Pakistan Responds to Bin Laden Operation

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Pakistan Responds to bin Laden Operation

May 3, 2011 | 1827 GMT

Pakistan issued an official statement May 3 in response to growing questions, bothdomestic and international, over the U.S. raid that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.The statement tries to balance between the two pressures, though it leans more towardmanaging the opinions of the Pakistani public, denying prior knowledge of the raid andexpressing concerns about unilateral U.S. action on Pakistani soil. While the domesticsituation is under control for now, continued questions over the raid could find Islamabadcaught between its people and the international community.

Analysis

Pakistan issued an official statement May 3 to respond to questions over the May 2unilateral U.S. military operation in Abbottabad that killed al Qaeda leader Osama binLaden. Domestically, Islamabad has faced the question of how U.S. forces were able toconduct the operation without the knowledge, let alone participation, of Pakistaniauthorities. At the same time, the international community has asked how the worlds mostwanted individual was able to live in a large, relatively secure compound not far fromPakistans capital for, according to U.S. homeland security adviser John Brennan, morethan five years.

The release is an effort to balance between domestic and international pressures, though itleans more heavily toward managing domestic opinion. It begins by describing the death of

bin Laden as an important milestone in the global fight against terrorism, then goes on todeny that Pakistani officials, either civil or military, had prior knowledge of the raid or thatPakistani facilities were used in the operation. It also provides some details on how the U.S.helicopters were able to travel from Afghanistan deep into the country undetected by thePakistani military and confirms that Pakistani air assets were scrambled in response to theincursion details clearly meant to assuage domestic concerns of Pakistani complicity inthe raid.

Addressing the issue of bin Ladens hideout and its coordinates in country, the statement

underscores the role played by the countrys Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate inobtaining the information that made the raid possible, though it does not addressinternational concerns about how Pakistani officials became aware of bin Ladens location.The Pakistanis have long complained about the limited acknowledgement they receive for their role in the fight against al Qaeda, specifically the role of the ISI, and the tens of thousands of Pakistani lives lost in that fight. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari reiteratedthis in a May 2 guest column in the Washington Post, calling his country the greatest


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victim of terrorism.

One of the most interesting parts of the statement was a reference to intelligence sharing between the ISI and the CIA regarding the presence of foreigners in the area aroundAbbottabad. The wording in the statement is vague, but it clearly indicates that the ISI wasnot only aware of the presence of suspicious foreigners in the area as far back as 2009, butthat the nations leading intelligence service was sharing such information with the CIAfrom then until April. The statement leaves it unclear as to whether the intelligence

pertained to the specific compound in which bin Laden was living, however. It may have been that the ISI had an idea that there were possible high-value targets living there andshared this information with the CIA, which then gathered separate intelligence that pointedto the presence of the al Qaeda leader. Or it may have been that the Pakistanis were sharingintelligence regarding the general area around Abbottabad without ever discussing thisspecific compound. Indeed, a prominent former Jemaah Islamiyah operative and al Qaedaassociate named Umar Patek, who played a leading role in the 2002 Bali nightclub

bombings, was arrested in the same town Jan. 25 carried out by the ISI from a CIA

intelligence tip.

On the nature of bin Ladens compound, particularly the height of its perimeter walls, thestatement said high walls are quite common in the tribal areas and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwaand fit with the local conservative cultural norms. Large houses are not uncommon in thatregion, but this ones structural consideration was different than others. It was surrounded

by two layers of security walls. The perimeter walls, topped with barbed wire, ranged from3-5.5 meters (10-18 feet) in height, while the inner walls surrounding the house were 3.4-3.7 meters tall. In addition, there was a 2-meter-tall privacy wall on the balcony of thehouse itself, while the portion of the house not covered by privacy walls had opaquewindows designed to obstruct views inside.

The statement then expresses deep concerns and reservations over Washingtonsexecution of the operation without prior information or authorization from Islamabad.Fearing that the incident could set a precedent for similar future actions, the statement says,unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule and that any such moves in thefuture will undermine U.S.-Pakistani cooperation, especially given that intelligenceobtained from the bin Laden raid could lead to other high-value al Qaeda targets in thecountry. In other words, the bin Laden raid was an understandable exception, but it will bedifficult for Pakistan to tolerate more of such operations.

The statement concludes, The Government of Pakistan and its Armed Forces consider

support of the people of Pakistan to be its mainstay and actual strength. Any actionscontrary to their aspirations, therefore, run against the very basis on which the edifice of national defense and security is based. This is Pakistans warning to the United States thatadditional actions could further enrage the Pakistani public and thus erode Islamabadssupport for Washington.

The statements general focus on the concerns of its domestic audience is understandable.


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There is very little Pakistan can do to prevent unilateral U.S. actions on Pakistani soil, soIslamabad must therefore focus on the potential domestic fallout. Of course, no singlestatement can be expected to effectively deal with the issue, but it does underscore thatIslamabad is on the defensive at home. The situation remains in control for now, but asinternational questions over bin Ladens support base in the country, particularly hislinkages to elements within security institutions, continue, the Pakistani state is likely tofind itself in a difficult spot between its own people and the international community.

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Pakistan Responds to Bin Laden Operation