On Hume's Cause and Effect

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An overview and brief analysis of Hume's ideas on cause and effect

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Christopher NahedDr. Dustin McWherterPhilosophy 214May 9, 2014Why is Hume Skeptical of Our Knowledge of Cause and Effect?The notion of cause and effect has been a topic of much debate and analysis. In Humes writings on the Enquiry of Human Understanding, he tackles the issue at its physical and tangible level. Since many philosophers and men of science tackle the notion from metaphysical and/or epistemological grounds, it serves to be a topic of much controversy. The knowledge and understanding of cause and effect is crucial since it allows for the analysis and understanding of what can help us strive and what can potentially kill us; however the extent of our understanding of such phenomena begets certain notions that serve to be problematic. It is understandable that cause is linked to effect; however Humes writings serve to be skeptical of whether we as humans can truly understand what the links consist of. Humes skepticism is rooted from his categorizing of what the constituents of human thinking are. Relations of ideas and matters of fact are the human thought bearers and since we are bounded by them, no amount of analysis on the link could ever hold any truth regardless of whether the logic used is consistent. The distinctions and limitations of the operations of human thought hold the basis of Humes argument. Relations of ideas pertains to the mere process of human logic and analysis while matters of fact pertain to what we identify as learning through experience and observation. With different forms of analysis of which each form pertains to an appropriate situation, humans are capable of identifying the origins of effects that we come into contact with, regardless of whether the effects are collateral to the cause or not. We have established methods of analysis that allow for the intricate relative analysis between multiple causes and multiple effects; thus we develop relationships that we ascribe to the causes and their effects. These relationships are thus descriptive of natures marvels and laws; however the development of any relationship brings into context the ignorance and limits of humans. This ignorance is manifest in the operations of our thought; irrespective of how simple a system may be, we cannot use reason or logic to be able to evaluate which effect will come from which cause. An example of such limitations is based on the simplest of all electrical systems. This is the electrostatic regime in which no relative motion exists between the charged particles of the given system. If a person skilled in the domain of mathematics was to propose how particles are to interact in a system, in which the charges are the causes and the interactions are the effects, that person would have at hand a mathematically infinite number of models that could possibly be descriptive of that system, let alone the entire regime of systems. The modeler would have no way of identifying which models pertain to the systems and regime being tackled. This is due to human limits in reasoning and understanding; the mathematician would be left ignorant of which model to keep. Hume comes to realize these limitations by identifying the links between the causes and their effects as being the secrets and powers of nature that we simply cannot access into. However it turns out that the descriptive model in electrostatics is one where the addition of individual effects of each cause holds and therefore yields the electrostatic effect; this holds under all systems, invariant under position and time. It is only through our observational analyses and assumptions that we are allowed to posit such descriptive beauty. Hume states that there can be no thought process that would enable us to tap into the links between cause and effect. If one were to falsify the limits which Hume describes, one must only come to conceive of such a system in which observation was not used in the construction of a relationship between cause and effect. This being said, the source of our knowledge is our ability to observe, compile and analyze our data thoroughly; from thereon we establish our models of cause and effect. However the legitimacy of our models depends on the assumptions we take. The assumption that the invariance of a systems cause and effect relationship holds regardless of the position of the observer and of the multiple results that were realized throughout the history of the analysis on the system must be taken if one is to build a path of knowledge. The models are then extrapolated and assumed to be valid in the future. From causes which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.

Regarding things that can pertain to our relations of ideas; an argument might be made against our limitations, one in which we are able to develop and analyze the links between cause and effect. A square circle, for example, cannot be conceived to exist as an effect since the causes themselves are not metaphysically linked to it. A circle and a square consist of different abstract concepts and thus they offer no link to the effect of a square circle. The argument that we can analyze the links between cause and effect holds, but it is held only within the realm of ideas; thus the systems that we distinctly conceive of cannot be falsified using logical analysis. This is due to the fact that distinctly conceived systems and their models consist themselves of the logical superposition of axioms which we have constructed. However, if one were to project these conceived models from the realm of thought onto the physical world, the axioms used would retain their observational origins and thus, allow for falsifiability. EXAMPLE.The only dictator of our interactions with the physical world is custom. Custom is the method of replicating operations onto others of a similar nature. Considering a fire from different perspectives, relative to the system needed, will always give warmth and will always burn. All fires will offer the same effects and once we generalize this method to all other physical systems, we can begin to understand that this method of acquiring knowledge about nature is the weapon in our arsenal. Thus, we base all the data we can acquire on observational analysis, and we then use our logical methods to construct from the data, our models; however, our customs overlook the fact that the course of nature may change. Therefore if anyone suspects that the past may be no rule for the future, our customs and methods will become utterly useless. If someone claims that the method of superposition in electrostatics must apply for all time, one can ask why it would apply. Who could possibly know? Therefore, this means that men of science are nothing more than experts at extrapolation methods. For philosophers that attempt at explaining the secrets behind natures interactions, they must seek out the knowledge that does is not manifest in our perceptions of the physical world. This brings into context the philosophies of metaphysics. For instance, Descartes explains how his clear perceptions and analyses of what is around him can only be doubted if he errs in his analysis or if God did not exist. This God cannot be a deceiver since he is an all perfect and infinite being and deception is in itself an imperfection. This implies that the only errors our perceptions can make have to do with our errors in analysis and observation. Once we have established the models that serve to describe cause and effect, and assuming that Descartes logic is sound, we should be able to conclude that our methods of extrapolation and custom are absolute and infallible. The link between cause and effect if invariant because the nature of the link between cause and effect cannot change; God will not deceive us. Accordingly we can conclude that God is what links the cause to its effect. However, Hume rejects the notion that the concept of a God can assure me that my deception does not exist. Even if the logic for the existence of this Supreme Being is fine; the concept is easily falsifiable. We have no reason to believe in this God; we cannot attribute weight to the philosophy more than the weight we attribute to a philosophy that tells me that there is a demon thats sole purpose is to deceive me. This concept can be backed up by logic similar to that of Descartes logic on the existence of God. We have no proof of this concept, thus I can formulate an infinite number of logical explanations for natures secrets and I would have no way of identifying the correct one. Secondly, we are ignorant of the manner in which bodies operate on each other. Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible. Since our understanding of the Supreme Being is based on our reflecting upon our own faculties we cannot begin to understand how Gods will can regulate the secrets of the universe because it is just as difficult for us to conceive of motion that occurs due to the conservation of momentum more than our ability to conceive of motion that is a result of volition. So this renders the need of God in the regulation of the universe useless to us. Hume envisions the universe to be one of many marvels; however as humans we are limited to the beauty and vice that come out of the relationships between cause and effect. These relationships explain to me which effects will result out of which causes and how they will continue to interact with us as observers. This serves as a tool which will allow us to interact with the universe in ways that more or less give us assurance. Therefore, as a species, we must strive to expand on our knowledge using our operations of thought in a way that can serve in enlightening us on the beauty of the universe and in ways that can serve to be of utility to our survival. The questions we must ask and find answers for should therefore be of importance to us; and since metaphysical reasoning cannot give fruit to the ill-nourished secrets and powers of nature, we must reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them.