Paper Implications of Foucault for Critic

7/30/2019 Paper Implications of Foucault for Critic

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Work in progress, usual disclaimers apply Ismael Al-Amoudi

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Ismael Al-Amoudi, University of Reading

Lancaster University, IAS Research Cluster, Foucault and Critical Realism, 18 June 2008

A realist reading of Foucault: what implications for critical realists?

5,185 words

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore further the consequences of a realist reading of Foucault for critical

realist (CR) scholars in social studies. After summarizing an argument in favour of a CR

interpretation of the later Foucault, it identifies some of the potential contributions and inflexions

that such a reading may bring to CR studies of organization and society. It is suggested that

Foucaults analytical framework does not necessarily contradict CR meta-theory but raises novel

questions for both meta-theory and substantive research. Special attention is drawn to two central

CR themes: the transitive dimension of knowledge and the occupation of social positions.

Keywords

Critical realism, Foucault, identity, interpretation, methodology, ontology, social roles


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NB: This conference paper is still very exploratory. I would be particularly grateful if the audience

could indicate complementary readings or if they could point out dubious arguments.

Introduction: a Lancaster story

When I was offered to present a paper at this seminar, I felt it was an opportunity to revisit the

paper I had started writing in this university almost a decade ago (1998-99), although it only got

published in July 2007. In 1998-99, I was an MA student in Organizational Analysis and

Behaviour in Lancaster University Management School. As I was very much under the influence

of my undergraduate studies in France, I used to spend quite some time in the university library

reading Foucault: Madness and Civilization1, Order of Things

2, Archaeology of Knowledge

3,

Discipline and Punish(Foucault 1977), History of Sexuality4

(I must confess though that I never

read tome 3!) Also, Dreyfus and Rabinows Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and

Hermeneutics5, together with some of Foucaults lectures at College de France and a few

interviews compiled by Rabinow6 proved useful in understanding Foucaults project.

It is under the inspiration of Steve Fleetwood, however, that I started drawing links between

Foucault and critical realism (hereafter CR). Steve had joined the department in the middle of the

year and it had been decided that he would supervise my summer dissertation. Incidentally

enough, Steve had published a book in which he suggested that the later Hayek was assuming an

1 Foucault, M. (1965). Madness and civilization; a history of insanity in the age of reason. New York,, PantheonBooks.2

Foucault, M. (1971). The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York,, Pantheon Books.3

Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. London,, Tavistock Publications.4

Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon.Foucault, M. (1985). The use of pleasure / Uniform Title: Usage des plaisirs. English. New York, Pantheon Books,Foucault, M. (1986). The care of the self / Uniform Title: Souci de soi. English. New York, Pantheon Books.5

Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton,Harvester.6

Foucault, M. and P. Rabinow (1986). The Foucault reader. Harmondsworth, Penguin.


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ontology quite close to CR7. When reading it, it struck me that a similar project for Foucault

seemedprima facie possible and, perhaps, fruitful.

In that paper, I attempted to make explicit what I perceived to be Foucaults implicit social

ontology. In turn, this allowed attempting three movements: first, protecting Foucaultian analysis

against accusations of constructivism, determinism, reductionism, localism and nominalism.

Secondly, it allowed to suggest a slightly different way of doing Foucaultian study of

organizations. To this end, I revisited a rather influential paper by Grey on Career as a Project of

the Self.

Thirdly - and this touched without really tackling the theme of todays paper - I hinted at

some of the consequences of a realist reading of Foucault for his CR critics. I tried to argue,

especially, that while Foucault is still potentially open to any criticism levelled at the level of histheories, he is probably less vulnerable at the level of his meta-theory i than it had been thought. I

also hinted at a significant difference of emphasis distinguishing Foucaultians (sic) from CR

students of organization and society: while CRs acknowledge the existence of mediating concepts

that link structure and agency, they mainly express interest in studying social structures.

Conversely, while Foucault appears to have an implicit notion of social structure, he is mainly

interested in studying the points of intersection of social structure and agency, namely,

institutions, apparatuses and modes of subjection (more about this below).

Building on the 2007 paper, I would like to push the reflection a little bit further and ask what are

the implications of a realist reading of Foucault for all CRs, including both those who are

sympathetic to Foucault as well as those who are more reserved or critical? To repeat, granting

that Foucaults meta-theory is compatible with CR certainly does not mean that every CRist

should accept his more substantial theories. However, this means that the latter are, in principle,

worthy of consideration unless proven otherwise. Thus, if we take both CR and Foucaults

programmes seriously, the question arises of what, if anything, are the consequences for a CR of

being sympathetic to Foucault? In other words, once we take Foucaults warnings and injunctions

seriously, how is our scholarly practice as CRists affected?

7 Fleetwood, S. (1996). "Order without equilibrium: A critical realist interpretation of Hayek's notion of spontaneous

order." Cambridge Journal of Economics 20(6): 729-747.


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In order to address this question, I first return briefly to the argument for a realist reading

of Foucault as outlined in the first Lancaster paper8 (section 1) before examining the contributions

of such reading for the critical realist project (section 2).

I/ A (condensed) realist reading of Foucault

I now summarize the fundamental features of Foucaults implicit social ontology that legitimize a

CR reading. Because of the focus and constraints of the present paper, this section is reduced to a

minimum. For a fuller account, please refer to the 2007 paper9.

1) Truth and meaning: Foucaults transitive dimension

Before examining Foucaults rapport to truth and meaning, it can be useful to clarify the CR

position on these themes. The latter is both ontologically realist and epistemologically relativist. In

order to maintain, develop and build on this distinction, Bhaskar coined the expressions transitive

and intransitive dimensions of knowledge (hereafter TD and ID). The TD of knowledge refers to

the ensemble of references (words, concepts, schemas, statements, discourse, etc.) that are used to

refer to (describe, analyse, explain, predict, etc.) the worldii. Conversely, the ID of knowledge

refers to the world, to the extent that it is the referent to which reference is made.

Notably, whereas the ID is absolute and includes the TD, the TD is observer-relative and

does not include the ID. The ID is absolute since any group of observers, however different their

points of view, necessarily refer to one and the same world. In contrast, the boundaries of the TD

are relative to the person or community who does the referencing. Indeed, two observers may use

very different systems of references to refer to one and the same referent. So while a reference

belongs to the TD of one observer, it does not necessarily belong to the TD of another observer.

The observer-relativity of the TD allows to state without contradiction that the TD of one observercan constitute the ID of another.

A significant consequence of the observer-relativity of the TD is that, contrary to a

common conception, realism is not antithetical with nominalism - understood as the view that any

form of interpretation or explanation is necessarily relative to and constrained by the discursive

8 Al-Amoudi, I. (2007). "Redrawing Foucaults social ontology." Organization 14(4): 543-563.9

Ibid.


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framework and context in which it originates and becomes reproduced as knowledge.10 Instead, a

realist stance accommodates nominalism by granting that, although the truth of a statement

depends in part on the state of its referent, the meaningfulness of the statement depends on the

discursive framework and social context of enunciation.

I now examine whether Foucault considers that truth is a mere social product, since he affirms that

knowledge and power are intimately linked and that knowledge produces truths (with quotation

marks) to which we submit? I attempt to make this point by analysing Foucaults study of

scientific activity. When he studies the process of (say) medicine, the nature of the objects of

enquiry are quite different: The medical scientist studies the body as the locus of disease whereas

Foucault studies the activities of the medical scientist and is therefore interested in the body as anobject for scientific investigation. If we keep to the distinction between transitive and intransitive

dimensions, we could say that the intransitive objects studied by the medical scientist comprise

such things as bodies and the natural mechanisms that help explain their (dys)functioning.

However, the intransitive objects that Foucault studies comprise instead such things as the

activities of the medical scientist, the discourses she re/produces, the network of relations in which

she acts11. Moreover, the transitive dimension of the medical scientist comprises the medical

discourse on biological mechanisms, health, illness and so on. It is different from Foucaults

transitive dimension that comprises his own theories about medical scientist activities but not

those of the medical scientist he studies. (Cf figure 1).

10

Reed, M. (2000). "The limits of discourse analysis in organizational analysis." Ibid. 7(3): 524-530.11 Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton,

Harvester. P.6


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Figure 1: Foucaults transit ive dimension

Transitive dimension

Theory of

medical scientist

on body and illness

Body and illness

(social forms

and activities exist

without being studied)

Act iv it ies and theor ies

of medical scientist

(body and illness exist

without being studied)

Theory of Foucault onmedical scientists

activities and theories

Intransitive dimension

Medical scientist

Foucault

Moreover, the very knowledge generated by Foucault has itself a well-defined referent in the

intransitive dimension: that of the relationship between power relations and scientific practice.

Since dubious science can have as much social consequence as legitimate science, and since the

social consequences are not necessarily good or liberating ones, it follows that, though not a

relativist (about the intransitive dimension), Foucault is also not scientistic in the sense of

having an unquestioned optimism about science. Indeed, the existence of an intransitive dimension

for science is maintained though not studied and Foucaults study of science is not doomed to

relativism.

b. Foucaults methodology: studying an open social world

In this section, I contend that the methodology of Foucaults project is highly consistent with the

critical realist methodological premises for the study of society as an open system without possible

closure. Accordingly I will tackle the issues of Foucaults fields of investigation, as well as the

way he uses history.

One of the things Foucault is often reproached for is that, by studying prisons and asylums,

he blinded himself to many other forms of power relations and, hence, incorrectly deduced a


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carceral vision of society12. Such comment implies that a mechanism isolated in a certain field

would not exist outside of it or, in other words, that society is a juxtaposition of isolated systems.

Yet, if we look at the reasons why Foucault has been interested in carceral power it appears that

his objective is to obtain knowledge about society, not about the prison or the asylum. Thus

Foucault makes it clear that he studies prisons as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power

relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used 13.

Therefore if Foucault focuses on prisons it is precisely because he wanted to isolate a

transphenomenal mechanism (that is, disciplinary power) that is actualised but less visible in other

organizational settings such as factories and court-houses. In short, by focusing on prisons,

Foucault not only admits the openness of the social world, but he also presupposes it and adapts

his methods of investigation to it.It can also be asked why Foucault bothered himself with the burden of historical accounts,

sometimes over periods going back to the middle ages while he was concerned with present social

mechanisms. The answer is, I think, to be found in Foucaults genealogical use of history. that can

perhaps be understood by referring to his statement that

[he] would like to write the history of the prison, with all the political

investment on the body it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why?

Simply because [he is] interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a

history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history

of the present.14

By affirming that he tries to write a history of the present Foucault aims neither to give a

totalising picture of the past, nor does he try to write a history of the past by referring to present

meanings (and thus ignoring the shifting nature of social mechanisms). Instead, what Foucault

aims at doing is to begin with a rough diagnosis of the current situation. In the The History of

Sexuality vol.1, for example, he diagnoses the importance of the mechanism of confession. He

12Boyne, R. (1990). Power-Knowledge and Social Theory: the Systematic Misinterpretation of Contemporary French

Social Theory in the Work of Anthony Giddens. Giddens' theory of structuration : a critical appreciation. C. G. A.Bryant and D. Jary. London, Routledge: 252.13

Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton,Harvester. P. 211.14

Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York, Pantheon Books. p. 31.


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then isolates the particular components of this relation of power15. These components form an

apparatus, a grid of intelligibility or system of relations that can be established between

(ontologically heterogeneous) elements such as

Discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws,

administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and

philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid.16

However, whereas archaeology is preoccupied with the reconstitution of the apparatus, genealogy

is interested in taking each of its components literally, and following the web of social relations

which supports them (and which they support and modify). Hence the objective of Foucaults

genealogy is to study the effects of the elements of the apparatus and not their meaning. Finally,

Foucault follows through history initially isolated components of the apparatus and then studiestheir current convergence.

c. Foucaults social ontology: a stratified and transformational conception of social

reality

The detractors of Foucaultian analysis often accuse it of being incapable of distinguishing

ontologically and analytically between human agency and social constraint. As Reed puts it

By denying any ontological and/or analytical differentiation between creative

agency and structural constraint, Foucaultian discourse analysis ends up with an

explanatory logic which is unable to distinguish between open doors and brick

walls17

I would now like to show that Foucault works with an (implicit) ontology that shares the crucial

characteristics of the critical realist ontology as it assumes a relational conception of society and

considers structures as both enabling and constraining for agency. Moreover, I argue that

Foucaults ontology is stratified and differentiates between biological, individual and social

15A critical realist could argue that relations of power are social mechanisms to the extent that they make a difference

to the field of possible actions between two persons.16 Foucault, M. and C. Gordon (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977.

Brighton, Harvester. P. 194.17 Reed, M. (1998). Organizational Analysis as Discourse Analysis. Discourse and organization. D. Grant, T. Keenoy

and C. Oswick. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications: viii, 248 p. P.209.


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realms. There is, however, a difficulty concerning the fact that Foucault uses a vocabulary that is

different from critical realist vocabulary. Thus, our excavation of the ontological presuppositions

of Foucault must be augmented by a work of translation of the elements that may be interpreted as

sharing identical referents but different references in each framework. For instance Foucault does

not use the words structure and agency but refers to strategies (processes located at the level

of social relations that may not be attributed to any specific people) and to tactics (processes

consciously initiated by people). He does not consider power as a (rare) substance to be seized but

rather as a relation between people in which one persons actions modifies the range of actions of

another person. Hence, any social relation between persons entails power relations and any power

relation supposes a social relation.

By studying society through power, Foucault is therefore adopting a relational conception of

society. Moreover, he does not consider power as mere restriction as do the authors who write

about structural constraint without mentioning as a corollary that it enables action. Rather his point

is that power has at once a negative and a positive role, that it constrains as well as it enables.

Hence, power relations do not only prohibit actions or limit the field of possible actions, they also

enable fields of action and permit the constitution of knowledge. However taking as a given that

power is at the same time restrictive (negative) and enabling (positive), to what extent do power

relations sustain/rely on social reality? Foucaults point about this is that: people know what they

do, they sometime know why they do it, but what they dont know is what they do does.18. This

amounts to saying that the use of power leads to deliberate tactics (of which the person may or

may not be aware), but at the same time it leads also to unintended strategies of power. Hence,

The rationality of power is characterised by tactics which are often quite explicit

at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power),

tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one

another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by

forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims

decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented

them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit

characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which

18Foucault, personal communication with Dreyfus and Rabinow, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 187


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coordinate the loquacious tactics whose inventors or decision makers are often

without hypocrisy19

Two conclusions can be drawn from Foucaults conception of power. Firstly, by distinguishing

between strategies and tactics, Foucault is clearly working with a stratified and differentiated

social reality in which the mechanisms governing strategies (relative to social relations) are not the

same as those governing tactics (relative to people). Secondly, we can recognise here crucial

elements of Bhaskars ontology: Thus, not only does Foucault have a relational conception of

society but also he recognises that peoples actions and social relations exist in virtue of two

groups of mechanisms that are ontologically distinct.

In addition to the strata of tactics/individuals and strategies/society, Foucault also takes account of

the more basic stratum of biology. This is particularly noticeable in his use of biopower as aninstance of power preoccupied with the government as humans to the extent that they constitute a

biological specie. Hence, according to him, one cannot understand modern society without

studying the web of power-knowledge relations that traverses it from the strata of strategies to the

very biological strata of human beings as a population20 (Foucault 1978: 143). Furthermore,

strategies and tactics (Foucaults designation) have the same influences on peoples practice as the

strata of individuals and society (Bhaskars designation): strategies both limit and enable tactics,

while tactics both reproduce (sustain) and produce (modify) existing strategies. Foucault refers to

the influence of strategies over tactics as technologies of power, while he refers to the influence

of tactics on strategies as tactics of power (Cf figure 2)

19 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon.. P.9520

Ibid. p78.


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Figure 2: Foucaults model of stratification of social reality

Bhaskars

terminology

Society

Individual

Biology

Foucaults

terminology

Domain of

the political/

strategy

Domain of

tactics

Species &

body

Te

ch

no

logie

sof

po

wer

Tac

tics

ofp

ow

er

I hope that my interpretation of Foucaults stratification of reality is now clearer and the different

strata of his ontology have been identified. The question, however, of how Foucault manages to

link structure and agency is not yet evident. My thesis is that, although Foucault did not pose the

problem of the links between strata in the same terms as Bhaskar, it is nonetheless possible to

locate in his work similar concepts that constitute a point of contact between human agency and

social structures. I will argue that these concepts endure although, contrary to what I defended in

the 2007 paper, I am not sure any more that they are immediately occupied by individuals (Cf.

section 2.1) For Foucault, institutions; apparatuses and, finally, subjects are examples of such

mediating concepts. (Cf figure 2.4)


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Figure 3: Foucaults transformational model of social activity

Bhaskars

terminology

Society

Individual

Biology

Foucaults

terminology

Political/

Strategy

Tactics

Species &

body

System of

mediating concepts

Institutions

Apparatuses

Modes of subjection

Te

ch

no

log

ies

of

po

we

r

Tac

tics

ofp

ow

er

Foucault affirms that it is legitimate to study power through carefully defined institutions, but

that this is not sufficient to grasp all the range of relevant power relations. Nonetheless,

institutions provide the analyst with a useful (though approximate) range of slots occupied by the

individual in the more general structure of power. In institutions, the positions (places, rules,

functions, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) and practices that individuals occupy appear easily. However

institutions alone might mislead the observer since she runs the risk of interpreting all the relations

of power by referring exclusively to the particularity of the institution. Hence, in order to study

institutions, Foucault uses another, deeper, mediating concept, that of apparatuses. The apparatus

has a double role for Foucault. First, it is a grid of analysis for his historical investigation and

second, it refers to a range of heterogeneous elements at play. These elements have two

particularities. The first one is that they act directly on the individuals actions (and sometimes onher body), the second one is that they are invested by the deep mechanism of power Foucault

the genealogist is seeking to excavate. Hence, they constitute privileged links between the

biological, the tactical and the strategic strata.

Finally I would put among Foucaults mediating concepts the very mode of subjectification of the

individual, with the double meaning of tied to oneself and of subject to someone else.


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II/ Contributions and inflexions to CR meta-theory

The existence of points of convergence between the CR programme and Foucaults implicit social

ontology suggest that Foucaults themes and concepts can and perhaps should be articulated by

CR studies of society, either as themes (explicandum) or as resources (explicans). Whereas the

2007 paper relied on the meta-theory of CR to explain Foucaults meta-theory, the present paper

attempts a reverse movement that consists in suggesting how Foucaults meta-theory (now

explicans) can help us refining CR meta-theory (now explicandum). Therefore, I do not attempt to

dress a list of Foucaultian concepts that I find interesting for their own sakes (although there

would be quite a number of them). Neither do I merely suggest that specific insights from

Foucault can be articulated within CR empirical studies, which is, for instance, what Richard

Marsden does in The Nature of Capital21

when he proposes that while Marx studies the why? ofcapital, Foucault studies its how? Instead, I focus on two themes central to CRs meta-theory and

attempt to show how Foucaults analyses and perspectives can offer contributions to the CR

programme that are valued from its own perspective.

The CR themes I now examine are, in turn, the transitive dimension of knowledge 22, and

the mediating concepts linking structure and agency (positions and practices). These themes are in

no way exhaustive of Foucaults potential contribution to CRs meta-theory, and indeed their

centrality suggests that there are arguably many other CR themes that can perhaps benefit from

Foucaults legacy.

1) Exploring the transitive dimension of knowledge

As we have seen in the previous section, nominalism and realism are not incompatible and,

indeed, the transitive dimension of knowledge (TD) of a certain community of observers can

constitute the intransitive dimension of knowledge of another (ID). Moreover, if we agree with

Bhaskars claim that one of the key differences between social and natural forms is that the former

do not exist independently of agents conceptions of what they are doing in their activity23 then

21 Marsden, R. (1999). The nature of capital: Marx after Foucault. London ; New York, Routledge.22 Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. Hassocks, Sussex Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Harvester Press ;

Humanities Press.23 Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences.

London ; New York, Routledge.p. 38


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studying agents conceptions is a necessary aspect of studying the social structures re/produced by

these conceptions.

Yet, apart from the notable contribution of critical discourse analysis 24 (CDA) first in

linguistics and, more recently, in organization studies, most CR inspired projects dispense with

studying the constitution, reproduction and social effects of the discourses employed by those

agents they study. As an aside, this omission is particularly salient in management and

organization studies25 and I would be interested to hear from you if you have noticed a similar

tendency in your own field of academic study.

As a consequences of ignoring discourse, the categories employed by agents (eg. lecturers,

administrators, students, reference letters, timetables, departments and so on) are naturalized and

what was intended to be a CR project falls back into structuralist forms of analysis, hencesuffering from the shortcomings of structuralism that were identified by Foucault in the

Archaeology of Knowledge. Indeed, a basic assumption of structuralism is that conceptual

elements can and should be identified independently of the situation under scrutiny 26. It is,

however, necessary to pay more than lip service to the understanding that the discourse used to

refer to objects of study is not neutral. An interaction that is understood as taking place between,

say, a lecturer and a student (discourse of the University) may alternatively be interpreted, or

performed, as an interaction between, say, a woman and a man (feminist discourse), etc.

Although appeals to the lecturer or the woman may be directed to the same person, the

meanings they convey or perform, and the associated conceptual frameworks that are mobilized

differ significantly. It is for this reason that the constructs used by participants should not be

invoked simply as available (categorical) resources used in realist analysis. Instead, constructs

become topics of de-naturalized analysis that incorporates a critical interrogation27. So, such

analysis might, for example, incorporate examination of the practices that sustain basic systems of

24 Fairclough, N. (2005). "Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies: The Case for Critical Realism." OrganizationStudies (01708406) 26(6): 915-939.25 Cf. the substantial contributions gathered in Ackroyd, S. and S. Fleetwood, Eds. (2000). Realist perspectives on

management and organisations. Critical realism--interventions. London ; New York, Routledge, Fleetwood, S. and S.Ackroyd, Eds. (2004). Critical realist applications in organisation and management studies. London ; New York,Routledge.26 Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rabinow (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Brighton,Harvester.pp.54-627

See for instance: Pollner, M. and D. H. Zimmerman (1971). The Everyday World as a Phenomenon. Understandingeveryday life: Toward the reconstruction of sociological knowledge. J. D. Douglas. London, Routledge and Kegan

Paul: xii, 358 p.


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opposition at play in a university (e.g. admin staff vs academics, academic decisions vs

administrative decisions, etc.).

Foucaults interpretive analytics may prove particularly useful and interesting for such

endeavours. Concretely, this involves paying attention to three aspects. First, the system of

differentiations through which (transitive) objects of knowledge are constituted and which permit

some people to act upon the actions of others (eg. lecturer/student but not clergyman/layman in a

contemporary British University). Second, the enunciative modalities that describe and determine

who can make what claim? (For instance, who can attribute a mark? Who can decide on

extenuating circumstances? But also, which students are entitled to comment on lecturers

research in progress?). Third, the apparatus (dispositif) constituted by the related discursive

practices and their relations to non-discursive practices and entities. Amongst practices directlyinvolved in and constitutive of a student/lecturer relationship: lecturing, examination, academic

advice, pastoral advice, professional recommendation. Amongst non-discursive practices and

entities iii: lecture theatres, lecturers office, antiplagiarism software, email systems, and so on.

This list is, as you can imagine, far from being exhaustive, its purpose is, however, to illustrate

with specific examples how Foucaultian analytics can help studying the TD of agents and its wider

social effects.

2) Questioning the acquisition of social positions and practices

A notable difference between Foucaults project and that of Bhaskar is that, while Bhaskar

assumes in the Possibility of Naturalism28

that social positions and practices are immediately

occupied by individuals, Foucault problematizes and studies their occupation. The assumption that

positions and practices are occupied not immediately but through (sometimes complex) processes

is certainly not at odds with the overall CR project though. And indeed Archer spends the last

chapter ofBeing Human sketching a general theory of how social roles are occupied29. I now

follow briefly her analysis before contrasting it with a Foucaultian study of the constitution of

subjectivity.

28 Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences.

London ; New York, Routledge. Pp.40-129 See chapter Actors and commitment, pp.283-305 in Archer, M. S. (2000). Being human: the problem of agency.

Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.


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Archer distinguishes between I, me, we and you. I is the self (eg. a child) and, although it

is ultimately influenced by social roles, its existence is independent of them. A number of pre-

existing social roles are available to I who has to make choices as to the ones s/he wishes to

adopt. This choice presupposes and indicates that I can reflect on itself as a me (primary agent,

eg. schoolboy/girl) and reflect on my life chances (eg. what happens if I refuse to go to school)

or compare them with those of others. Once the I is positioned as a me, s/he can start actions of

a collective nature and thus become a we (corporate agent, eg. play at games with other

children). The actions of we lead him/her to acquire, accept and personify a position and, thus,

become fully an actor, or a you (eg. a fully recognised schoolboy/girl). This process is iterative

and I is in turn transformed in her identity, both by occupying roles as a you and by reflecting

on these roles and their congruence with Is own sense of identity. Thus, through this continuousdialectical iteration, I acquires new roles: from schoolboy/girl, s/he can become an

undergraduate student, then a postgraduate, then a lecturer and so on.

Figure 4: Archers theory of social identity

You

Actor

Eg. Identifying with role

of active schoolboy/girl

We

Corporate agency

Eg. Participating in class

Me

Primary agency

Eg. registering at schoo l

I

Self

In spite of the infamous last paragraph of the Order of things (that Foucault himself regretted in a

later interview), Archers assumption of a personal human identity is not what separates her from

Foucault. Indeed, she recognizes that: in his own writings, Foucault appears to have bitten the

bullet [] by accepting an anthropological entity, a real subject, which confronts culture as a


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knowing subject, capable of agential resistance. In a late essay on The subject and power, he

conceded that power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.30

Yet, even if we admit that Foucault and Archer share a similar social ontology, the

questions he raises and the way he attempts to answer them are quite different from hers. Whereas

Archer takes for granted that there exists a (seemingly natural) desire for self-discovery and

development, Foucault questions and problematizes this desire. Thus, in the History of Sexuality,

Foucault asks: i) what is historically specific about the particular form of our desire for self

(sexual) discovery and development? ii) For what reasons, through what techniques and by acting

on what aspects of herself does the self constitute herself as a specific subject? And iii) what are

the social consequences of this desire? What strategies of power (in Foucaults terms), what social

structures are thus actualized and reproduced?

Back to the illustrative example of the child becoming a schoolboy/girl, then a student and then a

lecturer, it can be conjectured that a Foucaultian answer to the questions above would be sketched

along the following lines:

i) However intense and seemingly natural, the contemporary modalities of our desire for self-

discovery and development are relatively recent. For instance, if self-development is thought of in

terms of skills, career and success, then it might be illuminating to perform a rigorous

genealogy of these notions (which I am not attempting in the present paper!)

ii) The second set of questions mobilise the notions of ethical substance (the material thats

worked over by ethics); mode of subjection (reasons why people come to recognize obligations);

andself-forming activities (techniques through which one becomes oneself). For instance, in 20 th

Century UK, measurable examined results are paramount in the acquisition of professional

identities, though the question of what aspects of the self these examinations measure is contingent

on these positions. The discourse of success and autonomy may perhaps account to an extent,

together with more idiosyncratic reasons, for the choice of a lecturers position (and all the

obligations that come with it). Finally, the self-forming activities include, amongst others, the

writing of a thesis, attendance to conferences, pub-discussions, extensive readings, supervisions

(both given and received) and so on and so forth.

30Ibid., p.33.


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iii) Although most people are probably not aware of it, the particular ways in which they strive to

develop themselves re/produce in turn the wider social structure. In Foucaults terms, tactics of

power contribute to reproducing strategies of power. For instance, a PhD student undergoing

supervisions with his supervisor may be principally preoccupied by the advancement of her thesis.

Yet s/he also contribute to the re/production of pastoral power, that is, the typically Christian

form of power that is exercised through benevolent motives of help and salvation of the

individual. For instance, most PhD supervisors in most universities probably wish the best success

to their PhD students and usually influence the actions and thoughts of these students with this

academic success in mind. The corollary is that the same benevolent power can also lead PhD

students who do not manage to get an academic job to interpret their situation as one of failure-

despite-the-kind-help-of-my-supervisor instead of one of failure-because-PhD-programmes-are-designed-to-engage-more-students-than-there-are-jobs.

In sum, although Foucaultian analysis does not necessarily contradict Archers theory of the

morphogenesis of social identity, it can nonetheless help refining and extending the analysis of

their historical modalities, their structural points of contact and their broader social and political

implications.

Concluding remarks

After summarizing my argument in favour of a CR reading of Foucault, I have attempted to

explore the potential contribution of Foucaults legacy to two central CR themes. I have thus

argued that the transitive dimension of knowledge was under-studied by CRists and that

Foucaults conceptual framework opened the possibility of studying the formation of agents

concepts as well as the non-discursive social features that both condition and are conditioned by

agents modes of representations and understanding (their TD). I have also proposed that

Foucaults later studies of self-constitution were compatible with Archers theory of the

morphogenesis of social identity and could extend it by providing specific themes and objects for

such study: a historization of modes of self-constitution; a grid of analysis for describing and

differentiating various processes of subjection and, finally, a theoretical framework for connecting

individual modes of subjection to wider social structures, including structures of domination.


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No doubt, a number of other CR concepts could be discussed and, perhaps, problematized

further in light of a realist interpretation of Foucault. For instance: history and the evolution of

social forms (see Archer31, Bhaskar32, Jessop33), human flourishing, internal critique, judgmental

rationality (so different from judgmental rationalism), etc. Although in the case of the present

paper, a Foucaultian take on the transitive dimension of knowledge and on the occupation of

social positions extends and inflects CR without really disrupting or negating it, it is difficult to

know a priori whether such disruptions may arise or not for other central concepts of CR.

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i The expression meta-theory is coined by Fleetwood and refers to the set of ontological statements supporting a

research programme. Meta-theory is typically contrasted with methodology, techniques and substantive

theories. Cf. Fleetwood, S. (2004). An ontology for organisation and management studies. Critical realist applications

in organisation and management studies. S. Fleetwood and S. Ackroyd. London ; New York, Routledge: 27-54. and

Fleetwood, S. (2005). "Ontology in organization and management studies: A critical realist perspective." Organization

12: 197-222.

ii The world is the referent par excellence. However, if we accept that the world is intrinsically differentiated, it is

possible to think of other, more or less general, referents such as: entities, powers, plants, coffee, the smell of coffee,

my impressions when I smell coffee, that impression I had the other day when I smelled some coffee, and so on.

iii These practices are non-discursive in the sense Foucault assigns to discourse. Under an alternative conception such

as Laclau and Mouffes, all the practices and entities enumerated herein would be considered as discursive. Cf.

Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. London,

Verso.

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