Overtones of Solipsism in T. Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat?"

8/11/2019 Overtones of Solipsism in T. Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat?"

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/overtones-of-solipsism-in-t-nagels-what-is-it-like-to-be-a-bat 1/20

nternational Phenomenological Society

Overtones of Solipsism in Thomas Nagel's "What is it Like to be a Bat?" and the View fromNowhereAuthor(s): Kathleen WiderSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Mar., 1990), pp. 481-499Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108160 .

Accessed: 13/05/2014 12:03

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.40.239.25 on Tue, 13 May 2014 12:03:34 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108160?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108160?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips



Philosophyand Phenomenological

esearch

Vol. L,

No.

3,

March

I990

Overtones

o

Sol ips ism

i n

T h o m a s

N a g e l s

W h a t

s t L i k e t o

e

B a t

a n d

h e V i e w

F r o m

owhere

KATHLEEN WIDER

Universityof

Michigan,

Dearborn

Thomas

Nagel

has been

arguing

for

many years

now

that

a

physicalist

account

of consciousness can only provide

an

incomplete analysis of

mind.

It

cannot, given

the

very

nature of the

account, capture

the

subjec-

tive character

of

experience, i.e.,

what it is like to be

a

conscious creature,

to

have experience.

According

to Nagel,

an

objective physical

account

cannot

exhaustively analyze

subjectivity.

What

constantly eludes the

stretch

of

the

physical

theory

are

the phenomenological

features

of

experi-

ence.

The reason for this is that

every subjective phenomenon

is essen-

tially

connected with

a

single point

of

view,

and

it

seems inevitable that

an

objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view. ' He has

maintained this

thesis,

with some

modifications,

for two

decades

and

con-

tinues

to

argue

in

support

of

it

despite

constant

criticism

of

both the

thesis

-and he

positions

he has

developed

in

defense

of

it. He has been criticized

for

working

with

too

simplistic

a

notion

of

consciousness,

to which he

attaches too much significance

and

about

which he

says

too little.'

In

ThomasNagel,

What s it Like o be

a Bat? MortalQuestions Cambridge:

ambridge

UniversityPress,

979),

p.

i67. Any futurereferences

o the followingworks by Nagel

will be followed

by an

abbreviated itle and page number

n

parenthesis

n the text:

What s it

Like to be a Bat?

pp.

i65-80;

The View From Nowhere

(New

York:

Oxford

UniversityPress,I986);

Subjective

nd Objective,

Mortal

Questions,pp.

I96-21 3; Panpsychism,

ortal Questions, pp. i8I

1-95;

and

The

Possibility

of Altru-

ism (Princeton,New Jersey:Princeton

UniversityPress,

1978).

See KathleenWilkes,

IsConsciousness

mportant? ritish ournal or the

Philosophy

of Science 35

(I984): 223-43;

Owen Flanagan, Consciousness,

Naturalism, and

Nagel,

The

Journal

of Mindand

Behavior

6

(I985):

373-90;

and Paul

Muscari,

The

Status

of

Humans

n

Nagel's

Phenomenology,

he

Philosophical

Forum

I9 (I987):

23-33 for examples

of

this kind

of

criticism.

Norman Malcolm, Consciousness nd

OVERTONES

OF SOLIPSISM IN NAGEL 48I



additioncommentators

ave criticizedhim for maintaining is subjective

or introspectiventuitions

n

the face

of

scientificevidence

or

theoretical

considerations

nd

arguments

hat conflict

with

them.3

The most wide-

spreadcriticism rom

the

physicalists

has been that there s no good rea-

son to suppose

that

a

physicalist heory

cannot

provide

an

exhaustive

analysis of mind either

by accounting for the subjectivecharacterof

experience4

or

by showing

that no

such account

is necessary.'

Theseare only some

of the criticismsbroughtagainst

Nagel'sposition.

Thereareof courseother

objections hat havebeenraisedagainsthis view

and

more specificcriticisms

hat fall under the broad

ones I have men-

tioned.

I

intend, however,

to by-passthese more common

objections o

Nagel's

view

and

focus

instead

on a

problem

which

is

alluded

o hereand

there n the literature ut of whichtherehas beenno

realsustaineddiscus-

sion.

This is

the

problem

of

what

AnthonyKenny

alls an

odd

solipsistic

strain 6

inNagel.I want to explorethis strainparticularly s it manifests

itself in two of Nagel's works: What s it Like to

be a Bat? and The

View From

Nowhere.

Nagel's

concernthat physicalist

accountsof

mind

will

fail

to capture

fully

the nature

of

consciousness

s reminiscent

f

the concerns

about

con-

sciousness

expressed

n

the

early writings

of both

LudwigWittgenstein

and

Jean-PaulSartre.Althoughboth

Sartre

n

Being and Nothingness

and Wittgenstein

n

the Tractatus

Logico-Philosophicus

eny

the

exis-

tence of a transcendental go, both agree that even if science could

describe

all

there is

in

the

world, there

would

still

be somethingunac-

countedfor. What this something

s is consciousness

or

subjectivity.

For

Wittgenstein

n

the

Tractatus, ou

can describe

he world

completely, ive

all

the propositionsof

naturalscience,state

all

the meaningfulproposi-

tions

and

still there

is

something

eft

over. What is left

over is the meta-

physicalself,

life as consciousness,

he fact that

I

occupy

a

point

of

view.

Likewise orSartrenBeingand Nothingness,a completelyobjectiveand

physicalistdescription

of

the world

will

never

fully

capture

he

nature

of

Causalitywith D. M.

ArmstrongOxford:

Basil

Balckwell, 984)

makes

a related riti-

cism hat

Nagel

failsto

specify

learly nough

what he means

by

'the

subjective

haracter

of

an

experience'.

See

Flanagan,pp.

377-8I;

and Vinit

Haksar,

Nagel

on

Subjective

nd

Objective,

Inquiry

24

(I98I): 105-21

(especially

p.

113).

4

See

Flanagan;

nd

Lilly-Marlene

ussow,

It's

Not LikeThatto be a

Bat,

Behaviorism

IO (I982):

55-63.

See

Patricia

Smith Churchland,

Neurophilosophy Cambridge:

MIT

Press, I986);

Paul M.

Churchland,

Matter and

Consciousness,

ev.

ed.

(Cambridge:

MIT

Press,

I988)

and

Wilkes

among

others.

6

Anthony

Kenny,

Tackling

he

BigQuestion,

New YorkReview

of Books,

February

2-3,

I986,

p. 14.

482

KATHLEEN WIDER









my

own.

Nagel simply assumes hat others

(including

other non-human

animals)have experience. He assumes hat bats and

roaches

and

spiders

as wellas

otherhumans

and

perhaps xtraterrestrialeingshave

an

inner

life of

consciousness, .e., there is

something

t

is like for each of

these

organisms o be the organism t is and to have the

experiences t has. He

offers ittle defense or

this

view. At the

beginning

of

his discussionof his

famous

bat example n What s it Like to be a

Bat? ,he simplysays I

assume

we all believe hat batshave experience.

Afterall, they are mam-

mals,

and

there s

no

moredoubtthat

theyhave

experience han that mice

or

pigeons or whales have

experience What, p. i68). Although he

maintains hat the

subjective haracter

f

the experienceof

personsborn

blind

anddeafwould be

inaccessible

o

thoseof us not so

born,he seesthis

as no

barrier o believing

that there is

a

subjectivecharacter o their

experience

( What, p. 170).

While

discussing,

in The-

View

From

Nowhere, the subjectivelyunimaginablemental lives of other species,

Nagel

claims hat

we

know

there's

omething here,somethingperspec-

tival, even

if

we don't know what it is or

even how to think about it (p.

zi). So

although heremay be kinds of experienceof

which we can form

little

or

no

conception,

t does not follow

that we

cannot

believe such

experience

exists

and

has

a

subjective

character.

But he

offers

no

justification for such a

belief beyond simple intuitions. For

Nagel,

although cannotconceive

of,

except

n

schematic

orm,

what it

is

like

to

be a bat, for example,and so cannot know what it is like to be one

( What,

p.

172,

n.

8),

I

can

still believethat it is like

something.Nagel

never

directlyaddresses he questionof the grounds

upon

which

such

a

belief is

justified.

Am I

justified

n

believing

of

others

that

they

are con-

scious

and

that their

experience

has

a

subjective

haracter

nd,

if

so,

is

my

justification

trong enough

to

raise

my

belief

to

the level

of

knowledge?

Nagel

concernshimselfnot with this

question

but ratherwith

the

question

of how

we

form

the conceptionswe have of the subjective haracterof

others'

experiences.

The

interestingproblem

of other

minds

is not the

epistemological roblem,

how I

can know that other

people

are not zom-

bies.

It is

the

conceptual

problem,

how

I

can

understand

he attribution f

mental states to others

(VFN, p.

iv).

Since

Nagel's

concern s not with

establishing

ow we know that

other

creatures

are

conscious,

but ratherwith

explaining

how we

form

a con-

ception

of

their

experience,

do not

wish to rest

my

claim

that there s

a

solipsisticstrain n Nagel on his failureto addresssuchepistemological

questions.

will look insteadat

Nagel's

account

n

What s

it

Like o be

a

Bat? and The ViewFromNowhere of how we form a

conception

of the

8

SeeHaksar,p.

I

13 for a

similarpoint.

484

KATHLEEN WIDER







subjective haracter

f

anothercreature's xperienceand I

will argue hat

it is precisely his discussion

of how we form such

conceptions hat has

solipsistic

overtones.

ForNagel thereare

subjective acts.These actsare

facts

of

experience

facts about what

it is

like

for the

experiencing rganism What, p.

172.).

They areaccessible nd

fully comprehensible

romonly one point of

view.

These

factsare factsabout

what mentalstatesare ike

for

the

crea-

tures havingthem ( Subjective, . zoi). They embodya particular

point

of

view. They are

phenomenological acts,

facts which are

in

one

sense

objective, .e.,

one

person can

know or

say of anotherwhat

the

quality

of

the other's

experience

is

( What, p.

172)

but

are

in

another

sense

subjective

for

Nagel, since

I

can ascribe

experience

to

another only if

the other

is similar enough

to me

for me to be

able

to

adopt her point of

view, i.e., to understand the

ascription

in

the

first person as

well as

in

the

third

( What, p.

172).

We

grasp subjective

facts about

others, facts

about what it is like for them to

have the experiences

they have, by enter-

ing

imaginatively into their point

of

view

and

by

trying

to

see

how

things

appear from

their viewpoint ( Subjective, p.

2og).

For

Nagel, there are

subjective

conceptions

as well as

subjective

facts.9 Indeed

only

a

subjec-

tive

conception

can

fully capture

what

subjective

facts are about for

Nagel,

if

indeed

any conception, subjective

or

objective,

can do so com-

pletely.

The

reason

an

objective

conception

cannot

fully capture subjec-

tive facts

-

facts about the phenomenological features of an experience

-

is that

phenomenological features are connected to

a

single point of

view and

an

objective

conception

will abandon that

point

of view

( What, p.

i67).

Subjective

concepts

are

concepts

that we learn in

the

first

person

and we can

use them

in

the third person

only

if

we can under-

stand their use

in

the first

person

( What, p.

172).

For

Nagel

there are some

subjective

facts

which are inconceivable to

humans; they

lie

beyond the reach

of our

concepts,

subjective

and

objec-

tive. An example of such facts would be those that involve the specificsub-

jective

character

of a bat's

experience ( What, p.

17i). However,

the

problem of

solipsism

would

not

arise

for

Nagel simply

from

his belief

in

the existence of

subjective

facts that lie

beyond

the

reach

of human

con-

cepts.

But

a

solipsistic

strain would be

present

in his work

if,

as

a

conse-

9

See Colin

McGinn'sreview

of

Nagel's

The

View From

Nowhere,

Mind

96

(1987):

264-65,forhis criticism f Nagel'sfailure o disambiguatelearly he useof 'objective'

and subjective' ith

regard

o

facts

rom ts

usewith

regard

o

concepts.

Thissameambi-

guity s

present n What s it Like o be a Bat? PeterSmith,

Subjectivitynd Colour

Vision,

n The

Aristotelian ociety,

upplementary

ol. 6i

(I987): 245-64;

and A. W.

Moore in

his reviewof

The

ViewFrom

Nowhere,PhilosophicalQuarterly 7 (I987):

3Z3-27,

question he very existenceof subjective acts.

OVERTONES

OF

SOLIPSISM IN

NAGEL

485







quenceof his statedviews, it follows that the full comprehension f cer-

tain subjective acts

about other humans

and

the

meaning

of

concepts

whichdescribe uch facts

s

accessibleonly

to

the owner

of

the experience

the facts are about.

Nagel makes

it

clear

in

What s it Like to be

a Bat?

that when he

describes ubjective actsas facts thatembodya particular ointof view,

he is not referring o a point of view accessible o only a single ndividual

but rather o a typeof viewpoint.So he claimsI can takeup a pointof view

other hanmy own andso I can comprehend ubjective actsaboutexperi-

ence otherthan

my

own

(p.

171). Whenhe discusses

ubjective oncepts,

he claimsthat evenour most subjectivephenomenological onceptsare

publicin a sense ( Subjective, . 207). He agrees with Wittgenstein

about the publicityof rulesand so of concepts,even subjective oncepts.

However,subjective onceptsarepublic

n

a

differentway than objective

concepts(conceptsused to describe he physicalworld). What underlies

the publicityof objectiveconcepts is different rom what underlies he

publicityof subjective oncepts.ForNagel the publicityof objectivecon-

cepts

s

connected

with our

ability

o coordinate he

points

of view of

dif-

ferent ndividuals oward

objects

n

the world. This is not the case with

our use of

subjective oncepts

ince

they

are

not

about

objects they

do not

apply

to

objects). Sensations,Nagel holds

in

line

with

Wittgenstein,are

not objects.A sensation s not the appearance f

an

objectbut is simplyan

appearanceand as suchit must be an appearanceo someone; t is that

which

makes

it

subjective.

This

does not, however,

make it

private.

I

do

not claim to fully understandwhat Nagel is after here; his remarksare

tantalizingly

brief

on

this

point.

But what

seems

to follow is that what

underlies he publicnature

of our

use

of

subjectiveconcepts

is not the

coordination

of

the points

of

view

of

several ndividuals

oward

the same

objectbut toward similarappearances.Nagel says

that sensations are

publicly omparable

nd

not private Subjective, . 207). What this

means or

Nagel,

I

think,

s

that I can

adopt

another's

point

of view

(if

it is

enough

ike

my own)

and

so

I

can

imaginehaving

an

experience

imilar

o

theirs.This is the basis

for

my comprehension

nd use

of

subjective

on-

cepts

as

they apply

to others.

I

maintain

that

despite

these remarks here remains

on

Nagel's

view

facts about the subjective haracter

f

anotherhuman'sexperience,

ven

anotherhuman

very

much ike

me,

that are naccessible o me.

I will

argue

thatgiven Nagel'suseof theimaginationngroundingourconceptionof

how an

experience

s

for

another

and

given

his view

of

the

relationship

between he mentaland the

physical,

t follows that the true nature

of

an

experience

s

fully comprehensible nly

to

the

experiencer

erself.

I think

486

KATHLEEN

WIDER







this comes out when we look at

why

we cannot conceive of the

subjective

character

of a

bat's experience

except

in a

very

schematic fashion.

Nagel

argues that

what

is required for me to be able

to

comprehend

the

phenom-

enological

features

of

another creature's

experience

is

that I

be

able to

take up

or

enter imaginatively

into

the

point

of

view

of

the other.

In

the

case

of a

bat,

I am unable to meet this

requirement

because

the perceptual

apparatus of a bat is so different

from

my own.

When

I

try

to

imagine

hav-

ing a bat's experience, I find failure. If

I

try to imagine having webbing on

my arms, hanging upside

down

by

day,

and

so

on,

I

end

up imagining (and

not very successfully

at

that) only

myself behaving

as a

bat behaves rather

than

imagining

what it is like

for

a

bat

to

be

a

bat.

If I

try instead to imag-

ine having the internal

neuro-physiological constitution of a bat

( What, p. i69),

I fail

as well since

I

cannot

really

attach

any meaning

to

my possessing

such

a

constitution. Even

if I

could be

gradually

transformed into a bat nothing in my present constitution enables me to

imagine what the experiences of

such

a

future stage

of

myself thus meta-

morphosed

would be like

( What, p.

i69).

At

best we can

only

form

a

schematic

conception

of what

it

is like for

a

bat

to be

a

bat

because we nei-

ther share

the type

of

viewpoint

a

bat has

nor

can we

imagine adopting

that

point

of

view. The reason

for

this

failure

seems

to

be,

for

Nagel,

that a

bat's

neuro-physiological

structure and hence

way

of

perceiving

the

world

is just too distant from our own.

Any attempt

to

imagine having such

a

constitution will turn out to be impossible or simply incoherent.

But is this the case when it comes

to my attempting

to

adopt

the

point

of

view of another creature

of

my

own

species? Nagel

often

implies

that

types

of

viewpoint

are

species-specific, (for example, What, pp.

i69

and 175). Although Nagel is not sure about whether our imagination can

take us

beyond

our

species'

viewpoint, surely

it can allow us to

adopt

the

viewpoint

of

other humans. But

not other humans born blind

and

deaf.

Nagel claims that the subjective character

of their

experience

is

inaccessi-

ble to those not so born. His reason for

holding

this

would

seem to

be,

given

his discussion of bat

experience,

that those humans'

neuro-physio-

logical

constitution and hence

perceptual experience

would

be different

enough

from

sighted

and

hearing

humans that individuals

in

neither

group

could

imagine

what it would be like to be

a

person

in

the

opposite

group. Why

not?

Presumably because

if

I

try

to

imagine

what it is

like

to

have been

born both blind and

deaf,

I will

only

end

up imagining myself (a

person not so born) relying on my sense of touch more than I do now,

hearing silence, seeing darkness,

and

so on.

But I will fail to

imagine

what

it

is

like

for

the

person

who

is

born

blind

and deaf to be the

person

she

is and

have the

experiences

she

has. As Sue M.

Halpern

remarks in

her

OVERTONES

OF

SOLIPSISM IN NAGEL

487







review of

Under the

Eye

of the

Clock,

a

novel

by

Christopher

Nolan,

a

severely

disabled

person,

empathy

for

the

disabled is

unavailable to

most

able-bodied

persons ... for

every

attempt to

project oneself

into

that con-

dition, to

feel what it

is like not

to be

ambulatory, for

instance, is

mediated

by the

ability to

walk. '0

This

same situation

appears to

hold

between

hearing

and

non-hearing

people.

In

a

very

moving

review of

the

i98 8

stu-

dent

uprising at

Gallaudet

College,

a

college for

the

deaf,

Oliver

Sacks

claims that the differences between

the

community

and

culture of

the

hearing

and

that of

the deaf

consist not

just

in

different

modes of

commu-

nication

but

in

different

modes of

sensibility

and being.

He

notes

that

neu-

roscientists

have begun

to

study

neurological

differences

between

the deaf

and

the

hearing

and

they have

found

that

the brain

of

a

person who

is

deaf

from

birth

and

exposed

early

on to

American

Sign

Language

actually

alters to

adapt itself to a

supervisual

rather than a

visual/auditory

world.

But

why can't

we

imagine

having

a

different

neuro-physiological

con-

stitution

and

so

having

different

kinds of

experiences?

To

get

clearer on

what

Nagel is after

in

both the

bat

case

and

the case of

persons

born

blind

and

deaf,

I

would

like to

review

Bernard

Williams'

discussion

of

imagin-

ing in

Imagination and

the

Self.

Williams

points out two

ways

of

con-

struing

the

formula

imagining

myself

being

Napoleon. One can

con-

strue

it to

mean

something

like

playing

the role of

Napoleon

or

pretending

to be Napoleon in the way CharlesBoyer might play the role of Napoleon

in

a

film.

This

construal of

the formula

makes sense.

I

have

imagesof, for

instance,

the

desolation

at

Austerlitz

as viewed

by

me

vaguely aware of

my

short

stature and

my

cockaded

hat, my

hand in

my

tunic. '

This kind

of

imagining,

although it is

about

myself,

involves the

elimination of

my

actual

characteristics. It

is, Williams

says, what

I

do

when I

imagine

being

someone else.'3

There

is,

however,

another

way

of

construing

the

mean-

ing of the

formula

imagining

myself

being

Napoleon and

this

second

way

involves one

in

self-contradiction.

Here

I

try

to

imagine

myself just

as

I am

being Napoleon.

I

try

to

imagine

actually

being

or

having

been

Napo-

leon.

But

my

being

or

having

been

Napoleon

is

logically

impossible

(or

at

least

the notion

is

incoherent)

and so

I

cannot

imagine

it.

Sue M.

Halpern,

Portrait f

the

Artist, New York

Reviewof Books,

June30, 1988,

P. 3.

Oliver

Sacks,

The

Revolution f

the

Deaf,

New York

Reviewof Books,

June

2, i988,

P.

23.

BernardWilliams,

Imaginationnd

the Self,

Problems

of the

Self(New York:

Cam-

bridgeUniversity

Press,1973),

p. 43.

'3

Ibid.,

p.

40.

488

KATHLEEN

WIDER







These

two senses

of

imagining

myself being

another

seem

to

be at

play

in Nagel's

bat

example.

If I construe

the

formula

the

first

way,

then

I

try

to

imagine

playing

the

role

of a bat: having

webbed

arms, hanging

upside

down,

etc.

But since

a bat is

so unlike me,

I do

not

have

much

luck

with

this

imaginative

task

and

I

fail to

imagine

what

it

it like

for

a

bat to

be

a

bat.

So

I

construe

the formula

in the

second way

and

try

to

imagine

myself

actually

being

a bat;

I

try

to

imagine

my

switiching

species.

This

imagina-

tive

task is

impossible.

Nagel

concludes

that since I cannot imagine being

a bat

on either

reading

of the

formula

imagine

being someone

else,

I

cannot

comprehend

the

subjective

character

of

a

bat's

experience.

What

about

when

I try

to imagine

being

another

human with

similar

sensory

modalities

rather

than

trying

to imagine

being

a

member

of

another

species?

I should

certainly

have

more luck

here

imagining

myself

being

another

(human)

person.

Although

I would

not have

much luck

pre-

tending to be a bat or imagining myself playing the role of a bat in a film, I

certainly

could

imagine

being Eleanor

Roosevelt

for

instance

or

playing

the

role

of

ER

in a film.

But although

I can

get

much

further

in

imagining

being

ER

than

in

imagining

being

a bat, will

that

be

enough

to allow

me

to

comprehend

what

it was

like

for

ER

to be

ER?I think

not.

The

same

prob-

lem

that

arose

in

the

bat case

will

arise here although

less pronounced.

Does

imagining

being

ER

or

playing

the

role of

Napoleon

allow

me

to

comprehend

how it

felt for ER

to be,

for

example,

a woman

in

America

in

the

1930S

and

1940S

with power but always power subsidiary to the

power

of

the men

around

her?

No matter

how much

I know

about

Napo-

leon,

will my

fantasies,

my

pretending

to be

Napoleon,

ever

allow me

access

to a

full understanding

of how

it was

for

Napoleon

to

flee Corsica

or lose

at Waterloo?

Even

though

we

can go

much

further

imaginatively

in

cases

of beings

more

like

ourselves

(as

a woman

I

can

more

easily

imagine

being

ER

than

Napoleon

and

as a

human

I

can

likewise

more

easily

imag-

ine being

Napoleon

than

a bat),

still

I

think

it will

always

turn

out that

I

am imagining

myself

being

the

other just

as

in the

bat case

I

succeed

only

in imagining

myself

behaving

as

a bat.

Certainly

I

eliminate,

as Williams

notes,

my

actual

characteristics

in these

imaginings

but

I cannot eliminate

myself

altogether

as he

also

notes

or

I

would

no

longer

be

imagining

being

Napoleon.'4

For

Nagel

what

is

required

to

fully

comprehend

the

subjec-

tive

character

of

another

creature's

experience,

what

it

is like for

that

crea-

ture

to be the

creature

it

is,

is that

I be able

to

imagine

being

the

other,

that

I be able to enter imaginatively into their viewpoint. On either construal

of

the meaning

of the

formula

imagine

being

someone

else,

we

seem

unable

to ever

satisfy

this

requirement.

Fulfilling

the

formula

given

its

first

14

Ibid., p. 43.

OVERTONES

OF SOLIPSISM

IN NAGEL

489







meaning s

inadequate

as a means of

my comprehending, ully

at

least,

what

it

is like for another o be the

person

she is

and

have

the

experiences

she has.

The

second

construal

of

the

meaning

of the formula s

incoherent

and

so

I

cannot fulfill t.'5

Nagel would

respond

think

by pointingout that

the

reasonwe fail

in

the imaginative ask

in

the

case of

bats and those born blind

and deaf is

that we do not share heir

neuro-physiological

onstitutionand so

we do

not sharetheir type of viewpointbut with most otherhumans his is not

so.

He

says

in

What

s

it

Like

o be

a

Bat? hat the moresimilaranother

is to me, the more

easily

I

can

adoptthe

other'spoint

of

viewandsounder-

stand

ascriptions

f

experience

o the other

(p. 17z). Sincewe are neuro-

logicallyandphysiologicallyike most

otherhumans,we can

imagine

ak-

ing up theirviewpoint.But

even

if

I

am

wrong

in

my claim

that taking

up

their

viewpoint by imaginingmyself

being

them or

having

their

experi-

ences will never allow me to fullycomprehendwhat it is really likefor

another

person

to

be

the

person she

is,

I

think there are other

problems

with

Nagel's position

here.

Do

most humans

sharea similar

neuro-phys-

iologicalconstitution

n

the senseneeded o claim

similarity

f

phenome-

nologicalfeatures

of experience?At

least one new and still

controversial

theory

of

the

brain,

Neural

Darwinism,

advanced

by

Gerald

Edelman,

directorof

the

Neurosciences nstituteat

Rockefeller

University,

laims

that the

structureof the

brain

is not

predetermined y

an

individual's

geneticcode;ratheraperson'sexperiencesontinually hapeandalter he

person'sbrain.

According

o this

theory,

the

way

in

which

an

organism

interactswith its

environmentaffects

and indeed createsthe functional

anatomy

of

the

brainand hence affectsthe

way

the

organism

orders he

world. 6

n

addition,

there

is

still

controversyamong

physiologists

over

the effect of

male and femalehormoneson brain

development

nd other

neuro-physiologicaleatures

of

an individual hat

may affecthow the

per-

son

experiences

he world.

Even

given the abundant vidence hat most humans

have similarneu-

ro-physiological rocessesoccurringwithinthem

when,

for

instance, hey

see,

it would not

follow

given Nagel's

view

of

the relationbetweenthe

physicaland

the

mental hat

similar

kindsof

phenomenological

eatures

attach o

everyone's eeing.Nagel

has

alwaysargued

againstpsychophys-

ical

reductionism,

lthough

he

does maintain hat there are

connections

between he mentaland the

physical.

For

Nagel

mentaland

physical

prop-

erties or processesare propertiesor processesof the same organism.

Is

I

amgrateful ocommentsmadeby participants t an

NEH summer eminar t Cornell n

I985

with

regard o my ideas on Nagel's use of the

imagination.

i6

GeraldM. Edelman,Neural Darwinism New York:

BasicBooks,

i987).

490 KATHLEEN WIDER







Indeed

in

his discussion

of the

dual aspect

theory

in

The View

From

Nowhere,

he leans

toward the

view that one's

mental life

depends

on

the

states

and activities of

the

brain, i.e., the brain

may well be

both

the

bearer of mental

states

and

the

cause

of

their

continuity

when

there is

con-

tinuity (VFN, p.

40). The

brain

may provide the

objective

completion of

the

concept of

self.

However,

Nagel treats this

possibility

as

an

empirical

hypothesis

for

which there is

at

present insufficient

evidence to

establish

its

truth. He does,

however, think this

thesis is

plausible. Yet

he does

not

see

psychophysical

reductionism

following from

the

truth

of

such a

thesis.

Rather if

it turns

out that mental

states are

dependent on brain

states and

if some

form of

the dual aspect

theory is

correct, then Nagel

would

argue

that there

must

be

brain states

that are

non-physical.'7

Nagel also

admits,

in The

View From

Nowhere,

the

possibility of nec-

essary

connections

holding between the

mental and

the physical

and yet

that alone he argues is insufficient to allow an inference from the presence

of certain

physical

processes

to the

presence

of

certain

mental

processes.

The

failure of

such inferences

is

due to the

fact that the

mental and

the

physical

may both

be

aspects of

something more

fundamental and

so

both

the

mental and

the

physical

might

be

entailed

by

this more

fundamental

something and

yet not entail

each other. Even

if

it

turns out

that there is a

necessary

identity between

mental and

physical

processes,

as

it would

just

in

case

the

fundamental

something which is

the

basis

of the

mental also

has certain physical properties, still this possibility of necessary connec-

tion

does not

allow us

now, given

our

present

knowledge,

to draw

any

inferences from

the

presence of

certain

physical

processes to

the

presence

of

certain mental

processes

(VFN,

p.

48). Without a

knowledge

that

there

exists

something more

fundamental than either

the mental

or

the

physical

and without a

clear

understanding

of

the nature of

this

fundamental

something

if

it

does

exist,

there is no

way

for

us

to know its

connection

with the

mental or the

physical

and

hence no

way

to

know the

connection,

if

any, between the

mental

and

the

physical themselves.

Consequently we

cannot,

at

present

at

least,

infer

from the

presence

of a

physiologically

described brain

state the

presence

of

phenemenological

pain (VFN,

p.

48).

No

description

or

analysis

of the

objective

nervous

system,

however

complete, will ever

by

itself

imply

anything

which is not

objective, i.e.,

which

can

be

understood

only

from

one kind of

viewpoint..

. .

One can-

not

derive a

pour

soi from

an en soi

( Panpsychism,

p.

i88).18

That

is,

17

Nagel, VFN,p. 41. See

McGinn,pp.

265-67 forproblemswith

Nagel's

discussionof a

dualaspect

theoryand his

denialof psychophysical

eductionism.

I8

At certain

pointsNagel

does seem o appeal o the

behavior f

otheranimalsas

evidence

that

they

have a

conscious nner

ife

(VFN,p. 23).

In

his

veryvivid and rather

moving

description

n

The ViewFromNowhere

of the spider

aught

n a

urinal,hisevidence or

OVERTONES OF

SOLIPSISM IN NAGEL 491







even

f

what it is like for a human o see is

objectively

imilar or all

of us,it

wouldnot

necessarily

e the case that

seeing

would be similar or all of us

subjectively:

hat what it is

like

for

me

to see is similar

o what

it

is like for

another. I am not claiming

t is

not

similarbut

that

Nagel

has

no

grounds

for the belief that it is givenhis other

views.]

Soalthough

I

canattempt o

imagine eeing

as another

ees,

there s no

guarantee hattheimagining ucceeds

n

properlygroundingmy concep-

tion of what it is

like

for anotheras a

subject

o see

unless

I

know that simi-

larityof neuro-physiologicalonstitutionor

activity nsures imilarityof

phenomenological eatures

of

experience. Nagel

claims

in

What

s

it

Like o be a Bat? hat atpresentwe arecompletelyunequipped o think

aboutthe subjective haracter

f

experience

without

relying

on

the imagi-

nation (p.

178)

and yet it seems

that

the

reliability

of

this method

is

undermined y Nagel's position

on the

relationbetween he physical

and

the mental.

at least a reason) or his belief hatthe spiderhas desiresand fears, ndeed

a whole range

of conscious xperience, ppears o be behavioral.He also refers hose

who areskeptical

about he existence f conscious xperiencen creatures uitedistant romus in structure

and behavior o an early wentieth enturywork by H. S. Jennings ntitled

TheBehav-

ior

of the Lower Organisms New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress,

906). For Jen-

ningssubjective tatesaredirectly ccessible nly to theirownersand

so the only way to

inferthe existenceof such states n others(including therhumans)

s by analogywith

one's own case. Since he lowerorganisms e studiesbehave

n

someways analogous o

the ways humansbehaveand since nmy case such behavior s accompanied y statesof

consciousness, may inferthatsuch behavior

n

other animals s alsoaccompanied y

such states.But such inferences reultimatelyunderminedorJennings s they are for

Nagel becausenothing

n

the objective videncebarsthe possibility

hat such behavior

couldoccurunaccompanied y statesof consciousness. eeespecially p. 328-37 forJen-

nings'discussion f consciousness

n

lowerorganisms ndVFN, p.

23, for Nagel'srefer-

ence to

Jennings.

'9

SeeMuscari or a

good discussion

f

Nagel'spredicament caught recariously

etween

his phenomenological nd naturalistic mbitions.He is loathe to separate rganicpro-

cessfrom he organism'seelingof itinfearofendangeringhesubjectby separating on-

sciousness rom

body;yet

at the same imehe wants

an

explanation

f what t is liketo be

an incarnate

being

without

seeingthings

n

termsof

neurophysiology

r behavior

p.

z8). Muscari races he consequences f this predicamentor Nagel'smoral heory. am

interested

n

its consequences or his theoryof mind.

Nagel distinguishes erceptual

rom

sympatheticmagination

n

What s it Like o be

a

Bat? pp. 175-76, n.

ii

and argues hat-it

s

sympatheticmagination

hat

is

needed

n

forming

a

conception

of

the

subjective

eaturesof another's

experience.

To

imagine

something ympathetically

e are to

put

ourselves nto a conscious tateresemblinghe

thing

itself.

Nagel

tells us we can use this

kind of

imagination nly

to

imagine

mental

statesand events our own or another's.So to

sympathetically

magine

he occurrence

of a

mentalstate, we put ourselves nto

a state that resemblest. Butdoes this notion of

sympatheticmagination larify

how

we

form

a

conception

of the

subjective

eatures

f

experience?

akefor

an

example

an

occurrence f

pain my

own or another's.Let

me

492 KATHLEEN WIDER







In The View from Nowhere, however, he offers a different

way to

escape solipsism by introducing

a notion of mental

objectivity

-

a notion

he only mentioned at the end of What is it

Like to be a

Bat?

Mental

objectivity offers us, given Nagel's

account of

it,

a

way

of

conceiving

of

points

of view

that is not

dependent

on the

imagination.

It is a

way

of con-

ceiving of our own and others' viewpoints

from the

outside,

but

in

mental

not physical terms. Mental objectivity requires that we find ways

to con-

ceive

of

types

of

experience

that

do

not

depend

on our

being

able to

have

those kinds

of

experience

or

imagine

them

subjectively (VFN,

p.

25).

Nagel

offers us a

way

to form a

conception

of the

experience

of others,

even members

of other

species,

that

does not

rely

on the

imagination

and

so appears to avoid the problems

I

raised

against

his use of the

imagina-

tion

in

the

grounding

of such

conceptions

in

What

is it Like

to

be a

Bat?

In

the end, however, his use

of

mental objectivity

fails as a

way to

avoid

solipsism. Despite his earlier characterizationof mental objectivity, imag-

ination does come into play at least

in

the

first

stages

of

objectifying

the

mental. To

develop

an

objective concept

of

the

mind,

we

must

first

grasp

the idea

of all human

perspectives

and to do this

requires

us

to

use a

gen-

eral

idea

of

subjective points

of

view,

of which we

imagine

a

particular

instance and

a

particular

form

(VFN, pp. zo-zi). However, Nagel

claims

we

can

go beyond

the use of

imagination

in

developing

objective

concepts

that

apply

to the mental life of

creatures

very

different from

our-

selves. But in the end imagination is still required to understand all the

qualities

of the

experience

of

another.

According

to

Nagel,

no

objective

conception

of the mind will ever be

complete

because its

completion

requires

that we be able to

imagine subjectively

all

points

of

view

and

that

is impossible.

The

exact character

of each of the

experiential

and

inten-

tional

perspectives

with which it

[an objective conception

of the

mind]

deals can be understood

only

from within

and

by subjective imagination

(VFN, p. z6).

It is his insistence on

maintaining

this reliance on the

imagi-

nation

together with

his

position

on the

relationship

between the

mental

and the

physical

that accounts

for the

solipsistic

strain

in

Nagel's

work.

Perhaps

Williams'

warning

that

at least with

regard

to the

self,

the

imagi-

imaginewhatthe painwouldbe like f the knifewhich ustnow cut my fingerhadembed-

ded tself

n

my bone nstead.To do this,

I

must

put myself

nto

a

mental tateof

pain

hat

resembles he actualmental tateof pain

I

would be

in if

the knife

had

cut

moredeeply.

But what is this notion of one mental tate resembling nother?

f I

have

neverhad the

actualmental tatecreatedby a knifedigging nto my bone,how do Iknow that he oneI

havenow put myself nto resemblest? To sympatheticallymagineanother's

pain, I do

the same as

in

my own case, but here there are

even more

problems

with

knowing

whether he mental tate

I

have put myself nto resembles he mental tate

of the other.

These problemsare accentuatedby Nagel's position on the relationship

betweenthe

mentaland the physical.

OVERTONES OF SOLIPSISM IN NAGEL

493







nation s too trickya thing

o

provide

a reliable oad o the comprehension

of what is logicallypossible

could

equally

well

apply

to Nagel's use of

it

in

grounding

a conception

of the

subjective

characterof another's

experience.

Thereremains,givenNagel's analysis

of

how we

form a

conception

of

the subjectivequalities

of

another's

xperience,

a

comprehension

f

one's

own experience hat

s accessible o oneselfalone.

Thereremainsa form

of

self-knowledgeor self-understandingt least which is private.Andthis

privacy s in thestrongsense, the sense

used by Wittgenstein

n his argu-

ment

against

he possibility

of a

private anguage

or sensations private

in

the sense

that the full comprehension

f

certain ubjective

acts and the

meaning

of conceptswhich describe

hem is accessible

only

to the owner

of the

experience

he

facts are about or to which the concepts apply. 3

Nagel suggests

his consequence

f his views when

he

remarks hat even

for otherpersonsthe understanding f what it is like to be themis only

partial What,

p. 172, n. 8). Nagel missesthe

radicalnatureof Witt-

genstein'spoint

in

the private anguageargument

hat

ascriptions

f men-

tal states to

oneself, i.e.,

first

person

ascriptions,

make sense only

if

they

can makesense in the thirdperson.

It is

only

if

others

can

understandmy

ascriptions

of a

sensation

o myselfthat

I

can understand t as well.

The

use

of

concepts

hat

apply

o states

of

consciousness

n

the first

person

are

dependent

n the

possibility

hat

they

couldhave

a use

in

the

third

person.

Nagel's positionin What s it Liketo be a Bat? s thereverse.Theiruse

in

the third person

is dependenton their use in the first.

The objective

ascriptionof experience

s

possible

only

for

someone sufficiently imilar

to

the

object

of

ascription

o

be

ableto

adopt

his

point

of view to

under-

stand

the

ascription

n

the first

person

as well as

in

the third

What,

p.

17z). It is precisely his Cartesian iew

that the thirdperson

ascriptionof

experience

s

dependent

on the first

person

use that

Wittgenstein

hought

led to solipsismand

that he

arguedagainst

n The

Philosophical

nvesti-

gations.14

Williams,

p.

45-

See Russow,p. 6o

for an argument gainst

Nagel's assumption hatimaginabilitys a

reliable ndication

of understanding.

23

Nagel's position s

reminiscent f JohnWisdom'sview

in OtherMinds (Oxford,Eng-

land:Basil

Blackwell,

965)

that

although

can

knowanother'smental

tates,

can

never

know them n the

way I know my own andthat

ascriptions f mental tates o myselfwill

alwaysmeanmore o methan o others.Botharedrawn o a Wittgensteinianositionbut

both ultimately ake

positions hat are inconsistent

with Wittgenstein'siew about the

meaningof mentalistic oncepts.

24

Wilkes,p. 24o

raisesthe point

that

Nagel'sposition

stands

n

opposition

o

Wittgen-

stein'sprivate anguage

argument

nd that

Nagel

offersno

arguments

gainstWittgen-

stein'sargument.

My claim s that he does

not even see thathisposition

runs

counter o

494 KATHLEEN

WIDER







It is true

that

in Nagel's

discussion

of

solipsism

in The

Possibility

of

Altruism,

he takes

a very

Wittgensteinian

stand

in

holding

that

first

and

third

person

statements

share

a common

meaning.

He claims

that the

sys-

tem

of objective

reasons

upon

which

altruism

depends

requires

that

one

be

able

to conceive

of oneself

as

a

particular

person

among

other

persons

and

that

this requires

that one

have

a

particular

conception

of

persons.

This

conception

must

make

it possible

to say

of other

persons

anything

which one can say of oneself, and in the same sense (p.

ioi).

He main-

tains

that

first and

third person

ascriptions

of

mental

states

share

a

com-

mon element,

and

although

there

may

be differences

between

first

and

third person

statements

in terms

of their implications

or the

expectations

they

arouse,

these differences

can

all be

accounted

for in

a

public way,

i.e.,

from the impersonal

standpoint.

Nothing

about the

meaning

of the

attri-

butions

of states

of

consciousness,

whether

made

in the first

or third

per-

son,

is private

in

any

strong

sense.

The only personal

element

that

cannot

be grasped by the impersonal standpoint is the personal premise which

locates

me

in

the

world

that

has

been impersonally

described

(p.

103).

But

although

this

premise

makes

a

difference

in how

the world

is

con-

ceived,

it makes

no difference

in

the

content

of what is conceived.

Solip-

sism

is thus

avoided

for Nagel

in

non-practical

areas since everything

which

can be

stated,

asserted,

expected,

believed,

judged

from

a personal

standpoint

can be similarly

viewed

from the impersonal

standpoint

(p.

114).

There

are

indications,

however,

in both the

1978

postscript

to

The

Possibility

of

Altruism

and

in The View

From

Nowhere

that

Nagel

has

abandoned

his strong

claim

that all the

content

of a first person

judgment

can

and must

be

captured

in

a third

person

judgment.

Although

he talks

in

terms

of

practical

judgments

in

the postscript,

he

does imply that

in gen-

eral

the

personal

does

not

need to

be

completely

subsumed

under

the

impersonal.

The personal

standpoint

may

retain

its

power

after the

claims of the impersonal have been acknowledged (p. viii) and thus

Nagel says

some

degree

of

dissociation (Nagel's

terms

for selective

solip-

sism) may

remain.

The personal

premise

I

am

TN

which

Nagel

claimed

in The Possibility

of

Altruism

affected only

how the

world

was

conceived

but left

untouched

what

was

conceived, plays

a

much

more

significant

role

in The

View

From

Nowhere.

He rejects

the

semantic

diagnosis

of

I

am

TN

which

claims

it

states

no

further

truth

about

the world. Nagel

argues

that the

personal

premise

does

state

a fact

and that

even when

an

objective

conception

has

provided

all

the

public

information

about

TN,

Wittgenstein's.

ee Lawrence

Nemirow's

Review

of Thomas

Nagel's

Mortal

Ques-

tions,

The

Philosophical

Review

89 (I980): 473-77

(p.

476

especially)

nd

Moore,

pp.

3z5-z6.

OVERTONES

OF

SOLIPSISM

IN

NAGEL

495







the additional

thought

that

TN

is me seems

clearly

to

have further con-

tent (VFN, p. 6o).

Although Nagel acknowledges

Wittgenstein's point about the objec-

tive nature of

subjectivity

in

The View

From

Nowhere

(pp.

32

and

35,

for example), he misses the anti-Cartesianism of

Wittgenstein's position

by relying ultimately on the

imagination in grounding objectivity. Nagel

says

that if

one could understand how subjective experience can have an

objective nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other

than

oneself. But Wittgenstein goes

further. The objective nature of sub-

jectivity grounds not just one's

understanding of the existence of other

subjects

but

it grounds one's ability to talk about oneself

as a subject of

experience as well.

In

The View

From

Nowhere

Nagel does point out

that the

concept 'someone'

is not a

generalization of the

concept

'I'

and

that neither can exist without the other

(p. 3

5)

and he

does appear to agree

with the Wittgensteinian position that first and thirdperson ascriptions of

mental states

share the same meaning.

In

addition

he

develops

a notion of

mental

objectivity which allows

us to view mental

life,

one's own or

another's,

from

outside

and so allows for a

conception

of

mind that

can be

grasped by more than oneself and by more than members of one's

species.

That

is

why Nagel sees mental

objectivity

as a

way

to overcome

solipsism

and

anthropomorphism.

He

rejects

as well the

argument

from

analogy

as

inadequate to explain our knowledge

of

other minds and as unable to

avoid solipsism because it implies that the attributions of mental states in

the first and

third person

do not have the same sense

(VFN, p. zo).

How-

ever,

because he sees mental

objectivity

as

incomplete,

because he

argues

an

objective conception

of

subjectivity

can

only go

so far and because his

development

of

a

subjective conception

of mind relies

ultimately

on

the

use of the

imagination,

a

solipsistic

strain remains

in

Nagel's

work.

For

Nagel

the extent of one's

understanding

or

conception

of what it is like to

be another is

dependent

on the extent to which one can take

up

the other's

point

of

view.

If

one can take it

up

roughly,

or

partially,

then one's con-

ception

will also be

rough

or

partial

( What, p.

172,

n.

8).

Given

Nagel's general position

with

regard

to the

relationship

between the men-

tal and the

physical

and

given

his reliance

on

imagination

in

forming

a full

conception

of what it is like

for

another

creature to be the

creature

it is and

have the

experiences

it

has,

it follows that

our

understanding

or

concep-

tion

of what it is like to be another

human will

always

be

partial. Despite

his apparent acceptance of Wittgenstein's position with regard to the

objective

nature of

subjectivity,

there

remains, given Nagel's account,

a

kind of

private knowledge

or access to

private subjective facts,

an access

available

only

to the owner of the

experience

to whom the facts

apply.

496 KATHLEEN WIDER







This flies

in

the

face

of Wittgenstein's

private

language

argument and

the

anti-Cartesianism

it embodies.

There

is another

notion

Nagel relies

on

extensively

in

The

View From

Nowhere

-

that of the

objective

self

-

which appears

to

be a possible

source

of

the solipsistic

strain

in his work. Indeed Anthony

Kenny

in

his

review

of the book

thinks

this

is the source

of such a strain

in Nagel.

He

reads Nagel

as positing

a self separate

from

his

ordinary,

empirical

self

and one

that cannot

be known

or encountered

by

others. 5

Nagel himself

recognizes

that

to

insist on the

existence

of two separate,

non-identical

selves

is to

hover on the edge

of solipsism.

But the real problem

with

Nagel's

reliance

on this

notion of

an

objective

self is not

so much that it

can lead to solipsism

-

he

sees that danger

although

he is not always

as

careful as he

ought

to be

in avoiding

it- the

real

problem

is that a belief

in

such

a self results

in an isolation

not between oneself

and

another but

in

an

isolation from a part of one's own self. Nagel's reliance on this notion of

an

objective

self

leads

him to the

acceptance

of a

quasi-Kantian

noumenal

self,

ultimately

unknowable

not

just

to

others but

to oneself as well.

Nagel

discusses

the objective

self

at length

in

chapter

four of

The

View

From

Nowhere.26

The objective

self

is the

perspectiveless

ubject

that

constructs

a centerless conception

of the

world

by

casting

all

perspectives

into the

content

of that

world

(VFN, p.

6z).

It is the true

self

or the higher

self which

has no

point

of view

but which

includes

the

point

of view

of

the

ordinary, empirical self (TN in Nagel's case) within its conception of the

world.

It is the

'I'

that

steps

back from

an individual

and even

human

viewpoint.

It is

the existence

of this

objective

self which

gives

rise to the

two

questions

Nagel

focuses

on

in

this chapter:

'How

can

TN be

me?'

and

'How

can

I

be TN?'

Each

person

can

ask these same

questions

of herself.

The amazing

fact

which the thought

'TN is

me'

expresses

for

Nagel

seems

to

be that a

person

in

the

world

(TN)

can have

an

objective

view of the

world.

It is the

fact that

TN is

capable

of

drawing

back from his

particular

perspective

as

an

ordinary, empirical

self

and

forming

a

perspectiveless

conception

of the world.

It

is the same

human

capacity

for

objectivity

and

distance which

struck

Heidegger

and

Sartre,

among

others,

as

amazing.

How

can

something

in the world

have

a

point

of view

on the world?

Nagel's

amazement

goes

further than

this

though

because

he is struck

not

just

by

the

fact that

an

empirical

self

(one

situated

in

space

and

time,

in

his-

tory)

can take

an

objective

view

on

the world

but

also

by

the

fact

2

Kenny,

p. 14.

z6

He repeats,

or

the mostpart,

material

rom

TheObjective

Self,

n Knowledge

nd

Mind:

Philosophical

Essays,

ed. Carl

Ginetand Sydney

ShoemakerNew

York:

Oxford

UniversityPress,

983),

pp.

z][11-3z.

OVERTONES

OF

SOLIPSISM

IN NAGEL

497









It turns out that Nagel acknowledges the

most obvious source of the

solipsistic tendency

in

his work

-

his use of

the notion of an objective self.

However, the real source of the solipsistic strain

in

Nagel lies in a more

hidden place, one he fails to acknowledge. It

lies in his ultimate reliance on

the imagination

to

ground

one's

conception

of the subjective features of

another's experience conjoined with his

rejection of psychophysical

reductionism.

OVERTONES OF SOLIPSISM IN NAGEL

499

Documents

Overtones of Solipsism in T. Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat?"