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Volume 25 Number TwoMay/July 1995

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Ins t i tu te was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Terri-tory in 1975. The main objects of the Inst i tute are:• To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the

maritime profession,• to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and

the maritime profession, and• to publish a journal .

The I n s t i t u t e is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the I n s t i t u t e w i l lstress that the authors express thei r own views and opinions are not necessarily those of theDepartment of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encouragediscussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of pro-fessional knowledge concerning naval and marit ime matters.

The membership of the Ins t i tu t e is open to:• Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN. RANR. RNZN

or RNZNVR and persons who having qual i f ied for regular membership, subsequentlyleave the service.

• Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qual i f ied to heRegular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the I n s t i t u t e .

• Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a dist in-guished con t r ibu t ion to the Navy or the mari t ime profession, or by past service to theinst i tute .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Inst i tute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporationslis ted below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the I n s t i t u t e by being mem-bers of the "Friends of the Aus t ra l i an Naval Inst i tu te" coterie.

Austral ian Defence IndustriesBlohm -i- VossCSC Aust ra l iaJeumont Schneider DivisionAtlas Elek t ron ik ( A u s t r a l i a )Ansett AustraliaScientific Management AssociatesDawson Group

Rockwell Systems AustraStani l i te ElectronicsGEC MarconiWestinghouse ElectricCelsiusTechThomson Sintra PacificTelecom

Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteVolume 21 Number 2 May/July 1995

SPECIAL FEATUREThis issue provides readers with full details of the international conferenceSEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY which will be held at the NovotelBrighton Beach in Sydney during 22-23 November. It focuses on the whysand wherefores of naval operations beyond 2000, and our Institute is a ma-jor sponsor....Support your Institute and come along for an enjoyable andinformative time.

Regulars2 From the President3 From the Editor24 Despatch From Canada38, 50 Letters to the editor60 Book Reviews with Mike

Fogarty

Cover I'liotoitrapli: Training a Seaman '.s Eye - evenin i/ic satellite at>e. a solid grounding in the basicshas hit> payoffs: professional pride, patience,discipline, an eve for detail and it produces anaffinity with past generations of sailors.

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FeaturesThe SEAPOL Tri Regional Conference

Grant HewisonOld Wine in New Bottles: MaritimeStrategy in the Asia Pacific

Sam Bali'iiuinShip handl ing Corner - Night Fright inFrederick Reef

D.H.D.SPower of the Press: The Impress Act of1793

Graham WilsonCounting the Cost: Is our naval ethosbeing corrupted by the 'bean counters'?

A Inn HingeShould UN Commitments become ForceStructure Determinants?

Rick LeahyNot What You Thought...Shedding newlight on the naval side of the AmericanCivil War

Geoffrey BewleyNavy Blue Anzacs: The RAN was first

in and last out at GallipoliGreg Swindeu

Lead Kindly Light: History. Organisationand Operations of the Corporationof Trinity House

Graham Wilson

Layout & typeset by (,)N1MIN1( , I I ( ) V S S t i r l ing ACTPhone 06 2SS 5WO

Journal of the Australian Naval Inatitiite May/July

FROM THE PRESIDENT

T he big e v e n t for the I n s t i t u t e in 1995 is the SEAP( )WER Conference to be held in Sydney on 22 and23 of November. This conference w i l l do much to

promote the key objectives of the ANI, and this issue of theJournal gives full details including a registration brochure.Our institute is a major sponsor of the conference and mem-bers of the Council have been heavi ly involved in assistingthe Maritime Studies Program with 'designing' and organis-ing the even t . All the ingredients for success are now in place:ou t s tand ing internat ional and Austral ian speakers; an impres-sive, well appointed venue and a theme of particular interestto our members. A I29r discount on the registration fee - as a v i n g D! VMI - has been nego t i a t ed In Counc i l for I n s t i t u t emembers, so. please take advantage of this arrangement toensure that a large contingent of ANI members is present. Ialso hope to see some of our New Zealand members make thetr ip across the Tasman and be there in force too. X

Another h i g h l i g h t lor the I n s t i t u t e was the RAN in World Wai-Two conference that took place in Sydney during May. At-tendance was good and the presentations were excellent. Co-inciding wi th the conference was the delivery of the 1995 VernonParker Oration at HMAS WATSON by visiting international speaker, Eric Grove. Again, t h i s was thoroughlyen jovcd In members and their guests.

Most members wil l agree that 1995 has proceeded at a 'great rate of knots' and the pace shows no sign ofup. Personally, as many of you are aware, one of the many challenges I have experienced this year was a jobchange and a move to Sydney from Canberra to become the Maritime Commander. Now t h a t I am located inSydney I have been ably represented at monthly Council meetings by Vice President Terry Morgan, and Iextend my thanks for a job well done.

I feel arrangements for a Canberra based President need to be made. The Council is in the process of making thenecessary arrangements for succession, and members will be advised of my successor in the nex t issue. I h a v eenjoyed the best part of two years as President of the Australian Naval Ins t i tu te and I t hank members of the 1995Council for their support . Many of this years Council members served in 1994 and the team has worked well -our object ives have been furthered and the Ins t i tu te continues to prosper and grow. The Australian Naval Ins t i -tute is now supporting more conferences and the standard of the journal has improved substantially. From thefinancial point of view, we are on a very sound footing and this gives every indication of continued growth.Membership is also on the rise, al though attracting younger members wil l continue to be a priority objective forCouncil.

I look forward to seeing you at the SEA POWER Conference in November. The Insti tute and its new Presidentwi l l take a high profile there and th i s is entirely appropriate in our 20th Anniversary Year.

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of J A N I has it a l l ! Current marit ime issues and developments, modern naval strategy, rarely lookedat 'corners' of maritime history and even a hair raising trip through Frederick Reef in the Coral Sea for theseaman t\pes among us!

"Humil ia t ion Rounds' , our new column, includes some hard h i t t i n g comment on keeping up fitness standards in the

May/My IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

RAN, the fatal effects of political incorrectness on career prospects in the modern military and the insidious prolif-eration of 'defensive staff work'. Following l luminat ion Rounds, Grant Hewison, Fellow with the Centre for Stra-tegic Studies in New Zealand, gives an update on current issues in ocean law, policy and regional managementaddressed at the SEAPOLTri-Regional Conference.

In this issue it is my privilege to publish material from three'discoveries' who have already made a big impact on JANI'sreadership - Mike Fogarty. Graham Wilson and GeoffreyBewley. Many remember Mike Fogarty's outstanding articleon ship v is i t s to Vietnam in the Feb/Apr 94 issue - which Iconsider the outstanding JANI article of 1994 - and have en-joyed his regular contributions in the 'Book Review' depart-ment. In this issue he reviews two works. Graham Wilson isanother outstanding writer whose research skills and writingqualit ies shine. He has been invited to make two contributionsin this issue: the first being on 'Press Gang's" and the second onthe fascinating story of the history, organisation and operationsof the corporation of Trinity House. We also have a refreshingcomnientan, on the na \a l side of the American C i v i l War bvGeoffrey Bewley who impressed us all in the last issue with hispiece called 'Ramming Speed'. In an age where elegance inwrit ing and disciplined analysis is sadly on the wane, these threeauthors set the standard and JANI is fortunate to have them on'the books'.

Another excellent writer and regular contributor is Greg Swindenwho, in this issue, tells the story of the RAN's little known but significant role during the ( i a l l i po l i Campaign.However, lest readers think JANI is going too far down the historical track. Commodore Sam Bateman RANEMkeeps us on the straight and narrow with some modern maritime strategy. Rick Leahy then considers the topicalissue of whether UN commitments should be Australian force structure determinants. Yours truly then weighs theargument of whether civilianisation and commercialisation are k i l l i ng the Navy.

Commander Peter Jones gives us another welcome update on the Canadian Defence White Paper and he correctlypoints out the advantages at looking at the Canadian Defence experience, which in many ways parallels and fre-quently precedes our own. Working closely with our Canadian cousins can save us time and money. Also, fromCanada is a letter from Lieutenant Commander J. R Stocker BA RN who is currently on course at the CanadianForces Maritime Warfare Centre. He gives valuable feedback on LCDR Scott's article on Maritime Strategy and theLaw of the Sea (JANI Vol 20 No 4).

The President has highlighted SEA POWER IN THE NEXT CENTURY as the premier event for the Institute in its2()th Anniversary Year. There's no doubt that the Novotel Brighton Beach in Sulney w i l l he THE place to be during22-23 November, so get your priorities right ... ignore your boss, contracts, anniversaries, your job and interferingfamily members. Come along because you deserve it! I certainly plan to be there - but don't let that deter you - andother Council members both past and present are coming in force. It will be a time forgetting insight into key criteriafor. and constraints on. the conduct of naval operations post 2000. For those in industry th i s is a rare oppor lumiv loget a solid insight into what navies in the Asia Pacific need to do and what they need to buy in the first decades of theTwenty First Century. Ten 'hired guns' from overseas - internationally recognised experts in maritime strategy andtechnology - are being flown in to ensure that you are g i v e n representative, up to date assessments anil developmentsfrom the region.

Council is making every effort to support the Maritime Studies Program to ensure that this event is conducted in thefinest traditions of the SEA POWER conferences which the ANI has been associated with in the past. However, bewarned: bookings are coming in thick and fast, so don't be disappointed: send o i l v o u r regis t ra t ion form mid bookyour accommodation TODAY.

RegardsA/tin Hin^e

Journal of the Australian Niivul Institute Mu\/.lnl\

ILLUMINATION ROUNDSWITH"ODDBALL"

FITNESS TESTING AND THE RAN

Whatever happened to fitness testing in the Navy? Afew weeks ago I was speaking to a young midship-man who has just graduated from ADFA who waste l l ing me that at ADFA you must pass your fitnesstest, otherwise you don't graduate. Sounds good I re-marked, hut now he is disenchanted seeing all the'porkers' wandering around in rig, knowing that theirfitness will never be tested by the Navy.

Ho\\ did a l i g h t i n g service get itself into such a s i tu-at ion. ' Obviously the weight surveillance program isnot working. The evidence is throughout all NavyCommands, and let 's not disguise this fact - there aremain mid-seniority officers and sailors that are not'undertall for their weight' - they are FAT!

Just spending a few moments to pen this letterprompted me to think of just three benefits that wouldresult from the Navy introducing a fitness test. Theseare:1 . Reduced Medical Costs: Better fitness would re-

sult in reduced costs in treating our people for coldsand other minor ai lments . It may even reduce thethreat of heart disease and other serious illnesses.Perhaps a I K m - o n effect of a healthier lifestylewould prompt Navy personnel to avoid smokingand other drug use. I realise that these benefitswould be hard to q u a n t i f y wi thout the medicalsystem pu t t i ng together an all-encompassing da-tabase, but once this was done we could even com-pare the (presumably) increasing costs associatedwi th sports injuries with the (almost certainly)decreasing costs associated with other ailments.

2. Increased Productivity: As well as reducing theamount ot t ime personnel spend away from theirworkplace on sick leave, I know that I have readin many places that a general leve l of f i tness in-creases our capacity to th ink and work. A healthybody keeps a hea l thy mind .

v P u b l i c Image: In th i s environment of decliningbudgets, our public image is very important. Howhad does it look on a freedom of entry march tosee a mob of portly chaps, buttons and collars bulg-ing, waddling down the street? If we are seriousabout being a combat force, then we must alsolook the part.

The Maritime Commander monitors ships' readinessstales with various measures. By extending th i s con-cept a l i t t l e fu r the r , the Mari t ime Commander andShips' COs could monitor their crew's fitness as an-other measure of a ship 's progression on the road(channel?) to OLOC. Fitness isn't everything, but noone could argue that a reasonable level of individualstrength, flexibility and aerobic fitness is not going toimprove the combat capacity of each sailor or officer.If an individual can't pass the fitness test, he/she is

not maintaining that level of capability that means theyare ready to be sent in harm's way. If a ship fails itsworkup. it is given extra training and assessed again.That policy should be extended to each member ofthe ship's company. If they are not up to scratch physi-cally, then they should not be at sea.

How do we implement such a policy'. 'An\ fitness testmust assess strength, flexibility and aerobic condi-tion. We do not need to return to the dark ages andinsist on heaves and a 3 km run. Some people simplycannot do heaves and others cannot run. This doesn'tnecessarily mean they aren't fit. For instance Deeksmay not be able to l i f t his body weight, likewise ArnieSchwarzenegger would struggle runn ing 3km in 12minutes. No one could say they aren't f i t . We haveplenty of talented PTIs who could put together a lesithat assesses each of these three areas by a selectionof exercises. For example you could run 3km. swim1km. or ride 10km in a certain time.

We can't expect our people to keep fit in t h e i r owntime. If it is a Service requirement to be t i t . we mustprovide the time. The Army do i t . win can ' t we? Itonly requires three hours a week.

As one final thought, how's this for an incentive toget t i t and stay fit? If an individual fails a fitness test,he or she is deemed as not m i l i t a r i l y ready for servicein any area that the Navy may assign them to. By notbeing 'fit for sea' they narrow the Navy's options forpostings, and reduce the Navy's flexibility to meetdifferent contingencies. If they are physicalh u n f i tfor sea - they are no more ready for combat or othermil i ta ry duty than a public servant or defence con-tractor - stop their Service Allowance!

"Jane Fonda'

FORMULATING AN RAN FITNESS'STANDARD': TESTING TIMES

Let me begin by asking a fundamental question. Whatis the Royal Australian Navy's principal reason d'etre?Simply put. it is to fight and win at sea. How do weachieve this objective? By put t ing to sea ships which ,as a result of the symbiotic relationship between w e l lt r a i n e d personnel and effecliu1 and r e l i a b l e m i l i t a r )technology, are superior to those of our enemy. Themost important element of this symbiosis is. unargu-ably, personnel. Wi thou t a core of well trained per-sonnel who are fit to undertake sea service, fleet unitsbecome little more than doekside adornments.

In order to access these well trained, 'sea-ti t ' person-nel, the RAN must recruit, retain and regularly moni-tor its members. The first two of these functions arenot the principal concern of this paper, although the

Mav/Julr 1W5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

conclusions reached w i l l have implications for them.It is the contention of this piece that the RAN mustconduct regular health and fitness checks on its per-sonnel.. Such testing will ensure that a quorum of 'sea-fit' members is maintained.

The issue of test ing to achieve a common RAN fit-ness standard has long been mooted but never effec-tively enacted. It would, however, appear that the is-sue has once again raised its (oft perceived ugly) head,g i v e n i n i t i a l impetus by last years Townsend reportt i t led 'Operational Fitness Standard'. Latest develop-ments in dealing with this issue would indicate thatthe RAN has at least recognised that a Naval FitnessPolicy (NFP) is required. This policy wil l be broadlyaligned to work currently under way in SGADF ondeveloping a common ADF fitness standard.

If the current (acknowledged embryonic) principlesforwarded to form the basis of the NFP are accepted.the policy w i l l be inherently contradictory and largelypointless. It is envisaged that a Naval Physical Fit-ness Standard (NPFS) should be set (based on ageand gender) by conducting tests of muscular strengthand endurance, f lex ib i l i ty and aerobic fitness. Test-ing should be conducted in a cost effective way.using commonly available equipment. Where this ini-tially sound ideal loses all credibility, is in the notionthat testing should be conducted on a voluntary basiswith members encouraged to take the test at least an-nually and particularly when posted to a sea billet. Toargue that voluntary testing will establish a standardis to completely misinterpret the defini t ion of stand-ard. The Collins Dictionary defines a standard as "...an accepted or approved example of something againstwhich others are judged or measured". To this end,the NFP can establish the accepted example of theNPFS (expressed in terms of a 3.2km run, X pushups.Y s i tups . e tc) : but a voluntary format can neverenforce the measurement of personnel against thisexample and hence never establish a true Standard.

What is the basis of the standard? While intricaciesof detail are beyond the scope of this piece, argumentsfor the type of standard required can be expounded. Itis my contention that a single NPFS be applied to allNaval personnel. All members, whether ashore orafloat, should be at a level of fitness which w i l lenable them to serve, at short notice, at sea. It is im-plausible to give a member time to 'work up' to anoperational level of fitness. As such, 'basic' and 'op-erational' fitness should be a single entity.

Who should be tested? If a true Standard is to be es-tablished, all members should be subject to the rig-ours of a regular (preferably annual) fitness test. Iftesting is voluntary then we do not have a capital VStandard: we have an. essentially useless, little 'g'guideline.

What consequences wi l l this testing have for indi-v idua l members and the RAN as a corporate ent i ty?In its i n i t i a l stages of implementation, members mustbe given a grace period in which they wil l have time(six months, but preferably twelve) to 'work up' to

the required fitness standard. At the end of this 'graceperiod', all members should he able to achieve themin imum NPFS for their age and gender. Failure toachieve this standard will result in administrative cen-sure and impact on career progression and retentionprospects.

Emotive counter arguments and disagreement wi th th isproposal wi l l abound. Members who, due to seniorityor any other multitude of reasons (excepting medicalgrounds), will have only a slim (or no) prospect ofreturning to sea. wi l l undoubtedly argue that the NPFSshould not be applied to them. To my mind, t h i s be-comes a matter of leadership rather than posting pros-pects.

Implementation of the NPFS and the censure of indi-viduals who fail to meet its requirements w i l l alsohave considerable consequences for the Navy as acorporate entity. These consequences wil l be mani-fest in both time and resources: 'work hours' t ra in ingtime for individuals, personnel wastage, etc. Indeed,it would seem to be these costs which are foremost inthe mind of policy makers and their adoption of avoluntary fitness 'standard'. It is my contention, how-ever, that these costs will be short term in nature, andthe ini t ia l outlay will see a far greater return in termsof a Navy which, because of its access to well trained,sea-fit personnel w i l l have a h igher state of opera-tional readiness. In addition, yet more intangible andeclectic, the Navy wi l l benefit from having memberswho enjoy a healthier lifestyle.

The proposals forwarded in this piece do not consti-tute an unreasonable ask: for members to reach a levelof fitness which will allow them to serve at sea atshort notice. This level of fitness should be monitoredand maintained by a compulsory Standard. In the fi-nal examination, what we must ask ourselves is t h i s :Do we really want an RAN fitness Standard or merelyanother lip serving DI (N) that will be a sibling to theRAN Weight Management Program; serving no realpurpose but at least to which we can point and say"Yes, we've got a (fitness) policy"?

G. A. Cox

LEUT RAN

ANOTHER 'CHICKEN ANDSTORY.

Firstly, may I congratulate you on (yet another) ex-cellent issue. I always enjoy reading my copy of .1 ANI .and from my first quick glace I 'm sure this issue (Feb-ruary/April 1995) w i l l be no exception.

However, there had to be a another reason I'm w r i t -ing. and there is. Your "centrefold" Ships Sail for theTo/> End (pages 28/29) l i s t s the ships leavingSydney in order as HMA Ships Hobart, Canberra,Svdnev, Newcastle and Success. Now, I was never verygood on pennant numbers, but (in order) .W is Ho-

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

bun, 03 is Sydney (not Canberra), and I ' l l wager thenext ship that is sporting an illegible black paintednumber well down the hul l and a radar array that lookssuspiciously like that of a Leander class frigate isn't'HMAS' anything. Like the chicken and the egg. whatcame first, the caption or the photograph??

Lieutenant Commander A. S. Brown RANK

Ed — Congratulations LCDR Brown!

You are our inaugural prizewinner in the "Pick the In-tentional Error" competition which will be run in eachissue of JANI. Your $15 prize will be forwarded in duecourse...

•DEFENSIVE' STAFFWORK

by 'Oddball'

On 30 March. 1995 an intriguing interview appeared inthe Australian with the CEO of Asea Brown Boveri - amultinational corporation wi th annual revenue exceed-ing S35 billion dollars. The CEO. Percy Barnevik wasquoted as saying:

"I try to tell my people, to encourage them to speedup decisions, that they have a right to be 30'/f wrong.They should not be afraid to stick out their neck ...There is sometimes the attitude within companiesthat if you do not make a bad mistake, you are safe.But I don't hesitate to remove a person who hasmissed opportunities. He need not have done any-thing wrong but, if he has missed opportunities, thatis bad."

I pondered this interview for a while, considering howdistant this attitude was to that in the Navy. I glanced atsome recent correspondence from the 'Head Shed' anda proposal I was in the process of staffing within myown organisation, and threw up my hands in despair.

I am convinced that the Navy, and indeed the Servicesand the the Public Service in general are obsessed withthe minutae of minutes, discussion papers and draft pro-posals to the extent that the key issues are often ob-

scured by a senior officer's insistence on the correctpost-nominals, seniority order or the use of the ' inof-fensive' passive voice. Often, I am sure, we cannot seethe wood for the trees. Our current system seems toencourage incredible duplicat ion and waste, and to spon-sor the success of the bureaucrat over the innovator orthe achiever. The emphasis is on not getting anyth ingwrong: it should be on gett ing something right.

Now before I am felled by the traditional criticism thatthe Navy is not a business, let me say that we do needgood staff work. JSP 102 is a reasonable guide to theconventions of Service Writing. It is not however, a bi-ble. By striving to ensure every piece of correspond-ence is 100% correct - dotting each T. crossing every'( ' - we tend to miss more impor t an t issues. F v e r voffficer. I am sure, has an apocryphal tale to relate ofnumerous drafts being returned for minor alterations.In this sense, the introduction of wordprocessing tech-nology has not reduced staffwork - it has increased it.

To describe this characteristic. 1 have coined the ex-pression 'Defensive Staffwork' to emphasise the dif-ference between a slavish adherance to doctrine com-pared to a more creative and productive focus on is-sues. We need only to remind ourselves of the princi-ples of war to consider what approach we should adopt.Yes. attention to detail is important, but not at (he ex-pense of missed opportunities.

1 am reminded of Norman F. Dixon's s tudv On the Psy-chology of Military Incompetence. He identified (h i s'defensive staffwork' - although he failed to name it assuch - as a t e l l i n g symptom of mili tary incompetence.To Dixon, this sort of person is "uncreativc. unimagi-nat ive, narrow-minded, security-seeking, prestige-ori-ented, parochial and anti-intellectual." How main ofour peers and superiors do v\ e see about us focusing onorderliness, cleanliness and p u n c l u a l i t v as the d e f i n i -tion of efficiency? It seems that too many of our numberare cautious to the point of indecisiveness. To (hem it isa case of 'it is better to make no decision than the wrongone'. I guess it is a fear of failure that subconsciouslydrives these bureaucrats, and a desire for success thatdr ives the achievers - w h i c h are vou?

CONTROVERSY CORNERFrom the Canberra Times on 21 May 1995 comes this Asso-ciated Press story headlined "Politically Incorrect View Endsa Career."

A United States Navy board voted unanimously yesterday torecommend an honourable discharge tor a helicopter pilotwhose religious beliefs keep him troni leading women intocombat. The recommendation by the three navy captains todismiss Lieutenant Commander Kenneth A. Carkhuff, basedwith an anti submarine u n i t at Mayport Naval Station, nowgoes (o the Secretary of the US Navy, John Dalton. The navyveteran and graduate of the US Naval Academy was accusedof failure to support and carry out Pentagon policy. "I thinkthe Bible clearly teaches that we should not subject womento violence. "Commander Carkhuff. 35, who attends an Epis-copal church, said. "I t h ink combat is probably the most ex-treme violence one can undergo in society."

If Mr Dalton approves the board's recommendation. Com-mander Carkhuff can appeal to the federal court, his lawyer.Stephen Gallagher, said.

"I am confident of my abilities as a naval officer." CommanderCarkhuff said after the ruling.

Commander CarkhutFs squadron leader. Commander Doug-las Beeks. testified that in August Commander Carkhuff hadtold him that after months of consideration and prayer, he haddecided he opposed the policy allowing women in combat.

At the t ime. Commander Carkhul f ' s helicopter detachment,which had two women pilots, was preparing for possible as-signment in the Haiti military operation.

Commander Beeks and his successor. Captain Michael Ortinisaiil they never considered le t t ing Commander Curkhuff leadthe detachment after his views were known because theyfeared he might put himself or others in danger to protect thewomen.

Commander Carkhuff testified that he had been misunder-stood and that he would have taken the detachment if he hadbeen ordered to do so.

He submitted a letter of resignation in September, hut with-drew it later and said he would fisiht to stav in the nav v.

Ma\/.lul\ IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

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THE SEAPOL TRI-REGIONALCONFERENCECURRENT ISSUES IN OCEAN LAW, POLICY AND MANAGEMENT: SOUTH-EAST ASIA, NORTH PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

hv Grant Hewison

One hundred and f i f t y seven participants from22 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, ine lud ing the Minis ter of Foreign Affairs of

Cambodia, attended the SHAPOL Tri-regional Con-ference on current issues in ocean law. policy and man-agement in South-east Asia, the North Pacific andSouth-west Asia, held in Bangkok. Grant Hewison,fellow wi th the Centre for Strategic Studies partici-pated as the only New Zealander, delivering a paperon the precautionary principle/approach, another onbehalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,and acted as a commentator and participant in anumber of other sessions.

Al though the Conference covered a wide range of is-sues, of particular focus were maritime security con-cerns in the South China Sea, fishery managementproblems, the transportation and disposal of nuclearand other ha/ardous wastes, trends in coastal zonemanagement , mar i t ime boundary claims, offshorehydrocarbon development and trade/environment con-flicts. In addit ion, an oceanographic forum, witharound 20 s c i e n t i s t s p a r t i c i p a t i n g , considered aspectsof marine scientific study in the region.

The South-East Asian Program in Ocean Law, Policyand Management (SEAPOL), one of the first regionalassociations of its kind, began in the early 1980'sjustbefore the conclusion of the Third United NationsConference on the Law of the Sea. SEAPOL func-tions as a non-governmental network of scholars, gov-ernment officials, members of the private sector andother individuals with an interest in ocean affairs inthe South-east .Asian region. It acts as a n e t w o r k andconfidence b u i l d i n g forum for associates in South-east Asia to meet and exchange information and viewson current national and regional problems in oceanlaw, policy and management. SEAPOL has hosted anumber of conferences, workshops and training ses-sions, as well as supporting research and study bothat the national and regional levels for the past decade.

The SHAPOL tri-regional conference examined anumber of issues concerning ocean policy and lawover three days. The first day was devoted to a key-note speech given by Professor Edward Miles of theUniversity of Washington and two parallel panel ses-sions. Professor Miles considered the transformations

in governing regimes, patterns of state practice, thedevelopment of national capacity, as well as the policyf o r m u l a t i o n , implementa t ion and compliance that wi l lbe necessary to bring about sustainable development.He concluded that while the diplomatic arena had beensuccessful in creating and transforming regimes, aswell as in conflict resolution and consciousness-rais-ing, it had not been as successful in implement inginternational regimes or at terminating practices con-sidered harmful. Professor Miles also offered somesuggestions for how these compliance/implementa-tion problems might be overcome, such as the use ofinternational reporting mechanisms combined withindependent reviews. Not only could his observationsbe usefully applied in the area of sustainable devel-opment, but also in other areas such as regime build-ing for security purposes.

Two parallel panel sessions were also held on the firstday. One examined security issues in the South ChinaSea and the other, the precautionary p r i nc ip l e / ap -proach in ocean management.

Security issues in the South China Sea centre aroundoverlapping claims being made to the Spratly Islandsby Brunei. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwanand Vie tnam. The recent discovery of oil depositsaround the islands and relatively rich fishing groundshas intensif ied these c la ims . In add i t ion , the i s l andsstraddle important navigation routes in the SouthChina Sea. Dr. Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia regards theSpratly Islands claims as the "most potentially explo-sive conflict in the region at this time." The potentialfor conflicts exists at several levels. The first is a po-tential bilateral conflict between the claimants and inparticular between China and Vietnam. At anotherlevel, there is potential for conflict between membersof ASEAN and Vietnam as well as between membersof ASEAN and China or Taiwan. Finally, there is alsothe potential for conflict between members of ASEANitself. A question has arisen about whether the SpratlyIslands issues could be resolved through bilateralrather than regional negotiations. However, concernsexist about the role of China and the pairing off be-tween China and other individual claimants if solu-tions were sought through bilateral agreements. Itseems a regional solution is at present the one in mostfavour. I)r B A. Ham/ah of the Malavsian In s t i t u t e of

M(i\/.lul\ IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Maritime Affairs has also argued that the need forconfidence b u i l d i n g measures is very real at this stage,part icularly before the expected wealth from oile x p l o i t a t i o n fur ther complicates matters. The sixclaimants have already participated in a number ofconfidence-building workshops that have exploredn o n - s o v e r e i g n t y issues , such as nav iga t i on ,biodiversity, scientific research and resources. Anapproach s imi l a r to that negotiated between Malaccaand Singapore over the Straits of Malacca, where strictsovereign rights over the straits were put aside in fa-vour of dealing with the immediate problems of pol-lution and navigation, has been seen as a useful modelto emulate. While ways of resolving the issues arenot immediately foreseeable, topping the list is a jointdevelopment /.one or/one of co-operation in the SouthChina Sea between all claimants.

Wi l l i am Burke of the University of Washington in-troduced the panel examining the precautionary prin-ciple/approach, by focusing on application of precau-tion in the United Nations Conference on High SeasFisheries Management. It was wi th in this conference,argued Professor Burke, that the precautionary prin-ciple/approach has received most detailed attentionto date . He was particularly supportive of the FACT sinterpretation of the precautionary approach and re-jection of the United Nations application of precau-tion in the resolutions on drif tnet f ishing .

The FAO paper submitted to the U N. Conference dis-tinguished between the precautionary principle andthe precautionary approach, favouring the latter as amore moderate position. The precautionary approachtook into account the diversity of ecology as well associo-economic circumstances, whereas the former,argued Professor Burke, was fraught with "slack us-age leading to extreme interpretations regardless ofeconomic or social costs. Professor Burke's mainobjection to the resolutions on drif tnet f i sh ing werethat the moratorium did not provide the means of ob-taining information so that it might in future be lifted.Indeed, both Professor's Burke and Miles have ar-gued strongly that the decisions of the United Nationson driftnet f ishing were wrong and that the morato-rium should be lifted.

On the second and th i rd days, the conference brokeup into three parallel panel sessions. The first con-sisted of an oceanographic forum attended mainly bysc ien t i s t s from w i t h i n and outside the Asia/Pacificregion. The second panel examined current law of thesea issues and development, while the third exam-ined integrated coastal management and fishery man-agement, as well as sustainable ocean and coastal de-velopment.

The oceanographic forum began by examining re-gional and local c i rcula t ion patterns in the Asia/Pa-cific region and their relationship to forcing functions

and continued with a discussion of marine environ-mental and biological issues. The panel was alsocharged with establishing a research framework forthe region. The panel began this work by reviewingexisting international co-operative oceanographic re-search programs in South-east Asia and the Pacific.and then went on to discuss and draft a frameworkfor the next stage of oceanographic research for theregion. Participants agreed that while there was a con-siderable amount of scientific work being undertakenin the region, there was a need for greater integrationand co-operation. It was suggested that joint studiesof the Gulf of Thailand would be a useful place tobegin, with possibilities for future collaborative workin the South China Sea.

The second panel discussed current law of the sea is-sues and development. This discussion included anexamina t ion of the consequences ot non-acceptanceof the revised Convention on the Law of the Sea. post-Rio perspectives on sovereign rights and environmen-tal responsibilities in the exclusive economic /one.transportation and disposal of nuclear and other ha/-ardous wastes, prospects for the settlement of law ofthe sea disputes, environmental and trade policy im-pacts on f ishing and shipping industries, and ap-proaches to co-operation in offshore hydrocarbon de-velopment.

Of particular note were the sessions concerning trans-portation and disposal of nuclear and other ha/ardouswastes, and environmental and trade policy impacts.Dr. T Mensah of the Law of the Sea Ins t i t u t e pro-vided an overview of the international ins t rumentsconcerned with the transport and disposal of nuclearand other hazardous wastes. Of most concern, in hisview, were the problems of state responsibility, liabil-ity and enforcement. He suggested following the ap-proach that was being taken in the Draft Conventionon Liabil i ty and Compensation for Damage in Con-nection with the Carriage of Ha/ardous and NoxiousSubstances at Sea, where the emphasis was on theresponsibility of the carrier and owner of the cargoand where provision was being made for compulsoryinsurance. Professor R. Beckman recommended thatthe states in South-east Asia act on a regional basis.reviewing the various conventions and determiningwhether it would be in their interests to ratify them,ami \\ he ther thei r pa r t i cu la r interests were being rep-resented adequately at the internat ional level . Herethe panel were divided over the conclusions ot a re-cent paper by Professor Jon Van Dyke of the Univer-si ty of Hawaii that the transport of nuclear wastesthrough the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean werecontrary to in ternat ional law. The Japanese commen-tator. Ka/uomi Ouchi. as well as other commentatorsdisagreed with Jon Van Dyke's conclusions, w h i l ecommentators from those coastal states most affectedby the transport of wastes tended to affirm his views.

10 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/My

This issue remains controversial and important withinI ho S I . A I ' O I . context and is aKo becoming a s i g n i f i -cant ocean policy issue for Australia and New Zea-land. The Panel suggested that those international or-ganisations concerned with the transport of nuclearwaste needed to consider the rights of coastal statesover the transport of nuclear wastes and whether theserights should he strengthened.

Controversy overtrade and environmental issues alsoappears to be of increasing importance in the region.The panel focused on d r i f t n e t f i shing as an exampleof a trade/environment confl ict . Here the threateneduse of trade sanctions by the United States to achievean Internationa] environmental outcome came undersome scrutiny. The involvement of the United NationsGeneral Assembly in the case of driftnet f ishing againcame under criticism from a number of commenta-tors, i n c l u d i n g Professor Miles. Indeed, increasingpressure from several leading experts from the Uni-versity of Washington for l i f t i n g the moratorium ondr i f tne t fishing should be taken seriously by thoseconcerned wi th mainta ining the moratorium.

The third panel undertook a tri-regional review ofcurrent trends in coastal management and fishery man-agement, and sustainable ocean and coastal develop-ment. This included a review of the impact of mineralextraction and tour ism, on coastal waters, as well ashigh seas and enclave fishery management problems.

Commentators in this panel noted that many Asiannations are facing incredible pressures on their coastalenvironment, wi th expectations that this wi l l increasein future. Massive urban migration and its associatedinfrastructure overload, industry-based sources of ma-rine p o l l u t i o n , tourism, as well as inadequate plan-ning and management have created serious problemsfor almost all Asian nations. While it is clear that NewZealand and Asia differ significantly in terms of thek i n d s t i l pressure on t h e i r respective coastal e n v i r o n -ments, from the discussion taking place in this panel,there s t i l l appears to be opportunities for Asian coun-tries to benefit from New Zealand's experience in in-t eg ra t ed coastal resource management . Indeed, manyAsian nations are at present undertaking considerableinvestment in developing more adequate infrastruc-ture. There appears to be important opportunities for

co-operative ventures between New Zealand anil thesenations.

On another issue, this panel also concluded that highseas fisheries managers worldwide appear to be fac-ing a general failure of their programs. There are in-creasing numbers of stock collapses, too many fish-ers chasing too few fish, overcapitalisation of the fish-ing industry, disputes concerning jur isdic t ion andfailed inst i tut ional mechanisms. In some instances thishas led to conflict , a l though there are hopes that thepresent United Nat ions Conference on S t r a d d l i n gStocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks wi l l alleviatemany of these problems. Although much of the dis-cussion remained at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l eve l , Mr.Plodprasop Suraswadi of the Thai Minis t ry of Fisher-ies provided a very forthright nat ional and regionalperspective. Overlapping j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c laims be-tween countries wi th in the region, for instance, wereleading to arrests of fishing vessels, although of equalconcern were renegade Thai fishers who were ignor-ing new restrictions. Thai officials were facing severediff icul t ies in control l ing the extensive Thai f i s h i n gfleet, with the government on occasion distancing it-self from responsibility for illegal f i shing activities.This policy was itself causing Thailand diplomatic dif-ficulties, in particular between its Asian neighbours,but also with countries further afield.

Opportunities also arose during the final session ofthe conference for reports on other conferences heldin 1994 and forthcoming conferences in 1995. Of noteis the Law of the Sea Institute's 27th Annual Confer-ence, focusing on marine pollution problems in Asiaand the Pacific, to be held in Indonesia.

Through SEAPOL, there appear to be a number ofopportuni t ies for New Zealand academics, govern-ment officials and members of the private sector toparticipate in or in i t i a te projects in their region. Forexample, there appear to be significant opportunitiesfor New Zealand to participate in developments infisheries management, coastal zone management, aswell as in mediation or confidence bui lding in the areaof maritime security. As the South east Asian regiontakes on increasing importance for New Zealand intrade terms, it has also become essential that NewZealand participate actively in other regional activi-ties, such as those organised through SEAPOL.

May/My Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Old Wine In New Bottles?MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

by

Commodore Sam Bateman AM RANEM

A dmiral Richard H i l l of the United Kingdomintroduced the expression medium maritimepower to describe a country which has the

capabili ty to exercise some autonomy in its use of thesea. I n this context, 'medium-ness' implies a certainlevel of development and size (economy, population,geographical area, mil i tary strength, e tc) , as well asthe state's perception of itself. 'Maritime-ness' is basedon the state's dependence on the sea and th is is anamalgam of factors such as mari t ime t rad i t ion , sizeof navy and merchant fleet, dependence on seabornetrade, si/.e of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). valueof offshore resources, and the capabilities of the do-mestic shipbuilding industry.

Using this terminology, there is an increasing numberof medium maritime powers in The Asia Pacific. In-donesia, Malaysia, Thailand. South Korea, Taiwan andAustralia have some claim to fall w i t h i n the categoryeach with extensive maritime interests, a significantdependence on the sea, both strategically and eco-nomically, and capable maritime forces. Japan, Chinaand India are perhaps 'out of the bracket" and worthyof being termed major mar i t ime powers .

The Asia Pacific is a region where there has been no'peace d iv idend ' and maritime capabilities, in particu-lar, figure prominently in regional defence budgets.Some n a v i e s , which previously had on ly l imitedCoastguard-type functions, are bu i ld ing up enhancedoffshore capabilities - not only highly capable sur-face combatants and submarines but also significantnumbers of aircraft for both mar i t ime strike and sur-veillance. The regional sea control capability is grow-ing markedly and there has been, what one commen-tator has referred to as. 'the re-emergence of the im-portance of seapower' in the region. There is 'old winein new bottles' here as the new navies of The AsiaPacific lift their strategic horizons and seek inspira-tion from the writings of the classical maritime strat-egists. It could well be said that Mahan is alive andwell hut living in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei. Bei j ing. NewDelhi. Bangkok and Jakarta!

SECURITY IN THE REGION

At a conference in 1993. the Australian strategic ana-lyst. Professor Paul Dibb. presented a paper whichattracted considerable attention in the media due tohis somewhat pessimistic view of the security out-

look for the The Asia Pacific region. He identif ied'very worrying mi l i t a ry trends and developments ' andsaw prospects in the longer-term shift in the balanceof power in Asia, which may not be favourable toAustralia or other middle powers in the region' . Pri-marily Dibb was referring to China which has mark-edly increased military spending in recent years andcontinues to display potential for a des tab i l i s ing rolein The Asia Pacific. China will undergo a major po-litical and economic transition which wi l l affect re-gional security, and probably even global security.China has the potent ia l to emerge in the fu tu re as amajor hegemonic power with a significant strategicnuclear arsenal and powerful projection forces. Inspecific naval terms, and as a Chinese author recentlynoted. "Now it is no longer a question whether Chinawi l l have a carrier, but what will be its characteristicsand when wi l l it enter service.'

While economic growth and social improvement inThe Asia Pacific should lead to a regional securityenvironment of peace and prosperity, there are alsogreater tensions and uncertainties. Wherever one looksacross the region, there are pairs of long standing ri-vals - India and China. India and Pakistan. Vietnamand China. China and Korea. Korea and Japan. Rus-sia and Japan, and Japan and China. A 'peace d i v i -dend' is not apparent in the region simply becauseregional defence budgets, except that of Japan, werenever determined by considerations of the Cold War.

The role of the United States, as the world's only su-perpower, should be pivotal in reducing bi lateral ten-sions and ensuring stability. But it is unfortunate thatthe present relationship between China. Japan and theUnited States has never been worse, or more inher -ently unstable, for decades and American prestige inAsia is at, what one leading Australian writer on for-eign affairs claimed earlier this year, 'an a l l - t ime low'.

The ASEAN countries are concerned that i n s t a b i l i t ypersists and regional conflict between the major play-ers is a possibi l i ty . Thus uncer ta in ty is the t h r e a tagainst which they are developing their maritime strat-egies and expanding their maritime force. At a lowerlevel, there are the specific concerns of maritime se-curity, including maritime boundary disputes, conflict-ing claims to offshore territories and resources, andproblems w i t h piracy, drug smuggling, refugees, ma-rine safety and illegal fishing. The overall strategic

12 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/.lul\ IW5

i n t e r e s t l ies in the maintenance of a stable maritimeregime in the region and the preservation of law andorder at sea. Given the types of forces in the regionand the possible causes of conflict, any conflict in TheAsia Pacific is likely to have a significant maritimedimension. Aggressors will identify the vulnerabili t iesof their opponents at sea. particularly shipping, off-shore resource ins ta l la t ions and f i sh ing fleets, andconduct operat ions accordingly.

The most rapid expansion of naval forces in The AsiaPacific is now occurring in Northeast Asia althoughthese developments seem to be largely escaping theattention of Western maritime strategic analysts. Ja-pan is placing less reliance on the umbrella of themil i tary power of the United States and. with its heavydependence on imports of energy and other strategiccommodities, must inev i tab ly look beyond the l imi tof one thousand nautical miles as the currently ex-pressed extent of Japanese interest in capabilities forthe protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs).With the benefit of rapid economic growth. SouthKorea and Taiwan are both expanding their naval ca-pabi l i t ies . China has already been discussed.

It is now conventional wisdom to acknowledge thatthere is a process of fundamental change underwayin the global strategic balance. The notion of a West-ern strategic community is losing its relevance in aglobal sense al though perhaps not in the Europeancontex t . International alignments and centres of powercompet i t ion are becoming more diffused and the glo-bal strategic balance more complex, fluid and lesscertain in its structure. Regional powers, particularlyin The Asia Pacific, are increasing their power andinf luence and much w i l l depend in the fu tu re on howthis power and influence is exercised.

The implications of these changes may be appreci-ated more ful ly in The Asia Pacific than they are inEurope. Security assessments from a European view-point s t i l l appear heavily influenced by the past w h i l ein The Asia Pacific, one cannot help but look forward.There is so l i t t l e in the past that has any relevance tothe future. The regional 'world' is changing far tooquick ly .

The prolonged economic downturn in industr ia l isedcountries must be contrasted w i t h the ongoing eco-nomic dynamism of East Asia. The economic predic-tions are mind-boggling. Within the next twenty yearsthe largest economies in the world, with the solitaryexception of the US economy, w i l l all be in Asia andthe Indonesian economy, for example, wi l l be largerthan that of any European country, including Germany.The staggering economic growth of East Asia maxu l t i m a t e l y be much more challenging to strategict h i n k i n g in the West than was the mil i tary power ofthe Soviet Union. There is no reason to doubt that themari t ime power of the region w i l l not grow broadly

in line with its economic power. This w i l l be a par-ticular challenge to contemporary maritime strategict h i n k i n g in the West. The need for sea power in thefuture, and particularly in The Asia Pacific, can beconstrued in the light of these factors rather than inthe l ight of any perceptions of the diminished u t i l i t yof mili tary power or in any atmosphere of defencebudget cuts now confronting most Western navies.

It is not too hard to see the long-term strategic i m p l i -cations which flow from this contrast of economicperformance. In the words of 1'rotcssor Rober tO'Nei l l : There is also a backlash in most countriesagainst the growth of economic influence from abroad.Nat ional ism is becoming more strident as attempts todecrease trade barriers encounter greater resistance.Calls for protection and the advocacy of va r ious de-grees of self-sufficiency or autarky are heard in na-tional policy debates the world over. The c lamour isall the louder in the states which are suffering thesharpest rates of decline or the greatest frustration ofwhat were seen as high prospects.'

There are other contrasts to be drawn. Bob O 'Ne i l lhas also observed a 'decline ol the use ot force as theu l t ima te arbiter of conflicts of interest between greatpowers' because ' I t has s imply become too expen-sive, counterproductive, for the major mil i tary pow-ers to t h i n k of using their weaponry vis-a-vis eachother for any purpose other than deterrence'. How-ever, this is a view very much from the West. It doesnot necessarily apply to the East where perceptionsof the u t i l i t y of force are aff i rmed by. for example.North Korea developing ball ist ic missiles and Chi -na's disclosed mili tary spending doubl ing in the las tfive years.

This may seem to be a somewhat pess imis t ic \ icu ofsecurity in The Asia Pacific but there are rays of sun-shine. The first is the encouragement by ASEAN inparticular of substantial security dialogue in the re-gion. This includes the ASEAN Post Ministerial Con-ference (PMC) and Senior Officials Meetings (SOM)involving the seven ASEAN dialogue partners, andthe ASEAN Regional Forum, which also draws inChina, Russia. Vietnam. Laos and Papua New Guinea(PNG).

There are also some signif icant 'second track' i n i t i a -tives, including CSCAP (Counc i l for Secur i ty Coop-eration Pacific) which is designed to locus the researchactivities of non-governmental agencies working onsecurity issues in The Asia Pacific and to pro\ ide l ink -age between these activities and official regional security cooperation processes. CSCAP is l i k e l y to es-tablish a working group to look specifically at mar i -time security cooperation. All these developments ares ign i f ican t achievements in the development of mul-t i l a te ra l ism in the region.

May/My IW5 Jounuil of the Australian Naval Institute 13

The ASEAN states clearly perceive the potential formarit ime threats and are developing maritime forces(ships, aircraft, and to a lesser extent, submarines) -with a potentially powerful capability to detect anddestroy an adversary's forces in their maritime ap-proaches. Furthermore, the platforms and weaponsthey are acquiring are capable of operations over widerareas and longer ranges than was the case with previ-ous generations of systems. No longer can the mari-time forces of ASEAN be regarded as 'brown water'navies capable only of inshore operations in coastalwaters.

The maritime strike capabilities being acquired by theASEAN countries can be interpreted in a broader stra-tegic context. The key straits states of Indonesia,Malaysia and Singapore (and possibly even Thailandas well) are well aware of the potential strategic lev-erage they acquire from sitting astride or proximateto major waterways that are essential, first to both theireconomic well-being and to that of countries beyondtheir immediate region, and second, to the strategicmobi l i ty of countries that may wish to pass navalforces between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Thismobility was a clear consideration for the superpow-ers and remains a major consideration for the UnitedStates. It could also be a significant consideration forboth India and China, which could wish to deployforces in the future between the Indian and PacificOceans.

In an address to the Australian Naval Institute in 1991,the then Chief of the Singapore Navy noted that'wi th in South East Asia, the exercise of power andinfluence depends on being able to make use of theseas wi th in South East Asia' and that 'this is clearlyillustrated by the long succession of competing pow-ers who have sought to impose their will on maritimeSouth East Asia. Indeed all the ASEAN states wouldshare a view now that external maritime powers shouldnever be allowed to hold this position of power andinfluence again. This was apparent in the sensitivityof the straits states to any involvement of externalcountries in activities such as combating piracy in theregion and would probably also be a factor in mount-ing naval peacekeeping operations in the region.

The free movement of shipping in the region is animportant consideration for all regional states. Sea-borne trade has t ruly been the "engine" of the phe-nomenal economic growth of the region. Singapore,Kaohsiung and Hong Kong are now the world's larg-est container ports and container traffic through sev-eral other Southeast Asian ports, especially Bangkok,Tanjung Priok, Port Kelang and Manila, has grownenormously in recent years. Major factors here havebeen the growth of intra-regional trade, the lack ofany significant land transport infrastructure (other thanwith in i nd iv idua l countries) and the 'hubs and spokes'approach to container shipping. It is also relevant that

ASEAN flag merchant fleets have grown signif icantlyover the last decade. Against these developments, itis not surprising that the ASEAN states, as well as thecountries of Northeast Asia, are showing increasedinterest in capabilities and arrangements for the pro-tection of shipping and the security of SLOCs. SLOCsecurity is now a major factor in maritime strategicth ink ing in The Asia Pacific.

SLOCsThis growing regional concern with the security ofseaborne trade can be seen in the wider strategic con-text of the drawdown in US forces in The Asia Pa-cific. Other factors include the greater economic in-terdependence between countries and the lack of selfsufficiency among regional nations, which are vari-ously dependent on imports of energy, foodstuffs, rawmaterials, and particular manufactured goods. As overhalf its overseas trade now crosses the Pacific, theUnited States itself has a major interest in the freemovement of shipping in the Western Pacific.

There have been several developments in the regionin recent years which h i g h l i g h t the changing empha-sis on the security of SLOCs. During the 1980s therewere a series of conferences around the region hosted,in most cases, by a non-government organisation inthe host nation. The fundamental rationale of theseconferences was the problem of re-supply of North-east Asia in the event of confrontation between theSuperpowers and key players in the i n i t i a l round ofconferences were the US, Japan, Taiwan and SouthKorea. The ASEAN countries, Austral ia and NewZealand subsequently became involved.

At the SLOC conference held in Bali in 1993. a clearshift in emphasis was apparent from concern wi th theoceanic protection of shipping typical of the Cold Waryears to a greater focus on focal areas, straits transitissues and broader problems of the safety of merchantshipping. This was largely driven by the ASEAN par-ticipants who have become more sensitive about thetransit of foreign vessels through their archipelagicand territorial waters. It is perhaps also significant thatmany of the ASEAN participants come from organi-sations which are closely associated wi th their Gov-ernments.

It has been frequently argued in recent years that na-val roles are changing with the war-fighting role los-ing its utility and the constabulary and diplomatic roleslikely to grow in importance. Ken Booth, for exam-ple, has spoken about 'New Times for Old Navies'concluding that 'Turning warships into lawships is arational way ahead for future international society'.He believes that 'Navies do not have a great future, if"great" is meant in a Mahanian sense as expansive,shaping history, engaging in decisive battles, and pro-viding a l ife of Nelsonic heroism', and that, whi ledeterrence at sea w i l l remain ' the bottom l i n e of na-

14 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/July

val policy', power projection and coercive diplomacywi l l he of declining u t i l i t y . Cooperative naval diplo-macy and constabulary functions will increase in im-portance, he suggests.

Similarly. Geoffrey Till has written that less 'glamor-ous' roles of navies are likely to be areas of s ignif i -cant growth. He believes that constabulary duties,naval diplomacy and the sealift mission are all l ikelylo become more important in the future. The sealiftmission enters consideration largely because of theexperience of the Gulf War and the demonstrated de-pendence of allied operations on logistic support bysea. This poin t is particularly relevant to The AsiaPacific where the geographical operating environmentunderpins the importance of sealift capabilities andamphib ious forces to most regional navies.

For most Western navies, oceanic sea control is at-tracting less attention and much contemporary mari-time strategic th inking is directed towards naval sup-port of land operations, ranging from the direct pro-jection of power ashore (as demonstrated most ex-tremely by the USN's From the Sea doctrine) to thesupport of UN peacekeeping missions. For example,Jan Breemer has observed recently that the pre-occu-pation of the US Navy ' in the foreseeable future willbe land control, not sea control'. As part of this ap-parent demise of the oceanic sea control mission,major Western navies, in particular, appear to be at-taching reduced emphasis to the protection of SLOCs.

The coastguard or constabulary role is a familiar oneand includes combating drug smuggling and piracy,controlling i l legal immigrat ion, and generally enforc-ing the creeping jurisdiction of coastal states over lit-toral waters. The trade in i l legal immigrants is grow-ing and becoming more sophisticated requiring greaterresources for its monitoring and prevention. A par-t i c u l a r concern is the possibility of greatly increasednumbers of Chinese refugees should the economic-growth of China falter.

Because ot the incidence of these activities in EastAsian waters, it is easy to jump to a conclusion thatthis changing role of navies is particularly evident inthe Asia Pacific. However, while it may well be truein an absolute sense that the constabulary task is grow-ing it is not t rue in a relative sense. If anything, therelative importance of the war-fighting role may begrowing in this part of the world.

This point is well i l lustrated in the case of the RoyalMalaysian Navy (RMN).The Malaysian strategic ana-lyst . J N. Mak, has described how the RMN, like vir-tual ly all the navies of mari t ime ASEAN, is nowcaught on the horns of a dilemma in terms of f indinga proper balance between the coastguard function andthe warfighting mission. During the years when the1 S\ pro\ ided the o v e r a l l m a r i t i m e secur i ty umbre l l a

for The Asia Pacific and the main threats to nationalsecurity were perceived as land-based, the RMN wasable to concentrate its attention on constabulary mis-sions. But now times have changed and Mak perceivesthere is a need for the RMN to get back to basics andconcentrate on its primary warf ight ing mission and,if need be. hand over its lesser patrol vessels to an-other agency responsible for coastguard roles.

Although coastguard-type tasks, sovereignty protec-tion and EEZ policing are part of the justification forthe expansion of Asian navies, these navies see muchbroader strategic justification for the forces they areacquiring. This lies in those underlying tensions anduncertainties referred to earlier in this paper and per-ceptions of the importance of sea power which havemuch in common wi th the wr i t i ngs of the classicalmaritime strategists.

Overtime, theories of maritime strategy and sea powerhave revolved around command of the sea, projec-tion of power and economic warfare (ie. anti-tradeand protection of trade) as principal functions of seapower. During the Cold War, the maritime strategiesof the West were unequivocally about sea control andpower projection while the Soviet Union never lostsight of economic warfare considerat ions. AsGorshkov observed, anti-trade operations are 'the mostimportant constituent part of the efforts of a fleet aimedat undermin ing the military economic potential of theenemy'.

Now as we enter a period when national security,power and status in world affairs wil l be determinedincreasingly by economic success, it seems l ike ly thatthere will be a swing back to economic factors as alarge determinant of naval functions. This is despitethe current attention in USN doctrine on power pro-jection ashore and the interest in the West in redefin-ing naval roles.

Already there is a significant economic d imens ion tomaritime security in The Asia Pacific with maritimeforces seen both as important elements of nationalprestige and as necessary to support and protect eco-nomic activity. To some extent this is an inevitableconsequence of the economic growth which, on theone hand, provides the resources to support the de-velopment of maritime forces and. on the other, cre-ates demands for the protection of national economicinterests many of which lie offshore.

As we look to the future, there can be l i t t l e doubt thatthe navies of The Asia Pacific will continue to de-velop, both quanti tat ively and qualitatively. The ideathat the strategic rationale for these developments liesto some extent in classical principles of maritime strat-egy leads to the observation that history could he re-peating itself. Just as Mahan and subsequent writersdrew strength from the Indus t r ia l Revolution and the

May/July 1995 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 15

rapid expansion of world trade last century, now The the context of rapid economic growth and increasedAsia Pacific maritime strategy is being formulated in regional trade.

REMEMBERING THE..

VICTORY OVERJAPAN!

August 15th 1945

'BRAVO ZULU ' TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OFTHE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY WHO 'DID THEIRBIT' TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE VICTORY OVER A

RUTHLESS ENEMY.

'STAND EASY' AND WE WILL MAKE SURE YOUCAN ENJOY THE REST OF YOUR

RETIREMENT!

. . .NAVY'95

Read on! The next story takes us hack to the great Year of J 945.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute M/V//// /V

In JANI's 20th year we have been revisiting some oj the 'Ripping Yarns' of past issues.This one is taken from the May 1977 issue — Ed.

ShiphandlingCorner

The Second World War was over and we weregliding gently back to civilisation over the placidwaters of the Pacific. It seemed a good idea to'keep clear of the putty' by fixes from the light-house on Frederick Reef. But suddenly we hadan uneasy feeling that all was not well. . .

Every year throughout the world hundredsof ships go aground; or in the polite naval way ofphrasing it, 'touch the bottom'. In every casethere is subsequent heartburn and investigation,and often legal action, be it a Naval court martialor a civil damages claim, and eventually somesort of a reason for the grounding is arrived at tothe satisfaction of the majority of those con-cerned.

The story I am about to tell is not one of agrounding. Consequently it never became public,and only three or four of the participants knowthe details, such as they were. In the art of navi-gation there are dozens of well tried principles.Additional lessons are always being learnt bynavigators, but it is normally safe to generalise tothe extent of saying that every situation beginswith known facts. The only trouble is thatsometimes the fact is wrong. So it was in thiscase. 1 tell this story because I think it holds alesson which may be new to some seamen.

Necessary risks onlyThe middle watch is always a lengthy period

in a ship by herself in the middle of an ocean.The middle watch of my story was no exception.In our destroyer, at the end of 1945, we weregratefully steaming away from the Pacific battle-ground after the completion of a successful war.In the preceding few years we had many timestaken navigational risks in badly charted watersand got away with it. Our Captain was an ableand reliable seaman, who, whilst taking thesenecessary risks, had always stuck by the rathersensible maxim of keeping as far away from theputty, as he put it, as he possibly could. Thiseven gave rise to the invention of one or twonicknames for him which I shan't record.

When the dust of Hiroshima had settled(which, incidentally, we had seen in the distancefrom the ship), there followed the peace and theoccupation. In Tokyo we had wandered, with in-terest, through the desolated bombed ruins andhad taken part in a victory parade at the BritishEmbassy (miraculously still standing and stillkept immaculately clean by the same caretakerwho had looked after it for twenty years beforethe war). Now, with all this behind us, we werehurrying south through the Coral Sea with highhopes of being in port for Christmas. The CoralSea, as every seaman who has been in that partof the world will confirm, is a dangerous place.Mostly the depth of the water is in the region ofone or two thousand fathoms, but every now andagain there suddenly rises from the sea bottom atowering mountain, atop which a coronet ofcoral has thrust itself to the surface, giving riseto the well-known lagoons and atolls of this area.The average atoll (Iwon'tsay typical because noone case is the same as another) is therefore ratherlike the top of a submerged volcano. The rimeither breaks the surface, forming little isletswhich may even have vegetation growing precar-iously in their sandy crevices, or lurks menacing-ly below the surface at a depth, one would think,designed especially to trap the unwary mariner. Inplaces a deep channel may exist between the sun-ken reefs or the visible islets. Inside the rim thelagoons usually have sufficient depth of water fora ship to navigate, provided she dodges the NiggerHeads and knows the way in and the way out.

Turtle and sea-fowl eggsQuite good charts exist of the majority of

the Coral Sea reefs, many of which reveal safehavens and anchorages. These plans, as one of theAdmiralty charts explains, will, 'with the help ofa masthead lookout, enable a ship to round-tounder the lee of the reefs where she may caulktopsides, set up rigging, and obtain turtle, fishand sea-fowl eggs. On some of the salient reefs,beacons have been erected and, for the sake ofcastaways, coconuts, shrubs, grasses and everydescription of seed likely to grow have beensown in the sparse soil to promote the super-structure; and it is most desirable that theserefuge spots should be held sacred for universalbenefit and not ruthlessly destroyed.'

Jn lattitue 21° 01' 46" South, longitude154° 23' 29" East, there exists just such a coralatoll.

This is Frederick Reef.

Oval in shape with the longer axis lyingnorth and south, Frederick Reef is as near tobeing a typical coral atoll as one could wish. Rightacross the sothern end, and halfway up the east-ern side, the reef is just above the water. In thecentre of the southern part, in fact, there is asmall islet called Observatory Cay, which rises

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18 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/.lul\

FEIEDEEICK REEFObs.Hv? Cuyd.i.i -I" 1 l ( i "S ._ l.on^ 15-T j;'.'.2(i.'K.

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Ma\/.lul\ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 19

eleven feet above low water. The south-westernpart of the reef is called Danger Ridge, and herethe reef varies in depth from five fathoms tonothing, with one or two rocks that just breakthe surface. Needless to say this area is labelledon the chart as an unsafe passage for ships. Atthe northern end of Danger Ridge, which is half-way up the western side of the atoll, lies RidgeRock, over which the sea is always breaking, andnorthward of this the water deepens and is safefor ships. Halfway up the eastern side anothersafe entrance exists, but north of this, on thenorht-eastern corner of the atoll, the reef againrises to the surface and sand cays and rocks arejust visible. At the northern part of the atoll, orthe 'top of the egg', and in the whole of thelagoon inside, measuring about six miles by three,there is clear water with a depth of between tenand thirty fathoms. All round Frederick Reefthe sea-bottom drops sharply away, down thesteep-to sides of the sunken mountain, to depthsof many hundreds and even thousands of fathoms.

i ?J^S\rf > •*% •*

UlR p

We planned to keep dearAs we approached this lonely speck in the

Coral Sea that middle watch, we had few worriesand certainly no premonitions, for on the south-western corner there existed an unwatched light-house which we knew we would see at least tenmiles away. Our course was set to pass four milesto the west of this light, steering due south. Sureenough, the light was raised on time,and althoughwe found as we approached that we would passrather closer to the light than the planned fourmiles, the water was clear to the west of it andwe were not worried. Being a dutiful officer ofthe watch I informed the Captain and the Navi-gator and the latter came up to the bridge. Therewe shared a cup of cocoa together as we watchedthe light draw nearer over the moonlit sea. Byrunning fixes and later by a small radar contact,it soon became apparent that we would pass twomiles to the west of the atoll.

At about this stage the Asdic Operator,whom we still had closed-up in case there wereany Japanese submarines who had not heard thatthe war had ended, reported indications of adeep reef ahead. This interested me, but gave nocause for alarm even when he later reported thatthe reef was fairly shallow. Knowing that wewere in deep water. I successfully persuaded my-self, with the Navigator's concurrence, that whatwas being picked up was a tidal eddy sweepinground the southern end of the reef across ourpath. Sure enough, as the light drew aft towardsthe beam we passed over the alleged sunken reefand were then certain that it was, in fact, tidaleffect.

The night, as I have said earlier, was a bril-liant moonlit one, and as the lighthouse cameabeam to port we could even see the rocks andstrips of sand on which it was constructed. Oneof the officers on the bridge commented at thisstage that he thought the sea had become verycalm. Admittedly there had only been a gentleswell and a light breeze previously, but the Navi-gator and I had to admit that even the swellseemed now to have departed. As the light drewabaft the beam, we knew that we were wellclear of all dangers, because the light was situatedon the extreme south-western corner of thesoutherly reef.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when theStarboard Lookout awoke from his reverie toreport, in a rather startled voice, his sighting of asmall island broad on the starboard bow. Sureenough, at first glance it did appear to be a smallisland or rock, but knowing there was no rockthere we persuaded ourselves successfully that itwas a whale spouting on the surface. I shouldpoint out, perhaps, that the visibility to west-ward was not as good as in other quarters, andour supposition about this object can thereforeperhaps be forgiven.An odd effect

We have all read in meteorological books ofthat 'uneasy feeling that all is not well' that oftenattends the approach of a tropical revolvingstorm. This feeling, as many seamen know, alsoappears at other times. Perhaps it was a slightattack of this feeling that caused me to sweepthe horizon a little more carefully through mybinoculars at this stage (though, of course, Iknew I would see nothing). The calm sea wasproducing many lines of light from the reflectedmoon, and right across the horizon directlyahead of us was one of these. As it drew nearer,however, I could not help likening it, as perhapsexplorers in the Sahara have often done withmirages for which that desert is famous, to some-thing more materialistic: in this case it looked forall the world like a reef!

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/Jnl\

We discussed this odd effect for a few min-utes during which we were also busy in prepar-ing our second cup of cocoa. When I again look-ed ahead through the binoculars, the uneasyfeeling suddenly turned into one of early fright.Leaping into action I (a) called the Captain andtold him there seemed to be a reef ahead, (b)ordered an operator to close up in the echosounder (just, of course, to confirm that we werein deep water), and (c) suggested to the Navi-gator that it looked as if we were on the point ofdiscovering a hitherto unknown reef. As the Cap-tain appeared on the bridge, the mysteriousbroken water was by now only a few cable-lengthsahead, and there even seemed to me to be in theair around us that roar of breaking water thatone always hears when close to a real reef in theopen sea.Hard a'starboard

The Captain, I think, felt much the same asI was beginning to do, and let loose in his beststentorian voice.

'Hard a'starboard'.'Hard a'starboard, sir'. The Navigator repeat-

ed the order almost gratefully down the voice pipe.'What's the depth?''Echo sounder just closing up, sir. No report

yet'.'Show me the chart, pilot'.'Steer 240'.'240, sir'.'Bridge. This is echo sounder'.This is bridge'.'No bottom at two thousand fathoms, sir'.At this moment I was leaning over the port

side of the bridge watching with horror the brokenedge of a very realistic reef sweeping down alongour port side at a range of about ten yards. Stillno bottom with the echo sounder, so the Captain,after a quick examination of the chart with theNavigator, ordered the ship to resume her south-erly course, and stumped off the bridge with aremark to the Navigator as he left. 'Looks likeyou've found a new reef, pilot. See me in themorning about making a signal reporting it'.

Still slightly unnerved and troubled in ourminds, the pilot and I discussed the odd pheom-enon as some length, and eventually were equallydivided in our minds on two possible answers.Firstly, that it was a new reef (but we could notquite believe that somebody had not seen itbefore); secondly, that our tidal eddies whichhad caused us some concern earlier in the watch,had grown to even bigger proportions under theinfluence of, perhaps, some subterranean volcanicdisburbance. Anyway, all was well and the pilottrudged off to bed, leaving me to the lonelinessof the Coral Sea.

Ten minutes later a white-faced apparitionappeared silently at my elbow and motioned me

to come to the chart table with him. Even in themoonlight I had to admit to myself that I hadnever seen the pilot look quite so ashen-facedor worried, even in the face of kamikaze suicidebombers or typhoons off the Japanese coast.Within half a minute 1 think my own face hadprobably assumed the same hue and for the restof that night, even after I had left the bridge onbeing relieved at four o'clock, I found my imag-ination playing over a vast array of frighteningpossibilities.

On the matAt 8.30 sharp the following morning the

pilot presented himself nervously at the Captain'sdoor.

'Yes, pilot. Come in. I suppose we'd betterget that signal away about the reef. Is that whatyou came to see me about?'

'Wel l . . . e r . . . Yes, sir.''Right. Let's see what you propose.''Well . . . e r . . . Sir, you see ... it's like this.''Well? Come on, come on.''Well, sir, I don't think we ought to make a

signal.''Good God, why not? That was definitely a

reef and we don't want some other poor blighterto go up on it!'

'No, sir. Bu t . . . well. . . you see ... I.founda notice to mariners last night after you turned .in . . .'

'Well, what was it?''It's one I seem to have missed, sir. It appears

they've moved the light on Frederick Reef fromthe south-western corner to the north-easterncorner. We must have gone right down the centreof the lagoon and, as far as I can see, we wentout over Danger Ridge in between that rockthere, and this rock here, with about a yard tospare each side, and a foot or two underneath.'

There was silence for a few moments, al-though no doubt the pilot felt that the knockingof his knees was readily audible.

'Hmmm. Well . . . All right, pilot, it looks asif we were lucky, but now perhaps you realisewhy I never like going too close to the putty!'

D.HD.S.

Mav/Julv 1995 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 21

POWER OF THE PRESSThe Royal Navy And The Impress Act Of 1793

by

WO2 Graham Wilson

Australian Intelligence Corps

D uring the Napoleonic Wars, the inhabitantsof coastal areas of the British Isles lived inconstant fear of the sight of a French inva-

sion fleet. But a sight they feared even more was thatof a party of Royal Navy tars, armed with cutlassesand cudgels and under the command of a junior of-ficer, roaming the streets and fields in search of prey

— the dreaded "press".

Throughout that twenty odd years of global warfarereferred to as the 'Napoleonic Wars', Britain reliedon her 'wooden wall', the Royal Navy, to defend hershores, keep the sea lanes open for commerce, andtransport her armies to the battlefields of the world.The Navy of those days was, of course, wind pow-ered, and unfortunately the ships of the day were awe-somely labour intensive. A ship the size of Nelson'sfamous Victory needed a crew of about 1000 to sailand fight her; of these, 200 or so were the officers andnon-commissioned and enlisted specialists (surgeons,sai l ing masters, master's mates, gunners, boatswains,shipwrights, coopers, sail makers, carpenters, marinesetc) needed to command, maintain and run the ship.The remaining 800 odd were seamen and they werealways in short supply. The main reason for this ofcourse was that service in His Majesty's navy wasnot an attractive prospect. It offered low pay, savagediscipline, atrocious food, appall ing l iving conditions,unceasing hard labour and long years at sea (sailorsdrafted to the West Indies Station faced anything upto ten years away from home waters). It is not sur-prising, therefore, that few men were prepared to vol-unteer for such a life and even less surprising that theRoyal Navy was constantly chronically short handed.In the past, to make up its deficit in personnel, theKing's Navy had been wont to press men into serv-ice, that is, take men forcibly off the streets and placethem in the King's service against their will. Prior tothe end of the 18th century, despite the wide spreadnature of this practice, there was little legal just if ica-tion for it, the navy relying on the protection offeredby time honoured custom and various letters patentissued from time to time. The pressure of global war-fare meant that the Royal Navy must have men tocrew its ships. On the other hand, 18th century devel-opments in civil rights meant that the King's mencould no longer rely on custom and questionable le-gal documents to take men by force. To remedy this,the Br i t i sh Parliament passed the Impress Act of 1793

which authorised the Admiralty to 'impress' able-bod-ied men for service.

The Impress Act basically made it legal for the navyto recruit by force able-bodied men as it needed tocrew its ships. Oddly enough, the Act applied only tothe Royal Navy. While the British Army had its ownmanpower and recruiting problems, it used other meth-ods, some just as unscrupulous as the press, to fill itsregiments. One probable reason, however, tor theArmy's greater success at recruiting was the attrac-tion of a 'red coat'; the Royal Navy did not bother toissue uniforms to its lower ranks un t i l 1857.

In order to implement the newly legitimised press,the Admiralty was authorised to establish 'press de-pots' as bases from which the press gangs could op-erate. At the beginning of the 19th century, there wereover 40 of these depots scattered around B r i t a i n . The'depot', almost always located in a port town, was inactuality usually just a prominent building, often aninn or public house, which the press gangs made theirhome base and from which they roamed in search ofvictims. Pressed men could also be brought to thedepots by private citizens in exchange for a govern-ment bounty, usually with no questions asked. To ex-pedite the work of its press gangs, the Admiralty regu-larly placed advertisements in the local papers, as forexample this illuminating extract from an East York-shire newspaper of 1807:

"Wanted immediate ly , an ordinary seaman, orable-bodied landsman in the form of an impressedman, thirteen guineas will be given, for fur therparticulars, apply to Mr. H. Grey, Sign of the Ship,High Street. Hul l" .

The "Sign of the Ship" in all l ikelihood refers to aninn or pub and "Mr. H. Grey" was very likely the inn-keeper or publ ican, doubling as a "press agent" inexchange for a fee from the Admiralty and a percent-age of the bounties.

The law stipulated that a press gang had to be underthe command of a commissioned officer (often a pre-adolescent Midshipman, too young to shave) and bein possession of a "warrant of impressment". This lat-ter was the legal instrument empowering the pressgang to kidnap innocent citizens into governmentsanctioned near-slavery and it was issued by a magis-

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Mav/Julv

(rate or justice of the peace, who was more often thannot the press agent whose premises were utilised as apress depot.

The press gangs themselves were invariably made upof the toughest, most brutal sailors available, with oneor two even tougher and more brutal boatswains matesto keep the tars in l ine and to prevent them from us-ing the opportunity of being ashore as a chance todesert. To add to security, press gangs were often re-inforced with detachments of marines or soldiers. Thered coats were there both to protect the gang fromangry locals and to shoot down any members of thepress gang or any newly impressed men who tried toescape.

When selecting its victims, the press gang did not haveto be very choosy. Although seamen were preferred,and thus at greatest risk, any reasonably healthy, rea-sonably fit man was liable to be taken. Who knowshow many innocent young craftsmen or farm labour-ers found themselves u n w i l l i n g l y recruited into theKing's service and doomed to a life of unremi t t ingtoil in a bewi lder ing and alien world.

The only legal way for a man to avoid the press wasto be in possession of a 'protection ticket ' . This docu-ment granted exemption from the press and was is-sued at Customs Houses in the name of the Lord HighAdmiral. Tickets were routinely issued to ship's car-penters, sh ipwr igh t s and merchant seamen emp loyedin key trades. They were also issued to dischargedsoldiers and to seamen, both merchant and membersof the Naval Service, employed by the HonourableHast Ind ia Company. Protection t ickets did not, how-ever, guarantee immuni ty . Many, if not most, pressofficers and agents, under extreme pressure to fillquotas, routinely ignored tickets and impressed theirholders anyway. When it is recalled that each pressedman was a source of revenue for the press agent, it isobvious that the average agent would not be l ikely tolet a piece of paper stand in the way of turning a profit.

The Impress Act was not restricted in its enforcementto the land. Merchant seamen were also in danger ofimpressment at sea. Ciuardships often stopped inboundmerchantmen and took members of the crew by force.Pat ro l l ing ships of the Royal Navy would do the sameon the high seas, usually with complete disregard forthe flag flown by the merchantman. This arrogant andhigh-handed British habit was one of the direct causesof the War of 1812. In that year the Americans, t i redof, amongst other things, British refusal to heed dip-lomatic protests at the Royal Navy's habit of stop-ping American flag vessels and impressing their crew-men, declared war.

It may appear so far that the activities of the pressgang were simple and straightforward. Nothing couldbe further from the truth. Of course, more than one

employer was happy to rid himself of a la/.y or in-competent worker by tu rn ing him over to the press;as melodramatic as it may sound, it was not unknownfor the father of an attractive daughter to rid himselfof an unwanted or unsuitable admirer by having thehapless swain impressed; and there were always un-scrupulous people ready to turn unsuspecting victimsover to the press in exchange for the bounty. But, onthe whole, the work of the press gang was not easy.

No man wanted to be taken by the press, not on l \ fortheir own sakes. but for that of their families as well.Men taken in the streets would struggle might i ly toescape, often as not assisted by family and friends,even by total strangers. More than one r iot resultedfrom the ac t iv i t ies of the press. One of the most fa-mous occurred in H u l l i n M a x . 1815 . w h e n the H u l lpress gang took a young seaman as he was w a l k i n gdown a main street leading to the docks. While hewas being dragged away the intended \ i c t i m man-aged to slip out of his jacket and took to h is heelsdown the street with the impressmen in hot p u r s u i t .Reaching the dock area, the seaman was assisted b\ agang of workmen and angry townspeople who foughta running battle with the press gang. When the pressofficer appealed tor assistance from the mayor it w a srefused and the press gang was forced to retreat emptyhanded under a shower of stones and mud. That wasnot the end of it. however, as the by now thoroughlyaroused mob descended on the "Spurn Lights" i n n .the local press depot, and demolished the premises.

Impressing yokels in the countryside was rarely a sim-ple task either. Local people were always on the look-out for the press gang and when it was sighted womenand c h i l d r e n w o u l d rush to w a r n the men of i ts ap-proach. On being warned, workmen would scatter inall directions and go to ground in barns, has stacks.horse stalls, cellars, church cr \p ts . in fact an\ wherein an attempt to avoid impressment. A contemporaryaccount records the action of a Yorkshire farm labourerwho hid from the press gang in a pig sty. shieldedfrom view by its inhab i tan t s , and who eventua l ! )emerged some hours later, s t ink ing and filthy, but tree.

The intended victims of the press were often assistedb\ local newspapers as well. Happy enough to takethe King's silver to place press advertisements, new s-papers were also quick to publish warnings o f t lie pieseneeof the impressmen in the neighbourhood. Thesewarnings would usua l ly resul t in most able-bodiedmen making themselves scarce for a few days.

Seamen not in possession of a protection t i cke t andwho made it home after a voyage would often remainindoors for the whole of their time ashore in order toavoid the press. When setting out to report to t h e i rships at the start of a new voyage, they would usual lytravel late at night when the impressmen were abed.Alternatively, they would travel in a group, as large

Ma\/Jul\ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 23

as possible, the better to tight oft the press gang. Onenovel dodge was that utilised by Thomas Hawkins,skipper of the merchant vessel Eventhorpe. When hewas home between voyages, the captain would dressas a woman to enable himself to move about safelywi th his wife and family.

The navy did not always have its own way at sea ei-ther. Merchantmen could rarely hope to outrun theswift frigates and sloops employed as guardships butnevertheless, even when their ships hove to in responseto a guardship's signals, or even a warning shot, crew-men would often fight back against the press gangrather than be taken.

An early and notorious case involved the crew of thewhaling ship Sarah and Elizabeth in July, 1794. Theship was returning home after a season in the Green-land whaling grounds when she was stopped by thefrigate Aurora. Knowing full well their probable fate.the whaler's crewmen promptly barricaded themselvesinto the hold. Two boat loads of sailors and marinesfrom the Aurora boarded Sarah and Elizabeth andeventually managed to prise up a corner of the hatchcover, but the armed whalers refused orders to comeon deck. The bosun of the Aurora received permis-sion from his captain to throw a grenade into the holdto persuade the whaling men to come on deck butwas dissuaded from carrying out this lunatic actionby the horrified captain of Sartili and Elizabeth whopointed out that his ship's highly volat i le cargo ofwhale oil would be ignited by the grenade's explo-sion. Putt ing down his grenade, the bosun again calledon the crewmen to surrender but was answered by abullet which wounded him in the leg. The captain ofAurora, thoroughly outraged at the wounding of hisbosun and at the whaler 's refusal to obey his com-mands, now ordered his marines to fire into the holdand number of shots were fired, k i l l i n g one man (thecarpenter) and seriously wounding three others.

The whalers then came up and surrendered and mostof them, including the wounded, were transferred toAurora and placed in irons. The Surah and Elizabethwas then allowed to proceed as best she could. Whenshe reached port, her owners immediately ins t i tu tedproceedings tor murder against the captain ot the Au-rora. The resulting outcry was so great that the Ad-miralty ordered the Sarah and Elizabeth '.v men to bedischarged and released and posted Captain Essingtonol'Aurora to the West Indies.

Essington returned from the West Indies as an admi-ral in 1810 and the case against him was re-opened.But the case lapsed, doubtless much to the relief ofboth Admiral Essington and the Admiralty Lords, asthe report of the coroner's inquest into the death ofthe unfortunate ship's carpenter had been lost — sur-prise, surprise.

Another case, again involving a whaling ship, occurredin 1798 when the Blenheim, inbound from the Arctic,was intercepted by armed boat's crews from the Huni-ber guardships. Determined not to be t a k e n , t heBlenheim's crewmen locked their captain and theHumber pilot into the ship's cabin and set out to lakethe ship into port themselves. Unfortunately, they ranaground on a mud bank and the navy boats closed inand attempted to board. They were beaten oil by thewhalers who had armed themselves with whatever layat hand, including huge flensing knives. Shots werefired by both sides and two marines were k i l l e d ,whereupon the erstwhile boarders withdrew. Blenheimwas floated off on the next tide and eventua l ly madeport, where the crew scattered to safety.

For the lack of anyone else to blame, the Navy hadthe hapless captain ol Blenheim arrested and arraignedfor the alleged murder of the two marines. He wasacquitted when the navy's farcical case was thrownout of court by an unsympathetic judge.

But riots, warnings, hair's-breadth escapes, ruses, dis-guises, even pitched sea battles were not enough todeter the press. Despite all that their prey could do toescape their clutches, the press were awesomely effi-cient. They had to be. When the American War of I n -dependence ended in 1783, the Royal Navy had astrength of 1 ()().()()() men. 'fen years later when warbroke out w i t h France, t h i s had dropped lo 18.000.The Royal Navy had 12 ships of the l ine in actualservice and 1 1 3 in reserve. Ships in reserve werebrought back into service as soon as they could beoverhauled, refitted and, most importantly, crewed.With no volunteers forthcoming, the Navy hail theImpress Act passed and turned the press gangs loose.The fact that 54 ships of the line had been commis-sioned within weeks of the outbreak of war bears wit-ness to the brutal efficiency of the impressmen. This'efficiency' continued throughout the NapoleonicWars as the press gangs scoured the length and breadthof the kingdom t ro l l ing for sailors to man Britain 's'wooden wall'.

Viewed dispassionately, the press was a necessary evilfor, while few men in their right minds would volun-tarily join the Royal Navy (incredibly some did), theships still had to be manned. It was the job of theimpressmen to ensure that they were.

On the other hand, the press was to a great extent coun-ter-productive. Those men who had voluntarily cho-sen the Royal Navy as a career were tough, proudprofessionals who resented the great mass of pressedmen, regarding them as dirty, clumsy and thievish. Intruth , the vast majority of the pressed men were littlemore than tlesh and blood robots. The skilled work ofsail ing His Majesty's ships was carried out by thesprinkl ing of professional seamen, with the pressedmen merely supplying the brute muscle power needed

24 Journal oj the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/Jul\ IW5

to haul on ropes and shake out canvas. The pressedmen were also, understandably enough, u n w i l l i n g ,unruly, i l l-disciplined and mutinous. It is probable thatthe o n l \ reason the Royal Navy prevailed at sea overits foes was that those foes had the same manpowerproblems and resorted to the same means to resolvethem. In fact , when the Spanish squadron under DonJose de Cordova sailed out of Cartagena in February.1797 to join the French fleet which was sail ing out tomeet the Brit ish squadrons under Admiral Sir JohnJervis and the then Commodore Horatio Nelson off( 'ape St. Vincent , the Spanish crews had been broughtup to strength by sweeping the streets and prisons ofCartagena and Alicante. Out of the 950 or so men inthe crew of Cordova ' s f l a g s h i p , the colossalSanti.iisinui Trinidad, probably only 80 or so were realseamen. The French were, to pardon the pun. in thesame boat.

I n the end, as the old saying goes, one volunteer isdef in i t e ly better than ten pressed men.

The press was suspended in 1815 with the defeat ofNapoleon and the start of that period of European his-tory sometimes referred to as The Long Peace'. Withthe wars over the Royal Navy no longer needed its\ a s t mass of men and ships and w i t h i n three yearss t r e n g t h s had f a l l e n f r o m ove r 700 ships in commis-sion and 140.000 men to 130 ships and 19.000 men.Those men no longer required were simply dischargedand put ashore to fend for themselves. Most of coursewere delighted to be free. Those in good health gen-eralh dr i f ted hack to thei r previous jobs and homes.But if they were sick or wounded, very li t t le was done

to help them and former Royal Navy seamen reducedto beggary were a common sight in the sea ports ofBr i t a in for many years.

Although suspended, the press was not entirely abol-ished and the impressment of seamen into the RoyalNavy is recorded as late as 1835. in w h i c h year theAct was graciously amended to limit an impressedman's period of enforced service to five years; priorto that of course, service was for life, unless a manlost an arm or leg, or suffered some other disable-ment , when he would be unceremoniously dischargedand 'beached'.

Despite my best efforts and enquiries as far afield asthe United Kingdom, it has not been possible to as-certain if the Impress Act of 1793 has actually beenabolished. On the other hand, I have ascertained thatthe Act was s t i l l in force in the mid-1960s, so, asstrange as it may seem, as l i t t l e as thirty years ago itwas sti l l lawful to impress men into Her Majesty 'sNavy.

Bibliography

'An Old Sailor'. U>i> Rook. Southward c 1850

Oman. Carola, Nelson'.

Mac-Arthur. L i e u t . D. Wilson. R N V R . The RoyalNavy' London. 1940

The Rritish Empire, parts 10 and 36. London. 1972

DESPATCH FROM CANADA

hv Commander Peter Jones

I n December 1994 the Canadian Defence WhitePaper (CDWP) was tabled in Parliament. Thisfol lowed wide-ranging public hearings by a par-

liamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's De-fence Policy.

The CDWP is an attempt to provide a balanced andflexible defence force wi th in a very t ight budget (aboutSC10 b i l l i o n ) . The CDWP is a candid document whichstates.

"The Government's broad program for polit ical.social, and economic renewal is focused on pre-serving the values that make Canada one of themost fo r tuna te countr ies in the world. At thepresent time, however, our prosperity - and with itour qua l i t y of life - is threatened by the steadygrowth of the publ ic sector debt."1

The accumula ted federal and provincial government

debt is about $C750 b i l l i o n . To give an idea of theeffect of this burden the annual debt servicing pay-ments for the federal government alone (1994-95 ( w i l lbe S44 b i l l ion . This is about 277r of the total federalbudget. The pressure on defence spending is there-fore immense.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been sub-stantial personnel cuts and these will continue. In 1989the total uniformed permanent strength was 88.800.This has been cut to around 74.000 today and will bereduced further to 60,000 by 1999. Even more drasticare the cuts to de fence c i v i l i a n s w h i c h numbered36,600 in 1989 and w i l l be fewer than 12,500 by theend of the decade.

The dramatic personnel and financial cuts have led toa variety of reviews and decisions to reshape the CFinfrastructure. As an example, a water f ron t review is

26 Journal o/ the Australian Naval Institute Mav/Ju/\

underway which is looking at the entire support or-ganisat ion.

I gave an impromptu presentat ion to the water f rontreview team on the ADF/RAN structure. At the briefmany heads nodded in recognition as 1 went throughsuch i n i t i a t i v e s as total q u a l i t y management, programmanagement and budgeting, defence administrat ioncentres, devolution, dockyard p r iva t i s a t i on , defencehousing reviews etc. The ensuing discussions revealedthe extent of our shared reforming experiences. Manyof the in i t ia t ives discussed h a v e been implemented orare under active consideration by both defence forces.I would commend any ADF/RAN administrative re-view team to s tudy w h a t Canada may have tried int h a t f i e l d .

There are a number of aspects to the C'DWP that haveinterest to Australia. A key one is the commitment toUN operations. CF is heavi ly involved in many UNrelated missions. As alluded to in my previous des-patch the level of commitment , especially in the lightof defence cuts, is probably unsustainable. It is there-fore s i g n i f i c a n t tha t the C 'DWP stated.

"Although t h i s general ( U N ( c o m m i t m e n t is clear,under more normal circumstances Canada mustbe select ive if it is going to remain in a position toplay a meaningful role. Our sources are finite."-

This is a turnaround from earl ier days when Cana-dian defence ana lys t Peter Haydon commented,

"it has become nationally impossible to refuse anopportunity to join a peacekeeping operation nomatter where it is."-'

The Canadian position is of course closely mirroredi n the 1W4 Austral ian Defence Whi te Paper. Bothdocuments clearly articulate criteria on which futurepeacekeeping requests w i l l be assessed.

Turning to the Canadian mar i t ime force structure, theCDWP emphasises the need for two Canadian TaskGroups, one on either coast. Each would consist of 3-4 destroyers/frigates, a support sh ip and possibly asubmarine. The extremely busy operational tempo ofthe surface fleet in the Adriatic and off H a i t i over re-cent years probably ensured that force numbers were

maintained in the CDWP. Less lucky is the useful div -ing support ship Cormorant w h i c h w i l l p remature lypay off in IW.

On the matter of the Oberon Class submarine replace-ment , the CDWP authorised investigation i n t o acquir-ing the Brit ish Upholder Class, if the price was right.It is clear that the Canadian defence h ie ra rchy arecommitted to a f l ex ib l e balanced force and they seesubmarines as very much part of that force.

It is certainly an anxious time for the submarine com-muni ty because if the Upholders are not acquired thentha t is the end of the l ine for the submarine arm. Thequestion would only remain whe the r the Oberonswould pay off straight away or continue on for a fewmore years to the end of t h e i r l i v e s . On a posi t ivenote the Canadian-Spanish fish dispute on the GrandBanks can only help the submarine cause as theOberons have been effective in fisheries surveillance.

Final ly the C'DWP stated that Canada's interest in thePacific and Asia is growing. It noted the count ry ' smore active role in regional security dialogues. TheCDWP concluded t h i s po in t bv s t a t i ng .

"..as our economic stake in the region grows,Canada w i l l play a more active role in its security.To this end, we wil l expand the current programof bilateral mil i tary contacts we maintain with avariety of Asian countries, inc luding Japan. SouthKorea, and members of ASEAN."4

On this basis the RAN and RNZN can expect to seemore of the CF in the Western Pacific. Indeed the v i s i tby a Canadian Task Group to SE Asia. Austral ia andNew Zealand th is year should be viewed in t h i s l i g h t .There is tremendous scope for closer t ies to our i n ntual benefit.

NOTES1. Canadian Defence White Paper. Queens P r in t i ng

Office. Ottawa. 1994.2. Ib id . p . 3 l ..V P I . Haydon. Naval Peacekeeping: Mul t i na t i ona l

Considerations, A paper given to Peacekeeping '94.Washington. 14-16 November 1994. p.7.

4. Canadian Defence White Paper, op.cit . p.37.

Jtninuil of the Australian Naval Institute 27

This exsav is reproduced with the permission of the Chief of Naval Staff. It is the Open l}ri~e Winning Essavin the IW4 Commonwealth Navies Peter Mitchell Essav Competition, ami represents the author's ninili

major award in the competition.

COUNTING THE COSTAre traditional values and culture being unnecessarily sacrificed on the altar of eco-nomic rationalism in a modern navy?

by Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge RAN

N aval personnel have no dif f icul ty in accepting the constitutional imperative of c i v i l i a ncontrol over the service and the advantages

ot rat ional is ing inefficient personnel, t ra ining and lo-gistics systems. However, it is our obligat ion, evenduty, to be concerned by changes that affect the na-vy's abi l i ty to achieve its nat ional defence mission.Therefore, the number and na tu re of economicallydriven reviews and rationalisations, especially dur-ing the last five years, have become legitimate causesfor concern.

Some naval personnel feel that readiness, discipline,esprit de corps and cohesion are being buried undercost effectiveness and productivity criteria by myopicc i v i l i a n and mi l i ta ry bureaucracies that draw s impl is -t ic , dollar driven conclusions. They see the naval ethos- comprising the navy's unique values, traditions, iden-tity and cu l ture - as being under serious threat, wi ththe result that operational performance w i l l decline.The counter argument .which we wil l call the ration-al is t view, is that il the navy wants to keep its "toys'in the next century it has to consistently come up withsubstantial savings by th inking with its 'head' and notwith its 'heart', tha t is. by being open to change andput t ing away some of its ineff ic ient , hidebound waysof doing business.

A conspicuous advocate of the ra t ional is t view isformer Deputy Secretary Wrigley. who suggested thatsome traditional, value driven ways in which the mil i-tary does business are inordinately expensive: thatgreater efficiency and effectiveness can be achievedby rationalising activities throughout the ADF. Keyfeatures in his recommendations were 'commerciali-sation' and ' c iv i l ian isa t ion ' . Commercialisation in-volves contracting out practically all non-core act ivi-ties, and civil ianisat ion is another process of rational-i s ing expendi tures by converting a large number ofm i l i t a r y bi l le ts to civi l ian positions. Indeed, the mo-mentum of the Commercial Support Program(CSP) -which is probably the most conspicuous example ofchange driven by economic rationalism - is testimonythat the mi l i t a ry is less and less considered a 'specialcase' cushioned from economic pressures.

But does a V.ero sum game' re la t ionship (...when youwin , I lose and vice versa) have to exist between train-

ing economic benefits of rationalisation and retain-ing the navy's t radi t ional values ? Hopefully no t , andthe aim of th is essay is to determine whether t r ad i -tional naval cul ture or ethos is really being eroded byeconomically driven rationalisation and. if so. whereand how should the l imi ts of rationalisation be drawn.To achieve this aim we should first attempt to ou t l inethe t radi t ional is t and rationalist positions and tracethe i r origins. We w i l l then investigate the presence(or absence) of a causal l ink between economicallydriven rationalisations and consequent deteriorationof mil i tary values and performance. Finally, il is nec-essary to identify the nature, extent and consequencesof t h i s causal l i n k as i t affects the Royal Austral ianNavy.

The 'Traditionalist' case

For the purposes of analysis, the terms ' t radi t ional is t 'and ' r a t i ona l i s t ' as used in this essay are stereotypesand represent ext remes . However, most n a v a l prisonnel w i l l take positions somewhere ' in between" theextremes at various times and on various issues. Nev-ertheless, most of us are usual ly closer to one 'pole'than the another.

Mi l i t a ry t r ad i t i ona l i s t s suspect that economicallydriven rationalisations are adversely affecting thevalue system and culture of the navy, which in t u r ncauses a deterioration in cohesion and operationalperformance. A value system is an order of standardsof conduct and performance developed, accepted andpractised by most members of a group over a longperiod of time. Values help define a culture, whetherthat culture is ethnic, ideological or corporate. Aculture - being the sum of inheri ted ideas, values, be-liefs and knowledge - gives rise to traditional ways ofdoing business in the best interests of the organisa-tion and the indiv iduals that make it up. Over time an'ethos' springs up and is transmitted to govern ac-ceptable models of interaction, behaviour and per-formance.

The n a v a l ethos defines membership by reflectingvalues, habits and rituals which the navy has learnedto hold dear. Inherent in the naval ethos is a require-ment for close l iv ing and everyone being stakeholdersat iainst common danger. Crew cohesion and camara-

•^• -

THIS IS WHERE THE NAVAL ETHOS COUNTS:To conduct sustained maritime operations in the national interest our nav;,must have superior ships manned by superior people.

Superior people have a willingness to take on unusual reponsibility andaccept high levels of risk.

30 Journal of the Australian Ntival Institute Mtiv/Jiilv

derie are essent ia l . The naval ethos has t rad i t iona l lybeen t h a t d i s i i n c l i v e organisat ional spir i t and iden t i t ywhich separates being in the navy from any other pro-fession: the men ta l disposition to perform in a un iqueway; that a t t i tude of preparedness to work longer andharder under bad condit ions as w e l l as the w i l l i n g -ness to take on unusua l responsibility and accept ex-tremely high levels of personal responsibility and risk.Consequently, a 'Can Do' at t i tude has been an inte-gral part of the n a v a l ethos, both to our credit anddetr iment .

The more extreme t r ad i t i ona l i s t s often interpret re-v iews and changes imposed by government in nega-tive terms, such as the 'emasculation' of naval disci-pl ine because of c i v i l i a n pressure, or the 'Brass's' pre-occupation w i t h popular pol i t ical programs geared towoo p o l i t i c i a n s and the public, rather than to improvethe cohesion and d i sc ip l ine of the service. They alsosense a steady undermining of conditions of service,lowering of pr ide in uniform and believe tha t n a v a lpersonnel are being treated as second class c i t i / ens .Moreover , many see the biggest na i l s in the coffin ofsei v ice uniqueness and cohesion as being the com-mercialisation and civ i l i an i sa t ion of a growing numberot t r a d i t i o n a l l y service activit ies. Some tradit ional-ists would argue that continued commercialisation andciv i l i an i sa t ion w i l l infect naval personnel wi th a '9 to5' a t t i tude , the "profit mot ive ' , s lovenly work lo ru leh a b i t s and ' u p or out ' approaches to promotion. Con-sequent ly , servicemen so affected cannot feel uniqueand w i l l not h a v e the capacity to perform with unique-ness and d i s t i n c t i o n w h e n i t is t ime to 'stand up andfight'.

It could also be argued that drawing the l i n e s ofciv i l i a n i s a t i o n anil commercial isat ion is impossible.because naval operations and their close support sim-ply cannot be reduced to economic models; no oneknows for sure where the f i g h t i n g wi l l get down too.In combatant or po ten t ia l ly combatant situations serv-ice men and women simply have to know how far theperson n e x t to them is prepared to go. Civilians areo n l y responsible in accordance w i i h t h e i r job descrip-tions or contracts, and the negative consequences theyface are sacking, profit loss or transfer. They are sim-ply not 'stakeholders' who are directly responsiblefor the defence of our coun t ry and they face no majorconsequences - they are not paid to. Their commit-ment cannot, and should not, be counted on when iti n v o l v e s possible risk to life and l imb.

Traditionalists believe that many of todays rationali-sa t i on decis ions a re be ing made by those w h o w i l lnever be at the receiving end in time of confl ict , andthat 'Malfunction Junction" seldom appreciates thel imi ta t ions and difficult ies of the men and women atthe 'sharp end". They remain confident that the navyknows best what it needs and economic considera-tions must come second to the imperatives of cohe-

sion and having the very best equipment and lo ts ofi t . . . .no price is too high to place on national security!However, t h i s tendency towards self su f f i c i ency inall th ings; in an era of skyrocketing costs, competingsocial priorities and constrained allocations has comeunder intense ' r a t iona l i s t ' scrutiny in recent years. Butjus t what is rationalism?

The Rationalist case

P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , ' r a t i o n a l i s m ' i s the doc t r ine tha tknow ledge is acquired by ob jec t ive reason and wi th-out regard to o f t e n sub j ec t i ve in terpre ta t ions of expe-rience. Economic rat ional ism is the doctrine that mostdecisions about an organisation, i n c l u d i n g i ts struc-tu re and the na ture of its resources and act ivi t ies , canbe made almost purely on economic grounds and un-der the saliency of market forces. In the defence eon-text , economic rationalism is reflected in the w i d e -spread use of cost benefit and cost effectiveness ana ly-sis as the primary tools for e v a l u a t i o n and decisionmaking , as rationales for s av ing through reductionsin resources and personnel, and as methods to e l imi-nate inefficient work practises. Rat ional is ts tend tog i v e l i t t l e w e i g h t to professional mil i tary judgementtha t cannot be backed up by object ive c r i t e r i a andmeasures of effectiveness.

Before looking at the possible impact of economicrat ionalism in the navy , we should take (he t i m e tolook at the American experience of economic ration-al ism in defence and i ts effect on mi l i t a ry c u l t u r e fortwo reasons. First, the ascendancy of economic ra-t ionalis t views in defence can be traced hack to thereorganisation of the Australian Department of De-fence dur ing 1973-76. and these reforms were in t u r nmodelled directly on the reorganisat ion of the USDepar tmen t o f D e f e n c e d u r i n g the Johnson andKennedy Adminis t ra t ions in the 1960s. The secondreason is that many in the United States consideredthat a direct causal l ink existed between the imposi-tion of economic rat ional is t principles on the I S m i l i -tary and degeneration of mi l i t a ry values and perform-ance in Vie tnam. Consequently, seeing how muchthere is to th i s belief could have direct relevance tothe Australian experience of the possible impact ofrationalism on mil i tary cul ture.

Why economic rationalism in defencemanagement?

The tools of economic decision making were firmlyestabl ished in the US Department of Defence andmi l i t a ry during the Kennedy Adminis t rat ion by De-fence Secretary McNamara. his Comptroller CharlesHitch and the head of the Office of Systems Analysis.Ala in Enthoven. The new 'regime' demanded a sys-tematic, rationalist approach to defence p lann ing andmanagement, and aimed to establish clear budgetaryl i n k s between na t iona l defence ends and means.

May/July Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 31

The economic rationalists - with good reason at thetime - argued that Army. Navy and Air Force budgetswere not clearly l inked to defence policies and plan-ning, which took place from year to year and wereessentially ambit claims. Therefore, the rationalistsintroduced f ive year rol l ing programs together w i t hthe PPBS (Planning . Programming Budgeting Sys-tem) from which our Program Management and Budg-eting (PMB) system is derived.

Hi tch , in his seminal 1460 work. The l-'.conomics ofDefence in the Nuclear Age summarised the new eco-nomic ra t ional i s t approach to defence decision mak-ing and operations:

"...The essence of economic choice in m i l i t a r yp lann ing is not quantitative analysis : calculationmay or may not be necessary or useful, dependingupon the problem and what is known about it. Theessential t h ing is the comparison of all the relevanta l t e r n a t i v e s from the point of view of the objec-t ives each can accomplish and the costs which itinvolves; and the selection of the best (or a 'good')alternative through the use of appropriate eco-nomic criteria (my emphas i s ) ' .

McNamara insisted that all defence problems were tobe approached in a ra t ional and analytical way. andthen resolved on the basis of the nat ional interest. Heinsisted on integrat ing and balancing the nation's de-fence policy, mil i tary strategy, force requirements anddefence budget. Proposals were to be examined froma broader perspective than that of the organisationproposing them; economic choices had to be madebetween real alternatives, economic points had to beascertained indicating when fur ther spending on agiven act ivi ty resulted in incremental gains so smal lt h a t i t w a s no longer ju s t i f i ed . He also establishedthe Office of Systems Analysis to assess service pro-posals and review service ways of doing things oncost/benefit grounds. In Enthoven's words.'... Under-standably, an office w i t h the respons ib i l i ty of lookingat the entire defence program, independently of serv-ice interests, was disl iked by those that felt threat-ened". Cost effectiveness and cost benefit analyseswere ins t i tu t iona l i sed as dominant tools for defencedecision making during th is era. but while costs couldbe measured quite objectively, effectiveness had mul-tiple and often intangible measures in the defencecontext. This diff icul ty led to much argument frommany who considered that simple economic analo-gies were inappropriate to most mi l i t a ry organisationsand situations.

The Australian Experience

The Aust ra l ian Department of Defence picked upmany economic rationalist ideas from the US and.according to a departmental summary of the natureand impact of defence reviews up to 1991,'....reviewactivi ty in recent times has focusscd on developing

and implementing leaner and more cost effective or-ganisational strategies and structures, and the need toredirect resources to higher priorit ies in order for theAustral ian Defence Force to m a i n t a i n capab i l i t i e s ' .Whi le the number and nature of reviews have beenconsiderable, we w i l l concentra te on economicallydriven reviews and specifically those dealing withcommercialisation and civil ianisat ion. because theyare the most conspicuous examples of the ra t ional is tapproach as it affects the navy.

The Wrigley Report suggested that the ADF has of-ten demonstrated wasteful approaches to doing th ings ,and maintaining its t radi t ional ly high level of person-nel and material self sufficiency was at odds wi th cor-porate efficiency. He also suggested tha t , despitechanged strategic circumstances, the ADF remainsorganised as an expeditionary force which h a b i t u a l l yseeks self sufficiency in all manner ot support sk i l l s .He argued that the d iv id ing l ine of act ivi t ies best doneby the military and those best done by c iv i l i ans is ar-t i f ic ia l and commercial style defence work should beopen to the private sector . with military personnelconcent ra t ing on combat and combat related jobs.Wrigley made many good points in his report: Per-sonnel costs do make up about two t h i r d s of defenceexpenditure: costly mil i tary personnel should be usedwisely and he c i ted the example that expensivelytrained military technicians spent, on average, 50%less time in their trade funct ion . Nevertheless, he didemphasise the importance of keeping enough m i l i -tary presence in support echelons to manage and con-trol, as well as keeping posting ratios to acceptablelevels.

Many in the services could agree wi th some ofWrigley's principles, but the rub really came whendeciding just how far the rationalist/corporate anal-ogy could be safely applied. In particular, how doesone 'draw the l i n e " by specifying the nature, locationand extent of rationalist/corporate practises in themil i tary environment. To begin to answer these ques-tions in the Austral ian context we must look for em-pirical evidence which establishes or disproves thatrationalist/business values can actually lead to a de-cline in mi l i t a ry cul ture and performance.

Vietnam

A comprehensive examination of the breakdown inculture, values and cohesion of a modern military serv-ice, the US Army in Vietnam, is found in Gabriel andSavage's book. Crisis in Command: Mismanagementin the l/S Annv. This treatise was commenced in themid 1970s after two authoritative US Army War Col-lege reports indicted US Army performance in Viet-nam under conditions of generally low combat stress.Gabriel and Savage concluded that:

" . . . . ( the army) exhibited a low degree of u n i t co-hesion at v i r t u a l l y all levels of command and

Naval

•*

ISydney 22-23 November 1995Call 06 266 6503 for details

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«

rtrait Courtesy: Department of Defence and Jeff Isaacs

Operations in the Asia Pacific BEYOND 2000

D E F E N C ES T U D I E S

The Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence Studies Centreinvite you to a major international conference offering valuable insights intowhat navies of the Asia Pacific need to he able to do in the the 21st century.

34 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/July

staff.The data indicate a very high rate of druguse among US field forces in country, repealedattempts to assassinate officers and senior noncommissioned officers, combat refusal that bor-dered on mutiny, skyrocketing desertion rates inthe Army as a whole...the Army began to borderon an undisc ip l ined , ineffective, almost anomicmass of individuals who collectively had no goalsanil who. i n d i v i d u a l l y sought only to survive thelengths of their tours'

Many in the Army came up with s impl i s t ic explana-tions. It was argued by many senior officers that thet radi t ional m i l i t a ry va lues of honour, sacrifice, d isc i -p l i n e and responsibility were all hut impossible tomain ta in in the mi l i t a ry if they did not receive thesupport of the wider social v a l u e system; tha t theycould on ly do so much w i t h a.' drug ridden and per-m i s s i v e generat ion". They also tended to blame civi l-ian interference and the impositions of the rationalist'whi/. kids'. Nevertheless, both US Army War Col-lege reports concluded that :

'...There is no direct evidence that external fiscal,political, sociological, or managerial influences arethe primary causative factors of t h i s ....climate....Neither does the public attitude to the Vietnam war.or the rap id expans ion of the Army, or thecurrent(c ivi l ) anti mil i tary syndrome stand out asa significant reason for d e v i a t i o n s from the levelol professional behaviour the Army acknowledgesas its at tainable ideal ' .

So, what really did go wrong? According to all threestudies problems w i t h morale and performance werefor the most part internally generated, and th is con-clusion is backed up by other researchers coveringother conflicts, w i t h different participants under dif-ferent pressures. According to the Army War Col-lege studies, the breakdown in cohesion and commit-ment in Vietnam was primarily a t t r ibutable to the fail-ure of the officer corps to provide the leadership nec-essary in a combat army to mainta in primary groupcohesion. Furthermore, it was suggested that the lossof officer professionalism was largely derived from'managerial careerism' and the non selective absorp-tion of corporate work ethics and att i tudes by the of-ficer corps - the Army began to resemble an entrepre-neuria l s t ructure based on a modern business corpo-ra t ion. Moreover, according to the reports, officer at-i i m d c s IvL ' . in I" be d o m i n a t e d by sel l i n t e r e s t and therewas a corporate failure to exhibit 'presence' and lead-ership va lues in the field. A new set of values beganto replace the traditional military values of honour,sha r ing r i sk , involvement in the daily lives of subor-dinates and ins is tence on d i s c i p l i n e , as the new toolsof financial and personnel management were indis-c r i m i n a t e l y applied to t ra in and manage mi l i t a ry per-sonnel. Consequently, a l i n k between exposure to acivil ian/corporate management ethos and erosion in

l i t a ry va lues and performance can e x i s t , but the l i n k

is not in itself causal. It is a condi t ion. Cu l tu ra l de-generation in the mili tary is more l ike ly to be inter-nal ly generated by non selective absorption of prac-tises and values contradictory to a m i l i t a r y ethos. Andthis is only l i k e l y to occur if m i l i t a ry leadership itselfdoes not stand firm in reinforcing and e x h i b i t i n g itsown tradi t ional values.

Implications tor the Navy

Navies are in the fortunate position of being able tof i l l ships, which are ideal vehicles for bu i ld ing team-w o r k , m a i n t a i n i n g esprit de corps and deve lop ingcohesion. Ships become areas for focus and refresh-ment of personnel, but as our shore ' t a i l " increasesfewer and fewer people will go to sea for shorter andshorter periods of t ime , and naval leaders w i l l prob-ably have to work harder and smarter to m a i n t a i n t ra-di t ional teamwork, commitment and cul ture ashore.B l a m i n g our d i f f i c u l t i e s in m o t i v a t i n g people onciv i l i an i sa t ion . commercialisation, other forms ol ra-tionalisation or even a degenerate society is to takethe 'soft cop'. Indeed, many in the n a v y could saythat posting turbulence, erosion of pay and conditionsof service, promotion bottlenecks, undervaluing ofmili tary skills, lack of government support or the re-luctance of some leaders to take on responsibil i ty allreduce the pulse of endeavour in a modern navy.

To suggest that contracts and civilians somehow in-fect naval personnel is erroneous. Exclusivity or evensignificance of economic rationalisations as causesof deteriorating cohesion and performance has sim-ply not been established. After a l l . the navy has hadvery litt le difficulty in tolerating diversity of values;for a long time before CSP one in every four of then a v a l ' f ami ly ' were civilians, and the navy has al-ways had far less d i f f icu l ty than the other services instacking its logistics tai l wi th them. In fact, manyhighly committed c i v i l i a n s could teach some mem-bers of the service a lesson or two! Furthermore, toassume that values such as honour, duty and respon-sibility are exclusive to the military and are not re-flected in and supported by the wider community ispreposterous. Without them our society could not ex-is t .

Effective leadership and management of personnel intimes of change seems to be the decisive factor whenit comes to maintaining or losing our n a v a l v a l u e sand traditions. Whether we like it or not. change hasbecome the norm and it is often poorly handled. I t ispoorly handled because naval management often hasnot been good at understanding the nature and extentot change. If it had really understood, adequate time,resources and allowance would have been made forchange. As a case in point, at the end of a major CSP'lessons learnt' symposium in October 1993 the keylessons were summed up as:• Tier 1 reviews were rushed and not approached in

May/July

a proper way.• Imprecise ins t ruct ions and directions were given

throughout the process.• There was too much external interference and con-

flicting advice given.• Resources, expertise and training were inadequate:

and• Dif f icul t ies wi th c iv i l ian employment and indus-

t r i a l relations issues were not foreseen.

These problems are all too f ami l i a r and are for themain part in te rna l ly generated. A supply officer whowas i n t i m a t e l y engaged in the processslated.'... .Nightmare or what? Yes, a nightmare dueto inadequate, t r a in ing and experience'. To th is couldbe added inadequate consultation, a fai lure to antici-pate consequences and insufficient ski l ls and patiencei n e v a l u a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s , a l t e r n a t i v e s , costs a n dbenefits....Unfortunately, most of our "nightmares 'seem to be self infl icted! Surely, this kind of sloppymanagement ' tradit ion' is one that the navy culturecan do without, and a dose of economic rationalismhas forced us to t h i n k about what our objectives are,why we have them, how we have been achieving themand what our alternatives are for meeting them to-morrow.

Conclusion

The tools and policies of economic rationalism havecome in for more than their fair share of criticism.Some "Old and Bold' traditionalists have found eco-nomic rationalism a convenient scapegoat for resist-ing change and have blamed it for deficiencies in na-val performance. Yet there is no convincing evidencethai decisions emploving economic criteria have a sig-nif icant ly negative effect on naval performance, val-ues or morale if the navy takes the time and trouble toget a comprehensive handle on the costs and benefitsof proposed rationalisations. Furthermore, most na-val personnel do not appear to see the Traditionalist /Rat ional is t debate in defence as simply an 'all or noth-

ing' dilemma. They correctly assume that there is noinherent contradiction between the use of economiccriteria to inform decision making and the preserva-t ion , indeed improvement, of our un ique naval cul-ture . Indeed, most of the problems we blame on ex-ternal pressures are largely in ternal ly generated, andcould be managed much better.

Noth ing can compel naval personnel to accept socalled c i v i l i a n values and practices if t radit ional na-val va lues continue to be exhibited, encouraged andrewarded by naval leaders. Many principles and toolsof economic ra t ional ism can and have been success-fu l ly applied to navies, and they need not hinder thedevelopment of highly cohesive, disciplined and ef-fective naval forces. However, this remains the easeonly if naval leaders lead by example, manage changeintel l igent ly by doing their 'sums' properly and thenlogically establish a clear divide between core andnon core n a v a l activities.

Ultimately, the only altar on which our values can besacrificed is the altar of self betrayal

About the author

Alan Hinge is currently the RAN's Visit ing Fellow atthe Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC). Aus-tralian Defence Force Academy. He holds an MA inStrategic Studies (ANU) and also a HSc in Physicsand Applied Mathematics. In 1984 he became the firstj un io r officer in the ADF to be awarded a DefenceFellowship, and in 1993 was the inaugura l RockwellScholar in Strategic Studies. To date he has producedthirty seven articles for publication in Australian andinternational professional mi l i ta ry journals and is theauthor of a seminal work on mine warfare . I le is alsoa contributing author to the Australian Dictionary ofBiography. His most recent publication, with Dr StefanMarkowski of the Centre's Defence Industry Program,is a defence project management handbook which isproduced by and avai lable from the ADSC.

36 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute M<i\/Jiil\

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Journal of the Australian Ncivnl Institute Mm-/./nlv IW5

T\ Letters tothe Editor

The Editor.J o u r n a l of the A u s t r a l i a n N a v a l I n s t i t u t e

Maritime Strategy and the Law of theSea

Sir.

I e n j o v c d LCDR John Scot t ' s a r t i c l e "An Hssav onAustralia's Maritime Strategy and its Links With theLaw of the Sea', in the Nov 94/Jan 95 issue of TheJournal. It gives a comprehensive coverage to manyof the 'new' factors which we, as naval officers, haveto consider as a r e s u l t of UNCLOS I I I . Most are. ofcourse, not u n i q u e to Australia. He makes out a com-pel l ing case for the formulation of a national Non-M i l i t a r y Maritime Strategy. Such arguments applyequally well to the United Kingdom. Our admittedlymuch smaller, hut busier, and for its si/.e perhaps morecomplex EEZ. is subject to the activities of a host ofg o v e r n m e n t agencies tha t are probably in need ofgreater coordination and rationalisation. A US-styleCoastguard, subsuming the activities and responsibili-ties of several exis t ing bodies may be a logical devel-opment for both our countries, especially as the con-cept of an 'Oceans Policy' becomes more widely ac-cepted.

I would strike a cautionary note, however. As LCDRScott rightly points out, Canada does have such apolicy, formulated and executed by a Department ofthe Oceans. This has not stopped Canadians all butdestroying their Atlantic fish stocks and continuing arange of controversial environmental practices. Such'strategies', subject to the lobbying of special-inter-est groups and beset by the constraints imposed onany government bureaucracy, are not a panacea forall the problems of ocean management.

The specific implications for navies of the Third UNConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I I I ) fa l linto two broad categories:

a. Add i t i ona l duties and obl igat ions imposedupon navies; and

b. Constraints placed upon the activities of navalforces.

Scott provides us with a good overview of a., most.though not all of which, originate with the adoptionof 2(K)-mile EEZs. Greatly increased requirements for

surveillance and law-enforcement wi l l provide muchnew work for navies, especially as states become ever-more jealous of ' their ' resources. When it comes tob., however, he paints an inaccurately gloomy pictureand some of his assertions, left unchal lenged , masgive a misleading impression. Without wishing to beover-critical, the following points are worth making:

a. Foreign warships are expressly not requiredto seek the permission of the coastal state before en-tering the Territorial Sea, now expanded to twelvemiles from the traditional three. This right of ' inno-cent passage', previously part of 'customary law', isnow enshrined in the Law of the Sea and applies towarships and not, as Scott states, to merchant shipswhose activities are subject to greater, not lesser, con-trol .

b. The expansion of the Territorial Sea involvesthe inclusion in coastal states' jurisdict ion of over I(K)straits previously in international waters. N o t w i t h -s tanding the rights of Innocent Passage, which do notapply to aircraft and submerged submarines, foreignmili tary rights in these straits (such as Dover, Gibral-tar . H o r m u / and Singapore) have been extendedthrough the introduction of 'Transit Passage' whichimposes fewer restrictions than does 'Innocent Pas-sage'. For example, submarines may remain sub-merged and warships may continue to operate aircraft.With most states having already extended their terri-torial claims to 12 miles or even beyond, UNCLOSin this respect actually represents a reversal of 'creep-ing jurisdiction'.

c. An EEZ is just that - an E x c l u s i v e EconomicZone. Its scope does not extend to the ' t radit ional 'uses of the oceans - namely for nav iga t i on and mili-tary purposes. EEZs remain internat ional wate rs I t istherefore a litt le misleading to ta lk of "some .32 percent of the world's oceans now ... under coastal statecontrol", for this is certainly not the case. The UnitedStates and other major maritime powers played ana c t i v e role in the negotiations on the territorial prov i-sions of the Convention, and their interests are clearlyreflected in the maintenance and codification of t r a -di t ional rights of navigation.

d. SCOTT is right to note that the seabed min ingprovisions in Part XI were the reason that few of theindustrialised nations signed or ratified the originalConvention. However, this Part had been re-negoti-ated by July last year and as a result Australia wasone of the first western countries to ratify, in Octoberlast year. Most others have now either done so. orintend to. The notable exception to this new trend isthe United States, for reasons to do with the new Re-publican Congress. Although the President, StateDepartment and Department of Defense all supportUS r a t i f i c a t i o n , the f u t u r e o f UNCLOS 111 i n t h e

(Continued page 50)

May/July IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 39

An Age of Peacekeeping?Should Possible UN Commitments be Force Structure Determinants?

A Peter Mitchell Prize winning essay

by

Lieutenant R.C.A. Leahy, RAN

li has been variously suggested that we [are/ facing an era characterised by ethnic violence. h\ unrestrainednationalism. h\ the challenges of fundamentalism, by the 'end of history' anil by a clash of civilisations. Thecontentporarv world is vet to take anv clear shape and so far has no better name than the nondescript 'post-

Cold War era'. Is it possible that it will become the 'age of peacekeeping".'

A us t r a l i ans have made a proud and d i s t i nguished contribution to peacekeeping operalions around the globe. However, at least in

force structure terms, over recent years peacekeepinghas always been something that soldiers, sailors andairmen do when they are not preparing for war. Suc-cessive Labour Governments in the 1980s and 1990shave continued to encourage the Australian DefenceForce (ADF) in their contribution to worldwide peace-keeping, recognising that there are a number of op-erational benefits to gain from such 'war l ike ' expo-sure, but emphasising that such exposure is no substi-tute for proper t ra in ing . Therefore, the argument goes,peacekeeping can be a valuable adjunct to just ifyingthe defence forces in a t ime of relative peace, butpeacekeeping wi l l never be a force structure determi-nant in i t se l f .

The aim of this essay is to examine th i s approach inthe l igh t of Australia 's wider security interests, ratherthan from the more traditional and confining view ofthe 'Defence of Australia'. This essay wi l l briefly lookat Australia's contribution to peacekeeping forces ina historical context, before examining the argumentsbehind mainta ining the force structure status quo. Iw i l l then suggest an alternative means of looking atthe security question by force structuring for peace-keeping. The essay w i l l conclude by postulating acourse of action that will see Australia lead the worldi n t o a new era of peacekeeping.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

[ 1995 is] the f i f t ie th anniversary not only of the endof the Second World War. but also of the establish-ment of the United Nations (UN) . After a relativelyquiet first forty years of its life when the UN oversawthe creation of some 13 peacekeeping missions, thelast five years have seen peacekeeping missions blos-soming across the globe wi th a further 13 missionsbeing established, and there has been a variety of mis-sions that Australian service personnel have been in-volved in over the past four years.

Interestingly in force structure terms, defence p lan-ning documents have been slow to pick up on thistrend towards peace. For instance, the 1986 DibbReport did not discuss UN commitments in forces t ruc tu re te rms at a l l . wh i l e in the resu l tan t WhitePaper, the Defence of Australia in 1987. UN commit-ments rated only a passing ment ion. However, the endof the Cold War and the consequent demand for a re-vis ion of strategic th ink ing worldwide was not loston Australia.

The dramatic decrease in tensions result ing from theend of the Cold War seemed to result in renewed op-timism toward peacekeeping. General comments wereexpressed by a variety of commentators that the emas-culat ing effect of the superpowers vetoing UN Secu-rity Council resolutions may now be a t h i n g of thepast. The Gulf War in 1991 seemed to be testament tothis fact, with the Soviet Union, al though not contrib-uting directly to the US led coalition war wi th Iraq, atleast providing tacit support by not undu ly obstruct-ing the workings of the UN.

It was in this environment of cautious optimism butheightened uncertainty that the Force Structure Re-view was published in 1991. Interestingly, th is docu-ment emphasised that Austra l ian peacekeeping forceswould only be drawn from the existing force struc-ture - peacekeeping would not be a determinant initself. It stated:

'Defence Strategy is designed to cap i ta l i se onAustralia's geographic advantages, and to ensure-that any aggressor would face major obstacles inan attack on this nation. It also ensures that Aus-tralia can make a contribution to operations fur-ther afield and. when required, support friends,allies, and activities sanctioned by the United Na-tions.'

The Department of Defence's current s tandpoint onthe importance of peacekeeping commitments as forcestructure determinants is summarised in StrategicReview 93:

'Defence's commi tmen t to peacekeeping and

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peace enforcement operations has increased mark-edly in recent years. Forces structured for the de-fence of Australia have proved sufficiently versa-tile for us to meet our commitments to interna-tional security operations on time, well-trained andproperly prepared, wi thout requir ing fundamen-tal change to our force structure. Some operationshave necessitated adjustments to peacetime u n i tstructures, equipment acquisition priori t ies andoperating costs, hut they have not caused majorforce structure changes. The funding of such op-erations should not place in jeopardy our capa-b i l i t i e s for the defence of Australia. '

Force structuring for Defence

These statements serve to h igh l i gh t the significancethat defence strategists place upon the perceived needto 'defend Australia', and the relatively insignificantrole that they foresee for Australian contributions topeacekeeping. Indeed, I would argue that this sort oft h i n k i n g exemplifies the status quo of defence strat-egy over the past ten years.

Strategic Review 93 categorises peacekeeping alongwith disaster re l i e f , defence assistance to the c iv i lcommunity and defence aid to the civil power as "otherdefence roles". The Review goes on to argue:

'These roles can influence training and the organi-sation of materiel for specific missions, but theydo not determine the ADF's overall force struc-

6Hire .

Now this seems very much like 'hedging bets' and'sitting on the fence', rarely a good indicator of a de-cisive strategy. It seems that our strategic thinkers arekeen to continue Austra l ia ' s commitment to UN op-erations for the international kudos it provides, butthey are not prepared to dedicate resources solely toachieve these objectives.

These attitudes filter down through our commandstructure and perpetuate the th inking that regardspeacekeeping as a sort of 'Clayton's role' for the ADF.Generally speaking, the argument that we do not needto force structure specifically for peacekeeping, as ourcurrent defence organisation and training programprepares our men ideally for such operations, tends tohold sway. Colonel Mel lor. the Commander of theAustralian contingent sent to Somalia in early 1993,had th is to say on his return:

'The most fundamental reason for our successon Operation Solace was the commitment and pro-fessionalism of the officers and soldiers of all ranks.With very few exceptions, the men and women onOperation Solace approached their task with enthusi-asm and energy. The compassion and understandingdisplayed by the average digger for the plight of theSomali people were somewhat surpr is ing at first, but

given the humanitarian nature of the mission, entirelyappropriate. At the same time the digger's aggressionand determination in contacts were not lacking. I be-lieve we can take a great deal of confidence in thestandard of our officers and soldiers who made upwhat was arguably the best national contingent inSomalia.'

Now. not wanting to take any th ing away from theAustralian soldiers' achievements in Somalia, Colo-nel Mellor's comments really do beg the question. Yes,Australians do have a f ine record as in te rna t ionalpeacekeepers, but do we want to maintain t h i s 'giftedamateur' status, or should we develop a concerted,professional approach to training forces specificallyfor peacekeeping?

Aside from the strategic nonsense it makes of a 'de-fence of Australia' policy to deploy our OperationalReadiness Force overseas, it would seem that the t imehas now come to look closer at force structuring cer-tain parts of our defence forces specifically for peace-keeping. Realistically, it will not be easy to changethe status quo. However, to continue our currentpolicy will only ensure that the performance of onetask, whether peacekeeping or the defence of Aus-tralia, must only detract from the other - particularlyin resource terms. In the words of Dr Hugh Smith:

'At the level of national policy armed forces aresti l l employed to promote the traditional goals ofnational defence but they are increasingly beingasked to contribute to the broader goals of inter-national peace and security. These two sets of goalsdo not always sit together comfortably. Na t iona lsecurity is certainly assisted in the long term bygreater international stabil i ty but nations wi l l alsoremain concerned about their security in the shortto medium term. As the demands of peacekeepingactivities around the world rapidly expand, thechallenge of balancing these priorities w i l l be adi f f icul t issue for many governments.'

Towards a Security Force Structure

Revealingly the keystone of recent Australian defencestrategy was entitled the Defence of Australia, andnot the Security of Australia. The terms are not inter-changeable, and an essay published by Graeme Dunkentitled 'Security or Defence? Force Development inthe Absence of a Direct Mil i tary Threat' earlier thisyear spells out why. Of course any strategy termed a'defence strategy' implies that there is an enemy, oth-erwise it is a defence against what? Graeme Dunk ' sargument is that such a strategy is in conf l ic t withAustralia's broader foreign policy initiatives such ascloser ties with Indonesia and the so called 'compre-hensive regional engagement' policy espoused by PaulKeating and Gareth Evans. 1 would l ike to extend t h i sargument by suggesting that force structuring specifi-cally for peacekeeping operations, is force structur-

42 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/July

ing mure tor security than lor defence. If we are seri-ous about developing closer ties wi th in our region,such a policy will send out less ambivalent signals toour ne ighbours , whils t promoting our wider interna-tional image as a country firmly committed to globalsecur i ty issues and the development of other nations.These would seem to be significant benefits.

These issues are recognised by the defence establish-ment . Strategic Review 'A? states:

'Australia has a major strategic interest in the ef-fectiveness of global security mechanisms. Weha\e impor tan t po l i t i ca l and economic interests atstake in promoting global order. By constrainingunfavourable strategic developments beyond ournearer region, our own neighbourhood is less likelyto be affected.'

Signif icant ly , the importance of our involvement inregional disputes is given prominence:

'Australia gains international standing and inf lu-ence because of the good reputation of its forcesin mul t ina t iona l security operations ... Participa-t ion ... can provide valuable ind iv idua l and col-lective training benefits, with useful 'operational'experience that the ADF would not otherwise ob-t a i n . '

Our high p ro f i l e involvement in Cambodia, and ourmore recent, but perhaps less successful, involvementin Bougainvi l le are evidence of the support that theGovernment and the ADF are giving to th i s currentpolicy. It all makes perfect sense, as Gareth Evans,widely recognised as the 'broker' of Peace in Cam-bodia, explains:

'Australia's foreign policy - like that of every coun-try - is based on our perception of our own na-t ional interests, and we saw - and continue to see -these as very much involved in Cambodia. Whilethe war continued, it was the single greatest sourceof in s t ab i l i t y in our region. It fed tensions andhostility between regional countries who could andshould be friends. It drew in great powers and per-petuated divisions between those who supportedthem ... While the war continued, the great poten-tial of our region for new levels of economic co-operation and development could only be par t ia l lyfulfilled.'

Sadly, these benefits — greater regional security andimproved economic development amongst our neigh-bours — are not given the importance that they de-serve. For while we retain a 'defence' policy per se,we w i l l perpetuate a ' t hem and us' a t t i tude amongstthe defence establishment. While our diplomats aret h i n k i n g 'comprehensive engagement', our defenceanalysts w i l l be t h i n k i n g of 'just in case' scenarios.In this environment, the ADF will continue to forcestructure to reduce Australia's vulnerabil i ty if a threatappears, instead of force structuring to reduce poten-

t i a l threats. In medical terms we wil l be treating thesymptoms, not the cause. This has serious impl ica-tions, as Graeme Dunk hypothethises:

'A defence posture based primari ly on dis t rust andon the need to maintain a substantial m i l i t a r y ca-pabil i ty may become a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy,with that posture in t imida t ing and u l t i m a t e l y pro-voking other countries to s imi la r ly reduce theirperceived vulnerabilit ies. A s i tua t ion of no directmil i tary threat should therefore allow real policyalternatives with respect to security and force de-velopment to be considered.'

But if these are the benefits to he gained by force struc-turing for security, will it require massive changewi th in the ADF'.' I would argue that no, it will notrequire a massive restructuring of the ADF, althoughit wil l require a fundamental change in the way thatour leaders see the future role of the military. No longerwil l our service chiefs and senior strategists be ableto t h i n k solely in military terms, because a strategy ofsecurity and not of defence assumes social, pol i t ica l ,economic and cultural dimensions. The mi l i t a ry w i l lbecome just one level of a cooperative venture forsecurity, with other critical roles being played by dip-lomats, economists, and indeed vir tual ly all Austral-ians. Gareth Evans, in a Min i s t e r i a l Statement enti-f2tied Australia's Regional Security published in 1 W)argues that there are seven contributing factors thatpromote Australia's security interests:a. Our military capabil i ty .b. Our politico military capabil i ty (mi l i tary diplo-

macy).c. Diplomacy.d. Economic l inks .e. Development assistance.f. Non-mil i tary threat assistance (Assistance w i t h

health, pollution, population control, e tc ) .g. Exchanges of people and ideas.

These then are the areas tha t we need to locus on atthe strategic level, but what do the Services need todo to force structure for security?

The answer is to force structure specifically for peace-keeping. This does not mean in the semi-token fash-ion that we have gone about it in the past, where weattempt to 'get the best of all worlds'. Despite whatRobert Ray and other senior analysts may suggest, adefacto approach to peacekeeping, whereby we forcestructure for the defence of Australia, and then cob-ble together peacekeeping u n i t s on an opportunitybasis, is not completely successful. Brigadier JohnWilson, on his return from Bosnia, commented on thisapproach, and remarked that:

'As far as training is concerned, the Army has re-lied on the general professional t ra ining providedfor our officers and men in committing forces toUN operations. This has not been misplaced con-fidence as from my own experience Aust ra l ia ' s

May/My IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 43

officers have performed well as mil i tary observ-ers and are highly regarded by their peers and com-manders ... Nevertheless, there are techniquescommonly used in peacekeeping operations whichrequire adaption from our normal operationalmethods ... We thus need to look clearly at theparticular demands of peacekeeping and incorpo-rate them into our regular training. Field exerciseswi th peacekeeping scenarios would not be wasted.We have also started to look at peacekeeping doc-trine - a long overdue and positive initiative."From the Aust ra l ian Army's view, peacekeepingservice provides invaluable experience under op-erational conditions. But if we are to continue tocontribute to internat ional order then we must se-riously consider using peacekeeping as a resourcedeterminant and introduce appropriate training forour soldiers for the special demands of peacekeep-ing.'

This advice, from one of Australia's most experiencedpeacekeepers, is sound. As the complexity of peace-keeping operations increases, i.e. from the relativelysimple provision of military observers in Lebanon, tothe dangerous and unpredictable Bosnian conf l i c t , theless likely a 'gifted amateur' is to succeed. Troopssent on such operations need to be specifically trained,equipped and prepared for peacekeeping.

The United States' recent experience in Haiti indi-cates that combat-ready troops are not always the mostappropriate to send into such situations. Troops trainedfor. and expecting to. encounter strong oppositionflounder when these expectations are undermined. Thetraditional requirements of soldiering, namely con-trolled aggression, concentration of force, use of sur-prise, etc arguably become subservient to the sk i l l s ofneutrality, diplomacy and tact. The graduates of vari-ous staff courses find that the tasks they are assignedare qui te different to those that they have been trainedto undertake. Clone are the categorical 'seize this ob-jective' and substituted instead are the more ambigu-ous tasks of:a. Main ta in ing ceasefires.b. Inspecting demilitarised zones.c. Repairing c iv i l infrastructure.d. Protecting relief convoys,e. Resettling refugees.f. Providing medical aid. andg. Coordinating operations with non-Government

organisations.

However, in naval terms, peacekeeping requirementswould not be so different from the operations we cur-rently undertake. Al though there are fewer UN op-erations wi th a n a v a l component to relate to, it ap-pears that many of the roles expected of our Navywould remain the same with a peacekeeping orientedmilitary stance. The protection of Sea Lanes of Com-munication (SLOCs) and convoys would remain, as

would the need to retain a demonstrated anti-subma-rine, an t i - a i r , anti-surface and mine warfare capabil-ity. Areas where we would need to direct more atten-tion would be in our sealift capabili ty (to deploy ourpeacekeeping troops to where they were needed), inanti-piracy operations, and most importantly, in op-erations best defined as 'confidence b u i l d i n g meas-ures'.

To a l imi ted extent . Australia is beginning to forcestructure for peacekeeping. The establishment of theADF Peacekeeping Centre at Williamtown in 1993 isa step in the r ight direction. The Centre conducted itsfirst course in mid 1993 and held an international semi-nar in early 1994. The focus of these courses is onpre-deployment t ra ining for Australian contingentsbeing despatched on UN operations, and on the op-eration of UN Headquarters for higher-ranking ADFpersonnel taking up senior positions with the UN.

However, if we are to embark on such a concertedvoyage toward peace, we need to consider carefullythe arguments aligned against force structuring forsecurity. Understandably, the mi l i t a ry es tab l i shmentsee force structuring in this way as a dangerous trade-off- greater security, but weaker defence. Major Gen-eral Robert L. Ord I I I . an American i n f a n t r y m a n ,sounds this note of caution:

'As we move into this era of increased coal i t ionoperations, some may suggest we make fundamen-tal changes to our force structure specifically forpeacekeeping operations. But many who havecommanded peacekeeping operations have to ld usthat the best peace enforcement forces are thosethat are organised and trained for wa r . . . In simpleterms peacekeeping operations can be seen as w a rfought w i t h i n a different set of ROK | Rules ofEngagement]. We must not be fooled into believ-ine that peacekeeping is any th ing other than war

14because the word peace appears in the name.'

This is an important point to make, and it h i g h l i g h t sthe importance of t ra ining and equipping our peace-keeping forces for the potential wide variety of rolesthat they must fu l f i l in modern day peacekeeping op-erations. Obviously, to implement such change willrequire a paradigm shift in the way that Austral ians,and particularly our senior strategists, view our m i l i -tary forces. Such an approach wil l challenge our tra-ditional m i l i t a ry values, and may in fact be too ambi-tious an undertaking to contemplate at th is point intime. But we should not reject this approach out ofhand. The future of the world could well lie in thesuccess of the United Nations to bring about, if notworldwide peace, then at least sustained economicgrowth and a reduction in global suspicion and un-certainty. Australia's geographic, cu l tu ra l and eco-nomic position in South-East Asia and the Pacificmeans that we are in a unique and enviable positionto inf luence the development of our region. liven

44 Journal of the Austral inn Naval Institute Ma\/.hil\

though a shif t from a 'defence policy' to a 'securitypolicy' would require a fundamental change in theway we perceive our mi l i t a ry ' s roles, th is shi f t inpolicy would not require such great change at a forcestructure level . Fighting wars and keeping peace arenot m u t u a l l y exclusive in force structure terms, in-deed many of the requirements overlap and contend.Many of the Navy's current roles would remain thesame, w i t h the bieeest change coming about in t ra in-

S n u l h . H u g h 'Prospects lor Peacekeeping" in Huiltling

n on the Cambodian Experience p213.'^.Strategic Review 93 p ] 5 .

Dibh. Paul Review of Australia'.* Defence Capabilities..Force Structure Review 1991, p36..Strategic Review 93 p46.

7.Ibid p46..Mellor. Bi l l , Colonel 'The Australian Experience in

Somalia' in Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future

8 P66-.Smith. Hugh Peacekeeping: Challenges for the

Future pxi .

ing and the increase in 'confidence bu i ld ing meas-ures'. Importantly in a t ime of widespread peace, atleast regionally, when Australia does not foresee anydirect military threat, a mi l i ta ry es tab l i shment s t ruc -tured for peacekeeping operations would be more eas-ily justified to the general publ ic . I t is time that westopped paying 'lip service' to the ideals of globalsecurity, and took some practical steps to lead our re-gional neighbours on a voyage in search of peace.

.Dunk. Graeme 'Security or Defence? Force Develop-ment in the Absence of a Direct Mi l i t a ry Threat'Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.

.Strategic Review 93 p 15.p.Dunk, Graeme opcit p5.

.Evans, Garelh Australia's Regional Security p!5.

.Wilson. John. Brigadier. 'Lessons from I 'N Operationsin Yugoslavia ' in Peacekeeping: Challenges for theFuture p 1 2 1 .

.Orel. Robert L. I l l , Major General 'The I'S ArmsApproach to Peacekeeping Support Operations' inPeacekeeping: Challenges for the Future pp 141 /144.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMYU N I V E R S I T Y COLLEGE NORTHCOTT DRIVE CANBERRA ACT 2600

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIESDISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAM

The program will be offered initially as a three-year pilot program, commencing in Session 1, 1996, and is availableonly to Australian Defence Force personnel (both military and civilian), located in Sydney, Brisbane and Townsville.

THE PROGRAM WILL COMPRISE SIX SESSIONAL SUBJECTS:

• 1996 Session 1 Problems in the History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy

Session 2 A History of Pre-Nuclear Military Thought

• 1997 Session 1 The Vietnam War, 1954-75: American, Australian and Vietnamese Perspectives

Session 2 Australian Defence Since Vietnam: The Search for Self-Reliance

1998 Session 1 Land Warfare

Session 2 Politics and the United Nations

For further information on eligibility, entry, course requirements, and associatedfees/costs, and for application forms, please contact:Mrs Christa Savatich, Project Officer, Distance Education Program, UniversityCollege, Australian Defence Force Academy, Northcott Dr, Canberra ACT 2600.Telephone: (06) 268 8207; Fax: (06) 247 0702; E-mail: c-savatich®adfa.oz.au.

THE UNIVERSITY OFNEW SOUTH WALES '&

May/July IW5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Not what you thought...In what is more than a book review, GEOFFREY BEWLEY looks at a work thatsheds new light on the naval side of the American Civil War.

Hixtorv ix noi what von thought," 1066 And AllThat tells us. "It is what von can remember. All

other history defeats itself. "

T his is sadder, harder, truer than anything Prolessor Manning Clark ever pushed at us. Lotsand lots ot'history. more and more all the time,

and most people don't remember nearly enough of it.Worse still , some of the stuff they do remember wasnever true in the first place.

Often even the best intentioned historians aren't muchhelp. Take the long, serious rather good TV series onthe American Civil War, shown here on SBS a coupleof times. Maybe it gave a bit too much time to thethoughts of anxious wives at home, not quite enoughto the thoughts of chaps like Lee and Grant. S t i l l , itlooked to be well researched and pretty much on thelevel .

Then it showed the naval actions in Hampton Roads.South and north, shipyards raced to complete the iron-clad steam battery Virginia, rebuilt from the burnedsteam frigate Merriinac. and the ironclad turret shipMonitor. Virginia made her first sortie while Monitorwas s t i l l s t ruggling southward, and she smashed upthe Union's blockaders. Next day Monitor arrived, andthe ironclads fought their clumsy but historic duel.

"Both sides set to work building more ironclads," thenarrator told us. "while Europe watched in worriedfascination. From the moment the two ships openedfire that Sunday morning, every other navy on earthwas obsolete."

Confident, conclusive, and wrong all through. It 'swhat most people, most non-experts, perhaps evenmost experts t h i n k . There's a mistake in every line,though.

Actually, at the time of the Hampton Roads match,both sides were already bui lding more ironclads. Eu-rope watched in fascination, but not too worried, be-cause at that date the European powers already hadsix sea-going i ronclads completed, n i n e morelaunched and more than thirty still under construc-t ion. Nearly every one of them outmatched Monitorand Virginia. The Europeans had already made theirown wooden fleets obsolete.

So, Monitor and Virginia weren't the first ironclads,by a long shot. Nor were they the first ironclads to seeaction. These were French floating batteries that at-

tacked Russian forts in the Crimea in 1855. What theywere were the first ironclad ships to fight one another.

Why didn ' t the makers of the TV series get this r ight?Because they were general historians, not naval spe-cialists. Why didn' t they check? because they d i d n ' tth ink they needed to. They'd seen it told that way sooften before. Wrong every time, but they'd never beentold that .

It's not surprising Americans are happy to believe theircountrymen buil t and fought the first ironclads. Mostof them are s t i l l happy to believe Charles Lindberghwas the first man to fly the Atlantic. It is a bit surpris-ing, though, that the rest of the world is happy to goon letting them get away with it.

History is what you can remember, and the naval sideof the American Civi l War isn ' t ac tual ly very wellremembered. Everybody's at least heard of the Moni-tor and Virginia, even if they wrongly t h i n k of theVirginia as the Merrimac. readers of naval history inbulk w i l l know of the Confederate raiding cruisersand primitive submarines. Americans wi l l recall some-body or other saying, "Damn the torpedoes, fu l l speedahead." And that's about it.

Nobody remembers the other actions, nobody knowsmuch about the ships. Conway's All The World'sFighting Ships, l8f>0-IW)5. does well by the Union'smonitors, cruisers and gunboats, but it rules out nearlyall the other ironclads on both sides as river craft ,outside its scope. Monitor. Virginia and the subma-rines are the only vessels to rate much technical de-scription.

General histories by non-specialists tell us even less.Writers mention paddle steamers, gunboats, ranis,ironclads, without ever describing them, w ithout everexplaining that sometimes a single ship can be classedtwo or three different ways. It makes for confusingreading.

Not if you have Warships and Naval Battles Of TheU.S. Civil War. by Tony Gibbons, however. This bookcovers the actual lighting fairly briefly, although itstill tells more than most other books. It covers thetechnical side in detail, with more than 250 i l lus t ra-tions, and with notes treating any f ight ing craft big-ger than a rowing boat.

Tony Gibbons is an artist, and this book is all i l lus-tration, no photos, not many plans. It may sound a bit

46 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Mav/Julv 1995

u n s c i e n t i f i c , hm i t has ad\antages. Photographersweren't thick on the ground in the 1860s, and lots ofthese vessels were probably never photographed inthe first place.

Plans wouldn't be so useful, either. "You cannot seeth ings . " C.S. Lewis once explained, "t i l l you knowroughly what they are." A stark black and-white planof, say, a stern-wheel ironclad casemate gunboatwould he more confus in» than e n l i » h t e n i n « . Most il-

lustrations are side views in natural colour, but Gib-bons throws in perspective views from the bow or thequarters to explain the more surprising designs.

Gibbons starts wi th a short history of the nava l sideof the Civil War. Then he covers the ships type bytype, ironclads, gunboats, raiders, cruisers, blockaderunners, submarines. At the back, there are apparentlycomplete lists of f ighting ships used by the North(names \ikeAgamenticus, Baron DC Kalh, Chickasaw,

WORSHIPSAND NAVAL BATTLES OFTHE

civil**;:* WARIMJ 1«J LUHFhlcJ .» I

ht.Df ..<p«J in Apt.l \V Df^nd UHHIA1 f-Kt [.. V«*-»,

tIU.IM) nw the fuul LOM «u «»,»». •

1Mi> lut ilo.UflO. md ill* metHf

-Y GIBBONS

Cover of Tony Gibbons' hook. Warships and Battlesof the U.S. Civil War.

USS Sandusky, a lightweight turret ironclad for serv-ice on the Mississippi. 470 tons. 170ft. b\ 50ft. h\- 5//.. with 6 inches of armour on the turret. l'/j incheson the sides. Two 11-inch l)ahlf>ren smooth-bores. De-signed for 9 knots, hut it's not likely she ever inailethai.

i*i n* MI .« h

iJ n ike II70>. rim wtatifiw m

USS Dictator, meant as tin ocean xoinf> monitor-typeironclad. 44.18 tons. 312 ft. by 5()ft. (i in., with 15inches of armour on the turret, 6 inches on the hull.Designed for Id knots, actutdlv good for about 6.Commissioned November 1864, sold 1883. Two 15-inch Dahlgren smooth-bores.

Low freeboard made her a joke as a sea-going fight-ing ship, deep draught spoiled her for coastal serv-ice. Not a good formula.

Two more shallow-draught ironclads for river fight-ing. The 511-ton USS Indianola ttop) hud 11-inchsmoothbores in the 3-inch armoured casemate for-ward, and V-incli aft between the stern wheels.Rammed, captured and blown up h\ the Confeder-ates after a short active life.

The 395-ton USS Chil/icothe f below) mounted I l-ini itsmoothbores behind 3-inch armour. Chains over theposts aft braced the trav-likc hull so it wouldn 't hog.Because the pilot house was so far forward, shecouldn 't be steered when the guns were firing.

May/July IW5 Joitrnul of the Australian Naval Institute 47

n wvd Wl m <nhUSS V.«wi itt N«w InW. Nooh Cunhni.

I }niL^v^uLaHC,

USS Rattler, e.\ Florence Miller, 165 tons. two 30-pounder Parrot rifles, four 24-pounder smooth-bores.She was a river steamer converted into a "tint-hit!"gunboat, with thin iron plating over thick timber onthe how casemate. In September 1863, her captainand 16 crew were captured while ashore attendingchurch. Later she went aground, and the Confeder-ates burned her.

Two Confederate blockade-runners. Stag, lop. he-longed i/> the Confederate government. She wasbought on the stocks nl Liverpool, hut too late for anymajor alterations.

Banshee, below, displaced 500 tons, and measured214 ft. h\ 20ft. hy 8ft. She was good for 11 knots, notawfully fast, but enough to see her through eight suc-cessful passages before she was caught. Later pur-pose-built blockade runners were reputed to he goodfor 20 knots.

CSS Milledgeville, tonnage not given, 135ft. h\35ft.3 in. hy Vft. i'our i>uns. not specified, perhaps neverinstalled. Like most Confederate ironclads, she was areduced copy of the famous Virginia, with shallowdraught for coastal and river service. Milledgevillewas launched at Savannah. (Seorgia, in December1864, just before Union troops captured the city. Shewas burned at anchor, still unfinished, so she wouldn '/fall into their hands.

""" ------- "niyudonNcwBFri)nni\ 1WI A IcMti nf mlrqut uponu ti ,vofH I l l u n k v \i\tt i ...... i l i l hi

bB-riMl (nd H.J Ijmy, »>» »iu*<l

r I .d Ihr vcucl vmh John K Siotl. w

C.S.V Pioneer, submarine boat, 4 tons, 34 ft. bv 4ft. by4 ft. Launched as a privateer in 1X62, to tr\ to si/ikUnion ships for a hountv offer. Ran trials, hut scut-tled to prevent capture before she saw an\ .service.Now in the Louisiana State Museum.

Dunderherg, Harvest Moon, Kalamazoo, Kickapoo,Q~.(trk, S/nivten Duvvil, Tallapoosa, Winooski, Ya:,<M>land the South (names like Keauregard. Florida, Geor-gia, General Lee, Stonewall, McRae, Velocity.)

It turns out the Monitor and its family were just thetip ot the iceberg, as far as the North's fleet was con-cerned. Mr. Lincoln's commanders could also deploya handfu l of broadside ironclads, a staggering assort-ment of armoured and unarmoured shallow-draughtgunboats , a weird col lect ion of armoured paddle

steamers, a couple of even weirder craft perhaps bestcounted as stern-wheel monitors, and a couple of ar-moured gunboats with turrets.

The South's navy, reputedly more makeshif t , actuallylooked more u n i f o r m . This was because Southernnaval architects went for s imp l i c i t y first , and steamcasemate battery ironclads like the Virginia \\ere thesimplest type around. Otherwise they fielded a hand-ful of odd paddle ironclads and an assortment ofsketchily armoured paddle gunboats. The South's best

48 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/My IW5

ships were those they ordered abroad in England andFrance, and only a few of them ever actually came toII v the Confederate Hag.

The South was always short of armour plate, andSouthern builders made do with boiler plate and rail-road iron. The North sometimes seemed to have toomuch. The twenty 1175-ton monitors of the Cascoclass came out 300 tons or more overweight. Theywere designed for a freeboard of 15 inches, 3 inchesless than the original Monitor. When Chimo. the firstof them, was launched, she floated with a freeboardof just 3 inches, even before her turret and stores wereaboard. More than a mi l l i on dollars w e n t on hastyreconstructions, but the class never saw any seriousservice.

The Southern builders sometimes used cotton for pro-tection, because they could get hold of cotton a lotmore easily than they could get hold of iron. Thedovernor Moore of the Louisiana State Navy hadcotton hales piled amidships to cover her engines andboilers. The Stonewall Jackson was a slightly morescient i f ic design, w i t h cotton bales compressed be-tween pine bulkheads and a 1-inch armour sk in overher bow.

A few of the North's big side-wheel gunboats hadrubber armour. A coat of inch-thick India-rubber wasfixed over the wooden shell of the casemates, with ashell of 1-inch iron plating on top. Perhaps it was meantto make rebel shot and shell bounce off. II soon rot-ted, however, and apparently it was never tested inaction.

When you read of Civil War fighting afloat, you findlots of ironclads and gunboats mentioned as rams.When you see them illustrated, you realise that 's theloosest possible use of the term. Any odd steamer wasl ike ly to be b u i l t up with iron and t imber about thebow, even if it ac tua l ly steamed at a walk ing pace andsteered l i k e a pig on ice.

Hut there are side, p lan and bow views of the CSSMantissas, a serious son of ram and a great influenceon later designs everywhere. She was a converted tug.a former icebreaker, cut down and plated over so shelooked l ike a huge iron cigar floating low in the waterwith a huge funne l on top. and one gun firing forwardfrom a single narrow port. She fought at New Orle-ans, ramming the steam sloops USS Richmond andUSS Brooklyn but fai l ing to sink them. She blew upafter running aground, disabled by gunfire.

There arc other weird ships. The ironclad USS lientonwas 202 feet long with a 72-foot beam, bu i l t out of aca tamaran-hu l led snag boat. Her big stern wheelturned in the gap between the hul ls . The USS Rotmokewas a cut down screw frigate with six big guns inthree turrets , two odd nuns in each, no two turrets

armed alike. The USS ()sat;e was a sort of t u r t l e -backed stern wheel monitor, with a big twin tu r r e tright forward and a huge armoured housing like a flat-topped cone covering the paddle wheel right aft.

Apart from the Mantissas, the South's ironcladsweren't so imaginative. Southern designers had notime for extravagant experiments. They had enoughtrouble getting ordinary ships ready. They had to bat-tle shortages of armour plate, heavy guns, engines andboilers, and skilled labour to bolt it all together. Lotsof hal f -bui l t ships had to be blown up or burned whenthe North's forces overran the yards. The South's peo-ple deserve great credit for getting as much done asthey did.

Nearly all the monitors, casemate ironclads, gunboatsand rams were slow, tubby, shallow-draught, l o w -freeboard harbour and river craft. I t ' s true that at theend of the war, the reconstituted U.S.A. had more iron-clad ships than all the rest of the world put together. I t ' sjust as true, though, that nearly all of them were shipsthat would have had trouble getting safely from Circu-lar Quay to Manly on a blowy day.

The seagoing cruisers and gunboats of both sides lookmore like ships as we know them, and they're mostlyshown in profile. There are the famous Rebel raiders.Shenandouh, which visited Melbourne, and Alabama.sunk in a duel off Cherbourg. We find the corvette Loui-siana, ordered from a French yard by the South for acommerce raider, but never delivered, sold instead toPrussia, and going on to serve as a Prussian raider againstthe French in 1X70.

A few pages at the back are given to a selection of block-ade runners. At first all soils of merchant ships tried lorun the North's blockade, with mili tary supplies andother needs from Europe for the Confederacy. Theslower and the less handy tended to he nabbed bv pa-t ro l l ing Northern cruisers. As the war went on. speciallylong, narrow, shallow-draught, high speed cargo shipswere bu i l t in Britain for this service.

The blockade runners aren't nearly as well known asthe monitors, the raiders and the submarines. But theywere a fascinating exercise in evolutionary steamshipdesign, driven by the rule of the survival of the fastest.They may have done more for technical progress thanall the unseaworthy makeshifts and experimental falsestarts in the fighting fleets. The light-draught paddlerLizzie, for instance, was 230 feet long with a 22-footbeam, near the proportions of a new destroyer 30 yearslater. She was said to be good for 20 knots, at a t imewhen a fast cruiser might have made 15.

Gibbons shows four Civil War submarines. Two arefamous. CSS Hunter sank a sloop with a spar torpedo,after drowning several of her own crews in training,and C'SS David nearlv did the same for the broadside

Mciv/Julv 799.5 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 49

ironclad USS New Ironsides. Then there's the North'sexperimental Intelligent Whale, and the South's pri-vateer submarine Pioneer.

There are a few tiny lapses. New Ironsides is shownwith differently formed upper works in different il-lustrations, maybe she was rebuilt between battles.The curious spar-torpedo vessel Spuyten Duyvil isbriefly described in the end list, but she's not actuallyshown. Maybe no plans or views of her have survived.

The notes also cover the Stevens battery, a steam iron-clad laid down as early as 1854 but never completed.The work went ahead very slowly, the designerStevens died, the design was changed, enlarged,changed and changed again. Even the panics of theCivil War didn't speed things along. The builders ranout of money in 1874, and the hulk was broken up onthe sl ip in 1880.

The Stevens battery saga seems to have been a caseof everything that could go wrong, going wrong. Thestory of its failing struggle toward salt water is prob-ably worth a book on its own. We should all hopesome keen American wi l l have a shot at it one day.It's a pity Tony Gibbons didn't put in a picture of atleast one of its proposed incarnations.

The Stevens battery seems to have been the deadestof evolutionary dead ends. Most of the other Civi lWar ironclads weren't much better, though. TheNorth's ships routinely failed to make their designedspeeds, by margins of up to 50 per cent. New Ironsides,designed for 9.4 knots, made about 6.5. The nineCanonicus class monitors, designed for 13 knots, made8 or 9. The double-turret monitor Onondaga was de-signed for a more realistic 9 knots, but she s t i l l onlymanaged 6 or 7.

Nobody seemed to mind much. The South's ironcladswere mostly even poorer performers. The big casemate

ironclad Tennessee had exceptionally weak, pr imi t iveengines. Some of the gears connecting them to herpropellor shaft had wooden teeth. The best ships ofthe war were those built for the South in England andFrance, but most of them were never delivered.

So, American writers on the naval side of the Civ i lWar generally overstate their case. At least, where theystate, they overstate. On the other hand, there's much,much more that they generally don't get round to stat-ing at all. Gibbons' book does a solid job on the stuffeverybody knows already. It sheds a blaze of lightinto the maze of deep, dark, forgotten corners.

The most surprising part is. Gibbons is English, notAmerican. All the naval writers and artists in Americahave had more than a century to tackle something likethis. Apparently they've never got round to it. Greatcredit to Gibbons. Great shame to them.

Gibbons' book is splendid, but it 's not exhaustive. Itcovers the technical side apparently as far as the of-ten sketchy surviving data will allow. It doesn't coverthe operational side in great detail. There's stil l roomfor a large-scale Civil War naval history coveringpolicy, strategy and tactics. It should treat the fight-ing afloat as an issue in itself, not just as a sideshowto whatever Lee and Grant were up to. Thai's prob-ably a job for an American. A job for an Englishmanwould be a large-scale account of the Crimean steambatteries, which has been overdue for even longer.Maybe Tony Gibbons will take care of that too, pres-ently. Meanwhile, Warships And Naval Rattles Of TheU.S. Civil War is something to be grateful for.

Geoff Bewle\ found his cop\ in a S\dne\ cit\bookshop, hut it is not stocked ver\ widel\.. Thepublisher is Dragon Works, of Surrey, UK. ISBN I85028 094 0. — Ed.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Mii\/.lul\

Letters to the Editor /></ ! •< - .

Senate remains uncertain. Whether the United States\\ i l l c o n t i n u e to he able to exercise rights, previouslypart of customary law hut now enshrined in the Con-vention. if i i is not a signatory to that Convention, is amoot point .

e. We are probably a very long way from an ob-ligation for warships to seek permission to enter anEEZ (see a. above). Because, as Scott points out.UNCLOS III is a very comprehensive agreement, ittook over 20 years of tortuous negotiations before itcame into force. Significant amendment is likely totake just as long, and the leading maritime nationswil l be no more ready in the future than in the recentpast to surrender their traditional rights of unhinderedn a v i g a t i o n . For as long as any of us are serving, thisconcern is l iable to remain a purely academic one.

The actual l imi ta t ions placed upon naval forces byUNCLOS 111 are therefore relatively modest. Indeed.in sonic areas the Convent ion represents a reversal ofthe trend of 'creeping j u r i s d i c t i o n ' . There is l i t t l edoubt, however, that several states will be tempted toc l a i m r i g h t s in t h e n territorial waters and EEZs forwhich there is no legal basis in the Law of the Sea.(Some, for example Iran and Libya, already make suchc l a i m s ) . The n a v i e s of the advanced industrialisednations such as Austral ia (much as it pains a Pom tocall Australians 'advanced'!), may well f ind them-selves being obliged to pose a physical challenge tosuch claims.

LCDR Scott is to he commended on his thorough cov-erage of the implications for a navy of UNCLOS I I I .I hope he w i l l take my points as they are intended, asa clarification and not a refutation of his conclusions.I wish more RN officers of our seniority were asthought fu l about our profession as the pages of theJ o u r n a l i n d i c a t e s RAN officers are.

Lieutenant Commander J R Stocker BA RNCanadian Forces Maritime Warfare CentreFMO Ha l i f ax . NS B3K 2XO CanadaQ (902) 427 8282

The EditorJournal of the Australian Naval Ins t i tu teDear Sir.

I have just read the February/April 1995 edition ofthe Journal and as always found it interesting and in-formative. Of particular interest to me with my well-know n (to the editor at leas t ) fasc inat ion w i t h t h i n n s

off-beat in nau t i ca l history was (ieoffery Bewley'sexcellent article on 19th Century steam powered rams.

I confess that I had n e v e r heard of the Dutch shipscovered in the article and t h u s was de l igh ted wi th thear t i c le . On the other hand. 1 know q u i t e a hit aboutanother ram which Mr Bevvley mentioned in passing.the former Pe ruv ian and now Chilean ironclad ramHiKiscar. This ship deserves an article of its own butin capsule she was purchased for the Peruv uin N a v yin 1866. became a pawn in v a r i o u s internal Peruvianpower struggles and was eventual ly captured bv (heChileans in an epic battle on 8 October 1879 duringthe Pacific War. She is today both a museum sh ip anda commissioned vessel of the Chilean Navy.flying theflag of the officer commanding the Chi lean naval baseat Talcahuano. in much the same way as the Port Com-mander at Portsmouth flies his flag aboard HMS Vic-tory.

Of pa r t i cu la r interest are a couple of lasts and onefirst connected with Huxctir, namely:

a. she carried out the last recorded successful ram at-tack by a purpose buil t ram ship in history when sherammed and sank (after three attempts) the Chileansloop Extnei'iiUhi on 20 May 1879;

h. she fought an engagement w i t h the Br i t i sh shipsHMS Siiuli and Amethyst on 29 May 1877 w h i c hmarked the last occasion that a wooden sh ip of theRoyal Navy (Shah) fought an iron clad and in w h i c ha Royal Navy wooden ship equipped w i t h m u / / l e -loading t runnion guns (Amethyst) w e n t i n t o action;and

c. she survived the first torpedo attack in history w henHMS Shah fired a Whitehead torpedo at her in thefirs t (unsuccessful) recorded use of this weapon inhistory.

Hiuiscar is part of the proud naval traditions of bothPeru and Chile. She is inextr icably l i n k e d w i t h thememories of the two great naval heroes of those coun-tries. Commandante Arturo Prat (Ch i l e ) and AlmiranteMiguel Grau (Peru) and joint commemorative ceremo-nies are held on her decks every year.

I do not forward this informat ion to detract in anyway from Mr Bewley's first class article, but merelyto add another dimension to the tale which I am sureMr Bewley would have put in if he had the space.

Graham WilsonWarrant Officer Class TwoAustral ian Intell igence Corps

May/July Journal oj the Australian Naval Institute 51

NAVY BLUE ANZACSThe little-known involvement of the RAN in the Gallipoli campaign.

by

Lieutenant Greg Swinden, RAN

M ention Ciullipoli to any Australian and theyw i l l i m m e d i a t e l y t h i n k o f bronzedANZAC's storming ashore at ANZAC

Cove on 25 Apr i l 1915. Simpson and his donkeyevaeuating wounded, or the heavy f igh t ing at the Bat-tles of Lone Pine or the Neck. Few, if any, think of theRAN's small hut significant role in this campaign.

The RAN had two units involved in the Gallipoli cam-paign. These were the submarine AE2 and the RoyalAus t r a l i an Nava l Br idging Train (RANBT). Bothserved with distinction and ironically the AE2 wasthe first Australian u n i t to go into action at Gal l ipol iand the RANBT the last Australian u n i t to leave thePeninsula.

On 24 April the Australian submarine AE2 under Lieu-tenant Commander H.H.G.D Stoker RN was orderedto penetrate the Dardanelles, a narrow heavi ly minedstrip of water separating the Gallipoli peninsula fromthe rest of Turkey. Stoker's orders were to create havocbehind the Turkish l ines whils t the ANZACs werelanding and "to run amok generally". Although AE2'sofficers and senior sailors were on loan from the RoyalNavy the major i ty of her crew were Austral ian born.

At 0230 on the 25th AE2 began her approach to theDardanelles and after several tense hours includingbeing fired at by Turkish shore batteries and snag-ging the mooring wires of several mines the AE2 madeit through to the sea of Mamara. thus becoming thefirst Allied submarine to breach the Turkish defences.

AE2 began to run amok generally and fire her torpe-does at a variety of targets. At one point a Turkishbattleship was bombarding ANZAC positions whenAE2's periscope was sighted approaching the ship.The Turkish ship ceased firing and ran for safety justat the time its shelling was becoming most effective.Meanwhile, ashore on the peninsula, things were notgoing to plan. The Turkish defence was particularlystrong, the Austral ians had suffered heavy casualtiesand many troops were lost or disorganised. Seriousconsidera t ion was being given to evacuat ing theANZACs.

The British Commander. General Hamilton, was con-sidering the potential evacuation when news of AE2'spenetration of the Dardanelles was received. Hamil -ton immediately discarded all thoughts of evacuation

and immediately sent the following signal to the troopsashore: "Your news is indeed serious, but dig your-self in and stick it out. It would take at least two daysto re-embark you. Meanwhile the Australian subma-rine has got up through the Narrows and torpedoed aGunboat at Chanak. Make an appeal to your men tomake the supreme effort to hold their ground. Youhave got through the d i f f i cu l t business. Now all youhave to do is dig, dig, dig until you are safe"

What could have been a short three day raid becamean eight month campaign and cost over 8000 Austral-ian l ives . If not for AE2's actions it is h ighly l ike lythat the ANZACs would have been evacuated and thelegend of Gal l ipol i would have been s t i l l born.

AE2 continued her attacks on Turkish ships but on 30April was attacked and sunk by the Turkish torpedoboat Sultan Hissar. Her crew of 32 survived the sink-ing. However, all were taken prisoner. During the nextthree years of captivity four men from AE2 died fromdisease and ill-treatment.

Although the RAN's presence at Gall ipol i had endedwith the loss of AE2, it was not to be long before itwas back in a role that was jus t as u n l i k e l y and just asunexpected.

The Royal Australian Naval Br idg ing Train wasformed in Melbourne in February 1915 under the com-mand of Lieutenant Commander Leighton SeymourBracegirdle ( la te r Rear Admiral Bracegirdle). TheBridging Train consisted mainly of Naval Reservistswho could not be employed in RAN warships. Theywore Light Horse uniforms but with anchor badgesreplacing the Army rising sun badges and Navalbadges of rank. The Bridging Train was organised asa horse-drawn engineering u n i t and it was or ig inal lyplanned they would serve on the Western Front inFrance wi th the British Army. Like the i r ANZACcousins they were diverted to the Mediterranean thea-tre of war.

Embarking in the troopship Port Macquarie in earlyJune 1915 the RANBT arrived at the Greek island atMudros in late July. The uni t ' s horses were left be-hind and on X August they landed at Suvla Bay (a fewmiles north of ANZAC Cove) w i t h the B r i t i s h IXArmy Corps.

52 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/July

For the next five months the 400 men of the BridgingTrain carried out a variety of engineering tasks atS u v l a . These included bu i ld ing and m a i n t a i n i n gwharves, unloading stores, salvaging vessels that hadrun aground, control and storage of engineering equip-ment and control of water supplies for the Brit ishforces. They also ran a blacksmith and carpentry work-shop and were prominent in assisting with the evacu-ation of wounded. Based at "Kangaroo Beach" SuvlaBay the Bridging Train came under regular heavyTurkish shell fire: four men were killed and over 60wounded.

Several sailors went Absent Without Leave and wentup to the front l ine to assist the Tommies t ight JohnnyTurk. Two sailors from the Bridging Train rescued aBri t i sh soldier pinned down by Turkish sniper fire,hut when re turning him to his u n i t requested that noone be told as they would get into trouble for beingabsent without leave.

During their five months on the Peninsula many Bridg-ing Train men came down with illness including jaun-dice, paratyphoid, pneumonia and pleurisy. Otherssustained i n j u r i e s and blood poisoning caused by theessentially heavy and dangerous engineering workthey were involved in.

During November the weather at Gallipoli began todeteriorate and heavy snow f e l l . Trenches wereflooded, and men and equipment were washed away.Many British soldiers came down with pneumonia andfrostbite and had to be evacuated. The Bridging Trainsailors became stretcher bearers carrying the sick tothe beach for evacuation.

By December 1915 the decision had been reached toevacuate the peninsula. On 17 December the bulk ofthe RANBT left the Peninsula after destroying storesand equipment that could not be removed.

Fifty men of the R A N B T under Sub-LieutenantCharles Hicks RANR remained ashore to assist theevacuation of the British rearguard. Several days ofheavy shelling by the Turks preceded the evacuationand the Bridging Train detachment spent many hoursrepairing the wharves.

At 0430 on 20 December the last British troops filedover the wharves into waiting lighters. Hicks and hismen joined them, and as the lighters pulled away fromSuvla Bay their departure was si lhouetted by the firefrom the petrol soaked stores burn ing ashore. TheBridging Train and RAN's service at Gall ipol i hadcome to an end. The last ANZAC's had left the Pe-ninsula at 0400 on the 20th, thus the Navy had been"first in and last out".

Lieutenant Greg Swinden is co-author of "First in! - Lust out! — The Navv at Gallipoli", the siorv of RAN'sinvolvement in the Gallipoli campaign.

Ma\/.lul\ 1995 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute' 53

LEAD KINDLY LIGHTThe History, Organisation and Operations of the Corporation of Trinity House

byWO2 Graham Wilson

Australian Intelligence Corps

I n the very early hours of June 6, 1944, a fleet ofmine sweepers departed British ports and headedfor the French coast, their task to sweep the seas

clear of mines for the following invasion fleet. Hardon the heels of the mine sweepers came, not the inva-sion fleet, but a small flotilla of eight specialist mer-chant ships.

Although British merchant ships, these vessels did notfly the famil iar "Red Duster" of Britain's MerchantNavy. Instead they flew at the stern an ensign con-sisting of a red field with the Union Flag in the can-ton and the field defaced by a depiction of four Eliza-bethan sailing ships. At the head of each foremastproudly fluttered the White Ensign of HM Fleet. Theships were all support vessels of the Corporation ofTrinity House. Six of them were Buoy Vessels whosetask this June morning was to lay and service buoysmarking the swept channels to the invasion beaches.The other two, THV JUNO and KANSAS, were LightVessels whose task was to mark the seaward ends ofthe approach channels to the beaches. Trinity House'scont r ibut ion to the invasion of Europe was to guideand safeguard their fellow mariners, as the Brethrenof the Corporation had been doing in peace and warfor the previous 430 years. They performed their taskso well, at the cost of the loss of one of their ships toenemy action, that the Allied invasion fleet com-mander. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, singled theBrethren out for special praise.

Aim

Lighthouses and other aids to navigation have beenbuilt and maintained since man first went to sea. Eachcountry in the world has a "Lighthouse Authority",i.e. the organisation which is responsible for the erec-t ion, emplacement and maintenance of lighthouses,lightships, beacons and other aids to navigation. Herein Australia for instance, lighthouses are the respon-sibility of the Australian Maritime Safety Agency. Inthe USA they are the responsibility of the US CoastGuard.

The aim of this article is to outline the history, or-ganisation and operations of that most unique of mari-time organisations, the Corporation of the Worship-

ful Brethren of Trinity House, the organisation whichis the General Lighthouse Authority for England,Wales, the Channel Islands and Gibraltar. The articlewill also look at some of the ancient traditions andprerogatives of the Corporation.

Background

Since time immemorial, landsmen have lit beaconsto guide and safeguard those on the sea. We knowthat the Greeks, Romans , C a r t h a g i n i a n s andPhoenicians all set up systems of beacons to marksafe harbours and warn mariners of dangers. The im-portance of these beacons in the ancient world can bejudged by the fact that a lighthouse, the Pharos at Al-exandria, was listed by the historian Antipater ol Sidonin the 2nd Century BC as one of the Wonders of theWorld.

The Roman system stretched from Britain to AsiaMinor and was the most complex and comprehensiveof the ancient world. It was not to be rivalled un t i l thesystem set up by the Hanseatic League in the 13thCentury. As the traders of the League began to spreadtheir activities further and further from their headquar-

54 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May/July

ters in Hamburg, they es tabl i shed a chain of beaconswith permanent keepers which stretched from Ger-many, down through Scandinavia and into France andthe Low Countries. As these beacons were wood firedand operated year round, provision of adequate stocksof f u e l must ha \ e represented an immense logisticeffort.

The first systematic system of lights in the UK wasthat of the Romans. Following the Roman withdrawalfrom B r i t a i n , the e s t a b l i s h m e n t and maintenance ofbeacons, light houses and other aids to navigat ionbecame very much a local thing with no real systemor organisation. As years went by, many, if not most,l ighthouses, as well as pilotage services, passed intop r i v a t e hands with the owners operating their estab-lishments more with an eye to profit rather than as areal service to mariners.

Trinity House

This was the s i t u a t i o n in 1 5 1 4 when the Associationor Guild of Shipmen and Mariners approached HisMajesty King Henry VI I I and petitioned him for acharter. The Guild was a semi-religious body withla rge ly benevo l en t or char i t ab le objects and is be l ievedto h a v e been established in the 1 3 t h Century. W h i l ethis cannot be confirmed, it was certain that the Guildhad been established long enough to own a H a l l andAlmshouses at Deptford. and sufficiently importantenough to be able to pe t i t ion the King .

The Guild's petition was designed to regularise pilot-age and training of seamen and advised the king thata scarcity of Mariners was likely to result from thepractice of pilotage in rivers by inexperienced youngmen who were "unwill ing to take the labour and ad-venture of learning the shipmen's craft on the highseas", and drew his attention to the dangers of allow-ing foreigners, including "Scots, Flemings and French-men to learn the secrets of the King's streams".

On 2()th May. 1514. the Royal Charter authorised"oure trewe and fa i thfu l ! subjects. Shipmen and Mari-ners of this our Realm of England" in honour of "themost blessed tr ini t ie and Saint Clement Confessor",to "begyn of new and erecte and establysh a Guyildor Brotherhood perpetually of themselves or otherpersons, as well men as women, whatsoever they bein the parish Church of Deptford Stronde in ourCounty of Kent". Management of the new guild wasplaced in the hands of a Master, four Wardens andeight Assistants, under the t i t le of "The Master, War-dens and Assistants of the Guild or Fraternitie of themost glorious and blessed trinitie and Saint Clementin the parish Church of Deptford Stronde in the Countyof Kent".

The original home of the Corporation was near IDcpt fo rd N a v a l Yard and the Corporation's histi

•ar the

ans believe that the Yard was entrusted to the direc-tion of Trinity House, wi th authority for superintend-ence of Navy Stores and Provisions. Whether this istrue or not. it is certainly a fact that the first Master ofthe Corporation after the granting of the Charter wasSir Thomas Spert. formerly the sailing expert respon-sible for navigation in the Mary Rose in which shiphe was Master on commissioning in 1 5 1 1 : Sir Tho-mas later served in Henri (.irace A Dieu, Henry's fa-mous "Great Ship". In 1514. the year of the Charter,he was appointed by the King to the office of Comp-trol ler of the N a v y a position he held c o n c u r r e n t l ywi th that of Master of Trinity House.

Queen Fli /abeth I. in 1566. approved an Act of Par-l i ament authorising the Corporation to erect: "suchand so many beacons, marks and signs for the sea insuch place or places of the sea-shore and uplands nearthe sea-coasts or forelands of the sea whereby thedangers may be avoided and escaped and ships thebetter come unto their ports wi thout peril". In I5 l)4the Lord High Admiral surrendered to Her Majestythe rights of beaconage, buoyage and hallastage vestedin h im w i t h the recommendation, d u l y adopted, t h a tthese rights be bestowed on Trinity House.

The rights of beaconage included, of course, light-houses, but a long interval was to elapse before theCorporation had all major English lighthouses per-manently under its control. This was due to the prac-tice of the Crown issuing patents or grants of Light-houses to private individuals who. on payment of arent, had a right to collect the tolls. These private lightsvaried greatly in efficiency and in some cases werepoorly organised. Instances are on record of licensees.for reasons of economy, comfort ami convenience ,erecting the l ight above their own homes in the mid-dle of t o w n where they were w e l l nigh i n v i s i b l e fromthe sea. Despite such abuses, as well as general i n e f -ficiency, it was not unti l 1836 that Trinity House wasempowered to buy out all those private lights remain-ing at a cost (aided by a loan from the State) of nearly1,200,()()() Pounds. As an example of the prof i tabi l i tyof pr iva te ly operated l igh t s , w h e n the High and LowLights in Harwich, bui l t in 1818, were taken o v e r byTrinity House in 1836, the annual port dues amountedto lO.OOO Pounds w h i l e the a n n u a l r u n n i n g costs forthe lights, inc luding licence fees, was between 50(1and 1000 Pounds — a t idy p r o f i t indeed '

The original Royal Charter of 1514 gave Trinity Housegeneral powers to regulate pilotage and in 1604 JamesI conferred on the Corporation rights concerning thecompulsory pilotage of shipping and the exclusiveright to licence Pilots in the River Thames, that riverbeing as important an avenue of entry and exit to thekingdom as Heathrow Airport is today. The TrinityHouse Outport Pilot Districts were established byGeorge III in 1808. but many of the districts had ex-isted Ions! before that t ime .

55

Subsequent to the original Charter, a number of otherRoyal Charters efi'ected the Corporation. One of themost important was that issued by James I I in 1685which defined the constitution of the Corporation. Thiswas vi ta l , as by the 17th Century the sphere of theCorporation's act ivi t ies had become so wide that itwould be d i f f i c u l t to isolate any mar i t ime mat ter inwhich the Brethren did not have some authori ty orinterest. It was the business of Trinity House to erectbeacons, to lay buoys, grant certificates to Pilots, set-tle Pilotage rates, examine and recommend Mastersfor the Royal Navy ( u n t i l 1874 they examined offic-ers of the Navigation Branch, formerly known asMasters and Mates), and occasionally to act as anauxi l iary press gang. On top of this, the Brethren alsoexamined the Mathematical Scholars of Christ's Hos-pital and appointed British Consuls in foreign ports.A very wide brief!

The Brethren were also liable to serve the Crown atsea. Notable instances of th is include the meeting ofthe Spanish Armada when Captain Robert Salmon,then Master of Tr in i ty House, wrote to Lord Burghleyinforming him that there were "30 sail of merchantships which might be fitted within four days to jointhe Lord admiral". He was ordered by Lord HenrySeymour to go with his galley to guard the mouth ofthe Thames. Captain Wil l iam Borough. Master in1585, wrote that a fleet could be sent from Flushingof "30 or 40 good ships" to assist Lord Henry andenclosed a chart of the entrance of the River Thamesand Medway.

During the Nore Mut iny in 1797. the Elder Brethren,almost in view of mut inous fleet, removed or de-stroyed every beacon and buoy that could guide thefleet's passage out to the sea. In 1803. when a Frenchinvasion was i m m i n e n t , the Corporation undertookthe defence of the entrance to the Thames by man-ning and commanding a cordon of ten fully-armedfrigates moun t ing a total of 200 guns moored acrossthe river at the Lower Hope. The cordon was mannedwith an adequate number of seamen and gunners forthe defence of the river and the destruction, if neces-sary, of all channel marks which might guide the en-emy. The ordnance was manned by gunners of theexotically named Trinity House Royal Volunteer Ar-tillery (THRVA). At t h i s t ime the Master of TrinityHouse was the Right Hon. William Pitt who held acommission as Colonel in the THRVA; the DeputyMaster was a lieutenant colonel; the Wardens weremajors; the remaining Elder Brethren were captains;Younger Brethren were l ieutenants .

The Corporation continued wi th its role of providingaids to mariners throughout both world wars, includ-ing the i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to Operation OVERLORDwhich has already been mentioned. Lightships of theCorporation were popular targets for German aircraftin the Second World War and a number were sunk as

a result of enemy action. As the Corporation's area ofresponsibility included the Channel Islands, the Breth-ren were forced to cede control of a number of theirlighthouses to the Germans for the duration of the war.

A good example of the Corporation's service to theCrown at sea in time of peace is its involvement w i t hthe laying of four pairs of high voltage DC cables in1.6 metre deep trenches across the Channel in the early1980s. In 1980 when plans for the project were beingfinalised the Anglo French Safety of Navigation Com-mittee decided that protection was required for theprojects as the entrenchment and laying complexescrossed the busy Channel shipping lanes wi th in a bu-oyed 3000 m long x 2000 m wide safe haven. TrinityHouse pro\ ided the guardship for the s u r v e v ing phasein 1982 and then provided two auxiliary buoyage ves-sels and four guardships. as well as operation andmaintenance of buoyage for the duration of the mainoperation from Feb 1983 to Dec 1985. Vessels usedin the operation were chartered ( v i a DIOPTIC LTD..a wholly owned subsidiary of Trini ty House) and hadtheir own crews but flew the 'I 'll ensign and werecommanded by Trinity House officers, the senior onebeing designated Guard Force Commodore. Althougha number of near misses occurred, usually in poorv i s i b i l i t y , no accidents ensued and the project wascompleted in safety.

Organisation. The Corporation of Trinity House hasas its prime objective the safety of shipping and thewelfare of seafarers. Trinity House is the GeneralLighthouse Authority (GLA) for England. Wales, theChannel Islands and Gibraltar, providing such aids tonavigation lighthouses, light vessels, buoys, beaconsand radar beacons, together with a Radio Beacon Serv-ice and, jointly with other bodies, control and man-agement of the Decca Navigator System - an elec-tronic NAVAID service. It is also a Deep Sea PilotageAuthority and a charitable body for seafarers and theirdependants. Additionally, and at the request of the UKDepartment of Transport. Tr ini ty House operates andadministers Sombrero Lighthouse in the West Indiesand Cape Pembroke Lighthouse in the Falklands.

The overall affairs of the Corporation are controlledby the Court of Elder Brethren who are Master Mari-ners with long experience of command in the Royaland Merchant navies, together with a number of ElderBre th ren elected in recognition of t he i r d is t inguishedservices to their Sovereign and Country (for exam-ple. Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis) or be-cause of their particular experience in mar i t ime busi -ness.

The head of the Corporation is the Master, a t i t l e dat-ing back to the or iginal Royal Charter of 1514. KingJames 1 subsequently made provision for the appoin t -ment of a Master's Deputy, more generally knowntoday as the Deputy Master. The Deputy is ex officio

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/Jitl\

Chairman of both of the Corporation's major Boardsand. in the absence of The Master, takes the chair atmeetings of The Court. In recent times. The Masterhas always been a member of the Royal Family andthe current Master, elected in 1969, is HRH The PrincePh i l l i p . Duke of Ed inburgh . KG. KT. Other ElderBrethren include HRH The Prince of Wales, KG, KT(elected in 1W) and HRH The Duke of York. CVO(elected in I W 1 i.

The Klder Brethren may not, by Royal Charter, ex-ceed 31 in number, including retired members as theappointment is for life. Of the present (Feb 95) 30Klder Brethren, only seven are currently on the fu l lyemployed list running day to day affairs; they are sup-ported by about 300 Younger Brethren drawn frommariners who have, with few exceptions, hail com-mand experience in the Royal or Merchant navies.Younger Brethren are unpaid and have no executivefunctions although they give valuable advice and sup-port whenever required, as well as providing a poolfrom w h i c h the fu tu re active Elder Brethren are se-lected.

The day to day affairs of the Corporation are control-led by the Corporate and Lighthouse Boards respec-tively. The Corporate Board consists of a Board ofWardens and Assistants, all Elder Brethren, who at-tend to the Corporation's private affairs, i n c l u d i n gcharitable and deep sea pilotage matters. The Light-house Board is a separate board to whom the Corpo-r a t i o n delegates the responsibility for runn ing theLighthouse Service; the board is chaired by the DeputyMaster and comprises active (i.e. executive) ElderBrethren and an equal number of Associate Membersnominated by the Secretary of State for Transport,together wi th three senior members of the LighthouseService staff who are non voting members.

The Secretary of the C'orporation is Clerk to the Courtand is a non-voting member of both the Corporateand Lighthouse Boards, as well as being the ChiefAdministrative Officer of the Corporation.

In addition to the Court of Elder Brethren and theCorporate and Lighthouse Boards, the Corporation isdivided into a number of Directorates, namely Op-erations, Engineer ing. Administrat ion and Finance.These Directorates provide policy advice, commandand control, maintenance, training, and general ad-minis t ra t ive support both to the Corporation and tothe Trinity House Lighthouse Service (THLS).

Although the C'orporation maintains its headquartersin the Tr ini ty House at Tower Hi l l , London, most ofits operational functions have been decentralised. Day-to-day a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Lighthouse Service iscarried out from the principal depot at Harwich, wherecontrol of Trini ty House vessels and stations is han-dled by an Operations Control Centre which is manned

24 hours a day. The Harwich Depot also houses theFinance and Computer Departments of the THLS. Thedepot at Great Yarmouth contains the Corporation'scentral stores sub-depot and the THLS Engineer'sDepartment (subordinate to the Engineering Directo-rate) is located at the former Trinity House buoy sub-depot at Cowes on the Isle of Wight. First line main-tenance is carried out from a sub-depot co-located withthe Pen/ance Depot and at the Swansea and HarwichDepots.

Finance. The Trinity House Lighthouse Service isfinanced from light dues which are levied on vesselsloading or discharging at ports in the United King-dom and Ireland and are based on net. or net regis-tered, tonnage. Dues are paid into the General Light-house Fund which is under the trusteeship of the UKDepartment of Transport and is used to finance thelighthouse services provided by Trinity House and theother two GLA, namely the Northern LighthouseBoard (responsible for the waters of Scotland and theIsle of Man) and the Commissioners of Ir ish Lights(responsible for the waters of both Northern Irelandand the R e p u b l i c of I r e l a n d ) . Al l th ree GLA are mu-tua l ly supportive and liaise closely at every leve l . TheLighthouse Fund was created by the Merchant Ship-ping (Mercanti le Marine Fund) Act 1898 and variousOrders made under this act lay down the rates andregulations for charging l ight dues which are appl iedtoday. The cost of the lighthouse services for the Brit-ish Isles ( i . e . all three GLA combined) is currentlyabout 50 m i l l i o n pounds per annum.

Operations. A number of historical functions havenow ceased to be the responsibility of the Brethren.Most important is that for district pilotage which, un-der the terms of the Pilotage Act 1987, was transferredto local Harbour Authorities w i t h effect from I Octo-ber 1988. Trinity House formerly licensed approxi-mately half of the 1500 marine Pilots in the UK whohandled approximately 60% of the nation's pilot ton-nage. Despite transferring district pilotage to HarbourAuthorities, however, the Corporation's national re-sponsibil i ty as a Deep Sea Pilotage Author i ty contin-ues and in this capacity it examines and certifies DeepSea Pilots and represents the United Kingdom on theNorth Sea Pilotage Commission.

The Tr in i ty House sea area covers the coasts of Eng-land, Wales and the Channel Islands and extends asfar north as Berwick-upon-Tweed on the East Coastand to the Solway Firth on the West Coast. THLS isresponsible for visual and audible fixed and floatingseamarks, together with electronic aids to navigationsuch as the Decca Navigator System, radio beaconsand radar beacons.

Trinity House also has responsibil i ty, w i t h i n its seaarea, for surveying, marking and, if necessary, dis-persal of wrecks around the coasts of England and

Ma\/.lnl\ 1995 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Wales, except for those occurring within port l imi t sand wrecks of HM Ships. Additionally, while mostPort and Harbour Authorities maintain seamarks forlocal use, these are regularly inspected by TrinityHouse and the sanction of the Corporation must beobtained before any change can be made to thesemarks.

Manpower, Equipment and Facilities. Over the past20 years. Trinity House has reduced its personnelstrength from about 2200 to about 620. This has beenthe result of a combination of the transfer of func-tions, notably district pilotage, to other authorities,and introduction of new technology, in particular thecont inu ing process of automation of lighthouses,which has allowed the service to operate with a re-duced personnel strength.

To carry out its functions, the Corporation has a smallfleet comprising two modern purpose built supportvessels (THV Patricia (1982) and THV Mermaid(1987)) and four launches for inshore coastal work(THMB Satellite. THMB Triton, THL Farlane andTHL Vectis) and operates a small air wing consistingof a single (leased) Bolkow-105 helicopter. From timeto time, other vessels will be chartered for the use ofthe Corporation.

The Corporation currently operates 13 manned l ight-houses ( including Sombrero Lighthouse in Angui l la )and 62 unmanned lighthouses (including Europa PointLighthouse in Gibraltar and Cape Pembroke Light-house in the Falklands) as well as nine automatic lightvessels, two large light floats and three large auto-matic navigation buoys (LANBY). Other equipmentincludes approximately 400 buoys, 14 radio beaconsand 1 1 Decca Navigator Stations.

Depots are maintained at Great Yarmouth. Harwich,East Cowes (Isle of Wight), Penzance, Swansea andHolyhead. As previously mentioned, engineering andmaintenance support is carried out at the Cowes,Penzance, Harwich and Swansea Depots.

Research. Since its very inception. Trinity House hasbeen involved in research designed to increase theefficiency of its equipment and operations. Over theyears, the Corporation has experimented with newequipment and new methods of installation and main-tenance. In the early days when wood, coal or can-dles were the only source of i l luminat ion , experimentswere carried out designed to improve the amount oflight which could be put out. These experimentsranged from refinement of reflectors to developmentof more efficient bellows! When the oil burning lampwas invented in 1782, the Corporation was quick toadopt it. although the last coal-burning lighthouse, St.Bees Head in Cumberland, did not abandon coal until1822.

The immense technical developments of the first quar-ter of the 19th Century convinced the Corporation ofthe need for a specific research establishment. In 1828,it erected Purfleet Lighthouse on the Thames. Purflectwas never intended for the guidance of mariners butwas purely an experimental and research station. AtPurfleet experiments were carried out for almost f i f tyyears in an attempt to determine the best combinationof l ight , lenses and reflectors. The experimental l i g h tat Purfleet was kept under constant observation by aTrinity House vessel cruising in the Thames, and alsofrom the Corporation's Blackwall Point Depot about15 kilometres away. By about 1875, when the periodof expansion ushered in by Argand's oil lamp was atan end, the Corporation decided that the Purfleet l ighthad served its purpose and the station was closeddown.

The closure of Purfleet, however, did not mean thatTrinity House was satisfied. Experimentation went onelsewhere and after. In 1862, the first tests of electric-ity were carried out at the Dungeness l ight with a viewto the adoption of electricity as a l ighthouse i l l u m i -nant. The electric light at Dungeness was in opera-tion for 13 years , but was deemed to be not as effi-cient as an oil burner. Dungeness used a carbon-arclamp and it was not until 1922 that the first high-powerelectric filament lamp was installed in an English l ight-house - at South Foreland.

Fitt ingly, Dungeness, sight of the first electric pow-ered lighthouse, was also the sight of the Corpora-t ion 's f irst f u l l y automated l ighthouse. The newDungeness Lighthouse, commissioned in November1961 (the first major Trinity House lighthouse to havebeen buil t since 1910), was built to replace the exist-ing Dungeness light which was becoming obscuredby industrial development in the area. The new light-house incorporated a number of innovations in de-sign, construction and equipment, all developed byTrinity House.

The Project Engineering Section of the THLS Engi-neering Department continues to experiment in anongoing effort to ensure maximum efficiency of l ight-house operation.

International Co-Operation. Trinity House was afounder member of and continues to play an activeand prominent part in the International Associationof Lighthouse Authorities ( I ALA). The I ALA. whichmaintains a permanent secretariat near Paris, wasformed to foster technical co-operation between mem-ber countries in every possible manner. Apart fromregular working meetings, the IALA organises four-yearly International Lighthouse Conferences (at the1994 Conference held in Hawaii, the Australian l ight-house authority, the A u s t r a l i a n Mar i t ime SafetyAgency, was elected to the IALA Council for the pe-riod 1994-1998). Close co-operation by IALA mem-

58 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/.lul\

bers has enabled a number of difficult and importantinternational projects to be carried out efficiently andexpeditiously. Trinity House played a leading part inthe development of the I ALA Buoyage System whichreplaced over 30 different systems of buoyage previ-ously in use world-wide.

Chari table Work. In keeping wi th i t s roots in thesemi-religious and benevolent Guild of Shipmen andMariners, Tr in i ty House continues to be active in thefield of c h a r i t y . As a Charitable body. Trinity Housemain ta ins homes for former officers of the MerchantService and their dependants at Walmer. in Kent. Inaddition. Trinity House is responsible for the admin-istration of a number of legacies left by former ElderBrethren and other benefactors of the Corporation. Itprovides active support to other marine charities, inparticular being a strong supporter of the Missionsfor Seamen, and was a founder member of the Nauti-ca l I n s t i t u t e .

Beg inn ing in the Autumn of 1989. the Corporationhas been making use of its charitable funds for theT r i m t \ House Scholarsh ip Cadet Training Schemew h e i c b v a p p m v e d t r a i n i n g is p rov ided at t h e Bre th-ren's expense to Deck and Engine Room Cadets seek-ing a career in the Merchant Navy or elsewhere in theBri t ish marine industry.

It should be pointed out that the charitable work ofthe Corporation is to ta l ly separate from its operationalwork and funds for charitable work come from theBrethren 's o w n sources, not from the L igh thouseFund.

Coat of Arms, Hu}>s and Customs. The armorialbearings of the Corporation were granted by QueenLl i / ahe ih 1. through her Garter King at Arms. SirGi lbe r t Dethicke. in January 1573. These bearings (seei l lus t r a t ion) consist of a whi te shield bearing a redcross of St. George; in each quarter thus formed thereis a representation of an Eli/abethan sailing ship inblack, sa i l ing upon the sea to the observer's left. Sur-mounting the shield is an esquire's helm with whiteand red m a n t l i n g and crest - a demi-lion, crowned andw i t h its head facing the observer in gold, holding asword in the right paw. Or in heraldic terms and in SirGi lber t Dethicke's own Eli/abethan English words:"argent , a p la in cms geules. betwene four ships sable,the fore and top-sayles up, ande underneath on awrea th of theyr colers. a demi-lion rampant, gardat,and crouned with a croune imperial! or. in his rightpawe an a n m n g swoord argent , h y l t and pomell or.langued and armed a/ure. mant led argent , doubledgeules". The motto "TRI.NITAS IN UNITATE" (Trin-ity in U n i t y ) is borne on a scroll beneath the shield.

E l e m e n t s of the Coat of Arms are worn in the Corpo-ration's flags and uniform badges. Uniforms for ElderBrethren, \\orn since the hesiimiins: of the 19th Cen-

tury and officially authorised by Queen Victoria in1866, are based on the Royal Navy, w h i l e commis-sioned officers of the Lighthouse Service wear Mer-chant Navy type uniforms. Badges and buttons fea-ture the coat of arms of the Corporation, while lace isthe same as for the Royal N a v v . U n i f o r m s for ElderBrethren include Eull Dress ( last worn at the f u n e r a lof Sir Wins ton Church i l l , an Elder Brother of theCorporation), Day Dress (No. 5's). Yachting Rig. MessDress and Mess Undress. An amusing incident con-nected wi th the Corporation's uniforms is recorded inJack Broome's excellent book on naval s i g n a l l i n g"Make Another Signal". Broome records that the late-Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis , an ElderBrother of the Corporation, was embarked aboardTHV Patricia during the Coronation Naval Reviewat Spithead on 15th June, 1953. During the Review,he became aware that he had become the centre oflong distance and rapt attention by a group of admi-rals aboard another ship who were obviously scan-dal i sed by the combination of Trinity House (i.e.modified Royal Navy) Full Dress uniform and theField Marshal's "Guard's" moustache (Alex was anIrish Guardsman). Realising the cause of their con-cern, the E'ield Marshal s ignal led:

"Bet I would make a better admiral than you lotwould make generals!"

The red cross of St. George and the t o u r sh ips t a k e nfrom the Escutcheon provides the basis for design ofthe Corporation's sui te of flags i.e. Ensign, Jack.Burgee and personal flags of Master and Deputy Master . The Ensign has a red field bearing the UnionFlag in the upper portion of the hoist, the basic tour -ship design forming a rectangular panel on the fly.All Trinity House vessels wear t h i s ens ign and i t isflown at all the Corporation's l ighthouses throughoutthe year - except when special distinguishing flagsare flown - and at District Depots, Pilot Stations, andother installations.

The Trinity House Jack comprises the red cross of St.George between four black Eli/abethan galleons un-der sail. Officially the flag of the Elder Brethren, it isflown at the masthead of any THLS vessel when anElder Brother is aboard. It is also flown at the TrinityHouse (the Corporation's HQ at Tower Hil l in the Cityof London) on such special occasions as the birth-days of members of the Royal Family. A d i m i n u t i v eof the Hag is flown at the jack-staff when Trinity Housevessels are moored alongside or at anchor and whenships are dressed.

The personal flags of the Master and Deputy Masterconsist of the basic four-ship design (of s l igh t ly dif-ferent proportions to the Jack) wi th superimposed inthe centre the l u l l armorial bearings for the Masterand a gold l ined red disc bearing the Corporation'screst (the demi-lion) for the Deputy Master. The Mas-ter's flag is flown at the mainmast head of Corpora-

May/July W5 J/innuii of the Australian Naval Institute

tion vessels whenever the Muster is embarked and atTrinity House whenever the Master is present there.The Deputy Master ' s f l ag is also f lown at themainmast head when the Deputy Master is embarkedand is also flown at Trinity House ins t a l l a t ions when-ever the Deputy Master is present and the Tr in i tyHouse on Trinity Monday should the Master be ab-sent.

The Trinity House Burgee (or Cornet) eonsists of ared t r iangular flag bearing the basic four-ship designin a rectangular panel similar to that on the ensign. Itis flown at the mainmast head in District Tenders whenin port and when they are under way with the DistrictSuperintendent aboard. All District Depots fly it inaddition to the Ensign, providing two flags can beshown simultaneously.

Special reference must be made to Trinity House andthe White Hnsign. An incident occurred on 21 st May.1894, when the right to fly the White Hnsign on boardthe Trini ty House Vessel Satellite was challenged bythe Commanding Officer of H.M.S Mersey. The ElderBrethren were unable to produce any written author-ity for their practice of f lying the White Ensign intheir vessels on all occasions when ships were dressed.The Brethren claimed that the practice was observedprior to 9th July, 1864. when, in accordance with anOrder in Council, Squadron Colours were abandonedand the White Ensign was allocated to the Royal Navy.the Blue Ensign to the Royal Naval Reserve, and theRed Ensign to the Merchant Navy.

As a result of Mersey's challenge, the Elder Brethrenpetitioned the Admiralty to grant them a warrant. TheAdmiral ty decided tha t the ma t t e r did not jus t i fy aformal warrant but that the required authority couldbe conveyed by a letter. The Secretary of Trinity Houseduly received Admiralty Letter No. L. 4608 of 21stJune, 1894, which read as follows:

"Sir.With reference to your letter of the 18th instant.No. 2387. I am commanded by My Lords Com-missioners of the Admiral ty to convey to you theirpermission for the Elder Brethren of Trinity Houseto fly the Whi te Ensign of H.M. Fleet on boardtheir Steam and Sailing Vessels on all occasionsupon which Ships are dressed, and while escort-ing Her Majesty in company with Royal Yachtsand Ships of War.2. A copy of th i s letter may be produced as au-thority for the use of the White Ensign on the oc-casions referred to above.I am. Sir.Your obedient Servant.(Sgd.) EVAN MACGREGOR."

A copy of this letter is always carried on board allT r in i t y House Vessels in order that the Elder Breth-

ren shall not be found want ing in the event of a simi-lar challenge being made to them!

It would be quite ama/ing if an organisation as an-cient and. to be honest, as odd as Trini ty House didnot have some time honoured customs and t radi t ions .And such customs the Corporation certainly has. thefirst being of course the very name of the organisa-t ion and the titles for its senior members. Anotherancient and curious custom is the Annual Cowl. TheCourt is held with much ceremony at the Tr in i tyHouse, usually in mid-year, and is the occasion whenthe Master and Deputy Master are elected or re-elected, where new Elder Brethren are elected andwhere new Younger Brethren are sworn in. At thecompletion of the Court, a church service is held atthe Church of St Olave's.

Another ancient and jealously guarded t rad i t ion is theCorporation's right, since time immemorial, to a t t e n dthe Sovereign on sea voyages. In their buoy yacht theyproceed ahead of the Sovereign, embarked in theRoyal Yacht, on ceremonial or state occasions suchas Heel reviews or when proceeding or a r r i v i n g Iromoverseas. The Elder Brethren, embarked aboard the i rflagship THV Patricia, exercised th i s right in Mayand June of 1994 during various D-Day anniversaryceremonies.

An additional privilege based on t radi t ion is the r igh tof all Elder Brethren to style themselves "Captain",whether they have held a command at sea or not. Thisancient practice was confirmed as privilege by KingGeorge V. by Warrant under His Majesty's Royal SignManual on 2()th December. 1912. The Warrant alsodirected that on all social and ceremonial occasions.Elder Brethren ("Captains") should have place andprecedence next and immediately after the place andprecedence accorded to Captains in the Royal Navy.

The Elder Brethren also have a traditional, but veryreal, role to play in the English legal system. As partof the Corporation's ancient responsibility hi provideexpert opinion in the field of aids to navigation. ElderBrethren are called to sit as Assessors wi th the HighCourt of Admiralty. This duty was first conferred onthe Elder Brethren by the Charter of King James II in1685. In judicial terms, the Elder Brother Assessor isknown as a Trinity Master and carries out his dutiesin the Queen's Bench (Admira l ty ) Division of theRoyal Courts of Just ice or the Court of Appeals. ElderBrethren may also be called for duty in the House ofLords, High Court of Sessions in Edinburgh, and withthe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Despite recent reductions in personnel strength anddivesting a number of traditional responsibili t ies, thework of the Corporation has in no way decreased. Withthe increase in the size of ships operating in Englishand Welsh waters more shoal patches need to be

60 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

marked and the boundaries of existing marked chan-nels need to he more clearly defined. As a result oft h i s , the Corporation has increased its workload inthe area of buoyage.

Yet in spite of this reduction in strength, coupled withan increase in the workload, a high standard of aids tonavigation cont inues to be provided for all mariners -both to professional seafarers and leisure sailors alike.The Corporation and its smaller staff remains as com-petent and dedicated as ever before. Trinity House,from its incep t ion in 1514 to the present day, has keptas its objects the safety and progress of navigationand the welfare of seamen and their dependants. Fort h i s it was first incorporated and its authority has beenconfirmed and renewed by successive Sovereigns; aspart of the maritime spectrum of the United King-dom, Trinity House will forever strive "for the relief,increase and augmention of the shipping of this ourrealm of England".

Author's Note and Acknowledgement

It might at first glance appear odd tha t a Warrant Of-ficer in the Army is interested in a subject as esoteri-cally nautical as the Corporation of Trinity House but,in t ruth. I have been fascinated by lighthouses andlight ships since I was a young boy. part of my lifelong interest in the sea and its ways. I can rememberw h e n 1 was about ten badgering my father u n t i l hetook us to v i s i t Macquarie Lighthouse in Sydney. Mybrothers were bored to distraction, but 1 was capti-v a t e d . To me, lighthouses rank with clipper ships asthe u l t i m a t e expression of the romance of the sea —although I am pragmatic enough to realise that myromant ic notions would last about ten seconds i t I hadever had to punch canvas in the Roaring Forties ortramp up and down the staircase of a l ighthouse sev-eral times a day. 3d5 days of the year, to trim and caretor the lamp! When I discovered the story of TrinityHouse some years ago. it was only natural that 1 delvedinto the story more deeply. The result of that delvingis the foregoing article.

1 grateful ly acknowledge the generous assistance pro-vided to me by the Corporation of Trini ty House inthe preparation of this article. In particular. I wish toacknowledge the assistance of Mr H.L. Cooper, In-formation Officer of the Trinity House LighthouseService, svho provided me w i t h much up to date in-formation on the Corporation and its work.

Bibliography

Barraclough. E.M.C. & Crampton. W.C,. 1978. FA^.vof the World, Frederick Warne (Publishers) Ltd.. Lon-don.

Broome. Jack 1973. Make Another Signal. FuturaPublications. London.

Cam H. Gresham, Flags of the Corporation of Trin-ity House London. Trinity House. Tower H i l l . Lon-don.

Howe. Geo. W. 1962. 'Old l i g h t s , and new'Breezes. Liverpool, vol. X X X I I I . pp. 262-66.

Sea

Kemp. Peter led) 1976. The Oxford Companion inShips and the Sea. Chaucer Press. Suffolk.

Kerchove, Rene de 1961 . International Maritime Dic-tionary Second Edition. Van Nostrand Reinhold Com-pany Inc.. New York.

Trinity House, the Corporation of, 1991, The Corpo-ration of Trinity House 1514-1W1. TheTrinity House.Tower Hi l l . London.

Trinity House Lighthouse Service Annual Review JuneI9V4, Legal and Information Department. The Trin-ity House, Tower Hi l l . London.

Flash, The Thnit\ House Yearbook / W.X The T r i n i t yHouse. Tower H i l l . London.

May/My 1995 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 61

Book ReviewsHudson, W.J., "Australia and the NewWorld Order", 'Evatt at San Francisco— 1945% Australian Foreign PolicyPapers, Australian Foreign Policy Publi-cations Programme, Department ofInternational Relations, Research Schoolof Pacific Studies, The Australian Na-tional University, Canberra, 1993,158pages, $20.

A nzac Day this year was held amid cele-brations commemorating the fiftieth anni-versary of the allied victories in World War

II. It was also fifty years since delegates of 45 nationsmet in San Francisco in 1945 to create the UnitedNations. Evatt's actions ensured that Australia wasrecognised as an authentic victor of the second worldwar and as a nation with a legitimate agenda for apeace so grimly fought for.

Dr Herbert Vere Evatt (1894-1965) was Australia'sexternal affairs minister in a labor government dur-ing the war and after. It was through his performanceat San Francisco that he was elevated from party poli-tician to international statesman. He was recognisedas one of the British Commonwealth's leading con-stitutional lawyers. Brilliant yet erratic he possessedgreat intellectual gifts which saw him appointed as aHigh Court judge at an early age. Yet those very giftscould hardly be contained in a mind which tormentedhim in its bri l l iance - as the last declining years of hisNSW judicial career so sadly showed. It was left toJack Gevan to invoke Shakespeare in a summation ofa career: 'Evatt lost the fight and, Lear-like, "lost all'".

For many observers of the period, Evatt was an in-complete man yet when he focused his considerableenergies and talents he achieved great things for hiscountry that few of his peers could match. Those dip-lomats who worked close to him. Waller and Hasluck,held fairly orthodox views towards him. On the road,together wi th the late Sam Atyeo (not so much abagman as an urger) they all but suggested it wasstrictly vaudeville. This is why a sense of proportionis so necessary in any account of Evatt's life and times.Despite his many idiosyncrasies, not the least his dip-lomatic style, he will and should be remembered as agreat Australian who served his country well in peaceand war. His t r iumphs at San Francisco ring downthrough the years. That his endeavours were not uni-versally supported and drew criticism should not de-tract from the sense of idealism and those practicalresults which his demonic efforts achieved. AsErasmus said, "... in all great things, it is enough tohave tried".

Sir Keith Waller " ... disliked Evatt more than anyperson he had ever worked for ... but he gave himcredit for having generated an Aus t ra l ian foreignpolicy". Another diplomat, Francis Stuart, stated that" ... 1 found him, quite simply, evil; absurdly enoughthis did not prevent me from feeling sorry for him".Hasluck remarked that " ...Evatt's diplomacy couldbe likened to 'small boys throwing stones at streetlamps'". Roosevelt "regarded Evatt and MadameChiang Kai Shek as the two burdens that the Lordplaced upon him."

While this is not a complete biography, merely con-centrating on his diplomatic profile at San Francisco,Dr Hudson reinforces an observation made elsewhereby Katherine West that Evatt. like Men/ies, sufferedfor not having been subject of a major biography ear-lier in his political-legal career. Dr Hudson in his booktriumphs in that he avoids judgement on Evatt's moralqualities preferring to lend historical understandingto his performance as a foreign minister. Correctly,Dr Hudson adjures of us that we should not forget theaccompanying demands of a heavy domestic portfo-lio Evatt had to jointly carry.

To understand Evatt is to also remember the legacyof Australia's role in the peace talks at Paris after WorldWar I. Australia, through Bi l ly Hughes, was rathershrill at Versailles but then the Prime Minister had hisreasons - no less than 60,000 diggers who did not re-ceive their unfranked peace dividend on ArmisticeDay. At San Francisco, Australia was well preparedto preserve and advance her interests without anyembarrassment or lack of confidence. Evatt wasclearly unawed by the demands of traditional diplo-matic behaviour as demonstrated by representativesof the more established services. One participant(Louis) said that" ... Evatt was not a gentleman, Evattlacked personal grace and style, and he was an argu-mentative colonial". As Greene would have it, if Evattacted badly, badly may have been the only way tobehave. The author notes that, at the time, " ... theconventions and customs of diplomacy s t i l l owedmuch to their aristocratic origins". Such an unadorneddelivery from this Australian may have been a refresh-ing tonic to many as it was irritating to others.

Readers of this journal would be interested in theservice members of the delegation which includedLieut.Gen. Laverack (Army), Air Marshall Wi l l i ams(RAAF) and Commander S.H.K. Spurgeon (Navy).The naval representative was a practical person who,after sheathing his sword, at least had the wit to enterhis son, a younger Haddon Spurgeon. in the NavalCollege in the previous year. He possibly acted in thebelief that the league of nations had failed to pre

62 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/.lnl\

v e n t the current w a r so he covered his hel no doubtin the real isa t ion tha t others would have to t ight fu-ture wars that the L'N would be equa l ly unable toprevent .

As Dr Hudson \\ rites. " ... Kvat t emerged as a personof stature in the in ternat ional community such thatthree years later he could be elected president of theUN General Assembly". Alan Watt, a departmentaloff icial who accompanied Evatt, stated that " ... Evattreached the peak of his international influence duringthe San Francisco conference". Elsewhere, Crocketoffers a compell ing psychological s tuds of Evatt innoting that " ... he was not widely admired for hisdomestic political career - he was an unsuccessfulparty leader who never became prime minister, andwhose reputation was discredited by the Petrov affairand ALP split." Australians, notwithstanding theiradmiration for Evatt's ideals, held that no one shouldhe promoted higher than they deserved. That manyCatholic labor voters included him in t h e i r prayersdid not translate to the necessary electoral mandatewhich would have delivered the prime ministershipto h i m .

Why San Francisco? "The purpose of the conference(was) to prepare a charter for a general internationalorganisation for the maintenance of peace and secu-rity". That emerged from Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta.Their mission was to" ... devise a system which, w h i l erecognising these realities, nevertheless sought to pro-v ide m e c h a n i s m s for the peaceful l e s o l u t i o n of con-flict". After al l . many countries were cautious of sur-rendering too many international powers to the UN— especially when it crimped their domestic inter-

ests. But s t i l l , those talks at least established somechecks and balances even though Evatt was not suc-cess fu l in his efforts to control veto powers as bigpower n v a l r v later exerted itself within the UN.

Eva t t ' s major campaigns at San Francisco includedthe Security Council veto. General Assembly pow-ers, domestic jurisdiction, ful l employment pledgesand trusteeships. The author notes that the Australiancontribution was formidable in that Evatt attemptedto give the world a political structure which wouldpreserve the peace and improve the lives of its peo-ple , l l u s is \ \ h v E v a l t pu t great emphasis on the I ' Nas a collective security system stating tha t " ... there-is a direct obligation on all member States to placeforces at the disposal of the Security Council." Buthe did not do all the work alone. Evatt commendedthose of his staff who included Bailey. Burton. Forsyth,H a s l u c k and Watt .

It has been said that " ... Evatt emerged from the SanFrancisco Conference with a high and deserved repu-t a t i o n ... (Evat t ) was determined to have Australiaaccepted In i l i e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y as a sover-eign and l u l l v independent state." Dr Hudson con-

eludes that " ... as a fore ign minis te r formulat ing andpursuing policy he still ranks as one of Australia'sbusiest and most innovative; as a diplomat, he couldcharm on occasion but in general he was a poor per-f o r m e r - strident, loud, unpolished - and he had someextraordinary blind spots." Hasluck noted one obser-vation of him made by an American journalist describ-ing him as " ... emotionally simple and in te l lec tual lycomplex". If everyone has to have t h e i r Caliban thenthe delegation surely had Evatt.

"What cannot be doubted is that Evatt at San Fran-cisco achieved for Australia a standing in internationalpolitics previously absent. At San Francisco. Australiaestablished itself as a participant in the internationalm a i n s t r e a m . . . f o l l o w i n g I . v a n ' s e x a m p l e i n 1^45.Australia used busy part icipat ion in its affairs to re-tain standing in the international community."

Those who pursue political blood sports w i l l acknowl-edge that his detractors have had Evatt on the crossfor three decades. It is time to bring him down fromthe hi l l - his arms must be tired, he deserves a rest.His contemporaries await their own resurrection. Be-sides, if his adherents are to cont inue to burn a flamein his memory then they w i l l need all the wood theycan get. Evatt remains a great man w i t h some ordi-nary weaknesses. He was not prepared to accept forAustralia a subordinate status but o n l v on a posi t ionof equality. Never theless , his official achievementsat the UN will endure - dwarf ing us al l . Alan Renoufobserved that " ... Evatt's performance at San Fran-cisco was of v i r t uoso q u a l i t v ... there is nothing inAustralia's diplomatic annals to surpass it." He sei/edan adolescent foreign policy and frog-marched it intoadulthood. To deny Evatt his proper place in politicsand diplomacy is to rob history of its facts and Ian-

One of the d i f f icul t ies of reviewing anv w o r k bvauthor Hudson is tha t it is hard to f a u l t for the con-sistently high qual i ty of scholarship he achieves. Herehe does what he continues to do best - w r i t i n g excel-lent diplomatic history setting a standard others canonly aspire to. For this reason, this review is discur-sive merely serving to survey the literature by otherEvatt scholars as this latest work stands by i tself . Manyof the above comments and assessments draw theira t t r ibu t ion from other writers on Evatt who inc ludeCrockett, Dal/iel. Hasluck, Renouf. Stuart. Tennantand Waller. This work by Dr Hudson is an exemplar)addition to the studies. A half-century after San Fran-cisco it a l lows us to reflect on the UN - its origins.development and its future. It also reinforces Austral-ia's continued optimism for the UN if its original as-pirations are to be upheld and realised.

Michael Fogartv

May/July

Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia'sIndependence: Documents 1947, PhilipDorling, Editor, Department of ForeignAffairs and Trade, Australian Govern-ment Publishing Service, Canberra,1994, 545 pages, illustrated, paperback,$39.95.

T liis is a three volume series of historical doc-uments on Australia's diplomatic policy tow-ards Indonesia in the period 1947-49. Con-

ta in ing almost f ive hundred cablegrams, despatches,reports and other documents, the first volume cover-ing 1947 is not for the faint-hearted - nor was it everintended to be. Those taxed by their understanding ofthat era wi l l f ind much of interest in the series.

Australia's representatives were dealing w i t h somefundamental issues of lasting significance and i t uasin this context that these papers were drafted. The im-portant decisions taken at the time were evidence of astrongly assertive and independent nation keen to es-tab l i sh her internat ional credentials as an honest bro-ker yet acting to protect and preserve Australia's geo-political interests in the wider region. While moralityis not the law there is a place tor it in in ternat ionalrela t ions as these documents attest.

For its serious treatment of these events, t h i s bookw i l l f ind obvious acceptance within foreign ministries,universities, archives, libraries and from specialistsin the i r f ield. One assumes it w i l l receive keen a t t en -t ion in diplomatic studies courses, Asian history pro-grams and at defence staff colleges. If one was scep-tical about Australia's ' independent' role as a middlepower in the immediate post-war period, then th isvolume removes any doubt. The title itself has a re-flexive quality confirming Australia's own independ-ence in foreign policy i n i t i a t i v e s in those troubleddays. Many Austral ians w i l l take quiet pride in thecontribution made by our representatives and serviceofficers who contributed so much in supporting thesovereignty of that young republic in a critical phaseof its history. For the purpose of the review, the termsNetherlands East Indies ( N E I ) and Indonesia are usedin the same sense.

The themes covered in the book include: Australianreaction to the Dutch 'police action' of July 1947. thefirst deployment of Australian military personnel asUN peace keepers and Australian par t ic ipat ion in thei n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms which mediated the conflictbetween the two sides. Australia sought to increasetrade w i t h Indonesia and the difficulties which besetthose attempts ( including shipping bans) are wel ldocumented. This work is essential reading for any-one interested in the history of Austral ia 's poli t icaland economic engagement in Asia. Ably selected byP h i l i p Dorling, the documents show how Indonesia'sindependence was an early and critical test of Aus-

tralia's capacity to respond positively to change inAsia.

And what do the documents reveal? F i r s t K . t h a t the \should not be attempted in a single sitting. Many ofthe issues raised were quite complex and the editorhas done well in his attempt to unravel those convo-luted skeins. Secondly, it should be remembered thatAustralian diplomacy was then in its f ledgl ing daysand could not rely on well established tradit ions. Inmany ways, that experience was to truly test the abil i-ties of our officials chosen to represent Australia. Fortheir successful reporting on Indonesia, those yearshave now delivered the 'grand old men' of Australiandiplomacy to Indonesia - Alfred Brookes. Sir Rich-ard Kirby and Tom Critchley. The achievements at-tained throughout their professional careers showedthat the early faith in them was both deserved anilfulfilled.

This review is unable to adequately survey all ihcdocuments contained. Nor can it a t tempt to describethe evolution of policy. The introductory chapter, cov-ering the earlier period 1945-46, provides a fascinat-ing backdrop to the dramatic events of 1947. Whileearlier Australia had stood on the sideline, an onlookerrather than an active participant, this was not the casein 1947. Indeed, Sutan Sjahrir (Min i s t e r of ForeignAffairs) stated in a press conference in Singapore that"...the Australian att i tude has always been veryfriendly towards Indonesia - (we) look to them forassistance". The Dutch also recognised Aus t r a l i a ' sposition acknowledging it in a memorandum (docu-ment 438) to Prime Minister Chifley in stat ing "...theinterest of Australia that an orderly state of affairsshould exist in the territory of a near neighbour isappreciated because a state of anarchy and chaos hasinevitable repercussions on the political and economicl i f e of the South Pacific".

Austral ia 's relations with the Netherlands, in their at-t i tude to Indonesia's political development, were lesscomfortable. See document 34. One could recognisethe motives of the Dutch, no less than any former co-lonial power, for wanting to return to the status quoante helium. For many, restoration of authority in theirpossessions went a long way towards assuaging bit-ter memories of defeat in the pacific war. But thei rvery defeat by an Asian nation provided a catalyst formany Asian independence movements. Equally. Asiannationalists were quick to exploit the political vacuumwith the sudden collapse of Japanese power at thewar's end in 1945.

For the Dutch. Indonesia became a r u i n o u s war asthey attempted military solutions to essentially po-li t ical problems. Both countries were captive to t he i rhistory as the winds of change came early to Asia andinternational pressure aided that process. Australia hadconsiderable sympathy for Indonesia's nationalist as-

M Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Ma\/.lul\

pira t ions and our re la t ions w i t h the Dutch werestrained for tha t position - made more d i f f i cu l t as fel-low a l l i e s during the 1939-45 war. Ballard's recep-tion by Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-Generalof the NEI, was not enjoyable - being received first lyin hostile silence soon followed by anger. See docu-ment 27.

The documents also demonstrate that the service of-ficers assigned to Indonesia had the requisite profes-sional sk i l l s which enabled them to both carry anddischarge a political brief of considerable sensitivity.The staff paper (document 360) prepared by the Aus-tralian Military Observing Officers for Group Cap-tain Eaton in Batavia, being a despatch on the po-l i t ico-mi l i ta ry situation in Java for August-Septem-ber, could well become a standard reporting guide forany conflict .

The reports to Canberra and from other capitals de-scribe the d i f fus ion of power in (he NEI and how theconflict was managed in world councils at the widerpolitical level. Many of the documents are quite pro-l i x as they attenuate Australian policy positions in theiri n c r e m e n t a l p a t t e r n s . For t ha t reason, th i s countrystudy wi l l also remain an authoritative text for diplo-mat ic reporting for the use of the technical languageinvolved. But more than anything else, it shows theexegesis of an independent foreign policy by our rep-resen ta t ives on station. Gifted they were - amateursthey were not. Despite all the frenetic activity, andthe heavy demands placed on staff, one documentoffers some rare beauty amid the aridity of the ex-changes. I n document 324. Eaton concludes a letterto Canberra w i t h a remark, possibly intended for anofficial 's wife, observing " ... one redeeming feature,there are some lovely orchids in Java."

The reader w i l l be rewarded on arris ing at document376 to note how the French sought support from Aus-t r a l i a — making a connection with their own colonialproblems and showing a refined grasp of l inkagetheory. The department advised the Consul-Generalin Batavia (Group Captain Eaton) that "...the FrenchConsul has hinted that he would sign present draft(report), if he had some undertaking regarding oura t t i t u d e on French Indo-China". I t may have been for( h i s reason, in not ing Canberra's instructions, thatEaton replied to the cable (in document 37H) regret-t ing that his l iquor supply had not arrived - urgentlyrequest ing cases of Scotch Whisky. The prospect ofimpending travel in an RAAF aircraft, configuredmainly with bucket seats, only added to his unease.

Document 424 (Ki rby to Burton) reinforces the ten-

sions then experienced in Batavia in managing Aus-tralia's policy. Kirby felt compelled to advise the Sec-retary of the Department of External Affairs that "... 1did not ask for your opinion as to whether 1 was cor-rect ( a n d ) 1 am not under your instructions as to theway I perform this Mission". Whi le Kirby qua l i f i edhis remarks his cable clearly stresses that he was onthe spot and needed greater support from Canberra.As well, the key contribution made by secretaries andcommunicators in the Australian office in Batavia iswel l documented. They too were vital to the missionif the objectives were to be realised. At one stage,Australia was prepared to offer assistance to the re-publicans to safeguard their communications so as notto compromise their negotiations w i t h the Dutch.Document 441 refers.

Critchley was Australia's acting representative on theUN Committee of Good Offices from 9-31 Decem-ber and his negotiations and reporting were of thehighest order. See document 468 which was tabled in

USS Renville. Those negotiations were as protractedas they were tortuous often appearing as much changewith l i t t l e progress. But it was through perseveranceand quiet diplomacy that results e v e n t u a l l y followedlater in 1949 proving that the Indonesian quest ion \\ asnot amenable to a 'quick f ix ' . Indeed, document 49Swas a codicil for their work in 1947. Eaton, in his lastcablegram for the year, reported on New Year's Evethat " ... no pol i t ica l solution to the Indonesian prob-lem had been obtained."

Philip Dorling. w i t h his colleagues of the HistoricalDocuments Project Section, in their selection and care-ful editing of the primary documents, h a v e producedan original and a u t h e n t i c work of t o w e r i n g scholar-ship. There is only one thing worse than inventinghistory and tha t is i gnor ing it . Here. Indones ia ' s po-litical history in year 1947 is refracted through Aus-tralian eyes. The work is a material contribution toour knowledge of Australia's advocacy for Indonesiain an even t fu l period of its revolutionary history andthe relat ionship overall. I t explains why we went theway we did. Moreover, it evidences that Australia 'saff ini ty with Indonesia enjoys firm foundations w h i c hdraw t h e i r o r ig ins from the support and recognit ionAustralia gave to Indonesia in the formative years ofthe young republic.

Michael Fogartv

(The opinions expressed are solely those of the au-thor and do not reflect any official views - past orpresent)

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

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