CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE JVP

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of all organizations is to augment membership and expand its social base

so as to gain popular support and sympathy for its cause. Insurgent organizations also create

functional auxiliaries or front organizations like youth groups, workers groups and women

and peasants organizations. Keeping in mind the goals of these organizations, their nature is

mostly conspiratorial as they have to operate underground. This is true of the JVP also and

one cannot get a clear picture of its organizational structure. The reasons for this are not

only its clandestine nature but also the long periods of proscription which it faced, during

which the organizational structure was eroded and had to be rebuilt.

This chapter shall discuss the organizational structure, leadership and social

background of the JVP. It begins with a brief history on the efforts to give the JVP an

organizational structure and leadership during the 1971 insurrection and the 1987-89

insurgency. This is followed by a detailed analysis of JVP's social background, by

establishing its linkages to caste, class and occupation, with a special focus on its front

organizations. As the JVP operated mostly underground, it is through these organizations that

it tried to penetrate various sections of society.

ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP

The idea to set up an organization within the JVP had come about as early as 1965,

yet it was· only in late 1969 that the leaders took steps to establish a more formal and

coherent organization. At a meeting in Madampella, convened by Wijeweera, Sanath,

Karunaratne and Loku Athula, it was decided that the Central Committee should consist of

106

the district secretaries and a few others selected by Wijeweera.

Accordingly, a thirty-two member Central Committee was appointed. Wijeweera,

Sanath, Karunaratne and Loku Athula were the Founder Members. The other members

comprising this loosely constructed Central Committee, included: 1

1. Nissanka Wijewardene (District Secretary of Amparai) 2. Susil (District Secretary of Polonnaruwa) 3. Pantis Abeywickreme (District Secretary of Hambantota) 4. Jayasinghe (District Secretary of Anuradhapura) 5. Anura Ranjith (District Secretary of Kandy) 6. Sunanda Deshapriya (District Secretary of Badula) 7. Wijesundera (District Secretary of Matale) 8. Kapila (District Secretary of Nuwara-Eliya) 9. Premasiri (District Secretary of Monaragale) 10. Sarath Wijesinghe (District Secretary of Kegalle) 11. Samaratunga (District Secretary of Kurunegala) 12. Herath (District Secretary of Puttalam) 13. Susil Wickreme (District Secretary of Matara) 14. Jagath (District Secretary of Galle) 15. Nimal Maharage (District Secretary of Kotte) 16. Vasantha Kanakaratne (District Secretary of Colombo, South) 17. Chukki Premaratne (District Secretary of Colombo, North) 1H. Nayananda Wijekulatileke (District Secretary of Kalutara) 19. J. Uyangoda (District Secretary of Kandy Road) 20. Merryl Jayasiri 21. Batapola Athula 22. Cyril Dahanayake 23. Dhanapala (Trade Union Section) 24. T.D. Silva (Trade Union Section) 25. Lionel Bopage 26. Kumanayake 27. Lakshman Mahaduwage 28. Cecil Chandra and Osmund Silva.

In the later part of 1969, at a conference held at Urubokka and in the Dondra

conference in January 1970, the structural details of the future organization were discussed.

It was decided that at the lowest rung of the organizational structure would be cells of five

1 Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission (Insurgency), Inquiry no.] (Politbureau), (Colombo, 1976), pp.159-

163. Also sec, A.C. Alles, Insurgency 1971 (Colombo, 1976), p.:26.

107

members, with a leader. There would he several such cells in a police station area. One of

the leaders of such a cell was to he appointed as the area leader. The area leaders of a

district appointed a district secretary, who was in charge of the entire district. The country

was divided into twenty-seven districts. The district secretaries were members of the Central

Committee. The Politbureau which was above the Central Committee, was to consist of

twelve members, including the four top leaders and some of the district secretaries. 2

To elect the politbureau out of the Central Committee, it was intended to hold a party

congress at the end of 1970.3 However, due to the fear of repressive state action, the

congress was never held. Although there was no ofticial election for the polithureau,

apparently such a body did exist. And it was in September 1970 that the first meeting of the

polithureau took place at Ambalangoda. The following were reportedly members of the

politbureau in 1971:4 Wijeweera, Sanath, Karunaratne, Loku Athula, Anura Ranjith. J.

Uyangoda, Sunanda Deshapriya, T.D. Silva, Laksman Mahaduwage, Kumanayake, Dhanapala

and Cecil Chandra. These details have been constructed from the Judgement of the Criminal

Justice Commission (CJC). Wijeweera while speaking before the CJC had denied the

existence of a Central Committee and politbureau and claimed that he was the leader but did

not have a formal title.

Besides being in charge of districts, the top leadership and some of the district

secretaries had different sections under them, being looked after by one or more persons.

These sections were dealing with students, weapons, propaganda and posters,

communications, branch organization and intelligence and indoctrination of the armed and

police services. Wijeweera himself led the propaganda and agitation wings, Loku Athula the

2 Alles, ibid., p.27.

~ ibid., p.33.

4 Judgment of the Criminal Justice Cnmmission, n.l, p.171.

108

arms and ammunition section, Kumanayake publications, T.D. Silva and Dhanapala Trade

Unions and Mahuduwage, Cecil Chandra, Sarath and Loku Athula were in charge of

organizational activities in various districts of the country.5 Lionel Bopage was responsible

for co-ordinating activities between the district secretaries.6

On the basis of available material, it may be observed that till about 1977 the JVP did

not have a coherent and well-knit structure as most of its leaders had been jailed. After the

failure of the insurgency, some of the leaders had quit or had defected to other parties.

Some had left the organization out of disillusionment and due to Wijeweera ·s intolerance of

their opposition to him. This had led to various splinter groups emerging out of the JVP.7

They were led by those who did not agree with Wijeweera within the organization. A lot

of the leaders who left between 1971 and 1977 or immediately after being released in 1977,

have successfully entered various professions like politics, academics, bureaucracy, business

and also as management executives.~< When the organization had to be rebuilt in 1977 after

its decision to join mainstream politics, the pro-Wijeweera faction within the organization

laid the foundation. 9 Wijeweera provided the continuity. After 1977, the JVP was organized

more on the lines of a mainstream political party which had to contest elections. Their

efforts at emulating the organizational structure of mainstream political parties did not last

long because of their proscription in 1983 again.

5 Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A l.ost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy, 1 lJllO), p.87.

6 ibid., p.81.

7 Some of these groups were the Dharmasekera Group, Wijesekera Group, Peradiga Sulang Clique, Kamkam Mawatlw Group, Salwyogitha Peramuna, Vikalpa Kandayama, Nawa lanatha Vi1mtkthi Peramuna, etc. ibid., pp.127-135.

8 Loku Athula (W.D.N. Jayasinghe) had joined as a manager in Galle F<Jce Hotel, Colombo; Bopage was employed as a Civil Ertgineer in a Mercantile Company before he migrated to Australia; Podi Athula (Victor Ivan) has taken to journalism, edits Ravaya; Mahinda Wijesekera had become a lawyer in Matara, ibid., p.l23. J. Uyangoda is an

Associate Professor in the University of Colombo; Sunanda Dcshapriya edits the newspaper, Yukthiya; Susil Sirivardena was the head of the lansm'iya programme.

q ibid., p.l27.

109

By llJH7, Wijeweera was able to set-up an organization with thirteen Polithureau

members and twenty-nine Central Committee members. The members were as follows: 10

Polithureau Members

Rohana Wijeweera, Upatissa Gamanayake, Piyadasa Ranasinghe, Saman Piyasiri Fernando:

P.B. Wimalaratne, Gunaratna Wanasinghe, Sumith Athukorale, Somawansa Amerasinghe,

H.B. Herath, D.M. Ananda, Shantha Bandara, Nandatillake Galapatthi, L1lith Wijeratne.

Central Committee Members

Gamini Wij~gunasekera, Kandewatte, Amarasiri, Lionel Fernando, Ragama Some, Upali

Jayaweera, Norman Manawadu, Ananda Idagama, Ruwan, Jayatilaka. Palitha, Jude Anthnny,

Mirigama Chandare, P. Thangarajah, Gamini Jayalath, Beligalla Siriwardene, Aruna

Wijesuriya, Gunapala Satharasinghe, Ariyasena, Piyasena Ramanayake, Dharmawardhana

Munasinghe, Indraratne, Samaranayake, Algiriye Munasinghe, Y.M. Aheyratne, K.G.

Jinadasa, Sirimal, Ranjitham Gunaratnam, Kitulagoda.

Further, the organization was divided into three main departments. Various duties and

responsibilities were assigned to members in these departments. The departments were

directly placed under the authority of the politbureau. The Departments were divided as:

Department No. 1.

This department consisted of the Zonal Committees. And the country was divided

into five zones. These were: (i) Western/Sabaragamuwa; (ii) Central; (iii) Rajarata; (iv)

Uva/Eastern, and (v) Southern.

The Zonal Committees were in turn divided into District Committees which were

placed under the leadership of members of the Central Committee. The District Committees

1° For details, sec, C.A. Chandraprcma, Sri Lanka: The Years of Terror: The JVP Insurrection (Colombo, 1991),

pp.6-7.

110

were headed hy Central Committee memhers which were the following 11:

Distdct Secretaries

D.M. Ananda (Colombo), Dharmawardana Munasinghe (Gampaha), P.K.B.A.

Indraratne (Kegalle), Mahinda (Puttalam), Upali Jayaweera (Kandy), Dhammika ldamegama

(Matale), Ranjitham Gunaratnam (Kurunegale), Wimalaratne (Kalutara), S.K. Jayatilaka

(Galle), Gamini Wijegunesekera (Matara), Ariyasena (Hambantota), Sumeda (Polonnaruwa),

Tissa (An~radhapura), Premakumar (Trincomalee), Shantha Bandara (Nuwara-Eiiya),

Amarasiri (Badulla) and Kandewatte (Monaragale).

Each district was divided into a number of Divisions. A district could have two or

more Divisions, depending on the size and requirements. Each Division would have a

Divisional Secretary, and a Secretary each for education, finance, military organization,

propaganda, youth, students, workers, BhikkhtL\" and women. Rankwise, the Secretaries of the

Divisions were just below the ranks of Central Committee members. But quite often, a single

person tilled in various ranks simultaneously.

The Zonal Leadership 12

1. Western/Saharagamuwa Zone

Political Secretary: D.M. Ananda

Military Secretary: Saman Piyasiri Fernando

2. Central Zone

Political Secretary: Piyadas:1 Ranasinghe

Military Secretary: H.B. Herath

3. Rajarata Zone

Political Secretary: Lalith Wijeratne

II ibid., p.J7.

12 ibid., pp.l6-17.

111

Military Secretary: Lalith Wijeratne

4. Southern Zone

Political Secretary: Upatissa Gamanayake

Military Secretary: Upatissa Gamanayake

5. Uva/Eastern Zone

Political Secretary: Shantha Bandara

Military Secretary: H.B. Herath

Department No. 2

The National Committees were constituted along the following lines: (i) Education;

(ii) Finance; (iii) Propaganda, and (iv) Military Organization. The National Committees

were headed by the followingY

1. Education: Gunaratne Wanasinghe

2. Finance: Somawansa Amerasinghe

3. Propaganda: Upatissa Gamanayake

4. Military Organization: Saman Piyasiri Fernando

Department No. 3

The JVP had five Front Organizations. They were: (i) Youth; (ii) Students; (iii)

Workers; (iv) Bhikkhus, and (v) Women. The Front Organizations were headed by the

following: 14

1. Youth: Shantha Bandara

2. Students: D.M. Ananda

3. Workers: P.B. Wimalaratne

13 ibid., p.l7. 14 ibid.

112

4. Bhikkhus: D.M. Ananda 15

5. Women: D.M. Ananda

SOCIAL BASE

The socio-economic crisis of the sixties which resulted in high unemployment rates

was one of the primary causes for the growth of the JVP. Therefore, its cadres and support

groups came mainly from the youth and unemployed. However, the social base of the JVP

is much more complex and has not been static and shifted along with the growth of the

organization.

This section is largely based on the initial findings of a study done by Gananath

Obeyesekere in 1974. His findings were based on data made available to him about

interrogations made by the government authorities of 10,192 suspected insurgents held in

custody after the abortive April 1971 insurgency. According to Obeyesekere, this data was

largely reliable because even though some suspected insurgents may not have been directly

involved, most of them would h:1ve sympathized with it.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

An analysis of the educational background of the 10,192 suspected insurgents confirms

that JVP's cadres were predominantly rural youth with some level of education. About 32.2

per cent had completed secondary school. The number with a higher degree w;,--;, however,

very low and 2.5 per cent had no education at all. Almost 80 per cent of the suspected

insurgents came from the Maha Vidyalayas and about 6.4 per cent from Madhya Maha

15 He was a monk when he entered the University of Kelaniya but gave up h~s robes in the tina I year.

113

Vidyalas. 16 These schools had limited or no facilities for science training which could lead

to university admissions in medicine, agriculture or engineering subjects. Students were

generally trained in humanities courses which did not offer good employment prospects.

This may have been an important factor causing disillusionment among rural youth who

would later take part in the insurgency. These schools were probably important recruiting

centers for the JVP. According to Obeysekere, 4 per cent came from the technical schools

and universities and the JVP leadership came from this group. 17 He further, writes that

about 37 per cent of the sample were still in schools or just out of it. 1s It would have been

easy to mobilize this section as their grievances were real and JVP leaders surreptitiously held

lectures and discussions to highlight them. The Student Fronts also played a considerably

important role in providing a large chunk of recruitment to the JVP.

Student Fronts

When the JVP decided to set-up student fronts, it took over control of a Samajwadi

Sisya Sangamaya (Socialist Students Society) which was already functioning at the

Peradeniya University before 1970. A similar organization, Samajwadi Sant;amaya (Socialist

Society) was set-up at Vidyodaya University on 14 July 1970, with the help of Mahinda

Wijesekera. The JVP's student front came to be known as Deshapremi Sisya Sangamaya

(Patriotic Students Society) with Wijesekera as President and Kumanayake as secretary.

Piyatilleke and Piyasiri were appointed as organizers of the Students Section. By 1970, the

Samajwadi Sisya Sangamaya was in full co;1trol of universities at Peradeniya, Sri

Jayewardenapura, Kelaniya and Colombo. The students were divided into ordinary and

16 Gananath Obeyesekere, "Some Comments on Social Background of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri L1nka," Journal of Asian Studies (New York), vol.33, no.3, May 1974, pp.376-377.

17 ibid., pp.376-378.

18 ibid., p.378.

114

full-time members. By next year, there were at least ~00 members in the students section of

the Colombo district, with 100 as full-timers. 1lJ

Later, it set up the Inter University Students Federation (IUSF) which controlled most

universities for a fairly long period, except those in Jaffna and Batticalao.20 In September

1986, another student front, the Deshapremi Sishya Viyapraya (Patriotic Students Front) was

formed, first at Sri Jayewardenapura and later at Colombo.

JVP's activities had spread to the schools as well, and by 1986, they were active in

about 2000 schools. 21 Jathika Sishya Madyasthanaya (National Students Centre) which was

formed on the lines of the IUSF, was responsible for carrying out JVP propaganda work in

schools.

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND

Most of the suspected JVP insurgents were more educated as compared to the general

male population in the same age-group in Sri Lanka. A significant number of the insurgents

were unemployed. 22 However, the reason for discontent among the youth was not high

unemployment hut the nature of employment. A'> little as 0.2 per cent belonged to what can

be termed as elite occupations like the bureaucracy, medical practice or engineering. Apart

from being unemployed, 40 per cent were underemployed and poorly paid.23 Most held

minor and middle grade posts in the government services and lower ranks in the army and

police or were technicians, artisans and casual workers.

In a comparative study of the occupational background of the sons and fathers,

1q Alles, n.l, p.36.

'0 • - Gunaratna, n.5, p.46.

21 ibid., p.48. 22 A little over 17.5 per cent were unemployed. Obeyesekere, n.16, p.373.

2' ihid., p.374.

115

Oheyesekere points that both belonged to similar economic and occupational backgrounds.

Among the fathers, about 49 per cent were underemployed and ahclllt 2.5 per cent per cent

were unemployed,24 but hoped for social mobility of their children once they got educated.

Yet, they had radically differing views on their life situation. The older generation had

reconciled to their economic status.

While speaking before the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and describing the

swift growth of support for the JVP among the youth, Rohana Wijeweera, the leader of the

JVP, spoke of the late 60s as a period in which :

the youth and student frustrations had increased and general bitterness was being felt at the plight of the new generation ... (bringing) the youth of this country ... to the position of demonstrating their hostility towards the existing conditions. While under the UNP government (of 1965-70) unemployment was spreading more and more and the cost of living was spiralling higher and higher, radicalism began to take hold of the younger generation. 25

CASTE AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Unlike the popular view, the JVP was not a low caste movement. sg.s per cent of

insurgents belonged to the Goyi;;ama (farmers) caste which is the highest caste in terms of

status in Sri Lanka. The second caste in the hierarchy, the Karavas (fishermen), had a

representation of 6.2 per cent, hut the Salagama (cinnamon-peelers) were under-represented.

This was partly because Salagama is a tightly knit caste group and is traditionally hostile

to the Karava caste. Since much of the JVP leadership, 12 out of 14 members of the

politbureau, came from the Karava caste, it was detrimental to representation from the

26 Salagama caste.

24 ibid., p.375. 25 Quoted from Robert Keamey, "Educational Expansion and Politica I Volatility in Sri L1nb: The 1971 Insurrection", Asian Survey (California), vol.15, no.9, September 1975, p.743. 26 Obeyesekere, n.l6, p.372.

116

Some insurgents belonged tl1 the low-castes including the Vahumpura

(Jaggery-makers) from the low-country and the Batgama (Servants to Goyigama) from the

Kandyan area. It is important to note that the most intense and prolonged fighting during the

insurrection took place in areas with a heavy concentration of these two castes --- the

Vahumpuras were actively involved in Elpitiya in the Western Province and the Batgamas

in the Kegalle district. 27 Other areas where heavy fighting took place were along the south

and west coast which were mostly inhabited by Karavas. 2"'·

Notwithstanding Sri Lanka's multi-ethnic composition, representation from the other

minority groups were minimal. About 94 per cent of the suspected insurgents were

Sinhala-Buddhists. Tamils and Muslims accounted for around 1 per cent and 0.5 per cent

respectively. 29 This may be due to JVP's chauvinist attitude towards the minorities. 30

Wijeweera had argued that no revolutionary movement could succeed if it was largely

dependent on the suppm1 of minorities. 31 Tamil plantation workers were rejected as being

counter-revolutionaries. Although Wijeweera claimed in his testimony before the Criminal

Justice Commission (CJC) that "many efforts we made to build cadres among comrades of

the national minorities were fruitless". 32 But JVP could not have made serious efforts in

27 Refer to Robert Kearney and Janice Jiggins, "The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971 ", 7/ze Journal of Common»·ealth

and Comparatil'e Politics (LonJon), vol.13, no.1, March 1975, p.44.

28 Janice J iggins, Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1917-1976 (Colombo, 1979), p.129.

:? Kearney .. nd Jiggins, n.24, p.44.

:'10 For the JVP's attitude to the National question, see the chapter on "The JVP and the National Question," pp.140-151 in Kumari Jayawardena 's Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka, (Colombo, 1990); Kumari Jayawardena, "Sinhala Chauvinism of the JVP," Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vol.7, no.10, 15 September 1984, pp.9-11; Gamini Samaranayake, "The Changing Attitude Towards the Tamil Problem within the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)," in Charles Abeysekera and Newton Gunasinghe (ells.), Facets of Ethnicity in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scienrists Association, 1987), pp.271-297; and Gail Omvedt, "The Tamd National Question," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol.17, no.43, 23 October 1982, pp.1734-1736.

31 See A. Jayaweera, "The JVP and the Falsification of History," Lanka Guardian, vol.l, no.18, 15 January 1979, p.15.

32 ibid.

117

this direction as their ideological position on the minorities diu not give them any scope to

do so.

There were a few other reasons to explain the dominant Sinha! a character of the JVP.

This can be explained in terms ·of the socio-economic backwardness of the Kandyan

Sinhalese community.33 In the sixties the percentage of employment amongst the Kanuyan

Sinhalese and the low-country Sinhalese was 25 to 26 per cent, as compared to 51 per cent

among the Indian Tamils. A comparison between the two ethnic groups in regard to

land-holdings revealed, it was much higher amongst the Tamils, as high as 6.75 acres in

Batticaloa, in Trincomalee 4.50 acres, in Mannar 2.50 acres, whereas in Kegalle it was O.XO

acres, in Badulla 0.75 acres and in Kandy and Nuwara Eliya 0.60 acres. 34 Therefore, the

desire for a radical economtc transformation was much more pronounceJ amongst the

Sinhalese than the Tamils.

JVP AND THE WORKING CLASS

The foregoing survey of the occupational background of JVP insurgents shows that

its working class component was rather limited. However, Wijeweera always claimed that

the JVP was a working class organization and after the overthrow of the state, a dictatorship

of the proletariat would he established. Speaking before the CJC, he insisted that by 1971

they were gaining influence amongst the working class, including young workers in the

factories and at work sites.35 But due to state repression after the 1971 insurrection, the JVP

could not capitalise on this.

33 Urmila Phadnis, "Insurgency in Ceylonese Politics: Problems and Prospects," /D!)'A Journal (New Delhi), vol.3, no.4, April 1971, p.602.

34 ibid. 35 See, Rohan Wijeweera, "Speech to the Ceylon Criminal Justice Commission- 2 November 1973," New Left Rn·iew (London), no.84, March-April 1974, p.101.

118

Although Wijeweera often referred to the factory workers. his cnnception of the

oppressed class was perhaps that of the propertyless. In his view, all those who could not sell

their labour were also considered part of the proletariat. In a public speech on 13 September

1970, he said:

the unemployed rural youth, chena farmers, share-croppers, to what class do these people belong? If we categorize a separate class as the working class, it will be necessary for us to recognize class divisions such as students, teachers, d . 36

octors, engtneers etc .

. This conception or the crude reconstruction of the notion of class was perhaps intended to

give the youth and unemployed a role in the revolutionary transformation of society.

It was on this issue of the role of the working class in the Sri Lankan revolution that

the leaders of JYP split from the left parties. The JYP had then argued that in Sri Lanka the

working class comprised the urban proletariat, the plantation proletariat and the

non-plantation peasantry.37 Notwithstanding its claims of supptH1 among the urban working

class, the JVP considered them as degenerate and incapable of a revolutionary role.

Similarly, the plantation proletariat served the interests of the imperialists and therefore could

not be party to a revolutionary movement.

This shows an inconsistency in Wijeweera's conception of the working class which

may have been due to the petty bourgeois class basis of the JVP, and its inability to penetrate

the working class. Perhaps that is why the actual component of the urban working class and

the plantation proletariat was rather low in the JVP. The urban working class component was

less than 9 per cent among the suspected insurgents captured after the 1971 insurrection.

Some scholars have however, argued that although the working class component was low,

36 As quo;ed in G.B. Keerawella, "The Janatha Yimukthi Peramuna and the 1971 Uprising," Social.S"cience Review (Colombo), no. 2, January 1980, p.19.

37 See, Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection," New Left Review, no.69, September-October 1971, p.76.

119

there were a lot of young militant workers from the state industrial corporations and the state

agricultural sector such as the Land Development Department and Colonization schemes, who

had joined the Jvp_38 The only segment of the depressed classes from which the JYP got

support was the peasantry, which was as high as 26.9 per cent of suspected insurgents

analyzed after the 1971 insurrection?9

Events in 1971 substantiate that JVP's relationship with the working class had been

one of mutual antagonism. About 5000 workers and trade union activities directly took part

in resisting the insurgents.40 The Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) Intelligence used the

observation of bus crews during the insurgency to provide information to authorities. 41

Participation from the plantation lahour was as low as 1.9 per cent. It, too, did not

support the JVP in any significant manner. This was partly due to the JVP's stand on the

plantation labour and partly owing to certain events during the insurgency. Many plantations

reported cases ofvandalism by the insurgents. The insurgents looted the personal belongings

of the workers like chicken, goats and foodgrains. 42 They also lost their wages since many

plantations were closed down. Besides, many tea hushes, rubber trees, pepper creepers and

cinnamon groves were destroyed by the insurgents, affecting the workers' livelihood.43 Due

to these activities, the JVP failed to mobilize the plantation workers and win over their

sympathy and support for its cause. It also demonstrated a lack of theoretical comprehension

38 Charles Abeysekera, "JVP's Ideological Roots," Lanka Guardian, vol.2, no.14, 15 >Jovember 1979, p.11. 39 Obeyesekere, n.16, p.373.

4° For details see W.A. Wiswa Wamapala, "The Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka and the 1971 Insurrection," Asian Survey, voi.IS, no.9, September 1975, p.755; and Sadhan Mukherjee, "Ceylon Revolt of the Youth -II," New Age (New Delhi), vol.l9, no.24, 20 June 1971, p.!3.

41 See James.Jupp, Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, (London, 1978), p.322. 42 Sadhan Mukherjee, n.39, p.l3. Some of the insurgents could have been forced into this act as they were running out of provisions, due to the prolonged fighting taking place with the security forces. Also sec, Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (New Jersey, 1974), p.81. 43 ibid.

120

on JVP's part regarding the role of the working class. The JVP insurgents were characterized

as being reactionary by the plantation workers union which helped the government to

suppress the insurgency.

JVP AND THE TRADE UNIONS

In the pre-1971 period, the JVP had rejected working class struggles as a distraction

from the main task of nation-wide armed insurrection. Its contempt for the reformist trade

unions made them ignore the unions' tactics of mobilization for strikes or hartals. This

alienated the organized working class and they did not participate in the armed struggle.

Since the early membership of JVP mainly comprised the unemployed, underemployed and

students, it made their presence very weak in the organized trade union movement. 44

Besides, the mainstream Marxist parties were in complete control of the trade unions.

The JVP's trade union section was set up much later, as a kind of an afterthought. 45

It was only after the proscription on the JVP was removed in 1977 that they seriously

thought of mobilizing trade unions for their struggle. At a press conference after Wijeweera 's

release from prison, he expressed willingness to enter into 'United Actions' to defend the

democratic rights, and JVP's readiness to cooperate with any political group working for

hui !ding socialism.

During this period, the JVP warned that the United National Party (UNP) was trying

to usurp all power by enacting some repressive laws against the working class. Therefore,

its immediate task was to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the democratic rights

of the masses. The JVP realized that it may not be able to do this alone because bourgeois

and petty-)Jourgeois parties controlled a large segment of the working class in their trade

4~ Jupp, n.40, p.309.

45 See, A. Jayawecra, n.30, p.l5.

121 ~711--5 7go

unions. Therefore, the JYP agreed to initiate a campaign of united action along with five

other left parties.46 The formation of an 'action bloc', the Joint Trade Union Action

Committee (JTUAC), was announced in 1979, but before long, it tried to break this bloc.

Having subsequently left the 'action bloc' in 1lJ80, the JVP decided to confront the JTUAC

directly. It was argued that the JVP found the 'action bloc' members were anti-proletariat and

anti-JVP, whose motives did not suggest that they were interested in securing the rights of

the proletariat.47 They tried to convince the workers that they were being misguided by

their trade union leaders.

In July 1980, a call for an island-wide general strike was given by the JTUAC. This

strike was against the economic policies and labour laws. The post-1977 economy had caused

immense hardship to the people due to escalating costs of living. The economic policy also

demanded a docile labour force to attract foreign investment. The workers were adversely

affected hy the new labour laws meant to curtail their trade union rights. The JVP not only

kept away from the strike hut also denounced it. It argued that the strike was organized to

bring the SLFP back to power and obstruct the growth of the JVP. 48 It insisted that the old

left parties were treacherous and class collaborationists, and therefore, no united front could

be forged with them. Thereafter, the JVP waged a war on the trade unions affiliated with the

left parties,49 even while they were being repressed by the UNP-affiliated trade union,

Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (National Workers Organization).50

46 These details were provided by Lionel Bopage, the then acting General Secretary of the JVP, in an interview. Refer

to "JVP ---The Current Situation," Lanka Guardian, vol.3, no.18, 1 February 1981, p.11. Bopage who was a graduate in engineering served six years in imprisonment after the insurrection. Later, he was purged in 1983. 47 ibid. 48 See, S.C.Pemando, "Wijeweera and Trade Unions," Lanka Guardian, vo1.4, no.2., 15 May 1981, p.20. 49 "JVP: A Tum to the Class," Lanka Guardian, vol.3, no.12, 15 May 1980, p.4.

5° For an analysis of the way, the Jatlrika Sevaka Sangamaya was used by the UNP against their opponents, sec, Gananath Obeyeskere, "Origins and Institutionalization of Political Violence," in James Manor (ed.), Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis (London, 1984), pp. 160-166 and 111e Strike and Its Aftermath, A Report by S. Nadesan written

122

Wijeweera. in fact. advocated a theory that the workers in Sri Lanka should not

engage in strikes till the entire working class was organized under the leadership of his

partyY According to the JVP, the two major tasks before them were to relieve the working

class of the petty-bourgeois,· opportunist leadership and then, to make it rally round a truly

revolutionary party of its own.52 The JVP would continue to struggle until the proletariat

was emancipated completely. The above proposal went against one of the fundamental rights

of the working class, to organize unions in a democratic mannerY This was a tactical

blunder on the part of the JVP leadership, which resulted in their total isolation from the

working class. 54

Workers Front

During the 1%0 strike, the JVP trade unions were still in a formative stage. Since

1980, the JVP had tried to infiltrate some of the left trade Unions but had failed. Due to its

stand on the strike, one of the significant trade unions the JVP controlled, the Lanka Guru

Sangamaya (Ceylon Teachers Union), also left and joined the strike. 55 The other trade

unions under its control, included the Samastha Lanka Sevaka Sangamaya (All Ceylon

Workers Union), with 446 members from the state corporation sector.56 By 1986, they had

one in the Health sector called the Samastha Lanka Suwa Sevaka Sangamaya (All Ceylon

Health Workers Union), which had 1942 workers.57

for and adopted by the Working Committee of Civil Rights Movement of Sri L1nka, November 19R1. 51 See, J. Uyangoda, "Coming Few Years Crucial For JVP," Lanka Guardian, vol.4, no.13, 15 November 1981, p.21. 52 "JVP ---The Current Situation," (Interview with Lionel Bopage), Lanka Guardian, vol.3, no.18, 1 February 19R 1 p.lO. 53 See, Chin taka, "Is the JVP a Proletarian Vanguard Party," Lanka Guardian, voi.S, no.ll, 1 October 1982, p.17. 54 Uyangoda1 n.51, p.21. 55 See, C.A. Chandraprema, Putsclzism, Ethnic Chauvinism and Social Revolution (Colombo, 1989), p.9. 56 ;

Gunaratna, n.5, p.51. 57 ibid., p.52

123

In 1986, it tried to take-over the leadership of a 21 trade unions combine, the ma1n

demands of which were a fifty per cent salary increase of all employees and a minimum

salary of Rs.l,OOO/- per month. Due to resistance from the other left parties and its failure

to make any headway, the JVP broke away from this combine.58 However, they were

successful in infiltrating some of the smaller trade unions.

They were also able to establish a separate trade union combine called the Janatha

Satan Peramuna in 1986, with the help of V. Muruttatuwe Ananda, the President of the

Rajaye Sewa Eksath Heda Sangamaya. 5q By next year, it controlled seventeen trade unions

which operated under an umbrella union named the All Ceylon Trade Unions Federation.

This union was banned on 18 May 1987.60 The proscription was a disastrous move, because

it pushed a large number of workers into underground activity. Notwithstanding the han, the

JVP was able to halt economic activity and essential services in almost all sectors in 1988.

This was spearheaded by an organization called the Deshapremi Kamakasu Satan

Madyasthanaya. In 1989, during the repeated calls for strikes and boycott of Indian goods,

the JVP was able to mobilize organized labour on a Rs. 2,500 minimum wage demand,

despite its tenuous hold over the trade unions.61 This was possible partly due to the

weakness of the established trade union leadership and partly through coercion and

58 ibid., p.53.

sq ibid., p.54.

60 The trade unions batmed were the following: The All Ceylon Corporation Employees Union (1925 members), All Ceylon Progressive Workers Union (384 members), All Ceylon Health Employees Union (1129 members), All Ceylon Technical Offioers Union (430 members), Ceylon Postal Employees Union (516 members), All Ceylon Co-operative and Mercantile Employees Union (18 members), Sisil Bima Podu Sevaka Sangamaya, All Ceylon Estate Workers Union {259 members), Government Servioes Joint Clerical Union (124 members), All Ceylon Fisheries Employees Union {279 members), All Ceylon Electricity Employees Union, All Ceylon Higher Education Employees Union (381 members), Ceylon Local Government Union (20 members), Ceylon Transport Employees Union (199 members), Ceylon Telecommunication Employees Union (29 members), All Harbour Employees Union (526 men1bers), Janatha Estates Staff Union (100 members). ibid., p.55. 61 See, Mervyn de Silva, "The Phoney Peaoe is Over--- Protracted War Begins," Lanka Guardian, vol.12, no.5, 1 July 1989, p.3.

124

h' terror. -

JVP AND THE SANGHA

The Sangha's traditional social base for recruitment purposes had been gradually

undergoing a transformation. There was an increase in the recruitment from the marginalised

social classes, particularly the poor peasantry. Recruitment from the upper classes and

aristocracy was on the decline, even in the Siyam Nikaya, the highest order of the Sanxlw.

At present too, the Sangha in Sri Lanka offers the best means of upward mobility for the

rural youth inclined to join it. The Sangha not only takes care of economic needs hut also

accords recognition in a predominantly Buddhist society.63

This showed that the younger generation of the same social class provided for

recruitment, hoth to the Sangha and the JVP. For the poor rural youth, membership of Sangha

provided easier access to education and universities. But liberal university education had

helped young monks develop a rational and critical outlook, not only towards the

establishment hut also to the moral precepts imposed hy the Sangha.64

It was this moral dilemma and contlict within the younger generation of educated

monks that the JVP used to huild a network. It is also likely that the egalitarian Sinhala

Buddhist ideology of the JYP appealed to them. There is evidence regarding the involvement

of young monks in the 1971 insurgency. Although it was not very apparent, but they had

gone to great lengths to provide all kinds of incidental help. They were instrumental in

providing shelter in abandoned temples to JVP members on the run. These hideouts were also

used for storing weapons. These Bhikhhus had also assisted in raising funds for the

62 Mervyrt de Silva, "Prcmadasa M<Jkcs a Desper<Jte Move," Times oflndia (New Delhi), 13 September 191)9.

63 S. Leelananda, "JVP Learning From Vietnam," Lanka Guardian, vol.l3, no.19, 1 February 1990, p.1S.

64 ibid.

125

organization.65

It is possible that members of the JVP, posing as priests, went to various temples to

propagate their ideology. 66 In Kotmale, for instance, insurgent activity centered around the

Buddhist temple, where they coordinated the plan to attack the police station.67 The decision

to attack the government forces was also taken in a Bhikkhu hostel of a university. The

official figures provided by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs on the number of Bhikkhus

arrested in 1976, were fifty six. Unofficial figures could he much higher because many

h f .d . . 68 among t em gave alse 1 ent1t1es.

The involvement of young monks in the 1971 insurgency was not at any

organizational level, but due to individual initiatives, which resulted from the network

developed with JVP cadres in the universities or during the university days. The Siyam

Nikaya expressed concern about the waste of life and condemned the movement.6'~ The

Sangha did not want to get associated with the JVP uprising because it was also an attack

on the established order to which it was linked?) It was only in the post-Accord period that

there were some signs of overt involvement of the Sangha with the JVP on common issues

(may not be with common goals). This began with the founding of the Mauhima Surakeeme

Viyaparaya (MSV - The Movement for Safeguarding the Motherland) in July 1986. It was

an umbrella organization of monks, non-Marxist opposition parties like the SLFP, Mahajana

Eksath Peramuna (MEP) and JVP through its front organizations, and important Lay Buddhist

65 A.C. Alles, n.1, p. 97; and Swaroop Rani Dubey, One-Day Revolution in Sri Lanka: Anatomy of 1971 Insurrection (Jaipur, 1988), p.19. 66 Shakuntala Jean Jeyasingham, "Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna," South Asian Studies (Jaipur), vol.9, no.l & 2, January-July 1974, p.8. 67 M.S. Robi.nson, Political Stmcture in a Changing Sinlwla Village (Cambridge, 1975), p.280. 68 See, Janice Jiggins, n.27, p.145. 69 ibid., p.146. 70 When the Civil Rights Movement was formed in Sri Lml:a in late 1971, it was not supported by most well-known monks except for two. Interview of Reggie Siriwardene, 17 January 1994, Colombo.

126

associations. The fact that many of the Sangha and L1y Buddhist associations were willing

to wme on the same platform with the JVP indicated that they were sympathetic to JVP's

stringent opposition to Jayewardene's regime.71

The MSV was formed as a result of the discussions on devolution which took place

m the All Party Conference and was primarily to be a coalition of forces representing

Buddhist interests. JVP's front organizations which became a member of MSV included, Sri

Lanka Deshapremi Peramuna, Deshapremi Taruna Bhikshu Samidanaya and Manava

Hitabadi Bhikkhu Sanvidanaya. The MSV was endorsed by Mahanayakes (Sangha Chiefs),

like Palipane Chandananda Mahanayake ofAsgiriya chapter. Its leading ideologues were also

monks like Maduluwawe Sobhita.

The political role of the Sangha had been institutionalized in Sri Lanka after 1956.

Historically, the mainstream political parties always pandered to the wishes and aspirations

of the Sangha. Intluence in the Sangha was viewed as reaching out to a wider constituency

and thus, all Sinhala-based political parties had established support organizations within the

Sangha. This has resulted in political patronage and subsequently, various material benetits

to the Sangha.

In the post-1977 period, introduction of a free market economy had led to

marginalization of the monks in society. The Sangha as a custodian of traditional culture and

dependent on state patronage was being challenged by the materialist and acquisitive culture

of the west. Thus, in order to reassert their ascendent position in society, the monks sought

to play a dominant role in politics.72

The intensification of the ethnic conflict after 1983 provided an opportunity to the

71 Sarath Amunugama, "Buddhaputra and Bhumiputra?" Lanka Guardian, vol.14, no.19, 1 February 199::?., p.8.

· 72 Sarath Amunugama, "Buddhaputra and Bhumiputra (Part 2)," Lanka Guardian, vol.l4, no.::?.O, 15 February 199::?.,

p.::?.3.

127

monks to openly engage in political activity. The signing of the Accord led to protests in

most parts of the Sinhala-dominated country. These demonstrations were organized mainly

by the MSV. Thousands of Buddhist monks were seen rioting, looting and burning Tamil

houses. Among those arrested during that period was Reverend Maduluw.awe Sobitha.73 The

JVP recognized the potential of the monks agitational politics and thus enhanced their social

role in the post-Accord period.74 The Sangha, as a whole, did not support the JVP's tactics

but it definitely had many sympathizers and supporters among the younger monks. The

clergy~s response retlected some amount of ambivalence towards the JYP.

However, the monks faced a moral dilemma with regard to the JVP's increasing use

of violence. However, the JVP could justify the violence unleashed as only heing in reaction

to state violence and an end to the monopoly that the state had on the use of violence. 75 The

growing use of violence and terror led to fissures within the MSY. The major political

organizations, SLFP and MEP, including Reverend Palipane Chandananda distanced

themselves from the MSV.

Withdrawal of senior monks from the MSV left the younger monks in a dilemma.

Since they were not in a position to repudiate the violence or disassociate from the JVP, they

criticized the senior monks who did not support the JVP and pressurized them not to support

the UNP or SLFP. While chief monks were being pressurized, a public campaign was

launched to criticize them for inaction. They condemned their chief monks for supporting the

UNP in exchange for worldly benefits.76 They kept quiet when the JVP, in the process of

eliminating some sympathizers of the UNP and the Left parties who had supported the Indo-

73 Sumit Ch;Jkravarty,"Reporting Sri Lanka ---Prospects after Accord," Mainstream, Annual Number, 10 October 1987, p.l23. 74 Sarath Amunugama, "Buddhaputra and Bhumiputra (Part3)," Lanka Guardian, vol.14, no.21, 1 March 1992, p.17. 75 "Wijeweera Replies Readers,"' Sunday Times (Colombo), 13 November 1988. 76 For details of a critique of Sangha leadership, see, Sarath Amunugama, n.73, p.21-22.

128

Sri Lankan accord, assassinated some senior monks as well. 77 Some senior monks who were

assassinated included, Pohaddaramulle Pemaloka, Thambugala Sumanasiri, Vellatota

Pannadassi and Kotikawatte Sadhatissa.

When the security forces and the vigilante groups launched an offensive against the

JVP, younger monks were the most vulnerable as they had been identified for having

spearheaded public agitations. The JVP monks responded to this crisis in many ways. Some

surrendered or criticized the JVP for misleading them and started supporting the government.

Their statements were given wide publicity in the media. The possibility of some core

supporters giving up their robes and joining the JVP/DJV can not be ruled out?:l By early

1990, there were 45 Buddhist monks --- mostly university students in detention camps?-1

It may be argued, therefore, that the changing patterns of recruitment to the Sanf{ha

had created a new strata of socially committed radical monks, who formed an important

support group for the JVP. Their commitment to social revolution was so strong that they not

only condoned the use of violence hy the JVP, hut also resorted to it themselves.

JVP AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Classical Marxist theory clearly distinguishes between a popular revolution, in which

the broad masses struggle to overthrow the existing state, and coups and conspiracies, in

which an organized minority acts to take control of the state in its own hands. Accordingly,

it is important to differentiate between a revolution in which popular participation and mass

uprising are important constituents, and terrorism, involving sabotage and assassination of

individuals. The violence unleashed by the NP in the name of social revolution, and

77 ibid.

78 There ~re many stories in Sinhala folklore about young monks disappearing in the jungles and joining the JVP/DJV. One such story is related by Amunugama, ibid., pp.::?.::?.-23.

79 Reported in Lanka Guardian, vol.13, no.19, 1 February 1990, p.7.

129

intimidation of non-comhatants and unarmed political rivals, and their families, amounted to

terrorism.80

This section shall discuss the role of violence in JVP's campaign, the means through

which it was carried out and the rationale behind some of the assassinations by them.

JVP and its Armed Division

All revolutionary movements which believe in the violent seizure of power have a

separate armed military division or an armed wing integrated within the political structure

of the organization. The JVP did not have a separate armed division in 1971 and its

operations were carried out by what is known as "A class members" of the JVP. 81 It was

only after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 19R7, that the Deshpremi Janatha

Viyapraya (DJV - Patriotic People's Movement) came to the forefront.

It is not clear whether the JVP and the DJV were separate entities overlapping in

composition or the DJV was the armed wing of the JVP. Apparently there is some kind of

mystery about the DJV's origin, nature and its relationship with the JVP. Reports indicate

that the DJV was founded hy soldiers from a dishanded regiment called Rajaratna Ritles,

which was deployed against the Tamil militants in 1984-85, when the ethnic contlict had

t1ared up.82

While the DJV often claimed responsibility for abductions and killings publicly, JVP

did not do so. Wijeweera, in an interview to a Sri Lankan newspaper The Sunday Times, had

claimed that "the DJV is ~1ot the armed division of the JVP". He said that the JVP had still

not set up an armed division, but would do so when it was appropriate and required.

80 Refer to Eduardo Marino, Political Killings in Southern Sri Lanka: On tire Brink of Civil War (An International

Alert Publication, 1989), p.8.

81 In 1971, the membership of the JVP was divided into two lists. List 'A" consisted of those members who had attended the fifth lecture titled "The Path to Socialism in Sri Lanka", and had shown willingness to fight. The rest of the members were put in list "B". For details, see A.C. Alles, n.l, p.32.

82 Marino, n.79, p.6.

130

However, he did not deny that there were members of JVP who were part of DJV also.'B

Apparently, till the end of 1988, the JVP claimed a separate identity from the DJV, which

was being supported but not directed by the JVP.84 Later, this position changed and the JVP

gave instructions to the DJV to punish its enemies. The probability that the DJV and the JVP

were operating together could be discerned from a statement issued by the Joint

Commanding Headquarters of the Patriotic Armed Troops, signed by the Chief Commanding

Officer, Keerthi Wijebahu, giving eight conditions for a campaign to boycott Indian

goods. 85 Keerthi Wijebahu was believed to be the pseudonym of Upatissa Gamanayake,

the second in command of the JVP.

JVP and its Victims

Walter L1.queur wrote that "one learns more about a 'terrorist group· by looking at

its victims than at its manifestoes".8t> This is true for terrorists, as well as the insurgent

groups. A closer look at the JVP's victims after the Indo-Lanka Accord gtves us some

insight into its social base.

After the signing of the Accord, the JVP came down heavily on political parties like

the UNP, the left parties and the United Socialist Alliance (USA), which supported the

Accord. It carried out killings against the ruling UNP which had signed the Accord, and all

other parties which were perceived as posing a threat to the JVP's social base. The rural

petty-bourgeoisie did not oppose the killings, as they had been convinced that these were

being carried out to di·;rupt the implementation of the Accord. Trade unions affiliated to the

8~ See, "Wijeweera Replies Readers," n.75. A similar view was expressed by Wijeweera in one of his taped speeches as well, "They have declared war; Jayewardene has. That is valid, we know. We reserve the right to reply in an appropriate matmer, at the right time after making our own plans and erecting suitable machinery for this purpose". Wijewecra's Speech. Translations of Transcripts of Wijeweera's Taped Speech, April 1988, (Mimeograph). 8~ .

Marino, n.79, p.6. 85 According to a Pamphlet released by the DJV, dated 28 January 1989. See Appendix B. 86 Quoted in Neil Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism (Massachusetts, 1986), p.41.

131

UNP, like the Jathika Seva Sangamaya (JSS) and the SLTB, were also targeted.x7 It gunned

down some top UNP leaders like Harsha Abeywardhene and Nandlal Fernando.

The most acclaimed victim of the JVP/DJV was the actor-turned-politician, Vijaya

Kumaratunga, the founder leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP). At the time

of his killing in February 1988, he was tipped to be the leader of the newly formed USA and

its Presidential candidate. Kumaratunga, the son-in-law of Srimavo Bandaranaike had earlier

been with the SLFP. In 1984, he broke away from the SLFP, taking a sizeable section of the

left-leaning members of the SLFP with him, to form the SLMP. Kumaratunga was

immensely popular and stood for a just political solution to the ethnic crisis. Under his

leadership, the USA could have become a formidable challenge to the SLFP and the JVP.

The JVP denied its involvement in the assassination of Kumaratunga and said that

they were also interested in tinding out who was behind the killing.88 They argued that

Kumaratunga was killed because of his attempts to serve several imperialist forces at the

same time. While the JVP wanted to create that impression, the reality was that by gradually

winning over the left-leaning youths from all other parties, Kumaratunga was posing a threat

to the JVP. Another probable reason could he that the assassination was carried out with a

view to undermine the understanding being reached between the CP, LSSP, NSSP and the

SLMP. The JVP wanted to destroy the effort of these parties to forge a broad-based national

coalition by establishing links with the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam

87 Apart from the general distrust of the JVP, that most trade unions had, it is possible that the JVP was settling some personal scores against certain trade unions like the Sri Lanka Transport Board which had been instrumental in helping the s.tate to suppress the JVP during the 1971 insurrection. In one particular incident on 9 October 1987, a bomb explosion killed the Union President of the JSS. It was believed to be the handiwork of the JVP. See, Barnett Rubin, Cycles of Violence: Human Rights in Sri Lanka Since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, An Asia Watch Report, December 1987.

88 Translations of Wijeweera Speeches, n.82. There were allegations that JVP had split on Y. Kumaratunga 's killing. The JVP refuted these allegations.

132

(PLOTE) and Eelam Pellple's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF).s4 Later, Ossie

Abeygunesekara, the deputy leader of the SLMP survived two assassination attempts during

the election campaign. During the second assassination attempt, the vice-president of the

SLMP, Deva Bandara Senaratne was killed. 90

Initially, the SLFP members were spared from the JVP's violent campaign and the

former, in return, never condemned the JVP for using violent intimidation for political

purposes. In fact, Mrs. Bandaranaike said in July 1988 that "we do not condone what they

are doing. But in their thinking they are fighting to safeguard the sovereignty and

independence of our country" Y1 The SLFP probably thought that the JVP's violent

campaigns could serve its own political purpose. The physical elimination of the left and

trade union leaders and the intimidation of the grass-roots workers undertaken by the JVP

could probably help the SLFP win the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections

scheduled to be held in December 1988 and February 1989 respectively.

An anti-UNP political alliance, including the SLFP, Ehath Lanka J anatha Party

(EUP - United Lanka People's Party), MEP, Liberal Party and Tamil Congress was in

formation a few weeks before the Presidential elections. This proposed alliance was, however,

never formalized. Owing to major differences in strategy and policy, the JVP, the EUP and

the SLMC left the front in November 1988 and subsequently, the JVP targeted SLFP

members as well. The efforts to form an alliance was only a strategy of the JVP, which

perceived the SLFP as a major competitor with a large mass supp( \ft amongst the

Sinhala-Buddhists. The JVP had advanced steadily from its petty-bourgeois support base to

a much wider middle-class support base, comprising high status professionals and students

SQ Times'of!ndia, 7 April 1989.

90 Thomas Abraham, "Premadasa Prevails," Frontline (Madras), 7-:!0.January 1989, p.25, 27.

Ql Reported in Lanka Guardian, vol.ll, no.6, 15 July 1988, p.4.

133

from prestigious institutions. 92 It was to consolidate this support that the JVP wanted to

undermine the SLFP.

Apart from political activists, the other groups which came under attack were the

security personnel93 and human rights activists. This proved to be a tactical blunder. The

JVP undermined its own social base by killing members of the security forces.'M The

average Sinhala soldier came from the same lower middle-class, Sinhala educated rural

family, as the JVP activist.95 Their life-chances and aspirations were the same. When the

JVP started killing members of the security forces indiscriminately, they indirectly attacked

their own social base and alienated themselves from the society.

- JVP's GEOGRAPHICAL BASE

During the 1987-89 period, the JVP expanded its geographical base as well. In the

1971 insurrection, the JVP had a limited geographical base with its- strongholds in Kandy,

Kegalle, Kurunegale, Moneragale and Elpitiya.w, The JVP controlled these areas, wherein

prolonged fighting took place with the security forces. These were not exactly liberated zones

but for about a month, the JVP put up strong resistance and even ran the administration in

some areas.

In the 1987-1989 period, the strategy of insurrection was different from that in 1971.

The strategy in the later period was to break the will of the state and make it capitulate to

their demands. The JVP was prepared for a protracted struggle for this purpose. Political

92 See, C.A. Chandraprema, n.lO, p.111.

93 For details o.n this issue, see, Chapter VI.

94 See, Daya~ Jayatilleke, "Sinhala and Tamil Left and the Tigers," Lanka Guardian, vo1.12, no.2, 15 May 1989, p.16. / 95 Mervyn De Silva, n.61. 96 Charles S. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," Problems of Communism (Washington), vol.22, no.l, January­February 1973, p.37.

134

violence played an important role as the JVP was prepared to carry its violent campaigns

into the opponents camps. After the signing of Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the JVP

successfully carried out various strikes, work-stoppages, protests and boycotts, especially in

the southern and central districts. In districts like Matara, Hambantota, Moneragale,

Badulla, Kurunegale and in the Uva Province, the JVP seemed to enjoy public support as

well.n

When the Presidential election was announced in 1988, the JVP had called for a

boycott, notwithstanding the fact that simultaneously it was contemplating an electoral

alliance. After the electoral alliance between the JVP and the other eight parties broke down,

the former gave a call for the boycott of the election and asked all political parties to abide

by this. Election meetings were banned in many areas. The SLFP suffered the most as it was

forced to withdraw its election campaign under JVP's threat in three Provinces --- South,

North-Central and Uva. 0s

The election was held against a setting of violence and intimidation of voters by the

JVP in the Southern and North-Central Provinces. The average polling was 55.32 per cent,

the lowest ever in Sri Lankan history. Significantly, the JVP stronghold areas recorded a low

turn-out of voters. However, this does not mean that JVP had considerable support in these

areas. Many people might not have voted simply out of fear. Nevertheless, the JVP's reach

and capacity to carry out its threats indicated that it had tremendous intluence in these

areas. 99 The following table shows the low rate of polling in the areas where the JVP was

97 Arun Weerasuriya, "Backdrop to Presidential Election," Mainstream (New Delhi), vol.27, no.13, 24 December

1988, p.34. 4

QS ibid., p.6.

99 It is believed that in Anuradhapura, Kurunegale and Kandy districts vigilante groups and para-military forces were operating in significant numbers. Thus, according to the government, these districts constituted the maximum threat to the state and the electoral process. See, Robert C. Oberst, "A War Without Winners in Sri Lanka," Current History (Philadelphia), vol.91, no.563, March 1992, p.129.

135

strong.

Table I Voting Pattern in the Presidential Election in Sri Lanka - 1988

Southern Districts North-Central Districts

District Percentage Voting District Percentage Voting

Moneragale 17.01 Polonnaruwa 29.73

Matara 23.84 Mat ale 30.28

Hambantota 29.43 Anuradhapura 40.36

Galle 49.78 Badulla 41.80

Kurunegale 50.05

Source: 9th Parliament of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Lake House, n.d.), pp.45-46. Also see, Report of the Non-governmental Observer Group from SAARC Countries, Presidential Election of Sri Lanka, December 1988, (Colombo, 1989), p.82.

In all these districts the voting percentage was much lower than the national average of 55.32

per cent.

EXPANDING SOCIAL BASE

Many changes were noticed in the composition of the JVP during 1987-89. It had

been able to considerably expand its support among "school children, university students,

unemployed youth, Buddhist monks, the nationalist intelligentsia and intermediate layers of

rural Sinhala society", through its anti-Indian stand. 100 It was still a Sinhala-nationalist

party, the core made up basically of youth and students, including school children. Reports

In the later part of 1991 indicated that the JVP, in order to reactivate itself, had started a

100 "Communication from Sri Lanka: A Note on the Present Situation, October 1988," South Asia Bulletin

(California), vol.8, no.l & 2, Spring/Fall 1988, p.92.

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In the later part of 1991 indicated that the JVP, in order to reactivate itself, had started a

recruitment drive. 101 Freshers were indoctrinated through the famous 'five lectures· .102

JYP literature was freely distributed and cassettes containing Wijeweera·s speeches were

. I I d . . t 103 open y p aye at umvers1ty can eens.

The JVP campaign was mostly conducted in the university campuses by some of the

leaders who had evaded arrest in the 1989 government counter-insurgency operations. It is

believed that most of the organizers and activists were hardcore JVP members, who

comprised final year students as well as university staff. Most of these campaigns were

carried through the IUSF and the Deshapremi Sishya Viyapraya (DSV - Patriotic Students

Movement). 104 There were also intelligence reports of destabilization of university work,

behind which were a group of third-liners of the JVP. There is no doubt that the JVP still

retains the ability to mobilize university and school students. 105

In its leadership, the JVP has shed its 'Karava bias', 106 because with the exception

of Wijeweera, the entire leadership from 1971 had left its ranks by 19H7. As in 1971, the

JVP later could not make inroads into the working class. It had a few insignificant unions

under its control and had intiltrated a few more. It does not rely on the active support of

the working class but ensures support through threats and terror tactics. 107

Its social base is no longer limited to any social class. It is alleged that the

anti-Indian campaign and boycott of Indian goods, after the signing of the Accord, could

101 "JVP Trying to Raise its Head Again," Sunday Observer (Colombo), 27 October 1991. 102 These have been discussed in detail in Chapter V.

103 Prabath Sahabandu, "When Students Ran Amok," Tire Island (Colombo), 6 July 1991.

IM ibid.

105 Report of tire Non-Gol'ernmental Obsen·er Group from SMRC Countries, Presidential Election of Sri Lanka, Decembe~ 1988 (Colombo, 1989), p.fiO.

106 See, C. A. Chandraprema, n.l 0, p. 129.

107 Seema Guha, "Lanka's JVP Widens its Mass Base," Times of India, 10 March 1989.

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have been done in the interests of the Sinhala entrepreneur-ci<L<>s.tos This class, which has

business links with countries other than India, always resented the role played by the

businessmen of Indian origin in the Sri Lankan economy.HN After Wijeweera's capture

and interrogation in November 1989, a lot of information about JVP activities and those

assisting or backing it had come to light and a list of persons involved was given to the

President. The list containing eighty names of influential persons, including politicians and

big businessmen, was placed before the Defence Ministry.tto Since the elimination of

Wijeweera and some other top leaders in the operations of 1989-1990, the JVP has been

finding it difficult to reorganize itself. Some of its surviving leaders who escaped the counter-

insurgency operations, have taken asylum in London and Paris and at present, there is a

leadership struggle going on there. ttl

CONCLUSION

The JVP had a fairly elaborate organizational structure and several front organizations.

However, the organization itself was not democratic and revolved around its leader, Rohana

Wijeweera. The front organizations did manage to penetrate some sections of Sri Lankan

society. But there were inherent limitations in this effort because of the narrow social base

of the JVP. Thus after 1983, this was mostly done by penetration and intimidation.

During its initial stages, the social base of the JVP was limited to the youth,

unemployed and the petty-bourgeoisie. But later, it got support from a fairly large section of

Sri Lankan society and tried to build a broad coalition of forces. This, however, did not

108 See S.D .... M'uni, "JVP and the IPKF," Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 24 August 1989.

109 Gamini Navaratne, "Quit Lanka, JVP Tells Indian Traders," Times of India, 12 June 1989. i

110 See, Suranimala, "The Last Days of Wijeweera," Sunday Times, 19 November 1989 and Lanka Guardian, vol.13, no.18, 15 January 1990, p.l.

111 See, Appendix J.

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retlect support for JYP, hut rather was a reaction against the UNP regime and the Indo-Sri

Lanka Accord. The excessive use of violence by the JVP resulted in the loss of this support

as well. Finally, owing to the centralized organizational structure of the JVP, the elimination

of its top leadership led to the collapse of the movement itself.

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