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"THE TIME IS OUT OF JOINT"

ERNESTOLACLAU

Since this singular end of the political would correspond to the

presentationof an absolutelyliving reality,thisis one more reasonto

thinkthat the essence of thepolitical will alwayshave the inessential

figure, the veryanessence of a ghost.

-Jacques Derrida,Specters ofMarx

Halfway throughSpectersof Marx, Derridalinks the conceptof productionto thatof

traumaandspeaksof "thespectralspiritualizationthatis atwork inanytekhne"[SM97].He immediatelyconnectsthis assertionto Freud'sremarksconcerningthe threetraumas

inflictedon the narcissismof the decenteredman: thepsychologicaltraumaderivedfrom

thepsychoanalyticdiscoveryof theunconscious,thebiologicaltraumaresultingfromthe

Darwinianfindingsabouthumandescent,andthecosmologicaltraumaproceedingfrom

the Copernicanrevolution. To this Derridaadds the decenteringeffects coming from

Marxism,which, accordingto him, accumulateandput togetherthe otherthree: "The

centuryof'Marxism'will have beenthatof thetechno-scientificandeffectivedecentering

of theearth,of geopolitics,of theanthroposin itsonto-theologicalidentityor its genetic

properties,of the ego cogito-and of thevery conceptof narcissismwhose aporiasare,let us say in order to go too quicklyand save ourselves a lot of references,the explicittheme of deconstruction"[SM 98].

So deconstructioninscribes itself in a secularmovementof decentering,to which

Marxismitselfbelongs. Infact,atvariouspointsof SpectersofMarx,Derridainsists that

deconstructionwould be either inconceivable or irrelevantif it were not relatedto the

spiritor the traditionof a certainMarxism. And yet deconstructionis notjust Marxism:

it is a certainoperationpracticedin thebodyof Marxism,the locatingin Marx'stexts of

an area ofundecidabilitywhich,

in Derrida'sterms,

is that circumscribedby

the

oppositionbetweenspiritandspecter,betweenontologyandhauntology. The perform-

ing of this deconstructiveoperation-to which the last two chaptersof the book are

devoted-is farfromapurelyacademicexercise: theverypossibilityofjustice-but also

ofpolitics-is atstake.Withouttheconstitutivedislocationthatinhabitsallhauntology-and that ontology tries to conceal-there would be no politics, just a programmed,

predeterminedreductionof the otherto thesame.

It is easy to go fromdisadjustedto unjust. That is ourproblem:how tojustifythis passage from disadjustment(with its rather more technico-ontological

valueaffectingapresence)to an injusticethat wouldno longerbeontological?And whatif disadjustmentwereon the contrarythe conditionof justice?And

whatif this doubleregister condensedits enigma, precisely [justement],and

potentialized its superpower in that which gives its unheard-offorce to

Hamlet's words: "Thetimeis out of joint"? [SM19-20]

To find adoublelogic in Marx'swork,todetect intheMarxiantextsadoublegesturethatthetheorymakespossiblebutis unableto controlconceptuallyin a crediblesynthesis:all this looksratherfamiliar. Since the end of the nineteenthcentury,thisduality,deeply

diacritics25.2: 86-9686



Ii9 gic



inscribedin Marx'swork,has been theobjectof countlessanalyses. Thedualityof orthe

oppositions between economic determinismand the ethical orientationof socialism,between economism and the primacyof politics, even between the "scientific"and the

"ideological"componentsof thetheory,have been notonly recurrentthemesin Marxist

discussionsbut thevery

issues thathavemadepossible

ahistory

of Marxism. However,none of theseapparentreformulationsof the termsof awidelyperceiveddualismhasbeen

similartotheothers. We arenotdealingwith apurelynominalisticoperationof renaming:the displacementthat these reformulationsoperate,the logics of the social they imply,and,above all, thepolitical strategiesthey makepossible areradicallydifferent.

Derridadoes not tracethegenealogyof his interventionin the Marxiantext. This is

regrettable,in partbecause thespecificity,originality,andpotentialitiesof his interven-

tion do not come sufficientlyto light. Inwhatfollows, I will tryto stress some of these

specific features,aswell as theiroriginalityvis-a-vis othercomparableattempts.To this

end, I will referto whatI think are the two centraltheoreticalpointsin Derrida'sbook:

the logic of the specter(the hauntology)and the categoryof messianism.

TheLogic of theSpecter

[T]he specter is a paradoxical incorporation,the becoming-body,a certain

phenomenalandcarnalformofthespirit. Itbecomes, rather,some "thing"that

remainsdifficulttoname:neithersoul norbody,and bothone and theother.For

it is flesh andphenomenalitythatgive to the spirit its spectralapparition,but

whichdisappearrightawayin theapparition,in theverycomingofthe revenant

or the returnof the specter. There is something disappeared,departedin the

apparitionitselfas reapparitionof the departed.[SM6]

Anachronism is essential to spectrality: the specter, interruptingall specularity,

desynchronizestime. Theveryessence of spectralityis to be foundin thisundecidabilitybetween flesh and spirit: it is not purely body-for in that case there would be no

spectralityatall;butitis notpurespiriteither-for thepassagethroughthe flesh is crucial.

For there is no ghost, thereis neveranybecoming-specterof thespiritwithout

at least an appearanceof flesh, in a space of invisible visibility,like the dis-appearingof an apparition.For there to be ghost, there mustbe a returnto the

body,but to a bodythat is more abstract thanever. Thespectrogenicprocess

correspondsthereforeto a paradoxical incorporation.Once ideas or thoughts

(Gedanke)are detachedfrom theirsubstratum,one engenderssome ghost by

giving thema body. [SM126]

Fromthispointonward,Derridamakes aclassic deconstructivemove: thespecterbeingundecidablebetween the two extremes of body and spirit, these extremes themselves

become contaminatedby that undecidability. Thus, having shown how, in Marx's

analysisof commodity, exchangevalue dependsfor its constitutionon a spectrallogic,Derridaconcludes thatthis logic is not absent from use value either:

The said use-valueof the said ordinarysensuousthing,simplehule, the wood

of the wooden tableconcerningwhichMarxsupposes that it has notyet begunto "dance,"itsveryform,theformthatinformsitshule,mustindeedhaveat least

promised it to iterability,to substitution,to exchange, to value; it must have

madea start,howeverminimalitmayhavebeen,on an idealizationthatpermitsone to identifyit as the samethroughoutpossible repetitions,and soforth. Just

diacritics / summer 1995 87



as thereis nopure use, thereis no use-valuewhich thepossibility of exchangeandcommerce... has not in advance inscribedin an out-of-use-an excessive

significationthatcannotbe reduced to the useless. [SM 160]

Similarly,if thespiritis somethingwhose invisibilityhas to produceits own visibility, ifthe very constitution of spirit requiresthe visibility of the invisible, nothing is more

difficultthan to keep a strictseparationbetweenspiritandspecter. Once this pointhas

beenreached,the conclusionsfollowquickly.Wefind in Marxahauntology,anargumentaboutspectralityatthevery heartof theconstitutionof the social link. Timebeing "out

of joint," dislocation corruptingthe identity with itself of any present, we have a

constitutiveanachronismthat is attherootof any identity. Any "life"emergesout of a

more basic life/deathdichotomy-it is not "life"as uncontaminatedpresencebut survie

that is the condition of any presence. Marx, however, attemptedthe critiqueof the

hauntologicalfromtheperspectiveof anontology. If thespecterinhabitstheroot of the

social link in bourgeois society, the transcendenceof the latter,the arrivalat a time thatis nolonger"outofjoint,"therealizationof asociety fullyreconciledwithitself will opentheway to the "endof ideology"-that is, to a purely "ontological"society which, after

theconsummationof theproletarianmillennium,will look tohauntologyas itspast. And

since hauntologyis inherentto politics,the transcendenceof thesplitbetweenbeingand

appearancewill meantheendof politics. (We could, in fact,puttheargumentin Saint-

Simonianterms: the transitionfrom the governmentof men to the administrationof

things.) If, however,as the deconstructivereadingshows, "ontology"-full reconcilia-

tion-is notachievable,timeis constitutively"outofjoint,"andtheghostis the condition

ofpossibility

ofanypresent,politics

too becomes constitutiveof thesocial link. We could

sayof thespecterwhat GrouchoMarxsaid aboutsex: it is goingtostaywithusfor a while.

This contaminationof presenceby the specter can be considered from the two

perspectivesinvolved in a doublegenitive. Thereare,in the firstplace, spectersof Marx,insofaras Marx himself-an abbreviationfor communism-is hauntingus today as a

horizonpreventingthe possibility of its final exorcism by the apparentlytriumphant

capitalist"democracies"(herethe mainreferenceis to Fukuyama).But thereare also the

specters of Marx that visited Marx himself and preventedhim from establishing a

nonhauntedontology. Thus,thegroundwe reach-that of apresentnever identicalwith

itself-is thevery terrainof this phantasmatic,anessentialpracticethatwe call politics.

What to say about this Derrideansequence? A firstremark-first, bothtemporallyand logically-is that I have nothing to object to. The deconstructiveoperationis

impeccable, the horizons that it opens are far-reaching,and the intertextualitywithin

which it takesplaceis highly illuminating.However,as withanydeconstructionworthyof thename,there is a pluralityof directionsin which one canmove, and it is to consider

this pluralitythat I would like to pause for a moment. My own work has largelyconcentratedon the deconstructionof Marxisttexts,andIcould,primafacie, relatewhat

Ihave calledhegemoniclogic--which silentlydeconstructsMarxistcategories-to the

logicofthespecterasdescribedbyDerrida.Otherstoo haverecentlylinked"deconstruction"

and"hegemony." Simon Critchley,for instance,asserts:

Against the troubling tendency to subordinate the political to the socio-

economic withinMarx's "ontology". .. Derrida's argumentfor a logic of

spectralitywithinMarxismcan be linkedto the claimfor theirreducibilityofthe

1. Thebasicformulationconcerningtheconceptof "hegemony"canbefoundinLaclauand

Mouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,chapters3 and 4. I havereformulatedthe basicdimensionsof thisconcept,linkingit morecloselyto the categoryof "dislocation,"in NewReflectionson theRevolutionof OurTime.

88



political understoodas that moment where the sedimentedmeanings of the

socio-economicare contested. Following Ernesto Laclau's radicalizationof

Gramsci,one mightlink the logic of spectralityto thelogic of hegemony;that

is, ifonerenounces-as onemust-the communisteschatological "a-theodicy"

of the economiccontradictionsof capitalisminevitablyculminatingin revolu-

tion, thenpolitics andpolitico-cultural-ideological hegemonizationis indis-

pensable to thepossibility of radical change.

I hesitate, however, to entirelyendorse such an apparentlyobvious assimilation. Al-

thoughthereis noincompatibilitybetweenhegemonyandspectrallogic as far as the latter

goes, a hegemoniclogic presupposestwo furthersteps beyond spectralitythatI am not

sure Derridais preparedto take:

1. Spectralitypresupposes,as we haveseen, an undecidablerelationbetweenspiritand flesh which contaminates,in turn,these two poles. It presupposes,in thatsense, a

weakenedformof incarnation.Weakenedbecause a full incarnation-an incarnationinthe Christiansense-transforms the flesh intoapurelytransparentmediumthroughwhich

we can see anentirelyspiritualrealitywith noconnectionto its incarnatingbody. God's

mediationis whatestablishesthe linkbetweenspiritandflesh insofaras He is atan infinite

distance from both. So the lack of naturalconnection between both poles is what

transformsthe flesh into the mediumthroughwhich thespiritshows itself. At the same

time, however,it is this lack of connectionthatpreventsthe contaminationof one by the

other. No doubtthis Christianpolaritycanbe deconstructedin turn,but thepointis that

thisdeconstructionwill not takeplace throughthecollapseof the frontierbetweenspiritandspecter.Forin thespecterthe relationbetweenspiritandflesh is muchmoreintimate:

thereis no divine mediationthatbothsanctionsandsupersedesthe essentialheterogeneityof the two poles. Now, ahegemonicrelationis one in which a certainbody presentsitself

as the incarnationof a certainspirit.Thehegemonicrelationiscertainlyspectral:acertain

body triesto presentits particularfeaturesas the expressionof something transcendingits own particularity. The body is an undecidablepoint in which universalityand

particularitygetconfused,but theveryfactthatotherbodiescompeteto be theincarnatingones,thattheyarealternativeformsof materializationof the same"spirit,"suggestsa kind

of autonomizationof the latterwhich cannotbe explained solely by the pure logic of

spectrality.

2. Of what does this autonomizationconsist? This is our second step. Let usremember that any step that is taken out of the logic of spectrality cannot be in

contradictionto the latterbutmust,on thecontrary,presupposeit. If the autonomization

of the"spirit"is to takeplacewithinspectrality,"autonomy"cannot meanidentitywith

oneself, self-representation,because thatwould, precisely, restore a rigid frontierbe-

tween "spirit"and "specter." But autonomy does not require full identity as its

precondition: it can also emerge out of a constitutiveimpossibility,an absolute limit

whose formsof representationwill be necessarilyinadequate.Letussupposea situation

of generalizedsocial disorder:in such a situation"order"becomes the name of an absent

fullness, and if thatfullness is constitutivelyunachievableit cannot haveanycontent of

itsown,anyformof self-representation."Order"thusbecomes autonomousvis-a-vis any

particularorderinsofaras it is the nameof an absentfullness thatno concretesocial order

can achieve (the same can be said of similar termssuch as "revolution,""unityof the

people,"etc.). That fullness is present,however,as that which is absent and needs as a

result to be representedin some way. Now, its means of representationwill be

constitutivelyinadequate,fortheycanonly be particularcontentsthatassume,in certain

circumstances,a functionof representationof theimpossibleuniversalityof thecommu-

nity. This relation,by whicha certainparticularcontentoverflows its own particularityand becomes the incarnationof the absentfullness of society is exactly what I call a




hegemonicrelation. As we can see, it presupposesthe logic of the specter: thefullness

of the"spirit,"asit has no contentof itsown,canexistonlythroughitsparasiticattachment

to someparticularbody;but thatbody is subvertedand deformedin its own particularityas it becomesthe embodimentof fullness. This means,interalia, thatthe anachronistic

languageof

revolutions,which MarxreferstoandDerrida

analyzes,is inevitable: the old

revolutionis presentinthenewone, not in itsparticularitybutin its universalfunctionof

being a revolution,as the incarnationof the revolutionaryprincipleas such. And the

Marxianaspirationof a revolutionarylanguagethatonly expressesthepresent,in which

the "content"overcomes "phraseology,"is a pure impossibility. If the fullness of the

revolution-as all fullness-is unachievable,we cannotbut havea dissociationbetween

the revolutionarycontent and the fullness of a pure revolutionaryfoundation,and this

dissociation will reproducesine die the logic of spectralityand the split between

"phraseology"and "content."

Whatprecedesis anattemptto show thetypeof move that I would makeout of the

logic of spectrality. But,as I said, it is not theonly move thatone can make. Thestepsthatlead from thelogic of spectralityto a hegemoniclogic arestepsthatthe formerlogic

certainlymakespossible,but not necessarycorollariesderivedfrom it.

Butwhatpoliticalconsequencesdoes Derridahimself drawfrom his deconstruction

of Marx'stexts? Althoughtheseconsequencesare notentirelydevelopedin hisbook,we

cangeta broadhintof the directionthatDerridais takingifwe move to our second theme:

the questionof the messianic.

TheQuestionof

the Messianic

Letus quoteDerridaagain. AfterhavingindicatedthatbothMarxismandreligionshare

the formal structureof a messianiceschatology,he asserts:

Whileit is commonto bothof them,withtheexceptionof thecontent... it is also

the case that its formal structureof promise exceeds them or precedes them.

Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as

undeconstructibleas thepossibilityitselfofdeconstructionis,perhaps,a certain

experienceof theemancipatorypromise; it is perhaps even theformality of a

structuralmessianism,a messianismwithoutreligion,even a messianic withoutmessianism,an ideaofjustice-which wedistinguishfromlaw orrightand even

fromhumanrights-and an idea of democracy-which wedistinguishfrom its

currentconceptandfromits determinedpredicates today. [SM59]

HereDerridasummarizesthemes thathe developed in full in "Force of Law." These

themesandconceptsrequire,however,thattheybe reinsertedin the variousdiscursive

contexts within which they were originally formulated,first because these contexts

considerablydivergeamongthemselvesand, second,because thehigh metaphoricityof

some of the categories employed-such as the messianic-can lead to an undue

associationof thosecategorieswith theconcretehistoricalphenomenato whichtheyare

usually applied. I cannotproperlydo thisjob in the limitedspaceof areview,but letus,atleast,makesomespecifications.Bythe"messianic"we shouldnotunderstandanything

directlyrelatedto actualmessianicmovements-of thepresentorthepast-but, instead,

somethingbelonging to the generalstructureof experience. It is linked to the idea of

"promise."Thisdoes not meanthis or thatparticularpromise,butthepromiseimplicitin

anoriginaryopeningto the"other,"to theunforeseeable,to thepureeventwhich cannot

be masteredby any aprioristicdiscourse. Such an event is an interruptionin the normal

courseof things,a radicaldislocation. This leads to the notionof "justice"as linkedto

90



an absolutesingularitywhich cannotbe absorbedby the generalityof law. The chasm

betweenlawandjusticeis one which cannotbeclosed. The existenceof thischasmiswhat

makesdeconstructionpossible. Deconstructionandjustice-or, rather,deconstructionas

justice-is what cannot be deconstructed.Deconstructinglaw-which is finally what

politicsis about-is

possiblebecause of this structureof

experiencein which the

messianic,the promise,andjustice arecategoriesin a relationof mutualimplication.On the basis of these premises, Derridaelaborateshis concept of "democracyto

come" ("democratiea venir").This "a venir"does not involve any teleological asser-

tion-not even the limitedone of aregulativeidea-but simplythecontinualcommitment

to keep open the relationto the other,an openingwhich is alwaysa venir,for theother

to which one opens oneself is never alreadygiven in any aprioristiccalculation. To

summarize:the messianismwe arespeakingaboutis one withouteschatology,without

pregivenpromisedland,withoutdeterminatecontent. It is simplythestructureof promisewhich is inherentin allexperienceand whose lackof content-resulting from theradical

opening to the event, to the other, is the very possibility of justice and gives its onlymeaningto the democracyto come. Singularityas the terrainof justice involves the

radicalundecidabilitywhich makes the decision possible.

It was thena matterof thinkinganotherhistoricity... anotheropeningofevent-ness ashistoricitythatpermittedone not torenounce,buton thecontrarytoopen

upaccess to anaffirmativethinkingof themessianic andemancipatorypromiseas promise: as promiseand not as onto-theological or teleo-eschatologicalprogramor design....

But at a certainpointpromise

anddecision, whichis tosay responsibility,owe theirpossibility to the ordeal of undecidabilitywhich will always remain

theircondition.[SM74-75]

Whatto say aboutthevarioustheoreticaloperationsthatDerridaperformsstartingfromthisconceptualconstruction?I thinkthatwe candistinguishthreelevels here. Thefirstreferstothedeconstructionof theconceptof messianismthatwe have inheritedfromthe religious but also from the Marxist tradition. This deconstructionproceeds byshowingthecontingentcharacterof the articulationsthathavecoalescedaroundtheactualhistorical messianisms. We can do away with the teleological and eschatological

dimensions,we caneven doawaywith all theactualcontentsof thehistoricalmessianisms,but whatwe cannotdo awaywith is the"promise,"because the latteris inscribedin the

structureof all experience.This, as we haveseen, is not a promiseof anythingconcrete;it is some sort of "existential,"insofaras it is what prevents any presencefrombeingclosed arounditself. If we link this to the relationlaw/justice,undecidability/decisions,we can see thegeneralmovementof Derrida'stheoretico-politicalintervention,whichis

to direct the historico-politicalformsbackto the primaryterrainof theiropeningto the

radically heterogenous. This is the terrainof a constitutive undecidability,of an

experience of the impossible that, paradoxically,makes possible responsibility,the

decision, law and-finally-the messianic itself in its actual historical forms. I find

myself in full agreementwith this movement.Derrida'sargument,however, does not stop there. Fromthis first movement(for

reasonsthatwill becomeclearpresently,Ikeepthis "from"deliberatelyvague,undecidedbetween the derivativeand the merelysequential)he passes to a sortof ethico-political

injunctionby whichall the previouslymentioneddimensionsconvergein theprojectofa democracytocome,which is linkedto the classicalnotion of "emancipation."Derridais veryfirm in his assertionthathe is unpreparedto putthe latteratall intoquestion. Butwe have to beverycarefulaboutthemeaningof such astand,becausetheclassical notion




of emancipationis no more thananothernamefor theeschatologicalmessianismthat he

is tryingto deconstruct.

Variousaspectshaveto be differentiatedhere. Ifby reassertingtheclassical notion

of emancipationDerridadoes not meananythingbeyondhisparticularwayof reassertingmessianism-that

is, doing awaywith all the

teleo-ontologicalparaphernaliaof

the latterandstickingto the momentof the"promise"-then I wouldcertainlyagreewithhim,but

in that case the classic idea of emancipation,even if we retainfrom it an ultimatelyundeconstructiblemoment,is deeplytransformed.I find it rathermisleadingto call this

operationa defense of the classic notion of emancipation. But-a second aspect-theclassic notion of emancipationwas something more than the formal structureof the

promise. It was also thecrystallizationandsynthesisof a series of contents such as the

eliminationof economic exploitationand all forms of discrimination,the assertion of

humanrights, the consolidation of civil and political freedom,and so forth. Derrida,

understandably,does not wantto renouncethispatrimony,and it would be difficultnot

to join him in its defense. The difficulty, however, is that in the classic notion ofemancipationthedefense andgroundingof all those contentswereintimatelyconnected

totheteleologicaleschatologythatDerridais deconstructing.So, if hewantsto maintain

the resultsof his deconstructionand at the same time to defend those contents,as the

groundof the lattercan no longerbe an eschatologicalarticulation,there areonly two

ways opento him: eitherto show thatthose contentscanbe derivedfrom the"promise"as a generalstructureof experience,or to demonstratethat those contents aregroundedin somethingless thansuch a generalstructure-in which case the"promise"as such is

indifferentto the actualnatureof those contents.

Thereis, finally,

a thirdaspect

to bedistinguished.

Theprevious

distinctionshave

tobe situatedagainstthebackgroundof the realtargetof Derrida'sdiscussion inSpecters

of Marx: the exposureof a prevalentcommon sense (thathe exemplifies throughhis

brilliantcritiqueof Fukuyama)accordingto which thecollapseof the communistregimesis supposedto meanhumanity'sarrivalat a final stage where all humanneeds will be

satisfied andwhere no messianic consummationof time is any longerto be expected.Derridareactsagainstthis new dominantconsensus andits Hegelo-Kojeviangrounding

by showing, at the empiricallevel, the gap between historicalrealityandthe capitalistWest's satisfied image of itself and, at the theoreticallevel, the inconsistencies of the

notionof an end of History. It is againstthebackgroundof thispolemicthat the whole

discourseaboutthealwaysreturningspectersof Marxhastobe understood.WhatDerridais finally saying is that isolated demands,grievances, injustices,and so forth are not

empiricalresidues of a historicalstage which has-in all essentials-been superseded,thattheyare,on thecontrary,thesymptomsof a fundamentaldeadlockof contemporarysocieties thatpushesisolateddemandsto some kind of phantasmaticarticulationwhich

will result in new forms of political reaggregation.The latterare not specified beyondDerrida'squick allusions to the historical limits of the "party"form and to a "New

International"in themaking.Itis, however,clearthatanyadvanceinformulatingatheoryof political reaggregationcruciallydependson how the transitionbetweenthe generalstructureof experience-the promise-and the contents of the classical emancipatory

projectis conceived.This is the thirdlevel at which theargumentof SpectersofMarx can be considered:

the type of link it establishesbetween the promiseas a (post-)transcendentalor (post-)

ontological (non-)groundand the ethical and political contents of an emancipatory

project. This is the level at which I find theargumentof Spectersless convincing. For

here anillegitimatelogical transitioncaneasily be made. I amnotnecessarilyassertingthatDerridais makingthattransition,but,atanyrate,it is one frequentlymadeby manydefendersof deconstructionand one to whichthevery ambiguityof the Derrideantexts

gives some credence. Theillegitimatetransitionis to thinkthatfromtheimpossibilityof

92



a presenceclosed in itself, from an "ontological"conditionin which theopennessto the

event, to the heterogeneous,to the radicallyother is constitutive,some kind of ethical

injunctionto be responsibleand to keep oneself open to the heterogeneityof the other

necessarilyfollows. This transitionis illegitimatefor two reasons. First,because if the

promiseis an"existential"constitutiveof all

experience,it is

always alreadythere,before

any injunction. (Itis like the voluntaristicargumentcriticizedby Ortegay Gasset: on the

one hand it asserts that life is constitutive insecurity;on the other, it launches the

imperativeViverepericolosamente,as if to do it or not to do it were a matterof choice.)But,second and most important,from the fact that there is the impossibilityof ultimate

closure andpresence,it does not follow that thereis an ethical imperativeto "cultivate"

thatopennessor even less to be necessarilycommittedto a democraticsociety. I think

that the latter can certainlybe defendedfrom a deconstructionistperspective,but that

defense cannotbe logicallyderivedfrom constitutiveopenness-something more has to

be addedto theargument.Preciselybecauseof theundecidabilityinherentin constitutive

openness, ethico-politicalmoves differentfrom or even opposite to a democracy"tocome"canbe made-for instance,since thereis ultimateundecidabilityand,as a result,no immanenttendencyof the structureto closure and full presence,closure has to be

artificially broughtabout from the outside. In thatway a case for totalitarianismcan be

presentedstartingfrom deconstructionistpremises. Ofcourse,the totalitarianargumentwould be as much a non sequituras the argumentfor democracy: eitherdirection is

equallypossible given the situationof structuralundecidability.We have so far presentedour argumentconcerningthe nonconnectionbetween

structuralundecidabilityandethicalinjunction,startingfrom the"ontological"side. But

if we move to the "normative"side, the conclusions are remarkablysimilar. Let us

suppose,for the sake of theargument,thatopennessto the heterogeneityof the other is

an ethicalinjunction.If one takesthispropositionatfacevalue,one is forcedto conclude

thatwe have toacceptthe otherasdifferentbecause she is different,whateverthecontent

of thatheterogeneitywould be. This does notsound much like an ethicalinjunctionbut

like ethical nihilism. And if theargumentis reformulatedby sayingthatopennessto the

otherdoes notnecessarilymeanpassiveacceptanceof her but ratheractiveengagementwhich includescriticizingher,attackingher,even killing her,thewhole argumentstarts

toseemrathervacuous: whatelse dopeopledoall the time withoutanyneed for an ethical

injunction?

Yet I think that deconstructionhas importantconsequences for both ethics andpolitics. These consequences,however,dependon deconstruction'sabilityto go down

to the bottom of its own radicalismand avoidbecomingentangledin all theproblemsof

a Levinasianethics (whose proclaimedaim,to presentethics asfirst philosophy,should

from the start look suspicious to any deconstructionist). I see the matter this way.

Undecidabilityshould be literallytakenas thatconditionfrom which no courseof action

necessarilyfollows. This means thatwe should not make it the necessarysource of anyconcretedecision in the ethical orpolitical sphere. In a first movementdeconstruction

extendsundecidability-that is, thatwhich makesthedecisionnecessary-to deeperand

largerareas of social relations. The role of deconstructionis, fromthis perspective,to

reactivate the moment of decision that underliesanysedimentedset of social relations.Thepoliticaland ethicalsignificanceof thisfirst movementis thatby enlargingthearea

of structuralundecidabilityit enlarges also the area of responsibility-that is, of the

decision. (In Derrideanterms: the requirementsof justice become morecomplex and

multifacetedvis-a-vis law.)But this first movementis immediatelybalancedby anotherone of theopposite sign,

whichis also essentialtodeconstruction.Tothinkof undecidabilityas a bottomlessabyssthatunderliesanyself-sufficient"presence"wouldstill maintaintoomuchof theimageryof the "ground."The duality undecidability/decisionis somethingthatbelongs to the




logic of any structuralarrangement. Degroundingis, in this sense, also partof an

operationof grounding,exceptthatgroundingis no longerto refersomethingback to a

foundationwhich would act as a principleof derivationbut, instead,to reinscribethat

somethingwithinthe terrainof the undecidables(iteration,re-mark,differance,etc.) that

make itsemergencepossible. So,

togo

back to ourproblem,

it is nolonger

aquestion

of

findinga groundfrom whichanethicalinjunctionshould be derived(even less to make

of undecidabilityitself such aground). We live as bricoleursina pluralworld,havingto

takedecisionswithinincompletesystemsofrules(incompletionheremeansundecidability),and some of these rules are ethical ones. It is because of this constitutiveincompletionthatdecisionshave to be taken,butbecause we are faced withincompletionand not with

totaldispossession,theproblemof a total ethicalgrounding-either throughtheopeningto theothernessof theother,orthroughanysimilarmetaphysicalprinciple-never arises.

"Thetime is outof joint,"but because of thatthere is never a beginning-or an end-of

time.Democracydoes notneed to be-and cannotbe-radically grounded.We can move

to a moredemocraticsociety only througha pluralityof acts of democratization.Theconsummationof time-as Derridaknows well-never arrives. Not even as aregulativeidea.

This leaves us, however,with a problem: how to conceive of emancipationwithin

this framework.Whatkindof collective reaggregationis opento us oncewe have moved

awayfromtheeschatologicaldimensionof the classicalemancipatorymodel? Thiswill

be my last discussion,and I will broach it by locatingDerrida'sinterventionwithinthe

traditionof critiqueand reformulationof Marxism.

TheQuestionof the Tradition

Derridaverycogently maintainsthat one thinksonly from withina traditionand shows

thatthisthinkingis possible only if one conceives one's relationwith thatpastas acritical

reception.Now, thereceptionof Marxismsince theturnof thecenturyhasturned,in my

view, aroundthe discussion of two capital and interrelatedissues: (1) how to make

compatible-if it can be done at all-the variouscontradictoryaspectsof Marx'sthought,as in Derrida'sversion,which relatesthe"ontological"andthe"phantasmatic";(2) how

to thinkformsof reaggregationof politicalwills andsocial demandsoncetheobviousness

of the identificationof theworkingclass with theemancipatoryagencystartedto dissolve.It is my contentionthatthe deconstructionistinterventionrepresentsa crucial turn in

connectionwith both issues. To show this, let us recapitulatethe broadlines of the main

classical attemptsat recastingMarxism.

1. A firsttendencyrepresentsthe accentuationof theontologicaldimension(in the

Derrideansense)of Marx'sthought.The absolutereconciliationof societywith itself will

arriveasaresultof theeliminationof all formsof distortedrepresentation.The latterwill

be theconsequenceof theproletarianrevolution. Thistendencycan be found inavulgarmaterialistversion(forexample,Plekhanov)orin anapparentlymore"superstructuralist"

one, centeredin the notionof "false consciousness"(as in Lukacs). There is here no

reaggregationof collective wills (therevolutionaryagentis theworkingclass), andhuman

emancipationis fixed in its contentsby a full-fledgedeschatology.2. The variousformsof "ethical"socialism, to be found in Bernstein and in some

currentsof Austro-Marxism.The commonfeatureof all these tendenciesis a returnto a

Kantiandualism. Heretheontologicaldimensionbecomes weaker: the"necessarylaws

of history"become moreerratic,theagentof emancipationbecomes morecontingentand

indeterminate,and the Endziel loses most of its eschatologicalprecision. However,the

determinacywhichhas been lost atthe level of anobjectivehistoryis retrievedat the level

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of an ethical regulativeidea. The moment of the political decision is as absentas in

Marxistorthodoxy.3. The Sorelian-Gramsciantradition. It is here that the phantasmaticdimension

finally takes theupperhand. The anchoringof social representationsin the ontologicalbedrockof an

objectivehistorystarts

dissolving.The

unityof the class

is,for

Sorel,a

mythicalunity. ForGramsci,the unityof a collective will results from the constitutive

role of an organic ideology. Historybecomes anopenandcontingentprocessthat does

not reflectany deeper underlyingreality. Two aspectsareimportantforus: (a) the link

betweenconcretematerialforces andthe functionthattheyfulfill in the classical Marxist

scheme becomes loose and indeterminate. "Collective will," "organic ideology,"

"hegemonicgroup,"andso forthbecomeemptyformsthatcan be filledbyanyimaginable

politicaland socialcontent. Theyarecertainlyanchoredin a dialecticsof emancipation,butas the latteris notnecessarilylinked to any particularcontentit becomessomethinglike an "existential"of historicallife and is no longerthe announcementof a concrete

event. Now, is this notsomethinglike a deconstructionof eschatologicalmessianism:theautonomizationof the messianic promise from the contents that it is attached to in

"actuallyexisting"messianisms?(b)Thedistinctionbetweenthe ethicalandthepoliticalis blurred.The momentof theethico-politicalis presentedas aunity. Thiscan,of course,be given a Hegelian interpretation,but my argumentis that what is really at stake in

Gramsci'sinterventionis a politicizationof ethics, insofaras the acts of institutionof the

social linkarecontingentacts of decision thatpresupposerelationsof power.This is what

gives an"ontological"primacytopoliticsand to "hegemony"as thelogic governingany

political intervention.

Ihavesaidenoughto makeit clear thatfor me it is only asanextensionand radicalization

of this last tendency that deconstructioncan present itself both as a moment of its

inscriptionin the Marxisttraditionas well as a pointof turning/deepening/supersessionof thelatter.Myoptimisticreadingof Specters ofMarxis thatitrepresentsastepforward

in the prosecutionof this task. The main stumblingblock that I still see for this to be

accomplished-at least as far asDerridais concerned-is that theambiguitypreviously

pointedout between undecidabilityas a terrain of radicalizationof the decision and

undecidabilityas the sourceof an ethical injunctionis still hoveringin Derrida'stexts.

Oncethisambiguityis superseded,however,deconstructioncanbecome one of the most

powerfultools at hand for thinkingstrategically.This rethinkingof politics in a deconstructive fashion can (if we startfrom the

Marxisttradition)producethreetypesof effect. Inthe firstplace,if we arethinkingin the

termsof the thirdtendencywithin Marxism,we can recast and extend its system of

categoriesfarbeyondthe intellectualtools to which Sorelor Gramscihad access. This

recastingintermsof thelogic of differancecanopentheway to muchmorerefinedforms

of strategicthinking.

Second, the logics of hegemonic reaggregationface, in the contemporaryworld,much more serious challenges than those that a Gramsciwas confronted with. Our

societies are far less homogeneous than those in which the Marxian models were

formulated,and the constitutionof the collective wills takesplace in terrainscrossedbyfar morecomplex relationsof power-as a result,interalia, of the developmentof the

mass media. The dissolutionof the metaphysicsof presenceis nota purelyintellectual

operation. It is profoundly inscribed in the whole experience of recent decades.

Deconstruction,as aresult,faces thechallengeof reinscribingtheMarxianmodelin this

complex experienceof present-daysociety.

Finally, operatingdeconstructivelywithin Marx's texts can help in a thirdvitally

importanttask: reinscribingMarxismitself and eachoneof its discursivecomponentsas

a partialmomentin the widerhistoryof emancipatorydiscourses. Derridais quite right




to combatthe currentamnesiaof the Marxisttradition. But let us not make theoppositemistakeand thinkthatthehistoryof Marxismoverlapswith thehistoryof emancipatory

projects. Manymoreghosts than those of Marxareactuallyvisiting andrevisitingus.

Benjamin'sangelshouldbecome a symbol constantlyremindingus of ourcomplexand

multilayeredtradition.I rememberthat

duringmychildhood,in

Argentina,in the cinemas

of continuousperformancetherewas anannouncementsaying,"Theperformancebeginswhenyou arrive."Well, I thinkthat"emancipation"is theopposite: it is aperformanceatwhichwe alwaysarrivelateand which forces us to guess, painfully,aboutitsmythicalor impossibleorigins. We have, however, to engage ourselves in this impossibletask,which is, amongotherthings,whatgives deconstructionits meaning.

WORKS CITED

Critchley,Simon. "On Derrida'sSpecters of Marx."Society for Phenomenologyand

ExistentialPhilosophy. Seattle, October 1994. Forthcomingin Philosophy andSocial Criticism.

Derrida,Jacques."ForceofLaw:The'MysticalFoundationofAuthority."Deconstruction

and thePossibility ofJustice.Ed. DrucillaCornellet al.New York:Routledge,1992.

. Spectersof Marx: The State of the Debt, the Workof Mourning,and the New

International.Trans.Peggy Kamuf. New York:Routledge,1994. [SM]Laclau,Ernesto.NewReflectionson the Revolutionof OurTime. London:Verso, 1990.

Laclau,Ernesto,and ChantalMouffe.HegemonyandSocialistStrategy.London:Verso,1985.

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