NOBLAJES V TEEHANKEE (FOOTNOTE 5)REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. One Land Registration Commissioner, with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."cralaw virtua1aw library

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but deny that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioners stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioners theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R.A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R.A. No, 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioners theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the Presidents power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the Presidents supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII), sec. 10 [1]).

Incidentally, petitioners stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1206, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance" or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank." The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson Et. Al., Connolly v. Scudder (247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655), saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties."cralaw virtua1aw library

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., Et Al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law, Ed., 972,

"But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co. supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig. Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700 701, 71 Led. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co.v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 US. 469, 74 L. ed. 972) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil, 600).

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation 1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioners resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative: any bureau directors ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Courts recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.

GOMEZ V COURT OF APPEALS (FOOTNOTE 6)

The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.

The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lotsLots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among themselves.

After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor.

On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5 August 1981.

On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6

On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among others, thus

In resum, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113). When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown that homestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot be faulted because land already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987. 8 Hence, this recourse.

Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as against petitioners herein.

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10

Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a quo before its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11

Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).

Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings ." 13

The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.

Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra, where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision states:

With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion that such certificates are sufficient to prevent the title to such portion from going to appellants aforesaid, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders held adverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the evidence, and the said appellants failed to object to that possession in time. (Emphasis supplied)

Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered that the lots respectively claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the exclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... . (Emphasis supplied.) 14

The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15

The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16

Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof." 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants.ANGELES V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (FOOTNOTE 8)

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.[1] What we have before us now is touted as one of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history.[2] The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years. Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order[3] dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998. On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,[4] reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals,[5] the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule. In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property. The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners Report dated October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners for the following lots, namely: x x x x Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[6] Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order. The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply[7] dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement[8] dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11[9] issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part: We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following: x x x x In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998. The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.[10] (Emphasis ours.) The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings: i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.] ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City. iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.] iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing certifications and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917. v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No. 994.[11] (Underscoring in the original.) The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA to prevent its alteration and tampering. We quote the last portion of said letter-reply: As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration. With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution. As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.[12] Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,[13] made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that [n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land. According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on what is the valid OCT No. 994. Petitioner contends that [t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect.[14] Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for condemnation and reproof of the highest degree.[15] Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action. In his Comment,[16] respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition: 1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice. 2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court. 3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued. 4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.[17] Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case. Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry: (1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate.[18] Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committees report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court. Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioners counsel to present petitioners case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. [19] With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where petitioners claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.[20] In her Reply,[21] petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of public respondents failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected by the proceedings x x x. He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondents active participation. [22] Anent private respondents argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and pertinent acts of private respondent x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court. The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondents claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:

RULE 65

x x x x SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.

RULE 39

SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.[23] Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their Comment[24] on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names.[25] Public respondents claim the following as facts: The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x. As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baos, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patio, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia OFarrell y Patio, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex D, and its faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex E, and both made integral parts hereof. As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-enumerated true owners. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order of the lower court. The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.[26] We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents. Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.[27] It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.[28] Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request? In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority[29] instructive, to wit: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. x x x x x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.[30] (Emphasis ours.) As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request.[31] There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation[32] (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution[33] in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court[34] which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case: The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.[35] Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case: First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.[36] (Emphases supplied.) To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows: Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them. There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x. x x x x The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.[37] Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917 and categorically concluded that OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void. In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist. The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

RAMOS V RODRIGUEZ (FOOTNOTE 9)

ROMERO, J.:

Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban, Rizal, identified as Lot 125-B of subdivision plan Psd-760 with a total area of 156,485 square meters. Upon his death on April 6, 1982 and during the pendency of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his heirs, petitioners herein.

After issuing an order of general default, respondent judge rendered a decision on July 28, 1988, adjudicating the said lot to the petitioners.

On September 12, 1988, the court a quo issued an Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28, 1988 decision had become final and directing the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) 1 to comply with Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that is, to prepare the decree and certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio submitted a report dated September 26, 1988, which was earlier required by the court, recommending that the July 28, 1988 decision be set aside after due hearing because the subject lot was part of Lot 125, Psu-32606 which is already covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8816 issued on October 29, 1924, in case No. 1037 in the name of the Payatas Estate Improvement Company, and which was assigned Decree No. 1131 on January 31, 1905. Petitioners later claimed that TCT No. 8816 was fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in support of such allegation.

Several settings for the hearing were made before the court in an order dated February 2, 1990, merely noted the said report. The court opined "that it cannot set aside its (July 28, 1988) decision on the basis of the report dated September 26, 1988, which was received by this Court on October 10, 1988, after the finality of its decision." It added that the proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of judgment.

Bonifacio filed on March 9, 1990, through the Chief Legal Officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), a motion for reconsideration of the February 2, 1990, order.

On May 29, 1990, the court a quo issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration, denying petitioner's application for registration, setting aside its decision dated July 28, 1988, as well as its order for the issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988 and denying the petition to re-direct the LRA to issue the decree of registration. The court noted that the subject lot was already covered by an existing certificate of title and that no final decree has yet been issued by the LRA.

Petitioners are now asking the Court to set aside the trial court's May 29, 1990, order on the strength of the principle of finality of judgments.

This issue has already been settled in a similar case, 2 where the Court declared that:

. . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,) until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

It is also argued by petitioners that the issuance of the decree of registration and the certificate of title by the LRA is a ministerial duty which follows as a matter of course the order of the court directing it to issue said decree. This, too, has been squarely met in Gomez, thus:

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."

In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an officer of the court precisely to inform the latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a decree because the subject lot sought to be registered was discovered to have been already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under these circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.

This is also one of the reasons why we have to reject the claim of petitioners that the court's Order for Issuance of Decree is the reckoning point in determining the timeliness of a petition to re-open or review the decree of registration in view of the ministerial nature of the LRA's duty. The other reason is that the one-year period stated in section 32 of P.D. 1529 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration clearly refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31 of the said P.D., which decree is prepared and issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Finally, petitioners aver that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the July 28, 1988, decision and the order for issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988, upon the mere motion for reconsideration filed by the LRA, not by the Solicitor General, of the February 2, 1990 order.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor General is bound to "[r]epresent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings." 3 Add to this the fact that P.D. 1529 itself, specifically Section 6 thereof which enumerates the functions of the Commissioner of Land Registration, is bereft of any grant of power to the LRA or to the Commissioner to make the same representation as the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the government in land registration proceedings.

The court a quo could not have committed grave abuse of discretion because it was merely following the earlier recommendation of the LRA which was then acting as an agent of the court.

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. 4 This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, 5 "[t]he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

At this point, it may be stated that this controversy could have been avoided had the proper procedure in land registration cases been observed by both the trial court, acting as a land registration court and by the LRA, acting as an agent of the court. The court should have rendered its decision only "after considering the evidence and the reports of the commissioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands," as mandated by Section 29 of P.D. 1529, instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in question to the applicant and directing the Commissioner to issue a decree of registration and certificate of title when the report of the LRA was still forthcoming. On the other hand, if a faster disposition of the proceedings were really desired, the court could facilely wield the powers of its office in order to compel the LRA to speed up its investigation, report, and recommendation.

Finally, the Solicitor General is reminded to be more vigilant in handling cases which his office should, under the law, properly represent.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the order of respondent court dated May 29, 1990, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LABURADA V LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (FOOTNOTE 10)

PANGANIBAN, J:

In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?

The Case

These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]

The Facts

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus:[3]

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.

As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.

After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5]

Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree:[6]

In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:

On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;

After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;

The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;

On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;

On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;

After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;

After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.

For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x.

In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.

After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]

x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.

On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9]

With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.

It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).

Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.

Issue

Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]

Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.[13]

On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which held:[16]

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring supplied.)

We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.

First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17]

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.

In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:

SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).

However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void.

It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21]

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:

As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.

In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction,