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On the Value of

Parliamentary

Diplomacy

Madariaga Paper – Vol. 4, No. 7 (Apr., 2011)

This paper examines the role of parliamentary diplomacy as part of

and sometimes distinct from traditional forms of diplomacy. Beyond

providing some much needed clarity to the notion of parliamentary

diplomacy, this paper asks some specific questions: including, what are

the added benefits or weaknesses of parliamentary diplomacy in a

world marked by powerful states and increasingly influential non-state

actors, and under what circumstances may parliamentary diplomacy

complement the external activities of the European Union?

Daniel Fiott Research Fellow, Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation

14, Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée Tel: +32 2 209 62 10

B-1040, Brussels, Belgium E-mail: [email protected]

The views contained in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Madariaga

College of Europe Foundation

| Madariaga Paper – On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy (Apr., 2011)

Introduction

The aftermath of the Portuguese Carnation Revolution (1974 to 1975) brought about a worrisome admixture

of domestic political repression and the excesses of colonial rule in certain African countries, and there was

much debate on the whole of the Portuguese Left as to the future political direction of the country. Having

filled the political vacuum brought about by the Revolution, it was unclear as to whether Portugal would fall

under the Left’s more radical Communist Party or the more moderate Socialist Party (PSP). Given the eager

eye cast by both Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford on the situation, the decision could have had important

ramifications for the Cold War. Eventually, however, Portugal chose social democracy, but what swayed the

decision away from a turn to communism? There were of course many reasons including the need for

economic growth through a market economy, but more interesting was the role played by other political

parties across Europe in supporting the nascent PSP.

Indeed, in the 1970s many social democratic parties in Europe including the German SPD, the Swedish SAP

and British Labour grouped together to assist the PSP with the transition from dictatorship. This aid came in

the form of financial and human resources so that, should Portugal elect the PSP, there would be rapid

democratisation, de-colonisation of Portugal’s territories in Africa and EEC accession.1 This was a substantial

carrot and stick initiative led by political parties. What is interesting about this indirect form of intervention is

its sophistication, fostering inter-party dialogue instead of employing force and offering substantial gains in

the form of EU membership and swift political recognition by neighbouring countries. The German SPD also

managed to fend-off American and Soviet interests in the Iberian state by highlighting the geopolitical

overstretch this would cause, especially for the Soviets.

This introductory example highlights the potential strengths of the role to be played by political parties, and

“parliamentary diplomacy” more generally, but it is unfortunate that this form of diplomacy is often

overlooked. International politics is traditionally presumed to be the domain of diplomats and ministers, but

one should bear in the mind the significance not only of individual politicians and political parties but also of

whole parliamentary bodies in engaging in diplomacy. Accordingly, this paper examines the role of

parliamentary diplomacy as part of and sometimes distinct from traditional forms of diplomacy. Beyond

providing some much needed clarity to the notion of parliamentary diplomacy, this paper analyses the added

benefits and weaknesses of parliamentary diplomacy in a world marked by powerful states and increasingly

influential non-state actors, and under what circumstances parliamentary diplomacy may complement the

external activities of the European Union?

What is Parliamentary Diplomacy?

The idea of parliamentary diplomacy (“parlomacy”) is not new. The Roman Senate, for example, had played

both a role – albeit at the behest of Roman Generals - in first suing for peace and then sanctioning war with

Philip V of Macedon after the failure of the Treaty of Phoenice (205 BC). More recently it has been pointed

out that the United Nations General Assembly is, in essence, parliamentary diplomacy writ large. But

parlomacy is not simply about international congresses.2 Given the diverse array of forms of parlomacy, one

has to be cautious about who or what is said to conduct this form of diplomacy: here one must differentiate

between practice and actors.3 There are a number of parliamentary actors that do parlomacy starting from

individual parliamentarians, to political parties, to local parliaments or assemblies, to national parliaments, to

1 G. Devin, Internationale Socialiste: Histoire et Sociologie du Socialisme Internationale, 1945-1990, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation

Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), p. 118. 2 K.W. Thompson, “The New Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace”, International Organization, Vol. 19, No.3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 394-409. 3 For the differences between parliamentary diplomacy as a form of negotiation and as implying a diplomatic agent, see: N. Götz, “On the

Origins of ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’: Scandinavian ‘Bloc Politics’ and Delegation Policy in the League of Nations”, Cooperation and

Conflict, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 263-279.

1


Country A

Political Parties

Government

Parliamentarians

Country A

Parliament

Delegations

Political Parties

Parliamentarians

Country B

Parliament

Delegations

Political Parties

Parliamentarians

regional parliaments and ending with international parliaments. In general there are three major parlomacy

categories: i) parliamentarians; ii) political parties; and, iii) parliaments (be they local, regional or

international). Of course, the type of parliament selected will depend on the country and parliamentary system

one talks about: it is equally possible to speak of les députés or Mitglied des Bundestages.

All of the aforementioned different types of parlomatic actors can act in several formal and informal ways at

the intra-state, inter-state and intra- and inter-regional levels.4 There are, as Figure 1 below shows, different

forms of doing parlomacy. At the intra-state level parliamentarians and political parties are formally and

principally involved in scrutinising the foreign policy of their national government, and in this way can have a

direct bearing on the shape and extent of these policies (e.g. the British House of Commons). These same

actors may also lend their voice of support for policies, which adds legitimacy and more political weight to

them. At the inter-state level parliamentary delegations or multilateral parliamentary friendship groups can

interact to improve the legitimacy of a government in a third-country, and they may also play a role in

developing the representation of people also (e.g. the NATO Parliamentary Assembly). The intra-regional

level is also important, with the European Parliament promoting cultural exchange, dialogue and

understanding between the EU member states and between the EU and the rest of the world. The inter-regional

level sees all different regional parliaments meet for dialogue (e.g. Inter-Parliamentary Union).

As one can see from Figure 2 below there are a host of different activities for which parlomacy can be

involved in. It is noticeable that the activities of parliamentarians, political parties and parliaments tend to be

able to complete more of the formal and informal tasks listed (not an exhaustive list by any means). As one

moves from intra-state parlomacy to the inter-state level certain formal means of action become unavailable,

with less fora for the parliaments of two or more countries to vote or to participate in the cabinet meetings of

governments. Where intra-regional parlomacy is concerned - and here one thinks specifically of the European

Parliament - there are opportunities for parliamentarians to partake in committee hearings (e.g. the EP’s

Foreign Affairs Committee), political party interaction and to scrutinise the European Commission (i.e. a form

of executive scrutiny). Finally, inter-regional parlomacy can partake in far fewer of the activities open to other

levels. The diagram also suggests that the closer the level of parlomacy to power-holding institutions (i.e.

government or international organisations) the more formal activities they are able to participate in.

Figure 1 – Ways of Doing Parlomacy

4 One should distinguish between inter-state parlomacy, which can be undertaken by two or more parliamentary entities in an informal and

sporadic manner, and intra-state parlomacy, which concerns regular contact formally through an established structure (e.g. European

Parliament).

Intra-State Parlomacy

Inter-State Parlomacy

2


European Parliament

Delegations

Political Parties

Parliamentarians

European

Commission

Third Countries

Third Parties

Country A

Political Parties

Government

Parliamentarians

Region A

Parliament

Delegations

Political Parties

Parliamentarians

Region B

Parliament

Delegations

Political Parties

Parliamentarians

Figure 2 - Forms and Levels of Parlomacy

Formal Activities

Parliamentary Procedures (Committee hearings, votes, statements)

Parliamentary Interaction (Delegation visits, UN General Assembly)

Political Party Interaction (intra-party debate, cabinet meetings)

Parliamentary Duties (Observer Missions, Citizen Interaction, Media)

Informal Activities

Building mutual understanding and dialogue

Sharing experiences and expertise

The Value of Parlomacy

A number of factors contribute to the effectiveness of parlomacy. For example, the size of a parliamentary

body is important. The more individual parliamentarians there are then the more likely it is that skills and

expertise for conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue can be sourced. The financial and institutional

resources available to a parliament will also condition its ability to undertake parlomacy (i.e. the ability to

send delegations to third-countries). That said, one must not underestimate smaller parliamentary bodies.

Individual parliamentarians of high expertise and experience can still be found in smaller parliaments, and the

smaller parliament may have an added-value in engaging in a situation of greater concern and proximity to it.

Intra-Regional Parlomacy

Inter-Regional Parlomacy

Intra-state

parlomacy

Inter-state

parlomacy

Inter-

regional

parlomacy Intra-

regional

parlomacy

3


If one considers the geographical, historical and cultural aspects of diplomacy then a smaller parliament may

be privileged if a common language or historical and cultural kinship exists.

Formal communication and interaction may be strained when conducting inter-state parlomacy. Whereas in

the EU the European Parliament provides for a formal institutional setting in order to engage and debate, this

same setting becomes watered-down beyond EU borders. It is true that while the Euro-Mediterranean

Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), for example, provides a formal setting for the greater Mediterranean

region it only meets once a year. There can at times also be duplication of parliamentary institutions, which

can dilute the effectiveness and resources that might be achieved with one effective institution. The Latin

America Parliament (“Parlatino”), Andean Parliament and the Inter-American Parliamentary Group (IAPG) –

to name but a few of the parliamentary organisations in Latin and Central America - is to raise one such

example of this duplication.

Parlomacy tends to take a more pragmatic long-term approach to dialogue by building trust and

understanding. When utilising informal approaches to dialogue, parliamentarians and political parties can use

political camaraderie and affiliations to reach-out to interlocutors when traditional channels are strained. Aside

from trust-building, politicising a certain crisis situation through a camaraderie of political ideology may have

the benefit of re-framing conflict in other less harmful terms (i.e. than say ethnicity). But a shared political

creed or doctrine between actors can also lead to rivalry with other parties involved in dialogue. It may also

profoundly call into question the independence and sincerity of parlomacy. Furthermore, when dialogue

becomes merely a forum for political point scoring - or an indulgence for the egos of parliamentarians - then

langue de bois is likely to be privileged over constructive and objective debate.5

If parliamentarians are seen as too close and indistinguishable from their own governments then this can also

be viewed as a weakness of parlomacy. Indeed, the strength of parlomacy is its independence from

governments and other establishments. Parliaments are generally considered to exercise a certain degree of

control over their governments through budgetary powers and are less overtly elite than the diplomatic service

in composition, and this is seen to increase parliament’s standing vis-a-vis the government and the public. It

would be imprudent to suggest that the parliament is equal to the government in foreign policy terms, but

when parliamentarians act as truly independent actors by not succumbing to party discipline they can play an

innovative role. Alternatively, the fact that parliaments do not have the same powers as governments, nor the

parliamentarian that of a Prime Minister, means that they are mainly – albeit not exclusively – restricted to

using the power of debate.

Another important element related to parliamentary actors not having the powers of governments is that they

tend to be more utopian in aims and methods. Government implies being responsible for balancing between

values and interests, and having to take courses of action that may be the lesser of two evils. Government also

plugs into channels made unavailable to parliaments, such as intelligence and having discretionary contact

with governments in third-countries. While parliamentarians can vote on whether or not to go to war for

example, they are not involved in making decisions but rather only scrutinising them. It is for this reason that

there may perhaps be some element of friction between assertive parliamentarians and career diplomats or

even the minister for foreign affairs.

But even with these caveats in mind parliamentarians, political parties, delegations and whole parliaments do

bring experience and expertise to bear on preventing and managing crises and encouraging political dialogue.

While it is true that parliamentarians cannot always dedicate a concentrated amount of time on any one issue –

they do after all have many other duties (i.e. such as meeting with constituents) -, parliament is potentially a

5 S. Stavridis, “Parliamentary Diplomacy: Any Lessons for Regional Parliaments?” in M. Kölling, S. Stavridis, & N. Fernández Sola (eds.),

The International Relations of the Regions: Subnational Actors, Para-diplomacy and Multi-level governance, (Zaragoza, 2006).

4


treasure trove of various different forms and degrees of expertise. Of the total 735 current Members of the

European Parliament (MEPs), for example, 85 have held ministerial positions at the national government

level, which includes 10 former Prime Ministers and 10 former Foreign Affairs Ministers, and 108 have held

civil service posts up to the level of Secretary of State.

Encouraging Parlomacy

There are, therefore, many positive elements to parlomacy but the question is how it should be placed within

the framework of more formal diplomatic channels and practices. It is clear that Parlomacy should not and

cannot supersede formal diplomacy, but it should be considered an important element in its practice.

Accordingly, the practice of parlomacy may have to become more aware of three fundamental facets of formal

diplomacy if it is to become more successful: interests, timing and communication. It is the opinion of this

paper that a combined awareness of these three factors should improve the effectiveness and coherence of

parlomacy when related to traditional diplomacy.

Interests

The great difficulty with channelling parlomacy effectively is being able to properly manage the myriad

interests and objectives that may arise in any given instance of foreign policy. Interests are notoriously

difficult to define at any given time, and the sheer number of different interests from elites, business, unions

and NGOs (to name a few) vying for expression in a State’s foreign policy makes this task harder.

Parliamentarians must sit in this milieu of interests, and face the added difficulty of having to wrestle between

the needs of the constituents they represent and their own personal interests and moral conscious. This

entanglement of interests greatly impacts on the ability and reach of parlomacy. If, for example, the socialist

leader of Country A wants to pursue stronger diplomatic ties with communist Country B then he or she may

incur the wrath of the opposition, which may lead to electoral difficulties.

Some form of compromise over interests within the parliamentary body would be required therefore, which

can take the form of political horse-trading or genuine compromise. But this process would also rely on the

type of interests or objectives pursued. In this regard, Parlomacy should perhaps self-consciously disavail

itself of pursuing “interests” in the traditional reasons of state guise. Instead of interests, parlomacy should

perhaps better focus itself on inventing, experimenting and testing novel approaches to diplomacy.

Furthermore, beyond domestic preferences parliamentarians could play a key role in registering and

understanding the interests of other states and third-country domestic actors. Understanding the interests of

third-countries and their actors better, through exploiting non-official channels, would certainly be of

advantage to all.

Timing

One other element of traditional diplomacy which parlomacy can digest is the issue of timing. In the first

instance, parliamentarians should perhaps be given more resources and time to conduct parlomacy. Delegation

visits to third-countries are usually infrequent when compared to the permanent channels afforded to

embassies. Yet, without regular contact the ability for parlomacy to build relations with individuals and

entities in third-countries becomes strained. If the life-blood of the diplomat is diplomatic cables (now emails),

then face-to-face dialogue is that of the parliamentarian. Trust-building cannot effectively be attained without

time spent with interlocutors and sustained parlomacy. Without prolonged contact with actors in third-

countries there is little time for parliamentarians to really gain a full grasp of the people and country they want

to understand.

5


The second instance of timing relates to the deployability of parlomacy. Parliamentarians and parliamentary

bodies must know when they cannot play a worthwhile role and step aside. Parlomacy is not well-suited to

every aspect of foreign policy, and thus parliamentarians must be in a position to admit this. Nevertheless,

parlomacy does have a role to play in gauging what response is needed to crises or political stalemate. Based

on intuition, the situation may call for silent dialogue rather than the exaggeration that normally accompanies

the media spotlight. Timing over when this dialogue should be triggered, or when other tools or approaches

are required, is a large part of the role of parlomacy in international affairs. Through a different understanding

of a situation, parlomacy may have an added-value over traditional diplomacy in this respect.

Communication

But parlomatic added-value is predicated on parliamentarians having effective communication channels with

the organs of a State or entity such as the EU. If parliamentarians cannot feed their information and

understanding into the foreign policy “mainframe” then all is potentially lost. In this regard, parliamentarians

may have to better communicate their own abilities. That is, that the foreign policy identity of

parliamentarians has too often been concerned with promoting parliaments as bodies rather than the skills they

have to offer. In other words, instead of parlomacy solely fostering the parliamentary dimension of

international affairs, it should do more to promote itself as an integral element alongside traditional

diplomacy.

For example, more could be done to establish a permanent link between the newly established European

External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament. Thus far, the EEAS has one person responsible

for relations with the European and national parliament(s), plus there is one member of the High

Representative’s cabinet charged with EEAS relations with the European Parliament. Given this state of

affairs, it might prove promising for the EU to design innovative means by which the work of

parliamentarians at the European and national levels can be fed into the EEAS’ work and vice-versa. For the

EEAS and the High Representative, closer diplomatic strategising with the European Parliament may also be a

means to add more democratic legitimacy to European foreign policy.

Conclusion

Parliamentary bodies such as national parliaments and the European Parliament should not be conceived as

some monolithic entity. Indeed, parliaments are able to mobilise many different actors ranging from the

activating grass roots campaigners to politicians to solve an international problem. As state-to-state diplomacy

is not always effective or successful, parlomacy may be an innovative means to defuse crises and build

political trust over the longer-term. Parlomacy’s traditional weaknesses, such as not having the powers of

government and having limited resources, are paradoxically its strengths. Under parlomacy experience,

dialogue and trust are put at a premium and knowing when this skill set should be deployed alongside or

instead of formal diplomacy is key. As Europe charts its course through the choppy waves of the future, the

innovative approaches contained in parlomacy may become increasingly important. Not only will it afford

Europe better diplomatic capabilities, but it may also give Europe better parliamentarians.

7

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Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:696–714, 2011Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X onlineDOI: 10.1080/09592296.2011.625828

Never Talk to Strangers? On Historians,Political Scientists and the Study of Diplomacyin the European Community/European Union

KAREN GRAM-SKJOLDAGER

Diplomacy is an institution that has undergone tremendouschange over the last century—not least in relation to the new,supranational institutions of the European Community/EuropeanUnion. Nonetheless, it is only very recently that political scientistsand historians have taken an interest in the changes brought aboutby European integration processes for diplomatic norms, roles, andpractices. This article investigates the background for this late andlimited interest. It does so by comparing and contrasting dominanttheoretical trends that have shaped research on European diplo-macy in the two disciplines since the Second World War. Againstthis background it briefly evaluates the recent surge in researchon diplomacy and the European Union within political science,and it points to possible avenues for further, joint, research com-bining the transnational and sociological approaches adopted bypolitical scientists with the attention to temporality and nationalspecificities characteristic of historians’ dealings with Europeandiplomacy.

Diplomacy is one of the oldest instruments of statecraft and one of thelongest standing institutions of the international system. It is also an insti-tution that has undergone tremendous change during the past century.Traditionally associated with the Peace of Westphalia and the emergenceof the modern state system, it has been transformed by the spread of mul-tilateral international co-operation and the increasingly dense networks ofeconomic, political, and cultural relations cutting across national boundaries.Arguably, these changes are particularly pronounced amongst the statesthat have joined the supranational European Communities (EC), later theEuropean Union (EU).

It is therefore hardly surprising that political scientists in recent yearshave taken a growing interest in how the EC/EU has changed diplomacy.

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Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of Diplomacy in the EU/EC 697

What is perhaps striking, however, is the fact that it is only within the lastdecade that such an interest is detectable—and that it has no parallel inhistory—even if exploring the impact of the EC/EU on diplomacy is fun-damentally a question of exploring historical change. Addressing this lateand uneven interest in diplomacy in the EC/EU, this analysis is based in theassumption that this state of affairs reflects important traits and differencesin the understandings of diplomacy in the two disciplines. In this sense, onecan identify and distinguish analytically amongst three theoretical perspec-tives that have been central to the belated and limited interest in the impactof the EC/EU on diplomacy within the two disciplines: a national perspec-tive borne out of realist and liberal approaches, which views diplomacy firstand foremost as a tool of national interest; an international perspective thathas focused mainly on the general, international aspects of diplomacy as aninstitution of international society on a global scale; and the transnationalor global governance research perspective, which in its earliest manifesta-tions took a key interest in non-state relations and actors and juxtaposedthese with nation state representatives such as the diplomat.

In studying the EC/EU and diplomacy, political scientists have devel-oped approaches that include international and transnational perspectivesand shift the theoretical ground towards sociological perspectives and modesof analysis. Historians, by contrast, have maintained their political-functionalunderstanding and their interest in the national variation in diplomacy. Butit is possible by comparing and contrasting dominant theoretical trends thathave shaped research on European diplomacy in the two disciplines sincethe Second World War to lay out a first, tentative roadmap for further, andjoint, research on diplomacy in the EU; and, on this basis, to argue for thepotentials of merging the theoretical insights from political science with thetemporal dimension and perceptiveness to the national variation character-istic of history. In this way, it is possible to “Europeanise” historiography ondiplomacy and de-centre political science research on diplomacy in the EU,making it aware of the deeper historical processes and broader internationaland national contexts within which diplomacy in the EC/EU developed.

In dealing with diplomacy, there exists a principled distinction betweendiplomacy and foreign policy. Often, and particularly in American scholar-ship, the two terms are used interchangeably.1 This is not the case here,where a distinction is made between foreign policy—understood as thecontent and objectives of a state’s international relations—and the institu-tion of diplomacy through which inter-state relations are conducted.2 Thus,diplomacy is in its most narrow sense the institution that developed withinthe Westphalian state system and which found formal expression in theorganisations of foreign ministries—it is, to quote Jozef Bátora, perceived as“the organizational field” made up of foreign services.3 “Diplomat,” likewise,refers to bureaucrats who work in national foreign services.

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698 K. Gram-Skjoldager

Whilst there is a certain chronological pattern to the different concep-tions of diplomacy that developed during the time when the EC/EU hasbeen an institutional reality, it is important to note that in teleological terms,they are not separate states of mutually exclusive understandings of diplo-macy that have replaced each other. Rather, they are perspectives that havesupplemented and enriched each other and expanded our understanding ofdiplomacy.

The basic precondition for grappling with the question of how diplo-macy has been affected and transformed by the European integrationprocesses is that it is defined as an independent object of academic enquiry;it should not only be perceived as a tool of national interest but also beviewed as an institution that connects national polities and is shaped bychanging international preconditions. During the Cold War, this was the caseonly to a very limited degree. In this period, international relations (IR) andhistory were equally disinterested in diplomacy. It was a subject that had, inthe words of James Der Derian, been “left as a foundling by historians at thedoorstep of diplomatic theorists, who only investigated when mature noiseslike [Hugo Grotius’] de jure belli ac pacis were to be heard.”4 The scant inter-est in diplomacy was closely related to the realist and liberal theories thatstructured most IR debates and much international historical research duringthe Cold War—and which basically viewed diplomacy as a minor tool ofnational policy. In the national interest-driven international world associatedwith realism, states are the only relevant actors and national interests aredefined in terms of power. This situation means that diplomacy has beenperceived basically in instrumental terms as a tool in the national toolbox ofpower and influence5—and, given the relative importance that realists attachto force, “one of the lesser tools of foreign policy.”6 Neo-realism, despite itsfocus on systemic-level theorising, has not changed this view. Whilst assum-ing that state units interpret the environment in which they find themselvesbefore choosing appropriate behaviour, the socialising forces acknowledgedby Kenneth Waltz are seen as lying within the state units themselves and notin any processual relation or institution between states such as diplomacy.7

As a consequence, realism has rarely theorised or explored diplomacy in thecontext of the EC/EU or otherwise.

The same holds true for liberal approaches. Despite their focus onco-operation and peaceful relations, liberal scholars did not develop anytheories of diplomacy either. Focusing primarily on how state behaviour isshaped by state-society relations and viewing international politics in termsof preferences of various groups, liberal theorists have not given diplomacypriority as an independent object of theoretical development.8 In the con-text of EC/EU research, a prominent example of this is Andrew Moravcsik’sinterpretation of key collective political decisions in the European integrationprocess. In the context of inter-state bargaining processes, states are seen as

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separate entities that act and have national interests separate from those ofother states, and diplomacy figures as a constituent part of the states.9

A similar lack of interest in diplomacy may be discerned in his-tory. Though far less explicit about—and often also less conscious of—thetheoretical assumptions underpinning their analyses, the work of most inter-national historians has been based in what may be termed a “soft” variantof realism. Generally speaking international historians of the post-war yearshave been inclined to accept “the self-evident virtue of realpolitik, the cen-trality of the state and the fact of international anarchy,”10 even if theseassumptions have rarely been explicated. The bulk of international his-tory therefore aims to understand and explain national and internationaldecision-making processes and policy outcomes from a nation state per-spective. As a consequence, generous interest has been paid to diplomatsand statesmen operating at the inter-governmental level and forming part offormal international and European decision-making processes.11 However, itis their role in devising policy that has been researched. Attention has rarelybeen paid to how the gradually changing nature of the international andEuropean political processes has produced changes in the social structures,role orientations, and patterns of actions amongst actors such as politiciansand diplomats.

This lack of interest in diplomacy as an independent object of studyin mainstream international history is reflected in the fact that research ondiplomacy in this period almost exclusively took on the form of organi-sational histories. During these years, almost all European states had theinstitutional histories of their national foreign services written;12 and thesehistories in general were nationally compartmentalised and self-containedorganisational outlines that were largely unrelated to broader internationaland European political developments—in the shape of European integra-tion or otherwise. The only large-scale comparative study conducted beforethe end of the Cold War was the 1982 Times Survey of Foreign Ministriesof the World. Edited by the British historian, Zara Steiner, this book was acollection of a broad selection of essays on the history and organisation ofa range of different, though predominantly European, foreign ministries.13

It did not, however, address in any systematic way the changing precondi-tions for these bureaucratic units brought about by a growing number—andincreasingly invasive forms—of international and European organisations.

Only in France did historians to any noticeable extent push past thisorganisational mode of analysis when dealing with European diplomacyafter 1945. Here historians placed the subject of diplomacy on the histori-cal agenda and developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of it alreadyin the 1950s. In 1954, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pub-lished their Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationale, which wasinspired by l’École des Annales and propagated a broader and more com-plex form of international history than the classical recounting of inter-state

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high politics.14 On one hand, they wished to include the “forces profondes”that shaped international relations such as demographic and economic con-ditions and collective mentalities such as national and pacifist sentiments.On the other, they insisted on the importance of events, on placing theindividual at the centre of the historical process and on the importanceof political history. It was Duroselle in particular who developed this sec-ond part of their new international research agenda. In the latter half ofIntroduction à l’histoire des Relations internationals, “L’homme d’état,” hedealt with the decision-making individuals, their social background, theirideas and resources; with how they were influenced by structural forces andhow they were in turn capable of modifying and bending these forces.15

Since then, in the words of Robert Frank, a “durosellienne” tendency hasdeveloped in French international history, which has explored the foreignpolicy decision-making process, the administrative organisation of foreignpolicy making, and the individuals involved in this process.16 This litera-ture also has strong realist traits, claiming the primacy of national interestand taking a basically conflictual view of international politics as a zero-sum game;17 and it does not address in any direct way the changes broughtabout by the quiet transformation of the European political landscape. But itdoes consider diplomacy and its changing norms and practices to be issuesworthy of independent academic interest and, in this way, points forward tomore recent studies of diplomacy.

Whilst soft realist and nation state centred perspectives have dominatedIR and formed the basis of the modestly sized historical scholarship on diplo-macy since the Second World War, a minor theoretical strand has insisted onviewing diplomacy as an institution of international politics worthy of a con-siderable academic interest. Most IR research on diplomacy is rooted in the“English School” and is focused on the common, international characteris-tics of and developments in diplomacy. Emerging in the 1960s and basedjust as much in history as in IR, English School researchers were the firstto formulate general reflections on the nature and development of diplo-macy. Founded by British historians Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield,the School held—and still holds—strong, and positive, normative assump-tions about the political and moral quality of diplomacy; and it was withinthis context that the notion of diplomacy as an institution of internationalsociety was introduced.18

In his 2002 overview of English School studies of diplomacy, theNorwegian political scientist and anthropologist, Iver B. Neumann, has iden-tified three generations of English School scholarship.19 The main achieve-ment of the first generation, represented by Butterfield and Wight, was toplace diplomacy at the centre of international politics—with Wight claim-ing that diplomacy was the “master institution” of international relations.20

The second generation of English School writers—Hedley Bull and AdamWatson—shifted the view of diplomacy slightly as Bull introduced the notion

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of a “diplomatic culture” and claimed that diplomacy symbolised the exis-tence of an “international society.”21 The third generation of the EnglishSchool, writing from the 1980s, took the interpretation of diplomacy onestep further. Developing a finely meshed typology of the various historicalforms of diplomacy, scholars like James Der Derian and Christian Reus-Smitargued that diplomacy was a constituent rather than reflexive practice ofinternational society, and a practice that was embedded in broader moraland social systems.22

Following the breakdown of the rigid bipolar Cold War structure, theEnglish School and its notion of an international society of states has expe-rienced a renaissance. This revival also goes for its dealings with diplomacy,making it the mainstay of a large and diverse literature on this subject.23

At the theoretical level, this literature has gathered the threads of previousEnglish School writings on diplomacy, viewing diplomacy as an institutionconstituted by “a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting ofeasily recognised roles coupled with underlying norms and a set of rulesor conventions defining appropriate behaviour for, and governing relationsamongst, occupants of these roles.”24

However, in relation to understanding the effects of the European inte-gration processes on diplomacy, this literature has fairly little to offer. Thissituation is partially due to its general international—or global—outlook.Partially it is based in the fact that the English School literature is pred-icated on assumptions about a state-based international system that isfundamentally inter-governmental in nature and grounded on a dichotomi-sation between international and national politics. Thus it has continued tofocus on diplomats’ double mandate as representatives of both nation statesand international society; and it also sees diplomacy as a “third culture”in which diplomats, on one hand, function as boundary-maintainers thatuphold the discourse dividing politics into domestic and foreign spheresand, on the other, constitute “a locus for mediation between political enti-ties with diverse cultures.”25 Therefore, the empirical studies emerging fromthese perspectives have also been concerned primarily with diplomatic staterecognition practices and the role of the corps diplomatique in manag-ing mutually beneficial relations and reproducing the basic principles thatunderpin inter-state relations.26

The new English School research on diplomacy is in some respectsbackward looking. Thus, in pointing to the co-operative, mediating aspectsof diplomacy, the English School has to some extent brought the classi-cal diplomatic self-understanding back onto the research agenda. Twentiethcentury classics of diplomats’ writings such as Ernest Satow’s A Guide toDiplomatic Practice and Sir Harold Nicolson’s Diplomacy as well as manydiplomats’ memoirs, are generally characterised by what Paul Sharp hasnamed a practical, or unreflective, cosmopolitanism.27 Whilst firmly believ-ing in the sovereign state system and in diplomats as representatives of

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sovereign states and their interests, diplomats have often simultaneouslyargued—or implicitly assumed—that they function as a steadying, positiveinfluence in international politics, curbing the impulses of politicians andpublic opinions attempting to push national self-interest too far. With thesetting up of “diplomatic studies” programmes at universities and otherresearch institutions across Europe and the United States since the endof the Cold War, a new research field also has been created in whichboth academics and diplomats engage based on these shared assumptionsabout the positive role of diplomacy.28 In this context, a new academicallyoriented type of diplomats’ writings on diplomacy has also emerged thattends to emphasise the positive moral assumptions about diplomacy. Oneexample is the German former ambassador and professor of law and diplo-macy, Wilfried Bolewski, whose book Diplomacy and International Law inGlobalised Relations (2007) includes bold statements such as: “Through itsflexibility and adaptability diplomacy will emerge as an instrument for thisuniversal good in the 21st century.”29

Whilst scholars relating to the English School have highlighted the inter-national dimensions of diplomacy that have previously escaped scholarly—and particularly historical—scrutiny, it is therefore also apparent thatthis scholarship stands the risk of idealising the diplomatic profession,over-emphasising its exclusive and distinct character, and overvaluing therelationships amongst diplomats at the expense of their interactions withthe growing number of state and non-state actors. These new actors havecome to inhabit the diplomatic realm in the twentieth century—and not leastbecause of the new changes brought about by the increasingly invasiveforms of international cooperation, particularly the EC/EU. In one regard,however, the empirical studies generated through the theoretical interestsof the English School do point forward. They mark the culmination of adevelopment amongst English School writers away from abstract theoris-ing towards viewing and analysing diplomacy as a practice and as part ofsocial life. Thus, whilst Butterfield and Wight had as their primary aim todevelop a philosophy of history and adopted a rather speculative approachto their subject based mainly in textual analyses,30 Watson, much more thanhis predecessors, focused on diplomacy as a practice, viewing internationalnegotiation, information gathering, and communication as core practicesof the diplomatic trade. In focusing on the actual activities in diplomacy,Watson historicised and sociologised the institution of diplomacy that IR hadpreviously treated as a given.31 Both the understanding of diplomacy as aninternational institution and as a concrete political and social practice arefeatures that are echoed in recent political science research on diplomacyin the EU.

Before looking at this research, however, it may be helpful first toconsider another recent theoretical development that has, at least initially,inhibited the academic interest in diplomacy, but which has recently come

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to enrich it. This is the transnational research perspective. As pointed outabove, an important reason for the fairly limited and secluded scholarshipon diplomacy within IR and international history is the predominance ofintergovernmental, nation-centred approaches in both disciplines. However,part of the reason also lies in the fact that over the last two decades, develop-ments in the research agendas in the two disciplines have been moving pastthe international and national approaches and towards the transnational—or global governance—perspective. And from the outset this perspectivewas based in an—implicit or explicit—juxtaposition of transnationalism andthe study of intergovernmental institutions and actors such as diplomacyand diplomats.

In IR, global governance approaches have argued that diplomacy isnot only to be conceived an increasingly unimportant but also as a neg-ative force in international politics. Acknowledging that diplomacy wasonce an important institution in international relations, scholars subscrib-ing to this view have argued that technological developments and thecomplex interdependence that characterises the globalised world haveblurred the national-international divide and made diplomacy increasinglyirrelevant.32 Alongside this temporal argument, global governance literaturehas mounted a normative argument against diplomacy as a barrier to interna-tional co-operation. Diplomacy, so the proponents of this view argue, is aninstrument of control used by governments to limit international interactions.In its essential structure, diplomacy remains state-centric, and the diplomaticpreference for order and stability following from this mandate is at oddswith attempts to promote equity and justice and extend the ambit of rulesand regulations across states. From this perspective an academic interestin diplomacy is uninteresting because it assumes that diplomats as nationalrepresentatives defend particular national interests and that states’ diplomaticpractices remain fundamentally unchanged.33 Adding to this view, studyingdiplomacy is also problematic because it re-enforces the notion that govern-ments are the main actors in international affairs. Consequently, to the extentthat the global governance literature has been concerned with diplomacy, ithas focused on the development of an alternative diplomacy amongst NGOsand other transnational actors considered to increase the prospect of aninternational order transcending the state system.34 In Europe, this approachhas taken on a distinct and influential form with the Europeanisation liter-ature. In the face of the accelerating integration dynamics brought aboutby the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, public policyresearchers have explored the growing transnationalisation and regionali-sation of decision-making in Europe—and in doing so have tended to lookpast the foreign services.35

International history, too, has had its “transnational turn” and here asimilar marginalisation of the classical state representatives has taken place.Focusing on the flow of people, ideas, and goods across national borders,

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it has defined itself in contradiction to traditional inter-state history andtended to write the statesmen and diplomats out of the international his-torical narrative.36 In the context of European integration history, thesetrends have found a poignant expression in the German historian’s, WolframKaiser’s, re-conceptualisation of the EC/EU as a transnational political societyand supranational political system, highlighting the importance of informaltransnational networks in the EC/EU political system and the emergence ofa European public sphere.37

It is evident that the identification of emerging transnational politicalopportunity structures in the transnational and global governance literatureforms an important, historically founded challenge to the dominant under-standings of diplomacy—not least in the highly integrated European region.Recently, too, political scientists have come to renew the study of diplomacyas they have combined insights from the English School with the insightsgenerated by transnational research perspectives and taken an interest inthe changing forms and functions of diplomatic practices in the increasinglyintegrated bureaucratic and political environment in the EC/EU.

The theoretical essays and empirical studies that have emerged ondiplomacy in the EU over the last decade may be sub-divided into twocategories: one taking a largely political-functional view on the changingpatterns of diplomacy and another, and more recent, adopting a sociologicalperspective on this issue.

At a general level, Anne-Marie Slaughter in A New World Order pin-points the views of the first body of research.38 She points to how “theexecutive” in foreign affairs has become increasingly complex and differen-tiated and draws attention to the development of executive transnationalnetworks that exchange information, co-ordinate policy, collect and dis-tribute best practices, and so on. Stressing the pioneering nature of EU in thisregard, Slaughter has argued that these executive networks are themselvesan organisational form of global governance. Her points have been substan-tiated and developed by a number of scholars headed by the British politicalscientist, Brian Hocking, placing their analytical focus on the interactionsbetween the traditional diplomatic actors and other actors operating in thediplomatic environment. Arguing that foreign ministries have lost their tradi-tional gate-keeping role as primary points of interface between the domesticand the international environment, this literature contends that diplomatshave gained an alternative and equally important role: they have become“boundary spanners” mediating and managing relations between the grow-ing number of bureaucratic and non-governmental actors that have becomeinvolved in the production and administration of international policy.39 Thisprocess, so it is argued, is particularly prominent in the European diplo-matic arena due not only to the density of intra-European relations ingeneral, but also to two specific responsibilities of foreign ministries in rela-tion to the EC/EU: the co-ordination of sectorial ministries’ affairs with the

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EC/EU and member state participation in the common European foreign andsecurity policy.40

The question of how the EU has changed diplomacy in the mem-ber states has been elaborated by Jozef Bátora who, in doing so, picksup on a key aspect of the English School conception of diplomacy asboth a national and an international institution, understanding diplomacyas an institution of “a Janus-faced character with a national side anchoredin particular sovereign states and a transnational side anchored in the setof interstate diplomatic principles and rules.”41 Bátora considers how theprocess of European integration has changed this institution. In particularhe has reflected on the new co-operative bilateral diplomacy in the EC/EUarea and on how the new institutionalised interactions between diplomaticrepresentatives in the Brussels-based body of diplomats, the Comité desreprésentants permanents (COREPER),42 and supranational actors such asthe Commission and the European Parliament has changed diplomacy inEurope and created a particular intra-European mode of diplomacy. In thesame vein, a study by Mai’a K. Davis Cross has explored the Europeandiplomatic corps as a transnational epistemic community. Using as one ofher examples the role of the COREPER in the brokering of the Treaty ofMaastricht, she has demonstrated how they have often exercised their own,collective, agency—separate from member state preferences.43

Whilst this literature has identified and characterised important newaspects in contemporary diplomatic practice in the EU, it does not to anyconsiderable extent consider the motives and perceptions underlying thesenew patterns of diplomatic action; neither does it address the question ofhow this change was brought about. These are questions that have beentouched upon by Rebecca Adler-Nissen. Her empirical focus, too, is theCOREPER diplomats. Conducting interviews with diplomats working here,she has explored how the traditional mainstay of diplomats’ work—the pro-motion of national interests—has been subject to new forms of socialisationin what has otherwise been considered an EU institutional setting operat-ing along classical intergovernmental lines. Like Davis Cross, Adler-Nissensees diplomats as representing both European and national interests. Butshe claims that the clear distinction between what is national and what isEuropean—underpinning the analysis of Davis Cross—fails fully to graspthe character of the “late sovereign diplomacy” of post-1945 Europe. In thisarena, political and legal authorities are overlapping and the very construc-tion of national positions takes place “as part of a struggle for distinctionand dominance in a field where the stakes have already been defined.”44

Diplomats in the EU, she argues, operate on the basis of a—more orless conscious—shared understanding of working in a particular direction,towards fulfilling the aims of the treaties of “an ever closer union.” It means,she argues, that the politico-administrative elites in the EU member stateshave been undergoing a “Europeanization of national identity.”45 Whilst

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assuming that legitimate authority stems from non-elected supranationalbodies such as the Commission, as well as state-based elected and non-elected representatives, they do not view European and national loyaltiesas a zero-sum game; they develop “a more pragmatic and experienced ideathat one is influential if one can come up with common solutions.”46

The points made by Adler-Nissen are significant not only because theyare based on some of the first in-depth empirical research of EU diplo-macy, but also because her attention to the quiet transformations and shiftsin diplomats’ identities and loyalties47 accords with a broader socio-culturalturn in the study of diplomacy. Thus Neumann has argued in favour of—and conducted—anthropological explorations into professional norms andvalues of diplomacy, using the Norwegian Foreign Service as his analyti-cal entry point. Picking up on developments in the English School towards“sociologising” the study of diplomacy, he argues that diplomacy should beexplored as a social practice alongside other social practices of the every-day life of its bearers. Neumann is, in his own words, interested in “thepeople internal to it [diplomacy], that is, the people embodying the prac-tices involved.”48 Similar trends are discernable in French social scienceresearch, where sociological group portraits of different diplomatic groupshave appeared.49

Besides these broader mappings of the social structures of diplomaticprofession, these trends have also taken the form of investigations intoissues such as how technological developments have changed the work-ing of diplomacy and the working life of diplomats and added a genderperspective to the research on diplomacy.50 Whilst in history, there is noparallel to the strong, new interest taken in diplomacy in the EU, the turnto sociological perspectives on diplomacy is discernible in the form of stud-ies of gender and technology.51 And whilst there is still a clear, nationalfocus in these studies, they have become increasingly more contextualised,breaking the mould of the classical organisational history, and relating tobroader political developments in Europe—including in a few instances theEuropean integration process.

Over the last two decades a diverse historical scholarship has appearedexploring how different national experiences of twentieth century interna-tional politics have reflected on the various European diplomatic services.For instance, German historical research from the 1990s onwards has centredon exploring the role of German diplomats and the German Foreign Ministryin the Third Reich and in the transformation from the Third Reich to theFederal Republic.52 Similar attempts to come to terms with the role playedby diplomats in the fascist era and their subsequent diplomatic careers havebeen made in Austria and Italy.53

In Great Britain historical research has taken an altogether differentturn. Here, national narrations of the history of the Foreign Office andDiplomatic Service have been blossoming since the Cold War, and Britain

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is home to the most extensive scholarship on one single European ForeignService.54 In general this scholarship has been interested in understandinghow diplomacy has been applied and developed under changing inter-national conditions with a main focus on Great Britain’s decline from aworld Power to a European middle Power. Whilst sometimes including anAmerican or Commonwealth perspective, the EC/EU plays a minor role inthese narrations.55

French historiography, by contrast, reflects France’s key role in the cre-ation of the EC/EU with studies on how European co-operation has affectedthe Quai d’Orsay.56 Thus, recently, an edited volume has appeared thattakes a comparative historical view on how European co-operation hasaffected European national administrations.57 Though not focusing exclu-sively on the Foreign Services, this is the first publication since Zara Steiner’s1982 book on foreign ministries attempting to study national diplomaticservices from a wider, comparative historical perspective. The volume alsocontains one contribution by British historian, N. Piers Ludlow, which tran-scends the comparative setup of the volume; he studies the creation androle of the COREPER that has also been explored in recent political sci-ence research on EU diplomacy. Ludlow’s argument is quite similar to theones developed by the political scientists. The COREPER, so he argues, didnot only serve to counter-balance and increase member state control overthe European Commission. Pre-empting—and mediating—the arguments ofDavis Cross and Adler-Nissen, he shows how the permanent representativesserved as vital communication channels, mediators, and “trouble shooters”with a shared esprit de corps that mediated between the Commission andmember states as well as amongst member states.58

Picking up on the themes raised by this edited volume and tuning in toHocking and Bátora’s more functionally oriented explorations of diplomacy,Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen have recently explored theemergence of the EC committee structure in the 1960s and its implication ofclassical state representatives such as diplomats.59 Investigating the commit-tee structure in the field of agricultural policy-making during this period,they demonstrate how the emerging political system of the EC/EU created anew and very broad interface between the EC and national administrations.

This interest in the new patterns of diplomacy within the EC/EU isframed by a broader historical interest in the changes in intergovernmentaldiplomatic interactions with the emergence of summitry—both in the formof bilateral summits amongst heads of government60 and institutionalisedmultilateral summits of the European Council and the G7.61 However, theseexplorations are still largely nationally structured, focusing on the motivesand gains of the various governments involved in the summit diplomacy.

Thus there are some indications that historians are approaching theissue of how the EC/EU has transformed diplomacy in Europe and, con-trary to much previous historical research on diplomacy, these studies are

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not carried out by specialised historians of diplomacy but by historiansworking with European and international history more generally. This ishardly a coincidence, considering that there has been a more general ten-dency amongst these historians to consider more seriously the particularsupranational character of the EC/EU polity and bring the new transnationalperspectives together with the study of classical nation state representatives.As Ludlow pointed out in a 2005 article: “political historians [. . .] need tomove beyond the national political framework which has long been theirpreferred stamping ground, and adapt their techniques to the rather differentchallenges posed by supranational decision making”62

Seen together with the broader interest in exploring diplomacy from asociological perspective amongst historians, it is evident that even if thereis no coherent or explicit elaboration of themes about how the EC/EU hasaffected the history of diplomacy in terms of approaches, political scienceand history are currently synchronous. Assuming that these perspectivesare of critical importance for picking up and understanding the changesthat diplomacy in Europe has been undergoing, there are some concludingreflections to be made on what may be potential avenues for further, joint,research.

There is a fundamental incongruence between the far reaching changesthat the EC/EU has brought to inter-state relations in Europe and the lateand scant academic attention that has been paid to the effects of thesechanges for diplomatic norms, roles, and practices. Since the Second WorldWar, research on diplomacy in the two fields has been shaped by three dom-inant theoretical perspectives that for a long time have placed the question ofhow the supranational EC/EU construction transformed diplomacy at a blindangle: a national perspective based in realist and liberal approaches that hasconsidered diplomacy primarily as a tool for promoting national interests inintergovernmental bargaining processes; an international perspective rootedin the English School focused mainly on diplomacy as an institution of inter-national society more generally; and a transnational perspective concernedprimarily with non-state actors, networks and processes.

The idea of diplomacy as an international institution has bound togetherstates, and the awareness of the transnationalisation of twentieth centuryinternational and European politics have recently served to inform andenrich political science research on diplomacy in the EU. For long dominantin historical research on diplomacy, the national perspective has recentlyformed the basis of a historical scholarship that is increasingly adopting abroad political and cultural approach when looking at diplomacy in Europeand, gradually, taking an interest in the changes to the diplomatic tradebrought about by the EC/EU. In sum, the most recent research on diplomacyin the EC/EU area reflects a broader inclination within both political scienceand history to confront and disaggregate diplomacy as an analytical categoryand to challenge, or at least problematise, what Robert D. Schulzinger hastermed “the professional mystique” of diplomacy.63

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However, it still seems that further insights may be gained if historiansengaged more actively with the political science research on the transfor-mative effects of the EC/EU on diplomacy. Considering that the explicitambition of this political science research is to understand the historicaltransformations of diplomacy in relation to the changing forms of politicaland legal authority in the EU, there is a striking absence of historical depthto analysis in these studies. Whilst referring to the macro-historical shifts thathave taken place from the Westphalian state system, the investigations thatare carried out are almost exclusively contemporary in character. Or put dif-ferently: whilst this literature has a lot to say about the ultimate effect of theEuropean integration processes on diplomacy, it has less to offer when itcomes to understanding how this result came about.

Therefore it seems evident that history has something to offer interms of meso- and micro-level diachronic studies of the developments indiplomacy—both in relation to the scholarship that has concerned itself pri-marily with changes in the functional and formal relationships betweendiplomats and other national bureaucratic units and non-governmentalactors and the sociologically-inspired research on the emerging diplomaticfield around the Council and the COREPER. In relation to the first body ofresearch, historical studies would have a lot to offer in terms of exploring,through single national or comparative studies, when and how these newrelationships developed, if and how they developed differently amongstdifferent member states, and who or what were the drivers of change inthese processes.

Likewise, adding a historical perspective to the sociological analysis ofthe diplomatic field around the Council and the COREPER seems relevant.Whilst existing studies have convincingly identified key features of this field,questions such as when and how this particular pattern of social and politicalinteractions developed, how diplomats from new member states have beensocialised into it, and whether it has changed over time have not beenaddressed. Neither has the question of whether and to which degree thediplomatic practices of the EC/EU deviate from diplomatic practices in othermultilateral settings been the object of empirical research. As several studieshave demonstrated, increasingly complex international environments havein general changed diplomatic roles and patterns of actions.64 Even if itseems reasonable to assume that diplomacy in the supranational EU settingcarries certain distinctive features, it is not clear when EU diplomacy startedsetting itself apart from diplomacy in other multilateral settings and what isthe nature and extent of these differences.

In engaging with issues of this kind historians also may have some-thing to offer in terms of methodology. Most political science researchhas been based either in open sources or diplomats’ self-interpretationsas obtained through interviews. Consulting the archives of the variousdiplomatic services or the EC/EU might offer valuable insights into the

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perceptions, motives, and conflicts of interest underlying these processesof change. Also, it seems relevant to include in the research on the Counciland the COREPER, in a more systematic manner, the national dimensionthat has so far been at the centre of historians’ attention. In keeping withBátora’s view of diplomacy as a two-faced organisational field—a transna-tional side anchored in interstate diplomatic principles and rules; and anational side anchored in particular sovereign states—it would seem rele-vant to explore in more depth the relationship and exchanges between theinterlinked fields of EU diplomacy and national foreign services with theirdivergent institutional cultures, norms, and rules. For instance, it could beinteresting to explore in more detail how diplomats coming from differentnational milieus have responded and adapted to the Brussels-based diplo-matic environment, whether the political capital they have built up in theirnational home institutions and in alternative international diplomatic settingsare equally transferable to the EU diplomatic field, and how their differentstarting points and self-perceptions have shaped their interactions with thisenvironment.

Finally it seems relevant to look at the mirror image of these processes:investigating how, in the context of the national foreign services, EU assign-ments were perceived and integrated into and affected diplomatic careerpatterns; exploring how the building up and maintenance of EU exper-tise was secured in these various institutional contexts through recruitment,training practices, and diplomatic postings; and looking into the informalEuropeanisation processes that must have developed as circulation andintegration between these different diplomatic fields increased. If histori-ans would engage actively with the theoretical developments in politicalscience relating to the EU and diplomacy, this would not only serve torenew diplomatic history by opening up a field of study that so far hasnot been cultivated. It would also bring it in synch with broader researchtrends in international and European political history and enrich political sci-ence research by adding temporal and contextual perspectives so far largelyoverlooked.

NOTES

I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments on aprevious version of this article. The article has been written as part of a postdoctoral research projectfunded by the Danish Research Council for Culture and Communication.

1. One prominent example is Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994). Cf. Alan James,“Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies, 19(1993), p. 92.

2. For similar distinctions, see: Adam Watson, Diplomacy. The Dialogue between States (London,1982); Sasson Sofer, “Old and New Diplomacy: a Debate Revisited,” Review of International Studies,Volume 14, Number 3(1988), p. 196; Jan Melissen, “Introduction,” in Jan Melissen, ed., Innovation inDiplomatic Practice (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 1999), p. xvii.

3. Jozef Bátora. “Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?,” CliengendalDiscussion Papers in Diplomacy, 87(2003), p. 20.

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4. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, 1987), 16.Also see Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (New York, 2005), p. 12–3; Sofer,“Old and New,” p. 196; Barry H. Steiner, “Diplomacy and International Theory,” Review of InternationalStudies, Volume 30, Number 4(2004), pp. 493–94.

5. Paul Sharp, “Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation,” InternationalJournal, 52(1997), p. 615.

6. James, “Diplomacy,” p. 95.7. Barry Buzan, C. Jones, and R. Little. The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism

(New York, 1993), p. 40. Cf. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 17.8. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 17–8.9. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to

Maastricht (London, 1998). Cf. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” Hague Journal ofDiplomacy, Volume 4, Number 2(2009), p. 123–24.

10. Patrick Finney, “Introduction: What is International History?” in idem., ed., Palgrave Advancesin International History (New York 2004), p. 15.

11. For some excellent examples of this approach, see Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace.International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933 (London, 1976); Alan S. Milward, The Reconstructionof Western Europe 1945–1951 (London, 1984). Cf. Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy:Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London, 1981).

12. L.V. Ferraris, L’amministrazione centrale del Ministereo degli Esteri italiano nel suo sviluppostorico (Florence, 1955); Klaus Kjølsen et al., Den danske udenrigstjeneste 1770–1970, Volumes 1–2,(Copenhagen, 1970); H.G. Sasse, Hundert Jahre Auswärtiges Amt 1870–1970 (Bonn, 1970); JeanBaillou, ed., Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français, Volume 2: 1870–1980 (Paris,1984); Roger Bullen, ed., The Foreign Office, 1782–1982 (Frederick, MD, 1984); Vincenzo Pellegrini,L’amministrazione centrale dall’Unitá alla Republica. La strutture e i dirigenti, Volume 1: Il Ministerodegli Affari Esteri (Bologna, 1992); Bert van der Zwan, Bob de Graaff and Duco Hellema, eds., DeNederlandse ministers van buitenlandse zaken in de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag, 1999). In the caseof Germany, there are also studies attending to the re-establishment of the German Foreign Ministryafter the Second World War: M. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion und westdeutsche Realität. Vonden Vorbereitungen für einen deutschen Friedensvertrag zur Gründung des Auswärtigen Amts derBundesrepublik Deutschland 1946–1949/51 (Düsseldorf, 1978); H. Piontkowitz, Das deutsche Bürofür Friedensfragen 1947–49. Ein Vorläufer des Auswärtigen Amts im Widerspiel der Kräfte (Göttingen,1978); S. Tunberg, C.-F. Palmstierna et al., Histoire de l’administration des affaires étrangères de la Suede(Uppsala, 1940). This is a genre that has effectively disappeared in the last two decades; however, see:Iver B. Neumann and Halvard Leira, Aktiv og avventende. Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905–2005 (Oslo, 2005).

13. Zara Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982). Cf. ZaraSteiner, “Foreign Services and Modern Diplomacy: Suggestions for a Comparative Approach,” CambridgeReview of International Affairs, 3(1989), p. 3–13.

14. Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction à l’histoire des relations interna-tionales (Paris, 1954).

15. For introductions to the French history of international relations, see Georges-Henri Soutou,“Die französische Schule der Geschichte internationaler Beziehungen,” in Wilfried Loth and JürgenOsterhammel, eds., Internationale Geschichte. Themen—Ergebnisse—Aussichten (München, 2000),31–44, here in particular 39; Robert Frank, “Penser historiquement les relations international,” Annuairefrançais de relations internationales, 4(2003), pp. 42–9.

16. For examples of this approach, see: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 anos jours (Paris, 1953) (published in eleven editions from 1953 to 1993); Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse,Politique étrangère de la France: diplomatic et outil militaire, 1871–1991 (Paris, 1987); Rainer Hudemannand Georges-Henri Soutou, eds., Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert:Strukturen und Beziehungen/Élites en France et en Allemagne aux XIXème et XXème siècles: structureset relations, Volume 1 (München, 1994); Laurence Badel and Stanislas Jeannesson, eds., Diplomaties enrenouvellement. Actes de la journée d’études du 3 octobre 2008 à l’Université Paris-I Panthéon-Sorbonne(Paris, 2009). Currently, the young French historian, Matthieu Osmont, is working on a PhD thesis on Lesdiplomates français et l’Allemagne (1955–1990): (http://centre-histoire.sciences-po.fr/fichiers_pdf/fiches_doctorants/ OSMONTMATTHIEU.pdf.

17. Soutou, “französische Schule,” pp. 31–32.

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18. For instance, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays inthe Theory of International Politics (London, 1966)

19. Iver B. Neumann, “The English School on Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Papers inDiplomacy, 79(2002) on which the following is based. The working paper has later been publishedas: Iver B. Neumann: “The English School on Diplomacy,” in Christer Jönsson and Robert Langhorne,eds., Diplomacy, Volume 1 (London, 2004), pp. 92–116.

20. See in particular Herbert Butterfield, “The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy” andMartin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?,” both in Wight and Butterfield, DiplomaticInvestigations; Martin Wight (Hedley Bull, ed.), Systems of States (Leicester, 1977).

21. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977).22. Derian, On Diplomacy; Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State. Culture, Social

Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ, 1999).23. A testament to the revitalisation of research on diplomacy is the three-volume collection of

writings in the field: Jönsson and Langhorne, Diplomacy.24. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 25.25. Iver B. Neumann, Diplomats and Diplomacy: An Anthropological View (PhD Dissertation,

University of Oslo, 2008), p. 130.26. Neumann, Diplomats and Diplomacy; Costas Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy

(Minneapolis, 1996); Jönsson and Hall, Essence; Sharp, “Diplomats”; idem., “For Diplomacy:Representation and the Study of International Relations,” International Studies Review, 1(1999),pp. 33–57; idem., Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (New York, 2009), Paul Sharp andGeoffrey Wisemann, eds., The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society (Basingstoke,2007).

27. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (New York, 1939); Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice(London, New York, 1917). Cf. Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 624–29.

28. For a prominent example of one such programme, see Clingendael Diplomatic StudiesProgramme: http://www.clingendael.nl/cdsp/); Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 44–45. For a criticalreflection on this development, see James, “Diplomacy.”

29. Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin,Heidelberg, 2007), p. 26. For a similar example, see Charles Chatterjee: International Law and Diplomacy(London, 2007).

30. See in particular Butterfield, “New Diplomacy”; Wight, “International Theory”; idem., Systems.31. Watson, Diplomacy.32. Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 43–44; Brian Hocking, “Foreign Ministries: Redefining

the Gatekeeper Role,” in Brian Hocking, ed., Foreign Ministries. Change and Adaptation(Basingstoke/New York, 1999) 4–5; Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, “Diplomacyand Global Governance: Locating Patterns of (Dis)Connection,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking,and William Maley, eds., Global Governance and Diplomacy. Worlds Apart? (Basingstoke, New York,2008), pp. 2–3.

33. Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” pp. 125–26.34. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley, “Diplomacy,” pp. 1–3.35. For an overview of this literature, see Simon Hix and Claus Goetz, “Introduction: European

Integration and National Political Systems,” in Klaus Goetz and Simon Hix, eds., Europeanised Politics?European Integration and National Political Systems (London, 2001), pp. 1–26.

36. Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen, eds., The History of the European Union.Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72 (Oxford, New York, 2009), pp. 189–205; KiranK. Patel: “Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 52(2004), pp. 626–45.

37. For instance, Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union(Cambridge, New York, 2007).

38. Anne-Marie Slaughter, New World Order (Princeton, NJ, 2004).39. Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non Central Governments and Multilayered

Diplomacy (London, 1993); idem., “Foreign Ministries.”40. Brian Hocking and David Spence, Foreign Ministries in the European Union. Integrating

Diplomats (New York, 2002), in particular Brian Hocking, “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners—Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union,” p. 2; Brian Hocking and

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David Spence: “Towards a European Diplomatic System?,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy,98(2005); Jozef Bátora and Brian Hocking, “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union,” Towards ‘post-modern’ Patterns?,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, 111(2008); Bátora, “European Union.”In 2009, a special issue of the Hague Journal of Diplomacy was devoted to exploring the changes thatthe EC/EU has brought about for the institution of diplomacy. See Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Volume4, Number 2(2009).

41. Bátora, “European Union,” p. 1.42. COREPER is made up by the head of mission from the EU member states in Brussels. Its role

is to prepare the meetings of the ministerial Council of the European Union.43. Mai´a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Community. Diplomats and International

Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht (Basingstoke, New York, 2007), pp. 139–78 Cf. Jönsson andHall, Essence, pp. 160–61.

44. Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” pp. 132.45. Ibid., p. 130.46. Ibid., p. 131.47. See also: Rebecca Adler-Nissen,”The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to

National Integration Strategies,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(2008), pp. 663–84.48. Neumann, “English School,” quote: 20; idem., “To be a Diplomat,” International Studies

Perspectives, 6(2005), pp. 72–93; idem., “Sublime diplomacy,” Millennium, 34(2006), pp. 865–88; idem.,“‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for‘, or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New,”International Political Sociology, Volume 1, Number 2(2007), pp. 183–200; idem., “The Body of theDiplomat,” European Journal of International Relations, 14(2008), pp. 671–95. See also Costas M.Constantinou, “On Homo-Diplomacy,” Space and Culture, 9(2006), pp. 351–64; Sasson Sofer, “Beinga Pathetic Hero in International Politics: The Diplomat as a Historical Actor,” Diplomacy and Statecraft,12(2001), pp. 107–112.

49. Meredith Kingston de Leusse, Diplomatie. Une sociologie des ambassadeurs, (Paris, 1998);Marie-Christine Kessler, “Les ambassadeurs: une élite contestée?,” in Vida Azimi, ed., Les élitesadministratives en France et en Italie (Paris, 2006), pp. 171–85.

50. See Jozef Bátora, Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution: Going Virtual? (Leiden,Boston, 2008); Richard Grant. “The Democratization of Diplomacy: Negotiating with the Internet,”Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, 100(2005). Then Yves Denechere, “La place et le rôle desfemmes dans la politique étrangère de la France contemporaine,” Vingtième Siècle, Volume78, Number2(2003), pp. 89–98; Neumann, “Body.”

51. Sir Alan Campbell: “From Carbon Paper to E-mail: Changes in Methods in the Foreign Office,1950–2000,” Contemporary British History, Volume 18, Number 3(2004), pp. 168–76; S. Eldon, From QuillPen to Satellite: Foreign Ministries in the Information Age (London, 1994); David Paul Nickels, Underthe Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Helen McCarthy, “PetticoatDiplomacy: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service c.1919–1946,” Twentieth CenturyBritish History, Volume 20, Number 3(2009), pp. 285–321; Philip Nash, “America’s First Female Chiefof Mission: Ruth Bryan Owen, Minister to Denmark, 1933–36,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16(2005),pp. 57–72.

52. Hans Jürgen Döscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft: das Auswärtiges Amt unter Adenauer zwis-chen Neubeginn und Kontinuität (Berlin, 1995); Claus M. Müller: Relaunching German Diplomacy. TheAuswärtiges Amt in the 1950s (Münster, 1997); Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and MosheZimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in derBundesrepublik (München, 2010).

53. Rudolf Agstner, Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, and Michaela Follner, Österreichs Spitzendiplomatenzwischen Kaiser und Kreisky. Biografisches Handbuch der Diplomaten des Höheren Auswärtigen Dienstes1918–1959 (Wien, 2009); Bruna Bagnato, “Le cas du ministère des Affaires étrangères italien aprèsla Deuxième Guerre mondiale,” in Élizabeth du Réau, ed., Europe des elites? Europe des peuples? Laconstruction de l’espace européen, 1945–1960 (Paris, 1998), pp. 77–92.

54. Anthony Adamthwaite, “Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden, the Foreign Office and theMaking of Policy,” in Ennio di Nolfo, eds., Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Germany andItaly and the Origins of the EEC 1952–57, Volume 2(Berlin, 1992), pp. 19–42; Gaynor Johnson, ed.,The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, New York, 2005); MichaelDockrill and Brian McKercher, eds., Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy,1890–1951[a festschrift for Zara Steiner on her retirement] (Cambridge, 1996); Lorna Lloyd, Diplomacy

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with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880–2006 (Leiden, 2007); JohnZametica, ed., British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945–50 (Leicester, New York, 1990). Alongsidethis scholarship, more popular accounts have also appeared. See for instance: Edward R. Dudley: TrueBrits: Inside the Foreign Office (London, 1994); John Dickie: The New Mandarins: How British ForeignPolicy Works (London, 2004).

55. For the most recent and academically stimulating example of this genre, see: John W. Young,Twentieth Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice 1963–76, (Cambridge, 2008). For twoexceptions, see Helen Parr: “Gone Native: the Foreign Office and Harold Wilson’s Policy towards theEEC, 1964–1967,” in Oliver Daddow, ed., Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s SecondApplication to Join the EEC (London, 2002), 75–94; Elisabeth Kane, “Europe or Atlantic Community?The Foreign Office and ‘Europe’: 1955–57,” Journal of European Integration History, Volume 3, Number2(1997), pp. 83–98.

56. Jean Claude Allain and Marc Auffret, “Le ministère français des Affaires étrangères. Créditset effectifs pendant la IIIe République,” Relations internationals, 32(1982), pp. 405–46; GhislainSayer, “Le Quai d’Orsay et la construction de la Petite Europe: l’avènement de la Communautééconomique européenne, 1955–1957,” Relations internationals, 101(2000), pp. 89–105; Raphaële Ulrich-Pier, “Antiféderalistes et féderaliste: le Quai d’Orsay face à la construction européenne,” in Michel Catala,ed., Cinquante ans aprés la declaration Schuman. Histoire de la construction européenne (Nantes, 2001),pp. 103–18.

57. Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson, and N. Piers Ludlow, Les administrations nationales etla construction européenne. Une approche historique (1919–1975) (Bruxelles, 2005).

58. N. Piers Ludlow: “Mieux que six ambassadeurs. L’emergence du COREPER durant les premièresannées de la CEE,” in Badel, Jeannesson and Ludlow), Les administrations nationals; A revised versionof the article has been published as “The European Commission and the Rise of Coreper: A ControlledExperiment” in Kaiser, Leucht, and Rasmussen, History, pp. 189–205.

59. Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen: “A European Political System in the Making1958–1970. The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures,” Journal of European Integration History,14(2008), pp. 51–68.

60. David Reynolds, Summits. Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York, 2007).61. Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft (Munich,

1997); Johannes von Karcewski, “Weltwirtschaft ist unser Schicksal” Helmut Schmidt und die Schaffungder Weltwirtschaftsgipfel (Bonn, 2008); John W. Young, “‘The Summit is Dead. Long Live the EuropeanCouncil’: Britain and the Question of Regular Leaders’ Meetings in the European Community, 1973–1975,”Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 4(2009) pp. 319–38; Reynolds, Summits, pp. 401–35. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol however links the new summit diplomacy to the changing EC and international policy environmentin the 1970s more broadly; see Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? TheCreation of the European Council in 1974,” Cold War History 10(2010), pp. 315–39 and idem., “TheVictory of the Intergovernmental Method? The Emergence of the European Council in the Community’sInstitutional Set-Up (1974–1977),” in Daniela Preda and Daniele Pasquinucci, eds., The Road EuropeTravelled Along. The Evolution of EEC/EU’s institutions and policies (Bruxelles, 2010).

62. N. Piers Ludlow, “The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU’s First MajorPolicy,” Contemporary European History, 14(2005), p. 371. Cf. Kiran K. Patel, Europäisierung widerWillen: die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955–1973 (Munich 2009).

63. Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind (Middletown, CT, 1975), inparticular: pp. 101–23.

64. Bertrand Badie, Guillaume Devin, eds., Le multilatéralisme: nouvelles formes de l’actioninternationale (Paris, 2007); Samy Cohen, Les diplomates: négocier dans un monde chaotique (Paris,2002).

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