OSPREY· MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

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Text byPETER YOUNG

Colour plates byMICHAEL ROFFE

Published in England byOsprey Publishing Ltd, 1'.0, Box 25.i07 Oxford Road, Reading, Berkshire

Copyright '972 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

This book is eopyrighled under the BerneCOllvention. All rights reserved. Apan from :myfair dealing lor the purpose of private study,research, criticism or TCview, as ~rmilled under theCop)·right Act, 1956, no pan of this publicationrna)' Ix: reproduced, slored in a rctric\'al S)'Slcm, ortransmittcd in any form or by any mcans, elcclronic.electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photo­copying, recording or othcrwisc, without thc priorpermission ofthc copyright o,\'ner, Enquiries shouldbe addressed 10 the Publishcrs.

I "ish 10 record my gralitude to ~lajor W.F.Woodhouse, R.T.R., who has rendered me thegreatest assistance in preparing this work.Commissioned in 1948, he served as a captain in theArab Legion from 1953 to 1956. He was TechnicalAdjutant 10 the Armoured Brigade and Ihen 10 the3rd Tank Rcgimenl, and his knowlcdge of theweapons and vehicles of the ArmoUl'ed Brigade hasbeen particularly helpful.

Since lea\,jng the Legion he has qualified at theRoyal ~Iilital)' Collcge of Science, and is currentlyemployed at the ~"ililal)' Vehicles and EngineeringEstablishmcnt. Like so many olher British soldiers ­including mysclf - Bill Woodhouse looks back onhis three years with the Arab Legion as beingamong the happiest in his Army career.

Printed in Great Britain byjarrold & Sons Ltd, :'\orwich

:firewordWriting these pages has revived memories ofthref'very happy years spent in the Arab Legion, in thedays when Clubb Pasha, already a legendaryfigure, \\'as in command, "nd \\'hell Cooke Pashawas forging the 1st Division. Man for mall theArab Legioll was the best of all lhe Arab armies.In 1967 the Jordanian Army, according to friendand foe alike, fought far better than the Egyptiansor the Syrians. I look back with lhe greatestpleasure on the days \vhen I commanded the 9thRegiment. Such opportunities do not come 10 theBritish officer of the present generation. TheBritish Arm)' need not be ashamed of the officersit sent 10 help with the expansion of the ArabLegion. )Ieo like Galledy, Elliott, i\IcCully,Hutton, Wormald, Leakey, Griffiths, and Tirrell,

1920

October

1932

July

1939

21 March3 Seplember1941April

June

1945

15 ~Iay

Peake forms the Arab Legion.Defeat of the lVahhabis by R.A.F.at Ziza.Anglo-Transjordan Treaty andLegion establishment reduced.Glubb arri\'es to form the DesertPatrol.

Last tribal raid.Arab rising in Palestine. Formationof Desert i\lechanized Force.Campaign against Arab infiltratersfrom Palestine and Syria.Peake retires.Second World War begins.

Campaign in Iraq. Desert Mechan­ized Regiment accompaniesHabforce.Syrian Campaign. Desert Mechan­ized Regimenl again accompaniesHabforce and plays a dccisi\'e partat Sukhna on I July.Second World War ends.Xew Anglo-Transjordan Treaty;Amir Abdallah becomes King of atruly independent state.Palestine Mandate ends and Legionoccupies Arab are3S.

18 ~Iay

25 May­II June

II June­9July

19493 April

195314-15

October195430 June­

'2 July1955

1956I March

Arah Legion enters Jerusalem.

Fighting round Latrun.

Ceascfirc, followed by further fight­ing round Latrun.

Israeli-Transjordan Armisticesigned.King Abdallah assassinated.

The Qibya Incident.The Jerusalem Incident.

The Bcit Liqya Incident.Jordan application tojoin BaghdadPact. Egyptian-inspired riots.

Glubb and other British officersdismissed; Arab Legion becomes'The Jordan .\rab Army'.

J

to name but a handful, had fought with thegreatest distinction in the Second World \\'ar, andse\'eral went on (0 be major-generals in our ownsen'ice. The)" wert: men who really had something10 pass on. It was the policy ofH.)t. Governmelltat that lime to gh'e Jordan military assistance. Itwould be a mistake, however, to suppose that thispolicy was directed against Israel. This was not thecase. On the contrary the British officers, generallyspeaking, exercised a restraining innuence. Theywere not quick on the trigger. British officers wentto the Legion in the normal course of their carecrs,and for 110 UItCI ior mOli\ c. To sen c in such anarmy and with such keen soldiers was sufficiemprivilege. To command a bedouin regiment was amagnificent experience.

To my formcr comrades of Ihe Arab Legion ­Arab, British and Circassian -I dedicate this book,

~Jeish~~f1bi

The end of the First \\'orld War in 1918 broughtnot only peace to the former Turkish possessionsin the ;\liddle East but administrative chaos. Thesituation was nOt cased whcn in 1920 the French,as lhe mandatory power, demanded the with­drawal of British troops from S}'ria; tbe British notonly complied, but withdrew at the same timeI"rom 'Transjol'dan, leaving the coumry cast 01" lheRiver Jordan without eflcctivc govcrnmenL

The opponents of the French occupation ofSyria soon took ad\'antage of this situation to uscTransjordan as a base of operations, and in 1921

the Amir Abdallah appeared in Ma'an in southernTransjordan with a force oftribcsmen determined(0 evict thc French. Howevcr, as a result of theBritish )1iddle East Conference then meeting inCairo connict was averted and Abdallah waspersuaded to acccpt the Amirate of Transjordan,

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which was thus recognized as a state and part ofthe British mandated territories.

I twas againsl this background Ihal in DClober'9'20 Captain F. G, Peake, who had recently beenposted to the newly-formed Palestine Police, wassent across to T rallsjordan to report on thegendarmerie there. He found a small and totallyinefficient force - 'the officers were of the coffee·house loafing class who seldom troubled to dressin uniform and the men were lazy and dissatisfied,ha\ ing: receiHd no pay for many months'. It wasimmedialclr plain to Peake thai nothing could be,Ichic\cd \\ilhout a properly disciplined force andhe obtained authority to raise 100 men. The forcewas to be called Ai }tish Ai Arabi - the title used byFeisal's forces, with whom Peake had served in thercccllI w:\r. Though literally translated as 'TheArab Army' - a somewhat gnmdiose title ror sosmall a lorce - the English version became 'TheArab Legion',

The ,\rab Legion consisted initially of fivcoAlcers, scvcllIy-five cavalry and twellty·fi\·emountcd machine·gullners; its responsibiliticswere lillie more than the policing of Amman, thecapital, and its immediate area. Shortly afterwardsa further IWO officers and fifty men were raised forthe Kerak area. The Legion had only been inexistence for a few months when the first realsetback occurred. In north-west Transjordan laythe country of £1 Kura, peopled by a peculiarlyintractable Iribc who refused to pay their taxes.The government in Amman, without so much asconsulting Peake, sellt off the entire Legion, underan Arab officer, to bring thc recalcitrant tribes­men to heel. This officer unhesitatingly marchedhis mell into a deep wadi where they were success­fully ambushed, the force losing eiglJleen killed,a large number wounded and all its horses. Thesurvivors dispersed to their homes in shame.

Undismayed, Peake set abollt reforming hisdiscredited force. Somewhat rcluclantly eight ofhis best men agreed to come back, and as timepassed a few Illore recruits trickled in. These menpro\'ided the Ilucleus when, in latc '921, Peake wasordered to increase the Legion's strenglh to about750 men. I)eakc's persuasive powers overcame their.itial reluctance of the local people to enlist,and it soon l>ccamc a question of turning away thecager applicants, The Arab Legion now became

organized into two companies of infalllry, lWO

squadrons of cavalry, a troop of artillery and asignals section. For reasons of economy the civilpolice also werc placcd under control of ArabLegion Headquarters so that the wholc commandnumbered somc ',300 men.

The next few years demonSlrated l)eake'sability both as a soldier and an administrator, forthe standard of the Arab Legion improved and thecountry became more peaceful. One seriousproblem, howcver, remained. In the mid-'92oswhen the Legion was beginning to deal effecth'clywith the periodic disturbances in the settled areas,a more serious threat grew lip. This was theIVnhhahi movemelll, a Muslim religious revival in

.·-what is now Saudi Arabia. The Ikhwan, orethren, were determined to convert the peopleTransjordan by the sword. Their efforts wcrc

thwarted at Ziza in 1924, by an R.A.F. forcebased on Amman, a battle in which the ArabLegion look little part; however, the threatresulted in the formation of Ihe TransjordanFronticr Force which, when the Anglo-Tram­jordan treaty was signed in '927, assumed res­ponsibility for maintaining the frontier. It wasresponsible direct to the High Commissioner forPalestine. The treaty recognized Transjordan's'independence', while gidng Creat Britain theresponsibility for external defence and foreignrelations. Thc effect of all this was another blowto the Arab Legion, which suffered a reduction of600 men, including the loss of its artillery andsignals, Henceforth the Legion's role was to beconfined to internal security,

Peake had recruited the Legion, quite deliber­ately, from the village Arabs or haderi, because hesa\,/ the encroachment of tbe bedouin on thecultivated areas as the greatest threat to stableand prosperous Arab governmcnt. Initially thisworked reasonably well, but with the rise to powerof Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia the intcr-tribalraiding, which had always characterized bedouinlife, assumed an international status, since itdisregarded the borders of the twO new states.it became necessary to dcal with the nomadtribes, but this neither the Transjordan FrontierForce, whose task it properly was, nor thereconstituted Arab Legion could do.

The need for some sort of desert police was

s..~ean~ b ......hiJ Abu K.rachl of the Deli"rt Patrolpbo~OI""phedOD30 October 1944.(I.mperial War Munu..... )

evident and when, in December '930, Peake askedfor assistance, Major J. B. Clubb, ),I.C., was sentto him from iraq, where he had already beenserving with distinction amongst the bedouin.Glubb started to raise the Desert Patrol (theBadit},) from among the nomad tribes themselvcs;the beginnings were small, since it was only bypersonal persuasion that he was able to get any­ont to join him at all. His first patrol consisted ofhimsclr, his driver, Alec Kirkbridc the AssistantBritish Rcsident in Amman, and the Amir SaakerIbn Zeid, president of the Bedouin Control Board.However, as Clubb's reputation spt'ead, recruitsfrom the tribcs gradually came in, and by April'931 the Badi,h had been able to take oyer fromthe Transjordan Frontier Force both the B3ir and)"ludowwara sectors - in each case with a "erysmall detachment. So effective were Glubb'smethods thal within a rear virtually all tribalraiding had ceased and the last raid in the desertlook place inJuly 1932. Even the Howeitat - theprincipal offenders on the Saudi frontier - afteran initial reluctance be an to join the DesertPatrol, and Clubb's command \\'as soon lip to its

5

Cap badlll;l', Rl"Jlular Anny. The silver cap badlll;e of till'Arab ulII;ion is 1101' SarnO' for soldle" and poUc:e, but theNallonal Guard have .. dlffl'ffnt badlll;l' 10 Yl'lIow ml'tal

full strength of ninety men. Detachments, camel­mounted, lived on their own in their patrol areas,often commanded by a son of the local sheikh, andbefore long it beC;ll1le an honour to belong to theBadith, whose morale was correspondingly high.

The period 1932 to 1936 was one ofsteady, andgenerally peaceful, progress. Clubb continuedin command of the Desert Patrol, under the overalldircction of Peake, who himself remained at thehead of affairs in Amman. The relationship ofboth men with the Amir Abdallah and hisGovernment became increasingl)' cordial.

In 1936 the Arab rising in Palestine began andthough its effects were little felt in Transjordanto start with, it soon became clear that some centralreserve was needed to meet the threat to securityfrom across the border. From '930 the entirestrength of the Legion had been deployed aroundthe country in small detachments. Now a reserveof two squadrons of horsed cavalry and the Desert.\Icchanized Force of 350 bedouin soldiersmounted in trucks was raised and trained. Thewisdom of this decision was e,'ident when in.\1arch 1939 a para-military force some 100 strongelllered the country from Syria. It was spottedheading towards the wooded Ajlun mountains,but before it could reach the hills was engaged bythe Desen .\1echanized Force, whose first action

6

this was, under command of a reccntly joinedBritish officer, Lieutenant ~'lacadam.The bedouindashed into action and soon gained the upperhand. R.A.F. aircraft from Amman arrived togive support, pressing home their attack sosuccessfully that the enemy broke up in panic.The raiders suffered some thirty-fi\'e casualties,Ihe rest vanishing undcr CO\'er of darkncss. TheArab Legion lost its new British officcr and onesergeant killed and three othcr ranks \'>'ounded.

The March engagement set the scene for aseries of similar incursions over the next fewweeks, but the Legion soon gOt the measure oftheir opponents and on 24 April a final actionwas fought at Beit Idis. Here a force of some 200guerrillas were surprised by the horsed cavalryand the Desert ~Iechanized Force. A runningfight ensued as Ihe enemy were pursued into thewooded hills above the \'illage; contact was finallylost in the early cvening, the enemy having sufferedabout eleven killed and at least Iwenty wounded.This action finally discouraged the guerrillaleaders, and their bands of infiltraters were seenno morc in Transjordan. On 21 March 1939Glubb had assumed command of the Arab Legionwhen Peake retired and returned 10 England. AsClubb himself says, ' ... a considerable portion ofthe people of Transjordan were scarcely able toremember the da~'s before Colonel Peake came.His disappearance from the scene marked the endof an epoch for the Arab Legion, and indeed forTransjordan itself.'

The outbreak of war in Europe found Trans­jordan in an uneasy lull following the campaignagainst the Palestinian guerrillas. While thecavalry patrolled the Syrian and Palestine bor­ders, the Desert Mechanized Force, now aug­mented by six locally-made armoured cars,continued its interrupted training. Just beforewar was declared Captain r\. O. Lash joinedGlubb as the only other British officer, and tookover command of the Desert Patrol.

On the outbreak of war in 1939 the AmirAbdallah gave an unhesitating pledge of fullsupport for Great Britain. This was not taken "eryseriously until after the fall of Francc in 194-0,

when the Germans and Italians began to arrive10 take over the Syrian and Lebanese Govern­ments. With the British Army in Egypt committed

to the WcstCI'll Desel't, the tiny Arab Legionimmediately assumed an importancc bcyond itssize: it was indeed practically the sale defenceagainst any invasion from the east. IL was decidedthat the Dlosert r."lechanized Force should beenlarged to form a Mechanized Rcgiment, whichthe British agreed to equip. Meanwhile, Germaninfluence in S)'ria and Iraq increased and in early'94' a coup d'i!ol took place in Baghdad where apro·German party seized power; in April theregime declared war on Great Britain and a forcewas accordingly gathered together in Palestine tocross the desert and relieve the besieged Britishgarrison of the Habbaniyah R.A.F. station.Glubb, accompanied by Lash and the ~Iechanized

Regiment, was to accompany 'Habforce', with thetask on arri\'al in Iraq ofcontacting loyal elementsand persuading them to rise against the regime.

The ~lechanized Regiment (still in fact the350 men of the original ~lechanized Force, sincethe promised new equipment had not yct arrived)was ordered to cover the concentration of'Habforce' at H4, a station on the Iraq PetroleumCompany's pipeline, and, if possible, to capturethe frontier post fort at Rutbah, held by some 100

Iraqi police. On the morning ofB May the Legioninvested the fort but, despite some desultorybombing by a single R.A.F. aircraft, the Iraqisshowed no inclination to surrender. Withoutartillery or mortars the Legion was powerless andwhen at dusk 011 the second day a largc \'chicleconvoy appeared whh reinforcements for thegarrison, the Mechanized Regimellt was forced to

withdraw to H3 in order to replenish with waterand ammunition. Meanwhile, an R.A.F. arm­Ollred car company, supported from the air,renewed lhe attack lO such good eOcct that on10 May the garrison abandoned the fon.

The Legion now prepared lO accompany'Kingeol', the flying column commanded byBrigadier Kingstone, on its dash to relievcHabbaniyah. It seems clear that al this timeneither Kingstone nor Major-Ceneral Clarke,Habforce commander, fully appreciated thepotential of the Legion force accompanying them.However, when most of Kingcol's vehicles boggeddown in the soft sand and there was gloomy talkof returning to Rutbah, Glubb managed toper5uade the Brigadier that his experienced desert

,

---

Trooper of Glubb'. Dnert Palrol camelry. Glubb Pa.hafonned lhe DeHrt Panol in 1931 from amons!he bedouintn pUI an e.nd 10 raidinS by nomadic triM.me.n

soldiers could show lhem the way. Guided by lheLegion, the whole force mo\'ed into HabbaniyahwithOllt difficulty and unopposed. The onlycasuahies occurred in lhe rearguard which wasattacked by four German fighters; two bedouinsoldiers fought hack gallantly with the Lewis gunmounted in their truck, one being killed and onebadly wounded.

After the relief of I-Iabbaniyah the ~Ilechanized

Regiment was employed in raids on the Jezireharea nOl'lh of Mosul in an cITon to cut the MOSlll.Baghdad railway, Glllbb at lhe same time makingsuch local Contacts as he could. The Legion alsoreconnoitred suitable routes for the attack onBaghdad, and the columns which advanced on thecity towards the end of May were allied by ArabLegion guides. By 3' ~'b)' the outskirts of the cityhad been reached and the Iraqis had requestednn armistice, the terms of which Glubb helped todraft. Habforce entered Baghdad on , June andon 2June the Arab Legion ~lechanized Regiment,its job done, set OUI across the desert to return toAmman.

7

Chevrolet I.rucks or the Arab Legion Deserl MechanizlMIForce, which look pari In the Syrian C8.Dlpa..l(n, UnIMI upon Ihe parade (round for inspection by Ihe Amlr. Eachtruck carries a Lewis pn, and Ihe crew or five and onedriver carry rill.,. and revolvers. (Imperia.1 Wa.r Museum)

The Legion did not have long to recuper-.ltc.Operations to forestall any German occupation ofSyria began on 10 June, though initially wilhoutthe support of the Arab Legion. However, on21 June Habforce was withdrawn from Iraq andit and the .\Iechanized Regimem were orderedinto Syria, with Palmyra as their objective..\1ajor·General Clarke's force was divided imothree columns. The Royal Wiltshire Yeomanryled the way, guided by a·n Arab Legion detach·ment; their (ask to capture Ihe hills west ofPalmyra. The remainder of 4th Cavalry Brigade,again guided by a Legion detachment, were tomove eaSI of the town and capturc the nonhernhills. The lhird column, which included ForceHeadquarters, consisted of the I St Essex, someartillery and sappers and five Arab Legion troopsled by Glubb; the Legion's task after the attackon Palmyra being to cover the rear of Britishtroops moving west towards Horns.

It had been hoped that Palmyra would fall onthe firSI day but surprise was 10SI at Juffa, some

8

lwcnty·fivc miles to the soulh·east, when a '·ichypost managed to get off a radio message before itwas overrun by lhe Yeomanry. In addition, 4thCavalry Brigade was held up at T3, an IraqPctroleum Company cantonment. Leaving aparty to walch the French garrison at T3, the restof Habforce moved on to attack Palmyra, undercontinual French air anack. On 26June, with themain force investing Palmyra, the Legion wasordered to capture Seba' Biyar to the cast andthen to take Sukhna, some thiny miles to lhenonh·east, in order to secure the lines of com­munication. Soon after dawn on 28 June Clubb'sforce approached 5eba' Biyar, which surrenderedas the force drove up - just as well since lheattackers had no anillery.

On 29 June the Legion moved out to Sukhnaand found the village unoccupied by the enemy.However, carlyon t July a column was observedapproaching from Deir ez Zor while most of thetroops were away getting breakfast. Leaving Lashwith the Legion's three armoured cars and a trOOpof infantry, in a position he had prepared on a hillto the cast of the village, Clubb went off to alertthe Household Cavah·y squadron which hadjoined his force two days before, and sent a truckto recall his own troops. On his rCturn he foundLash already engaged with French infantry andarmoured cars; the bedouin infantry, nevcrpatient of a defensive battle. could not restrainthemselves and, instead of holding on until theremainder of the force could take the Frmch inthe flank, as Glubb had ordered, rushed into theattack. Although greatly oumumberul theypressed home their assault with dash and gal•lantry, and, supported by the thrc:c: armouredcars, put the enemy to flight. The French ..·chiclesmade off to the cast. FOrlunatdy the Legion'sinfantry trucks appeared at that moment andClubb instantly ga\·e chase. 1"he Frmc.h in­advertently ran into a dried-up "...t.t:n:.ou.r'St, werecaught and surrendered without fU.rt.Qcr fighting.Only one \'ehic1e escaped.

The French troops at ukhna .1•. ted of 2ndLight Desert Company and wbc:a thrit c:omradesin Palmyra heard what bad happ "cd theymutinied and forced their officers IIIJTender.By II July the fighting in )-ri.a w» O\"U. thebattle at Sukhna having been - tal in

achieving this result. The signal sem by CeneralWilson, C.O.C. Palestine, to the AmiI' Abdallahon '2 J lily expressed well the high esteem in whichthe Legion was held - 'The Transjordan DesertPatrol (sic], under Clubb Pasha, carried outyesterday at Sukhna, a most successful operation,capturing 80 prisoners, 6 armoured cars and 12machine guns. I offer respectful congratulationson spirited action and fighting qualities of yourtroops.'

Sukhna was destined to be the last action foughtby the Legion in the Second World War; despitepersistent efforts by Clubb and the AmiI' Abdallahto persuade the British to employ the Legion in anacti\"e role, the )'ears till t945 were spent infurnishing guard companies for installationsthroughout the ~:Iiddle East theatre. During thewar years the Legion expanded to three infantryregiments with a brigade headquarters, formedfor operations whieh ne\'er in fact materialized, inaddition to the sixteen guard companies dispersedabout the theatre.

The year 1946 was marked by the negotiationof a new treaty with Britain, under which Trans·jordan became truly independent and the AmiI'became King Abdallah. Howe\"er, more seriouswork lay ahead, for twO years later, on 15 :\'Iay1948, the Palestine :\Iandate was due to end;in response 10 Ihe pleas of the Palestinians, whohad no other forces to protect them against theJews, Transjordan prepared to occupy with theArab Legion those areas of Palestine adjacent toher frontiers ,,'hich had been allocated to theArabs. The troops available for this operationconsisted of foul' lorried infantry battalionsorganized in two brigades, plus two batteries of25-pounder guns, four guns to each battery.There were in addition sC"en garrison companieswho had had little tactical training and possessedno support weapons. The total strength was about4,500 all ranks and was commanded by BrigadierLash with an improvised headquarters, under theo\'erall direction of Clubb Pasha. There were noreser\'es of trained men and little beyond first linestocks of mortar and artillery ammunition.

On 15 ~'lay the Arab Legion crossed intoPalestine; 1 Brigade liSt and 3rd Regiments)mo\"ed to tlte Xablus area, while 3 Brigadeso-called for deception comisting of 2nd and ,ph

Regimenls moved to Ramallah; both brigadeswere soon involved in a number of small actionsas the Jews moved forward into the Arab areas.Meanwhile the U.N. Truce Committee tried tostop the fighting which had already started in thesupposedly internationalizedJ erusalem. Clubb wasreluctant to mo\'e into the Holy City while trucenegotiations continued but, appreciating that theJews there were being reinforced from Tel A\'i\',4th Regiment was moved to Latrun to block thatroute. At noon on 17 May Clubb recei\'ed a directorder from King Abdallah to mo\'e the army intoJerusalem where the Jews appeared to be gainingthe upper hand; Clubb still hoped to a\'oid theaction, knowing that his slender force would bestretched beyond its limit if fully committed tostreet fighting in addition to its commiunents else·where in Palestine. Xe\'crtheless, on 18 .May heordered 1st Independent Company to mo\"e for·ward from the ~Iount of Oli\'es and man theOld City walls.

Although the presence of the Legion in Jeru­salem stiflcned Arab resistance it was clearly notenough, and on 19 ~Iay Lash was ordered to breakinto the city from the north with whatcxer troopshe could muster. By clearing the Sheikh Jarraharea and establishing a line across the westernedge of the Old City, Clubb hoped to halt theJewish offcnsh"e. The attack went in at 03'45 hourson 19 May and consisted ofone infantry company,one armoured car squadron (at that time anintegral part of each lorried infantry battalion),four 6-pounder anti-tank guns and four 3·inchmOrtars. There was also limited support from onebattery of artillery. This small force of 300 men,reinforced during Ihe day by two more companies,was firmly established in Sheikh Jarrah by night­fall, although the armoured cars had had towithdraw. The next day this lid hoc collection oftroops continucd to hold on under mountingenemy pressure and Lash decided to relie\'e themwith 3rd Regiment, the only unit a,'ailable. Thismeant virtllally denuding Samaria of troops, butwith no altcrnati,·e nOh' that the Legion wascommitted to the battle for Jerusalem, the orderwas gi\'en and shortly after 04'00 hours on 21 :\1aythe Regiment came into action"

For se\'eral hours the fighting was confused andintense and it was not until !oroo hours that the

9

- .~,

Trooper. of the Household Cavalry SqUlldron paradialtM:(ore 5euin. out on patrol. Occober f9+4. (lrnperiat WarM ..se....... j

companies had reached their positions ncar ~OtrCDamc- from which theJews dominated the wholearca. This slrongpoinl had 10 be taken before aproper defensive line could be established and on23 Mayan attempt was made, but progress wasslow. Fighting cominued throughout that dayand night and through the followillgday. Althoughsed Regiment gained a foothold in the immenseblock of buildings which made up NOIre Dame,they were unable to hold on and casualties ,'"eremounting: at 17"00 hOUTS on 24 May the attackwas abandoned. The Regiment had foughtbravdy, but was now exhausted and casualtiescould not be replaced. XeverthcJcss, the Old Cit)'was held and that had been the main objective.~Ieanwhile twO independent infantry companieswere now hea\·ily committed inside the Old City,

10

_ t;..~-

fighting off altacks from Mount Zion to the southand allhe same time auacking the Jewish quarterwilhin the \...alls, an area ,... hich \...as not cleareduntil 28 May.

The main aClion now swung to Latrun, where4th Infantry Regiment had been blocking the TelAviv road since 15 May. From 25 ~Iay untilII June Jewish pressure on this vital positionincreased. :'l"everthelcss 4th Regiment, later re·inforced by 2nd Regiment, held firm against allatlacks, the Jews losing hundreds of men in fruit­less assaults on Latrun itself. at Bah AI Wad andon Radar, this last position having been "''Testedfrom them by 1st Regiment in a brilliant attackon 26 ~lay.

~Ieanwhile Count Bernadotte, the .X. media­tor, had arranged a truce for II JUDe but this

lasted barely a month, the Arab leaders decidingto renew the fighting on 9 July. The resumptionof hostilities found the Legion's 3 Brigade in theLatrun area, with ilS right flank weakly coveredby the Arab-held lowns of RamIe and Lyddaj thejews planned to attack this vulnerable area withthe Palmach, their corps d·ilile some 6,500 strong,and then capture Latrun iuelffrom the 1,500 menof the Arab Legion who held it. Lydda and Ramie,garrisoned by irregulars, fell to thejews on 12 J lilyand on Ij July they attempted to outflank theLatrun position from the north_ Thev wcre. .howe\·er, held at AI Burj by a 2nd Regimentcounterattack_ Fighting continued in the arcauntil 18 jul)', when the Palmach put in a finaleffort supported by armour; almost all their tan.kswere knocked out by a gallantly-sen:ed 6-pounderand the infantry attack never materialized. Latrunwas held.

Bernadotte had arranged for another truce totake effect on 18 july and this lasted, with anumber of violations, until October, despite thetension caused by the jewish assassination ofBernadotte on 1i September. Howe\·er, on15 October the Eg)'ptians were defeated in theNeqev by a large-scale jewish attack which cutoff from the rest of their army the Egyptians inHebron. A small detachment of the Legion mo'-edinto the area just in time to stave off a determinedJewish armoured car altack, and thus undoubtedlysaved Hebron itself and the surrounding area forthe Arabs.

By November 1948 only the Arab Legion andthe Iraqi army remained in lhe field, with theLegion holding a 'oo-mile front with, by thistime, some 10,000 men. An uneasy cease-fireprevailed uillil 3 April 1949 when an Israeli­Transjordan Armistice was finally signed inRhodes.

Although the fighting officially ended with theRhodes Armistice, for the Arab Legion, facedwith the responsibility of guarding a 400-milefrontier (the Iraqis having withdrawn) againstan aggressi\'e enemy, 'peace' was a relative term.Apart from its operational task the Legion had anenormous training problem. During the fightingthe army had expanded, in somewhat haphazardfashion, from a strength of 6,000 to some 12,000men; the ad hot di\'isional organization which had

been used in the 1948 fighting had to be put on amore permanent basis and the need for admini.strative units was painfully obvious. At the sametime the Legion had a great lack ofsenior officers,particularly in the technical arms; if the army wasto become a modem and up-to-date fighting forceit needed the technical equipment and experiencedofficers to train lhe soldiers in the handling anduse of it. The only source of such aid was theBritish Government, which already provided asubsidy, eventually totalling some ten millionpounds a year; and this at a dme when, somewhatparadoxically, most Palestinian Arabs saw theBritish as the author of all their misfortunes.Understandably, as the British element in theLegion increased, so did the people of jordan ­which now included a large slice of Palestine and a,-ast number of refugees - begin to question Britishill\-oh-ement in jordanian affairs. However, des­pite frontier incidents and despite the assassinationof King Abdallah in 1951, to be succeeded afterTallal's brief reign by the Amir Hussein in 1952,jordan remained outwardly calm and the armysteadfastly lopl. Glubb himself was well aware ofthese under-eurrents, and plans were made for thegradual handover of British command to Arabs,as the lauer graduall)' became qualified - more orless - for high command. The process was tOOslow for Arab tastcs.

~...Ieanwhile, from 1949, when 1 Di,-ision (ofthree brigades) was formed from the nine infantryregimellts which had grown up during 1948,rapid expansion tOok place. Lash, the first divi­sional commander, retired in 1951 to be succeededby J\tfajor·General Cooke, who remained with theLegion until 19j6. In 195' also, the armoured carsquadrons, which bad formed part of the infantrybattalions, were collected into an armoured carregiment, the nueleus of an armoured foree whichlater included a regiment of tanks. The artillerywas similarly expanded to pro\'ide a field regimentfor each infantry brigade, a light allli-aircraftregiment and an anti-tank regiment. Engineersand service units also appeared gradually, whilethe signals expanded to form a regiment; at thesame time, Ihough there was little money to payfor it, a :\'ational Guard was formed to providesome son of resen-e and to enable the frontiervillages to protect themselves.

II

Caplain Mohamnud inspeclalnranll")' at the AMIlb Lel!lionTl'1liniDI!l School, OClo~r J944. (I.m.perial War Museum)

Until 1953 only one of the three brigades wasstationed on the \\"est Bank, as that arca ofPalestine which tbe Arab Legion had held for theArabs came to be known: the remainder weremostly based on Zerka and Khnw, north ofAmman, and Irbid, and were kept busy training.In October of that year, however, an incidentoccurred ;\1 the \"il1age of Qiby.', about ten milesnorth of Latrun. which altered the situationdramatically. An attack on the \"illage by theIsraeli army in battalion strength resulted in thedestruction of Qibya itself and the slaughter ofsome sixty-eight people, mostly women andchildren. To make matters worse, no effe<:tin"counler action was taken b)' the brigade stationedin the area. The result of this disastrous incidentwas thal from then on twO infantry brigades werepermanelllly stationed on the West Bank andtraining of the division suffered in consequence.One brigade was kept around .Jerusalem and theOlher ncar ~ablt1s. The illcidenl al Qibya alsoled to serious riots in Amman, which were sup­pressed without bloodshed by the 2nd ArmouredCar Regiment and the 91h (Infantry) Regimelll.

Qibya heralded a change of policy on the pariof the Israelis. General Dayan, who had recentlybecome Chief of Staff, was now in power. In hisbook 200 black rabbits made a black horse. Thaiis to say that when there had been a number ofcases of infiltration from Egypt, Jordan or Syriait was his policy to strike a massive blow in return.This had the added advantage ofgiving his picked

12

troops, led by men like Sharon and Davidi, agreat deal of experience in night operations andraiding at which they came to excel. Thal someof the Arab infiltralion was done by guerrillas isnot unlikely, but it must be remembered thatEl Fa/ok and thefido)'un had nOt really got goingin 19';3. ~Iost of the infiltraters were dispossessedPalestinians going across the border to see theirfriends and relations; a few were smugglers.

The attack on Qibya underlined lhe need foreffective tactics which, if they could not deter theIsraelis from attacking, could at least prevenl thcenemy escaping afterwards and perhaps dis­courage them from trying again" Israeli 'reprisalraids' of varying intensilY continued to occurthroughout [954. The improved ability of theLegion to cope with this kind of warfare, no smallpan or which consisted or preventing Jordaniansfrom infiltrating into Israel, was demonstrated atUeit Liqya, rour miles insidcJordan, in September1954. The village was altacked by aOOUI twocompanies of Israelis, but on this occasion the:\ational Guard, under a regular :\.C.O., repulsedthe attack. The Israelis, knowing that Legionreinforcements could be expected, had mined thelikely approach roads and covered them withambush parties. Sure enough a Legion platoonmoving down one route ran into the ambush andwas halted. A company ofjth Regiment, ho\\"e\·er,encountering a second Israeli blocking force,engaged it fiercely and dro\"e it back over thedemarcation line. In addition, the Bdt :\'uba:\'ational Guard mo\"cd up from the south to assisttheir neighbours and encountered a third ambush,which they engaged. The fact that the Israelisfailed to get into the village, coupled with theinitiative displayed by the Legion and NationalGuard junior commanders ill their vigorousreaction to the attack, showed that at last theLegion was meeting with some success.

The mOst serious incident of Ihis period, butone that was completely unlike the raids onfrontier villages or police stations, took place inJerusalem between 30 June and 2 July. It sochanced that the present writer was temporarilyin command of the brigade on the Ramallah·:\ablus frollt, with the 9th Regiment of which hewas then Commanding Officer, in the: Old Cityarea. TheJerusalem Incident wasashootingmatch

B"'-ouin. or tbe Desert Patrol dUNS traJ.......s •• A.o:nn>an,Febntary I94J. (Imperial W.r MURum)

which went on for three days, and caused anumber of casualties, mostly civilians. The 9thRegiment had only one man wounded and that bythe merest chance. On 3July Ceneral Bennike, forthe ljnited :'\ations. thanked both sides for theirco-operation in putting an end to the shooting,expressed his sympathy for the victims, ande..xpressed a pious wish that the ceasefire would notbe broken again. This satisfied nobody.

The Jordanians, considering that the Israelishad opened fire simultaneously all along the front,supposed that it was as the result of a prearrangedplan. :"01' was this wholly unreasonable since the~Ii.xed Armistice Commission had recently con­demned Israel for a raid on the village of Azzoun.a fact which fighting in Jerusalem could keep fromthe pages of the world Press. The Israelis for theirpart blamed the bedouin of the 9th Regimelll,claiming that they were attempting to avenge theirbrethren in the 1st Regimelll slain at Azzoun.This suggestion is simply untrue. The Regimenthad only ten ofllecrs present at the time, and thesenior officers, allliclltenants as it happened, wcrcnot capablc ortaying on such an operation withoutthe knowledgc and co-operation of their Colonel,which they neither had nor invited.

\\'hile the Legion had been getting to grips withthe practical side of its task, the politicians had notbeen idle. Towards the end of 1955, Jordan hadapplied to join the Baghdad Pact, and negotiationstook place in Amman which would ha\'e resultedin considerable increases to the Arab Legion's

establishment-notably the pro\'ision of anurgently needed fourlh inl~\Iltry brigade. How­ever, the Egyptian Covernment took the oppor­tunity during the negotiations to foment a seriesof riots in the main Jordanian cities as part of:"asser's campaign to assert his leadership of theArab world. These riots, in December '955, taxedthe loyalty and resources of the Legion to theutmost and it says much for the army that, withvery few exceptions, they stood firm and carriedout their unaccustomed internal security dutiesextremely well. despite the fact that they were in­\"olved in operations against theirown countrymen.

Thus the internal tranquillity of Jordan wasshattered. Sadl)', she'... was to become just onemore unstable, passionate, blood-stained Arabcountry'. Time was now fast running out for theArab Legion. Although order was restored byJanuary 1956, a personal campaign against ClubbPasha was gathering momentum; a clique ofyounger officers had gained the car of KingHussein and their efforts succeeded on I ~Iarch

1956 when Clubb was summarily dismissed - sosummarily in fact that he was required to lea\'ethe country, after thirty years in the service ofJordan, the next morning. Clubb was nOt unawarethat the King, or rather his new friend Ali Abu:'\awar, had been considering getting rid of him forsome time. The immediate cause of his dismissalappears to ha\'e been the misinterpretation by the

011 IJ March 1944 'EaUciH Crocodile' look place in.Palestine and Trw.nsjord..., direCled by LieutelUlnl_Generw.1 Hob..es. Here, uoope" o{ lb" Camel Corpa onpard al lbe Dir"""lor'. camp are iDIipec:ud by GenenlHolmes. (Imperial War Museu...)

13

King of an ammunition return, which seemed to

show that stocks were dangerously low.Be that as it may, Glubb departed, followed

very shortly afterwards by the remainder of thesixty-four British offieers at that time serving withthe Legion. The existence of the Arab Legion,\\'ith its varied and distinguished history, may besaid to have come to an end on that first day of~larch 1956, when a Jordanian radio announcerfirst referred to it officially as 'The Jordan ArabArmy' - the title by which it has since beenknown.

CJ!feaCeaders

Amir Abdallah originally arrived in Transjordanfrom the Hejaz in 1921, with the intention ofraising a force of tribesmen for operations againstthe French in Syria. Winston Churchill, then theBritish Colonial Secretary, was in Cairo for theBritish ~'Iiddle East Conference at that time andwhen he heard of Abdallah's arrival decided tomeet him; it was as a result of this meeting thatAbdallah was offered the Amirate of the countryof which he later became king.

The new Amir was a very astute man, with awell-developed sense of humour; Kirkbride, formany years British Resident and later Ambassadorin Amman, says of him'... he had a perennialtwinkle in his eyes, which was an indication of hisbasic character'. At the same time, Abdallah wasa man with considerable political experience, hav­ing spent much of his time as a young man inConstantinople among the ruling classes of theOttoman Empire; Glubb commcnts that thisearly experience produced in him a 'wise andtolerant mind' - attributes which certainly stoodthe Amir in good stead in the trials to come and

14

enabled him to meet statesmen on their ownground.

Glubb also points out, howcver, that Abdallahwas a very human man, with his faults like anyoneelse; he could be irritable, even vindictive to thosehe did not like and he was not always careful whathe said - •A man whose enemy is his own tongue'according to his cousin the Amir Shakir ibn Zeid.A sincerely religious man, at the height of thebattle for Jerusalem in 1948 he told Glubb thathe would rather die on the walls of the city thansee theJews in possession of the Holy Places.

As a ruler Abdallah was essentially a practicalmonarch, albeit with a romantic side, who puthis Country before all else. He alone amongst theArab leaders could see the need for a genuinepeace with the new state of Israel; after the 1949Armistice he is quoted as saying: 'Israel is strongerthan Jordan, therefore we cannOt fight them.Israel wants peace. Why not sec whal they haveto say? Perhaps we shall get better terms that way.'The King ignored the denunciations thai pouredin on him from the other Arab countries andeventually this was to prove his undoing when, inJuly 1951, he was murdered in the city he 10\'ed,Jerusalem.

That Jordan had been the peaceful and pros­perous country it had for so many years was to avery large extent due to the wise leadership ofKing Abdallah; a statesman morcover who \\'asprepared to stand by his country's friends. andwho did not hesitate to declare war on Germanyas England's ally in 1939. The grief felt throughoutJordan when Abdallah died was undoubtedlygenuine; the people of Jordan had lost a kingaptly described by Stewart Perowne as a 'greatruler, innexible friend and most royal gentleman'.

KIl'~G HUSSEIN

Hussein, grandson of King Abdallah, was King ofJordan and Commander-in-Chieffor the last threeyears of the Legion's existence, and his was thedecision which brought about the end ofthe Legionas it had grown up under Peake and Glubb.Although the son of a de\'oted falber, tha.t father,King Tallal, had become insane; in addition theprince had been with his grandfather, Abdallah,when he was assassinated in 1951, hardly an

J

, --,., -.• t '.","" .. r. t'

•

, -,

AnUr Abdallah. deco 'u a Les:ionnairc (or valour .ho....ndurlnll:: the Syrian ca pa;S-D. (hnpuial War Mu.e"In)

auspiciolls start for a young and incJ\pcricncedmonarch. Hussein, after a period at school inAlexandria, completed his education in Englandat Harrow and then at the R.:\I.A. Sandhurst.When he returned for his coronation in '953 hischief characteristic was an impeccable Brigade ofGuards salute; there were those who describedhim, unkindly, as ')'Iade in England'. At thatperiod the chief impression he gave was onc ofex(reme shyness. He was at his most confidclllwhen handling a plane or a car.

In 1953 Jordan was already facing increasingactivit)' on her frontier with Israel, and politicalattacks from other Arab states, Egypt in parti.cular. Thus from thc outsct the pressures on theKing were great and it is not surprising that in hisenthusiasm for things military he listened, at leastfrom 1955 onwards, to the \'oices ofa small cliqueof ambitious young Arab officers, in prcfcrence LO

that of Clubb, a man thirty.eight years his seniorand, morco\-er, a man who had ad\i~d his grand­father. Hussein'sjudgmcnt seems to ha\'c bccn atfault in dismissing Clubb and thc othcr Britishofficers in the way he did, and yet it is under­standable, In fact the men who brought aboutClubb's dismissal were also out to dethrone

Hussein. Clubb says of the King that he is \'crylike his grandfather, who was also impctuous inhis youth, and expresses the opinion that ifHussein can maintain his throne into middle agehe has e\'ery chance ofbccoming as great a man asAbdallah was. It is indeed certain that, sinceClubb's departure, the King has shown himself tobe a man of courage and initiati\'e, ha\'ing re·tained control in Jordan through countless crises,including an attempted coup d'ilat, a disastrouswar with Israel and civil war against the \'ariousPalcstine gucrrillas - any onc of which couldcasil~' ha\'e brought him down. If his judgmclll issometimes suspCCt he secms to ha\'e luck on hisside. I)erhaps Clubb should ha\'C the last word ­'He is a man of character and courage, who mayrender great sen-ice to the ~Iiddle East if hesun'i\'es these uncertain times.'

PE,\KE P,\SH,\ t886-19io

Licutenant·Coloncl Frederick Gerard Pcakc,C.~I.C., C.B.E., who created the Arab Legion andcommanded it fol' sc"enteen ycars, had a can·\'cntional early carccl' - public school, Sundhurst,and a regular commission in The Duke ofWelling.ton's Regiment . .\'ot contclH with peacetimesoldiering in England, in 1906 he arranged to beposled to the second battalion of his regiment inIndia, but found the gay social life there equallyunattracti\'c, and in 19'3 he obtained a second·mcnt to the Egyptian Army. Peake saw no sen-ict'on Ihe main fronts in the First World War,although he did takc part in the Darfur expedition

One or King Abdallah'lI penonal bod)·gu...d o£Clrcan;ans

15

H.M. King Hussein, ucortf:d by troopers of the HouseholdCayalry Squadron, inspects the A....b Legion at the ArabLegion Day Parade, 1955

in the Sudan in 1915. Disappointed at not seeingmore active servicc, hc made his way, whilstostensibly on lea\'e, to Salonika and spent somefivc months as an observer with Ihe R.F.C. InApril 1918 he joined Ihe Egyptian Camel Corpsand \\'as sent to Feisal's Arab Army, operating onAlIenby's eastern flank in Transjordan - the firstview Peake had of the country he was to serve forso many years.

Peake earned a considerable reputation as ademolitions expert, so successful was he at sabotag·ing the Hejaz Railway. A photograph of him atthis time shows us a fine·drawn, rathcr haggard,face, with a poilllcd beard already grcying andwith piercing, almost fanatical, cyes. It is notdifficult to imagine him as the 'hot, impalientsoul' described by T. E. Lawrence, nor as a'twelfth-century Arab swashbucklcr' - anothercOlllemporary description. This, then, was theman who was selll to Transjordan in [920 to formthe Arab Legion. However, he soon revealeddiffcrent tal en IS, those of an administrator, andalthough his courage and ability as a soldier are notin queslion, il is perhaps for these that he shouldbe remembered. Peake's primary task, as he saw it,was to show lhe flag around the country; this wasimportant as many of the country districts, parti­cularly areas in the south such as Kerak andTafileh, were without any representatives of lawand order. One result of Peake's indefatigabletours was thaI he became the arbiter in numerouslocal disputes, frequently being asked to press thecase with the Government in Amman for somelocal project such as a new road or irrigation

16

scheme; equally frequently he received the creditwhen Ihese Ihings were eventually provided.

Peake's tours were not always without excite·ment. On one occasion near Madaba he and hissmall escort came under fire from a nearby ridge,lined with the heads and rifles ofthe Beni Hemeida.Peake went forward alone and managed toidentify himself, whereupon the tribesmen camerushing forward to greet him, apologizing pro·rusely and protesting that they were merelyprotecting Iheir homes and herds. While Peakewas lunching with the sheikh after this encountera party of merchants passed by along the track hehad followed, and it became very clear why theBeni Hemeida were there. A meaning look fromthose piercing blue eyes showed the sheikh thatPeake understood the situation, and such was thestrength of his personality lhat the tribe ga..;e littlefurther trouble.

However, it was not until after the Anglo·Transjordan Treaty was signed in 1927 thaIPeake's abilities as an administrator really cameto the fore; his first seven years in Transjordanhad been spent almost exclusively in raising andtraining the Legion and in keeping the peace.He was determined to do more than Ihis for thecountry and was anxious for the developmentof a prosperous and stable Arab government.With lhe more peaceful conditions Ihen prevailing- at least until [936 - Peake was able to turn hisattention to less military pursuits. He saw, forinstance, the benefils to the local population (andincidentally to the police) of refurbishing the oldRoman road which ran from Aqaba to Ammanover the highlands via Kerak, Tafileh and Shobek.A large part of this road was reconslructed dur­ing Peake's service and, although not melalledthroughoul its length until the laIc 1950s, itbecame a vcry adequate route for motor vehiclesin all except Ihe very worst wealher. Peake alsoinstigatcd the repair of part of the old Romanirrigation systems, in particular the undergroundreservoirs, wilh the result that, in the increasinglysecure atmosphere, the villagers began to plantorchards and to till fields further away from thesafety of their homes; there was such an increasein cultivation that in the laIc 1920S Transjordan,often dismissed as a desert country, was in aposition to export grain to Palestine.

To Peake must go much of the credit for theremarkable siability of Transjordan at this time.His firm touch was felt everywhere; nOI only inthe Legion, whose smartness and efficiency werca byword in the ~Iiddle East, but also in Ihe civiladministralion of the country. Peake had earlyrealized thai only Arabs can really control Arabsand so, while keeping a close eye on generaladministralion as he Ira\·elled about the country,and Ihough little escaped him, he very rarelyinterfered.

Peake had captured the hearts, nOt only of Ihemen of the Arab Legion, but of Ihe country as awhole. The code-word 'Thundercloud' used toprecede him on his visits, and he was capable ofgreat anger, though whether real or assumed isuncertain. What is certain is that he was a man ofgreat kindness and consideration for olhers. Clubbrecounts how Arabs would often say ofhim, 'PeakePasha - Cod bless him - his heart was simple.' Acontemporary pholograph, taken in the 1930s,shows a tall, erect and impressive figure in bluepatrols, very much master of the situation, andperhaps more at ease with himself than the manportraycd ten years before.

Peake's departure from Transjordan in 1939was almost a roya.l progress as he travelled southtowards Aqaba. In Amman the Amir Abdallahcalled on him personally to say farewell. Hisimpact on the people of Transjordan was demon-

I '

ColoDel Frederidc ee.....rd Peake (eastins: in a ~ou.in

u~nl wilh his slaff officer aad (riead Abd..1 Qadir s"y AIJUftdi in the tale 192"

strated by the way whole villages lUrned out towish him well. At EI Udrah the Howeitat underHamd Ibn Jazi had assembled in force, while at~1a'an were drawn up all the tribes from the WadiSirhan and the Wadi Rum. Finally, just beforePeake's car crossed into Sinai on its way to PortSaid, his chief-of-staff, Abdel Kader, arrived bycourtesy of the R.A.F., who had flown him downfrom Amman so that he could say a final farewellto Peake on the frontier line. There can be fewforeigners who ha\'(; inspired such universal likingin the country of their adoption. His publishedworks include The History anti T ribu of Jordan.

Peake's decoralions included the Order of EI:\ahda (First Class); the Order of El Istiqlal(Second Class) and the Syrian order Pour IeMerite.

CLUlHl PASHA:

Lieutenant-Ceneral SirJohn Bagot Clubb, K.C.B.,C.M.G., D.S.O., O.R.E., M.C.

Born in 1897 MajorJ. B. Glubb, O.B.E., M.e.,came to Transjordan in 1930 and, like Peake, wasno stranger to the Arab scene, although he hadnot arrived in the ~liddle East until after the FirstWorld War. Unlike Peake he had seen action, inthe Royal Engineers from 1915 in France, wherehe was thrice wounded. One of his wounds left apermanent scar earning the nickname of AbuHtna;k - Htna;k meaning 'jaw' - among thebedouin, who love to bestow nicknames. In hisown words 'the barrack square at Chalham wasmorc than monOlonous' and he leapt at the chanceofa morc adventurous life when, in 1920, \'Ohlll­leers were required for service in Iraq. While thereClubb became interested in tbe bedouin and theirway of lifc and in 1924 spell[ his lcavc on a 500­milc jOllrney by cameJ, in itself no mean achicve­melli, across the Syrian descrt from Iraq toTransjordan, being recei\·ed by Ihe Amir Abdallahon his arrh·al. However, it was to be anothcr sixyears before Clubb, who had acquired somcrepulation for his success in bringing peace to thenomadic Iribes of Iraq, was im'ited to do the samein Transjordan.

When Clubb entered the service of the :\mirAbdallah he was already something of an expenin bedouin tribal laws and customs and was a

17

Arab kgion U'''R1pet~r blowing: ·AlI!i~R1bly'. (1R1p~rial

War MUll~UR1)

fluent Arabic speaker. He was also an extremelypatient man, which was fortunate because forsome time after his arrival in Transjordan he wasunable to persuade anyone to join the desert policeforce which he saw was needed to end the tribalraiding. Glubb spent the first few weeks touringthe tents of the Howeitat, the tribe principallyconcerned in raiding - and being raided - acrossthe Saudi-Transjordan border, trying to get him·self accepted as someone who was anxious to help,rather than the representative of an unreelingGovernment. Gradually Glubb began to gain thetribe's confidence and a plan to end the destruc·tive raiding began to evolve; he managed toorganizc a system of tribal piquets who wouldwarn the remainder of the tribc if a raiding partyapproached, and this meant that the Howeitatcould continue to use their traditional grazingareas right up to the fronticr. However, whenGlubb detected onc of thc piquct commandersfony milcs from his post, standing at the door ofhis tent, the quiet-voiced Englishman showedanother side to his character. He struck the man.

18

\Vhen the man's brother arrived, threatening to

shoot Glubb, the latter rctaliated by roundingup all the tribe's camels and handing thcm over toa nearby detachment of the Transjordan FrondeI'Forcc. Whcn latcr that same day the tribesmenrode up to Glubb's camp with apologies for theincident, Glubb returned the camels with anadmonition not to neglect the vital piquet dutyagain. Glubb like Peake before him had earlyappreciated that the formal regulations of estab­lished government arc not always the mostappropriate answer to tribal problems. Clubb'soriginal approach had nOt only prevented a nastyincident, it had taught an idle man a lesson(without the arrest and imprisonment he deservedand probably expected). The peoplefollow the strongmall, says an Arabic proverb. One need not sup·pose that this outburst of righteous rage did any·thing to lessen Clubb's prestige.

The Government had agreed to withdraw thetroops from the desert and the enlistment of localmen in the Desert Patrol was an esscntial part ofClubb's plan, but it was not until 193' that theHoweitat began to join, having at last becomecon\'inced by Glubb's determination that if theydid not he would enlist men from other tribes topolice them.

The picture of Glubb that we have at this timeis that ofa man of almost unlimited energy, com·pletely involved with the Arabs and in particularthe bedouin. The fact that all tribal raiding hadceased by the middle of 1932 is a remarkabletribute to his courage, pcrsonality and energy,especially when it is remembered that he carriedout the task with no more than ninety men, andwith no bloodshed, fines or imprisonments.

Clubb continued to command in the desertuntil 1939, when Peake retired, and so was notdircctly concerned in the 1936 Palestine troubles,which did so much to poison relations bctweenthe Arab world and Great Britain. However, onceClubb assumed command of the Lcgion, he feltincreasingly the pressure from the bedouin on oncside and the settled Arabs on the other. Clubbbecame increasingly involved in the political lifeof Transjordan - one suspects with some reluct~

ance - and although he got on well with the AmiI'Abdallah, relations with the Amir's ministers werenot always so smooth. It seems likely that many of

Dnam .eetlon or the Arab Lesion Band, October 19014,n ...... are thr..e bands in the Lesion, the blue, the r ..d andth.. sr....n. In winter th..)' w"'r kh.ki baul..-d.re••, ..nd inthe .ummer white lIervlce d ....... They Can be distin_Iw.hed one rrom the Olher by the colour or their lanyard!!,epaulelle. lLDd pi...... All mudcian. wear' lyre badse OnIhe riSht arm above the elbow. (lrnp.-rial War Mu.eum)

the latter suspeCled Glubb's motins and thoughtthat, given the opponunity, he \\'ould have usedhis loyal bedouin soldiers to keep them in theirplace. That such a thought \\'ould never occur to aman of such unshakeable integrity as Clubb isapparent Ihroughom his writings; his own con­cept of his duty as a servant ofTransjordan and itsKing and Government comes O\'er wilh completesincerity.

Clubb is a deeply religious man, his thiny yearsin the service of a predominantly Muslim slategiving him a rare insight into the relationship ofIhat religion with Christianily. Z\owhere is thismore evident than in his masterly analysis ofthe Jewish-Arab problem, wilh its roots deep inthe three great religions of Ihe J\liddle East, re­vealed in his Prau in thr Holy Land. He is also aphilosopher. Glubb's cventual dismissal from IheArab Lcgion, if not ell Ii rely unexpected, wasexecuted in a particularly abrupt manner. Alesser man would havc been unable to conceal hisresentment and yet Glubb, in his account writtensoon after the event, could say, without apparentbitterness, '... I should like ... to acknowledgemy gratitude to Ihe Hashemite royal famil)' ...from whom I received innumerable kindnesses.'The contrast of Glubb's hurried depanure by airat six o'clock in the morning with Peake's grandexit is a sad commentary on the decline in theaffairs of Transjordan. Glubb for his pan hasalways maintained that his dismissal was perfecllylegal, his only regret being the manner of it andthe fact that he had perforce lost contact with somany friends in Jordan.

In an earlier book I described him as 'engineerofficer, arabist, tribal judge, author, minister andgeneral, not one after the other, but simuhane­ously'. This may stand, but it says nothing of hishumour and his courtesy, and Ihe quiet way inwhich he managed to gi\'e in his peculiar voice Ihemost unequi\'ocal orders on a muhilude of sub­jects. Some of his Brilish officers thought his longyears in Arab lands had made him as devious as anArab. For my part I think he just understood Iheways of the world.

COOKE PASHA

Born in Ig03, Major-General Sidney ArthurCooke, C.B., O.8.E., joined the Arab Legion int951 to assume command of I Division. Like man)'officers who came to the Legion, he was nostranger to Jordan, having some years previouslycommanded his battalion, the Royal Lincolns,when it had formed part of '0' Force, the BrilishGarrison in Aqaba.

A tall, broad-shouldered man, 'Sam' Cookewas always immaculately dressed and Sci a high

19

standard for an already well-turned-out division.The particular attributes which he brought tothe Legion were those of an organizer and admini­stralOr. and there is little doubt that the efficiencyof 1 Division, probably at its peak about mid-1955,was largely the result of his efforts. He was pos­sessed of great patience - an essential quality forany British officer with the Arab Legion. Arabsoldiers are amongst the keenest to learn, but itmust be admitted that they do not always takekindly to European discipline and the thoroughtraining which most modern weapons require.

Patient though Cooke was. he could be caustic.Xcvcr hesitating to take a decision himself. hecould be intolerant of others who wcrc lessdecisive, On one occasion a staffofficer, q lleslionedas to lhe action taken o\'er some incidelll, ad­mitted thal he had in fact done nothing. 'To donothing', came the classic rejoinder. 'is alwayswrong' .

Cooke never had to command his division infull-scale operations but he was faced with thealmost equally difficult task of training it for war,while simultaneously directing defensive oper­ations on the West Bank under conditions not ofpeace but of armistice. Towards thc cnd he hadalso to deal with a massi\'e internal securityproblem in Amman and the main towns andrefugee camps on the East Bank. These heavyresponsibilities ne\"er affected his sang froid. Afterthe assassination of King Abdallah, Glubb tele­phoned him orders for the maintenance oflaw andorder in jerusalem. 'One thing about Cooke wasthat he was always calm; he acknowledged hisorders', Glubb wrote, 'as if I had said "Comeround and have a drink".' A man, in short, whoinspired confidence in all those under his command.

LASH BEY

Captain N. O. Lash, who had already had a four­year tour with the Legion, but who had beenposted to a staff appointment in Palestine in 1938,rejoined in 1939. shortly before the start of theSecond World War. He replaced Clubb as com­mander of the Desen Patrol, but this panicularresponsibility lasted only until 1941, when hewent as Clubb's second-in-command withHabforce to Baghdad.

20

To Lash. leading an Arab Legion patrol acrossthe frontier. fell the honour of the first skirmish ofthe II"aq campaign, when he brought in sometribesmen who had been 011 a r«:onnaissance forthe Iraqi garrison in Rutbah. Lash took part inpractically all the engagements leading 10 thecapture of Baghdad, acquiring a reputation forcoolness under fire. He then played a prominenlpan in the Syrian campaign, culminating in theaction at Sukhna. He made himself slightly un­popular with the soldiers at Palmyra, when, withsome difficulty, he restrained Sergeant Salim asSom'ari and his over-cnthusiastic troop fromtrying to capture the [Own entirely on their own!

The rcst of the war Lash spent as Glubb'sassistant in the monumental task of creating amodern army OUt of what had been little morethan a Iribal police force. Thus it was that whenthe Arab Legion tOok the field again in 1948 itw:u Lash, now with the rank of brigadier, whocommanded the di\"ision of two brigades whichcrossed the jordan on 15 .May. Lash bore theresponsibility for the day-to-day tactical controlof the Arab Legion throughout the 1948 fighting,a command which he exercised with ability andcourage, leaving Glubb the o\-erall control of thewar and the unCll\iable task of dealing with thepoliticians.

;\'0 other Arab arm}' achie\'ed as much as theArab Legion and the end of hostilities in 1949found jordan impoverished but the Legion itselfvictorious, having sccured a considerable area of

Clubb Pa.h.. Co~Dd''''>1 ..r tb.. Anob ~I..n, ,..,.ud(c...ur..) wicb a Voup ..r LeFOR ..ffic...... J" October 1C)4.4.

(Imperial War MUMU.... '

Palestine for the Arabs. Lash retired in 1951, andreturned to England, in order to make way for amore experienced soldier at a time when theLegion was expanding. He could look back withpride on his service in Jordan.

Cj!fe1JJjtll1tlJ'

When Peake firSI raised lhe Arab Legion in 1920be saw it primarily as a force to protecl lhe 'Sown'againsllhe 'Desert'. It was clear to him that withthe passing ofTurkish authoril)', the bedouin wereencroaching on the Arabs of the settled areas;anless this trend could be checked no stable Arab

vernment would be formed in Transjordan. Theoriginal Arab Legion infantry were thereforedeliberately recruited from the townsfolk andvillagers - lhe hader;. It was not until 1936, whenthe Desert ~1echanized Force was raised, thaI lhebedouin were included in any numbers in theinfantry, the new unit being recruited exclusivelyfrom the desert nomads.

The lorned infantry of the Desert ~1C(:hanized

Regiment, as it later became, performed theirfunction very well, although they were neverorganized on a proper battalion basis, consistingas the regimelll did of a number of troops each ofbetween fift), and seventy men. I t was during tile

ond World War that infalllry battalions on theBritish model began to be raised, 1St, 2nd and 3rdRegiments being the first 10 be grouped into abrigade, followed by another three regiments for asecond brigade. It was these two brigades, plus anumber of independent Guard Companies, whichformed Ihe infantry arm when the Arab Legionmoved into Palestine in 1948. The Guard Com­panies were not fully-Irained infantry soldiers,having been raised during the war for the solepurpose of guarding miJitary camps and depOts

throughoul the Middle East. ThaI they had donethis unglamorous job superlatively well did notmake up for the fact that Ihey possessed nomachine-guns or other support weapons and hadnOl, in most cases, had any more than the mostrudimentary field training. They had not, ofcourse, experienced practical offensive operations.All the more credit to them, Iherefore, that in the1948 fighting lhey soon learnt, and learnt well, tbeinfantryman's job.

After Ihe Rhodes Armistice in 1949 came therapid expansion of the Legion based on theestablishment of a com·entional British infantrydivision. Amalgamation of the Guard Companies,and new recruitment produced enough men toform nine battalions, numbered 1 to 9, and thesewere grouped into three brigades to form the basisof the new division; later the loth, known some­times as 'The Hashemite', Regimelll was alsoraised. This extra battalion proved to be aninvaluable, though small, reserve which allowedthe divisional commander a little nexibility indeployment, so as to reconcile the operationalcommilments on the West Bank with the urgenlneed to train his expanding division. When +thArmoured Brigade was formed it was proposedthat one infantry battalion - 1st Regiment wasprovisionally earmarked for the task - should betrained in the armoured infantry role and shouldform the infantry element in the new armouredbrigade; the general political situation prcvenledthis happening before 1956, although some time

i'",-,

.~

Piper. or th" k.:ion on pa....de; they we.... trained toplay t.he baKJ>ipu by the pipe... or the Black Watch.(Imperial War Museum)

21

after Clubb Pasha was dismissed 1st Regimentwas eventually equipped with Saracen armouredpersonnel carriers.

Although both bedouin and hadrri were nowrecruited for the infantry, it was nevcr Legionpolic)' to mix the twO in the same battalion, sothat 1St, 2nd, 3rd, ;th and 9th Regiments wereall-bedouin battalions (except for a number ofclerks, signallers, SlQrernen, cooks and orderlies),while thc remaining battalions were all-haderi;brigades were made up from battalions of either.The twO types of soldier had very differentcharacteristics, some good, some bad. Thebedouin tribes vary one from anOlher, but ingeneral they are a feckless, volatile and cheerfulpeople, but who arc nevertheless very hardy, takewell to soldiering and can accept disciplinc; how­cver, they need to be led, not driven. The greatmilitary weakness of the bedouin soldier, at leastin the early days, was his reluctance to take up astatic defensive position. But if he needs somepersuasion 10 dig in, he needs lillie to launch intoan attack. This attitude explains the disobedienceto orders at Sukhna in 1941, and at the same timeaccounts for the victory, for without the dashdisplayed on that occasion by the bedouin of theMechanized Regiment, outnumbered as theLegion was, the outcome of the battle might havebeen very different. The bedouin produce excellentplatoon and section commanders.

The Jordanian haderi, on the other hand, makesa solid and dependable infantryman who, if well

Al'ab ugionnail'es during infantry I.ralning al a rec::ruhs'depol, 19+4. (1R1~l'ialWar MuseuR1)

22

lcd, can hold his own with any Arab soldier. Theofficers tend to be belter educated than thebedouin, but arc politically minded and fond oftheir creatme comfOrls. Like so many educatedArabs, they tend to think of academic qualifica­tions as a passport to any position of authority,and Clubb tells of his difficulty in persuadingJordanian politicians that possession of a univer­sity degree does not of itself make a man officermaterial. This is llOt to say that there arc notexcellent hadtri infantry officers.

Both bedouin and haderi proved extremelyenthusiastic and keen to learn; experienced foreignsoldiers dsiting the Legion invariably retained agood impression of them, and Field·MarshalTemplar for one, after inspecting the 9th Regi.ment in 1955, is on record as saying: 'Tell themthat in time of war I would rather have them onmy side than against me.'

The British clement in the infantry was small,only four of the ballalions, all bedouin, havingBritish commanding officers; the three brigadecommanders were also British, but only one had aBritish brigade·major and he was replaced by anArab officer in 1954. Nevertheless, like the otherarms, the infanlry suffered from a lack of experi­enced senior Jordanian officers, though possiblyless than most. For its first twenty years the Legionhad been very largely restricted to police dutiesand even in the Second World \'\Tar, through nofault of ilS own, its aClive participation in opera­tions had been limited. This meant that by 1956,when the Legion's strength had risen 10 some27,000 mcn, there was no Jordanian officer withproper military training morc than 36 years old.This was of course, the main justification for thepresence of the British officers in the seniorcommand positions and, in the more technicalunits, at lower levels; but the rapid expansion alsomeant, Glubb always being very insistent on nopromotion without proper qualification, that com­panies were often commanded by captains orlieutenants and platoons by cadets serving aqualifying period before finally receiving theircommissions. It was nOl uncommon for platoonsto be commanded by sergeants or evell corporals.This situation was as true of the infantry as of lheother arms and in most ballalions the only majorwas lhe second-in-command. Sometimes the

BedouilUl of the I)rsert Patrol Cunelry. (Imperial WarMUft'wn)

second-in-command was a captain or cven alieutenant, but this was of no great importance.

By the mid-1950s battalion organization hadbeen standardized on the British model, with somedifferences, and consisted of Battalion Head­quarters, four riRe companies each of threeplatoons, a support company and a headquarterscompany. The basic sub-unit of the platoon wasthe section, of which there were three, each ofnine men. The support company consisted of amortar platoon, a machine-gun platoon, an anti­tank platoon and, eventually, an assault pioneerplatoon; headquarter company included signal,transport and administrative platoons. The majordifferences between the Arab Legion and theBritish battalion concerned numbers and trans-

-..... . ..

port. The Legion was a long-service volunteerarmy, where the average length of service of allranks was about four and a half years; in generalthe difficlllly was in turning men away, not inpersuading them to join. This meant that whereasa British battalion in the 1950S had an establish­ment of about 750 men, invariabl)' under­implemented, Arab Legion battalions were alwayswell over 800 strong and sometimes exceeded goomen. The second difference, transport, lay in thefact that the Arab Legion battalion had sufficientorganic transport to lift the entire battalion,whereas in the British Army at that time a batta­lion had to calion the R.A.S.C. if it wished tomove more than one company by road transport;othem·ise it marched. Arab Legion battalions

23

• ••

Trials of the Legion's prOIOtype and.tank vehicle con­1I.00ctfli rrom. Ford_ClI.nadia .. Ih.ree.lon trud•. December1953

were, in effect, lorricd infantry. as indeed the oldMechanized Regiment had been in 1939, and thiswas an essential requirement \\'hen battalions had tobe ready to reinforce the ,,"cst Bank troops at vcryshon notice. It also made the unit much morencxiblc for training, and was a tremendous assetin internal security operations.

"·capons allocation to the infantry followed ingeneral the British pattern, the ~Iark III, thenthe Xo. 4. '303 TiAe being the basic platoonweapon coupled with the 8ren light machine-gunand the Stell SlIb-machinc-carbinc for sectioncommandc~. 2-inch mortan were held in eachplatoon, while hca\~' support weapons consistedof the 3·inch mortar, \'ickers medium machine·gun and the 6-pounder anti-tank gun. The6-pounders were replaced in 1954 by the 17­pounder anti·tank gun, in order to gh"c thcbattalion a better anti.lank capability. Thisdecision followed current British Army thought andthe infantry battalions were faced with the sameproblem as the British had been, that of finding asuitable gun tractor to tow this large and heavyweapon, and to carry an adequate supply of itsbulky ammunition. The British solution had beento use a tracked carrin, but the Legion could notafford this and 3-ton trucks had to be employed,with all their attendant problems of concealmentand vulnerability in the forward areas. An entirelydifferent answer to the problerr. of anti-tankdefence of the infantry battalion had been con·sidered in 1953. The Legion possessed a largenumber of Ford Canadian 3-ton trucks, and a

24

design to mount the 1i-pounder over the rearaxle of this \'ehic1e, with limited traverse over therear arc, was e\"olved. The truck superstructurewas entirely remO\"ed and side and limited over­head protection against shell fragments and small­arms fire was planned. The problem of vulner­ability was thus to some extent overcome, andconcealment too since the highest point on thisunusual vehicle was the steering wheel. A proto­type was built and performed very well on usertrials in late 1953, but unfortunately the project,which had interesting possibilities, was notpursued and battalions were issued with theirtowed guns.

As in most armies, there were never enoughinfantr)' battalions to cope with all the Legion'stasks and because of this all regiments saw activeservice in one form or another between the years1949 and 1956. Thus the Arab Legion infantrycan fairly be said to have formed the mainstay ofthe army and to have been, in general, equippedand trained well up to modern standards.

C]/fe 'R.pj~/

~77Z0ttred Gorps

The Arab Legion Royal Armoured Corps - a titlebestowed on it by King Hussein in 1954 - may besaid to have had its beginnings as long ago as1939, when Clubb Pasha invested in six home­made armoured trucks mounting machine-gunsonl)', manufacwrf:d, ironically enough, b)' theCf:rman-Jf:wish firm of Wagner in Jaffa. Fightingvehicles of a sort, in the shape of unarmouredtrucks arm«1 wilh Lewis guns, the Legion alreadyhad, and between them these two typf:S of vehicle

Desert Patrol (Badieh)

1ol1CHAEL ROffE A

B

1 Colonel (Qa.iJnakan1), 19552 Conunander, Mounted Bodyguard, 19553 Major-General (Qaid el Firqa), 1955

MICHAEL ROffE

toUCH...U ROFfE

I

1 Lieutenant-Colonel (Q.aid), 9th InfantryRegi..rnent, 1955

'2 Standard-Bearer, 7th Infantry Regintent,1953

3 Colour-Sergeant (Naguib), 9th InfantryRegim.ent, 1954

c

Trooper, Mounted Pollce (Fursan), l:9SS

D MICHAEl ROfFE

MICHAH ROFFE

I Dru.m.m.er, Arab Legion Band, c. I9S32 Cadet, Cadet Training School, A%nm.an, I9S33 Dnun-Major, Arab Legion Band, c. I9SS

------)E

F

I Corporal (Areef), Circassian Bodyguard,1955

;1 Trooper) Jundi Than's ArD'loured CarRegiInent, 1955

3 Trooper) CaInel Corps, 1955

MICHAEl ~OHE

toIlCHAoH AOHE

Trooper, Household Cavalry Squadron, 1955

G

H

I

I COrporal (Areer), Arab Legion Engineers,c:. 1954

2 Constable, Police, 19553 Private, National Guard (Haris el Watani),

1954

MICHAEL ROffE

rendered yeoman service to the MechanizedForce throughout the Iraq and S)'rian campaignsof 1941, and indeed for man)' years after.

It was not until 1945 that the Legion acquireda more up-to-date armoured fighting vehicle.the ~larmon-Herrington armoured car. Thesevehicles, whieh were South African built fromBritish and United States componcnts, had becnextensh'ely uscd in the Western Desert beforebeing passed on to the Legion, but they wererugged and easily-maintaincd machines, well­suited to the technical capabilities of the Lcgionat that time. HO\\'cver, after a few years it wasrealized that the 2-pounder gun, which formed themain armament of the ~Iarmon-Herrington, hadlimited range and penctration when matchedagainst the current Israeli tanks. Colonel Broad­hurst, the Legion's Senior Technical Officer,devised an extension to the turret mantelet whichwould allow the 6-pounder anti-tank gun to bcmoumed instead; production of cars with thismodification, carried out entirely in Arab Legionworkshops, started in 1953 and eventually allarmoured car squadrons had a proportion ofthcscup-gunncd \'chicles.

The armoured cars had been incorporatcd with­in infantry battalions to start with, and were usedeffectively by them in the 1948 fighting. However,when the Legion began to reorganize into aconventional infantry division it was decided toconcentrate the armour into one unit - 1StArmoured Car Regiment. This unit was organizedon the lines of a British armoured car regiment,within the limitations of the equipment a\'ailable,and consisted of Regimental Headquarters, three'sabre' squadrons, a headquarters squadron,signals troop and Light Aid DCl.1chmclll, Thebasic sub-unit was lhe reconnaissance troop; in theBritish service at that time this would ha\·e beenmade up of two armoured cars and two scout cars.No scout cars were available in the Legion, soLandro\'ers were used instead and these vehicles(the original So-inch short wheelbase version) weresuitabl)' modified lO carry twO men only, a radioplus spare batteries and a forward-firing Brenlighl machine-gun. ~o canopies or \vindscl'eenswere fitted and the rear of the \·ehicle was built upto carry the crew's kit, spare petrol, etc. In addi­tion to the rcconnaissance troops. cach squadron

t

A vish by H.M. KiDs: H.,sHin (0 the Divisional Recime.",Arab lAJ:ioft Royal Armoured Corps, No.....rnHr 1954

had a support troop consisting of fivc sections ofassault troopcrs and three 3-inch howitzers. Nosuitable armoured personnel carriers \\'ere avail­able and either I-ton trucks or armoured cars withthe turrets removed were lIsed in the supporttroops; similar turretless armoured cars providedlhe howitzers with a self-propelled mount.

Once 1st Armoured Car Regiment was estab­lished, 2nd Armoured Car Regiment, similarlyorganized, began to form. Money was scarce andit ,,'as some time before the regiment could bebrought up to establishment - in fact 2nd Arm­oured Car Regiment was ne\·cr so lavishlyequipped as 1St. The twO regiments bore diflcl'entdislinguishing badges on their vehicles - lhe 1Stbeing marked by crossed lances with pennants,while lhe 2nd adopted a hawk as its badge. The2nd took, on the strength, a particularly finespecimen as its regimental mascot and it had itsperch outside the commanding officer's office,where it proved somewhat disconcerting to theunw::Iry vi~;lOr; the bird was carried on all formalparades and was trained to rear up and stretch itswings as the Landrover which carried it passedthe saluting base. These twO armoured carregimellts were almost entirely bedouin-recruited,excepl for some of the attached pel'sonnc1- signal­Icrs and fitters - and they each had only oneBritish officer, the commanding officer; the Britishlraining captain, originally 011 the strength of 1StArmoured Car Regiment, was nOt replaced whenhis tour ended in 1953. All three of their BritishC.O,s afterwards became major-generals in theBritish Army.

25

In 193'2 a small armoured headqu<lrtcrs wasformed, later (Q become the headquarters of the4th Armoured Bri~adc, when it was decided toadd a tank regimcm to lhe Legion's armouredforces. The British subsidy, which supported theLegion fmancially, was not large enough to payfor a complete armoured regimclll on the Britishmodel and the only vehide which the British wercprepared to release al that lime was the y:tlel1tineI i·poundcr sl'lf-propelled gun, known as the.\rcher. While this armoured vchicle provided theanti·armour hilting power lhe Legion so badlyneeded - it outclassed any vehicle-mountedweapon the Isnlclis then had - it could in no sensebe called a lank, since it had no overhead armourand the ~lln was restricted to firing on'r the rear

•

-- - -- ..-.."'- -Tb" colour party of the :zod Armour..... Car Rep..ne.. t,with thne of lbur Ma.rmoo_Herrin«ton ~1ark IVarmnured car•. The hawk i. the regi.m.enla.1 ma,eot

26

arc of the vehicle: In the Legion, therefore, the_\rcher was used in lhe only feasible way - organ­ized into a Divisional Regiment Royal .-\rmouredCorps, the currem British solution to the anti-tankdefence of lhe inf.1.ntry di\-ision. This hadn;­recruited regiment was firsl called, somewhalunglamorollsly, The Divisionnl Regiment, but illaler became the 3rd Tank Regimenl and adopteda scorpion as its badge. The regiment consistedof a Regimental Headquarters, three 'sabre'squadrons each ortwch-e Archers, a headquarterssquadron, signal troop and Light Aid Delach­ment; the basic sub-unit was the lroop, made upoflhrce Archers, the squadrons being commandedfrom Landrovcrs.

The Archers were shipped in fOllr at a time

..\

..

MARMON_H£RRlNCTON ARMOURED CAR, MI{. IVTechnical Specifications

Cr"w: three - CommlLnder Loader, Cunner Radin Opel"ll_tor, Driver. Wei~hl: 6·5 10.... LenSlh: 18 fl. 1·5 in. (wheel_ba,e 9 {t. 10 in.l. Width, 7 ft. Hei"hc: 7 ft. 6 In. Speed:56 m.p.h. Engine, 9S b.b.p. Ford V8. Aronamenl: Main ­:a_pounder Q.uick_~"iring and_lank gun. Secondllry - "JOBro.....uns: eoaxllli mllchine_gun, 'JO Brownins machlne­«un in anti_aircraft mountin«. Frontal aronOur: I:a mm.madInUlll. R.8.diUI or action: :aoo m.ile!il

through the port of Aqaba, and thence by tanktransporter to railhead at Ras al .\iaqb and by railto Zerka - a journey not without its hazards onthe narrow-gauge Hashemite Railway. (It was thisrailway, the Hcjaz, which had so often been thetarget of T. E. Lawrence when Jordan was partof the Turkish Empire.) The operation continuedslowly throughout 1953, but before the regimentcould be completed to establishment, the British\\'erepersuaded that the Legion deserved somethingmore up-ta-date. In the early 19505 the Russianthreat to Europe had accentuated the shortage oftank guns in the Western armies and in an effortto get more 20-pounder guns - then the mainarmament of the CeIlturion tank - into the handsof the troops, a design to up-gun the Cromwell

•

l

tank, of which large numbers were available, hadbeen developed; the modified vchicle was calledthe Charioteer. Although Charioteer had all-roundtraverse and a fully-enclosed turret, its armourwas thin and it was only really suitable as a tank­destroyer. In addition it suffered the grave defectof being unable to take up a fire position 011 areverse slope iftbc ground ill frOIll fell away at allsteeply; because the recoil of the 'lo-poundel'could not be accommodated within the diameterof the Cromwell turret ring the gun had to bemounted high in the turrel, allowing a corres­pondingly small angle through which the guncould be depressed. Indeed, so limited was theroom inside the turret that the empty 'la-poundercases had to be ejected through .a trap-door to the

CHARIOTEERT~(:h.nical Spec:i.6calions

Cr~.... : fo.... r _ Commander, Gunner, Loader Radio Opera.lOr, Driver. Weight: 28'5 10Pal. Length: 29 fl. (gun for_....ard). Widlh: 10 fl. Heighl: 8 fl.3 in. Traek widlh: I fl. 3 in.Speed: 30 m.p.h. Verliea! slep: 3 ft. Engine: 600 h.h.p, RoUsRoyc:e Meto:<>r. Armanunt, ~in _ 20·po der Qu..ick-firing taD.k gun. Secondary - '30 Bro o.i.og c:oax.Ialmachine.guo. F"rontala.r'n>our: 57 mm. maximum. Radiusof ac:uon: 150 rn.i!~.

27

. '

rear, and the designers had prodded accommoda­tion for a two-man turret crew only.

In 1954 the British agreed to release a numberof Charioteers to the Arab Legion and, despitetheir disadvantages, they were seized on eagerly.EventuaJly 3rd Tank Regiment was equippedwith two squadrons of Charioteers and one ofArchers, the surplus Archers being lUrned o\'er to

the ~ational Guard. 3rd Tank Regimenl wastedno time in installing a third man, as lank com­mander, in the turret of their new tanks and,although the regiment wasstilJ commilted officiallyto the divisional anti~lank role, training in the1\\'0 Charioteer squadrons soon took on a dis­tinctly armoured regiment fla\'Ollr in which theoffensive rather than the defensive spirit pre­dominated.

It had been recognized when the formation of atank regiment was first planned that the acquisi­tion of tracked vehicles would be a new departure

28

VALENTINE 17_POUNDER SELF-PROPELLED GUN(ARCHER) (ltnperial War Mu&eum)

Technical SpecificationsCrew: four - Commande.. , Gunne.., Loader RadioOpe..... to .., Driver. Weight, 16 tonl;;. Length' 21 ft. 8 in.Width: 9 ft. Hdght: 7 ft. " in. Track widlh, 1 fl. 2' in.Spe~: 20 n>..p.h. Vutical slep: 2 ft. 6 in. Engine, General101otortl 6-cylinder two_l;;troke Diesel. Arman>.ent: 17­pound",r quic:k_firinl anti_tank gun. Frontal armour,65 mn>.. rnaxin>.un>.. Radius of action: 90 nUl",..

for the Legion and that they would introduceentirely new problems. Accordingly an armouredworkshop was created to provide technical backingfor the new regiment, and incidentally for the reSlof the armoured units as well, and a few tanktransporters were obtained. In addition, the regi­ment was allowed a very high proportion ofBritish ofllcers - the commanding officer, threesquadron leaders (later cut to two), a technicaladjutant and a warrant officer as technical quarter.master·sergcanl. This was unusual for the Legion,where, if anyone, the commanding officer was theonly Briton and where squadrons were usuallycommanded by captains or lieutenants and troopsor platoons often by cadets. However, the arrange­ment provcd \'ery worthwhile, the regimclllbecoming operational by mid-1955 - a remarkablyshort lime considering lhat few of the soldiers hadevcn seen a tank before '952.

Onc other operational unit formed part of the

Arab Legion Royal Armoured Corps and this wasthe Desert Reconnaissance Squadron. The squad­ron was entirely bedouin manned and commandedand had no British e1emen!. Equipped withLandro'·ers mounting -50 calibre and .30 calibreBrowning machine-guns, this small force wastrained for long range penetration behind enemylines and for Special Air Service type raidingoperations.

finally thcre was lhe Armourcd Corps BoysSquadron, which was formed in 1955 undcr thecommand ofa British major. As the equipment ofthe armoured unilS became more sophisticatedthe problem of training the soldiers in its usebecame increasingly acute, and the Boys Squadronwas formed in order to give the young entr)' abetter start when they subsequently joined theirregiments. E,·en in the comparatively well­established armoured car regimenlS unexpectedtraining problems arose, a typical case being thatof map-reading. The chief role of the armouredcars wasofcourse reconnaissance, and the bedouinsoldiers who formed the regiments had no diffi.culty whatever in finding their way aboul thcdesert; the problem arose when they were requiredto pass information back to headquarters. Carcommanders often found great difliculty in relatingtheir position on the ground to the map andexperienced and otherwiK: most competent officerswere frequently unable to give a correct gridreference or compass bearing.

Despite all these problems the soldiers in thearmoured corps units mastered their equipment

remarkably well and made up with cnthusiasmwhat the)' lacked in experience of armoured war­fare. The 3rd Tank Regiment was not committedto action before 1956, except in a dismountedinternal security role, but the armoured carregiments and the Desert Rcconnaissance Squad­ron did a tour of frontier duty on thc West Bankin 1955, in order to relieve thc prcssure on theinfantry brigades, and displayed there a highorder of operational efficiency.

cJztppol1il1[~771Sa/ldcJervices

ARAB LEOIO:'\" ROYAL ARTILLERY

At the very outset thc Arab Lcgion had includedan artillery element when, in t921, twO mountainguns werc addcd to the force; this small artillerytroop took part in the ill-fated EI Kura expeditionlatcr that year, which resulted in the temporarydisbandment of the Legion. Peake having re­formcd thc Legion, howc,"cr, thc guns provcdtheir worth in his succcssful operation in ~Iay

1922, whcn a fortunatc direct hit on thc house ofthe headman at Tibna prccipitatcd the surrenderof the Kura tribesmcn. From thcn until 1927 theguns, although no doubt in usc from time to lime,do not seem to have played any very prominentpart in the Legion's operations, and in that )·ear,with thc arri'"al of the Transjordan FrontierForce, the Legion establishment was reduccd.The Legion's role being now ,"cry largely that ofa police forcc, there was no requirement forartillcry and this arm was disbanded.

From 1927 to 1948 the Arab Legion was withoutits own artillery, even during thc Iraq and Syriancampaigns of 1941 when artillery support would

29

have been invaluable. [\'en in the expansion ofthe Legion towards the end of the Second WorldWar no artillery was provided for the mechanizedbrigade then formed, and it was nOt until t948that eight 25-pounder guns were recei\·ed. Thesewere formed into twO batteries each of four guns,to support the t\\'O infantry brigades which thenexisted. The bauery commanders were Britishofficers and Ihere:: was one British warrant officerwho was an Assistant Instructor in Gunnery. Thusthe Arab Legion entered the fierce fighting inPalestine 11\ 194.8 with an almost 10lal lack ofexperience in modern artillery techniques andwith ver~' little equipment; indeed the onlyofficers who were capable of directing fire werethe three Britons. \\'orse: only first line slocks ofammunilion were held. However, despite theseproblems the guns proved to be invaluable and,by dinl of extraordinary exertions on Ihe part ofbaltery commanders and individual gun detach­ments, coupled with eXlreme economy in expendi­ture of ammunition, were used 10 good effecl.

In 1949 lhe reorganization of the Legion into a

four of 'Clubb'. «irb' - the niclulanu: «i,·"'n 10 bedownli'servin! w;th I.bo: !.r&:;OD - of tbe De.ert Patrol a1 fi..,ld1\lR practice. (In>p"'rial Wa.r MUHIUI1.)

30

conventional infantry division also involved aconsiderable expansion of the artillery, the normalallocation to a division being Ihree field regiments,consisting of three-, six- or eight-gun baueries, 10support each infantry brigade. Shortage of moneyfor equipment, and the lechnical Iraining neededto raise three field artillery regiments imposedsome delay on the expansion and it was not until1954 that the third regiment was in being. Eachregiment numbered I to 3 was equipped with the25-poundcr field gun, long in service wilh theBritish Army, towed with its limber by a 3-tQntruck; regiments also included British command­ing officers and each had a British training major,all seconded from the Ro)'al Artillery. Training\Vas carried out in a ,'cry thorough manner and inthe best tradilions of the Royal Regiment. Theresult was mOSI impressi,'c; gllns and \'chicleswere maintained in immaculate condition and tosec a hattcry of the Arab Legion Royal Artillerycoming into action was a demonSlration of pro­fessional efficiency second to nonc. Annual practicecamps were held, as in British service, and at theseregiments were able to demonSlrate on the openrange lhe results oftheir year's training, under thecrilical eye of the Commander Arab Legion RoyalArtillery.

The brigadif.:r who commanded the artilleryhad a small headquarters or his own forming partor Headquarters 1 Di\'ision, so that he was readilyavailable to adviSf.: the dh'isional commander onartillery mallers. In addition 10 the field regi­ments, which formed the bulk of the Legion'sartillery, he had twO other units under his com­mand, a combined anti-tank and light anti­aircraft regiment (4th Regiment) and thc Schoolof Anillery, In 1954- the t7-poundcr anti-tankguns of the combined regiment were dispersedamongst the infantry battalion anti-lank platoons,This decision conformed to current British Armydoctrine, which had led to tbe artillery handingo\'er its anti-tank role to the Royal ArmouredCorps, the formation of the grd Tank Regimentallowing the Arab Legion to do the same.

Air defence, no\,' pro\'ided by 4th Light Anti­Aircraft Regiment equipped wilh the Bofors40 mm. gun, was becoming of increasing import­ance in view oflhe continued increase in Israeli airpower; particularly when it is remembered that

at this time Jordan had no combat aircraft of herOWI1. However, it must be admitted that theeffectiveness of this regiment was bound (0 belimited since it was never, before 1956, equippedwith radar and the other necessary fire directionequipment essential for the successful engagementof low-Aying high-speed aircraft.

Finally there was the School of Artillery, com­manded by a British major, assisted by a Britishwarram officer. Courses on all aspects of gunnerywere run by them and their Jordanian instructorsfor artillery officers and N.C.O.s, achieving a vcryhigh standard with slender resources. Almost allthe Arab Legion artillery officCfS passed throughthis school, which had an influence out of allproportion to its size. Its success was largely dueto the late Lieutenant-Colonel Shaun Richmond,-"I.C., R.A. (a major when he commanded theschool), who was a brilliant arabist and an officerof first rate professional attainments.

ARAB LEGIO:-: ROYAL ENGI:-:EERS

There had been no tradition of military engineer­ing in the Legion before 1949, but the need forthis arm of the service, as of so much else, becameonly tOO apparent as the army expanded. By 1951a field engineer squadron, British commanded,was in existence and plans for expansion into anengineer regiment were in hand. Some of theJordanian officers then in the engineers had hadsomc technical training in Great Britain, but therewas no pool of experienced officers on which todraw for any expansion.

In view of the technical nature of engineerwork, and because the squadron was in muchdemand for actual engineering tasks, it wasdecided to form a separate training wing, initiallyunder a British captain; later the wing wasexpanded into a training squadron, commandedby a major whose staff included two Britishwarrant officers. As many young Jordanianengineer officers as possible were sent to the Schoolof Military Engineering at Chatham for tcchnicaltraining and this did much to raise the standard;however, the majority of all ranks had to learntheir trade with the limited resources a\'ailable inJordan.

At first field squadrons "'ere permanently

I

EnSlilib officeII' o( Ibe Arab Lelion lakin! com... in _h..soldi""Ii' 11....51 l ..nl. OClobell' 1444.(lmperial Wall' Mus....m)

allocated on formation to infantry brigades, butthey tended to be miscmployed and their trainingcould not be properly supervised. In 1952 allengineer units were concentrated at Zerka, wherea proper camp was built and lhe sappel's wcreable to train as a regiment consisting of three fieldsquadrons, a field park squadron, signals troopand Light Aid Detachment. The heavy C(lllipmclltused b}' a modcrn engineer rcgiment was in vcryshon supply and much had to be borrowed fromthe British Army in Eg}'pt; nevertheless, by mid­'953 the Didsional Engineer Regiment \\'as well­established, together with much ofil5 heavy plantsuch as buJldozers and graders.

The training facilities at the Zerka campeventually became very comprehensi\'e and in­cluded small arms ranges, a drivcr training area,signal training facilities, trade training workshOps,md various tactical training facilities coveringdemolitions, minc laying and clearing and bridg­ing. For more comprehensive bridging training,special camps were held from time to time in theJordan nlley.

The full concentration of the engineers as aregiment was, howe\'er, comparatively short-Ih·ed;as the number of engineer tasks in support ofoperations on the West Bank increased, theengineers found that they always had at least onefield squadron deployed in the frontier areas,busily engaged in laying minefields, constructingairstrips for light aircraft and advising on defenceworks. This intense activity underlined the need

31

for more engineer backing and a Base EnginecrRegiment was formcd to suppOrt tnC divisionalengineers. This organization, wnicn later becametne Base Engineer Group, nOt only provided morcelaborate worksnop and plant facilities tnan theDivisional Engineer Regiment had at its disposal,but also included the Training Squadron, and anewly-formed Boys Squadron for the educationof boys below military age who aspired to a placein the engineers.

The expanded Arab Legion Royal Engineers,the personnel of which were hadtri, had a com­paratively high British element compared withother arms, including a lieutenant-colonel, twomajors and two warram officers. Due to the overallshortage ofcxperiencedJordanian officcrs through­out the Legion, particularly in the technical arms,the remaining appointments were filled by vcryjunior officers indeed, in some cases by cadetswith only one or two years service. Nevcrthelessthe engineers performed their tasks remarkablywell under the circumstances, and by 1956 couldbe compared very fa\'ourably with their Britishcounterparts.

ARAB LECIOX SICXA1.S

Like the artillery, the Arab Legion Signals couldtrace their history back to the early 1920S and, aswith the gunners, they suffered a temporaryeclipse in '927 when the strength of the Legion wascut. But it was soon evident that communica­tions were important, evcn in a police force, andin fact radio was in almost constant usc in thcLegion for most of its history. However, it wasnot until the rcorganization and cxpansion stem­ming from the Second World War that a propersignals organization was set up. Overall commandwas exercised by the Chief Signals Officer, aBritish lieutenant-colonel, whose own head­quartcrs formed part of Arab Lcgion Head­quarters in Amman. Directly under him came theBase Signals organization, most of which was atZerka and which, incidentally, maintained anefficient and regular radio link with the ArabLegion Liaison Office in London. The ChiefSignals Officer also maintained technical controlof the Divisional Signal Regiment, which providedsignals troops permanently attached to most major

32

units and headquarters throughout I Division.Thc standard achieved by thc Arab Legion

Signals was extremely high. It might reasonablybe supposed that to man and maintain such ahighly technical arm of the sen'ice would ha\'epresented a serious problem for a comparati\'elyunsophisticated and, by European standards,uneducated people; in fact the re\'Crse was true,no doubt in part because of the long experiencewithin the Legion of radio and telephone. :'\otonly was the standard ofoperating high, but radiorepairs were also efficiently carried out in theSignals' own workshops. The cquipment ingeneral usc at unit level was the ~o. 19 or :'\0. 62HF radio, both then becoming obsolescent in theBritish Army; in addition evcry desert fort mannedby the Descrt Patrol also had its No. 19 scI. Theseradios wcre habitually worked ovcr \'ery longdistances, both by voice and key, and it was rarethat a Legion operator failed to get through. Oncof their more impressivc techniques was theirability to transmit and rcccive morse messageswithout understanding a word of English, morsenot lending itself to transliteration into Arabic_The most complicated message would be writtenout perfectly and handed to its recipiclll althoughthe operator often had not the faintest idea as toits meaning.

In 1955 the newly-formed Arab Legion AirSupport Signals Section, equipped with the latestground·ta-air communications, took the field forthe first time and was used most effecti\-cly todirect ground aHack exercises by the R.A.F. insupport of Arab Legion ground forces; this wasample proof, if any were necded, of the Signals'claim to a standard of performancc as good as,and perhaps in some cases better than, any to befound in the British Army.

ARA" LEGIO:-: ELECTRIC,\L ,\:'\D ~'IECUA:-:ICAL

E:"'(H~EERS

Vehicle repair facilities in the Arab Legion were,up lIll1il 19.J.9, of a very rudimentary nature.HO\\'ever, as the technical arms gradually built upit became impcrati\'e to build up with them thenecessary technical stores and workshops. Foradministrath-e cOll\'enience the Legion departedfrom normal British Army practice in that

technical storcs sllch as vehiclc and wcapon spareswerc grouped with the workshops under theSenior Technical Officer; a British IicUlenant­colonel, under the Senior Technical Officer'sdirection, had his own headquarters withinHeadquarters I Division and had under hisoperational command the three infantry brigadeand one armoured brigade workshops within thedivision, This arrangement took some time to

implcment and it was not until mid-1954 that allfour workshops wcrc in operation, onc only - 4thArmoured \\'orkshops- bcing British-commanded,

In addition to the divisional workshops, theSenior Technical Officer controlled two staticworkshops - a small one in Amman dealing withthe staff cars and police vehicles based thcre, anda large base workshops at Zerka, Zerka Work­shops, commanded by a British lieutenant-colonel,with a number of British warrant officers on hisstaff, had belonged to the Transjordan FrontierForce. Handed over to the Legion when theFrontier Force disbanded in 1948, by 1952 theworkshops had expanded into an cxtremely well­equipped establishment, which could tackle re­pairs to all \'ehicles and guns, including tanks.There was a good instrumcnt shop where opticalequipment such as sights and binoculars could berepaired, and fabrication of complete assembliesand comprehensi\'e overhaul of vehicles could becarried out; the up-gunning of the Marmon­Herrington armoured car, referred to in an earlierchapter, was undertaken in Zerka Workshops andthe prototype 17-pounder, self-pl'opclled anti-tankgUll for the infantry was also buililhere.

Finally, training of young soldicrs entering theArab Legion Electrical and ~Iechanical Engineers

was not neglected, apprentice tradesmen beingtaught their basic skills in a special training centreforming part of Zcrka Workshops.

(~.AiJ;c3ea, 'Police,~ollal qlitlrt!

alIt!Cjmillillg

ARAB LEGIO:-; AIR FORCE

The Arab Legion Air Force, which existed underthat name until 1956 (shortly afterwards it be­came the Roynl Jordanian Air Force) had nocombat aircraft, although towards the end of 19.55pilou were beginning to be trained on "ampirejet fighters; combat aircraft did not arrive untilsome time after Clubb's dismissal. As late as 1950,when King Abdallah visited Aqaba to inspect theBritish garrison stationed there, he had perforceto travel in an Anson provided by R.A.F. Amman.

However, the King was most anxious to estab­lish an air force and gradually aircraft wereacquired and pilots traincd; thc air force was

Rcgimenlal badSeli.1A!cr" collar badse, &Iaffofficcr. 0011)'; centre,cpauJeue badsc, a, wornb)' an ranks ....d beari0Sthc words 'AJ Jeish alArabi'; right, col.la.rbadSe, inlanlry officcnonly

33

commanded by a British wing-commander, whosestaff included a British squadron-leader, work­shops officer and technical warrant officers. By1954 the Air Force could boast a communicationsflight of two de Ha\·ilIand Dovcs, a Yiking and a)'Ionarch; unhappily the last-named crashed atKolundia airport ncar Jerusalem soon after it hadbeen received.

The next step for the Arab Legion Air forcewas the formation of an air obSCT\'ation flight,whose primary task was to direct the fire of thearmy's guns. At that time this task in the BritishArmy was carried out by officers in the RoyalArtillery trained as pilots and flying Auster lightaircraft; accordingly an officer was brought overto jordan from the Brilish troops in the CanalZone of Egypt to lrain the jordanians in thenecessary lechniques. Progress was slow but inlimc sevcral qualified pilots took their place in lheflight, and appeared for the first time in publicin a fly-past at the '9,5,5 Arab Legion Day Parade.The air observation flight in fact obtained littleexperience at directing the guns exccpt duringpractice camps, but the Austers proved invaluabl{'as communications aircraft, and carried out usefulreconnaissance tasks during the cordon and searchoperations which took place in various parts ofjordan during the disturbances in early 19,56.

ARAB LECIO:" FLOTILL....

Jordan has an outlet lO the sea at the port ofAqaba, but it was not considered necessary for herto have any naval craft operating in the Gulf ofAqaba. However, after thc 1948 fighting the truceline ran through lhe southern end of the Dead Sea,

Collar badse, l)e,ad Sea Fl....1

34

and accordingly steps were taken to find craft topatrol tllese salty waters. A motlcy collection weregathered together, typical of which were one ortwO infantry assault landing craft, on which2-pounder guns in their turrets were mounted ­removed from otherwisc unscT\,iceable ),larmon­Herrington armoured cars. The Flotilla's craftalso mounted Bren guns and some Browningmachine-guns. These few craft patrolled the DeadSea until, in 1955, the first of twO high-speedlaunches arri\·ed from Britain. These craft, whichhad been specially designed for operations in theDead Sea - their hulls and melal fittings had beenspecially treated to resist the corrosive effects ofthe salt water - had to be brought overland fromAqaba - in itself no mean feat. They were armedwith heavy and light machine-guns and the arri\'alof the first \'cssel ga\'e the 'Dead Sea Fleet', as theFlotilla was popularly known, its first I'callyeffective craft for patrolling jordanian waters.

Operaling any boat on the Dead Sea was notonly hard on the craft but could also be extremelyunpleasant for the crew; the salt spray Ihrown upcould be excruciatingly painful in all)' open cut,and afler only a short cxposure crews would comein covered wilh a Ihick layer ofsalt left behind bythe c\'aporated water which had dricd on them.:\'e\'cnhdess the jordanian crews took to the seawell enough, although one is quoted as saying,during a rough passage, 'r 10\'e the sea, were it notfor the wa\·es.' It was probably the physicaldifficulties, as much as any olher factor, whichprevented another product ohlle Senior Technic.'l.lOfficer's fertile brain from getting beyond theprototype stage. In order to give the Flotillagrealer hitting power, his idea was to mount a2,5-pounder gun on a simple catamaran hullpowered by twin ford V8 engines; although aperfectly practical proposition it would ha\'e been:tlmoSl impossible to have protected the gun fromserious corrosion, and Ihe freeboard was so smallthat in anything but the calmest sea the crewwould have found the conditions quite intolerable.However, with such resources as it had the ArabLegion Flotilla under its ex-Royal Marine com­mander (who inevitably became the 'Dead SeaLord') maintained a Jordanian presence on theDead Sea and was able to keep a close watch onsuch Israeli activity as there was in that area.

POLICE

Under Peake's original plan the police wereformed into two distinct branches, the town police,in their familiar spiked helmelS, who were onoccasion used as infantry in the very early days,and the police ca\'alry, or mounted gendarmerie,who patrolled the country districts on horseback.The Desert Patrol, not formed until Glubb'sarri\'al in 1930, were then added to the policeforce and they were generally camel-mounted,though from the earliest years of the Legion boththey and the foot police had a proportion of motortransport; all police were armed with pistols, themounted men carrying riOes in addition. Thesethree basic divisions of the police force remainedas the Arab Legion expanded, and Police Head­quarters in Amman remained under the ovcrallcontrol of Arab Legion Headquarters, e\'cnthough the policc wcrc entirely divorced frommilitary operations after the formation of the firstArab Legion brigade during the Second WorldWar. This combined command of military andpolice forces was ofcourse contrary to all Europcanpractice, but in jordan it worked extremely wdl.

In the country districlS the police ca\'alrymenwere required to carry out their duties very largelysingle-handed and with little supervision; thisthey did with such success that they acquired anauthorit), which, in the eyes of the an':ragevillager, rated rather higher than that of theDistrict Go\'ernor. In the towns the foot policeestablished what must have been a unique recordfor Middle Eastern countries in that, for somethirty-four years up until the riots of October1954, it had never been found necessary for thepolice to fire on a civilian crowd, so quiet andstable had the country been. In tbe desert, themain task of the Badith -once they had put an endto tribal raiding in the early 1930S - was havingroutine patrols based on the stone police postswhich were established throughout the desertareas. Such was the slatus of the Desert Patrolamongst the bedouin tribes, that at each fort asmall patrol ofa few men under an X.C.O. waseffectively responsible for an area of manyhundreds of square miles, their only contact withhigher aUlhority being the fort's radio working 10

Police Headquarters.

A troop o( Mounted Police set(i.Qr out on patrol, OCtober1944. An inlelraJ pan of tbe Lelion, tbe Police forceco...lst. o( cavalry and infantry (or the settled areali, andcan1elry (or the duen. (bnperial War MUliieurn)

It is perhaps thc greatest testimony to the ArabLegion police to say that, up tlnlil 1956 at least, it

traveller in Jordan was as safe as he would be inthe English countryside and that tourists could,and frequentl)' did, tra\'e1 on their own anywherein the country without the slightesl difficulty.

:\ATIO:\'AL GUARD

After the 1948 fighting King Abdallah grantedjordanian cilizenship 10 enr)' Palestinian refugee,and also to those stillli\'ing in Iheir homes on theWcst Bank in the area retained by jordan afterthe Armistice:. The Arab Legion was left with afrontier 'Joo miles long to guard and Glubbquickly saw thal if the Legion was lied down instatic defences its esselllial mobility would bedestroyed. He therefore conceived the idea offorming an unpaid i\"ational Guard from thefrontier villagers themselves, leaving the bulk ofthe Legion free 10 form a mobile reserve. At firsthis idca was received with scepticism by thepoliticians, who lhought nobody would join ­'Fellaheen li\'e for mone), ... ~o money, nosoldiers' summed up Iheir altitude,

Howe\'er, despite the gloomy forecasts Clubbwent ahead with his plans, although there waslittle money a\'ailable to pay for the minimumnumber ofweapons required. Initially the XationalGuard consisted only of a few men in the fronticr"ilIages, but after the Go\'ernment had beenpersuaded to pass a bill, making a month's annual:\ational Guard training compulsory for all male

35

Jordanians of military agc, the force quickly grewand eventually reached a strength of some 30,000

men.),'ational Guard regiments, who had little be­

yond their rifles and a limited number of Brenguns, were organized from groups of six to eightvillages in an area; detachments garrisoned theirown villages and did what they could to put theminto a satisfactory state of defence with the fewstores available - often little more than barbedwire. Arab Legion Headquarters retained a firmcontrol over the :\ationaJ Guard and each detach·ment was under the command ofa regular ~ .C.O.,while the defence plans of regular units on WestBank duty wcre integrated, as far as possible,with those of the local Nalional Guard Regiment.By 1956 training camps were set up in EastJordan so that proper courses could be run by theregular army for i'\ational Guardsmen - whoreeei\'ed twO pounds a month when away fromhome on training courses. At the same time equip­ment was gradually improving and lhe T\ationalGuard was well on the way towards becoming not

..I •••

Men or Ihe Desen Patrol Oa Ihe ma..eh Ib..ouSh Ibe desen.Ia Lbe bauS«Iuad hi • fon built ia tbe dlin~DLb c.'DtUryand uHd by the ki.... Dr Damascu.. (lrnpe.rial W...Mu.eum)

36

only a useful frontier defence force but also awonhwhile reserve for the Legion itself.

The setting up of the :\'ational Guard took time,and had to be on a strictly 'no cost' basis, whateverfunds that could be scraped together being spenton weapons. Howe\"er, the operational needexisted from the start, with the result that in theearly days the Xational Guard inevitably metsome disastrous reve~, the Qibya incident in1953 being one of the more spectacular. .L\e\"erthe­less, many individual detachments did wellagainst vastly superior and better trained forces,and at Beit Liqya in 1954, described in an earlierchapter, they put up a very creditable perform­ance. Individual ~ational Guard companies werealso used, with some success, in support of regulartroops on internal security duties in the Jordanvalley in early 1956, thus giving the lie to thosepoliticians who had said that if an)'one joined theNational Guard, which the)' thought unlikely,those that did would rise against the Governmentas soon as they had rifles in their hands. Nothingof lhe sort had happened and in fact the raisingof the Xational Guard probably did more to raisethe moralc of the frontier \'iIIages, and to convincethem that the GO\'ernment in Amman had theirinterests at heart, than any other factor.

TRAI;\,I~G ESTABL1SHME~TS

Each arm of the Arab Legion was responsible forthe specialist training of its own soldiers, in manycases, such as the engineers and artillery, settingup its own training centres and boys' schools forthe purpose. In addition, however, there was acentral training establishment, known as the ArabLegion Training Ccntrc, at Abdali on the outskirtsof Amman, which was responsible for initial recruittraining, officer cadel training and somc con­tinuation training for xC.a.s and officers.

All recruits entering the Legion had to passthrough the Training Centre after enlistment andthere they did a basic course of drill, weapontraining and similar military subjects; a fairly largeproportion of recruits were illiterate and these alsorecei\"cd some primary education, although by1955 many recruits came from the Legion's ownschools and so illiteracy was not the problem ithad been ill the early days. The Training Centre

APPENDIXEquivalent Arah Legio1l British Army Ranks

Arab Legion British Army CourtesyTitle

rely heavily on the British clement for its seniorstaff officers, simply because it had few suitablytrained officers of its own to fill the posts createdat various headquarters as the army expanded.Glubb managed to persuade the British to reservetwo places a year at the Staff College, Camberleyfor Jordanian officers, but the political pressureon him to replace tbe British officers in the Legionby Jordanians was continually growing; so it wasthat in early 1955 the Arab Legion's own StaffCollege was created and was located within theHeadquarters I Division camp at Khaw. Althoughofficers were still sent to England for staff training,it was hoped gradually to build up a pool ofJorda:1ian-trained staff officers, who would beable to fill some at least of the stafr appointmentsat the various headquarters from brigadesupwards.

Clubb had always been determined, howeverquickly the army had to grow to meet its opera­tional tasks, that he would not accept the second­ratc; the carc and thought given to training at allIcvels in the Arab Legion weill a long way to meetthis ideal.

-_-..:­. .

Bedo...ua cavalry recruits lU driU 0'" the parade Irou..n.d ofthe Arab LecioQ Trab>.i"'5 Ce"'tre at Abdali.. (ImperialWar MUlleunl)

\Vas run by a British colonel, ably assiSled by awarram officer drill instructor from the Brigade ofGuards, and these were the only British membersof the staff; the training was rigorous and demand­ing and the smartness and bearing ofArab Legionsoldiers was ample evidence of its effectiveness.

The officer cadet school, which formed part ofthe Training Centre, existed to train suitablecandidates for commissions. Candidatcs weretaken both from the ranks oftbe army in the shapeof suitably qualified N .C.O.s, and also fromci"ilian life; after a tough course candidates wentto their regiments, still as cadets, to serve a pre­liminary period as troop or platoon commandersbefore finally being gazetted second-lieutenant.

The Training Centre's third main responsibility,that of continuation training for )l'.C.O.s andofficers, consisted largely of advanced drill andweapon training courses for the former andcompany and equivalent commanders' tacticalcourses for the latter. The Arab Legion had acareful selection and qualification system forpromotion, and this higher level training assistedXC.O.s and officers to qualify.

Officers' staff training presented the Legionwith another problem entirely. The Legion had to

Al FariqAmir al Li",aZaimQaimakamQaidWaxil QaidRaisMulazim AwalYlulazim Thani~Iorasha

WaqilXaqibXaibAreefJundi AwalJundi Thani

Lieutenant-General}:\lajor-General

Brigadiee }ColonelLieutenant-Colonel:\IajorCaptain

Lieu",,,'" }Second LieutenantCadel"'arrant OfficerStaff SergeantSergeanlCorporalLance-CorporalPri\'ate

I)asha

Bey

Effendi

37

CJ!fe 'Plates

A Desert PalrolThis is a bedouin soldier, perhaps of the Howcitattribe from South Jordan which gave so muchsuppor! to T. E. Lawrence during the 1914-18war, when their chief was lhe famous warriorAuda Abu Tay. Shown here in full dress, auniform of khaki drill is worn. It was cuI ill thesamt: manner as ordinary bedouin dress, with longrobes reaching almosllo the ground. A red sash isworn, together with a red re\'olver lanyard on theright shoulder, a belt and bandolier full of ammun­ition and a silver dagger in the frolll of the bell.:"ormally when 011 patrol in the desert the soldierwould nOt wcaT the long white 'cuffs' falling fromhis sleeves. He holds a long bamboo cane in hisright hand, which helps him 10 steer his somewhatunprediclablt: mount. The scarlet saddle cloth isin fact a cloak or mantle of fine cloth, lined withsheepskin, and it is this which serves as protectionagainst the cold desert nights. The saddlery isdecorated in bedouin style, with a fantasia ofcoloured woollen ornamentation. Equipment in­cludes a ~'fark IV Lee·Enfieid riAe and a '38pistol, the laner is suspended from the right armand therefore cannot be seen.

111 Colonel (Qaimakam), 1955In full winter dress, this officer is a Q.aimakam (orcolonel of bedouin origin. His neck decoration isthe Order of EI Xahda (Third Class), and he alsoholds the Order of £1 Istiqlal (Fourth Class).These two decorations are divided into five classes,the fifth being reserved for other ranks, fourth forjnnior officers and so on.

From a portrait taken by the author at theOpening of Parliament in Amman, 1 .\'ovember

1955·

38

B2 Commandu, .\tounted Bod)'guartJ, /955This officer is a Rais (or captain) and wears the fulldress of the Royal Bodyguard. The tunic is redwith dark blue facings, and the breeches are alsodark blue.

From a colour slide taken at the Arab Legion~[ounted SportS ncar Zerka late in 1955.

B3 .\lajor·Ctn"al (Qaid tl Firqa), /955This officer wears his winter !ef\'ice dress, withblack leather Sam Browne bdt and shoes. Hisdecorations include the Order of EI Istiqlal ofJordan (Star and Sash) and the C.B. (neckdecoration).

From a portrait of J\'1ajor.General S. A. Cooke,C.B., O.B.E., taken by the author at the Openingof Parliament in Amman, [ I'iovcmber 1955.

CI Lieutman/-Colonel (Qaid), 9th Infantry Regiment,

1955The uniform is the khaki drill service dress asworn during the summer months. The red andgreen lanyard and badges on the epauleue strapsarc regimental, the lauer being surmounted by thenormal Jeish-el-Arabi badge of white metal. TheSam Browne belt and shoes are of black leather,not brown as in the British sef\'ice at the time.The pistol, a luger, carried as shown is not regula.tion. The head-dress is the dark blue sedarQ (orforage cap), with a red crown and piping andornamented with the Arab Legion cap badge. Thisofficer is one of those seconded from the BritishArmy. At the time, four of the ten regular battal­ions of the Arab Legion were commanded byBritish officers.

From a colour slide of Q.aid P. Young. 0.5.0.,M.C., taken at Zerka in the summer of [955.

C2 Slondard·BeQTtT. 7th hifantry Regime1lt, 1953A junior officer in full dress, bearing the Regi­ment's Colour (tl alam), old pattern. at the ArabLegion Day Parade. Only ranks of WarrantOfficer and above wore ties.

C3 Colour-S"geant (Naguib), 9th Infantry Regiment,

1955Wearing the full-dress summer uniform of khakidrill, this scnior ~.C.O is a bedouin, and one ofthe Guard of Honour for the President of Lebanon

as indicated by the \~'caring of white gloves. Allnon-commissioned officers wear stripes of theBritish style, but the metal slars and crowns ofsenior ~.C.O.s and officers arc of Arabic design.He is armed with a Mark III Lee·Enfield riAt,and carries his bayonet on the Icft hip - this beingconcealed by the knot of his crimson sash.

From a colour slide taken by the author alAmman airport in 1935.

D Trooptr, .\lounud Poliu Fursan, l!Jjj

This trooper wears his summer uniform of khakidrill service dress. He has black leather equipment,belt and bandolier, and is armed with Ihe BritishMark III Lee-Enfield. ~ote lllat the police, likethe Xational Guard, wear a shtmagh distinctivefrom the rest of the Arab Legion. The silver capbadge of the Arab Legion is the same for soldiersand police, while a different badge afyello\\' metalis worn by Ihe National Guard. The horse appearsto be a tough country-bred arab of about fouTleenhands, perhaps rather small by British standardsfor the load he has to carry, but nevertheless wellup to his work.

From a colour slide taken by the author ncarAmman on 18July '955'

£1 Drummtr, Arab /..~gion. Band, c. 1953The winter battle·drcss is of the standard Britishpattern of the day, adorned with blue epaulettesand aiguilletle. Bell and gaiters arc also of theBritish pattern but blancocd. The shtmagh and agalarc the normal Arab Legion issue, the formerbeing tucked illlo the back oflhe belt to keep it inplace. The badge on the agol is that WOTll by all theregular personnel of the Arab Legion. The drumwas one of:\ set bought from ~\'lessrs. Polter & Co.of Aldershot in lhe 1950s, .wd is melal \~'ith theh:\dgc and title emblazoned on it. This soldierappears to be a 110n-bedouinJordanian Arab.

From a coloured photograph by ~(ajor R.Young and reproduced in The Arab LegionCalendar.

£2 Cadtl, Cad,t Training School, .lmman., l!Jjj

This cadet wears British battle-dress wilh h·hitegorgct patches while at Cadet School, but whenhe leaves he will \~·ear silver bars 011 his shoulder.He differs little from his British counterpart orthe

period, exccpt fol' the mlara (forage cap) and theArab Legion hadge on his epaulette strap. A cadethas to serve in a regiment for three years beforebeing promoted second-lielltcn:lIlt - ah...ays sup­posing he passes his promotion exam.

1:.3 Drum.Jlajor. Arab ugion BaT/d, c. 1955The drum-major, probably selecled for his height! , is only a Jandi Awol lance·corporal. He

wears his winter uniform, which is British battle­dress, butloned to the neck, with the usual ArabLegion badges, and ornamented with blueepaulettes and lanyard. The colour of these latterindicates that this drum-major is a member of theblue band, there being three bands in the AmbLegion - lhe red, the blue and the green.

Ff Corporal (AmJ), Cirtassian Bod)'gllard, 1955This bodyguard was raised by King Abdallah,but by '955 it was small in numbers and itspersonnel, despite their soldierly, not to sayferocious, appearance were becoming ratherelderly. Their handsome uniform, with yotoghandagger} and cartridge-cases, seems 10 ha\'e been

inspired by the cossacks of the old ImperialRussian Army.

From a coioul slide taken by the aUlhor at theOpening of Parliament in Amman, I :\ovember

'955·

1'"2 Trooptr, Jundi Than'J :md Armourtd Car IUgi­mtnt, 1955This soldier is dressed in Brilish battle·dress, whichis his winter uniform. He wears the shtmagh andagol and the badge on his right arm is regimental.It is his duty to carc for the regimental mascot, ahawk, which was introduced when Qaid (Liellt.­Colonel), now .Major·General, J. D. LUlll wascommanding the unit, The Despatch Rider'sgauntlets arc \~'orll, of course, as a protectionagainst the bird's talons.

f3 Trooptr, Camtl Corps, '955The uniform is that worn by the Desert PoliceBadi~h during the winter; summer uniform as

worn in full dress is ofkhaki drill. The equipmentis of dark red leather. The soldier wears his pistolbullets '38 o\"Cr his left shoulder, and his riflebullets '303 in Ihe bandolier around his waist.

39

The white metal badge on the right of his chestbears his army number.

From a colour slide taken by the author inAmman in Xovcmber 1955.

G Trooper, Household Cacalry Squadron, 1955This trooper was photographed by the authorat the Opening of Parliament in Amman onI November '955. He wears the full-dress red coatand navy blue breeches of the Household Cavalry,which was not a bedouin unit, but recruited fromamong the fellahin or haden inhabitants ofJordan.All the horses were greys, not unlike large ~ew

Forest ponies, and the men were armed withlances made of aluminium.

[II Corporal (Areel), Arab Legion Engineers, c. 1954The uniform is the standard ballie-dress with beltand gaiters, all of British pattern. The N.C.O.'schevrons have been whitened with blanco. Thewhite metal badge on the epaulelle straps wasworn throughout the Arab Legion, and bore thewords 'Jeish-el·Arabi' (Arab Army) in Arabiccharacters. The bluc and red badge above thechevrons is that of the Arab Legion Engineers.From his appearance and style of wearing hisshen/agh this corporal could be a bedouin, but asthere were few, if any, in the Engineers, he isprobably a hade';.

40

From a coloured photograph taken by MajorR. Young and reproduced in The Arab LegionCalendar.

H2 Constable, Police, 1955The blue serge service dress is as worn on trafficduty in winter, while in summer the uniform wouldbe khaki drill ballle·dress. He appears to bearmed with a Colt or Browning automatic. Notethe distinctive spiked head-dress of the ArabLegion Police. The web equipment has beenadapted from that acquired from Great Britain.The collar-badge gives the policeman's armynumber.

From a slide taken by the author in Amman in

'955'

H3 Private, National Guard (Haris tl Watani), 1954This soldier was photographed by the author in anObservation Post on the frontier between Jordanand Israel. He belonged to a ballalion that hadbeen mobilized, as opposed to the National Cuanlraised solely for the protection of frontier villages.He was of typical Palestinian hadm' stock, not ofbedouin extraction. His khaki drill ballie-dress isof British style. About his waist is a bandolierof '303 cartridges, and his khaki shemagh andyellow metal badge are peculiar to the NationalGuard.

Men-at-Arms Series

Each title in this series gives a brief history of a famous fighting unit, with a fulldescription of its dress and accoutremenlS, illustrated with eight colour platesand many drawings and photographs. Collectors of militaria, war-gamers, andhistorians will find no other series of books which describe the dress of each unitso comprehensively. The series will range widely in time and terrain, with aspecial effort to include some of the lesser-known armies from other lands.About twelve titles will be published each year.

TITLES ALREADY PUBUSHED

THE STO:O;EW:\LL 8RIGAm: )M" &l/>,}

THE BL....CK W....TCH C~IJ'/'J Gr.'"

HlESCH FOREIGN LEGlO:\' M.rli. ll"i"drDw

FOOT GRENADIERS OF THEIMPERIAL GUARD C.,ltsG,.,.1

THE tRO:O; BRIG....DE )IM Sd/>.1CHASSEURS OF THE GUARD Pm r __1

WAFFEN-SS .U.n. lI'i'"THE COLDSTRf.....M GUARDS a-tu Gral

U.S. CA\'ALRY ). &1."

THE ARAB LEGIO:O; Pith 1"-..,

ROYAL SCOTS GREYS CMr/u Gr••'

THE CONN....UGHT RANGERS til_ SN",,;

FUTURE TITLES INCLUDE

ARGYLL & SUTHERLANDHIGI-ILANDERS II'. .I/,£Ju:tt

:Wfli l'USJA8lS ).tlUl lAuf..,

GEORG": W..\SHINGTOS'S :\R~IY Pfln , .....1

THE BU....S CrtI'? 81u1u4

SAI'OLEO:O;'S MARSHAI.S Pun I • .,

US. MARI1\"F.5 )oh Sd."THE RED ARMY A. SH/#It

THE ROYAI.IST ARMY OF THECIVIL WAR PI,," r...,

THE COSSACKS .-41~' St.,.THF. ROY,\I. ARTILLERY II'. r. C.._.

THE KISG'S REGIME:'>;) ..Un SM#t';

BRIGADIER PETER YOUNG retired from the Army in 1959 after a colour.ful career which included wartime service in Nos, I and 3 Commando Brigades,and the years 1953-6 as Commander of the 9th Regiment of the Arab Legion.From 1959 to 1969 he was Head of thc Military History Department at theRoyal Military Academy, SOlndhurst. His many books and articles have madehim onc of the best·known British military historians; and his reconstruction ofCivil War battle! at Marslon ~'Ioor, Newbury, Copredy Bridge and elsewherehave made him known to an even wider public. He is currently Editor ofPurnell's History of the First World IVar.

£r'%5 net (in .K. only)