Paper 3 : Systems Thinking in Foresight - Europaforesight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta/papers/Session 2 Process Management... · EU-US Seminar: New Technology Foresight, Forecasting & Assessment

EU-US Seminar: New Technology Foresight, Forecasting & Assessment Methods-Seville 13-14 May 2004

SESSION 2 - PROCESS MANAGEMENT

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Paper 3 : Systems Thinking in Foresight A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF BRITISH, IRISH AND TURKISH FORESIGHT PROGRAMMES

Ozcan Saritas

Abstract This paper should be seen as a first step on the way to understanding and analysing Foresight from the systems thinking perspective. The paper analysed three contextually and methodologically unique national Foresight exercises. For the analysis of the exercises, a framework was developed. Based on the basic notions of systems thinking such as causality and holism, this framework structured the questions for the interviews that were held in the UK with PREST, in Ireland with FORFAS and in Turkey with TUBITAK on their national programmes. Viewing Foresight as a system and a sub-system of other environmental systems, a systems perspective helped to see that Foresight is ‘fragmented’ and ‘punctuated’ in its thinking processes due to the production of disconnected ideas relating to the part of the system and their introduction to the physical and social environments at any time. The analyses indicated that certain changes and mistakes would have avoided, if programme managers had thought about the design and the implementation of their exercises in a more systemic way.

I. INTRODUCTION Either by necessity or fashion-driven, national Foresight exercises have become widespread to inform present-day policy and strategy making. Most of the Foresight exercises attempt to create wealth, to achieve social development and economic prosperity, and to increase the quality of life by exploiting science and technology (S&T) advantageously. Scenarios, Delphi and panels are the most common techniques employed in these exercises.

Although there are similarities in the goals and techniques adopted, significant differences are expected in the in the way the programmes are performed in different national and sectoral contexts. This paper explores the reasons for these differences from the systems thinking perspective. While advocating the existence of causal interrelationships involved both in the real world and in idea creation, systems thinking emphasises the incorporation of context, content and process. With these basic notions, systems thinking owns some highly desirable properties when applied to thinking about the future.

In this paper, three recent Foresight Programmes were analysed from the systems thinking perspective. A framework was developed for the holistic analysis of structures, relationships, and emergent dynamics of a complex Foresight system. This framework structured the questions for the interviews with PREST in the UK, with FORFAS in Ireland, and with TUBITAK in Turkey on their national programmes.

During the analyses, the systems thinking provided insights that would otherwise be difficult to reach at. If programme managers had thought about the design and the implementation of their exercises in a more systemic way they would anticipate certain changes and would also have avoided making certain mistakes. The paper is concluded by raising a key question on how systems thinking could be adopted in Foresight.

II. SYSTEMS THINKING



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The central concept of a ‘system’ embodies “a set of elements connected together which form a whole, this showing properties which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of its component parts”. [Checkland, 1998] Stemming from this definition, ‘systems thinking’ is about viewing ‘events’ as a system and/or part of larger systems. Systems thinking advocates the treatment of systems as wholes, composed of related elements. The idea behind considering the wholes and related elements as a system is based on the perception of ‘causality’.

Causality explains the interrelatedness and interdependency of the elements. Interrelatedness is the connection between the elements of the set that make up the system and implies that the system taken as a whole has properties that differ from those of the simple sum of the effects of the individual relationships between pairs of elements. Interdependency is more specific and is the way relationships are conducted.

Systems thinking recognises ‘holism.’ Holism is based on a profound understanding of the interconnectedness of the system elements and their relationship to the whole system. Based on the idea of holism, in systems thinking, the issues cannot be considered and the new ideas cannot be created by considering them in isolation from the system that they are part of. Furthermore, the issue or idea system cannot be understood independently from the environment within which they are embedded in. Therefore, from the systems thinking viewpoint, not only the system itself, but also its context becomes worth to consider.

If the task is the analysis of ever-changing systems, this implies the management of three related areas: (a) the content of the activity, (b) the context in which it occurs, and (c) the process of change. [Pettigrew, 1985] Figure.1 demonstrates the dynamic relationships between these areas in an issue system.

Figure.1: Representation of Pettigrew’s analytical framework

In the figure, the inner context relates to the structure, culture and politics of the organisation. The outer context represents macro-scale environments outside the border of the organisation, where the organisation has limited or no control. In content the ‘subject matter of issue’ is considered such as the central objectives, the source of thought, and the extent to which thought anticipates the means of implementation. Finally, the process represents the interactive dimension, where the designed exercise captures the dynamic aspects of system and its change (see Whipp et.al., 1989).

1.1 Systems Thinking in Foresight Systems thinking owns some highly desirable properties when applied to thinking about the future. Systems thinking recognises complexity and uncertainty, and the existence of



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causal interrelationships involved both in the real world and in idea creation, while attempting to propose actions within either a bounded or an open system.

From the systems thinking perspective Foresight can be said ‘fragmented’ in its thinking process. Foresight is fragmented due to pretty much ad hoc ideas which cannot be placed in a systemic framework. Foresight is also ‘punctuated’ due to the production of novel ideas relating to the part of the system and their introduction to the physical and social environments at any time. As a consequence, Foresight as practiced; 1. Rarely pays attention to the interrelationships and the interconnectedness of the

ideas. Current practices create disconnected ideas, with more or less successful attempts to glue these together through scenario writing. As practiced Foresight remains as a systematic activity that is the sum of well defined, purposeful and coordinated actions.

2. Faces the challenge of the interaction between the context, content and process. This means Foresight’s insufficient communication with (a) the nature of the subject issue at hand, (b) its unique environment, and (c) the methodologies and techniques adopted.

Foresight is not or should not be about the application of tools transferred from a different environment where they were designed in a particular form within a particular system. As Miles (2003) stated “foresight should have a useful tie to reality and action.” [p.3]

1.2 A framework for systemic analysis of complex issues

In order to be able to analyse the performances of Foresight exercises based on the theory set above, we employ a systemic framework. Built on the structure developed by Keating et.al (2001), the framework is based on two very basic ideas:

1. issues at hand should be considered as systems –seeing Foresight as a system 2. a system’s behaviour cannot be understood independently from its environment

–accepting that the Foresight system is embedded in a context.

The systemic framework consists of six main steps: (1) Foresight programme-as-designed. Aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the Foresight system, its environment, initial performance and relevant information. Programme-as-designed is the system as it was intended to operate. (2) Foresight programme-as-performed. Identifies the changes occur during the implementation phase. “This system emerges as the system-as-designed is deployed in an operational setting. This captures the problem system as it is actually functioning.” [Keating et.al. 2001, p.774] When a designed system is deployed, various intended as well as unintended consequences are produced. (3) Causes of the differences between the programme-as-designed and as-performed. Investigates the reasons of the gap between what was intended versus what is actually being performed in the system. This is what is called as the “self organisation” of the system. Citing from Clemson, Keating et.al. state that “Self organisation holds most of the structural and behavioural properties of the system, emerge through interaction of the system elements.” (4) Attributes and the performance of the Foresight system. Establishes attributes and performance requirements that must be met by the Foresight programme. The



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performance of the programme is evaluated against these attributes and performance criteria drawn. (5) Idealised design. Represents a normative scenario, in which the situation is considered as we would desire it to be in the light of the lessons learned. (6) Potential failures in Foresight system re-design. Tests the idealised solution by conducting a failure analysis to optimise idealised Foresight system solution prior to implementation. Table.1 shows the questions asked under six headings:

Table.1: The steps of systemic and the questions asked under each step Steps of systemic analysis Questions asked under each step

Foresight programme as-designed

• Background of S&T policy-making • The motivations and goals of the programme • The context in which the programme was designed • Content of the exercise (focus, scope and limits) • Process design, panel organisation, participation and

implementation Foresight programme as-performed

• Changes in the original design • Control of the performance of the exercise

Causes of the differences • The reasons of all above-mentioned changes Attributes and the performance of the system

• Evaluation of the exercise by practitioners • Achievements and problems • Attributes of a successful Foresight exercise

Idealised design • Lessons learned from the Foresight exercise • Design of a new Foresight exercise • Changes and more and/or less important issues in the new

design Failures analysis • The likely problems if the idealised design is deployed

III. THREE COUNTRY CASES This paper analyses three national Foresight exercises by using the framework for systemic analysis of complex issues. The selection of the cases was based on three rationales (a) the presence of contextual exclusivity (b) representation of three different periods in the last 10 years of Foresight experience in Europe, and (c) the availability of data, information and historical background.

3.1 The British Case (1993-1995) Background, Motivations and Objectives of the exercise

1980s saw science came to be regarded as a source of strategic opportunity and industrial innovation becoming a central priority for publicly funded R&D. Both resource constraints and the strategic value put on S&T were driving factors in the search for some way of prioritising both the public and private spends on R&D in the UK.

In 1984, Irvin and Martin’s book, ‘Research Foresight’, drew attention to Foresight activities conducted elsewhere across the globe, and argued that the UK could benefit from a similar exercise for prioritisation. This book supplemented the ACARD (Advisory Council for Applied R&D) report called ‘Exploitable Areas of Science.’ Following on from these reports, during the late 1980s somewhat isolated attempts were made at research Foresight such as by the ACOST (Advisory Council on S&T), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the Research Councils. Indicating the weaknesses of these efforts, Martin made two points in his reviews: [Keenan, 2000]



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1. There could have been benefits in pooling the efforts, i.e. demand-pull and science-push could have given equal weight within a single forum.

2. There had been a failure to implement a more ‘holistic’ foresight exercise.

In 1992, the Government announced the creation of a new Office of Science and Technology (OST). Its mission was to act as the focus for developing and co-ordinating Government policy on S&T, to establish better links between Government-funded S&T and industry, and to ensure an adequate supply of well trained and skilled scientists and engineers, all with a view to making the maximum contribution to the nation’s economic performance and quality of life.

The intention to conduct a national Technology Foresight Programme (TFP) was announced in the 1993 White Paper, ‘Realising our Potential,’ with the following aims:

1. to inform spending priorities in the public sector science base and industry 2. to increase networking activities, particularly between academia and industry 3. to lead to the development of a foresight culture, particularly in business

Four teams, PA Consulting, PREST, SPRU, and ISI Fraunhofer, with their expertise in the area, were commissioned to develop a methodology suitable for the UK.

Some highlights from the design of the exercise The British Foresight exercise can be described as a holistic programme which aimed to setting priorities in the UK science base. Some of the remarkable points in the design of the exercise from the systems thinking view are as follows: • Goals affected the methodology. As the main designers of the methodology,

PREST and PA were well aware that the background, motivations and objectives of the programme would affect the methodology to be employed. The methodology had to be capable of producing a prioritised list of emerging generic technologies. During this priority setting process it was considered that wider consultation was important. In addition, the experiences of other counties were also influential in methodology selection. The success of Japanese and German economies encouraged process designers to try to emulate their experiences. Derived from the motivations and goals of the Programme and the experiences of others, the main points of the methodology were (a) the use of the Delphi, and (b) the use of co-nomination to identify a pool of experts to serve on expert panels and to act as recipients of the Delphi questionnaire.

• From technology-oriented to market-based panels. Despite the original proposals for the setting-up of technology based panels, by the autumn of 1993, everyone had agreed that market-based panels would be preferable. The initial concentration on technology-oriented panels was based largely on a precedence that had been set in other national exercises. The reasons of moving to market-based panels were; (a) the political context. Politically, the governing party was taking its political power mostly from the industry. Therefore market focus was seen more imperative. (b) the rationales of the programme. The main rationale, ‘wealth creation,’ could be through the promotion of a greater awareness of the importance of innovation, particularly amongst firms. A technology-based approach could easily see panels captured by single disciplinary interests. The market-led panels would emphasise users and be more problem-oriented in their outlook. The final decision was adoption of a market based approach, while preserving a balance between market-pull and technology-push.



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• Sectoral focus. It was decided that the programme should be divided horizontally into 15 sector Panels. They sectors were chosen according to market needs, on the basis of goods and services where there are broad consumer markets, and technology domains, many of which can be associated with readily identifiable academic disciplines.

• Cross panel linkages. Sectoral panels brought some concerns about drawing the boundaries of panels, which could cause duplications and uncovered areas. As a solution, the Steering Group (SG) asked panels to build links with each other such as by considering other panels’ preliminary reports. Some other formal channels were designed to facilitate the linkages such as the organisation of ‘Mega-Forum.’ The aims of this event were mainly to consider the ‘cross-sectoral’ issues. Another formal way for the cross-fertilisation of ideas was through SG Assessors. Associated with panels they attended some meetings to provide linkages.

• Standardised processes: A terms of reference for the panels was drawn up and distributed to all panels. It included (a) the initial information gathering phase, (b) a wider consultation phase, and (c) assessment of priorities and publication of final reports. For the consultation phase the designed method included the development of programme-wide macro-scenarios, the Trends & Issues survey, benchmarking, and an Interim report. In SQW/PREST designed an “attractiveness-feasibility matrix” for the purpose of prioritisation to be used by all panels. Everything was structured and standardised in the process deliberately, because; (a) to make sure that the panels consulted widely, (b) to provide transparency and coherency, and (c) to let the comparison of different panel works.

Changes & the reasons of the changes

“The Project Plan was hardly written in stone.” This was the first time a national Foresight exercise had been conducted in the UK. The programme was designed as OST went along and the following changes were experienced during the process: • Individual and Organisational behaviours caused changes. This was due to

three main reasons; (a) people and their personality, (b) disruptive personal and institutional changes, and (c) the lack of experience.

(a) The people in the panels were quite influential during the process. The success of the panels depended mostly on the panel chair person and Technical Secretary. The case of the technical secretaries was perhaps one of the most noticeable one. The technical secretaries were there just for one year, which was the initial target of the programme duration. They were the links between the panels and the OST, and were supposed to be helpful to deliver the programme. However, because the secretaries were not tightly linked to the OST, to use the term of Keenan (2000) they often “went native.” “They went into the panels and they agreed all the complaints in the panels. They even started talking about how the programme should be done.”

(b) During the process, new Panel and SG members had to be appointed including new Panel chairs and Technical Secretaries. The most significant personal change was that of the Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA), whose absence affected the process. During this time all appointments to the Panels and SG were put on hold. Regarding to the institutional changes, the major change was the move of OST from the Cabinet



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Office into the DTI in July 1995. Caused a lot of turmoil, this institutional change led an implementation gap for six months. SG could not work during this time.

(c) Lack of experience of panellists also caused deviations. They were mostly senior people and had their own ideas. They did not understand the methodology very well. Some of them did not like the Delphi. They found it artificial and not useful. As a result, they decided to work in more traditional committee way.

In July 1995, Programme managers decided to seek the views of panellists concerning the process with a questionnaire. The findings included (a) the fact that some panels worked better than others, probably due to the above-mentioned reasons (b) the Delphi was disliked; and (c) cross-panel works were inadequate.

• Delphi became unpopular. The Delphi was a mandatory part of each panel activity. It provided the involvement of thousands of people in the Foresight process. Some found it useful both for individual and panels. The others saw it as costing time and not very contributing. The Delphi did not work very well and panels made little use of the results probably because of the weakness of some statements and the tight schedule.

• Unattractiveness of the Attractiveness-Feasibility matrix. Despite the development of standardised prioritisation process, the Panels failed to identify priorities and give recommendations according to criteria drawn. Except few panels used the criteria explicitly, others thought that the priorities identified were considered to be ‘obvious’ and there was no need to use formal models. However consultants claimed that “such arguments are common to committees reluctant to make systematic use of external expertise and information.” [Keenan, ibid., p.132]

• Alterations in consultation phase. The idea of ‘macro-scenarios’ was dropped. The reason, as expressed by SG members, that “panels might object to being constrained in their visions of the future by the ‘imposition’ of ‘macro-scenarios.’” [Keenan, ibid., p.111] There was a consensus that Panels should be asked to concentrate on the networking and free-thinking aspects of the task, rather than on benchmarking, although they would analyse the strengths and weaknesses during the consultation.

• Limited cross-panel work. Both the OST and SG had urged the panels to make reference to the work of other Panels in their reports. There was little evidence that this had happened. Held in September 1994 by which time the Panels had reached their preliminary views and had specified the issues to be included in Delphi, the ‘Mega-forum’ was successful in terms of dissemination and networking. However, it was not in terms of cross-panel linkages. The activities of SG Assessors were also very limited. This mechanism did not work because they were busy. Although they were not expected to attend all the meetings, they could not even keep their contacts with panels due to their workload. Consequently, the formal attempts did not work properly, because they were not embedded in the exercise and as a result they stayed artificial. The informal attempts initiated by the panels worked better. Most panels recognised the potential of informal cross-Panel links and appointed individuals to liaise with other panels.

• Nature of the sectors affected the process. There were differences between the sectors according to the nature of the sectors being worked on. Nevertheless, these differences are not reflected in the design and they were not anticipated. During the



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practice they became existent. It might be useful to distinguish the factors creating these differences such as the nature of the sector. This would be possible to do it with some further research.

• Implementation was considered later. Although it had been highlighted as an important issue for consideration initially, the first serious discussion of Foresight implementation was towards the end of the first year. The OST considered implementation lately because of remaining uncertainty (a) the nature of the Programme’s outputs, and (b) the level of Government support for the Programme after the Sector Panels had produced their reports.

Learning from the experience

The British exercise was a large organisation and many details overlooked in other programmes were considered in the UK in detail. This was because of the involvement of the experienced institutions in the design of the programme like PREST and SPRU. After the exercise, the vast majority of respondents thought that it had been worthwhile and should be repeated in the light of experiences gained.

However, the second exercise did not learn much from the experiences of the previous round. This was because the designers of the first programme were not involved in the second cycle. The new cycle was mostly designed by the people who took part in the implementation of the first exercise. Unlike the consultation phase, which was a “heroic stage” of the exercise and the creativity from 1993-1995, the implementation part between 1995-1997 was a non-creative stage and it saw the bureaucratisation of the exercise.

“They threw the baby out with bath water.” In the second programme there was a reaction to the ex-previous methodology. First, the word technology was dropped and the Delphi was left. A more co-operative and collaborative design was introduced. There were more connections between the panels. Thematic panels were established for cross-cutting issues. There were Task Forces consisting of ten members from different panels. Involving more ‘stakeholder’ groups in society, in this more participatory process, societal needs and their interaction with technology become equal of interest. The panels were free now. However, they were “rudderless” to use Keenan’s word. The programme was structured insufficiently and the panels had no guidance. Moreover, the programme became more complex institutionally because of the formalisation of informal relationships between the stakeholders to be able to monitor the practices and to duplicate the best ones.

3.2 The Irish Case (1998-1999) Background, Motivations and Objectives of the exercise

In Ireland, there are two sides of research: 1. The university side (Higher Education Authority, Department of Education &

Science) 2. The industry side (Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment)

The major issue in the university side was managing the money coming from the Education Ministry to the universities. In 1998 HEA, as a responsible body, launched a program called Programme for the Research in the Third Level Institutions (PRTLI).



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Through PRTLI the universities could only be funded in a competitive process by developing their own projects in particular focus areas. Therefore, the universities were to develop their own visions and strategies. In that sense, the policy was set very much by the universities themselves at the areas they saw most important.

In the industry side, publicly funded PATs (Programmes in Advanced Technologies in Science) were influential from the mid 80s to mid 90s. Each PAT was specialised in particular aspects of the particular technology. However, because of the decrease in their performance, mainly due to the lesser share of government in funding, they were closed. As a result of the changing S&T funding scheme, there was a need to restructure the S&T funding organisations.

In 1996 there was an evaluation of the Irish S&T landscape. The STIAC (Science, Technology & Innovation Advisory Council) report was produced with the chairmanship of an industrialist Dan Tierney. The report reviewed public, industry and the university S&T environment and showed the directions to go and the things to do. The notion of doing a Foresight activity was first mentioned in the STIAC report.

The government responded the STIAC report with a white paper in 1996 and set up what is called as S&T infrastructure that led to the establishment of the Irish Council of Science, Technology & Innovation (ICSTI). In 1998 the ICSTI was asked by the government to undertake a Foresight exercise5. The main goals of the exercise were: 1. Restructuring of the S&T funding of the Dept. of Industry, Trade &

Employment 2. Selection of the technologies to be invested in 3. Supporting the preparation of the National Development Plan covering 2002-

2006.

Some highlights from the design of the exercise

As described by FORFAS, the Irish exercise was a good example, where all the stakeholders came together in panels for one year activity to take a longer-term perspective. Some of the highlights of the exercise are as follows: • Sectoral focus. The Irish exercise was very much industry focused. The society was

not involved. This was because the exercise was totally driven by the enterprise agenda. In the scoping of the exercise, eight strategically important sectors 6 , underpinning most of the economy, were selected by the Council. The main rationales for a sectoral focus were: i. the industrial policy in Ireland has historically been done on the

sectoral basis. ii. sectoral focus makes it easier to identify stakeholders. When

there is a particular sector, the issues in that are quite clear. iii. there are very well defined borders and limits. iv. a lot of background information and data are available and there

is an accumulated knowledge in sectoral context and also v. “other countries also choose sectoral focus.”

5 Besides STIAC report, the Foresight practices in other countries were also influential in government’s decision to conduct a Foresight exercise. 6 In the exercise there was not any thematic panel for the cross-cutting issues.



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• Learning from the others. Because “there were no country guides available,” they did what everybody else did: “Travelled.” From the UK, Ireland learned that they would not do a Delphi and they would try to keep the reports produced fairly simple, short and digestible. After examining Austrian exercise they were more convinced not to use Delphi, because of cultural reasons. “In Austria, the Delphi was the order of the ministry there and because of this people responded to it and it has never occurred to them as a burden, whereas in Ireland people are so frightened by letters coming from the ministry.” While going with panels, after two or three meetings, it was realised that scenarios would give a structure to the discussion. During this process, they got some consultancy assistance from Dutch experts.

• Lack of country context. However, the structure of the industry was reflected in the exercise by involving the multinationals along with indigenous business. Because there is not a big home market to sustain the competitiveness firms, any high potential start up in the country becomes an exporter immediately.

• Disconnected panel works. The relationships between the sectors and inter-panel works were not considered. As they state, this was because of the lack of time. Only at the end of the exercise some horizontal issues were identified. Nevertheless, neither the relationships between the sectors nor inter-panel works were done systematically.

• Standard and systematic processes. Having no designed process difference between the panels according to the nature of the sectors being worked on, each of the panel was asked to develop a ‘First view’ of their sectors. That was like a taking a snapshot of the here and now of that particular sector. First view was to be used for the first round consultation. For the first view panels were given templates to provide some sort of comparability between them.

• Not horizontal, but vertical communication. There was not any formal horizontal communication channel between the panels. Panel secretary meetings were organised to provide vertical communication. The idea was spotting problems early like an early warning system. Information, knowledge and experiences were shared through the steering committee meetings which hosted FORFAS and panel chairs, who were the industrialist members of the Council to keep the panels locked and to keep the ownership there.

• Just-in-time implementation design. The implementation started being considered after the publication of the final reports. They thought that if everybody was thinking about implementation, they would miss “the point.” The point was Ireland’s entry into a new area, “basic research.” This was a total change. “We could lose the main message of Foresight, if we got into the implementation discussion.”

Changes & the reasons of changes

“We were not prisoners of the project plan.” According to FORFAS, the planned activities mostly happened. This was because most of the exercise was not planned initially and the planned parts were quite flexible. This was the first exercise and there a



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lack of experience. As many other beginners, they were “learning as they were going.” Some of the changes experienced are bulleted below. • The need for scenarios. The exercise started with the panels. However, during

the process implementation, one of the deviations in methodology occurred. After several panel meetings they started to appreciate the importance of the scenarios. Scenarios would enable people to take a long term perspective and would enable them to leave their own personal agendas outside the door. In this way a common understanding and a “global” picture of the future could be created.

• Differences occurred in panel processes. There were no designed process differences between the panels but various differences occurred during the exercise. The differences in panel processes were mainly due to the panellists. The personalities of the panel members were influential during the process. For instance, because the chair and some panel members of the Health and Life Sciences panel were really strong and were very committed to biotech, their report became a biotechnology report in the end. One of the other panels had to go back, because they were going earlier. The main reason was the very enthusiastic technical secretary who was just pushing the panel to finish the exercise early. This was another behavioural issue.

• Influences of the nature of the sectors. There were differences in panel works because of the different time lines of different sectors. Consequently, the sectors and their understanding of the future and their horizons were different. The year 2015 was not very meaningful for ICT sector, because their time frame and the product life cycles are much shorter.

• Gluing panel works. ICSTI developed some visions for Ireland at the end of the exercise to “glue” all the panel works, which was overlooked in the process design and implementation. Because of their involvement in all panels, the council was able to bring all the panel visions together. At the beginning the only planned outcome was the panel reports, but then visions were also published in a final report.


Irish exercise was a short, one-year, and also a ‘one-time’ exercise. It is still under implementation. During the first exercise Ireland learned that the following factors are crucial for the success of the exercise: • The purpose. Foresight is designed and operated to produce outputs and achieve

objectives. Therefore the output and the outcomes must be considered sufficiently deeply.

• The integration. The integration of different perspectives, such as the integration of sectors and their relationships with the society, and also the inclusion of the organisational and behavioural aspects, are all vital.

• The customer. The impact of the exercise during the implementation stage is higher, if there a strong customer, such as government.

• Champions. “There should be someone to work and think about the exercise all day and all night, and to drive the process with a lot of energy and effort.”

Foresight activities would continue in Ireland, however in another format. A society Foresight exercise is already visible in the horizon now. After such a strong industry focus, the planned exercise will include wider society, by taking the social partnership



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model a key to success in Ireland in development during the 80s. A society Foresight could help to activate social partnership again.

3.3 The Turkish Case (2002-2004) Background, Motivations and Objectives of the exercise

Turkey’s S&T policy making history starts from the 1960s with the introduction of first economic development plan covering 1963-67. The Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) was established in 1963 with the purpose of:

1. organising, coordinating and promoting basic and applied research, 2. directing research activities to the targets of the plan, 3. setting research priorities.

The basic policy in 1960’s and 1970’s was the “promotion of basic and applied research in natural sciences.” The first detailed S&T document was prepared in 1983 with the contribution of over 300 experts and scientists. There was an S&T – Industry Platform to design 1983-2003 S&T policies. The S&T document produced explicitly recognised the role of technology for development and suggested broadly defined priority areas of technology. This document also led to the establishment of Supreme Council for S&T (SCST) as the highest policy making body in S&T.

Although the first attempts to formulate comprehensive S&T policies go back to the early 80’s, Turkey’s first institutional Foresight experience has its roots in the SCST Decision in 2000. The overall goal of SCST was the production of a new national S&T document for the period 2003-2023 to build a welfare society in 2023. TUBITAK was appointed to undertake this task.

The S&T policy implementation in Turkey was problematic due to the lack of ownership, society involvement, political support and dissemination, and isolated S&T policies. Diagnosing these problems, TUBITAK suggested the use of Foresight to produce S&T policies and to disseminate them. Foresight was considered as a useful tool which could satisfy the problems related with the implementation of the policies. Implementation was only possible with ownership and ownership could be provided by including the society extensively. Then the wider involvement of the society would bring political support together. It was also thought that in order to provide benefits to the society, S&T policies needed to be considered with other sectoral policies.

Some highlights from the design of the exercise

TUBITAK describes the Turkish Foresight exercise as a national level and holistic (covering all related sectors) programme used as a tool to design S&T policies for the next 20 years. The following points are noteworthy from the systems thinking perspective: • Sectoral focus. TUBITAK first wanted to learn society’s demands from S&T, in

order to produce S&T policies to meet these demands. They considered that the only structured body to get the society’s demand was economic sectors, because they were the ones who implement S&T policies. In addition, economic sectors have very clear definitions and distinctions. Consisting of public and private sectors, academe and



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NGOs, the Steering Committee (SC) prioritised ten technology and policy-relevant sectors underpinning the competitiveness and economic development were selected.

• Ten Disconnected sectors. The relationships between these sectors were not considered. According to TUBITAK this was because of time limitations. TUBITAK thought that the discussion on the relationships between the sectors would take too long, because the sectors could be protective and defensive about their own areas.

• Learning from the others. The idea of undertaking Foresight came from TUBITAK. With the personal efforts of several staff members, who had just learned about Foresight in an International Training Programme, TUBITAK proposed the use of Foresight for S&T policy making for the next 20 years. Foresight could be helpful to develop robust policies under uncertainty. It was also applied widespread in many EU and candidate countries in a “fashionable” way. TUBITAK analysed Foresight programmes of other countries and noticed the widespread use of Panels and Delphi.

• Organisational capabilities determined the technique. In the Turkish exercise the selection of the methodology was related with the organisational capabilities. This was an influence of internal context. Foresight was a new concept for TUBITAK as for Turkey. In TUBITAK it was considered that they would not handle scenario planning. “We could not understand scenario building, as we could Panels and Delphi. We thought about it, tried to understand, but then we felt like we could not apply it properly. Delphi’s steps were clear and well defined. Everybody knew what to do.”

• New functions for the old techniques. TUBITAK thought that panels would define the “demands from the technology,” whilst Delphi would fulfil the “technology supply” side by wider participation from different stakeholders. The Delphi would also function to test the possibility and the feasibility of the technology demands from the panels.

• Standard and systematic processes. TUBITAK Project Office (PO) produced a four-step Task Definition including “Vision building,” “Dissemination,” “Delphi” and “Policy proposals,” which were common for all panels as well as the methodology.

• Fragmentation of sectors. In the process design phase bringing the ideas from different sectors was not considered. There were some attempts to do that in panel scale but not between the panels. The only difference was considered between the Sectoral and Thematic panels.

• Uneven representation of stakeholders. One of the initial motivations of Turkish Foresight was “participation”. TUBITAK tried to provide an equal representation of stakeholders from the public and private sectors, academia and NGOs. But this was not possible in some panels.

• Lack of country context. During the design of the process, the country context, which includes STEEP environments, was not considered. Their argument at this point was that all these were “implicit” when the exercise started.

• Horizontal communication. In the process design regular panel core group meetings were designed to provide horizontal communication between the panels.

• Uncertain implementation. The implementation was not planned in the process design phase.

Changes & The reasons of changes



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“We were learning by doing and changing by learning.” This was the first attempt of Turkey. TUBITAK did not know much about Foresight and used the most common tools for the exercise which could bring some product benefits as well as process benefits. Figure.2 shows the Foresight process as-designed (a), and how it was practiced differently by two panels. Figure.2b shows the process as-practiced by the construction panel, whilst Figure.2c shows the process as-practiced by the IT panel (c). In the Figures, white boxes show the steps decided in the initial design. The grey and black boxes show the deviations from the original design, while the black boxes also highlight the differences in the practices of the two sectoral panels.

Figure.2a, b &c: The programme as-designed (a), and as practiced in the

construction panel (b) and in the IT panel (c)

From the systems perspective these changes and their reasons were due to: • Same processes for the sectoral and thematic panels. The PO had thought different

processes for the sectoral and thematic panels, which were planed to start later in the process. Thus there was not any design for the thematic panels when the exercise started. However, because of the pressures from SC, the thematic panels started with others and used the same processes with the others. In the end, the thematic panels experienced major problems and Education and human resources panel did not work.

• Behaviours caused different practices. Panel works were differentiated during the implementation of the exercise. These differences in panel works were not because of the differences between the characteristics of the sector, but due to the differences among panellists and their backgrounds (some of the panels were dominated by

(b) (c)

(a)



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industrialists and the others were by academicians). The viewpoint of panel chairmen and/or dominant groups in the panel affected the panel’s view as a whole.

• Nature of the sectors affected the process. There were differences between the panels in terms of the technological content of the sectors. Some panels were to propose new technologies such as the IT and Materials panels. On the other hand, there were others, which were technology users such as Transportation and Tourism panels. When they were asked to produce roadmaps in the updated task definition, the technology user panels were confused. They knew what they needed but they did not know which technologies to use to do that.

• Less lateral more vertical communications. During the exercise the core panel meetings, which were originally designed for horizontal communication, were used for vertical purposes to facilitate the communication between SC, PO and the panels. There were very limited interactions between the panels, which happened with the panel’s own initiative. “But these were not perfect.”

• Just-in-time Delphi. In terms of methodology, there was not any change at all. Panels worked as they were planned. There was also no change in Delphi, because there was no time to do that. Delphi was designed, just before its implementation. The idea of Delphi was there, but it was not clear how to do it from the beginning. The Delphi was designed separately. After 7-8 months, after the publication of preliminary reports an “organic connection” occurred and PO directed panels to work towards the Delphi.

• New Task Definitions. At the end of the process panels were also asked to build roadmaps for the future. However, the panels were frustrated with these changes and the additional tasks. These amendments in plans, additional tasks and the uncertainty of the process found their reflection as big timing problems in the schedule of the exercise.

• Country context was there. The country context was not considered during the content and the process design of Foresight. However, this context found its reflection in people’s minds. Because there was a big economic crisis, people were pessimistic and had difficulty to think about the future -in an environment where they could not even think about the next day. However, the organisers stated that “if we were starting this programme today, people’s psychology and approach would be much different. Today the country is much ahead of where we started 2-3 years ago. Parallel to these positive developments, people have become more optimistic and now they are more interested in what we are doing.”


TUBITAK knows that the new exercise would be different, but they do not know how. They think that in the next programme the goal would be different so do the design of the programme. The main task of TUBITAK in this exercise was producing an S&T policy document for SCST. TUBITAK felt this responsibility from the first moment. Consequently the main goal of the exercise affected the whole process. TUBITAK states that “if we did not have this heavy task, the programme would be more flexible, panels would be more independent and the results would be significantly different. But, we had to force them to deal with technical issues.” These pressures led participants to think “policy-oriented” rather than problem-oriented as they used to think.



59

Besides the change in the way participants think, TUBITAK sees “political will” vital for the success of the exercise. They accept the exercise successful if the government translate the outputs to social and economic benefits. TUBITAK believes that if the government does not show any particular interest to this first exercise, then they will not be able to crate the same mobilisation again. They also underline that the “proper” design of the programme is a key to the success of the exercise.

IV. SOME FINDINGS During the analyses of three national Foresight Programmes, the systems thinking perspective provided fresh insights, which could otherwise be overlooked. The framework developed for the analyses was underpinned by the basic notions of systems thinking –causality (interrelatedness and interdependency), holism, hierarchy, and continuity. This structure helped to highlight many ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ issues, either embedded in external or internal organisational context, which affected the content and the process of the exercises. Following, we highlight some very basic points according to the notions of the systems thinking as the provided space let.

The analyses of the three programmes indicated that they were all driven by the technology agenda. The exercises were methodologically systematic and standardised. The organisers/practitioners all claimed that their programmes were holistic in view and they all focused on individual sectors.

Technology focus. The exercises were mostly driven by the S&T agenda. Therefore they were mostly technology oriented. The technology focus caused exercises to focus only a particular part of the system which also covers social, economic, ecological and political sub-systems. As we highlighted in cases, these other sub-systems have strong causal effects on the technology sub-system. These influences become explicit during the exercise and when the findings of the exercises are implemented, such as in the form of lack of political will or economic constraints.

Methodologically systematic and standardised. The organisers/practitioners described their programmes as methodologically systematic. However, the changes that they experienced during the process indicated that the application of standard and systematic processes under different national and sectoral contexts is not appropriate. Although some practitioners felt that they would be more secure with systematic approaches, with very well defined tasks and steps, Foresight is an evolutionary development. It is a complex issue and it needs to be considered as a systemic activity in more open, evolving, learning and continuously developing processes.

The changes in this systematic process occurred due to both hard and soft factors, which we are familiar with from the systems thinking view. The natures of the sectors covered by the exercises were quite different. For instance, some of the sectors were technology generators whilst the others were technology users. The sectors like IT and aerospace even had quite different time horizons for the future. Besides these hard factors, covering human and organisational factors, soft factors were notably influential on the performance of the exercises.

In the cases we analysed, we noticed that the differences between the practices in different panels were mainly due to the behaviours of the institutions and, particularly,



60

of the people acting in the exercises, their enthusiasm, willingness and curiosity. We also saw that externally developed formal models may not find a big support and a large audience, because of the participants’ lack of understanding the methodology, personal experiences and individual judgments.

Holistic in content. The organisers/practitioners describe their programmes as ‘holistic’ by considering that ‘they covered all the relevant sectors in their exercises.’ However, this is not sufficient evidence to claim that the programmes were holistic. Holistic thinking is based on a profound understanding of the interconnectedness of the system elements and their relationship to the whole system. In this case the systemic relationships within the sector boundaries, between the sectors and with other STEEP systems become crucial, which are not considered adequately in the exercises. As a consequence, Foresight rarely pays attention to the interrelationships and the interconnectedness of the ideas. Current practices create fragmented and disconnected ideas7.

Sectoral focus. The sectoral focus is quite common in national Foresight exercises. This is mostly because of the availability of data and very well defined sectoral boundaries. However, in the exercises these sectors were analysed individually, not as parts of a wider system. Very simply, an economical input-output table shows clearly the causal economic relationships between the sectors (see Bon et.al., 1999). Considering the other types of relationships such as social, political, ecological would give a more holistic picture and would highlight the need for involving not only the economic sectors, but also the other actors in the society.

Coupled with focus on sectors individually, limited cross panel linkages also contributed to the isolation of the ideas created. As a consequence, because of poor inter-sectoral relationships, the panels focused mostly on one part of the whole system independent from the other interrelated system elements.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we took a significant first step with the analysis of the complex Foresight system. The framework presented and the analyses of three country cases provided us:

1. Engagement with a high-level systems-based analysis, 2. appreciating the unique national and organisational contexts and operational

environments where Foresight is embedded, and 3. enhancing individual and group system problem solving skills and perspectives.

This initial step on the way to understanding Foresight from the systems thinking perspective made explicit that Foresight faces difficulties, because;

1. the organisers/practitioners are far from understanding the complexity of the situation if they are even aware of it, or

2. the methodologies and techniques that they adopt and the ways they are implemented are in fault.

7 Saritas and Oner (2004) analyses the results of the first and second cycles of the UK Foresight Programmes construction sector panel works to indicate the fragmentation of the ideas created. They also propose a novel systems approach for Foresight by considering the interrelated and interconnected components of a complex Foresight environment and their mutual causality.



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As a result, causes and consequences are not considered sufficiently deeply and Foresight remains punctuated and fragmented. Now the question remains ‘How can the notions of the systems thinking be applied to Foresight?’ The possible answers to this basic question have been discussed both theoretically and practically in Ozcan Saritas’ PhD thesis titled ‘Adopting a systems thinking in Foresight’ under the supervisory of Prof. Denis Loveridge and the advisory of Dr. Michael Keenan of PREST, the University of Manchester.

Acknowledgements The author is grateful to Dr. Michael Keenan of PREST (UK), Ms. Helena Acheson of FORFAS (Ireland), and Prof.Dr. Turgut Tumer, Dr. Filiz Cimen and Mr. Ender Arkun of TUBITAK (Turkey) for the valuable information they provided on the British, Irish and Turkish Foresight Programmes.

REFERENCES 1. Bon R., Birgonul, T. and Ozdogan, O. (1999) An input-output analysis of the Turkish

construction sector, 1973-1990, Construction Management and Economics, 17, 543-551. 2. Checkland, P. (1998). Soft System Methodology in Action, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 3. Keating, C.B., Kauffmann, P., and Dryer, D. (2001). A framework for systemic analysis of

complex issues, Journal of Management Development, 20, 9, 772-784. 4. Keenan, M. (2000). An Evaluation of the Implementation of the UK Technology Foresight

Programme, PhD Thesis, University of Manchester. 5. Miles, I. (2003). Ten years of foresight in UK, paper presented in The Third Generation

Foresight and Prioritization in Science and Technology Policy – The second international conference on technology foresight. February 27-28, 2003, Japan.

6. Pettigrew, A.M. (1985). The Awakening Giant, Blackwell, Oxford. 7. Saritas, O. and Oner, M.A. (2004). Systemic analysis of UK foresight results: Joint

application of integrated management model and roadmapping, Technological Forecasting & Social Change,71, 1-2,27-65.

8. Whipp, R., Rosenfeld, R., and Pettigrew., A. (1989). Managing strategic change in a mature business, Long Range Planning, 22, 92-99.

Presentation 3 :



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Seville 13 / 05 / 2004

Hierarchy

Content

Causality

Continuity

Systemic

Holism

Recursivity

InterconnectednessComplexity

Expansionism

SoftContext

Hard

Systems thinking

Proc

ess

Envi

ronm

entSystems

System embodies a set of elements connected together which form a whole.System as a whole has properties that differ from those of the simple sum of the effects of individual relationships between pairs of elements.Systems thinking is viewing ‘events’ as a system and / or part of larger systems. Systems thinking advocates the existence of causal interrelationships involved both in the real world and in idea creation.Causality explains the interconnectedness and interdependency of the elements.The issues cannot be considered and the new ideas cannot be created by considering them in isolation from the system that they are part of.Holism is based on a profound understanding of the interconnectedness of the system elements and their relationship to the whole system.The issue or idea system cannot be understood independently from the environment within which they are embedded in.Systems thinking emphasises the incorporation of the context, content and the process.



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Seville 13 / 05 / 2004

Antic

ipat

ion

Stra

tegy

Networking

Long term

Polic

y

Punctuation

Priority

Prosp

ectiv

e

Present

Parti

cipati

on

Systematic

Future

MessFragm

entation

Uncertainty Complexity

Delp

hiScience

Visi

on

TechnologyScenarioForesight

Systems thinking & Foresight

Actions

Panels

Foresight is the application of systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-building process to informing present-day decisions and mobilising joint actions. [Miles & Keenan, 2002]

Expert committees or working groups (panels) are widely used along with Scenario building and Delphi techniques.These methods and procedures used are designed to identify specific ideas and events for other aspects of science and technology.The formal products of such exercises are largely a matter of research priorities, policies and strategic goals.Foresight attempts to anticipate the undetermined future with a number of influential factors, with their complex and uncertain structural and behavioural relationships.

Foresight produces disconnected ideas relating to the part of the system. Foresight introduces the ideas physical and social environments at any time.The punctuated and fragmented ideas produced by Foresight activities are liable to produce an Ackoffian mess from an existing mess. Mess: “a system of external conditions that produces dissatisfaction”.

A framework for the holistic analysis of structures, relationships, and emergent dynamics of a complex Foresight system.

Analysis

Programme as performed

Programme as designed

Failure analysis

Causes of the differences

Attributes & performance

Idealised design

A Systemic Framework

Describes the system as it was intended to operate by developing a comprehensive understanding of the Foresight system.Identifies various intended and unintended changes occur during the implementation phase.Investigates the reasons of the gap between what was intended versus what is actually being performed in the system.Establishes attributes and performance requirements that must be met by the Foresight programme.Represents a normative scenario, in which the situation is considered as it would be desired to be in the light of lessons learned.Tests the idealised solution by conducting a failure analysis to optimise idealised Foresight system solution prior to implementation.



64

UK, IRL & TR cases

S&T

Economy (TR)

Goals (UK)

Politics

Others

Individ

ual se

ctors

Priorities

Pane

lsStandard tech.s

Org

. bhv

.s

Ind. bhv.s(IRL)

Lim

ited

inte

ract

ion Im

plementation prob.s

Different practicesSys

temati

c

New techniques

Sectoral dissimilarities

Participation

Org. capabilities(TR)

Vertical com.

New tasks (TR)

Part of th

e system

Discon

necte

d ide

as

Discontinuity

world

org.

country

Conclusions

- Not systemic

- Strongly procedural and method bound (systematic)

- Exclusive of ‘soft’ issues

- Fails to permit subsystem elements to self-organise based on their contextual knowledge, understanding, and proximity to the operating environment

- Interrelationships are not considered

- Sub-(sub)-system level focus

Documents

Paper 3 : Systems Thinking in Foresight - Europaforesight.jrc.ec.europa.eu/fta/papers/Session 2 Process Management... · EU-US Seminar: New Technology Foresight, Forecasting & Assessment