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8 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT January-February 2001 W hile Europe celebrated the millennium last year, the reason for there being one was largely forgotten. That it might be was evident years earlier, when the British government decided that its commemoration of 2000 years since the birth of Christ would be a “dome” with no relevance to Christianity. It is tempt- ing to wonder whether the Millennium Dome might have been less of a disas- trously expensive white elephant if it had indeed celebrated Christ and his legacy. Just as important to the future direc- tion of some European societies has been the further derogation, in the mil- lennial year, from the Judaeo-Christian principles that underlie, at whatever depth, legislation and public morality. In their place, utilitarian arguments have gained much ground, yet are often used crudely and ineptly. The most re- cent example is the debate surrounding regulations passed by the U.K. House of Commons that permit virtually un- limited research on human embryos. Research on human embryos had been legally limited to studying the causes and treatment of infertility and of congenital disorders. Now, however, research licenses may be granted to in- crease knowledge about the develop- ment of embryos, or about serious dis- ease, and to enable such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments for serious diseases. The pressure for such a change came from a research communi- ty which wishes to be unfettered in its development and use of stem cells. The propaganda used was quite shameless: Mike Dexter, director of the United Kingdom’s largest medical research charity, the Wellcome Trust, claimed that six million Britons (over 10 percent of the population) would benefit from stem cell research. Others talked of cures for Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s, diabetes, spinal cord injury, and cancer, within five years. Yet however outrageous the claims, government ministers and Members of Parliament alike believed them. It was frequently said that MPs should not deny the populace such enormous ben- efits. What they ignored was the similar hype over gene therapy just a decade earlier—a decade which saw not a sin- gle cure as a result of gene therapy. The claims of enormous potential benefits were not examined critically, nor were there questions about the costs of apply- ing the research if it is successful. Many MPs did not even consider the status of an embryo created for research purposes, or if they did, they dismissed it as a ball of cells. The idea that it was worthy of special protection as a poten- tial human being was largely ignored, as was the belief of some that the embryo already has full human rights. The wider risks to societal beliefs about the value of human life, if one devalues the embryo, were hardly considered. So the principle that an embryo is worth protecting, and should not be used as a means to other people’s ends, was ditched, and the utilitarian analysis was crude, overwhelmed by prophecies of benefit. The only safeguard put in place is that embryo research should be into “serious disease” (and how long is a piece of string?). Another example of crude utilitarian thinking was the Court of Appeal deci- sion to allow doctors in Manchester to separate the conjoined twins known as Mary and Jodie. Because of their anato- my, and the inadequate performance of Mary’s heart, it was known that separa- tion would result in her immediate death. The judges appear to have decid- ed that it must be better to have one live baby than to allow both to die, as the parents wished. The long-term risks in society of deciding to kill one person in order to save another were not entered into the utilitarian calculus. The decision of the Dutch parlia- ment’s lower chamber to legalize volun- tary euthanasia could be seen in a simi- lar light. Respecting the wish to die of those facing unbearable pain or other suffering is valued more highly than maintaining the injunction that one cit- izen should not deliberately kill another. Yet one must ask how much allowance was made in that calculation for the Netherlands being relatively underpro- vided with hospice and palliative care services. It should perhaps be no surprise that utilitarian calculations made in medical settings are relatively crude, since that is how they are in other areas of public life. Limited calculations are at the root of many odd decisions in our increas- ingly risk-averse cultures. Selling beef on the bone was banned in the United Kingdom to stop bovine spongiform encephalopathy from being passed on. I calculate that average life expectancy in the United Kingdom was thereby ex- tended by one thirtieth of a second; not much to set against further loss of busi- ness for farmers and butchers. Perhaps the ultimate in risk-aversion is the in- creasingly common decision to ban tra- ditional games in the school playground for fear of injury to children, without recognizing the importance of those games in children’s development. The lesson seems to be that it is dan- gerous to ditch long-held moral princi- ples in favour of utilitarian arguments, and doubly so if we have not developed a utilitarian calculus that can take ac- count of the costs of ditching them. The Greatest Happiness? by Richard H. Nicholson old world news Richard H. Nicholson is a physician and ed- itor of the Bulletin of Medical Ethics.

Old World News: The Greatest Happiness?

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8 H A S T I N G S C E N T E R R E P O R T January-February 2001

While Europe celebrated themillennium last year, thereason for there being one

was largely forgotten. That it might bewas evident years earlier, when theBritish government decided that itscommemoration of 2000 years since thebirth of Christ would be a “dome” withno relevance to Christianity. It is tempt-ing to wonder whether the MillenniumDome might have been less of a disas-trously expensive white elephant if ithad indeed celebrated Christ and hislegacy.

Just as important to the future direc-tion of some European societies hasbeen the further derogation, in the mil-lennial year, from the Judaeo-Christianprinciples that underlie, at whateverdepth, legislation and public morality.In their place, utilitarian argumentshave gained much ground, yet are oftenused crudely and ineptly. The most re-cent example is the debate surroundingregulations passed by the U.K. Houseof Commons that permit virtually un-limited research on human embryos.

Research on human embryos hadbeen legally limited to studying thecauses and treatment of infertility andof congenital disorders. Now, however,research licenses may be granted to in-crease knowledge about the develop-ment of embryos, or about serious dis-ease, and to enable such knowledge tobe applied in developing treatments forserious diseases. The pressure for such achange came from a research communi-ty which wishes to be unfettered in itsdevelopment and use of stem cells. Thepropaganda used was quite shameless:Mike Dexter, director of the UnitedKingdom’s largest medical research

charity, the Wellcome Trust, claimedthat six million Britons (over 10 percentof the population) would benefit fromstem cell research. Others talked ofcures for Parkinson’s disease,Alzheimer’s, diabetes, spinal cord injury,and cancer, within five years.

Yet however outrageous the claims,government ministers and Members ofParliament alike believed them. It wasfrequently said that MPs should notdeny the populace such enormous ben-efits. What they ignored was the similarhype over gene therapy just a decadeearlier—a decade which saw not a sin-gle cure as a result of gene therapy. Theclaims of enormous potential benefitswere not examined critically, nor werethere questions about the costs of apply-ing the research if it is successful.

Many MPs did not even consider thestatus of an embryo created for researchpurposes, or if they did, they dismissedit as a ball of cells. The idea that it wasworthy of special protection as a poten-tial human being was largely ignored, aswas the belief of some that the embryoalready has full human rights. Thewider risks to societal beliefs about thevalue of human life, if one devalues theembryo, were hardly considered.

So the principle that an embryo isworth protecting, and should not beused as a means to other people’s ends,was ditched, and the utilitarian analysiswas crude, overwhelmed by propheciesof benefit. The only safeguard put inplace is that embryo research should beinto “serious disease” (and how long is apiece of string?).

Another example of crude utilitarianthinking was the Court of Appeal deci-sion to allow doctors in Manchester to

separate the conjoined twins known asMary and Jodie. Because of their anato-my, and the inadequate performance ofMary’s heart, it was known that separa-tion would result in her immediatedeath. The judges appear to have decid-ed that it must be better to have one livebaby than to allow both to die, as theparents wished. The long-term risks insociety of deciding to kill one person inorder to save another were not enteredinto the utilitarian calculus.

The decision of the Dutch parlia-ment’s lower chamber to legalize volun-tary euthanasia could be seen in a simi-lar light. Respecting the wish to die ofthose facing unbearable pain or othersuffering is valued more highly thanmaintaining the injunction that one cit-izen should not deliberately kill another.Yet one must ask how much allowancewas made in that calculation for theNetherlands being relatively underpro-vided with hospice and palliative careservices.

It should perhaps be no surprise thatutilitarian calculations made in medicalsettings are relatively crude, since that ishow they are in other areas of publiclife. Limited calculations are at the rootof many odd decisions in our increas-ingly risk-averse cultures. Selling beefon the bone was banned in the UnitedKingdom to stop bovine spongiformencephalopathy from being passed on. Icalculate that average life expectancy inthe United Kingdom was thereby ex-tended by one thirtieth of a second; notmuch to set against further loss of busi-ness for farmers and butchers. Perhapsthe ultimate in risk-aversion is the in-creasingly common decision to ban tra-ditional games in the school playgroundfor fear of injury to children, withoutrecognizing the importance of thosegames in children’s development.

The lesson seems to be that it is dan-gerous to ditch long-held moral princi-ples in favour of utilitarian arguments,and doubly so if we have not developeda utilitarian calculus that can take ac-count of the costs of ditching them.

The Greatest Happiness?

by Richard H. Nicholson

old world news

RRiicchhaarrdd HH.. NNiicchhoollssoonn is a physician and ed-itor of the Bulletin of Medical Ethics.