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By Christie Husted PhD, Capella University Renee Gendron MA, Presented at the 2010 ASAC Conference May 21-25, 2010 Regina, SK © SBM Consulting Services LLC

Organi-Deviance Part I

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Page 1: Organi-Deviance Part I

By Christie Husted PhD, Capella University

Renee Gendron MA, Presented at the 2010 ASAC Conference

May 21-25, 2010 Regina, SK© SBM Consulting Services LLC

Page 2: Organi-Deviance Part I

Organizational culture has been defined as “written and unwritten expectations of behavior (rules and norms) that influence members of the organization”(Ross, 1995, p. 346).

How likely is an organisation to place restraints and punishment on deviant behaviour, determines levels of deviant behaviour (Tittle, 1995)

Page 3: Organi-Deviance Part I

Levels of control are “reflected by the control experienced across any number of situational and global domains” Piquero and Piquero (2006)

Relationship between CEO and board i) little contact between CEO and board ii) controlling – CEO sets direction board just

“rubber stamps” iii) collaborative relationship, iv) focus on

each party's strengths (Cady & Soukup, 2008)

Page 4: Organi-Deviance Part I

2008 Ph.D Dissertation by Husted: Systematic Differentiation Between Dark and Light Leaders: Is a Corporate Criminal Profile Possible

Dark Leadership, defined through Edwin Sutherland (1949) coining of the term “white-collar crime”, defining it as a criminal act of respectable individuals in the course of their occupations Led to questions about leadershipConcerns about group interactions

Page 5: Organi-Deviance Part I

Figure 1: Dark Leadership Framework

1. Egoism

14. Justification Neutralization

2. Motivation

6. Stockholder Theory

DARK LEADERSHIP

13. Deterrence Theory

3. Opportunity

4. Strain Theory

15. Cognitive Dissonance

5. Conflict Theory

8. Culture of Competition

9. Capitalism

7. Stakeholder Theory

11. Symbolic Constructs

10. Interactionist Theory

12. Pleasure/Pain

Principle

Page 6: Organi-Deviance Part I

Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman of theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC)from 1993 - 2001, stated there was A “Culture of Gamesmanship” where it was

considered okay to bend to the pressures of analysts.

A culture which believed it was okay to tweak the numbers and bend the rules and to allow discrepancies to slide” (Smith et al., 2006).

Page 7: Organi-Deviance Part I

Group think occurs in a situation in which agroup is extremely cohesive and there is a strongdesire to reach consensus among members. Signs of group think:

i) illusion of Invulnerability ii) collective rationalisation iii) illusion of morality iv) excessive stereotyping v) pressure to conform vi) self-censorship vii) illusion of unanimity viii) mindguards: people protect group from outside information

Page 8: Organi-Deviance Part I
Page 9: Organi-Deviance Part I

Organisational culture starts at the top Rey (2002). Without that creative dynamic, of being

able to openly constructively criticize, an environment of fear, antipathy and stagnation sets in.

Page 10: Organi-Deviance Part I

Truab & Little (1975) defined deviance as “ behavior which violates institutionalized expectations, that is, expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate within a social system”

Alison et al. (2002) identified the need to approach behavior using a holistic approach; focusing on the interaction of the Person x Situation

Page 11: Organi-Deviance Part I

Argument to include internal organisational people-processes and people-dynamics in the definition of “Corporate Social Responsibility”

CSR must also include how an institution monitors and manages the human interactions occurring in it

Focus on people-dynamics not just for corporations, but also NGOs, government institutions, private firms

Page 12: Organi-Deviance Part I

Internal human-processes of any organisation, including corporation that may lead to deviance

Human-processes include but not limited to:

Supervision: Too much, too little Validation: Yes Men, Group Think,

Gang/Cult Mentality, Justification

Page 13: Organi-Deviance Part I

A cult was defined by Robbins andAnthony as a group having manipulative,authoritative leadership and coercivepower. Likely to have: Authoritarian leaders Totalitarianist in their organization Have a specific form of indoctrination

(Richardson, 1993, p. 351)

Page 14: Organi-Deviance Part I

Pavlos' Points on a cult Business Cult – like Behaviour

A cult has a living leader in which the direction of the cult is set by the revelations of the leader

A living leader; whose charisma is used to manipulate followers into working towards the leader’s personal vision, not the company vision

A cult's religious leader has absolute authority over the group

A person who micromanages, who squashes any sort of independent thought, who refuses to hear the input of staff or colleagues and uses transactional relationships and coercive power to gain compliance of followers

Page 15: Organi-Deviance Part I

Pavlos' Points on a cult Business Cult – like Behaviour

A cult promises converts salvation through hard work and loyalty

In business terms, this can be translated into greater profits, subsequently equating with higher pay as long as the individual is willing to conform and transact the behaviors prescribed by the group and its leader

Cults require the members do demeaning work for the cause

Those who consistently question the leader’s vision or strategy are relegated to work which is far below their capabilities, and are subject to coercive power and reprisal for not transacting the wishes of the group and its leader

Page 16: Organi-Deviance Part I

Pavlos' Points on a cult Business Cult – like Behaviour

Cults promise everlasting salvation for their faithful followers

As long as members continue to do what the leader tells them to do, they will maintain high financial rewards

Converts must remove themselves from the greater society

Increasingly the business becomes more opaque, even to auditors and regulators

Cults strongly discourage critical thinking

The company’s leader surrounds him/herself with yes people and encourages group think.

Page 17: Organi-Deviance Part I

Pavlos' Points on a cult Business Cult – like Behaviour

Cults create strong feelings of dependency between cult members

Workers directly involved in the fraud or criminal act become increasingly hostile to outsiders.

Cults indoctrinate members through extreme personality, attitude, belief and behavioral change techniques

Workers become increasingly consumed by their employment, their personal lives are out of balance with their work lives.

Cults practice rituals which are psychologically unwholesome to members

Work related performance is increasingly judged by hard metrics instead of a combination of hard and soft metrics.

Page 18: Organi-Deviance Part I

Too much supervision: Enron executives led Wall Street analysts through the trading floor (previously empty rooms). It looked like people were working – they were pretending.

Too much supervision can led to micro-managing, bullying, loss of critical thinking in staff; over-dependence on a few people

Page 19: Organi-Deviance Part I

Superficial charm Grandiosity

Manipulation Deceit

Lack of remorse Shallow affect

Failure to accept responsibility Failure to conform to social norms

Impulsivity Irritability and/or aggressiveness

Disregard for safety for self or others Lack of self-awareness

Lack of self-monitoring Inability to manage emotions

Self motivation Inability to relate well to others

Page 20: Organi-Deviance Part I

Dr. Christie Husted chusted[@]sbmconsultingservices.com

Renée Gendron, MA, Ph.d candidate reneegendron[@]hotmail.com orrgendron[@]ciian.org

Folders with full article and presentation available

Page 21: Organi-Deviance Part I
Page 22: Organi-Deviance Part I

Alison, L., Bennell, C., Mokros, A., & Omerod, D. (2002). The personality paradox on offender profiling: A theoretical review of the processes involved in deriving background characteristics from crime scene actions. Psychology: Public Policy and Law, 8(1), 115-135.

Cady, Joseph, H.; Soukup, William, R., (2008), “The Ugly Truth about Board Relations: SOX Isn't the

Biggest Problem, It's the Interpersonal Relationships. Here is a Way to Move Your Board from

Dysfunctional to Optimal”, in ABA Banking Journal, Vol. 100, Issue 2, Simmons-Boardman, (Gale Cengage Learning), pages 47-48

Coleman, J. (1987). Toward an integrated theory of white-collar crime. American Journal of Sociology, 93(2), 406-439

Corporate (2009), In The FreeOnline Dictionary by Farflex. Retreived May 15, 2009, from The Free

Page 23: Organi-Deviance Part I

Cressey, D. (1953, 1971). Other's people money: A study in the social psychology of embezzlement. Belmont, MA: Wadsworth

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 Husted, C., (2008), Systematic Differentiation Between Dark and Light Leaders: Is a Corporate Criminal Profile Possible, Capella University

Moore, J. (1992). Corporate culpability under the federal sentencing guidelines. Arizona Law

Review, 34. Online Dictionary: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/corporate

Page 24: Organi-Deviance Part I

Piquero, N., & Piquero, A. (2006). Control balance and exploitative corporate crime. Criminology, 44(2), 397-430.

Piquero, N., Exum, L., & Simpson, S. (2005). Integrating the desires for control and rotational choice in the corporate crime context. Justice Quarterly, 22, 252-280.

Rey, J., (2002), “Lessons Learned from Enron. Say “No” to “Yes-Men”, in About.Com: Management, September 19, 2002, Retrieved January 20, 2010 from http://management.about.com/cs/generalmanagement/a/Enron091902.htm

Richardson, James, T., (1993), Definitions of Cult: From the Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 34(4): 351

Ross, D.; Benson, J., (1995), “Cultural Change in Ethical Redemption: A Corporate Case Study”, in The Journal of Business Communication, Vol. 32, Issue 4, Association for Business

Page 25: Organi-Deviance Part I

Smith, H. & Schaffer, M. (Writer), & Schaffer, M. (Director). (2006). Bigger Than Enron [Video recording]. Schaffer, M. (Producer), Frontline. Boston, MA: PBS.

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