On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War by Harry G. SummersReview by: Gregory F. TrevertonForeign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 191Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045140 .

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RECENT BOOKS 191

From "Nippophobia" to Fortress Europe to the Single Market: the

European Community's progress over the last decade has been little short

of stunning. Krause, a reporter and editor for The International Herald

Tribune, combines a focus on the underlying economics that drive the

process with easy-to-read prose, enriched by anecdotes about how the

change has affected Europeans in the street. His book frames the chal

lenges that lie ahead?widening to include new members in western

Europe and stretching eastward. Its last chapter, visions of the year 2000 by four European leaders, is inadvertent testimony to the looming question for the United States: none of the visions, save that of Margaret Thatcher, has much of a role for America.

ON STRATEGY II: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GULF WAR. By Harry G. Summers, Jr. New York: Dell, 1992, 302 pp. $4.99 (paper).

People, military, government: Clausewitz's trinity is Summers' frame for

assessing the Gulf War, as it was for his acclaimed and controversial critique of Vietnam. For him, a decorated veteran of both Korea and Vietnam, the Persian Gulf success was stunning: clear and constant goals; a quick,

massive offensive in place of Vietnam's slow squeeze; reserves committed, not held aside lest calling them up be the tripwire to domestic opposition; and for the military, successes produced by unity of command, maneuver and combined arms?successes based on lessons the military had never

entirely forgotten, Vietnam notwithstanding. His watchwords for the future are as provocative as his assessment of the war: talk of multilateral

approaches is misplaced; the United States requires the strategic offensive of a unipolar power.

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H. Daalder. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 411 pp. $45.00. Events of the last two years have all but ended NATO's nuclear

predicament?how to frighten Soviet leaders enough without scaring its own citizens too much?and so the time is ripe for taking stock. Daalder's

richly documented and cleanly written history will stand as definitive until more documents are released. He breaks some new

ground?about, for

instance, the "mininukes" debate of the early 1970s?brings together strands of the story told in parts elsewhere, and does it all with a lucid

understanding of the strategic differences that drove alliance members

apart and the political stakes that pushed them together.

DECISIONS FOR DEFENSE: PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ORDER. By William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner. Washington: Brookings,

1991, 78 pp. $9.95 (paper). Rapid change makes defense planning a moving target, and this

pamphlet by two veteran Pentagon-watchers helps keep the target in view. For them the Pentagon's post-Iraq five-year plan to cut U.S. forces by a

quarter (but spending by somewhat less) was too conservative, too nuclear and too enamored of high-technology birds in the bush at the expense of

weapons in hand. They propose several cheaper options that still share the administration's cautious presumption that, for all the change, interna tional politics has not been revolutionized. They conclude by relaxing that

presumption to outline a cooperative security option, one based on the

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