OP20 - Unveiling Social Safety Nets

Occasional Paper n° 20

Unveiling Social Safety Nets

Ugo Gentilini and StevenWere Omamo

November 2009

The paper is the result of our multiannualengagement in the area of socialprotection and safety nets, at both theglobal and national level. As part of thisprocess, we benefited enormously frominteractions with a wide range of actors,including government officials,community leaders, technical advisers,academics, entrepreneurs, civil society,and journalists. Earlier drafts of thispaper greatly benefited from commentsby WFP colleagues, particularly ManuelAranda da Silva, David Stevenson,Nicholas Crawford, Henk-Jan Brinkman,Martin Bloem, Dom Scalpelli, ParvathyRamaswami, Getachew Diriba, VolliCarucci, Harry Johnstone, Annmarie Islerand Mary Njoroge. Special thanks go toSusanna Sandstrom. We are also gratefulto Chris Barrett, Armando Barrientos,Carlo Del Ninno, Colin Andrews, BenDavis, John Hoddinott, and Patrick Webbfor very useful discussion and feedback.

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Ugo Gentilini and Steven Were Omamoare with the Policy, Strategy and PlanningDivision (OEDP), as Policy Adviser andDeputy Director respectively. They can becontacted at [email protected] [email protected].

Acknowledgementsby the authors

The views expressed in this paper are the author’sand should not be attributed to WFP.

Ugo Gentilini and StevenWere Omamo

November 2009

Occasional Paper n° 20

Unveiling Social Safety Nets

Interest in safety nets and socialprotection is growing exponentially. Waysof strengthening them are called for inhigh-level statements, researched inacademic articles, and implemented bypractitioners. Such developments areencouraging and may help to shed lighton some long-standing humanitarian anddevelopment challenges. The conceptremains controversial, however, andseveral issues must be clarified. Thispaper delineates core areas of tension,and lays out key issues underpinningthem at the analytical, policy,institutional and implementation level. Itconveys the following five messages:

1. Social protection is a broader conceptthan safety nets. Although there is nouniversally agreed definition of socialprotection, there is growingconsensus that it includes safety nets,mostly in the form of cash or foodtransfers; social services, such ashealth clinics; and insurance options.Safety nets are therefore only one ofthe many components of a socialprotection system.

2. All countries have some form ofsocial protection, but models differgreatly. Social protection is largelyabout public action, and all countriesdeploy some form of public measuresagainst hunger. However, countries’different capacities and objectiveslead to diverse models of socialprotection. These include contextswhere social protection systems arelimited, such as in Bangladesh;

emerging, as in Brazil; andconsolidated, as in Sweden. Suchdiversity must be recognized, andinterventions tailored to meetcontext-specific challenges.

3. Social protection policy cannot beformulated in isolation. Long-standing debates should be includedmore explicitly in the formulation ofsocial protection policies. Theseinclude the debates on public versusmarket interventions to addresshunger, the effectiveness of foreignaid, and the growth effects of socialprotection.

4. Social protection raises importantinstitutional, financial andadministrative challenges.Mostdeveloping countries face criticalinstitutional and financial challengesthat can only be met gradually andprogressively. However, some actorsadvocate for an immediateinstitutionalization of socialprotection. Inadequate attention isoften paid to competing priorities andtrade-offs, bringing the risk ofmisinforming or misguiding decision-makers.

5. Specific implementation issuesinspire lively debate. Socialprotection programming typicallyevokes debate over traditionalprogramming areas, including theappropriateness and design ofconditionalities – whether or not tolink transfers to certain activities; the

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Executive Summary

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World Food ProgrammeOccasional Paper n°20/Unveiling Social Safety Nets

type of transfers – cash, food orvouchers; or targeting mechanisms. Itis not unusual to find dogmaticpositions in these areas.

The paper’s conclusions can besummarized in the following threeinterlinked remarks:

i) Approaches need to be fullycompatible with prevailing cultural,social and economic factors.Countries have followed differentpathways to introduce and expandsocial protection systems. Context-specific factors should be fullyrecognized, and approaches tailoredaccordingly. There is scope forlearning from each other, but it is notappropriate to simply replicatemodels developed in other contexts.

ii) In developing countries, the debatetends to overemphasize conceptualissues and underplay administrativeand implementation constraints.Decision-makers face difficult trade-offs, some of which can be minimizedwhile others are more difficult toreconcile. Introducing and expandingsocial protection systems do not allowfor shortcuts or easy choices. Ignoringpossible trade-offs makes debatesnaïve at best, and misguided at worst.

iii) Rhetoric has often prevailed overevidence. There is a need to informdecision-makers more fully, and notmerely to convince them. This is truefor both the advocates and the critics

of social protection. A more balancedand pragmatic approach is required –based on technical partnerships, freefrom pre-packaged agendas, andgenuinely owned and demanded bynational governments and actors.

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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Message 1: Social protection is a broader concept than safety nets . . . . . . . . . . .6

Message 2: All countries have some form of social protection,but models differ greatly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Message 3: Social protection policy cannot be formulatedin isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Message 4: Social protection raises important institutional, financialand administrative challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Message 5: Specific implementation issues inspire lively debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Figure 1. Components of Social Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6Figure 2. Forms of Social Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Figure 3. An Illustrative Typology of Social Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Table of contents

Twenty years after the publication ofHunger and Public Action by Drèze andSen (1989), the need for effective publicmeasures to address hunger remainscompelling, especially in developingcountries. Indeed, whether in response tosudden crises or to overcome chronicpoverty, recommendations to implementsocial protection and safety net systemsare becoming increasingly frequent. Forexample, this year leaders called for“…social protection mechanisms such assafety nets and social policies for the mostvulnerable” (G8 Summit, 2009, p. 2),pledged significant funding “…for socialprotection for the poorest countries” (G20Summit, 2009, p. 8), and committedthemselves to “…support improved socialprotection programmes in places at riskof malnutrition or food shortages” (DFID,2009, p. 35).

Despite mounting interest, the concept ofsafety nets remains elusive and difficult tograsp. Part of this difficulty stems fromthe blossoming of terminology andapproaches, which has made thedefinition of safety nets particularlychallenging. As safety nets are part ofmost national public policy discussions,debates feed into broader issues of publicversus market-based interventions.Especially pressing are the debatesbetween spurring productivity growthand promoting equity, and betweenincreasing the pie and slicing the pie.

Such debates also intersect with anothercomplex area: whether the resources forpublic action are raised domestically orexternally. As public action in developingcountries is largely funded by donors,

fears about dependency on safety nets areintertwined with concerns aboutdependency on international assistance.Despite the deep implications of theseareas, much of the debate on safety netstends to revolve around specificimplementation modalities, for example,whether transfers should be cash- orfood-based, or programmes conditionalor not.

In other words, a number of areas requirefurther attention. The objective of thispaper is to identify those areas, unbundletheir contents, and offer ways of dealingwith them. It conveys five key messages,spanning core analytical and practicalissues.

The document is organized as follows: thenext section presents the first message,reviews the definitions and approachesunderpinning social protection and safetynets, and identifies emerging commonpatterns; the following section on thesecond message lays out context-specificmodels, and the third and fourth set outkey policy and institutional debates,respectively; the section on the fifthmessage discusses key implementationissues, and anticipates the concludingremarks. Taken together, the messagesmay help policy-makers and practitionersto navigate through contentious debates,weighing possible trade-offs and chartingengagement strategies accordingly.

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Introduction

MESSAGE 1: SOCIALPROTECTION IS A BROADERCONCEPT THAN SAFETY NETS

There are no universally accepteddefinitions of social protection and safetynets. Governments, donors and otherpartners adopt several approaches. Mostdefinitions are broad and comprehensive,but actors adopt a range of differentperspectives on the scope, objectives andcomposition of social protection(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007;Sabates-Wheeler and Haddad, 2005;Conway and Norton, 2002; Whitefordand Forster, 2002).

For example, the United NationsChildren’s Fund (UNICEF) applies achild-sensitive approach to socialprotection, including access to servicesand provision of unconditional transfersfor vulnerable groups (UNICEF, 2008);similarly, the Department forInternational Development (DFID)focuses on chronic poverty and socialtransfers, mostly in the form ofunconditional cash transfers (DFID et al.,2009; DFID, 2005); the German Agency

for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) leanstowards health insurance, and theInternational Labour Organization (ILO)explores the costing of minimumstandards and labour-related issues (GTZ,2007; ILO, 2006); the World Bankcentres on managing risks and economicvulnerabilities, while WFP focuses onnarrower food-based safety nets(Holzmann and Grosh, 2008; WFP,2004; World Bank, 2001).

These features map out general patterns,and there is emerging consensus on anumber of areas. For example, it is widelyrecognized that social safety nets (orsimply ‘safety nets’) are a subset ofbroader social protection systems. Safetynets include mostly non-contributory1

transfers in cash, vouchers or in-kind/food, which can be unconditional orconditional – such as conditional cashtransfers, school feeding, food for workand cash for work – and on otherinterventions to improve access to foodand basic essentials, such as pricesubsidies (World Bank, 2008; Adato,Ahmed and Lund, 2004; Shepherd, 2004;Alderman 2002). In addition to safety

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1 In general, a contributory transfer is one that people pay for. Contributory transfers include the insurance contracts that stipulatethe payment of a premium, and pension schemes in which part of the salary is deducted in payment for financing the pension inthe future. Non-contributory schemes do not envision a payment from beneficiaries. There are also combinations of both; forexample, under some contributory schemes, individuals pay part of the premium and the employer or the government coversthe rest.

Figure 1. Components of Social Protection Systems

e.g. Weather insurance

e.g. Health clinics, classrooms

Social Protection

e.g. Cash transfers

Conditional cash transfers

Food transfers

Conditional food transfers(e.g. school feeding)

Public/community works

Vouchers

Price subsidies

Social safety netsTransfer (non contributory)

and subsidiesSocial sector policy

Services and infrastructure foreducation, health, nutrition,HIV/AIDS, agriculture, etc.

Labour policy and insurancee.g. contributory pensions,

unemployement benefits, healthinsurance, minimum wage

nets, social protection also includesaspects of labour market policies andinsurance options, such as contributorypensions and health insurance, andaspects of other sectoral policies foreducation, health, nutrition, HIV/AIDSand agriculture (Bundy et al., 2009;Devereux et al., 2008b; Greenblot, 2007).These social protection components aremapped out in Figure 1.

Weather insurance products represent acommon area between safety nets andlabour/insurance (Alderman and Haque,2007). Sectoral policies sometimesoverlap with safety nets, as they providethe supply side of interventions, such asphysical infrastructure for schools andhealth clinics. However, the scope andrange of labour market and sectoralpolicies often go beyond social protection.The next section lays out the corecommonalities and differences amongsocial protection systems around theworld.

MESSAGE 2: ALL COUNTRIESHAVE SOME FORM OF SOCIALPROTECTION, BUT MODELSDIFFER GREATLY

As mentioned in the introduction, socialprotection is largely about public action,and all countries deploy some form ofpublic measure against hunger. Theunderlying rationale for social protectionreflects long-standing debates on theroles of public action, markets andcombinations of both in fostering moreinclusive development pathways. Thisprinciple applies equally to developed anddeveloping countries. It is therefore notsurprising that in spite of markeddiversities, a number of similarities alsoemerge.

For example, vouchers and cash transfersare implemented as safety nets in bothdeveloping and high-income countries. Inthe United States, about 25 millionpeople, or one-twelfth of the population,benefit from the national food voucherprogramme, which is now called theSupplemental Nutrition AssistanceProgram (SNAP). SNAP is the largestvoucher programme in the world, with abudget of about US$37.5 billion/year(USDA, 2007). New York City recentlylaunched a conditional cash transferprogramme, Opportunity NYC2, similar toMexico’s PROGRESA-Oportunidades(Miller, Riccio and Smith, 2009). Middle-East countries have extensive experiencewith safety nets in the form of consumerprice subsidy programmes, particularlyfood-based ones (Alderman, 2002). InEurope, countries such as Italy protectedthe poor from the financial crunch bydistributing targeted vouchers for use insupermarkets and other outlets.3

However, there are marked differencesbetween these programmes and those indeveloping countries. In high-incomecountries, social protection is aninstitutionalized feature of a socialcontract between the State and citizens(OECD, 2008; De Neubourg, Castonguayand Roelen, 2007; Lindert, 2005; Alesinaand Glaeser, 2004). In contrast, socialprotection in developing countries is notreally an institutionalized system, butoften a collection of short-term, scatteredprogrammes (Devereux and White, 2007;Devereux, 2006; WFP, 2005). As a result,informal arrangements often bear theburden of social protection (Morduch andSharma, 2002). Figure 2 lays out thedifferent forms of social protection, andtheir ramifications.

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2 For more info on SNAP and the Opportunity NYC programme see www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/snap/ andhttp://opportunitynyc.org/.

3 See www.governo.it/governoinforma/dossier/carta_acquisti/.

Informal social protection includessharing and insurance mechanisms withinand among communities, such as theHawala systems in Muslim countries4.Formal arrangements can be either public– provided by the government – orprivate, provided by actors operating onmarkets. Public measures can be fundeddomestically or externally, by donors orinternational agencies. Safety nets usuallyfall into this category. Private mechanismsare mainly insurance products availableon markets, such as health insurance.Developing countries tend to have largeinformal social protection systems andsome formal public safety nets, mostlyfunded by donors. Advanced economiestend to have large formal social protectionsystems, both public and private, and fewinformal arrangements. These and otherfeatures delineate a number of possiblemodels of social protection.

A key driver in shaping different models ofsocial protection is the level of nationalcapacity – the country’s institutional,administrative, financial and technical

ability to introduce and sustain socialprotection programmes.5 Drawing fromexisting literature, case studies and dataon the topic,6 Figure 3 proposes a typologywith three core models for countries withlimited, emerging and consolidated socialprotection systems (Gentilini, 2009;Ravallion, 2009; Barrientos and Hulme,2008b; World Bank, 2008; Shepherd,2004).

The definitions of these models are notcategorical, and the typology does notimply a predefined linear pathway forintroducing or expanding socialprotection. Rather, it broadly illustratesdifferent models based on prevailingcontext-specific conditions. Thecontextual challenges that countries faceneed to be clearly spelt out and accountedfor. Too frequently, lessons learned inhigher-capacity contexts, such as theprogrammes in Brazil or South Africa, areblindly applied in lower-capacity settings.There is scope for learning, but not forstraight replication of models developedin other contexts.

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4 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawala.

5 The political will present within a country also plays a critical role. The level of social expenditures is often used as a measure ofwill or commitment, mostly expressed in relative terms (e.g. % of GDP).

6 Tools developed to appraise countries’ social protection capacities include, inter alia, the World Bank’s Automated Analysis of theDistributional Impact of Social Protection Programmes (ADePT-SP) toolkit, and ILO’s Social Protection Expenditure andPerformance Reviews (SPERs). The quantitative measurement of countries’ capacities, and how they have evolved, is anintriguing research area that deserves further investigation.

Figure 2. Forms of Social Protection

Private

Domesticallyfunded

(fiscal revenues)

Externallyfunded

(donors, revenues)

Social protection

Formal

Public

Informal

Limited social protection systemsIn general, countries with limitedcapacities are chronically food-insecurewith high poverty and malnutrition rates,fragile ecosystems and extremely limitedfiscal space. Two core sets of countriescan be identified, based on theirunderlying stability. First are post-conflict and highly fragile countries,where most social protection is providedthrough donor-funded safety nets, oftenin the form of large humanitarianresponses to recurrent emergencies.Examples include Liberia, Somalia, theSudan, Haiti and Afghanistan (Harvey,2009; Save the Children, Oxfam andCARE, 2009; Government ofAfghanistan, 2008). Second are morestable countries that are laying the basisfor longer-term social protection systems.

In these contexts – such as in Ethiopia,Malawi, Kenya, Nicaragua, Cambodia andBangladesh – markets may allow a wideruse of cash-based safety nets, and someinsurance products might also appear(Government of Malawi, 2007; Regaliaand Castro, 2007; Hess, Wiseman andRobertson, 2006; WFP, 2005).Some limited-capacity governmentscontribute to social protection withdomestic resources, such as inMozambique (Ellis, Devereux and White,2009), but these national contributionsare generally small compared with thoseprovided externally. For example, thepercentage of aid in gross capitalformation7 in Mozambique is 118.9percent, while in Liberia it reaches 473.6percent (World Bank, 2009a). Moregenerally, this group may include most of

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7 The percentage of aid in gross capital formation measures the extent to which a country’s capital – such as schools, roads,railways, hospitals and land improvements – is financed with national resources; this indicator signals the country’s dependencyon aid, thereby providing a proxy for its capacity to fund social protection systems domestically.

Figure 3. An Illustrative Typology of Social Protection Systems

Limitedsocial protection systems

(Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh)

Capacities(financial, admin, institutional,

technical)

Composition(safety net tranfers

or insurance)

Funding(external or national)

Var

iable

s’le

vel

Less advanced More advanced

Stage of development in national capacities

EmergingSocial protection systems(India, Egypt, Brazil, China, South Africa)

ConsolidatedSocial protection systems

(UK, US, Poland, Japan, Sweden)

Ins

SNs

Nat

Ext

Ins

SNs

Nat

Ext

Ins

SNs

Nat

the countries that Ravallion (2009)defines as having “…little or no scope formaking a serious impact on the problemof extreme poverty through internalredistribution from those who are notpoor by Western standards”8(p. 19).

Emerging social protectionsystemsCountries with emerging systems arethose where social protection has begunto be institutionalized. These includetransitional economies, fast-growingAsian countries, and most Near Easternand Latin American (e.g. China, India,Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, South Africaand Egypt). In these countries,international assistance has a morelimited role, and systems are largelydomestically funded.9 Basic socialprotection is sometimes mandated bylaw, such as in India (Supreme CourtCommissioners of India, 2008); safetynets are mainly cash-based; formalcontributory schemes have beenintroduced; and the private sector offersmarket insurance products (Aldermanand Haque, 2007; Lindert, Skoufias andShapiro, 2006). However, there is scopefor significant improvements of thesesystems’ coverage, effectiveness andefficiency (Gao, Garfinkel and Zhai,2009; Baulch, Wood and Weber, 2006;Giambiagi and de Mello, 2006;Sumarto, Suryahadi and Pritchett,2003).

Consolidated social protectionsystemsThe consolidated model reflects thesophisticated systems in most OECD andEastern European countries. Benefits areprimarily insurance-based, linked largelyto formal labour markets, based onelectronic and ICT infrastructure, and

financed domestically through tax bases.Social security, equity and welfare areamong the key objectives that shapesocial protection systems in advancedeconomies (OECD, 2008, 2007; DeNeubourg, Castonguay and Roelen, 2007;Lindert, 2005).

Taken together, these considerationsconvey a simple message: all countrieshave social protection systems in place,but their forms, objectives, compositionand funding modalities vary dramatically.This diversity has generated differenttypologies of social protection, which callfor context-specific approaches. Withinthis framework, the next section discusseskey policy debates, including the issues ofpublic versus market measures, the roleof international assistance, and ways forsocial protection to foster economicgrowth.

MESSAGE 3: SOCIALPROTECTION POLICY CANNOTBE FORMULATED IN ISOLATION

A number of broad policy debates have amore or less direct influence over socialprotection. Therefore, those issues shouldbe recognized and addressed moreexplicitly also in social protection policy.This paper does not address all of thesedebates, but acknowledges three majorareas of discussion: (i) the role of theState as a provider of social protection;(ii) the effectiveness of foreign aid; and(iii) the trade-offs between equity andefficiency. Together, these interconnectedthemes have a profound influence onsocial protection theory and practice. Anycredible approach to social protectioncannot be disentangled from theseunfolding debates.

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8 In other words, in some countries the marginal tax rate on the rich needed to close the poverty gap would be of 100% or more.

9 In countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil, the percentage of aid in national gross capital formation is lessthan 1 percent; in South Africa and Egypt it is less than 5 percent; and in CIS countries such as Armenia and Georgia it is about 10percent (World Bank, 2009b).

Public actionThe first debate relates to the scope forpublic action in the economy in general,and in providing assistance to needypeople in particular. In a diverse world,there will always be passionate debateabout where to draw the line forgovernment action. A wide range ofpolitical, economic and ideologicalconsiderations feed policy discussions,often polarizing opinions andhampering consensus-building efforts.There are marked differences evenamong OECD countries – such as thosebetween the United States andScandinavian countries – reflecting thedifferent approaches behind all thepossible market-State combinations (DeNeubourg, Castonguay and Roelen,2007; Lindert, 2005; Alesina andGlaeser, 2004). Debates on safety netsare no exception, as safety nets areultimately a form of public action.

The experience of higher-capacitycountries shows that there are differentpathways for introducing socialprotection systems, and that these havebeen anything but linear (Lindert, 2005;Noble, 1997). Neither has the processbeen spontaneous, but rather the resultof continuous adjustments as acountry’s specific conditions changeover time. Overall, national systemshave been introduced gradually to begenerally consistent with – among otherfactors – the level of growth that thecountry can generate over time. As somedeveloping countries are advised tointroduce social protection systemsaccording to a different sequence andmodality – that is, before rather thanafter sustained growth and adequatecapacities have been established, andmostly with external rather thandomestic funding – these initiatives maynot necessarily lead to the same results.

Foreign aid and poverty trapsThis second area of discussion is moresubtle. In many contexts, socialprotection is funded largely by donors,especially in the limited/emerging modelsdescribed earlier. Therefore, debatesaround social protection are closelylinked to debates around foreign aid, itssustainability, and how it can helpunlocking poverty traps (Barrett, Carterand Ikegami, 2008; CPRC, 2008).Indeed, discussions on social protectionare increasingly interlinked with those onaid effectiveness. As a recent OECD policystatement put it, “…[donor] actions in[social protection] must be harmonisedand aligned with national policy, in linewith the Paris Declaration on AidEffectiveness and Accra Agenda forAction” (OECD, 2009b, p. 15).

Calls for an expansion of socialprotection programmes will have toconfront the “big push” approach – thetheory advocated by Professor Sachs thatenvisages lifting people out of povertytraps by scaling up aid-fundedinvestments (Sachs, 2006). The majordetractors of this theory, most notablyProfessor Easterly, claim that top-down,externally funded plans have a grimrecord of failure in reducing poverty10

(Easterly, 2006). As debates on socialprotection in poor countries often entailthe scale-up of donor-fundedprogrammes, these conflicting viewshave a profound influence on donor aidpolicies, and thereby on social protectionpolicies. What sustained livelihoodimpacts can be expected from a largeexpansion of safety net programmes?Would it be more effective to allocatescarce resources to enhancing theproductivity of small farmers? Thesequestions, which are matters of heateddebate, anticipate the content of thethird theme.

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10 See for example a debate in the Financial Times: www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/easterly/file/ftjune07_3.pdf.

Growth linkagesThe third policy theme is perhaps themost contentious and intriguing: thequest for growth. This discussion is veryrelevant for social protection, as it helpsto inform policy-makers about theimpacts of alternative development-oriented interventions. In the context oflimited budgets, social protection has tocompete with other interventions, and itspotential role as a driver or co-driver ofgrowth is under scrutiny. The literatureon presumed trade-offs between growthand equity is large, and the debate iscomplex (Whiteford, 2006; Ravallion,2003; Moffitt, 2002).

In general, studies show that safety netscould foster growth in four ways:

• Accumulating human capital. Forexample, better nutrition amongchildren may lead to higher incomestreams when they become adults,due to the combined effects of bettercognitive development, schoolattainments and labour productivity;or protecting gains in human capitalduring times of distress.

• Encouraging the adoption of higher-risk but higher-income livelihoodoptions. For example, farmers mayunderperform because of conservativepractices but could be encouraged toshift to more rewarding practices.

• Alleviating some market failures.Examples include labour-intensiveschemes to build bridges that connectmarkets; or providing cash orinsurance to income-constrainedhouseholds.

• Reducing inequality. Greater equalitymay enable marginalized people toparticipate more actively in inclusiveand pro-poor growth processes.11

These four linkages are changing theperception of social protection from a short-term palliative to an investment in futuregrowth (Samson, 2009; Barrientos andScott, 2008; Hoddinott, 2008; Aldermanand Hoddinott, 2007; Dercon, 2004).

A number of information gaps remainhowever. For example, there is limitedevidence supporting the claim that morepredictable and multi-annual socialprotection generates higher impacts thando other approaches.12 Moreover, longtime frames are required to generatedevelopment benefits, such as humancapital, while poor households faceimmediate trade-offs, which may not becompatible with longer-term investments.Long-term safety nets may help mitigatethose trade-offs on the ‘demand-side’. Buttheir ultimate effectiveness (in reducinginequalities in human capital forexample) would also hinge oncomplementary investments on the‘supply-side’ (Handa and Davis 2006).For example, if investments in education,including safety nets such as schoolfeeding, are not matched by future jobopportunities for using the skillsacquired, there is little incentive forpeople to keep investing in education(Pritchett, 2001). Households at risk ofstarvation may rationally opt to keepchildren out of school, so that they canhelp raise household short-term income(Barrett, 2007). Overall, the underlyingissue therefore seems to revolve aroundpeople’s incentives, the ultimate driversof economic decisions and growth.

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11 The relationship between inequality and growth is a much debated area of research. Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006) differentiatebetween “good” and ”bad” inequalities for growth, with the former reflecting the role of economic incentives in fosteringinnovation and entrepreneurship, while the latter include inequalities that prevent individuals from connecting to markets andinvesting in physical and human capital – in other words, they reflect inequality in opportunities.

12 For example, it is unclear whether more predictability would encourage risk taking or rather foster moral hazard and negativedependencies (Barrett, 2006).

A related issue is that medium-term aimscan overwhelm short-term needs. Forinstance, concerns over food productionmay prevail over the need to expand accessto food, such as through safety nets.Conversely, a rapid and massive scale-upof safety net transfers in poor countriesmay neglect medium-term investmentpriorities. The design of interventions thatcreate incentives for growth in the mediumto long term, while meeting short-termneeds in ways that are compatible withthose incentives will likely remain an areaof debate in coming years.

Further research is therefore needed for abetter understanding and quantificationof the overall policy and programmetrade-offs involved, and ways ofminimizing them. Specific researchthemes may include investigation of thefactors shaping countries’ socialprotection capacities and their pathways;the possible outcomes generated byprioritizing investments in socialprotection over other domains, such asagricultural productivity; validation of thepredictability factor and relatedbehavioural responses; and exploration ofvarious combinations and sequences ofdifferent social protection measures,including comparison of these with othergrowth-promoting interventions. So far,these questions have been only partiallyanswered.

Against this background, the next sectionargues that trade-offs are oftenoverlooked or easily dismissed.

MESSAGE 4:SOCIAL PROTECTION RAISESIMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL,FINANCIAL ANDADMINISTRATIVECHALLENGES

By definition, introducing or expandingsocial protection entails institutionalreform and innovation. To understandthe challenges raised by thisimperative, the three main entry pointsfor social protection in developingcountries have to be considered: (i)breaking the cycle of recurrentemergencies requiring relief; (ii)enhancing systems’ effectiveness andefficiency; and (iii) buildingconstituencies and rights for socialprotection.

Relief cyclesThe first entry point, breaking the cycleof relief, is based on the assumptionthat a group of people is likely to needlong-term assistance, regardless of theoccurrence of an external event, such asa covariate shock. Some chronic needsare therefore predictable, and acorresponding predictable level ofsupport is required to address theseneeds in advance, rather than withpost-emergency assistance. Clearly,such a risk management approachoffers intriguing opportunities forembedding work on social protectionwithin broader climate change anddisaster risk reduction frameworks(Christoplos, 2009; Davies and Leavy,2009). This common ground mayinclude index-based risk transferproducts, such as weather insurance, toreduce relief response times duringcrises (Barnett, Barrett and Skees,2007; Hess, Wiseman and Robertson,2006).

This approach is particularly relevant incontexts of limited capacities, aspreviously defined. Indeed, it has

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triggered the shift from annual reliefprogrammes to multi-annual support incontexts such as Ethiopia and Kenya.13

Some donors have a quantitative targetattached to this approach. For example, inAfrica, DFID aims to “…double to 16million the number of people moved fromemergency relief to long-term socialprotection programmes by 2009” (DFID,2006, p. 60).14 However, most of theseschemes commenced only a few yearsago, and preliminary quantitative studieshave been cautious about theirdevelopmental impacts (Gilligan,Hoddinott and Taffesse, 2008). Theprogrammes also tend to be funded on ashort-term basis, so the long-termoutcomes triggered by more predictablesocial protection have yet to be fullyverified.15

At the same time, social protection short-term responses to emergencies have notbeen very encouraging (Devereux et al.,2008a; Save the Children, 2008). Ingeneral, social protection in countrieswith limited systems seems to lack theinstitutional flexibility for rapid reliefresponse.16 Programmes are sometimes“lost in transition”, slow to tackledevelopment problems while beingunable to meet relief needs adequately.These gaps are often referred to asvertical and horizontal institutionallinkages: the former concern theorganizational chain and thedecentralization of decision-making; thelatter refer to the operational

arrangements and partnerships forlinking safety nets with other foodsecurity interventions – “graduation” – oremergency responses (Slater et al., 2006).Significant time is required to developand refine capacities for making socialprotection responsive and counter-cyclical, or capable of being scaled up anddown according to needs (Alderman andHaque, 2006).

Weaving the netThe second entry point for enhancingsocial protection is based on efforts toboost the effectiveness and efficiency ofnew and existing systems17. Frequently,several different social protectionprogrammes are being provided bydifferent actors with different lines ofresponsibility and accountability,resulting in patchwork governance andmanagement. This may generateduplication of efforts, gaps in coverageand poor institutional coordination. Inother cases, programmes areimplemented in isolation and lack acoherent policy framework.

This second entry point therefore aims at“weaving the net” and harnessing its fullpotential. Such an objective is particularlyimportant for emerging social protectionsystems, but it also has applications inother contexts.18 Activities for weaving thenet include mapping, appraising,rationalizing, retargeting and costingprogrammes, and the overall streamliningand coordination of roles and processes.

14

13 Including the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya:http://hungersafetynet.org.

14 DFID’s new white paper on eliminating world poverty states that “…our aim is to help build social protection systems to get helpto 50 million people in over 20 countries over the next three years” (DFID, 2009, p. 25).

15 See Devereux et al. (2006), Sharp, Brown and Teshome, (2006) and Slater et al. (2006) for evaluations of Ethiopia’s PSNP.

16 In some contexts, emergency responses are considered to be an institutional activity that is separate from social protection. Thelatter includes long-term programmes to address chronic needs, while relief addresses short-term acute needs. In many ways, thisseems a sensible distinction, since it is difficult to accomplish both short and long-term objectives at once. Progressive andflexible arrangements are needed to manage such delicate balance.

17 For example a recent IMF note argues that more social protection does not necessarily entail larger governments and that anumber of options can be identified without increasing the fiscal space (Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009).

18 See, for example, World Bank (2007b) for Pakistan; RHVP (2007), World Bank (2007a) and Devereux and Macauslan (2006) forMalawi; and World Bank (2006) for Bangladesh.

Rights and constituenciesThe third entry point uses socialprotection as a means of enhancing socialstatus and upholding rights-basedagendas (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008a;Holmes and Jones, 2009; Devereux andSabates-Wheeler, 2004). Recent rightsand advocacy campaigns in SouthernAfrica have fed into this debate, partly asa follow-up to the intergovernmentalconference on social protection held inLivingstone, Zambia in 2006, with follow-up consultations in 2008. Sponsored bythe African Union (AU) and civil society,those movements are building thepolitical constituencies for socialprotection, calling on Africangovernments to galvanize political andeconomic commitment to socialprotection (AU and Help Age Int., 2008;Government of Zambia and AU, 2006).

These campaigns propose the rapidinstitutionalization of social protectioninto national budgets and structures,often with little attention to countries’diverse capacities and priorities. Theyhave raised the importance of socialprotection in national policy agendas, butthey also risk misinforming or misguidingpolicy-makers.

State-provided social protection is oftenseen as an objective in its own right,ostensibly aiming to release people fromchronic poverty. The lack of socialprotection is seen largely as a lack ofpolitical will. For example, at a socialprotection workshop in Mozambique it wasdeclared that “…we [members ofParliament of Angola and Mozambique]reiterate that, with the requisite politicalwill, social transfers are affordable and thatour governments should explore, prioritiseand implement social transfers in theirvarious forms” (SADC ParliamentaryForum and RHVP, 2009, p. 2).

But trade-offs exist. Once a programme isinstitutionalized, it becomes more visibleand formal. Eligible people can claimtheir rights to access to the programme,and governments must be accountable inmeeting their obligations (Devereux et al.,2005). This is a positive step, but itbecomes controversial when bold long-term social protection commitments areinstitutionalized in low-capacitygovernments. As shown, suchgovernments often rely heavily on short-term or volatile external support, andhave limited possibilities for financingsocial protection domestically. Asequential or progressive approach tosocial protection is likely to be moreappropriate than the shock therapysponsored by some actors.

In Southern Africa, these trade-offs areexacerbated by, on one hand, the financialcrisis, which has narrowed the prospectsfor fiscal revenues (OECD, 2009a); andon the other hand, the HIV/AIDSpandemic, which is generating significantlong-term demand for public support,especially for the elderly, orphans andcare givers (DFID et al., 2009). Citizens’expectations are raised, but the prospectsfor meeting them remain low.

Finally, national ownership of socialprotection is often limited, at both theconceptual and the implementationlevels19 (Nigussa and Mberengwa, 2009;Chinsinga, 2007). Some actors seem moreinterested in convincing decision-makersabout the merits of broad-based socialprotection, ‘buying the agenda’, than ininforming them about real context-specific opportunities and limitations(Tibbo, 2008). In some cases, sustaininglimited social protection packages seemsaffordable; in others, large shares ofnational income would be required forlarger-scale programmes, such as 15 to 20

15


19 This may also include a longstanding concern by communities over ‘top-down’ approaches to social protection, and how systemscan be influenced and strengthened from the ‘bottom-up’.

percent of gross domestic product (GDP)in Burkina Faso and the United Republicof Tanzania, or even 45 percent of GDP inEthiopia (Pal et al., 2005). These figuresare seldom mentioned in advocacyinitiatives.

MESSAGE 5: SPECIFICIMPLEMENTATION ISSUESINSPIRE LIVELY DEBATE

The programming of effective safety netsentails several interrelated choicesspanning analysis, design,implementation and evaluation. Thesechoices should be informed by solidlessons and evidence, but dogmatic viewsor ideology often play a role in shapingprogramming processes. Three examplesof important implementation issues aredescribed in the following: conditionality,transfer selection and targeting. Theseimplementation issues tend to catalysemassive debate around social protectionprogramming.

ConditionalityExperience with conditional transfers inLatin American countries has emphasizedthe importance of an integrated approachto poverty, health, education and nutrition(World Bank, 2009a). A conditionaltransfer programme requires beneficiariesto perform some activities in exchange fora transfer. Conditional cash transfer (CCT)programmes provide cash as an incentivefor households to ensure medical check-ups or school attendance for theirchildren.20 School feeding programmesare a form of conditional transfer, as theyrequire school attendance to obtain accessto food (Bundy et al., 2009).

There is passionate debate over not onlythe feasibility of conditionalities, but alsotheir desirability. Some actors areadamant about not imposing behaviouralconditions on beneficiaries (Freeland,2007). In their view, transfers should bedelivered unconditionally and free fromany sort of reciprocity. Other actorssuggest that conditional transfers do notforce people to change behaviours, butrather promote appropriate co-responsibility between governments andcitizens21 (Adato and Bassett, 2008). Inaddition to these philosophicaldivergences, a number of empirical gapsremain. Should outcomes be attributed tothe transfer or the conditional service?How can specific outcomes be improved,for example, to address micronutrientdeficiencies? And can conditional cashtransfers be adapted to low-capacitycontexts? These questions have started tobe scrutinized empirically, but furthercomprehensive investigation is required(De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008; Soaresand Britto, 2007; Schubert and Slater,2006).

Transfer selectionAnother contentious programming areacentres on transfer selection, or morenarrowly the long-standing cash versusfood debate. Devereux (2006, p. 11) notedthat “…the ‘cash versus food’ debate hasbecome unnecessarily polarised, evenacrimonious. It is also spurious andmisdirected”. These considerations stillhold in some contexts. As outlined in theprevious section, the most rigid positionsenvision cash transfers as almost the onlymodality for rights-based socialprotection schemes.

16

20 Lessons on CCTs are part of regional learning networks such as the Inter-American Social Protection Network and SocialProtection in Asia, and cross-regional initiatives such as the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program on Social Protection:www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129473.htm, www.socialprotectionasia.org/newsandevents.asp, and www.undp-povertycentre.org/ipc/africa-brazil.jsp.

21 There are also approaches adopting ‘soft’ conditionalities. These are based on initiatives to induce behavioural change, but whichdo not envision program exclusion as a penalty for non-compliance.

However, in most cases, the debate ontransfers is more constructive and lesspolarized than a few years ago, and thereis growing consensus on the underlyingconditions for utilizing a given transfer.It is now widely recognized that thechoice of the most appropriate safety nettransfers – in cash, food or vouchers –hinges on proper assessment of context-specific factors. These includeprogramme objectives (e.g. nutrition,income transfer), the spatial andtemporal functioning of markets, theavailability of implementation capacitiesand delivery mechanisms, cost-efficiencyanalysis, and beneficiaries’ preferences(Gentilini, 2007).

However, controversies remain on howto utilize different tools. Although thereis growing experience with cash-basedtransfers in low-capacity contexts, itremains relatively limited and derivesmainly from short-term and small-scaleinterventions, raising importanttechnical concerns about the feasibilityand knock-on effects of larger-scaleoperations (Devereux and Coll-Black,2007). Almost all the evidence onlonger-term impacts of larger-scaleprogrammes comes from higher-capacity contexts, such as Brazil (WorldBank, 2009b). In low-capacity contexts,there is a paucity of quantitativeevaluations on, for example, the impactsof cash-based transfers on chronicmalnutrition,22 measured by stunting orunderweight prevalence. In this case too,empirical evidence comes almostentirely from countries such as Mexicoor South Africa (Leroy, Ruel andVerhofstadt, 2009; Fernald, Gertler andHou, 2008; Aguero, Carter and Woolard,2007). In low-capacity contexts, areasfor further investigation include long-run market-based nutrition trials, such

as vouchers for fortified food products,and seasonal transfer combinations.

TargetingTargeting mechanisms are a third area ofprogramming controversy. Effectivetargeting is key for maximizingprogramme impact and minimizingleakages. A number of targeting methodsexist – for example, means-tested,categorical, geographical and community-based – with comparative pros and consin each context. However, in low-incomecontexts where “everybody is poor”, it ischallenging to differentiate rigidlybetween chronic and transitory poverty.Such distinction may become blurred incountries such as Zambia and Swaziland,where more than 80 percent of thepopulation lives on less than US$2/day,or Malawi and Mozambique, where morethan 90 percent does so (World Bank,2009b). This is particularly important forinitiatives that envision a predeterminedthreshold for programme eligibility, suchas the poorest 10 percent, who areincluded in cash transfer schemes inMalawi and Zambia (Schubert andHuijbregts, 2006; Schubert, 2005). Theseschemes have grown in popularity, buthave stimulated severe criticism on theirtargeting methods (RHVP, 2008b). It isimportant to strike a balance betweenensuring that benefits reach the mostvulnerable populations, and avoidingartificial boundaries among and withinalmost equally vulnerable communities(Ellis, 2008; Mgemezulu, 2008).

17


22 Evidence in low-capacity contexts tends to be qualitative and descriptive, with few experimental or quasi-experimental trials totest for causal effects; Sharma (2006) is one of the few exceptions. However, also food-based interventions require more robustevaluations. Also in this case, Adelman et al. (2008) is one of the few studies available. In general, there is also a need for furtherrobust comparative studies, such as the one by Ahmed, Quisumbing and Hoddinott (2007).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Interest in safety nets and socialprotection is growing exponentially. Waysof strengthening them are called for inhigh-level statements, researched inacademic articles, and implemented bypractitioners. Such developments areencouraging and may shed light on somelong-standing humanitarian anddevelopment challenges. But the conceptremains controversial, and there iscompelling need to clarify a number ofissues.

This paper has delineated core areas oftension, and laid out key issuesunderpinning them at the analytical,policy, institutional and implementationlevel. Conclusions from our discussioncan be summarized in the following threecore remarks:

• Approaches need to be fullycompatible with prevailing cultural,social and economic factors.Countries have followed differentpathways to introduce and expandsocial protection systems. Context-specific factors should be fullyrecognized, and approaches tailoredaccordingly. There is scope forlearning from each other, but it is notappropriate to simply replicatemodels developed in other contexts.

• In developing countries, the debatetends to overemphasize conceptualissues and underplay administrativeand implementation constraints.Decision-makers face difficult trade-offs, some of which can be minimizedwhile others are more difficult toreconcile. Introducing and expandingsocial protection systems do not allowfor shortcuts or easy choices. Ignoringpossible trade-offs makes debatesnaïve at best, and misguided at worst.

• Rhetoric has often prevailed overevidence. There is a need to informdecision-makers more fully, and notmerely to convince them. This is truefor both the advocates and the criticsof social protection. A more balancedand pragmatic approach is required –based on technical partnerships, freefrom pre-packaged agendas, andgenuinely owned and demanded bynational governments and actors.

18

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Adelman, S., Alderman, H., Gilligan, D. &Lehrer, K. 2008. The Education and NutritionImpacts of Alternative Food for EducationPrograms in Northern Uganda. Paper presentedat the conference Social Protection for the Poorestin Africa: Learning from Experience, Entebbe,Uganda, 8–10 Sept.

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Documents

OP20 - Unveiling Social Safety Nets