On Mamba Station U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990-2003

8/7/2019 On Mamba Station U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990-2003

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O n M am ba Station

U .S. M arines in W est Africa, 1990 2003

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

byM ajor Jam es G . AntalU .S. M arine C orps

andM ajor R. John Vanden Berghe

U .S. M arine C orps

H istory and M useum s D ivisionU nited States M arine Corps

W ashington, D .C.2004

DI STRI BUTI ON STATEMENT A: Appr oved f or publ i cRel ease; Di st r i but i on i s unl i mi t ed


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O ther Publications in the SeriesU .S. M arines in H um anitarian O perations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation ProvideComfort. 1995

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. 2003

PC N 19000413300


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This m onograph tells the story of thousands of U .S. M arines w ho supported O perations Sharp Edge,Assured Response, Q uick Response, N oble O belisk, and Joint Task Force Liberia, the noncom batant evac-uation operations in 1990, 1991, 1996, and 2003 from Liberia, in 1996 from the C entral African Republic,and in 1997 from Sierra Leone.

The traditional concepts of em ploying M arines predicated their involvem ent in W est Africa on protect-ing A m erican lives and property that m ight be in danger. Before its actions in W est Africa, the M arineCorps w as frequently called on for noncom batant evacuation operations. Classic exam ples of w hichinclude recent evacuation operations in Cyprus in 1974, South Vietnam in 1975, Cam bodia in 1975, andLebanon in 1982 and 1984. M arine involvem ent in the Liberian evacuations during the countrys 14 yearsof civil w ar w ent beyond the perm anent presence of the M arine Security G uard detachm ent at the U .S.Em bassy in M onrovia, requiring a total of six M arine A ir-G round Task Forces and one Fleet AntiterrorismSecurity Team platoon to deploy in Liberia. Supporting elem ents w ere present in Sierra Leone, Sengal,and Spain. As a testam ent to operational flexibility, the M arines in Liberia reached as far as the C entralAfrican Republic, w hen a M arine A ir-G round Task Forces successfully launched an additional noncom -batant evacuation operation from the Liberia area of operations to support the evacuation of U .S. citizensfrom Bangui. The civil w ar in Liberia from 1989 to 2003 caused m uch bloodshed, death, suffering, anddestruction. The M arine Corps efforts focused on protecting Am ericans lives and property and resulted inthe evacuation of Am ericans and foreign nationals from the violence and chaos of civil w ar.

The authors of this volum e, M ajors Jam es G . Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe, served as historicalw riters assigned the H istory and M useum s D ivision. M ajor Antal previously served in a variety of infantry

and intelligence billets and com m anded the M arine C orps Security Force C om pany in N aples, Italy. H eretired from active duty in 1998. M ajor Vanden Berghe, an infantry officer, served as the assistant opera-tions officer and the operations officer of Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th M arines, during thatunits participation in O peration Sharp Edge. H e retired from active duty in 2002.

In pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the H istory and M useum s D ivision w elcom es com m ents frominterested individual.

John W . RipleyColonel

U nited States M arine Corps (Retired)D irector of M arine Corps H istory and M useum s

Forew ord

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This m onograph exam ines the decisions, deploym ents, and actions of U nited States M arine C orpsforces in Liberia associated w ith O perations Sharp Edge, Assured Response, and Joint Task Force Liberia,and in the C entral African Republic w ith O peration Q uick Response and N oble O belisk in Sierra Leone.The U nited States M arine Corpssupport of the Am erican Em bassy in M onrovia, Liberia, during the coun-trys civil w ar (1989 to 2003) involved six different M arine Air-G round Task Forces. The study begins w ithinteractions betw een the M arines forw ard com m and elem ent and the em bassy staff from M ay throughAugust 1990. Review ed in detail are significant actions leading up to the em bassys 4 August 1990 deci-

sion to evacuate and draw dow n selected sites. M arines conducted security, support, and noncom batantevacuation operations from 5 August 1990 to 15 February 1991. The concurrent actions of W est Africanpeacekeeping forces and Liberian peace efforts are included to provide the context of M arine actions inM onrovia. A short discussion of the interim civil w ar years follow s. W ith the reintroduction of Am ericanforces in April 1996 com es the arrival and deploym ent of the M arines as a joint task force. Accordingly,the study exam ines the deploym ent, com m and relationships, political-m ilitary relationships, the fighting,and M arines actions at the em bassy. N ext is an account of the Special Purpose M arine A ir-G round TaskForce, the last M arine unit in Liberia. Included is a narrative of the units deploym ent, turnover, actionsashore, and their final phased w ithdraw al from the em bassy on 3 August 1996. The account of the M ay1996 evacuation (Q uick Response) from the C entral African Republic provides a related exam ple ofM arine responsiveness in noncom batant evacuation operations. This m onograph illustrates the flexibilityand utility of naval expeditionary forces, specifically, M arine expeditionary units, to conduct noncom bat-ant evacuation operations in an uncertain w orld.

This m onograph could not have been published w ithout the professional efforts of the staff of theH istory and M useum s D ivision. The authors w ould like to thank M r. Charles D . M elson, M r. Charles R.Sm ith, D r. D avid B. Crist, and M rs. W anda J. Renfrow for their m eticulous review and corrections to bothstyle and content, and M r. Charles R. Sm ith, for his contributions to the text. W e also w ould like to thankM s. Evelyn A. Englander, the research librarian, M r. Frederick J. G raboske and his staff in the ArchivesSection, and the Reference Section, headed by M r. D anny J. Craw ford.

Preface

v

Jam es G Antal R. John Vanden B erghe


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Table of Contents

Forew ord ..................................................................................................................................iiiPreface .......................................................................................................................................v

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................vii

Part I - O peration Sharp Edge 1990-1991

Chapter 1 - Liberian Unrest Turns Violent .......................................................................1The G eography of Liberia ........................................................................................................1Sam uel D oes Rise to Pow er ....................................................................................................4Civil W ar Begins ........................................................................................................................5The N eed for U .S. Involvem ent ...............................................................................................5First Look at M onrovia ..............................................................................................................8

Chapter 2 -Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge .........................................................11From Predeploym ent Training to the M editerranean ...........................................................11Point M en in M onrovia ...........................................................................................................12Circling at M am ba Station .......................................................................................................16Frantic N egotiations Fizzle ......................................................................................................19M arines Poised for Insertion ..................................................................................................21The Call to Evacuate ...............................................................................................................23

Chapter 3 -Evacuation Operations ..................................................................................27A Rainy D -D ay ........................................................................................................................27Into the Em bassy .....................................................................................................................30W est African Peacekeepers Arrive .........................................................................................35

Evacuation from Buchanan ....................................................................................................38Rotation of M arine Forces ......................................................................................................41Turnover and D eparture .........................................................................................................42

Chapter 4 -Operation Sharp Edge ...................................................................................43D eploym ent of the 26th M EU ................................................................................................4326th M EU and the Form ation of the CM AG TF in Liberia ....................................................46Peacekeepers, Fighters, and Contigency M AG TF...................................................................47Rotation and Reduction of CM AG TF M arines........................................................................62Com pletion of Sharp Edge .....................................................................................................63The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team and the D eparture of the M arines .......................64

Part II - Continuing O perations 1996-2003

Chapter 5 -22d MEU in Operation Assured Response .................................................67Civil W ar Continues .................................................................................................................67Introduction of Am erican Forces ...........................................................................................69M arines Take the Reins ...........................................................................................................73Actions Ashore ........................................................................................................................74

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M arines Return Fire .................................................................................................................76Reduction of M arine Forces ..................................................................................................83

Chapter 6 -Operation Quick Response ...........................................................................85Violence to the East ................................................................................................................85Call in the M arines ..................................................................................................................88

M arine O perations in Bangui .................................................................................................90Planning for Reinforcem ents ..................................................................................................93Reduction of Presence and W ithdraw al ................................................................................94

Chapter 7 -Planning, Deployment, and Action ............................................................95Special Purpose M AG TF D eploys ..........................................................................................95The Special Purpose M AG TF as the Assured Response Joint Task Force ..........................98M arines D raw D ow n and D epart .........................................................................................100

Epilogue -A Stabilizing Presence.....................................................................................103

Notes .....................................................................................................................................117

Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology ......................................................................................................129Appendix B: C om m and and Staff List..................................................................................135Appendix C: Citations ...........................................................................................................137Appendix D : G lossary of Term s and Abbreviations ...........................................................139

Index .....................................................................................................................................141

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The Geography of Liberia

Liberia is geographically situated betw eenSierra Leone, G uinea, and the Ivory Coaston thew estern bulge of Africa. In total landm ass, thecountry is slightly larger than the state ofPennsylvania. Its narrow coastal strip, from 20 to50 m iles w ide, is interlaced w ith sw am ps, tidal

lagoons, and m arshes. The coastal areas lead torolling hills that range from 400 to 1,200 feet highand are covered w ith dense broadleaf and ever-green forests. Tim ber and rubber plantationsabound in these areas of abundant naturalresources. Along Liberias northern border, therugged G uinea highlands divide the N iger River

basin to the northeast from stream s flow ing acrossthe country. The dom inant m ountain ranges ofthe W ologisiand N im ba, w ith elevations to 5,748feet, are found along the countrys eastern andnortheastern borders. Both of these m ountainranges, as w ell as the low er Bong H ills, are richw ith iron ore deposits and littered w ith goldm ines. The countrys six m ajor rivers drain north-

east to southw est into the A tlantic O cean. Threeof the countrys seven significant diam ond m inesare located near the Lofa River. M ajor port citiesinclude B uchanan, H arper, M onrovia, andRobertsport. The tropical clim ate has very distinctw et and dry seasons. D uring the w et season,w hich runs betw een April and N ovem ber, the

Chapter 1

Liberian U nrest Turns Violent


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average accum ulation of rainfall is betw een 150and 170 inches w ith alm ost daily torrential thun-derstorm s in the late afternoon. In the capitalcity of M onrovia, the m ean tem perature is 82degrees Fahrenheit w ith an average hum idity of90 percent.

Liberia traces its origins back to the 1816 estab-lishm ent of the A m erican Colonization Society.Intended to sponsor the repatriation of form erAm erican slaves to W est Africa, this organizationestablished its first successful settlem ent on CapeM esurado in 1821. That site grew into the city of

2 O N M A M B A STATIO N


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M onrovia. By 1847, m ore than 45,000 freed m en,as w ell as Africans rescued from slave ships, hadsettled there. M ost of these settlers died of diseaseor in conflicts w ith local tribesm en. The settlersdeclared independence from the Am ericanColonization Societys jurisdiction in 1847 andestablished a republic constitutionally m odeledafter the U nited States. European nations quickly

recognized the new country, but the U nited Statesfailed to establish diplom atic ties until 1862.1

Liberias seem ingly dem ocratic structure w as,in fact, a faade. Territory claim ed by African-Am erican settlers and their descendents (Am erico-Liberians) and those rescued from slave ships(Congoes) extended eastw ard into the interior,w hich w as populated by at least 16 indigenoustribal groups. The ruling Am erico-Liberian elitehad no interest in assim ilating the African popula-tion and referred to them as the Country People.Adopting the attitudes and lifestyle of antebellumsoutherners, A m erico-Liberians regarded thenative Afro-Liberians as uncivilized inferiors.Although Liberians considered their stateChristian, only about 10 percent of the populationbelonged to one of the C hristian denom inations;20 percent w ere M uslim , and the rem aining 70percent m aintained traditional African beliefs.

English is the official language, but there are m orethan 20 dialects derived from N iger-Congo lin-guistic groups. A pidgin Liberian Englishis thecom m on tongue.

The True W hig Party, w hich represented theinterests of a sm all group of interrelated fam iliesthat dom inated the country, m onopolized politicalpow er for 133 years. This group com prised only5 percent of the population. This ruling classresided m ainly in the coastal urban centers, prin-cipally M onrovia, and exploited Liberias naturalresources of rubber, iron ore, and lum ber usinglabor coerced from the rural population. Firestone

Tire and Rubber Com pany established the w orldslargest rubber plantation at H arbel in 1936,heralding a period of increased Am erican eco-nom ic involvem ent in the country. An O pen D oorPolicy, im plem ented after the election ofPresident W illiam S. Tubm an in 1944, led toincreasing foreign investm ent and m odest pros-perity. D uring W orld W ar II, the U nited Statesbuilt Roberts A irport and the Freeport ofM onrovia, further developing the countys infra-structure.

U nfortunately, m ore em phasis w as placed onexporting raw m aterials than on expanding

Liberias industrial capacity. In addition, aN ational U nification Policy aim ed at assim ilatingrural Afro-Liberians fell short of incorporating thenative population into the political pow er struc-ture. Tubm an, in fact, had no tolerance for anyform of political opposition. W hen form erPresident Edw in Jam es Barclays IndependentW hig Party challenged Tubm an in the 1955 pres-idential elections, his supporters w ere harassed

LIBERIAN U N REST TU RN S VIO LEN T 3

Photo courtesy of the authors

In government since 1935, William RichardTolbert, Jr., succeeded to the presidency of Liberiaupon William S. Tubmans death in 1971.Instituting reforms to close the disparity betweenAmerico-Liberi ans and indigenous tribesmen,Tolbert raised expectations whi le the economyfailed, stimulating opposition and a military

coup.


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and Barclays party w as eventually banned.Although Liberia prospered, only the True W higoligarchy benefited and repression m aintainedthe chasm betw een them and the m ajority of thepopulation. This situation continued during thepresidency of W illiam K. Tolbert, w ho assum edoffice upon Tubm ans death in 1971. But discon-tent led to organized opposition and theM ovem ent for Justice in Africa w as form ed at theU niversity of Liberia in 1973. Then in 1975,Liberian students in the U nited States organizedthe Progressive Alliance of Liberia. An unpopularincrease in the cost of rice led to a dem onstrationon 14 April 1979, w hich escalated into rioting,looting, and the deaths of nearly 100 people inM onrovia.

Samuel Does Rise to Power

A year later, Tolbert died w hen 17 noncom -m issioned officers, led by M aster Sergeant Sam uelK enyon D oe, storm ed the Executive M ansion.They m urdered the president in bed and killed 26m em bers of his security guard. After advising trib-al soldiers not to obey Am erico-Liberian officers,the enlisted m en assum ed control of the govern-m ent and proclaim ed them selves the PeoplesRedem ption C ouncil. The public initially w el-com ed the end of 133 years of Am erico-Liberianrule w ith enthusiasm , but the televised executionof 13 Tolbert Adm inistration officials by drunkensoldiers foreshadow ed the im position of a m ilitary

dictatorship. D oe prom ised a return to civilianrule by 1985; political activity w as banned until1984. O f 14 political parties that w ere organized,only four w ere allow ed to participate in the pres-idential and legislative elections held on 15O ctober 1985. M any of D oes opponents w eredetained or otherw ise harassed, and w hen theelection still seem ed to turn against him , repre-sentatives of his ow n N ational D em ocratic Partyof Liberia m anipulated the vote count and pro-claim ed him the victor w ith 50 percent of thevotes (80 percent of the legislative seats beingclaim ed by his party). M eanw hile, D oe rem oved

m any of his fellow 1980 coup conspirators fromthe governm ent, increasing the concentration ofpow er to m em bers of his ow n K rahn tribe. TheK rahn, like the A m erico-Liberians before them ,becam e a despised m inority ruling over arepressed m ajority. O n 12 N ovem ber 1985, form erPeoples Redem ption Council m em ber G eneralThom as Q uiw onkpa led an unsuccessful coupattem pt. Q uiw onkpas failure led to his execution

and that of 16 of his supporters, follow ed byw idespread persecution of their G io and M anotribesm en. Approxim ately 3,000 w ere killed,especially in Q uiw onkpas ow n N im ba County.

M any fled the country to aw ait an opportunity forrevenge.2

D uring the early 1980s, Liberia w as view ed asa bastion against Soviet expansionism and Libyaninfluence in Africa and Am erican aid flow ed intothe country. The end of the Cold W ar and increas-ing alarm over D oes abysm al hum an rightsrecord led to a reduction of aid by the end of thedecade. This decline, coinciding w ith decreases inthe value of Liberias exported raw m aterials andthe corruption and incom petence of the regim e,resulted in econom ic chaos and w idespreadunem ploym ent.

Then cam e Charles Taylor. An Am erico-Liberian educated in M assachusetts, Taylor w as anexpatriate opponent of the Tolbert regim e.Present in Liberia during the 1980 coup, hisdegree in econom ics and glib personality earnedhim the leadership of the G eneral ServicesAdm inistration, w hich w as responsible for cen-tralized governm ent purchasing. H e w as accusedof em bezzling about $1 m illion U .S. dollars in


Leaders of the voilent 1980 military coup thatoverthrew Pr esident Tolbert were: ( left) Sgt

Nicholas Podier, who became speaker of the inter-im National Assembly; Sgt Thomas StrongmanQuiwonkpa, commander of the Armed Forces ofLiberia; MSgt Samuel Kenyon Doe, head of state;and Sgt Thomas Weh Syen, deputy head of state.All died violently. Three were killed on orders ofSamuel Doe, and Doe himself was ki lled in themidst of the 1990 civil war.


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1983 and fled to the U nited States, w here he livedas a fugitive until he w as arrested by U .S. m ar-shals. In Septem ber 1985, Taylor escaped fromM assachusettsPlym outh County Jail, w here hew as aw aiting extradition. H e m ade his w ay toLibya w here M uam m ar Q adhafi allow ed him to

train an insurgent force. After additional trainingin Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, TaylorsN ational Patriotic Front of Liberia (N PFL) crossedthe border into N im ba C ounty on Christm as Eve,1989.3

Civil War Begins

Initially, few in the governm ent took the threatseriously. By late D ecem ber, how ever, D oe sentthe 2d Battalion of his arm y to suppress the guer-rillas. Targeting G io and M ano tribesm en associat-ed w ith Q uiw onkpas 1985 attem pt, the K rahn-

dom inated Arm ed Forces of Liberia (AFL) alienat-ed the population w ith indiscrim inate m urder,rape, and pillage. As civilians began to fear gov-ernm ent soldiers m ore than the N PFL, Taylorsforce grew . M any soldiers likew ise fled to therebels, taking their w eapons w ith them . Theinsurgents lured som e AFL units into am bushes bypassing false m essages on captured radios, gain-ing m ore arm s in the process. Children as youngas 10 years old fought as w ell, som e to avengeslain fam ily m em bers and others sim ply becausethey had no option.4

As popular support grew , the N PFL expanded

its initial focus on killing governm ent troops andofficials to persecution of D oes Krahn and theirM andingo associates. By 6 January 1990, m orethan 10,000 refugees had fled to the Ivory Coast,spreading w ord of atrocities com m itted by bothgovernm ent and rebel forces. M eanw hile, D oetightened his ow n security by establishing num er-ous checkpoints throughout M onrovia and dis-patching additional troops into the interior.5

The insurgents successfully eluded D oesforces, m oving across m ountains and throughforests to seize the tow n of Tapeta, w hich gavethem control of the coastal road and split the

country in half. O n 7 M arch, the U nited StatesCongress passed H ouse Resolution 354, con-dem ning atrocities com m itted by both parties inthe conflict.6 O n 24 M arch, an A m erican m ission-ary w as killed in crossfire. In M onrovia, govern-m ent troops began harassing Liberians em ployedby the A m erican Em bassy. Threats directedagainst em bassy officials over the security guardsradio net culm inated in the burning of an

em bassy w arehouse by tw o disgruntled em ploy-ees on 29 M arch. As Taylors forces advanced intoG rand G edeh County in early April, the num berof Liberians seeking refuge in neighboring coun-ties grew to m ore than 140,000.7 O n 23 A pril, anem bassy travel advisory stated the security situa-

tion w as deteriorating as random acts of violenceagainst foreigners increased. Three days later, thevoluntary evacuation of official dependents andnonessential personnel w as authorized. W ithin aw eek, the official Am erican com m unity shrankfrom 621 to 143 as em bassy fam ilies, Peace C orpsvolunteers, and em ployees of the Voice ofAm erica and the U nited States Agency forInternational D evelopm ent(U SAID ) left the coun-try.8

M eanw hile, D oe urged K rahn chiefs to: gettheir cutlasses and single barrel guns and get intothe bush and pursue the rebels,prom pting fur-

ther atrocities.9 Loyalist troops arrested 150 G io

soldiers suspected of treason. M any of M onroviasprim arily M andingo taxi drivers fled to SierraLeone and G uinea w hile AFL troops m anning agrow ing num ber of checkpoints throughout thecity detained, harassed, and extracted bribes fromm otorists. In addition, the num ber of m utilatedcorpses m ultiplied. O n 24 M ay, the U .S. StateD epartm ent issued another travel advisory order-ing all nonessential personnel to leave.

The Need for U.S. Involvement

As the situation continued to deteriorate, theJoint Chiefs of Staff began looking at four possi-ble actions that had been presented by the U .S.European Com m and. The m aritim e option includ-ed the em ploym ent of a M arine am phibious force.The other three involved Arm y airborne or U .S.Special O perations Com m and forces seizing

LIBERIAN U N REST TURN S VIO LEN T 5

During the early 1980s, Liberia wasviewed as a bastion against Sovietexpansionism and Libyan influence in

Afr ica and American aid flowed intothe country. The end of the Cold Warand increasing alarm over Doesabysmal human rights record led to areduction of aid by the end of thedecade.


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Roberts International Airport. The A m ericanEm bassy in M onrovia w anted a m ilitary optionavailable, but did not favor a direct m ilitary pres-ence ashore. Personnel w ere still being evacuatedby com m ercial charter flights, and although therew as no governm ent opposition to their departure,nor any apparent physical threat, num erous road-blocks had to be negotiated on the w ay to the air-port. Evacuees traveled in convoys escorted bythe em bassys regional security officer and locallyhired guards. W hile it appeared a noncom batantevacuation operation conducted by U .S. forcesw as unnecessary, the m aritim e option providedthe m ost viable contingency force. After review ,President G eorge H . Bush, w ith the advice of theChairm an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, G eneralColin L. Pow ell, and the Secretary of D efense,Richard B . Cheney, approved the European Com -m ands plan to station off the Liberian coast 2,500

M arines equipped for an am phibious landing.O n 25 M ay 1990, the 22d M arine ExpeditionaryU nit (Special O perations Capable) (M EU (SO C)),as part of its Landing Force Sixth Fleet deploy-m ent 2-90 (the second M EU deployed to the

M editerranean that year), w as training at Cam p deCanjuers near the port of Toulon in southernFrance. The M EU com prised a com m and elem ent(the M EU staff); Battalion Landing Team 2dBattalion, 4th M arines (BLT 2/4); M arine M ediumH elicopter Squadron 261 (H M M -261); and M EU

Service Support G roup 22 (M SSG -22), the M EU slogistical support elem ent. W hen the deploym entorder cam e in from G eneral Pow ell, the M EUsM cD onnell D ouglas AV-8B H arrier detachm ent,based ashore at H yeres N aval Air Station east ofToulon, abruptly shifted its focus from routinetraining to m ounting outon board ship. The fol-low ing day, Adm iral Jonathan T. H ow e,Com m ander in Chief, U .S. N aval Forces, Europe,

issued the deploym ent order directing theM editerranean Am phibious Ready G roup (ARG )w ith the 22d M EU to proceed to the vicinity ofM onrovia. U pon arrival off the Liberian coast, theM arines w ould prepare for evacuations and secu-rity operations at U .S. installations ashore to beconducted w ith or w ithout perm ission from theLiberian governm ent. Colonel G ranville R.G rannyAm os, com m anding officer of 22d M EU ,had been m onitoring the situation for som e tim eand im m ediately directed that equipm ent and per-sonnel be em barked in com pliance w ith a 12-hour standby plan.10

G overnm ent and rebel forces continued fight-ing at the key tow ns of G arbande and Buchanan.*The rebel tactics w ere to first attack checkpointsand convoys outside a tow n, then encircle it.O nce surrounded, governm ent troops usuallyretreated into the tow n, haphazardly firing m or-

tars, rockets, and m achine guns. The terrorizedcivilian population suffered m ost. D oes troopsgenerally deserted or fled, allow ing the rebels tow in easy victories.11 Taylors rebels em ployedthese very tactics on 26 M ay to seize the city ofKakata, about 30 m iles northeast of M onrovia.Arbitrary arrests and detentions in M onrovia con-tinued, as did the indiscrim inate killing of G iosand M anos by K rahn soldiers. As fighting drewcloser, m ore refugees flocked into the capital.Seeking protection from the violence, a largegroup gathered outside the com pound of theU nited N ations D evelopm ent Program (U N D P).

U .N . personnel granted entry to about 1,500.O n the evening of 29 M ay, governm ent AFL

troops broke into the com pound firing autom aticw eapons, w ounding tw o guards and killing athird. Betw een 30 and 40 m en and boys, includ-ing G io and M ano U N D P em ployees, w ereforcibly rem oved. At least eight w ere tortured,executed, and m utilated on a nearby beach.M ichael H eyn, the U .N . representative in Liberia,described the attack as incredible, and a violationof international law .12 O n 30 M ay, the U .N . evac-uated its entire staff. Although D oe visited thecom pound the follow ing day, prom ising the sur-

vivors he w ould find the culprits, he either couldnot, or had no intention of, controlling his arm y.

Prior to this incident, the com m ander of theSixth Fleet, Vice A dm iral Jam es D . W illiam s, U SN ,authorized the dispatch of the 22d M EUs forw ard


* Buchanan is a port linked by road and rail to both M onroviaand the interior.

On the evening of 29 May, governmentAFL troops broke into the compound fi r-ing automatic weapons, wounding two

guards and killing a third. Between 30and 40 men and boys, including Gio and

Mano UNDP employees, were forciblyremoved. At least eight were tortured,executed, and mutilated on a nearbybeach.


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com m and elem ent to Liberia. Serving as a liaisonbetw een State D epartm ent personnel and theM EU , the em ploym ent of a forw ard com m and ele-m ent is standard procedure for any evacuationoperation.13 U nfortunately, the em bassy inM onrovia had not requested the forw ard com -m and elem ent, w hich m ade coordination difficult.The team s five original m em bers w ere reduced to

tw o due to problem s w ith travel arrangem ents.Encum bered by personal w eapons, am m unition,pyrotechnics, satellite com m unications equip-m ent, cryptology gear, rations, uniform s, andcivilian clothes, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J.Labadie, Jr., the 22d M EUs executive officer, andM ajor G len R. Sachtleben, executive officer of BLT2/4, flew from the U SSSaipan (LH A 2) by heli-copter on 29 M ay.

After landing at Rota N aval Station in Spain, thepair sought transportation for them selves andtheir equipm ent to Liberia. Com m ercial trans-portation presented several problem s. N ot onlyw as it extrem ely expensive, but their equipm entw ould be difficult to pass through custom s. Theyalso had no visas, and the circuitous route (con-necting at M adrid, Paris, and Am sterdam ) w ould

take 46 hours to com plete. A N avy Beech D -12Super King airplane w as available, but it couldnot carry both them and all their baggage. Theofficers considered crossing to M orocco, renting acar, and driving to M onrovia. M eanw hile, ColonelAm os decided to send the three rem aining for-w ard com m and elem ent m em bers: Captain D avidJ. M ollahan, officer in charge of the M EUs airnaval gunfire liaison com pany detachm ent;


D VIC D N -SC-90-08850A port view of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2) . In the Mediterranean participating withthe 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit in NATO southern region exercise Dragon Hammer 90, the Saipanand other ships in the amphibious ready group would be ordered to waters off Liberia.


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Lieutenant Com m ander Robert Peterm an, officerin charge of the A m phibious Squadron 4s(Phibron 4) naval special w arfare group detach-m ent; and Sergeant Scott R. W iddifield, from theM EUs radio battalion detachm ent. W hile the triotraveled to Rota, M ajor Sachtleben m etCom m ander Phillip G . H obbs, the com m andingofficer of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 22(VR-22), a N avy Lockheed C -130 H erculessquadron based at the naval station. That night,the tw o officers agreed that a V R-22 H erculesw ould fly the forw ard com m and elem ent toM onrovia, provided each got the approval of theirrespective chains-of-com m and. W hile the forw ardcom m and elem ent spent 30 M ay getting vaccina-tions and M alaria pills, VR-22 helped them obtainpersonal clearances to travel to Liberia and sub-m itted an aircraft clearance request. At 0500 on 31M ay, their C-130 left Rota for M onrovia.

First Look at Monrovia

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, M ajor Sachtleben,and the rem aining m em bers of the forw ard com -

m and elem ent arrived at 1205 local tim e. The air-craft spent only 15 m inutes on the ground, justlong enough to quickly offload its passengers andtheir equipm ent. Roberts International Airport, 35m iles from M onrovia, w as closed to com m ercialtraffic due to nearby rebel attacks. LieutenantColonel Bruce N ew m an, U SA, assistant chief ofthe m ilitary m ission at the em bassy w elcom ed theforw ard com m and elem ent. The five-m an teamthen drove to the em bassys G reystone com -pound, w here Lieutenant Colonel Labadie direct-ed them to establish com m unications w ith the 22dM EU w hile he m et w ith the em bassy staff.14

The staff briefed the forw ard com m and ele-m ent on the current situation. At the m eeting ofthe Econom ic Com m unity of W est African Stateson 30 M ay in Banjul, G am bia, the participantscalled for an im m ediate ceasefire and establisheda standing m ediation com m ittee to help resolve

the conflict. But the insurgents had alreadyreached H arbel (site of the form er Firestone rub-ber plantation, now Japanese ow ned), bringingthem w ithin 20 m iles from the capital. Thisadvance effectively closed all air traffic to Roberts



Armed I ndependent National Patri otic Front of Liberi a soldiers drive past the Ameri can Embassy onUnited Nations Drive. The rebel soldiers belonged to one of two factions challenging government forcesfor control of the capital.


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International Airport. In addition, Taylors N PFLhad split into tw o factions, w hich further com pli-cated the situation. Form er arm y captain and eth-nic G io, Prince Yorm ie Johnson, broke w ithTaylor in February to form a new faction calledthe Independent N ational Patriotic Front ofLiberia (IN PFL). This group w as challenging boththe governm ent forces and their form er com radesfor control of the capital. Control of m ore thantw o-thirds of the country w as now split betw eenthe tw o rebel factions, each of w hich continued toadvance in spurts, pausing to reorganize betw eenattacks.

O n 26 M ay, the 22d M EU com pleted loading its

personnel and equipm ent on the ships of theARG , w hich sailed from Toulan the follow ing day.As the group passed Rota, H M M -261 helicopterspicked up additional personnel, supplies, andm aps of Liberia. The ships then headed southafter taking on fuel and supplies. TheSaipan andU SSSumter(LST 1181) proceeded together w hilethe U SS Ponce (LPD 15), delayed by repairs, fol-low ed later.

Recognizing the M EU m ight be given a contin-gency m ission in Liberia prior to receipt of thedeploym ent order, Colonel Am os directed theM EU staff to refine their plans. U sing rapid plan-ning techniques, they w ere a day ahead w hen theorder w as received on 26 M ay. The follow ing day,the staff briefed G eneral Jam es P. M cCarthy,U SAF,D eputy Com m ander in C hief, EuropeanCom m and; Brigadier G eneral Richard Potter, U SA,Com m ander, Special O perations Com m and,Europe; A dm iral Jonathan H ow e, U SN ,Com m ander in Chief, U .S. N aval Forces, Europe;and Vice Adm iral Jam es D . W illiam s, U SN ,Com m ander, Sixth Fleet, on board the Saipan.

The briefing detailed various courses of actionopen to the M EU , should it be called upon to exe-cute a noncom batant evacuation operation inM onrovia, now designated O peration Sharp Edge.

Reports on the deteriorating situation led to anall-out effort to get the M arines to Liberia quickly.Accom panying the ships of Phibron 4, w hichform ed the A RG , w as the destroyer U SS Peterson(D D 969). The M EU transferred a reinforced pla-


D VIC D N -ST-90-11228

The American Embassy in Monrovia became the focal point for American ci tizens and other foreignnationals to gather in preparation for evacuation during Liberias political unrest and civil war.


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toon of M arines and one helicopter to thedestroyer so they could arrive prior to the rest ofthe task force. These 75 M arines w ould providequick reinforcem ent if called upon, and includedan evacuation control center to coordinate anevacuation. A detachm ent of N avy SEALs (Sea,Air, Land) from N aval Special W arfare G roup 2also boarded the Peterson. Traveling at 30 knots,the destroyer arrived off Liberia on 2 June.

The operation order for Sharp Edge directedthe task force to be ready to conduct an evacua-tion w ithin 24 hours of notification. It alsoassigned Adm iral W illiam s, the com m ander of theSixth Fleet, as the com m ander of the joint taskforce (JTF).15 The JTF, now officially form ed,com prised approxim ately 2,300 M arines from the22d M EU and 1,900 sailors from the ARG . W henthe Saipan and Sumter arrived on 3 June, theM arines on the Peterson returned to theSaipan.

W ith the arrival of the Ponce on 4 June, the JTFw ent into a m odified location at sea, designatedM am ba Station.*

The em bassy com pound w as located on apeninsula at the w estern edge of M onrovia w iththe ocean to the w est and south and theM esuardo River to the north. To the east w ere thebusiness district, central m arket, Tubm an Stadium ,and the A FLs Barclay Training C enter. TheExecutive M ansion and Capitol w ere southeast ofthe training center. Tubm an Boulevard, the citys

m ain thoroughfare, passed eastw ard through theSinkor D istrict, Spriggs-Payne Airport, and CongoTow n. Tubm an B oulevard branched off atPaynesville. Traveling northeast, it w as eight m iles

to the U .S. O m ega navigation transm itter site and22 m iles to the Voice of Am erica transm itter. Sixm iles further east the road forked again, leadingeither northeast to K akata or southeast to H erbel.

The other fork in Tubm an B oulevard led eastw ardalong the coast tow ard the U .S. telecom m unica-tions transm itter and Roberts InternationalAirport. Tw o bridges crossed the M esuardo Rivernorth of M onrovia, connecting the capital w ithBushrod Island w here the Freeport w as located.The road continued north across the St. PaulRiver, passing through Brew ersville to the Voiceof A m erica receiving station and Am ericantelecom m unication office receiver site.

The Am erican com m unity w as spread outam ong the city of 400,000 people. An em bassyw arehouse w as on Bushrod Island.16 The U SAIDlibrary w as located in the central business district.The G raystone com pound w as located one blockeast of the M am ba Point em bassy com pound andhoused diplom atic personnel. The em bassysM arine Security G uard detachm ent lived at M arineH ouse on U nited N ations D rive. A U .S.

G overnm ent Services O rganization w arehousew as w ithin a block of the B arclay Training C enter,w hile the Am erican C ooperative School, U SAIDH eadquarters, Peace Corps O ffice and trainingcenter, and housing for several em bassy staffm em bers and other Am erican citizens w ere locat-ed in Sinkor and Congo Tow n. Am ericans w ork-ing in outlying areas such as the O m ega andVoice of Am erica transm itter sites lived in eitherM onrovia or its suburbs.

Both the em bassy staff and senior N avy andM arine com m anders of the task force w ere clear-ly aw are of U .S. policy tow ard the D oe regim e.

D uring the 1980s, approxim ately $500 m illion ineconom ic, m ilitary, and social aid flow ed intoLiberia, m aking it W est Africas largest per capitarecipient of Am erican assistance.17 Because of thecountrys long-standing ties w ith the U nitedStates, and the Cold W ar access to Africa it gavethe A m erican governm ent, the tw o nations hadstrong m utual interests.** Yet the D oe regim escorruption, incom petence, and appalling hum anrights record could not be ignored.18 As the rebelfactions closed in on M onrovia, M arines andsailors w aiting off the coast faced an increasinglycom plex and volatile situation.

10 O N M A M B A STA TIO N

** United States aircraft could land and refuel in Liberia on 24

hoursnotice. The O m ega navigation station assisted interna-tional shipping by p roviding navigational fixes, w hile the

Am erican telecom m unications relay site provided com m uni-

cations for diplom atic traffic betw een em bassies in sub-Saharan A frica. The Voice of Am erica relay station transm itted

broadcasts throughout the region.

* M am ba Station w as nam ed for M am ba Point, the location ofthe U .S. Em bassy in M onrovia.

During the 1980s, approximately $500million in economic, military, and socialaid flowed into Liberia, making it West

Africas largest per capita recipient ofAmerican assistance.


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From Predeployment Training to theMediterranean

In the course of training for its deploym ent, the22d M arine Expeditionary U nit (SpecialO perations Capable) practiced three noncom bat-ant evacuation operations. For the 22d M EUs

graduationspecial operations exercise, BattalionLanding Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4) conducted tw o dif-ferent site noncom batant evacuation operationsconcurrently. O ne evacuation took place at am ock em bassy and the other at an outlying site.U sing rapid planning techniques, the M EU exe-cuted the m ultisite noncom batant evacuationoperations exercise at Cam p Lejeune, N orthCarolina, w ithin six hours of receiving the w arn-ing order. Com pany E perform ed the outlying sitem ission and C om pany H the m ock em bassy m is-sion.19 By coincidence, the exercise m irroredclosely the subsequent actions of the unit in

Liberia.Before the deploym ent, the staff studied a

num ber of contingency areas, including Liberia.The M EUs intelligence officer, M ajor Stephen L.Sayko, explained: Prior to the deploym ent w estarted to take a look at the m ap, and Africa kindof stood out at us.If a contingency arose thatneeded a m aritim e option, the M ed M EU w ouldbe the only gam e in tow n.The intelligence sec-tion took the standard contingency planningm aterials for W est Africa, w hich includedLiberia.20

The 22d M EU s deploym ent began on 8 M arch

1990 w hen it sailed from M orehead City, N orthCarolina. As the next unit in the norm al rotationto the M editerranean, they steam ed across theAtlantic and arrived at N aval Station, Rota, Spain,on 26 M arch. W hile at Rota, the staff received itsfirst dispatch on Liberia, w hich reported anAm erican citizen had died from a gunshot w oundto the leg. After this initial m essage, the M EU staffbegan receiving other reports from the em bassy

in Liberia, including inform ation on the 29 M archburning of the U .S. Em bassy w arehouse inM onrovia.

By 23 April, in Cannes, France, the M EUlearned that the State D epartm ent had issued atravel advisory on Liberia. The advisory recom -m ended that Am erican citizens leave the country,

and noted the start of a reduction of official per-sonnel at the em bassy. That sam e day, the FleetM arine O fficer at the U .S. N avys European head-quarters, Colonel W illis H . BillH ansen, togetherw ith U .S. European Com m and representatives,briefed the M EU staff. Colonel H ansen had led afour-m an European Com m and assessm ent teamto Liberia earlier that m onth and had acquired anexcellent understanding of the em bassys situationas w ell as possible evacuation sites.21 The first-hand assessm ent gave the M EU com m ander andhis staff helpful planning inform ation and accessto recent pictures taken in Liberia. Colonel

H ansen review ed all possible force options avail-able to European Com m and if an evacuation w asrequired, but the staff focused on the one m ar-itim e option that included the M EU . W ith this newand updated inform ation, M ajor Saykos intelli-gence section began to develop detailed supportplans in earnest.22 * M eanw hile, the M arines con-tinued their scheduled training and exercises inthe M editerranean.

In the first w eek of M ay, the M EU participatedin D ragon H am m er, a N orth Atlantic TreatyO rganization exercise in Sardinia. After the exer-cise, the M EU sailed to San Rapheal, France, and

off-loaded equipm ent and personnel on 16 M ayfor training at nearby Cam p de Canjuers. W henthe M editerranean-based Am phibious ReadyG roup (ARG ) anchored in Toulon on 17 M ay, theM EU split for training and liberty. W hile one halftrained for 10 days at Cam p de Canjuers, the other

Chapter 2

Preparing for O peration Sharp Edge

* The p lanning included obtaining the em bassys Em ergency

Action Plan from U .S. European Com m and.


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half enjoyed liberty in Toulon. W ith m essages

from the Am erican Em bassy in M onrovia indicat-ing a steadily w orsening situation, ColonelG ranville Am os w anted his M arines prepared toreact quickly. H e directed his staff and subordi-nate com m anders at Cam p de C anjuers to readyplans for a possible 12-hour return to the ships atany point in the training cycle. Realizing the seri-ousness of the deteriorating situation, ColonelAm os, a veteran of the evacuations of PhnomPenh and Saigon, as w ell as operations inG renada and B eirut, w anted to be ready for anyeventuality.23

Early on the m orning of 25 M ay, Colonel Am os

officially learned about the possible contingencym ission in Liberia. The alert order issued by theChairm en of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the22d M EU and Am phibious Squadron 4 (Phibron4) to get under w ay for Liberia.24 The ships sailedtw o days later after a quick loading of equipm entand personnel back on board. As they steam edout of the M editerranean, the ships received fueland fresh supplies. The M arines received person-

nel augm entation.* O n the w ay to Liberia, the

M EU received European Com m ands O perationO rder Sharp Edge w hile conducting m ass casual-ty drills and evacuation operation receptionrehearsals.25 The orders directed the M EU to beprepared to protect and evacuate A m erican citi-zens and other foreign nationals from Liberia.

Point Men in Monrovia

In preparation for the evacuation, the M EUsent a five-m an forw ard com m and elem ent to theem bassy in M onrovia to assess the situation.Arriving on 31 M ay, the team s reception indicat-

ed that m any of the em bassy officials consideredtheir presence prem ature. G athering at their quar-ters on the day of their arrival, Lieutenant ColonelStephen J. Labadies team m et w ith Colonel D avidStaley, U SA , the chief of m ilitary m ission in


D VIC D N -ST-90-11531

Stationed off the coast of Liberi a, Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit practice body-searchtechniques on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2) in preparation forOperation Sharp Edge.

* Personnel augm enting the joint task force included intelli-gence specialists, such as a four-m an joint intelligence liaison

elem ent.


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M onrovia. Colonel Staley instructed the team onits conduct, to w hom the team could talk, w hatthe m em bers could w ear, and w here it could go.Essentially, the forw ard com m and elem ent couldtalk to anyone, but if it needed to talk to anyArm ed Forces of Liberia personnel, the team hadto first clear coordination w ith Colonel Staley.D irected to w ear only civilian clothes, the teamcould travel freely unless going to som e unusualplace. In those cases, the team needed advanceclearance for the visit from the chief of m ilitarym ission. Speaking frankly, Staley stated he reallydid not know w hy the M arines had com e, andsaid the em bassy had a good handle on the situ-ation. H e further inform ed the team the em bassyexpected a coup and anticipated it w ould taketw o or three days. That w ould likely be follow edby a great deal of killing and other acts of retri-bution for the excesses of the D oe governm ent.

O nce that w as over, Staley said the U .S. w ouldrecognize the new governm ent and the em bassyw ould go back to business as usual.* ColonelStaley did not anticipate any need for an evacua-tion because the em bassy had already draw ndow n staff and dependents. H e then expressedthe hope that Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and hisM arines w ould have a nice stay, how ever brief,and reaffirm ed that he w ould support the team inany w ay he could.26

G iven the nature of the alarm ist m essage traf-fic com ing out of the em bassy, the forw ard com -m and elem ent reacted w ith surprise. M ajor G len

Sachtleben put it plainly:

O f course w e w ere shocked. W eexpected to land and fight ourw ay to the Em bassy and thensaw that it w asnt that w ay. Thecheckpoints w e w ent throughw ere very quick, no problem s atall. The soldiers w e saw w alkingaround all had w eapons, butthey w ere all lackadaisical look-ing. There w as no feeling that

this country w as falling apart inour first im pression.27

Their dism ay at the low level of urgency deep-ened as the team m et other em bassy officials dur-ing the rem ainder of that first day. M ost of theem bassy staff, including the deputy in charge ofm ission, m em bers of the defense attache office,and the chief of station appeared surprised to seethem , unconvinced and unsure of w hy M arinesw ere there. O nly Larry H artnett, the regional secu-rity officer, and Colonel Staley appreciated theM arinespresence and fully understood their m is-sion. M ajor Sachtleben felt the attitude am ong theem bassy staff w as that of this isnt going to hap-pen guys.28 The forw ard com m and elem ent teamm em bers knew their tasks and w anted to get tow ork. The tasks included conducting liaison andassessing the overall situation, surveying helicop-ter landing zones and landing beaches, determ in-ing the num ber of evacuees, and estim ating thelevel of hostilities likely to be encountered during

an evacuation. U nfortunately, the prevailing opin-ion of the staff, that an evacuation w as not nec-essary, led to a reluctance of certain key em bassypersonnel to support the M arines effort.Personality conflicts am ong the em bassy staff alsolead to certain m em bers of the staff obstructingthe team s efforts sim ply because of its associationw ith another staff m em ber.29 All of this m ade thew ork of the team m ore difficult.30

The forw ard com m and elem ent m et w ith theM arine security guard detachm ent, w hich w asheaded by Staff Sergeant Tim othy Love. Teamm em bers noted that G uard Post O ne w as located

at the m ain entrance to the chancery. At the post,the M arine guard on duty m onitored local com -m unications and functioned as the net control sta-tion for one of the five radio nets at theem bassy.31** The posted M arine w as the com m u-nication link for Lieutenant Colonel Labadiesteam w hen they conducted reconnaissance for-ays. As the violence escalated, the M arine securi-ty guard detachm ents quick relaying of m essages

PREPARIN G FO R O PERATIO N SHA RP ED G E 13

* This line of thinking originated from past Liberian events.Sam uel K . D oes bloody but successful coup in M onrovia, 12

April 1980, ended quickly. The city also rapidly returned to

business as usual after a failed coup attem pt on 12 N ovem ber1985.

** For official Am ericans and governm ent em ployees, these

radio nets allow ed the passing and receiving of m essages to

w arn them of potential problem s. In case of em ergencies ordangers, m ost official and nonofficial U .S. citizens received

notification or w arnings by radio using a tiered contact sys-tem . N onofficial (non-governm ent em ployed U .S. citizens)

Am ericans in Liberia m aintained contact through a w arden

system w ith the m issionary radio netw orks, or through com -m ercial com paniescom m unications w ith their M onrovia

offices. Backup for nonofficial Am ericans w as by telephone or

short w ave radio. Liberia Em ergency Planning H andbook,

dtd 1990, Annex B (Sharp Edge H istColl, M CH C, W ashington,D .C.).


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and reassuring assistance w hen called helpedem bassy staff and forw ard com m and elem entpersonnel in potentially life threatening situations.In addition to the M arine security guard detach-m ent, the em bassys local guard force stood postoutside the gate and inside the em bassy com -pound. The em bassy em ployed a very loyal con-tract guard force com posed of Liberians hired byW ackenhut Corporation. D arrell M . Low e, aretired M arine lieutenant colonel, oversaw the 550guards, w ho carried only nightsticks.32 This forcem anned m ore than 200 posts throughout the cap-ital to protect official Am erican citizens and prop-erty.33* Stationed at all U .S. properties, the guardsproved to be a source of local inform ation to theM arines, passing on reports as to w ho controlled

certain areas and w hat types of activities tookplace during the fighting.34 As a testim ony of theirloyalty, throughout the crisis m any of the guards

rem ained on post and reported inform ation evenafter the rebels had overrun the surroundingareas. Som e guards w ere beaten and others w erekilled in the violence.

W ith the destroyer USS Peterson (D D 969)steam ing tow ard Liberia, m em bers of the forw ardcom m and elem ent w ere alm ost certain EuropeanCom m and w ould select the m aritim e evacuationoption that included the M arines. O nce thedestroyer arrived, the M EU and ARG constitutedthe quickest response for the em ergency and ren-dered the three other European C om m and forceoptions irrelevant. Lieutenant Colonel Labadiebelieved the M arines on board N avy ships just off-shore and over the horizon best suited the em -bassys diplom atic intentions. Colonel Staley as-

sured Lieutenant Colonel Labadie that the deputychief of m ission, D ennis C. Jett (in charge of theem bassy in the absence of the am bassador),w ould not allow the U .S. Arm y to bring in troopsand sim ply leave them at the airport, w hich couldenflam e an already delicate situation.35

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and M ajorSachtleben found the State D epartm entsapproach extrem ely frustrating, often putting


D VIC SN-D T-90-11420

Offi cers of the 22d Marine Amphibious Uni t gather in the Mari ne Expeditionary Unit commanders officeon board the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for a briefing on the situation in and around Monrovia.

* In addition to the unarm ed guards at the em bassy, otherunarm ed guards m anned posts at the G raystone com pound,

U .S. Inform ation Service (U SIS) building, USA ID Library,

U SAID com pound, Peace Corps com pound, D oD m ilitary m is-sion, Am erican Cooperative School, official Am ericansresi-

dences, and the navigation and com m unication site facilities.


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them at odds w ith em bassy officials. According toM ajor Sachtleben: W e think of things in term s ofseconds, m inutes, hours, and days, and then w eroll in on top of the State D epartm ent w ho havea totally different philosophy. They think of thingsin term s of w eeks, m onths, years, and decades. Sohere w ere these tw o different elem ents, theD epartm ent of D efense and the D epartm ent ofState, kind of bucking up against each other. So itw as extrem ely frustrating.36*

D espite the hindrances, m em bers of the for-w ard com m and elem ent set out to collect infor-m ation for a possible noncom batant evacuationoperation. They began by surveying helicopterlanding zones.** Traveling in civilian clothes,Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, Captain M ollahan,and Sergeant W iddifield visited every designatedlanding zone (LZ) in the area. The site surveysincluded the Am erican Telecom m unications

O ffice, the Voice of Am erica, the Barclay TrainingCenter (AFL com pound), and the A m ericanCooperative School. The team gathered updatedinform ation on size, slopes, obstacles, directionsof flight access and egress, surface m aterials, anddom inant terrain of each landing zone. That infor-m ation w as then relayed to the M EU throughm essages and phototelesis.37

The results of the survey excluded som e land-ing zones from the list of evacuation sites. Thepresence of AFL soldiers at the B arclay TrainingCenter and the extensive overhead w ires support-ing the antennas at Voice of Am erica sites elim i-

nated these landing zones from consideration.The survey also identified som e new landingzones, such as the basketball court in the em bassycom pound. N am ed LZ M agic after the profession-al basketball player M agicJohnson, the basket-ball court becam e the prim ary helicopter landingzone for O peration Sharp Edge.38

Because the evacuation could em ploy eitherhelicopters or landing craft, Lieutenant Colonel

Labadie felt it prudent to survey possible landingbeaches. Lieutenant Com m ander Robert Peterm anand M ajor Sachtleben w ere assigned to this task.The tw o officers, dressed in civilian clothing andcarrying concealed w eapons, hiked to seven areabeaches. Aw are of the delicacy of the situationtraveling the countryside w ithout visas and look-ing at beach landing sites for w hat could be con-strued as an evacuation or an invasion, depend-ing on your point of view both m en acted ascircum spect as possible. They looked at everydesignated landing beach and Peterm an conduct-ed a sw im m ing survey in the surf zone at m ost ofthem . The tw o officers discovered hidden rocks,undertow s, and plunging surf at every beach. Theteam especially concentrated on the beach next tothe com pound, know n as Red B each, conductingsurf observations tw ice each day for severalw eeks. W hen the A FL put the beach under sur-

veillance, the surf observations for Red Beachstopped. The team recom m ended N avy SEALs

conduct a com prehensive beach survey beforeusing Red Beach as a landing site.39

The chief of station, Jim M cW illiam s, opposedthe idea of conducting further beach surveys. In

their first m eeting, M cW illiam s assured LieutenantColonel Labadie that special operations personnelfrom European Com m and already had assessedthe beaches and approved them for evacuation.Lieutenant Colonel Labadie knew the beachesrequired a m ore detailed hydrographic survey,but M cW illiam s and the m ilitary attache did notagree. W ith Jetts initial support, LieutenantColonel Labadie subm itted the proposal up the


* Deputy C hief of M ission, D ennis C. Jett, expressed anem bassy staff view point of the forw ard com m and elem ent

after about a m onth ashore. Jett stated that em bassy relations

w ith the m ilitary w ere beginning to frayby July. D ennis C.Jett, Evacuations D uring C ivil W ar, Liberia 1990,in EmbassiesUnder Siege: Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the FrontLine, Joseph G . Sullivan ed. (W ashington: Brasseys, 1995), p.138.

** The forw ard com m and elem ent brought w ith them a copy

of N oncom batant Evacuation O perations (N EO ) IntelligenceSupport H andbook (N ISH ) that contained im agery and data

on key landing zones, landing beaches, routes, and locations

in Liberia for a N EO .

We think of things in terms of seconds,minutes, hours, and days, and then weroll in on top of the State Departmentwho have a totally different phi losophy.They think of things in terms of weeks,months, years, and decades. So here

were these two different elements, theDepartment of Defense and theDepartment of State, kind of bucking upagainst each other. So it was extremely

frustrating. M ajor G len Sachtleben


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chain-of-com m and.* H igher headquarters disap-proved the request and the M arines m ade duew ith the results of the forw ard com m and ele-m ents lim ited surveys.40

W ork such as reinforcem ent of the em bassystill required the team s attention. The forw ardcom m and elem ent planned for the reinforcem entof the em bassy, w hich included specific posts todefend and harden. The regional security officerclosely cooperated w ith the team on its plan. Toidentify specific em bassy evacuation responsibili-ties, the team w orked w ith the consular section.The rush for visas as people tried to leave the

country kept the consular office extrem ely busy.D espite the surge of people, the consular officer,M rs. Penny M cM urtry, coordinated w ith the for-

w ard com m and elem ent. Increm entally, theM arines gained the required inform ation andcom pleted the basic reinforcem ent plan by thetim e the ARG arrived.41

The team also w orked w ith the em bassy staffin planning a m ore detailed evacuation than w hatw as in the em bassys em ergency evacuation plan.This, too, proved difficult because alm ost all theem bassy staff thought an evacuation w as unnec-essary. The staff believed its draw dow n arrange-m ents to be sufficient. N o one at the em bassyactively obstructed the M arinesefforts, but m anyon the staff sim ply did not feel an evacuation plan

constituted an urgent priority or m erited theirim m ediate attention. D espite this indifference, theteam com pleted a detailed evacuation plan.42

Circling at Mamba Station

O nce off the coast of Liberia, the A RG w aitedin the overpow ering heat and hum idity at a posi-tion officially designated M am ba Station. For the


D VIC D N -ST-90-11412LtCol Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., commanding officer of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261, deliv-ers a pre-operation brief to his officers and pilots in the squadron ready room on board the USS Saipan(LHA 2).

* Dep uty C hief of M ission D ennis C. Jett later stated, since the

surveys w ould have been conducted w ithin site of theExecutive M ansion and the arm ys m ain base, an arm ed con-

frontation w as entirely possible.The forw ard com m and ele-

m ent elim inated this particular beach early in the planning forthe sam e reason.


27/157

next tw o m onths, w hile the ships steam ed slow lyin a circular ocean track, the em barked M arineskept busy. Virtually every day they rehearsed var-ious evacuation plans w ith all units and consid-ered all location options. O ne particularly sensi-tive plan concerned the extraction of PresidentD oe if he decided to leave Liberia. The M EU prac-ticed the contingency based on tw o different

options. The first involved a helicopter evacuationfrom the em bassy, w hile the second w as a directflight from Spriggs-Payne A irport by fixed-w ingaircraft. In both options, once evacuated, D oew ould fly in one of the M EU s Lockheed KC-130H ercules aircraft to a country that w ould providehim sanctuary.43 A m aritim e special purpose force(M SPF), com posed of the M EUs M arine forcereconnaissance detachm ent and the ARG s SEAL

detachm ent, repeatedly prim ed for these options,conducting day and night full dress rehearsals.Acting as the covering force for the M SPF,Com pany H also practiced its role in the prepara-tions. The plan rem ained on stand-by and in earlyJuly the groups alert tim es shortened tem porarilyto a one-hour alert to execute.* D uring June, m ostof the cabinet officials fled their posts, w ith the

exception of one or tw o m inisters, w hilePresident D oe doggedly m aintained he couldreverse the grow ing victories of the rebels inLiberia.

In anticipation of the evacuation, the designat-ed com m ander of the joint task force ordered the


D VIC D N -ST-90-11421

Mari nes of the 22d Mari ne Expeditionary Unit gather in the hanger bay of the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for abriefing on the situation in Monrovia. Also outlined were the rules of engagement governing their mis-sion once ashore.

* Although the vacillating President D oe eventually refused a

U .S. offer for safe p assage, the M arines rem ained ready.


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establishm ent of a forw ard logistics site at Lungiairfield in Freetow n, Sierra Leone.* The M EUbased its KC-130 aircraft detachm ent from M arineAerial Refueling Squadron 252 (VM G R-252) atLungi. Tw o aircraft arrived on 5 June w ith them ission of providing aerial refueling and support-ing the logistical air bridge betw een Rota or D akarand Freetow n. M arine and N avy helicopters also

began conducting short-range logistics flightsfrom the A RG ships to the airfield. Later, theFreetow n forw ard logistics site w ould serve as atransit point for evacuees arriving by helicopter orship.44

At the beginning of June 1990, the M onroviaem bassy staff m aintained its daily routine, includ-ing shopping in tow n. The staff appeared toreflect the citys w ait and seeoutlook. Since allthe fighting betw een arm ed factions had takenplace in the countryside, M onrovia appeareddeceptively calm . G radually, how ever, the fight-ing outside M onrovia started to disrupt the calmfacade. Rebels overran the citys satellite earth sta-tion and international telephone service ceased.45

The voluntary draw dow n turned m andatory afterthe D epartm ent of State granted the em bassysrequest for an authorized dep arture status.(Authorized departure status im plied there w as

im m inent danger to State D epartm ent em ployeesor their dependents.) Sunday charter flights con-tinued to depart w ith Am erican citizens from theirtem porary hom es in M onrovia, m ost leaving w ithjust suitcases. O rganized convoys of Am ericansdeparted from the em bassy to the airport in tow n,Spriggs-Payne, w ith the regional security officerand his local guards providing security.Approxim ately 1,450 A m ericans rem ained inLiberia, dow n from 10,480 five m onths earlier.46

By 7 June, Taylors N PFL forces controlledH erbel and the international airport areas. Theadvancing fighters established roadblocks and

cam ps to the east of M onrovia. D enied access tothe international airport, m any foreigners trying toleave crow ded onto the rem aining com m ercialflights at Spriggs-Payne A irport. O n 10 June, theU .S. Em bassy extricated 360 m ore A m ericansusing charted Air G uinea Boeing 737 aircraft.47

Colonel Am os decided to send three m em bersof the M EUs radio battalion detachm ent toM onrovia by boat to augm ent the forw ard com -m and elem ent. Em bassy officials turned dow n ahelicopter insertion feeling it w ould frightenLiberians or draw attention to the em bassy andsend the w rong m essage about Am erican inten-

tions.48 A helicopter-announced arrival m ighthave confused m any Liberians involved in theconflict, as w ord had gotten out to local new spa-pers that a M arine task force w aited offshore.Liberians, especially those w ho cam e from theinterior w here m ost of the N PFL troops originat-ed, m ay never have seen or heard a helicopterbefore. For them , such a sight m ight incite fear,curiosity, or both. M any Liberians w anted the


D VIC D N -ST-90-11540

Mari nes prepare to fir e automatic M249 lightmachine guns, known as Squad AutomaticWeapons or SAWs, during weapons training held

on the stern of the USSSaipan (LHA 2). Fielded inthe 1980s, the SAW fi lled the void created by theretirement of the Browning Automatic Rifle.

* Am ong the C om m ander of Fleet Air O perations

M editerraneans (Com FA irM ed) responsibilities w as position-

ing and operating the forw ard logistics site, sup ported by aCH -53E helicopter detachm ent from the N avy helicopter

squadron, H C-4. The site periodically received additional

logistic help from N avy Lockheed C-130 H ercules and D ouglasC-9 Skytrain aircraft. (JO 2 W illiam D avis, H C-4 Continues

O peration Sharp Edge Support,Signature (Naval Air Station,Sigonella), 26O ct90, p. 1; H M M -261 C om dC 1 Jul-31D ec90, p.3; H C-4 Com dH ist 1990, encl., p. 3).


29/157

M arines to com e ashore prim arily as a peace-keeping force to stop the fighting and relieve thesuffering. Som e factions w anted the M arines tosupport President D oe, and others w anted theM arines to rem ove President D oe and allow theN PFL to take over the governm ent.49

O n 12 June, Colonel Staley, Thom as J. W hite,the em bassys econom ics officer, and the fourm em bers of the forw ard com m and elem ent w entout to theSaipan. They m ade the trip to the ship,located below the horizon off the coast ofM onrovia, in a 21-foot sailboat belonging to thestation chief. The group conferred w ith ColonelAm os and his staff on board theSaipan for abouttw o hours. They conveyed Jetts thoughts on w hythe em bassy did not feel a sense of urgency asexpressed in earlier and recent m essages. ColonelStaley, W hite, and m em bers of the forw ard com -m and elem ent explained that rather than conduct

an im m ediate evacuation, as the M EU had antici-pated, the M arines needed to w ait. The quintes-sential force, the M EU could hold at M am baStation until the situation ashore reached a crisispoint.50 Follow ing the briefings, the forw ard com -m and elem ent, W hite, and Colonel Staley, accom -panied by three previously selected m em bers ofthe radio battalion detachm ent, headed back toM onrovia.

O nce at the em bassy, the radio battaliondetachm ent, headed by Sergeant K enneth M .Sharp, set up their intercept equipm ent. W ith anabundance of unsecured chatter on M otorola-type

handheld radios, the detachm ent listened to theradio nets of the various fighting factions in andaround M onrovia.51 The Liberians lack of opera-tional security m ade the collection effort easy.M ost governm ent and rebel forces spoke LiberianEnglish, although they spoke in dialects w henthey w anted a secure conversation. The rebelsincorrectly believed the A m ericans could nottranslate these dialects. D uring the entire M EUoperation in Liberia, the detachm ent provided theSaipan useful daily reports for analysis.52

Frantic Negotiations Fizzle

As the rebels gained ground and m oved intothe M onrovia area, D oes AFL forces responded tothe increased pressure by engaging in randomshootings, beheadings, m utilations, and otheratrocities. In the Clay-Ashland D istrict of centralM onrovia, an A FL squad executed 14 Am erico-Liberians. O n 14 June, a group of m ore than 1,000

Liberians conducted a peace m arch in M onroviaand stopped in front of the em bassy. The M arinesecurity guard detachm ent and extra StateD epartm ent security personnel deployed through-out the chancery and com pound in defensive andobservation posts. Fortunately, the dem onstrationled by church officials did not turn violent. Theem bassy, m eanw hile, on 16 and 17 June, flew out210 m ore A m erican citizens by chartered air-craft.53

W ith the situation in M onrovia w orsening rap-idly, respected Liberians frantically m ade anattem pt at peace negotiations. The LiberianCouncil of Churches, encouraged by outsideorganizations such as the O rganization of AfricanU nity and the Econom ic Com m unity of W estAfrican States, organized and chaired the m eeting.N egotiations sponsored by the InterfaithM ediation Com m ittee of the Liberian Council of

Churches m et in Sierra Leone but failed to reachan agreem ent. Apparently, Taylors delegation


D VIC D N -ST-90-11402

Mari nes are led to one of Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 261s Boeing CH-46E SeaKnight helicopters on board the USS Saipan (LHA2) during a rehearsal for Operation Sharp Edge.


30/157

believed their forces w ere about to achieve a m il-itary victory and saw no need for further discus-sion and arrogantly w alked out of the talks.

The fighting by 23 June had advanced to theoutskirts of M onrovia. Johnsons IN PFL rebelsattacked Taylors N PFL rebels from positions just13 m iles northeast of the capital city inBensonville and Careysburg. A large crow ddem onstrated for peace on 26 June, calling for aceasefire and dem anding the Liberian presidentleave the county. About 500 Liberians broke offfrom the m ain body dem onstrating dow ntow n,m arched to the gates of the Am erican Em bassy,and chanted for the U .S. to intervene w hile diplo-m atic security personnel and the em bassysM arine security guards took up defensive posi-tions. But the dem onstration rem ained nonvio-lent.54 The next day in central M onrovia, AFL sol-diers fired on another peace dem onstration killing

and w ounding m any in the crow d near the U .S.G eneral Services O rganization com pound. D uringthe shooting and ensuing panic surrounding them arch, stray rounds penetrated the chancery andricocheted off som e of the taller buildings in thecom pound. O ne round hit the bulletproof glass infront of Corporal Jam es Landherrs standing postone.55

The follow ing afternoon, the N PFL, m any inbizarre costum es such as carnival m asks, w igs,football helm ets, w om ens dresses, show er caps,and even toilet seats, attacked Liberian arm y posi-tions at Roberts International Airport.* O n 28 June

1990, the new Am erican A m bassador, Peter D eVos, arrived in M onrovia. By this tim e the Sundaycharter flights had reduced the official em bassystaff to approxim ately 40 essential personnel.56 Asif to w elcom e him , the IN PFL seized the hydro-electric plant at the M ount Coffee D am the nextday and cut off electricity to the city.

Early July found Taylors rebels firm ly in con-trol of m ost of the Liberian countryside, includingthe cites of Buchanan and G barnga. The offensivetem porarily halted to replenish supplies. A fewdays later, Prince Johnsons IN PFL rebels clashedagain w ith Taylors N PFL fighters outside

M onrovia. Form erly allies, now opposing forces,both m eant to destroy the other and D oe.57

Fighting on 8 July m oved to the citys suburbsw ith heavy fighting occurring at the Spriggs-Payne

Airport and the Sinkor area just w est of the U .S.m ilitary m ission quarters. The citys populationfeared the rebels and the daily random searches,arson, looting, shooting, executions, and rapescom m itted by governm ent soldiers. Rebeladvances resulted in rice and gasoline shortagesand cut off w ater in the city. Em bassy w ater andfuel tank trucks ran a daily gauntlet of hostilecheckpoints and the effort becam e progressivelym ore difficult as the m onth continued.58 For safe-ty, the A m bassador m oved all official U .S. per-sonnel inside the com pound or to the Sam and Ebuilding across the street from the em bassy.

The resum ption on 5 July of peace talks, nowm ediated by the Econom ic Com m unity of W estAfrican States, offered only a glim m er of hope forthe citizens of Liberia. D uring talks in Freetow n,Sierra Leone, the N PFL dem anded that D oe stepdow n before the fighting could stop. The talks

broke off the latter part of July due to the lack ofagreem ent and progress am ong the w arring par-ties.

Fighting continued am ong all three factionsthroughout the m onth of July w ith the arm yattacking the N PFL near Paynesville and Cam pSchiefflin. Prince Johnsons and Charles Taylorsfighters fought near Bensonville on 9 July.Another violent clash betw een the IN PFL andN PFL near Careysburg and Paynesville took placeas Johnsons IN PFL m oved south from the BongM ine area tow ard M onrovia. As a result, the U .S.O m ega station w ent off the air and the station

operators subsequently abandoned the site. W ithO m ega off the air, ships and aircraft could nolonger receive navigation fixes from that station.**Thousands of uprooted and hom eless Liberianssw am ped the O m ega and Voice of Am erica sitesseeking protection. Jett, in a letter to his w ife,stated: There are displaced people anyw herethey feel safe: 500 cam e over the w all of theAm erican Com m unity School: 6000 at the Voice ofAm erica: 2000 at O m ega.59

In M onrovia on 12 July, Taylors fighters invad-ed the N igerian Em bassy. To prevent the m assacreof their citizens, G hana and N igeria sent ships to

aid in the evacuation. G uinean soldiers crossedthe G uinea border into N im ba county to evacuateand protect that countrys citizens. The Am ericanEm bassy continued to schedule chartered flights


* M any fighters w ore these item s as sym bols of good luck or

good juju.Skulls of victim s often decorated checkpoints or

vehicles to show the fighters ruthlessness and to frightenpotential enem ies.

** Although the Liberian O m ega station w as off the air, the

Am phibious Ready G roups ships and aircraft received accu-

rate O m ega fixes from other stations located around thew orld.


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for Am ericans w anting to leave. Throughout thecountry, foreigners and Liberians fled from thefighting.

O n 14 July, the em bassy requested approxi-m ately 20 additional M arines from the M arineSecurity G uard Battalion.60 The June convoyescorts, peace m arches and groups of refugees atthe em bassy had taxed the tw o-dozen diplom aticsecurity personnel brought in to assist the region-al security officer.61* By m id-July, the increasedviolence prom pted Larry H artnett, the regionalsecurity officer, to direct his diplom atic securitypersonnel to m an posts along the perim eter andconduct night patrols inside the com pound. O nthe roofs of buildings near G ate O ne and G ateTw o, diplom atic security personnel set up defen-sive positions and placed Am erican flags over theprotective cinder blocks.62 M any Liberians andsom e Am ericans m istook the arm ed diplom atic

security personnel for M arines.63

The request foradditional M arine security guard personnel high-lighted the em bassys need for extra security. Theforw ard com m and elem ent had advised D e Vos tobring in a rifle com pany from off-shore andobjected to the request, but the Am bassadorbelieved M arine security guard augm entationunder H arnett offered the best solution.**

Marines Poised for Insertion

M arines offshore w ere placed on tw o-houralert to reinforce the em bassy on 20 July after

President D oe accused C olonel Staley, the chief ofthe m ilitary m ission, of directing rebel attacksagainst the governm ent. President D oes accusa-tion sparked a new w ave of anti-Am erican senti-m ent w ithin the disillusioned, disintegrating arm y.D eclaring him persona non grata, D oe orderedColonel Staley to leave the country.64 Colonel

Staley departed the next day and flew toFreetow n, Sierra Leone, w here he provided up-to-date inform ation to an aw aiting M EU debriefingteam .

Late in the m orning on 20 July, PrinceJohnsons forces crossed the St. Paul Riverbridgesto Bushrod Island, increasing the pressure onM onrovia. Traveling in a protected convoy,Am bassador D e Vos visited President D oe the fol-low ing day. Approxim ately 25 AFL soldiersstopped D e Vosvehicle at gunpoint and threat-ened the Am bassador. After a heated argum ent

that alm ost escalated into gunfire betw een D eVossecurity and the A FL, the troops allow ed thevehicle to proceed to the Executive M ansion.65

Tw o days later, w hile the M EU rehearsed the D oeextraction and the reinforcem ent of the em bassy,President D oe, holed up in his m ansion, accusedthe U nited States of again siding w ith the rebelfactions and saying a U .S. subm arine had shelledthe Executive M ansion. The A m bassador denied


D VIC D N -ST-90-11544

A plane director signals to the pi lot of aMcDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harri er I I aircrafttaxiing on the flight deck of the USS Saipan (LHA2) during Operation Sharp Edge rehearsals. Thesix-plane Harri er detachment was part of the 22dMarine Expeditionary Units composite helicoptersquadron.

* Prim arily there to p rovide personal protection service, the

diplom atic security special security team focused its attentionon security for am bassadors and key em bassy officials. The

team perform ed other security m issions such as escorting

Am ericans leaving the country under authorized departure sta-

tus as w ell as escorting the w ater and fuel trucks attem ptingto m ake daily runs in tow n.

** O n 24 July, 20 M arines left Q uantico, arriving on board JTF

shipping on 28 July. By the tim e they arrived, the 22d M EU

could not bring them in by helicopter because of fighting

around the em bassy. The augm entation rem ained on boardship the entire tim e the M EU op erated ashore. W hen analyz-

ing w hat size force w as needed to replace the 22d M EU ,

European Com m and staff considered a M arine Security G uardaugm entation option.


32/157

the preposterous subm arine attack accusation butD oe had again fueled his soldiersanti-Am ericansentim ent.

Prince Johnsons IN PFL took control ofBushrod Island and brought the w ar into dow n-tow n M onrovia. Crossing over the M esurado Riverbridges from the north on 23 July, IN PFL rebelsentered Crow n H ill, the central business districtand the capital by-pass areas. Fierce firefightstook place betw een IN PFL and governm ent sol-diers as droves of civilians fled M onrovia by ship,vehicle, and foot. W ith m ore than 32,000 dis-placed and hom eless Liberians concentrated in

the city, large groups w andered about looking forshelter in local churches, schools, internationalnongovernm ental organization com pounds, andabandoned U .S. Em bassy properties.66 In ahum anitarian gesture, the em bassy openedG raystone com pound to the frightened andhom eless Liberians, w ho quickly filled the area.

H ighlighting the deteriorating situation, on 24July gunfire one block from the em bassy causedapproxim ately 30 to 50 people to rush the gatesand scale the outside w all.67 Som e of the pan-icked crow d gained access to the courtyard infront of the adm inistrative annex. Alerted M arinesecurity guards m oved to defensive positions inthe interior of the chancery.* The crow d desper-ately craw led through every conceivable crackand opening in that em bassy w all and w ere insidew ithin seconds because the em bassy sim ply w asnot ready to defend itself,M ajor Sachtlebenrecalled.68 A diplom atic security guard fired five

shots into the air to disperse the crow d and tocontrol the situation inside the com pound.69 Theincident ended w ithout bloodshed w ith diplom at-ic and contract security guards finally rounding upthe intruders.

W hile rebel forces infiltrated further into thecity, governm ent soldiers looted the central busi-ness district superm arkets and the U .S.Inform ation Service building. Roving bands ofgovernm ent soldiers entered an International RedCross-protected com pound and the John F.Kennedy H ospital. They captured, beat, andkilled those of G io and M ano tribal backgroundsw ho did not escape.** President D oe furtherinflam ed the situation w ith m ore absurd asser-tions, accusing the U nited States of sending blackM arines to assist the rebel forces. These falseassertions fueled yet another w ave of anti-Am erican sentim ent in the AFL, w ho thought theU .S. favored the rebels. W ith no celebrating, theAFL spent Liberian Independence D ay, 26 July,conducting house-to-house searches for rebelsand rebel sym pathizers, and black M arines.AG hanaian ship from Freetow n, Sierra Leone,

arrived to evacuate 1,500 of its citizens.Thousands m ore refugees now crow ded into var-ious abandoned Am erican properties in an effortto escape the AFL.

Fighting betw een the AFL and the IN PFL inten-

Documents

On Mamba Station U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990-2003