokros. Prime ministerial dominance - March 1996 - July 1998 This new cycle was a result of a changing political line of Horn. Supply side economic policy was replaced with a more demand side one, and policy change was accompanied by changing person of minister of finance (Péter Medgyessy). Despite leadership challenges in late 1996 and early 1997, Horn managed to secure his intra-party position. The Hajós group failed to provide personal and policy alternatives to Horn. The trade unionists had a policy alternative but - as it was seen above - their candidate was 12 The latter comprised groups and party leaders across factions left of the liberals. They were dissatisfied with Horn, the cabinet’s policy and the coalition partner. 13 The party’s approval rate had fallen under 10 percent as a result, and, with an exception of one month, it had never risen above 10 again.

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out-maneuvered by the prime minister. Leadership challenges in this cycle were rather “verbal” in character since they lacked both personal and policy alternatives. Horn also put the SzDSz on the defense, reduced coalition conciliation to bilateral meetings with the minister of interior who became the party leader of SzDSz in 1997. He tended to ignore his coalition partner to an increasing degree. Under these circumstances this cycle can be described as a prime ministerial dominance. Major decisions were made by the prime minister who relied on his own staff in the PMO. With the help of the PMO’s administrative state secretary and the chief of his own private office, Horn took certain issues out of a minister’ jurisdiction or made decisions despite protest by the SzDSz (e.g. inter-governmental agreement with the Vatican). As it can seen (Figure 3) number of coalition conciliation meetings, together with the approval rate of SzDSz, decreased gradually.

Figure 3 Relationship between coalition conciliation meetings (N) and approval rate of SzDSz (%), 1994-1998

0

5

10

15

20

25

1994Jul

Oct 1995Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1996Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1997Jan

Apr Jul Oct 1998Jan

Apr

Coalition meetings Approval rate

Source: July 1994 – December 1996: based on Sándor-Vass 1998, 133-136; from 1997: collated by the author. 3.2. The Orbán cabinet The Orbán cabinet operated under political conditions different from these of the Horn cabinet. Prime minister Orbán commanded full support of the Fidesz (Federation of Young Democrats), leading party of the coalition, and had a firm power position in his party. Fidesz was probably the most united party in Hungarian politics. It was not divided by factions since intra-party dissenters left the party in 1993-94. There was no challenger vis-à-vis Orbán for party leadership so he never faced a leadership challenge as prime minister. His intra-party position was so secure that, as part of a wider political strategy of the Fidesz, he stepped down from party leadership in 2000. In 1998-2002 main dimension of political competition with the coalition partners (FKGP – Independent Smallholders’ Party; MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum) was not macro-economic policy but pure partisan and coalition issues. Macro-economic policy was not a subject matter of coalition play; coalition conflicts over economic policy took place at the level of bargains about the budget only. Coalition conflicts included issues of governmental structure, personnel policy and party competition. The latter centred on the problem of unification of the Right (a union party or an alliance of parties), who is the leading party of the right pole of party systems (Fidesz versus FKGP), alliance policy of the MDF (autonomy vis-à-vis the Fidesz or integration and merge). Another condition influencing cabinet functioning was a higher degree of coalition solidarity. This came from the lessons from the MSZP-SzDSz coalition, on one hand, and from the fact

11

the party system, which reduced from tripolar to bipolar in the mid-1990s (Körösényi-Tóth-Török 2003, 147-156), increased cohesion and solidarity among coalition parties and cabinet members, on the other. Taking these into account, two political cycles can be observed in functioning of the Orbán cabinet: 1. coalition bilateralism (July 1998 – Mid-2000), 2. prime ministerial dominance (Mid-2000 – May 2002). Coalition bilateralism - July 1998 – Mid-2000 Functioning of the Orbán cabinet was determined by the fact it was a divided cabinet. Contrary to the Horn cabinet, portfolios were under a “monocolour” political control with minister and political state secretary coming from the same party.14 Cabinet was divided along major division line between the Fidesz and the FKGP.15 Three portfolios of the FKGP were under political control of the party leader-minister of agriculture József Torgyán. His department was a super-department in a double sense. Jurisdictions were taken away from the other major FKGP department (environmental protection) during government formation. In addition, all FKGP ministers (environmental protection, defence, and a minister without portfolio) were politically responsible to Torgyán and not Orbán in the first two years. This dominant position of Torgyán came from the FKGP was a united party in 1998-2000, and Torgyán as party leader did not face leadership challenge. Orbán’s strategy vis-à-vis the coalition partners was different from that of Horn. Orbán did not seek and make coalition conflicts in order to sideline the FKGP. He did not need to use neither of the coalition partners to strengthen his own intra-party position and to play factions off against each other. He rather used the MDF to counter-balance the FKGP and vice versa. In terms of coalition play three stages can be distinguished. In 1998-1999 Orbán bided his time till the FKGP made mistake(s). By giving free hand to Torgyán with regard to the FKGP portfolios and dividing the cabinet he detached political responsibility for these portfolios from the Fidesz and himself.16

In this political cycle, major political decisions were made in bilateral meetings private between Orbán and Torgyán.17 Bilateralism came from a tactics by Torgyán. In order to avoid to be “outvoted” by prime minister or ministers he tended not to attend cabinet meetings. During his ministership (2.5 years) he attended only fifty per cent of meetings.18

Prime ministerial dominance - Mid-2000 – May 2002 Scandals and decreasing approval rate of FKGP ministers seemed to affect the cabinet as whole and begin to damage Orbán’s image as prime minister by 2000. He began to sideline Torgyán and the FKGP. Orbán’s room for manoeuvre was widened by two facts. First, his and his party’s approval rate declined to a lesser degree or even increased while Torgyán’s and the FKGP’s rate saw a continuous decline (Figure 4).

14 The only exeption was the Ministry of Defence. Because of the importance of NATO accession minister of the FKGP was controled by a political secretary from the Fidesz. 15 The MDF being a free-rider, its one portfolio of justice did not make a great deal of difference in this respect. 16 As a result Torgyán prevented him to dismiss FKGP ministers in the first two years. Despite repeated efforts Orbán could dismiss the first FKGP minister (environmental protection) in 2000 only. 17 Bilateralism was the practice is confirmed by Ibolya Dávid, minister of justice and the party leader of MDF, who complained of this in August 1999 and February 2000 (Magyar Hírlap 17.08.1999 and 08.02.2000). 18 56/108=52% (Magyar Hírlap 04.08.2001).

12

Figure 4 Changing approval rate of the coalition parties, the MSZP, Prime Minister Orbán, and József Torgyán (July 1998 - March 2002)

0

20

40

60

80

1998Jul

Oct 1999Jan

Apr Jul Oct 2000Jan

Apr Jul Oct 2001Jan

Apr Jul Oct 2002Jan

Fidesz FKGP MDF MSZP Orbán Torgyán

Note: Marked point of time on Torgyán’s dataline indicates leadership challenge. Source: www.szondaipsos.hu

Second, Orbán successfully managed to get a biennial budget (instead of an annual one) for 2001 and 2002 accepted by the coalition partners and enacted in 2000. This provided the cabinet with the major legislative and political condition for governability and cabinet stability even without the FKGP till the next election in 2002. The FKGP’s room for manoeuvre was finally narrowed to minimal from January-February 2001 onwards. Due to his and the party’s falling approval rate intra-party position of Torgyán was weakened and his party leadership was challenged. He was also forced to resign as minister, and the FKGP, formerly hold together by the unchallenged authority of party leader, split into factions (Figure 5). Figure 5 Factions in the FKGP (2001-2002) Party

leadership Democratic Alliance

of Independent Smallholders

Civic Platform

Reform Smallholders

Party

Smallholders Alliance

Non-aligned

MPs

Leader Torgyán, József Szabó, János Bánk, Attila Liebmann, Katalin Cseh, Sándor Souce: collected by the author from daily press. The FKGP, being divided along factions competing with each other for party leadership, made possible for Orbán to sideline it as coalition partner completely. He manouvered among platfoms and strengthened or weakened (one of) them depending on what served the political interests of Fidesz best. Prime ministerial dominance saw a development in decision-making similar to that of the Horn cabinet. Orbán relied on his own staff in the PMO and private advisors to an increased degree. Similarly to Horn, Orbán reduced ministers’ jurisdiction and made decisions in a unilateral way. With a decreasing approval rate of the party leader of FKGP he also ceased to consult his major coalition partner from 2001 (Figure 6). Due to the divisions within the FKGP ministers delegated by the party became “his men”.

13

Figure 6 Relationship between coalition conciliation meetings (N) and approval rate of Torgyán (%), 1998-2002

05

1015202530354045

Approval rate Coalition meetings

Source: approval rate: www.szondaipsos.hu; coalition meetings: collated by the author from daily press.

3.3. The Medgyessy cabinet

The Medgyessy cabinet is a coalition of the MSzP and the SzDSz again. A bipolar party system continues to produce a high degree of party unity and coalition solidarity.19 The MSzP, major party of the coalition, continues to be divided by factions but acts more in concert and factionalism has a less effect on cabinet functioning than in 1994-98. The SzDSz is more divided than formerly. The party leader has a strong intra-party opposition that criticises the party’s coalition politics and relations with the MSzP and cabinet functioning as well. This intra-party opposition seems to institutionalise as a tendency or a single-issue coalition in a form of series of monthly public talks and lectures called “Free Deliberation” late 2003 (Figure 7). Figure 7 Factions in the SzDSz (from autumn 2003)

Party leadership Free Deliberation

Leader Kuncze, Gábor Bauer, Tamás; Béki, Gabriella; Eörsi, Mátyás; Fodor, Gábor; Gusztos, Péter Souce: collected by the author from daily press. However, the faction’s room for manoeuvre seems to be limited since it failed to provide a political alternative for the party as whole. It has no candidate for a leadership challenge and a political alternative for coalition politics.20 As to party politics one of the major determinants of cabinet functioning is the prime minister is a non-party member. He became head of government as a result of competition among party factions. They rather accepted an external candidate than one of the rival factions’. As to coalition politics a major element is the SzDSz is not a free-rider in the cabinet. Contrary to 1994 no formal body for coalition conciliation was established. The party has not got an institutionalised veto power. Its bargain power and political influence on cabinet functioning is provided by its share of seats necessary for a majority. A third element is a relatively high ratio (one-third) of cabinet ministers who are non-party members.21

One year after government formation growing prime ministerial dominance can be observed from mid-late-2003. Due to a decreasing approval rate of the MSzP and an increasing rate of

19 This does not seem to reach the degree of 1998-02 but higher than in 1994-98 by all means. 20 As to the latter the faction does not propose to quit the coalition, its politial message can be summarised in a blurred view of “to do things better” or “to do the same thing but in a different way”. 21 9/26=34.6% (appointed between May 2002 and 1 April 2004).

14

the Fidesz (Figure 8), prime minister Medgyessy, being a “prisoner” of the MSzP in 2002 and early 2003, seems to set “free” and distance himself from the MSZP.

Figure 8 Changing approval rate of the coalition parties, the Fidesz, and Prime Minister Medgyessy (July 2002 - December 2003)

0

20

40

60

80

2002 Jul Oct 2003 Jan Apr Jul Oct

MSzP SzDSz Fidesz Medgyessy

Source: www.szondaipsos.hu He appointed ministers and made some of the major policy decisions without a prior consultation of the MSzP in 2003. As to the coalition conciliation in 2002-03 (Figure 9), however, no clear pattern can be established.

Figure 9 Changing number of coalition conciliation meetings, 2002-2003 (N/month)

0

2

4

6

8

2002 Jul Oct 2003 Jan Apr Jul Oct

Source: collated by the author from daily press. 4. Hungary in international comparison Where can be cabinets of Hungary placed in international comparison? The following indicators will be analysed: cabinet meetings, cabinet size, cabinet committees, duration of cabinets, prime ministers and ministers. Cabinet meetings First, some of the output indicators of cabinet meetings in Hungary are presented (Table 4). As a summary it can be stated, cabinets tend to meet 40-45 times a year, with 20-25 agenda items on a meeting. Compared to 4-5 meetings in a month as an international average (Verebélyi 1996, 199), 3-4 meetings a month do not significantly differ from international trends. Compared to 500-700 agenda items a year as an international average (Manning et al. 1999, 5), number of agenda items between 700 and 1000 a year seems to be higher. As to the Horn cabinet more detailed data is available on cabinet meetings. Ratio of agenda items taken-off a cabinet meeting varied between 4 and 8 percent, while the ratio of items which where decided without cabinet debate, increased from 45 percent to one-third. European cabinets tend to make 300-600 decisions without debate and 500-700 decisions with

15

debate a year (Verebélyi 1996, 199, 200). Data available for the Horn cabinet (638, 312) are above and below these averages, respectively. Table 4 Output indicators of cabinet meetings in Hungary, 1990-2003 Cabinet Cabinet

meetings

Agenda items Decision on agenda item

Way of decision

total/year Total/year mean/ cabinet meeting

taken-off made without debate N(%)

with debate miscellaneous

Antall & Boross 1990-94 Mean 700a

Horn Jul 1994- 22 373 17 14 359 169 (45) 169 35

1995 47 1119 24 57 1062 645 (58) 393 81 1996 45 1005 22 77 928 609 (61) 332 64 1997 45 1194 27 73 1121 793 (66) 253 148

-May 1998 20 522 26 25 497 334 (65) 104 84 Total 179 4213 246 3967 2550 (64) 1251 412

Mean/year 45 1053 24 638 312 Orbán Jul 1998- 24b 17

1999 45b 24 2000 37 747 20 56 691 2001 46 910 20 Total 152 3071

Mean/ year 43 877 20

Medgyessy May 2002- 32 2003 50 Total 82

Notes: Missing data was calculated by the author on the base of sources available. Total Orbán includes period till December 2001 only.

a Estimation by Szilvásy 1998, 443. b Estimation by the author on the base of sources used. Sources: Horn cabinet: A Miniszterelnöki Hivatal jelentése; Orbán: 1998-2002: A Miniszterelnöki Hivatal évkönyve 2000, 2001; Medgyessy: collated by the author from the PMO’s website: <www.meh.hu/kormany>.

16

Cabinet size The size of Hungarian cabinets has been varying between 14 and 21 during the years of 1990-2004 (Table 5). A slight decrease can be observed in the mid-1990s, which was followed by an increase that began at the end of the decade. However the cabinet size has not reached the number of the first period again. It can be stated, the variations have been limited in the sense they have not resulted a change in the overall scale of cabinet size. Table 5 Changing cabinet size, 1990-2004 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Apr/May98

99 00 01 02 03 04

1 Apr WE mean 18 19 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 18 17 18 18 WE s.d. ±4 ±4 ±4 ±4 ±4 ±4 ±3 ±3 ±4 ±4 ±4 ±4 ±4 CESE mean

17 18 19 19 18 18 19 19 21 19 18 16 16

CESE s.d. ±3 ±1 ±1 Intl mean 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 17 17 Intl s.d. ±4 ±4 ±4 ±3 ±3 ±3 ±3 ±4 ±3 ±3 ±3 ±3 Hungary 21 20 20 18 14 16 15 15 17 17 18 18 18 16 18 18 Source: calculated by the author from the source Table 1 in the Appendix. Note: Cabinet size as on 31 December of each year, unless otherwise stated. The cases being persons, means and standard deviations are rounded. 0.5 was rounded upwards. Intl mean is based on WE plus CESE cabinets. CESE means in 1991-2000 are based on Czechoslovakia (1991-92), Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland only. For this reason no CESE standard deviation was computed for these years. CESE mean of April-May 1998 is based on countries in Table 8. How big is the Hungarian cabinet in international comparison? The data shows the size of Hungarian cabinets does not stand out of international trends significantly. Compared to international mean (Intl), changing size of Hungarian cabinets was a bit higher in the early 1990s, it was a bit below the mean during the decade, and then it approached to the mean from the late 1990s. Deviations from international mean, however, can not be said significant in either ways. Compared to the changing West European cabinet size (WE) the same tendency can be observed. In comparison with the Central Eastern and Southern European (CESE) democracies, cabinet size in Hungary has been even lower over the period. In short, cabinet size in Hungary moves together with international trends in terms of decrease and increase (direction of change), while the extent of change is an average or a little below it compared to CESE democracies. Cabinet committees As to cabinet committees more limited comparison is made in terms of time span. Political context, however, is more interesting since it can be made with Western Europe, and with the new democracies in Eastern Europe and in Africa. Mean number of cabinet committees in Hungary is much lower than in Western Europe in the early 1980s (Table 6). It is similar to these of the new democracies of Eastern Europe and Africa in the mid-1990 (Tables 7, 8).

17

Table 6 Cabinet size and number of cabinet committees in selected WE countries (1982-1985) and in Hungary (1990-2003 mean)

Cabinet rank ministers (N) Cabinet committees (N) Australia 17 10 Belgium 15 7 Canada 40 10 Denmark 21 14 Finland 17 3 Germany 17 16 Japan 13 10 Netherlands 14 14 New Zealand 18 9 Switzerland 7 12 United Kingdom 19 38 WE mean 18 13 WE standard deviation ±5 ±5 Hungary mean 17 4 Source: WE countries: Mackie-Hogwood 1985, 19 Table 2.3. ; WE mean and standard deviation and Hungary means: computed by the author. Note: The cases being persons and organisations, means and standard deviations are rounded. Table 7 Number of cabinet committees in selected new African democracies and in Hungary (1997) Cabinet committees (N) Benin 9 Botswana 2 Guinea-Bissau 1 Mali 7 Zambia 7 Africa mean 5 Hungary 4 Source: African countries: Manning et al. 1999, 2 Figure 1. Africa mean and Hungary: computed by the author. Note: For the African countries data is a year of publication of a source (Bratton et al. 1997) on which Manning et al. (1999) was based on. The Figure does not display numbers, only bars, they were identified with the help of Mackie-Hogwood 1985, 19 Table 2.3. Ghana was omitted since the author was unable to identify the data for it. The cases being organisations, the mean was rounded. No Africa standard deviation was computed because of the small number of cases. Table 8 Cabinet size and number of cabinet committees in CESE countries and in Hungary (April-May 1998) Cabinet ministers (N) Cabinet committees (N) Albania 22 3 Bulgaria 17 0 Czech Republic 17 n.a. Estonia 15 n.a. Latvia 13 1 Lithuania 15 4 Macedonia, FYR of 19 6 Poland 24 3 Romania 27 0 Slovakia 18 0 Slovenia 21 0 CESE mean 19 3 CESE standard deviation ±3 - Hungary 17 4

18

Source: CESE countries: collated and calculated by the author from each country’s Centre of Government Profile provided for the OECD’s SIGMA Programme. <www.sigmaweb.org/libpubs/pubprofiles.htm> Accessed: 19 February 2004. CESE mean and standard deviation, and Hungary: computed by the author. Notes: n.a.=not available, 0=did not exist. The cases being persons and organisations, CESE means and standard deviation are rounded. Mean number of CESE cabinet committees includes only those countries where cabinet committees existed in April-May 1998 and their number were published. Any correction will be appreciated by the author. No CESE standard deviation for cabinet committees was computed because of the small number of cases. Duration of cabinets, ministers and prime ministers Cabinets in Hungary seem to be in office for significantly longer time than their West European counterparts (Table 9). While an average cabinet in Western Europe is in office around 2 years, they function for 3 years in Hungary. Although the time spans compared are different, cabinets in Hungary last second longest time (after Luxembourg) in Europe. This high duration also applies vis-à-vis the new CESE cabinets to an even greater degree (Table 10). Cabinet duration is more than double than in the region’s new democracies. High cabinet duration, however, is coupled with shorter ministerial duration. While it is almost 5 years inWestern Europe (Table 11), ministers tend to be in office less then 2 years in Hungary (Table 10). This less than 2 years (1.8) even shorter than the average in Eastern Europe (1.9 – Table 10). Duration of prime ministers (3 years) is identical with cabinet duration since formation and termination of government is linked to a prime minister. Due to constitutional arrangements (constructive motion of no-confidence) when a prime minister fails his or her cabinet is also terminated. 3 years as duration of Hungarian prime ministers in 1990-2002 is shorter than 3.8 years in post-1945 Western Europe (Müller–Philipp 1991, 137), and a slightly longer than the two and a half year in CESE (Table 10). Table 9 Cabinet duration in WE (1945-1998) and Hungary (1990-2002)

Mean duration (y) Minimum duration (y) Maximum duration (y) Austria 2.3 0.4 3.9 Belgium 1.4 0.02 4.1 Denmark 1.7 0.1 3.7 Finland 1.2 0.1 3.9 France (V) 1.7 0.1 3.3 Germany 1.9 0.04 4.0 Ireland 2.4 0.6 4.2 Italy 1.0 0.03 4.5 Luxembourg 3.2 0.4 5.3 Netherlands 2.2 0.2 4.5 Norway 2.1 0.1 3.9 Portugal 1.6 0.3 4.1 Sweden 2.1 0.5 4.0 WE mean 1.9 0.2 4.1 WE s.d. 0.4 0.2 0.3 Hungary 3.0 0.5 3.9 Source: WE countries and WE mean: Müller-Strøm 2003, 585 Table 15.13.

WE s.d. and Hungary: computed by the author. Note: Müller-Strøm (2003) published data in days, which were recalculated by the author to years.

19

Table 10 Mean cabinet, prime ministerial and ministerial duration in CESE (1990-1999) and Hungary

(1990-2002) Cabinet duration (y) Prime ministerial duration (y) Ministerial duration (y) Albania 0.9 1.5 1.2 Bulgaria 0.9 0.9 1.3 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.2 1.5 2.1 Croatia 1.8 2.3 2.6 Czech Republic 1.5 2.2 1.5 Estonia 0.9 1.6 1.5 Latvia 0.9 1.3 1.6 Lithuania 1.4 1.4 1.9 Macedonia, FYR of 1.5 3.7 2.7 Moldova 2.3 3.8 1.3 Poland 0.9 1.2 1.6 Romania 1.0 1.7 2.1 Serbia/Yugoslavia 1.4 2.8 2.0 Slovakia 1.4 2.8 2.8 Slovenia 1.7 6.7 1.6 CESE mean 1.3 2.4 1.9 CESE s.d. 0.33 1.1 0.4 Hungary 3.0 3.0 1.8 Source: CESE countries: Müller-Rommel 2001, 197 Table 2; CESE mean and s.d. and Hungary: computed by the author. Table 11 Mean ministerial duration in WE (1945-1984) and Hungary (1990-2002) Ministerial duration (y) Australia 5.5 Austria 6.0 Belgium 3.8 Canada 4.8 Denmark 4.4 Finland 3.0 France (V) 3.6 Germany 5.6 Greece 2.1 Iceland 6.1 Ireland 6.6 Israel 5.8 Italy 3.8 Japan 1.9 Luxembourg 6.8 Malta 6.6 Netherlands 4.0 New Zealand 5.5 Norway 3.9 Portugal 2.8 Spain 4.5 Sweden 5.9 Switzerland 7.8 UK 4.8 USA 3.0 WE mean 4.7 WE s.d. 1.3 Hungary 1.8 Source: WE countries: Bakema 1991, 75 Table 6.2; Blondel 1985, Appendix II.

20

WE mean and s.d. and Hungary: computed by the author. Note: Bakema (1991) publishes data for 1945-84, rest of the countries was collected from Blondel (1985) which publishes data for 1945-81. “Crude average” was used and rounded to decimal from Blondel (1985). 5. Summary and conclusion In this paper cabinet functioning is tried to explain on the basis of political competition. Political competition can be instrumentalized through party politics and coalition politics. Party and coalition politics is linked to changing power relationships within and among parties. It is believed cabinet functioning is determined by these changing relationships. Two or three political cycles can be observed in every cabinet’s functioning. A main trend seems to be that every cabinet functioning is moving toward a prime ministerial dominance. Hungary was also presented in international in international comparisons with Western Europe and the new democracies of Eastern and Southern Europe. It can be stated cabinets in Hungary show a high stability and durability below the surface of political competition among cabinet parties. With the exception of the first cabinet, all cabinet left office due to a regular election. Bibliography • Andweg, Rudy 1993: A Model of the Cabinet System. In: Blondel, Jean – Ferdinand

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Appendix Table 1 Cabinet size, 1990-2004 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Apr-May 98 98 99 00 01 02 03 1 Apr 04

Albania 22 Australia 17 18 19 18 17 17 15 16 16 16 16 17 17 Austria 15 17 16 16 16 16 16 13 14 13 12 12 12 Belgium 18 17 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 18 18 18 17 Bulgaria 17 Canada 22 39 39 23 23 24 25 28 28 28 28 29 28 Czechoslovakia/ Czech Rep. (1993) 16 10 19 19 19 16 16 17 19 17 16 16 17 Denmark 19 19 19 24 20 20 19 20 20 20 21 18 18 Estonia 15 15 14 Finland 18 17 17 17 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 Macedonia, FYR 19 France 33 20 27 30 29 28 28 17 15 15 16 16 27 Germany 19 20 20 20 18 18 18 18 16 15 15 15 14 Greece 24 20 22 22 24 20 20 20 20 21 20 20 Hungary 21 20 20 18 14 16 15 15 17 17 18 18 18 16 18 18 Iceland 11 10 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 Ireland 17 15 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 Israel 19 19 18 17 17 21 17 18 15 23 14 28 19 Italy 32 30 26 25 26 21 21 22 27 26 25 25 24 Japan 15 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 18 18 Latvia 13 15 18 Lithuania 15 14 14 Luxembourg 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 Malta 10 13 13 13 13 15 14 13 14 14 14 14 Netherlands 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 11 New Zealand 19 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 18 20 20 20 20 Norway 19 19 19 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 Poland 17 25 20 20 18 21 23 24 23 20 19 15 15 Portugal 19 19 17 17 17 18 17 19 19 19 19 18 Romania 27 Slovakia 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 16 Slovenia 21 17 Spain 19 18 18 18 17 15 15 15 14 16 16 16 Sweden 21 21 20 21 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 19 22 Switzerland 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 UK 22 22 22 22 22 24 23 22 21 22 22 23 23 USA 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17

Source: 1990: collected by the author from the country tables in the European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, 1-120; 1991-2002: Table 1 in the editors’ introduction chapters of the EJPR’s annual political data yearbooks (in 1992: Table 2); Apr-May 98: collated and calculated by the author from each country’s Centre of Government Profile provided for the OECD’s SIGMA Programme (<www.sigmaweb.org/libpubs/pubprofiles.htm>, accessed: 19 February 2004); Portugal 1998 and Luxembourg 2000: collated and calculated by the author from Keesing’s Archive (www.keesings.com); Hungary 1990 - 1 Apr 2004: collated and calculated by the author. Note: Cabinet size as on 31 December in each year, unless otherwise stated. Cabinet rank ministers and prime ministers are included only.