Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914

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1/29

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The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914Author(s): Jonathan GrantSource: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 9-36Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677343Accessed: 06-03-2015 04:01 UTC

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2/29

The Sword f

the Sultan:

OttomanArms mports,854-1914

Jonathan

Grant

AT

he

beginning

f

the

nineteenth

entury

he OttomanEmpirewas

self-sufficient

n

its

armaments

production,

yet by

1914 its domes-

tic

military

nd naval manufacturing

apacity had eroded to such an

extent

that the

empire

had become

almost

completely

dependent

on

imports.

While Turkish ttempts o foster

omestic

production

apabili-

ties

proved sporadic

and unsuccessful,

he

Ottoman

Empirewas

trans-

formed nto

one of

the most

important

markets for

armaments

n

the

world.Why

did

this erosion

in

production

apacity occur, and why

did

the Ottomans

ultimatelyrely

on

importing

he hardware

rather than

domesticating

he technology?

Did the

unwillingness

f

foreign

irms o

transfer

echnology

orce he

Turksto

import

he

finished efense

goods

and

preempt

the

development

of Ottoman

war

industries?Was

there

a

conscious design

on

the

part

of

the

European producers

of armaments

o

make the Ottomans dependent? In lightofthe evidence,the answerto

the last

question

must be

negative.

Rather than

to any foreignplot,

the

process leading to Ottoman

dependency

on

foreign

rms

suppliers

should

be

attributed

more

accu-

rately

to the

interplay

f

external

and internal

factors.

Externally,

he

impersonal

forcesof

rapid technological hange

and

the

development

of

an

international rmaments

mass

marketmade the

rapidacquisition

of

the latest defense

equipment

a

financially

ound

choice.

Internally,

he

political

and

personal

decisions

of Sultan

Abdul

Hamid

11

1876-1909)

profoundly

ffected he course of

Turkish

policy.

This article

emphasizes

Turkish

gency

over

foreignmanipulation

as the

key

to understanding

the

erosion

of the

domestic

defense

industries.

Furthermore, lthough

the

Ottomans

failed o achieve

self-sufficiency

n

armamentsproduction,

the Turkish case

may

be considered

a

qualified success

in

that

the

Ottoman

state did

obtain

high quality

equipment quickly

and

relatively

cheaply,given

ts

limited

financial

means.

The Journal of Militarvy listory 6 (January 2002): 9-36 C) Societv forMilitaryHistorr

*

9


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3/29

JONATIIANGRANT

Ottoman

war

industries

had

deep

roots

n

the

gunpowder

ge. Since

the fifteenthentury he Ottomanshad manufactured heir

wn military

and naval equipmentusingforeign xpertise nd copying oreignmodels.

After alling ehind technologically

uring he eighteenth entury,

urk-

ish domestic productionbegan

to return o a high evel of quality begin-

ning in the 1780s, thanks to the help of formalmissions

of technical

specialists

from

western Europe. By

the

early

nineteenth

century the

Ottoman Empire

once

again

had

become self-sufficient

n

its

military

production.'

Ottoman

armaments

policy

from the 1850s

up

to World War

I

reflected

he

empire's

weak industrial

nd financial

foundations,

s the

Ottomangovernmentncreasinglyooked to the industrial nd financial

capabilities of Germany,Britain,

and

France to

meet its

needs for

weapons

and

military quipment.

Ultimately, mported

rms became a

substitute

ordomestic

ones,

as the Ottoman

state

armaments

ndustry

could not compete with

the foreign roducers

n

quantity r modernity

of

weapons

and

ships.

It became

easier

simply

to

restock with the

newest, top-of-the-linequipment rather

than lose

time

and money

attempting

o

create and maintain

domestic arms

industry.

This complete dependence on foreign uppliers to meet Ottoman

defense needs

placed

the

country

n

an

extremely

ulnerable

position,

and

presented

the

potential

for foreign uppliers

to

exert influenceon

Turkishpolicy through

he

manipulation

f the flowof

arms

and

equip-

ment.Recognizing hispossibility,

he Ottomangovernment ried o min-

imize risksby avoiding xclusive

reliance

on

any single

foreign upplier.

Given

these

conditions,

he Ottoman

Empire

in the

pre-1914 years

can

serve

as a valuable

case study

for

he

dynamics

of

the arms trade

n

the ThirdWorld.

The Ottoman Empirewas not unique in grapplingwith the chal-

lenges ofmodernizing ts

defense

ector.

Russia, Japan,China,

and

Egypt

similarly

onfronted he

problem

of

mportingmilitary

echnology

rom

the

West,

with

varying egrees

of success.

By

1914

Russia

and

Japan

had

accomplished

the

most

n

terms f

developing

domestic

military

ndus-

trial

base, yet

even

they

had

not

achieved

self-sufficiency

n

armaments

or

warship production.

For all these

modernizing ountries,

the chal-

lenges posed by

the

high

costs of

foreign xpertise, mported

materials,

and skilled abor placed severe economic strains on state resources. In

orderto

meet defense

requirements

s

quickly

as

possible,

all

these

pow-

ers turned

o

imports

o

a

greater

r lesser

degree.2

1. Jonathan rant,

Rethinkinghe Ottoman

Decline':

Military

echnology if-

fusion n the Ottoman mpire, ifteentho

Eighteenth enturies, ournal

f World

History 0 (Spring 999): 179-201.

2. David B. Ralston, mporting he European

Army Chicago:

University f

ChicagoPress,1990);

Thomas

L.

Kennedy,

he

Arms

ofKiangnan:

Modernizationn

10 *

THE

JOURNAL

OF




4/29

The Sword

of theSultan

While they made

this substitution

f imports, he question facing

Ottoman policy-makers

was fromwhom to buy arms, for they always

considered multipleoptions forsuppliers.Based on an analysis of the

patterns of Ottoman

arms and equipment purchases, it is

possible to

establish

a

periodization

consisting

of four phases: (1) circa 1850-85,

when

domestic

arms production

waned as reliance on importsfor the

bulk of defense tems

grew; 2) 1885-95,

marked by the preference or

Germany

n

both military

nd naval

orders; 3) 1898-1907,

the period

of

renewal

of

naval orders

fromBritain

nd France

while

Germany

con-

tinued as thepreferredupplier

for and forces;

nd

(4) 1908-14, when

Britain

was preeminent

n

Ottoman

naval ordersand the Franco-Ger-

man rivalry n military rders ended in the selectionofGermany.

Overall,

the

entire period may

be seen as

characteristic f one way

in which

the Ottoman

Empire reacted to

the

issue

of

Westernization.

n

the

realm

of warfare,

t

was

more acceptable, or rather ess

objection-

able,

to

incorporate

Westernborrowings

han

n

other

areas of state and

society.

The eclecticism

with which the Ottomans

combined arms

sys-

tems

and

purchases

fromvarious countries demonstrated

Take the

best

from he

West policy.

A concise

summary

of

the

sixty-odd

years

wouldbe thatthe Ottomans bought suppliesfrom hose countriesrec-

ognized

as world eaders

in

particular

ategories.

More

specifically,

his

meant

that the

Ottomans imported army weapons

and

supplies

from

Germany

nd naval

systems

rom ritain

and

to

a

lesser

degree

France).

In both

cases,

the

respective

countries

were

acknowledged

and

respected as the best.

A

good

deal of attention

has

been

given

to the

place

of

the

Ottoman

Empire, and the

Middle East

in

general,

n

the

developing

world

econ-

omy.

These

studies

have tended to concentrate

n the

transformation

f

traditional griculturentoan export ectorserving heneeds ofthemar-

kets of the core of the

world

economy,

or

they

have

examined the

ruina-

tion of domestic textile

industries

by cheaper European imports.3

However,

there has been

no real

systematic

study

of

the

changes

in

theChinese Ordnance ndustry, 860-1895

(Boulder,

olo.:

Westview ress,1978);

JohnDunn, Egypt's ineteenth-Century

rmaments

ndustry,

ournal fMilitary

History61 (April1997): 231-54; JonathanGrant, TsaristArmament trategies,

1870-1914, Journal

of Soviet Military

tudies

4

(March 1991): 141-49; Joseph

Bradley,

uns for the Tsar: The State,Labor and

Technology

ransfern the

Russ-

ian Small Arms ndustry DeKalb: Northern

llinoisUniversity

ress,1990); Japan,

in

Conway's

All the World's ighting hips

1906-1921 (London:

ConwayMaritime

Press,1985),

222-23.

3.

*evket

Pamuk,

The

Ottoman

mpire and European Capitalism,

1820-1913

(Cambridge:

ambridge niversityress,1987); RogerOwen,The

MiddleEast in

the

World

conomy,

800-1914 (London:

Methuen nd

Co., 1987).

MILITARY HISTORY * 11




5/29

JONATIAN GRANT

Ottoman war industries.This

is

rather surprising iven the historical

importance f the military n the Ottoman Empire.4

Superficially,ne might xpect a degreeofdependency n the arma-

ments sector because the rest of the Ottoman economy was subinfeu-

dated to the West; however, his proved not

to

be the case. There was no

monolithicWesterncontrol because the West was

not

a single unitary

economic actor. The

individual

states

and the

private arms suppliers

engaged in keen competitionpolitically nd economically, llowingthe

Ottomans to

exercise choice

in

arms

and

financial

markets.

Ultimately,

he

primary

ause

of

the decline of Ottoman war

indus-

trieswas

a financial ne.

By

far

nd

away money

was

the

commodity

he

Porte mported hemost, nd capital provedtobe thetrue bottleneck n

Ottomanproduction.

Technical

expertise

or

necessary

materials

uch as

coal

and

iron could

be obtained

with

ease

if the

fundswere

available. It

is true that the technological hanges caused difficultiesor n unskilled

labor force,but the Turkishworkerswere certainly rainable.Moreover,

the

greatesthardship

for he

Ottomansregarding

abor

was retaining or-

eign experts,due largely o

the

need to pay

them

higher alaries.

Government

evenues

were

the lifeblood

of the war

industries,

nd

by the nineteenthcenturythe Ottoman Sick Man ofEurope clearly

had

a circulatoryproblem. Attempts o

raise revenues

failed, and the

Ottomans acked

the means

to

cover the costs

of

reforms nd continual

wars.

When

they

had

the money, the Ottomans

chose

to

pay

the

high

costs required

to

maintain their

armed

forces.

During

the

1830s the

armyclaimed

70

percent

of total revenues.5

The

government imply

ran

out

of money

n

the 1840s,

and

consequently,

he war

industries

began

to

atrophy.

State

borrowing

ffered

he

apparent

solutionto the

problem.Begin-

ningin 1841 the state issued short-termonds to pay a war indemnity

but soon exhausted

internal sources.

The

only

alternativewas

foreign

loans,

which commenced

during

he Crimean

War

(1854-56)

when the

Turks

borrowedfrom

rivate

bankers of

their

military llies,

Britain nd

France. After he

war

Sultan Abdul

Aziz

(1861-76)

continued

to

spend

money, mostly

for the construction

f

palaces,

and the debt

increased

further.Due to

inefficient

dministration

and

tax

collection,

the

Ottoman

government egularly

an in the

red

financially

nd covered the

deficits y more borrowingthighratesof nterest.UnderAbdulAziz, as

4. WilliamHale, Turkish

olitics and the

Military

London: Routledge, 994).

Turkishnaval imports n the period 1908-14

are

described

n

Paul Halpem, The

Mediterranean aval Situation,

908-1914 (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity

Press,1971), 314-54.

5. Owen,MiddleEast,

59-62.

In the

early

1800s

the

Ottoman

nnual

public

rev-

enue was approximately2,250,000-?3,750,000 ompared

o the

British verageof

?16,800,000 for

787-90.

12 * THE JOURNAL OF




6/29

The Sword of the

Sultan

much as

one-third f

government

ncome went toward

paying he

debts.

As a

result, duringthe 1870s

the

salaries for

oldiers and

bureaucrats

were chronically n arrears.6

By 1880 the

government aced

bankruptcy, nd the large

Turkish

war

indemnity to

Russia resulting

from

the

Russo-Turkish

War of

1877-78 threatened catastrophe. To stave

off

fiscal collapse, Sultan

Abdul Hamid

II

in

1881 issued

the

Decree

of Muharrem

creating the

Ottoman Public Debt Administration

PDA).

The

Ottomansderived

con-

siderablebenefit rom he

PDA,

as half

f

their

debt

was

forgiven

nd bor-

rowingfrom

European

sources

became

easier. A

negative aspect of

the

PDA, though,was

its authority

o collect ts

own

taxes

within

he

empire;

consequently,muchofthe state revenuethatcould have flowed nto the

government'shands went instead

to the

PDA.

Over the

whole period

from

854 to 1914, Ottomangross

borrowing otaled

399.5 millionTurk-

ish lira.

Of theloans,

45

percentwas used to

liquidate debts, another34

percent

was

taken

out

as

part

of the

commissioning

f the

loans,

and

only

6

percent 22.3 million

Turkish

ira)

went

for

military xpenditure.

Sultan Abdul Hamid

II

saved the state fromfinancial

ruin, but

at

the

expense

of

not

paying

teachers' salaries or

buying

the

technological

means for heempire to defend tselfwith ts owndomesticresources.7

Military roduction,

1850-85

The

most

outstanding

haracteristic

f

Ottoman domestic

military

production

was

thedegree

of

state

control.All the

factories hat manu-

factured nd maintained war materials

were

state-owned

nd adminis-

tered. The

government

department responsible

for these

various

activities was the Ministryof Imperial Ordnance (Tophane-i Amire

Nezareti),

which

was

independent

of

the

Ministry

of War

(Bab-i

Seraskeri).

The

Ordnance

Ministry

was entrustedwith the

production,

repair,

and

supply of

weapons

and

military

quipment,

and

directly

administered

he

Zeytinburnu

actory

nd

powder

mills

n

Istanbul and

Anatolia.

Comprised

of

defense,

communications,

nd

supply depart-

ments,

ts main

duties

were

guarding

he straits nd

training

echnical

personnel.8

6. Owen,MiddleEast, 61; Afif iiyiiktugrul,smanli Deniz

Harp Tarihi

II.

Cilt

(Istanbul:

.

C.

Deniz Basimevi, 973), 1; JustinMcCarthy, he OttomanTurks New

York:Addison

Wesley

Longman, 997),

301-4.

By 1863 the nternal ebt was 32.5

million urkish ira,

nd the foreign

ebthad reached

40 million.

7. McCarthy, ttomanTurks, 04-13.

8. Erkem

Mustevellioglu,

smanli

Askeri

Teskilat ve

Kiyafetleri

876-1908

(Istanbul:

Askeri

Miize

ve

Kiiltiir itesi Komutanligi ayinlari, 986), 9-10.

MILITARY HISTORY *

13




7/29

JONATHANGRANT

In general,Ottoman

ndustry

was weak and

underdeveloped, nd

the

domestic defense ndustrieswere no

exception.

The few

existing

facto-

ries had resulted fromgovernment fforts o create a modern army.

Technological developments

played

a role

in

driving

under

Ottoman

domestic firearms

manufacturing.

he

advances in rifled

gun

barrels

duringthe 1840s required a

greater degree

of technical

precision and

more money than the Ottomans were

able

to manage. By the

middle of

the

nineteenth

entury, ttomanfactories roducingmilitary oods

con-

sisted

of the

factory

t

Izmit

that made

cloth and

military niforms; he

Istanbul

fez

factory; he

Zeytinburnu actory hatproduced cotton cloth

for

militaryuniforms;

he

military quipment factory

t

Beykoz

that

manufacturedmilitary hoes, boots, bandoliers, nd cartridge elts;and

the

Tophane

arsenal

and artillery actory

n

Istanbul.9This list

demon-

strates

that

most of the factories

produced

items of

military

lothing. t

would appear then, that greater

emphasis

was

put

on

having

the

army

dress

in

a modern

style,

rather han

equipping

t

with

modern

weapons.

By

the

early 1870s, the domestic

military roduction

f the

Ottoman

Empire could not provideenough equipment

and

supplies to sustain

the

empire's

rmed forces

n

time

of

war.

The

Tophane works,

which

with

ts

associated workshopsemployed about fifteenhundredmen, was the

main

Ottoman arsenal. It

had the

capacity

to

repair every

kind

of

weapon

with

onventional

gunstock,

s

well

as swords. n

addition,

fac-

tory

at

the

Golden Horn

(Halic)

could

repair

and manufacture

ome

weapons.

The

Zeytinburnu

factory

ould

produce

ten

thousand car-

tridges er day.

The

powder

works t

Bakirkoy

nd

Azadli,

established

or

modernized

during

he

1790s,

continued

n

production.

There

were also

two

major saltpetre

works

nd one

major sulphur

works.

However,

hese

establishments

roved ncapable

of

meeting

Turkish

requirements,

nd

almost everythingwas obtained from foreignfirms. Furthermore,

although

he

arsenals at

Tophane

and

Zeytinburnu

maintained

an

enor-

mous

quantity

of

military

tores,

the bulk

was

obsolete and

worthless.

With

supplement

f

English

raftsmen

rought

o the

stanbul

Tophane

factories,

ome

rifles,

ronze

cannon,

and

mountain

guns

could be man-

ufactured,

but not in sufficient

uantities.

Besides

guns,

the

Imperial

arsenal

at

Tophane

also

turned

out

a numberof

arge

cases intended

for

submarinemines and some

torpedoes.10

9.

OmerCelal

Sarc,

Ottoman ndustrial

olicy

1840-1914,

n Charles ssawi,

ed., The Economic History f theMiddle East, 1800-1914

(Chicago: University f

Chicago Press,1975), 55-56; Owen,

Middle

East,

117.

See also

Larry

H.

Addington,

Th-e atterns fWar Since theEighteenth entu?y Bloomington:ndiana

University

Press,1984), 3.

10. Rumbold o Granville, April1872, ForeignOffice FO) 78/2216;

Elliot to

Earl

of Derby, May 1875,

FO

78/2383,

Public

Record

Office

PRO), Kew, Surrey,

England;

Ramiz

Ertem, 877-1878

Osmanli-Rus

Harbi

Kafkas Cephesi

Harekati

H.

14 * THE JOUR-NALOF




8/29


9/29

JONATIAN GRANT

obtain the

materials necessary

for

maintaining

he

army

that

domestic

sources could

not

provide.

As the

government ought

n

immediate

rem-

edy for the situation,American industrypicked up the slack. In this

instance the

Ottoman choice appeared remarkably imilar to

Egyptian

decisions in the late 1860s.'4

The easy acquisition of

modern weapons from oreign

manufactur-

ers greatly acilitated he immediate

trengthening

f the

Ottoman

army.

This armamentpolicy certainlymade an impression n the

foreign or-

respondents covering the war. According

to the

London

Daily News,

The various forts nd lines [at Varna] mountedover three

hundred

guns, varying

from 10 to 15 centimetres

calibre,

and all

of the

latest

model. The supply ofammunition eems unlimited; nd all day long the

troopstoil unloadingthe

barges

crammed with hell and

cartridge oxes

brought p by

the

transports. '5

Moreover,

he Ottoman

mport trategy

yielded

a

significant ualitative

advantage

for

the Turks over

the Rus-

sians

in

this war. The

Turks

achieved

superior firepower

nd

longer

range withtheirAmerican

repeater

rifles nd German

steel

breechload-

ing artillery.

Armed

with

these imported weapons, Turkish forces

inflicted xtremely igh

asualties

on Russian forces

singRussian-made

weapons of esser quality.'6

As a field test of the

import strategy,

he

Russo-TurkishWar of

1877-78 resoundingly

alidated Ottoman

choices. Both

Russia and the

Ottoman

Empire

had a tradition f

strong

tate control

n

military

ndus-

try.

Both had

attempted

o modernize

their

forces

n

the

eighteenth

en-

tury nd had fallenbehind

again by

the time of the

Crimean

War,

when

the two

empires

had

possessed comparable

evels of

military

echnology.

Their

respectivereactions to the

Crimean

experience

showed the

grow-

ing dependency

of

the Ottomans.

The

two states

adopted

strategies

or

modernizationwhich were absolute opposites.Whereas the Ottomans

moved ever

closer to

total

dependency

on

Western

mports

o modern-

ize their

forces,

Russia

diligently

worked to establish a

modern,

domes-

tic

military industry.

Yet,

when

war came

in

1877,

the

Turks

undoubtedly

held

the

advantage

n

quality

of arms.

Naval

Production,

1850-85

Ottomannaval productioncapabilitiesfellbehind in the mid-nine-

teenth

century.

The failure of

Ottoman

naval

yards

to

develop

into a

truly

elf-sufficient

ource for the

empire

was due in

large

measure to

14. Dunn, Egypt's

ineteenth-Centuryrmamentsndustry, 42-43.

15. WarCorrespondence f theDaily News, 36.

16. WilliamMcElwee,The Artof War Waterloo

o

Mons (Bloomington:ndiana

Universityress,1974),

193-94.

16 * THE JOURNAL OF




10/29

The

Sword of

thte

ultan

threefactors: ime,

money, nd

the

rapidly hanging echnology f naval

systems.These factors

ombined

to end the possibility or strong, eli-

able indigenous naval industry.Anynaval program, ven for a country

with well-established

apabilityfornaval production,

akes a greatdeal

of time and money,

both ofwhich the Ottoman Empire acked. Through-

out the period,the government

aced wars

and enjoyed only ntermittent

peace; thus, t did not have enough

time

to wait for

hips to come off

he

local yards. Confronted

with continual

financial

difficulties,he govern-

ment

certainly

did not have

the

resources to

cover the expenses of the

ships themselves,

much ess the

start-up

osts of

expanded

docks. These

two factorsserved only to magnify

he

impact

of the

third factor,

he

incredibly apidchanges takingplace in naval technology. or example,

perhaps the most unstable, unpredictable

time

in

the

historyof naval

developmentwas

the final

quarter

of

the nineteenth

century

and the

early part

of the twentieth,

when

the

rapid

transition rom

ronclads

to

heavy

steel

dreadnoughts

made

many systems

obsolete before very

much

time

had elapsed.

As

a

result,

he

Ottomangovernment, long with

many

other

states,

found

t more

prudent

o

buy from broad, and then

make replacements

s

new

technology

rose.

Aftermaintaining reasonablyrespectablenaval construction apa-

bility

or he first

art

of

the

century,

he

Sublime

Porte's government's)

position

deteriorated

n the 1850s

and

significant

omestic naval pro-

duction

began

to come

to an end.

During

the

Crimean

War,Russia

crip-

pled Ottoman

naval

strength y destroying

he

Ottomanfleet

t

Sinop

in

1853.

To

compensate

for the loss,

the Porte

purchased warships

from

abroad for he

first

ime, cquiringeight

vessels fromBritain nd France

in

1854

and

paying

forthem with

a

foreign

oan.17 The

development

of

steam-powered

ronclads lso

contributed

o the

demise

ofTurkishnaval

yards.The necessity omaintain omekindof naval force omparableto

the

European

ironclads caused

more

foreign

urchases.

As

a result of

these

factors,

he

foreign omplement

within

he

Ottoman

navysteadily

rose. In the period1859-68,

some

thirty

hips

were

purchased

abroad,

as

opposed

to thirteen

manufactured

domestically.

The British-

and

French-made

hips

carried

ust

over one-half f

the

navy'sguns

and most

of

the tonnage.

Whole

classes

of

ships

were

entirely oreign.

or exam-

ple,

all four sail corvettes

originated

n

Britain,

ll

five river

gunboats

came fromFrance,and theentire ronclad fleetwas of British r French

manufacture.18

17.

Nejat

Giilen, iinden

Buguine ahriyemiz

Istanbul:Kastas A. S. Yayinlari,

1988), 122.

18. Bulwer o Russell, 3 June

1860, FO 78/1507;Alisonto

Earl

of Clarendon,

27 December 1857, FO 78/1276;

Biiyiiktugrul,smanli

Deniz Harp Tarihi II. Cilt,

16-18.

MILITARY HISTORY *

17




11/29


12/29

.....

.....

. . ......

.... .. . .. ...

...... ....

...

. ... .. ....... .

...

.. ....

i::

..... .....

.

.... . .......

.. . ....... .......... ... .

........ . ....

..... .....

......

..

. ..... .... . .

.... ... ...

.. . . . .... ......

A

P

Map

1:

Major dockyards

in the

Ottonwn

Empire,

c. 1870.

MILITARY HISTORY

19




13/29

JONATIIAN

GRANT

launched in 1870.21 Finally, ecause of nonpayment, our ronclads

were

never actually delivered.

Amongwooden vessels, domestic production iguredmuch more sig-

nificantly. hese vessels included frigates nd sloops. It appears that a

little ver

half

of the wooden ships came

from

omesticyards.While

the

Turkish onstructionwas

verygood,

t

also relied

on

Englishmechanics.

Most of the wooden ships came from urkishwharvesusing high-quality

lumber fromAsia Minor,Bulgaria,

nd the

Danubian Principalities.

The

Istanbul

and Izmit

yards produced frigates

nd

sloops, while additional

sloops

came from

Gemlik.

The rest of the wooden

ships apparently

were

the

workof

British acilities.22

Overall, then, the Ottomanfleet at the timeof the Russo-Turkish

War was an

impressiveforce, ontaining high

number

of

state-of-the-

art

ironclads

purchased

from

broad,

as well as a

couple

of

domestic

manufacture.

Although asically

a

coastal defense

navy,

he

fleet hould

have

been

more than

adequate

for he

empire's

needs. The

London

Daily

News

evaluated the fleet

n the

following

manner:

Turkey

then,

has

numerically peaking,

ne of the finest leets

n

the

world, nd this naval

force

n other

respects

also is now not so

deficient s it

was

some

months

ago. 123 t the outset of the war, most foreignobservers rated the

Ottoman

navy superior

to the Russian one. The fact that the

Russians

outperformed

he Turks and crossed

the

Danube

rather

asily

reflected

more

on the

quality

of

Ottoman

naval

leadership

than

on its

equipment.

The

years

from

he

1870s

to

1885, then,

can

be seen as a

phase

of

decreasing importance

of

domestically

manufactured

weapons

and

ships.

This was

true

of

both the

army

and the

navy. Accordingly,

ach

service branch

developed

its

own

pattern

f

imports.

The

army

favored

German

artillery

nd

American

or French

rifles,

while the

navy

tended

towardsBritish nd Frenchships and British uns.

Military roduction,

1885-1907

In

the next

period, 1885-95,

German

defense

mports

ose to

a

posi-

tion

of virtual

hegemony,

s

part

of a

broader

expansion

of the

German

role in Ottoman economic

relations.Since

1800

Great

Britainhad been

the

major

Ottoman

trading artner, ccounting

for

roughly

ne-quarter

of all Ottomanexports mostly agricultural roducts)and deliveringn

turn

between 30

and 40

percent

of

Ottoman

mports.

n

terms f

foreign

investment

within

the

Ottoman

Empire,

however,

the

British share

21. Ollier,

Cassell's Illustrated History,

1: 141;

Giilen,

Diinden Bugimne

Bahriyemiz, 34-35; Conway's

All theWorld's ighting

hips,

1860-1905,

389-9 1.

22. Ibid.,392-93; Cooke,

Ottoman mpire,

60.

23.

War

Correspondence

f

the

Daily News,

22.

20 * THE JOURNAL OF




14/29

-________________________________________

The w ord of

thte

ultan

*HaSk

'y(Imperial

akoy

(Arsenal)

N

t: .

:A--

N

.

.

' -

+

~Navy

ophan

t 0;/

Nse// ;

--:--0-Arsenaly3

I e

)-Top

-k.

IcaIac

Map

2: Istanbul area.

decreased

over

the

period

1888-96

from 0

percent

to 20

percent.

At

the

same

time

the

German share

of

foreign

nvestment ose from

percent

to

25

percent,

while the French became

the

single largest

nvestor

by

increasing their share from 30 percent to 50

24

The Germans

owed their new-found

dvantageous

position

to

the

policies

and

temperament

f

Sultan

Abdul Hamid

a,

who was

highly

autocratic,

deeply suspicious,

and

overly

ontrolling.

He had an

obses-

sive

preoccupation

with

oyalty

nd relied

heavily

on

a

private

network

of internal

pies

and

police

informers.

he

value

he

placed

on

personal

loyalty

over

efficiency

r

performance

hus

promoted

corruption

nd

favoritism.

he effects f his autocratic

tyle

manifested

hemselves

neg-

atively n theOttomanarmed forces.The Sultan distrusted heOttoman

navy

because

it had

played

the

key

part

n the

coup

that

deposed

Abdul

Aziz,

his

predecessor.

Ever fearful f

conspiracy,

Abdul Hamid

kept

his

forces on a short

eash. He

forbade the

navy

to leave

its docks

on the

Golden

Horn in

order to forestall

ny

potential

movement

against

the

24. Erik

Zurcher,Turkey:

A

Modern

History London:

I. B.

Tauris

and

Co.,

1997),

89.

MILITARY HISTORY

*

21




15/29

JONATHAN

GRANT

palace; consequently, he ships

rusted

way

at

anchor.Similarly, he Sul-

tan was waryof the armybecause he

suspected thatthe military olleges

promoted iberalism among the graduates. Therefore,he consciously

promoted

nd

favoredofficerswho

had

not been

trained at the acade-

mies and who lacked

background

n

modern military cience.25

In the aftermath f the

Turkishdefeat by Russia, the Sultan sought

a

German militarymission

to

oversee

training

nd

modernization f the

Ottoman

army.

n

June

1880 he

requested

that

officers

f

the

German

General

Staff, nfantry, avalry,

and

artillery

services come to the

Ottoman

Empire

on

three-year

ontracts.

n

April 1882,

officers

ohler,

Kamphoevener, on Hobe,

and Ristow

rrived,

nd the

Sultan gave them

rankswithin heOttoman army.Later that same year,Colmar Freiherr

von

der

Goltz oined the mission.

After

Kohler's

death

in

1885, von der

Goltz

functioned

s

acting

head of the mission and

remained in the

Ottoman

Empire

until

1895. After is

departure

he nfluence f

the

mis-

sion

declined,

and

by 1898, only

three

of the

German officialswere

still

in

Turkey.26

Abdul

Hamid had

his own reasons

for

preferring

erlin. n

1876-77,

priorto the Russo-TurkishWar,

he

Ottoman

War

Ministry ad engaged

a considerable numberof British fficerswith thehope that theirpres-

ence would be followed

y

active

English

ntervention

n

favor

f

Turkey.

After

he Berlin

Congress

1878),

when the

Britishnot

only refusedto

stand

up

for

Turkey

but

in

addition

deprived

it of

Cyprus,

the

Sultan

made

every

effort o

minimize

the authority

nd

influence

of

these

British officers.

rospects

for a French mission also seemed

unlikely

because

the Sultan

distrusted

France

as much

as Britain.

Therefore,

n

place

of

Britain, he Sultan now looked

to

Germany

s the first

military

power

in

Europe

and as

the most

disinterested

egarding urkey.

Abdul

Hamidstronglyesiredto retaingoodoffices t Berlin. However, is dis-

trustful

ature

meant that no

foreignmilitary

mission would ever be

treated

with real

confidence

and no

foreign

fficerwould ever

be

given

serious

exclusive

authority xcept

under the

exigencies

of

hostilities.

Moreover,

he

foreign

fficers iscovered

to

their

dismay, ccording

to a

British

fficial, hat

zeal

and

industry

n

their

part

are

discouraged

nd

are

positively

distasteful. 27

ndeed,

von der Goltz

complained repeat-

edly

about

his

inability

o effect

more

improvements

n the

Ottoman

army. Specifically, he Sultan forbadetrainingmaneuversbecause he

feared that

they

could

serve as

a means for

military oup,

and out of

25.

Hale,

Turkish olitics,28-29; Ziircher, urkey,

4.

26. JehudaWallach,

natomie inerMilitarhilfe,

ie preussich-deutschen

ili-

tarmissionen

n

der Turkei, 835-1914 (Dusseldorf: roste

Verlag, 976), 35, 43, 54,

64, 85.

27.

Chermside

o Ford, 26 May 1893,

enclosed

in

Ford to

Rosebery, 9 May

1893, FO 78/4479.

22 * THE JOURNAL OF




16/29

The word f he ultan

similar concerns,

he

never

allowed

the

troops

to

practice

with live

rounds.28

For theirpart, he Germans used theirprivileged ositionto support

the cause of German military uppliers as theyoverhauledthe Ottoman

armed forces.29 ecause theywere

incorporated

within

he framework

f

the

Ottoman military ystem,

members

of the

German mission had

tremendous pportunities

o

expand

the

role of German

arms

and

equip-

ment in the Ottoman army.

Primarily, his unique position gave the

German

officers asy

and

frequent

ccess to members

of

the Ordnance

Ministry, hichcontrolled upply

nd

military roduction.Until

1889 all

the German officerswere

subject

to the

Serasker (War Minister).

How-

ever, fter on derGoltzrefused orenewhis contract hatyear because

of dissatisfactionwith his lack

of

nfluence,

he

was attached

directly o

the

Imperial MilitaryHousehold

with the

right

o

address reports o the

Sultan. Some

Turkish fficers

nd

foreign

bservers

grumbled

bout the

German mission.

A

British epresentative

oted: One of the main han-

dles for ntrigue

as been

the

accusation against

the

Chief

of

the Mission

being

nterested

n

supplies

of

war-likematerial

by

German firms

..

but

in 1891-92 there was an active

but

unsuccessful ntrigueby the

then

FrenchMilitaryAttache n favour f a FrenchMilitaryMission. 30

The

German military

mission

proved

to

be

a

boon

for

German

firms.

In

1882,

the

Ottoman government

laced

a

large

order with

Krupp

for

artillery

o

replace

and

repair

the

fortificationsnd batteries of the

Bosphorus and (anakkale. This

order

largely

resulted from

the

insis-

tence ofvon der

Goltz,

head of

the

mission,

who

in

1885

managed

to

sell

500

Kruppheavy guns

to the

Ottomans. The

magnitude

f this sale can

be

appreciated

when

one considers

that n

the 1877-78

war,

there were

590 field

guns among

the

army

n

Europe.

In

1886 the

Ottomans

bought

426 fieldgunsand 60 mortars romKruppand favored heGermanfirm

Schichauwerft ith

n

order for

orpedo

boats.

Then in

1887,

as a result

ofthe

military

mission'srearmament

rogram

or he Ottoman

rmy,

he

Ottomans

purchased

half a million

rifles

and

fifty

housand carbines

from he

German

firms f Mauser

and

Loewe.31

28. Hale, Turkish

olitics,29.

29. For a thorough iscussionof the German militarymission, ee Wallach,

Anatomie inerMilitarhilfe,5-85.

30. Ford to Earl of

Rosebery, o. 159, 24 April1893, FO 78/4479;No.

208, 26

May, 1893; enclosure,Chermside

o

Ford,

Position

of

German

Military

Mission at

Constantinople.

31. White o Rosebery,

1 February 886, FO 78/3869;White o

Salisbury,

8

February 888, FO 78/4098;

lber Ortayli,

kinci

Abdulhamit

dnemindeOsmanli

Imparatorlugunda

Alman

Niifuzu (Ankara:

Ankara finiversitesi

iyasi

Biligiler

Fakultesi ayinlari,

o. 479, 1981), 65-68; Ollier,

assell's Illustrated

istory,

:140;

MILITARY

HISTORY

*

23




17/29

JONATIIANGRANT

Undoubtedly

the

Germans profited

from

these

sales,

but Abdul

Hamid acted as

the

decisive force

n

granting

he orders

to Germany

nd

played a directrole n selecting he armaments.Forexample, n 1887 an

Ottoman military ommission

deliberated

whether

o

adopt the

Mauser

or

the Martini s the new rifle

ystem.

Over the

objections

of the War

Ministry

nd other

Turkish military uthorities,

he

Sultan ordered a

provisional contract with Mauser. Only

financial

difficulties revented

the immediate conversionof the provisional

contract

nto

a final

one.32

In

spite

of

growing gitation

n

Istanbul against

the

Mauser contract,

he

Sultan

considered the deal

as

his own

act and

deed,

and

in

the end his

will prevailed.33However,by

1890

none of the

Mausers had

yet

been

issuedto thetroopsor training chools; instead,theyremaineduncrated

in

storage.34

The year 1889 was a banner

one

for

German

arms sales

to the

Ottomans,

who as a

resultof

the Kaiser's visit to Istanbul

placed

a

mas-

sive

new order for

rtillery

rom

Krupp,

rifles

rom

Mauser and

Loewe,

and

torpedo

boats

from

chichau.

Such

a

large

order

required

financing,

and the Germans

happily

arranged

loan. The

Deutsche Bank

acted as

contractor,

nd the

income

from

he Public Debt's

fishing

ndustry

was

pledged as security.35Whenput into context with the annual expendi-

tures

in

the

Ottoman

budget,

the enormity

f this

purchase becomes

apparent:

the loan

represented

n

amount

equal

to 19

percent

of the

total

military/navaludget

and about

10

percent

of

the total Ottoman

revenues

for he

year.

n

the years

ahead,

the

Sultan continued

to

make

large

arms

purchases

from he Germans.36

WVallach,natomie

iner Militarhilfe, 05. The

1882

order

was

for1,206,987

iras

worth fartillery.

n

1888 Turkishwar

orders o Germanfirmsmounted o

2.2 mil-

lion marks.

32. White o FO (telegraphic), o. 10,

30

January

887,

FO

78/4002.

33. WVhiteo

Salisbury, 8 November

887, FO 78/4001.

34. Chermside

o

WVhite,

6

January

891, FO

78/4342.

35. WVallach,natomie inerMilitarhilfe,

05;

Rafii-Sukruuvla, The Ottoman

Debt 1850-1939,

n

Issawi, d., Economic

History,

04. The

Ottomans pent total

of 15.3

millionmarks

n

1889.

JustinMcCarthy,

he

Arab World, urkey, nd the

Balkans: A

HandbookofHistorical tatistics Boston:

G.

K.

Hall

and Co.,

1982), 160,

184. The amountof

the

loan issued

was

1,617,647 gold

lira,although he amount

actually eceived otalled ,132,352 ira,

or roughly

0

percent

f

the ssue. The sum

actually ollected by the Ottomangovernmentn thefinancial ear 1888-89 was

1,571,375,960

kurus or approximately

5.7

million

old

ira).

The

budget llocated

for he

Harbiye

Nezareti nd the

navy

was

807,203,175

kurus

or roughly

.1 million

gold ira).

36. Chermside

o Fane,

5

July

1890, FO

78/4276;

Ford

to

Rosebery, 4 April

1893, FO

78/4479; otharRathman,

erlin-BaghdadBerlin:

Dietz

Verlag,

962), 18;

Wallach,

Anatomie

iner

Militarhilfe,

05; Ortayli,

kinci Abdulhamit

oneminde,

68.

In 1889 and 1890 the

Ottomans

pent

six million

marks

for

uch items

s

one

thousand

ield

uns

from

rupp

nd several

hundred

housand

ifles romMauser nd

24 * THE JOURNAL OF




18/29

The Sword

of

heSultan

The Germans also improved their arms trade position by the way

they onducted the military eforms. or example, n 1893 von der Goltz

declared that a number of Ottoman officersmust become proficient n

the handling nd use ofthe rifles ewlydeveloped n Germany.He stated

furthermorehat the munitionsfactory t Tophane would have to pro-

duce

dummy cartridges,

nd

then

these new

rifles hould be given to

the troops. Clearly, the

close German

ties with the Tophane-i Amire

Nezareti paid off.During this time the French and Britishwere practi-

cally eliminated from he Ottoman arms market.By 1894 Krupp's and

Mauser's exploitation

of their

complete market sovereigntybrought

accusationsfrom oreign bservers hattheGermanswere selling xpen-

sive and low-qualitygoods. Amongthe German items ordered by the

Ottomans

were

torpedo boats,

field

artillery,

oastal

guns,

rifles,

nd

ammunition.37

Meanwhile,

t

is difficult

o

gauge

domestic

production of military

supplies, rifles,

nd

other weapons

for

the

army

from

the Hamidian

period up

to WorldWar I.

Clearly

the

Turks had

trouble paying forthe

maintenance of plant and foreign experts. During the

1880s

seven

Britishworkmen t

Tophane

filed

petitions

ver

wage arrearsamounting

to six thousand Turkish ira. The claims of these British ubjects occu-

pied the attention f the British mbassy

from

882 to 1889, but owing

to the impecunious state of

the Ottoman

Treasury,

o

settlementwas

forthcoming.ndeed,

since

April

1888 the Ottoman Bank

had

refused

o

pay anyone's salary, ncluding

the German

generals

and the

Ottoman

diplomatic service.38 ventually

the British

employees

at

Tophane

did

receive

back

pay

for

he

period

from

May

to

September1888,

but

claims

for rrearsfor he

previous

five

years

remained

outstanding.39

The

fragmentary

vidence of Ottoman domestic

armaments

produc-

tion suggestsa noticeable decline in capabilities afterthe 1880s. For

example, duringthe 1890s, Tophane

could turn out

only

ten Martini-

Henry rifles week,

a

production

rate

significantly

ower than the one

hundredrifles

er

week

manufactured

here

n 1888.40

n

the

years

1902

and

1903

the Turks

attempted

o

manufacture

ix

quick-fire

ield

guns

Loewe.

n

1891 they ought pproximately

.9 million

marksworth f rms;

for 892

and 1893 the amounts

were10.1 millionmarks

nd 13.1 millionmarks espectively.

37. WVallach,natomie iner Militalrhilfe,

7, 105; Ortayli, kinci Abdulhamit

Ddneminde, 8. In 1895 an additional 2.2 millionmarksworth fgoods came from

Germany.

ll in all

in

the period 1885-95, no less

than 100 million rancs

worth

f

orders orwar materialwent o German nterprises.

38. White to Salisbury, November

1888,

FO

78/4105; 15 November1888,

Enclosure:memorandum

4 November 888,

FO

78/4105.

39. WVhiteo Salisbury, December1888,

FO 78/4106.

40. Captain Sir

W.

Cecil Domville,Report

55, Turkish leet and

Dockyards,

1890,

12,

AdmiraltyADM)

231/18, RO; Doniville,

eport 88, Turkish leet and

Dockyards, 888,

12,

ADM 231/14.

MILITARY HISTORY

*

25




19/29

JONATHAN

GRANT

on the

Krupp model presented

by

the

Kaiser,

but

Tophane's production

proceeded

rather

slowly owing

to want of

funds.41

y

the time

of the

BalkanWars 1913), Tophane was manufacturingome handgrenades.42

The

underdeveloped state

of

Ottoman industry generally

becomes

apparent

when

compared

to

other

sectors of

the

economy.

n

1894-95

therewere

approximately 86,000 factory

workers

ompared

to 185,000

government

fficials,

nd a combined

total of

servants,maids,

and sec-

retaries xceeding186,000.43

By and

large the

equipping

of the

Ottoman

army

became the

province of foreign mports,

specially

fromthe

Germans.

During the

1890s,

the

mainstay

of the Ottoman

infantry

ecame

the

Mauser

rifles

manufacturednGermany.44 ere again,theOttomansfound teasier to

buy

the newer

models. German

dominance

in

orders

forthe

army

was

still

unquestionable.

The

Germans

achieved their

greatest

sale-over

twice

the

size of

the

large

1889

order-in

1905,

when the

Ottomans

placed

an

enormous

order for

military quipment

from

Krupp. Because

of the order's size, once

again

the Deutsche

Bank

contractedthe

loan.

Since

the Ottoman

government

found itself unable to

pay

arrears

amounting

o almost one

million ira

on

its former

ontractsfor

Krupp

gunsand Mauserrifles,twas decided to payoff he old debt and at the

same

time

arrange

new contract

by

means of

a

loan

from he

Deutsche

Bank.

Additional ustoms duties

for

military

quipment

and the

6

per-

cent additional

revenues of

the Public Debt

Administration

erved

as

security

or he loan.45

41.

Intelligence epartment,

WVar

ffice, Reports

n

Changes

n

VariousFor-

eign

Armies

uring

heYear

1902, 82,

WO 106/6179;

ntelligence epartment,

ar

Office, Reports n Changes n VariousForeignArmiesDuring he Year1903, 85,

WO 106/6180.

42.

Captain Sir

NV.

ecil Domville,Report188,

Turkish leet

and Dockyards,

1888, ADM

231/14;Captain Domville,Report 55,

Turkish

leet

and

Dockyards,

1890, ADM

231/18; Ortayli,

kinci

AbdulhamitDdneminde,69;

Ramiz

Ertem,

Balkan

Harbi Garp Ordusu

Karadag

Cephesi

H.

Cilt (Ankara:GnkurBasimevi,

1984),

40.

43. Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and

Social Ch-aracteristics

Madison:University

f

Wisconsin

ress,1985),

59, 218.

44.

Ford

to

Earl

of

Rosebery,

4 April1893, FO

78/4479;

Reports n Changes

in Various oreignArmies uring heYear 1902, WO 106/6179; aptainC. B. Nor-

man,

The Turkish

Army f To-Day,

n American

Monthly

eview

ofReviews, 16

(November 897): 593-94.

45.

Reports

n

Changes

n Various

oreign

Armies

During

he Year

1905, WO

106/6182;

A.

S. Avetian,Germanskii mperializmna blizhnemvostoke Moskva:

Izdatel'stvoMezhdunarodye tnosheniya, 966),

109-10;

Suvla,

The

Ottoman ebt

1850-1939,

105. The

Krupporder

n

1905

was

worth etween

60

and 70

million

francs.

The

new loan from

Deutsche

Bank

amounted

to 2.64 million

gold lira, of

which

2,098,800 about

79.5

percent)

was

actually

eceived.

26 *

THE JOURNAL OF




20/29

-__

_ _ _ _ _

The Sword

of theSultan

Naval Production,

1885-1907

The late 1880s saw little

new naval

construction,nd the

domestic

naval programof the latterpart of Abdul Hamid's reign proved to be

largely

bortive.

n 1886 the Turksdid succeed

in

building orpedoboats

in

Istanbul

by copying

one-hundred-foot

oat built

by the French firm

Forges

et Chantiers and purchased

the

previousyear. Based

on this ni-

tial success

the Turkish ockyard

aid

down the

keels for hree

dditional

boats.46

British Admiralty ntelligence

observed about these torpedo

boats

that

Everything

as

made in the

dockyard,

nd

it

speaks highly

for

their

factory hat

they should be

able to run

the engines without

hitch the first ime

they

were tried,

nd to make 17 knots.

Royal Navy

observerCaptain

Henry

Kane rated

the Turkish

dockyard

n Istanbul as

better

han

the

Russian

yards

at Kronstadt r Nikolaev

n

1886,

although

not as

good

as

English yards. Captain

Kane

reported,

The factory

s a

large

establishment, airly

itted

p

with

machines,

and

capable of good

work.They have

iron and brass

foundries, puddling

housewith everal

furnaces,mills

for

olling

rmour-plates,

ngle-iron, ars,

and sheets; two

smitheries,

with a

15-ton

and

7.5-ton

hammer;

fitting,recting,

and

boilershops,and altogether,

very

complete

establishment. 47 owever,

just a fewyears atertheconditions n thedockyardhad deteriorated ig-

nificantly.

he

steel factory

roved

to

be

dysfunctional,

nd

most of

the

castings

were useless because

of

insufficient eat from he furnace. By

1894

the

dockyard

had

fallen

nto a

neglected

state.

Construction

had

commenced

for

everal ships,

which remained

n

skeletal form oryears.

The

yard

lacked

systematic

management.

For

example,

after

designing

new hulls that requiredyears

to

build,

the

Turks

put

old

engines

and

old

guns

nto them.

n

one

glaring

ase,

the Turks eft

he

armor-clad bd-ul

Khadir

on

an

inadequate building lip,

and

fortwo

years

the

ship

sank

into the ground.

A

comparatively

arge

naval

building rogram

was initi-

ated

in

the

1890s. Construction

of

two

Shadiye-class

cruisers

com-

menced at

Izmit,

but

neitherwas

ever launched.

Similarly,

battleship

begun

in

1892 was

never

completed.Although

he

domestic

naval

pro-

gram

of the late Hamidian period

did

have

some

degree

of

success

regarding

maller hips,

the

Hamidian era

essentially

marked the end

of

domestic

building

programs

n the

empire.48

n terms of

domestically

produced

warships,

he

mediocre

program

f the

1890s

was

the

last

one

46. Trotter

o WVhite,

2

April

1886, enclosed in White

to

Rosebery,

3

April

1886, FO 78/3870.

47.

Captain

Henry

C. Kane,

R.N., Report

127,

Turkish

leet and Dockyards

1886,

6, 11, ADM 231/10.

48. Captain

Domville,

Report

55, Turkish

leet and Dockyards,

890, ADM

231/18;

Captain

Egerton, eport

85, Turkey,

leet,Dockyards,

uns, 1894,

ADM

231/24;

Gillen,Dunden

Bugiine

Bahriyemiz,

58-59.

MILITARY HISTORY

*

27




21/29

JONATHANGRANT

to give any significant rders. Thereafter, specially duringthe Young

Turk era, foreign-manufacturedhips completelydominated the Otto-

man naval buildingprogram.

The period 1885-95 also marked a point of departure n the pattern

of Ottoman naval purchases, which the Germans came to dominate.

Expediency, ost,

and

Abdul Hamid's personal involvement ll played a

part n bringing bout the turning oint fornaval procurement n 1886.

Initially, he Turkshoped to buy more boats from rance,but the French

informed he TurkishAdmiralty hatno torpedoboats would be available

for immediate

purchase.

Faced

with the need to

place construction

orders, the

Turks solicited

bids.

The

Germans

sharply

underbid

the

French and offeredpectacular savings, greeing o providetwelveboats

at a lowertotalpricethan the

French had

proposed

for

nly eightboats.

The Sultan gave

the contract

himself.49

n the

ongoing ompetitionwith

Armstrong, rupp gained

the

upper

hand.

From 1886

to 1890

all five

Sinub-class wooden

sloops

were rearmed

with

Krupps.

n

1891, many

of

the

Ottoman hips replaced

their

previously

mounted

British

Armstrongs

with Krupps.Additionally,

he

torpedogunboats

and

third-class

ruisers

built

at Istanbul

possessed Krupps.

n terms

of

ship production,

German

firms lso gained substantially. he Ottoman navyhad no German-built

ships

n

1877,

but

n

this

new

period

the

German

firms

roduced

thirteen

torpedoboats (five

built

by

Schichau

in

1886, eight

built

by

Germania n

1887-92).

The French did

sell

six

torpedo

boats

to the

Ottomans

n the

years 1885-86 (La Seyne

and

Des

Vignes

built

three

each),

but

received

no

more

orders after1886.50

Therefore,

886

can be

seen as

the

begin-

ningof German hegemony

n the

Ottoman

naval

market.

Obviously,

he

big

loser

in all this was

Britain.

The

true

magnitude

of

German gain

at

this

time

showed

in the almost

complete

removal

of

Britain froma naval market which she had commanded previously.

Britain till

had a minormarket n

supplying

Whitehead

torpedoes,

but

this

was a mere

fraction

f her

former

usiness.

Nevertheless,

he

Sultan

did take a

liking

o the

English-made

Nordenfelt ubmarine

nd

accord-

inglypurchased

a

pair

out

of his

personal

funds.

To an

Englishobserver,

thispurchase

seemed

more

a

vanity

s

His

Majesty

has

alreadypaid,

not

only

the value

of

the material

obtained

from

England,

but the

cost

of

putting

hem

together ere,

the

atter

perationhaving

aken threetimes

as longand cost threetimes as much as theestimate. '51

The

German

hegemony

n

Ottoman

naval

orders

turned

out

to be

short-lived.

From

the

late

1890s to

1907,

the Ottoman

government

49. White o Granville,

9 April 885, FO

78/3751;CaptainHenryKane, Report

127, Turkish

leet and Dockyards 886,

ADM 231/10.

50. Chermside o Fane, 5 July

890, FO 78/4276;Captain HenryKane,

Report

127, Turkish leet

and Dockyards, 886, ADM

231/10.

51. Ibid.

28 * THE JOURNAL OF




22/29

Thze

word of theSultan

embarked upon a foreignbuilding and

reconstruction rogramfor ts

navy. During those years the British firm

Armstrongmade a rousing

comeback. In 1898, the contract for rebuilding he ironclad Mesudiye

went to

Armstrong-Ansaldo,

branch

of

the

British irm n Genoa. Arm-

strong ompleted

the

ob

in

1903, along

with

he new construction f the

armored cruiserAbdul Hamid.

In

the reconstruction f 1903-7, Arm-

strong-Ansaldomodernized

three

ironclads.

Only

one

ironclad was

handed to a German firm Krupp)

in

1903-7,

and this was only because

Ansaldo had been unable to

complete

the

work n

1899. The British ven

moved into the German domain of

torpedo boats. Armstrong-Ansaldo

builteleven of

these

craft n the

years

from

901 to 1906. So, the period

1897-1907 markedthe returnofBritainto theOttomannaval market.

Meanwhile, he French and Germans

also

acquired

some

Ottoman naval

orders

n

the

1903-7 program.52

Naval

Production, 1908-14

The

Young

Turk Revolution

brought change

in

naval

affairs.By

deposing

Abdul

Hamid

II

in

1909,

the

Young

Turks

removed the single

most important mpediment o revitalizing he Turkish navy. Accord-

ingly, hey planned formajor

improvements

n

the

composition of the

fleet

and called for

six

battleships,

twelve

destroyers,

welve

torpedo

boats,

and

six

submarines.53

he

Young

Turks did not limit

their

ambi-

tions

merely

to

upgrading

the

class

of their

navy,

but also

sought

to

strengthen

omestic

productionby developing

he

capacity

to

build

their

own

dreadnoughts.

To this

end

they

pursued

a naval

docks contract

which

would

put

in

place

the

necessary

nfrastructureor

elf-sustained

warshipconstructionwithin heempire.

However,

the

Young

Turk

program

did

not have the chance to

develop fully.

he

Italian

NVar,

he Balkan

Wars,

and

finally

WorldWVar

interrupted

nd

hampered

t. As a

stopgapmeasure,

the

government ur-

chased a numberof

vessels

which had

originally

een intendedfor ther

countries. n the end the

Young

Turk

plans

for

elf-sufficiency

ere

frus-

trated

by events,

nd

expediency

once

again

favored

mports

s the solu-

tion

for

Ottoman

policy

makers.

Having

announced

the new naval

policy,

the

government

et about

achieving ts goals. In 1909 the YoungTurkgovernment iscussed the

procurement

f

capital ships

forthe

first

ime. The

plan

for

1910

called

fortwo

battleships

of the

Reshadiye class,

and the

corresponding

rder

went to

the

BritishfirmVickers.

AlthoughKrupp

obbied

hard for the

52. Report841, Turkey,Greece and Roumania.War \Tessels. 908, 30-36,

ADM 231/49;Giilen, iinden Bugiune ahriyemiz, 34-35.

53.

Conway'sAll theWorld's

ighting

hips, 1906-1921,

388.

MILITARY HISTORY *

29




23/29

JONATILAN

RANT

order,Vickerswon out by offering particularly

weet deal

to the Turks.

Then

in

July 1911, Vickers' bankers

Glyn

Mills

guaranteed

a

large

advance to the Turks n respect of paymentdue to Vickers on the war-

ships.54

Vickers

became the

primary

naval

supplier

in

the final

phase of

Ottoman

policy.55 ltimately,

he battleship

deal

with

Vickersturned ut

to be unfortunate or the Ottomans because

the British

retained the

Reshadiye after ts aunch in 1913.

In the meantime, he Ottomanstried

to bolster their fleet s quickly

as

possible by buying

two

old German

battleships

n

1910. As another stopgap

measure,

in

1913 they pur-

chased the Rio

de

Janeiro,

which Brazil

had intended

to buy from

Britain, t a reducedprice.56

For the ast fewyears before

WVorld ar

,

Britain

ruled the

Ottoman

naval market.This resurgence

n

Turkey

was

part

of

her

mprovednaval

trade

worldwide

for

the years 1900-14,

when

British

xporters

f

war-

ships

and naval ordnance had 63.2

percent

of

the world market

com-

pared

with

Germany's

7.6

percent.

Vickers

had in

hand

Turkish

armament orders

equivalent

to 84

percent

of British

manufactured

exports

to the

Ottoman

Empire

n 1913. The

crowning

British

chieve-

mentthatyear was the acquisitionof the docks contractfor he Vickers-

Armstrong

Turkish

Company,

the

result of

collaboration between

Vickers and

Armstrong

or he

exploitation

f

Ottoman

state

docks

and

arsenals.

The

Ottoman

government

eld the

controlling

hare

ofthe

cap-

ital of this enterprise,

with the

minority

ivided between Vickers and

Armstrong.5'

The dock commission

triggered

war

of

threats

between

Germany

and Britain. n October

1913,

the Ottoman

government lanned

to reach

54.

Tyne

nd WearArchive ervice

TWAS)

130/1268,

no.

3,

Armstrongoard

MeetingMinutes,

0, 131, 134, 171; Giilen,

Diinden Bugiine Bahriyemiz,

85-86;

Clive Trebilcock,

The Vickers

Brothers:Armaments nd Enterprise,

854-1914

(London:European

Publishers td.,

1977), 130.

Vickers

rovided

or ix months' ree

creditwith ayment

n tenequal parts,

nd

paid

for

he

startup

osts. The GlynMills

advance to the

Turkswas ?600,000.

55. Trebilcock,

ickers rothers,

21. In 1911 Vickershad contracts

rom he

empireworth pproximately

.2 million old ira,

nd promises or further.5 mil-

lion n 1913.

56. Avetian, Germanskii imperializm, 116; Gillen, Diinden Bugiine

Bahriyemiz, 81, 186. The ship

was priced

t ?3.4 million, ut theOttomans ought

her for 2.3 million

57.

Trebilcock,

ickers rothers, 23-24;

Zafer

Toprak,Tiirkiye'de

Milli kti-

sat 1908-1918 (Ankara:MAYA

Matbaacilik-Yayincilik,

982), 362;

J. D.

Scott,Vick-

ers: A History

London: Weidenfeld

nd

Nicolson,

1963), 85; Suvla,

The Ottoman

Debt,

1850-1939, 106. The capitalof

theVickers-Armstrongurkish

ompanywas

?250,000

sterling;

ts oan to

the

Ottomans

was for .485 million

old

ira at 5.5

per-

cent nterest.

30 * THE JOURNAL OF




24/29


25/29

JONATIAN

RANT

optionsopen

with he French. Like

Abdul

Hamid before

hem, he Young

Turks requested and received

a new

German military mission to

strengthenheirposition, nd theyputforthhequestion about the rear-

mament of the

artillery

nd

coastal

fortificationsf

the

straitsby Ger-

man factories

with

broad credit

foundations.

he Frenchtold

Cemal Bey,

the Minister f Marine, that they would not

object to the German mis-

sion as long as France was not deprived

of orders

forwar materials.The

struggle etween French and

German

firms ecame

so bitter hat Cemal

Bey undertooknegotiationswiththe business and

government ircles of

each

country.6'

Just year

beforeWorldWar

began,

both

German

and

Frenchfirms

lobbied forwar orders. n the fallof 1913 the OttomanWVar inistrywas

preparing o orderabout six hundredguns,

ofwhich

two-thirds ouldbe

mountain

guns

and one-thirdfield

guns. Prospects

for

arger

orders of

shells

lay ahead,

since their number

did

not exceed two

hundred

for

every

fieldor mountain

gun. The

Balkan

Wars had

shown

the

superior-

ity of Schneider artillery ver

Kruppguns,

and

therefore, ttoman offi-

cials

generally agreed

that the

mountain

guns

should

be

ordered

in

France.62 The Ottoman

government's

aspiration

to

support modern

artillerynd concentratea largepartofthe order withSchneider com-

pelled

the

Germans to

take

corresponding

measures.

At this

time

the

numberof Krupp pieces

in

the Ottoman

army

was

twice

as

great as the

number

of

artillery ieces

of

other

manufacturers, nd Krupp had no

intention f etting his

commandingposition slip away.63

The Ottoman officials used

the

Documents

Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914