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1 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Forging a Whole of Government Approach to R&S Operations

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Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Forging a Whole of Government Approach to R&S Operations. The United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 post-conflict operations since the end of the Cold War. 2. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Forging a Whole of Government Approach to R&S Operations

Page 2: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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The United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 post-conflict operations since the end of the Cold War.

.2

Page 3: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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2500

1000

2000

1500

0

500

Hostile Deaths

-Non- Hostile Deaths

Major Combat Operations

Hostile Deaths

-Non-Hostile Deaths

Stability Operations

Major Combat Operations vs. Stability Operations 1990- 2006

U.S. Casualty Comparison

U.S

. Mili

tary

Per

son

nel

Dea

ths

• Stability Operations take Stability Operations take place in hostile environmentsplace in hostile environments

• Number of U.S. military Number of U.S. military deaths in stability operations deaths in stability operations over six times that of major over six times that of major combat operationscombat operations

• Stability Operations take Stability Operations take place in hostile environmentsplace in hostile environments

• Number of U.S. military Number of U.S. military deaths in stability operations deaths in stability operations over six times that of major over six times that of major combat operationscombat operations

$300

$150

$250

$200

$50

$100

Major Combat Incremental Costs

Cost Comparison

Major Combat Operations vs. Stability Operations 1990- 2006

Bill

ion

s o

f F

Y0

4 d

oll

ars

Stability OperationsIncremental Costs

• In the last 15 years, the U.S. In the last 15 years, the U.S. has spent over five times as has spent over five times as much on stability operations much on stability operations compared to major combatcompared to major combat

• In the last 15 years, the U.S. In the last 15 years, the U.S. has spent over five times as has spent over five times as much on stability operations much on stability operations compared to major combatcompared to major combat

Stability Operations have Cost Blood and Treasure

Page 4: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning S&R

December 2005

Goal: “To promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance.”

Scope: “Foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”

Key Elements: The Secretary of State (may delegate to S/CRS) will:

Coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all relevant Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct S&R activities;

Coordinate USG responses for S&R with SecDef to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations…at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for R&S;

Lead USG development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to ensure that the US has civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for S&R activities to respond quickly and effectively.

Page 5: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)*United States Department of State

Coordinator Amb. John Herbst

Deputy Coordinator for Conflict Prevention and Outreach

Principal Deputy Coordinator for Civilian Response,

Planning and Management

Office of StrategicCommunications

Legislative Strategy

Diplomatic Strategy

Public Affairs

AcademicOutreach

Office of Conflict Prevention

Early Warning

F AssistanceLiaison

Office of CivilianReadiness

and ResponseOffice of Planning

Operations Support

Planning and Operations

Management

Civilian – MilitaryAffairs

Sectoral ExpertiseAnd Best Practices

Office ofResource

Management

General Services

FinancialManagement

Human Resources

InformationTechnology

Senior MilitaryAdvisor

DOD AssistanceLiaison

U.S. Civilian Reserve Home

Office

ARC/SRC

Training

AUGUST 2007

Page 6: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Mission: To lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

Created July 2004 88 interagency staff, including 11 Active Response Corps (ARC) members 4 whole-of-government strategic planning engagements

• Kosovo, Sudan, Haiti, and Cuba (CAFC); • Civ-Mil PRT planning in Afghanistan

Rapid Response Deployments to 8 countries Exercises

• Blue Advance 2006-2008, Unified Quest, Joint Venture 2006 (United Kingdom), Multi-National Experiments 4 and 5, Unified Action, Civilian Venture 2007 (United Kingdom), Certain Trust

Interagency Management System to Organize USG Civilian Response Whole of Government Planning Framework Essential Task Matrix (ETM) Compiling Best Practices for R&S Developing common R&S Training for Civilians and Military FY 09 Budget Request: $249 Million to build Robust USG Civilian Response

Capability

S/CRS in a Snapshot

Page 7: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Effective U.S. Government R&S Efforts Effective U.S. Government R&S Efforts

PREPARE:TRAIN: Seven new R&S training courses are being offered for civilians and military at

the Foreign Service Institute; and an integrated training strategy is being developed.

EXERCISE: The R&S PCC is driving a joint exercise strategy for R&S operations that tests the new USG capabilities (planning process, operations management system). Blue Advance 2008 was the most robust exercise of the IMS and planning process to date.

CIVILIAN CAPACITY: The Civilian Stabilization Initiative proposed in FY 2009 will create an interagency Active and Standby Response Corps and build a U.S. Civilian Reserve Corps.

PLAN: The U.S. Government Planning Framework for R&S integrates planning across all agencies. In March 2007 the Executive Branch approved a “Triggers Paper” on whole-of-government planning for R&S.

CONDUCT: The Interagency Management System for R&S, approved by the Executive Branch in March 2007, provides a new three-tiered system to manage interagency planning and operations for reconstruction and stabilization.

Since 2005, 15 agencies have worked to implement the Presidential Directive “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Stabilization and Reconstruction” - ensuring all agencies, civilian

and military, are ready to comprehensively approach this new national security challenge.

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•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&SMeeting the Challenge of R&S

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

Page 9: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&S: PlanningMeeting the Challenge of R&S: Planning

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

USG USG

Planning Planning

Framework Framework

for R&S for R&S

USG USG

Planning Planning

Framework Framework

for R&S for R&S

• Common operating picture • Assessment of conflict

dynamics • Development of policy

options with risks and costs • Clear, achievable whole-of-

government policy goal• Integrated, cross-sectoral

strategies applying all elements of national power

• Common metrics and assessment process

Page 10: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Conflict Transformation

Strong

Weak

Large-scale intervention

Goal

Lead passed to local actorsTime

Strength

The USG should focus all elements of the intervention on transforming the dynamics of the conflict in a manageable timeframe.

- Reduce the drivers of conflict and instability- Strengthen legitimate local institutional capacity

Tipping point on the trajectory to viable peace

Page 11: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

.

.

.

Supporting &

Feedback

A New Planning Framework for R&S A New Planning Framework for R&S

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #5

Essential Task Area #6

Major Mission Element #5

Major Mission Element #1

Major Mission Element #2

Major Mission Element #3

Major Mission Element #4

Major Mission Element #6

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION GOAL

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #5

Essential Task Area #6

Major Mission Element #5

Major Mission Element #1

Major Mission Element #2

Major Mission Element #3

Major Mission Element #4

Major Mission Element #6

Vision

F

ield

W

ash

ing

ton

Interagency Implementation PlanInteragency-crafted sub-objective concepts; synchronization and

prioritization of Agency activities over time and space; monitoring and revision

R&S USG Strategic Plan One USG policy goal; interagency-crafted strategies to address sources of conflict; resource strategy and designation of USG lead for implementation

ActivityActivity

Activity

TasksTasks

TasksActivity

ActivityActivity

TasksTasks

Tasks

DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION PLANS & EXECUTION

Page 12: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Whole-of-Government R&S Planning with the IMS Whole-of-Government R&S Planning with the IMS

OVERARCHING POLICY GOALThe overall objective, stated as an outcome, that the U.S. Government (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a specified timeframe.

Subgoal 1: A more specific and textured statement of the overarching policy goal.Subgoal 2: Subgoal 3:

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #5

Essential Task Area #6

Major Mission Element #5

Major Mission Element #1

Major Mission Element #2

Major Mission Element #3

Major Mission Element #4

Major Mission Element #6

OVERARCHING POLICY GOALThe overall objective, stated as an outcome, that the U.S. Government (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a specified timeframe.

Subgoal 1: A more specific and textured statement of the overarching policy goal.Subgoal 2: Subgoal 3:

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #1

Essential Task Area #2

Essential Task Area #3

Essential Task Area #4

Essential Task Area #5

Essential Task Area #6

Major Mission Element #5

Major Mission Element #1

Major Mission Element #2

Major Mission Element #3

Major Mission Element #4

Major Mission Element #6

Three Levels of Three Levels of Planning: Planning:

(1)(1) Policy Formulation Policy Formulation

(2)(2) Strategy Strategy DevelopmentDevelopment

(3)(3) Implementation Implementation PlanningPlanning

Situation Analysis Overview

Policy Advisory

Memo

R&S USG Strategic Plan

Interagency Implementation Plan

Policy FormulationLed by CRSG Secretariat Strategic Planning Team

Implementation PlanningIn support of COM - Led by ACT Implementation Planning Team and Sub-Objective Teams

Proposed Revisions to Strategic Plan and

Interagency Implementation Plan

Plan ImplementationExecution, monitoring and reassessment

Deputies or Principals Committee

Issues Policy Statement

COM, then CRSG-PCC, Approves

Interagency Implementation

Plan

CRSG-PCC Approves R&S USG Strategic

Plan

Strategy DevelopmentIn support of CRSG - Led by Secretariat Strategic Planning Team and Major Mission Element Teams

COM, then CRSG-PCC,

Approve changes to the Strategic Plan

Crisis Response Planning Triggered

= Decision Point = Product

COM = Chief of MissionACT = Advance Civilian Team

CRSG = Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group

Page 13: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&S: Systems Meeting the Challenge of R&S: Systems

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

Interagency Interagency

Management Management

System for System for

R&SR&S

Interagency Interagency

Management Management

System for System for

R&SR&S

• Approved in March 2007

• Provides a new system to manage interagency planning and operations

• Three-tiered to ensure unity of action at all levels (Washington, regional military HQ, field)

Page 14: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

System designed to provide policymakers in Washington, COMs, and military commanders with flexible tools to achieve: • Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic

and implementation plans, including funding requests; • Joint interagency field deployments; and, • A joint civilian operations capability including shared

communications and information management.

For highly complex crises and operations which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response.

What is the IMS? What is the IMS?

Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS):

Page 15: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Country Reconstruction& Stabilization Group

(CRSG)• Consists of a Washington-based

interagency decision-making body, supported by a full-time interagency Secretariat that performs planning and operations functions and mobilizes resources

Co Chaired by

1. State Dept. Regional Assistant Secretary

2. S/CRS Coordinator

3. National Security Council Director

Country Reconstruction& Stabilization Group

(CRSG)• Consists of a Washington-based

interagency decision-making body, supported by a full-time interagency Secretariat that performs planning and operations functions and mobilizes resources

Co Chaired by

1. State Dept. Regional Assistant Secretary

2. S/CRS Coordinator

3. National Security Council Director

A New Interagency Management System A New Interagency Management System

Integration Planning Cell (IPC)• Consists of interagency planners and regional

and sectoral experts

• Deploys to relevant Geographic Combatant Command or to multinational headquarters

• Assists in harmonizing ongoing planning and operations between civilian and military agencies and/or the USG and multinational HQ

Integration Planning Cell (IPC)• Consists of interagency planners and regional

and sectoral experts

• Deploys to relevant Geographic Combatant Command or to multinational headquarters

• Assists in harmonizing ongoing planning and operations between civilian and military agencies and/or the USG and multinational HQ

Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT)

Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT) Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT)

Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT) Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT)

Field Advance Civilian Team

(FACT)

Advance Civilian Team (ACT)• Supports Chief of Mission in the field to

develop, execute, and monitor plans

• Provides interagency field management, deployment, and logistics capabilities

• Develops and implement activities through regional field teams

Advance Civilian Team (ACT)• Supports Chief of Mission in the field to

develop, execute, and monitor plans

• Provides interagency field management, deployment, and logistics capabilities

• Develops and implement activities through regional field teams

Page 16: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&S: CapacitiesMeeting the Challenge of R&S: Capacities

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

Civilian Civilian

Stabilization Stabilization

InitiativeInitiative

Civilian Civilian

Stabilization Stabilization

InitiativeInitiative

• Establishing Civilian Response Corps (Active, Standby, and Reserve) across 8 civilian agencies.

• H.R 1084 auth. passed House, pending Senate.

• $250M in State FY09 budget request (Civilian Stabilization Initiative).

• Build the U.S. Civilian Reserve Corps to 2000 in 2009

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ACTIVE RESPONSE CORPS (ARC)

STANDBY RESPONSE CORPS

CIVILIAN RESERVE CORPS (CRC)

2-5 DAYS FOLLOWING CRISIS

• USG staff trained and ready to go in 48 hours to one week.

• Standing agency capacity for rapid response.

• Will assess situation, design response and begin R&S implementation

• USG employees

• Civilian agency employees who have ongoing job responsibilities but are trained and available for deployments.

• Deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days

• USG employees when mobilized

• Have regular jobs outside the USG

• Fully trained and deployable in 45-90 days

• Provide sector-specific Civilian Response expertise

Civilian Stabilization InitiativeCivilian Stabilization Initiative

250 New ARC

2000 identified SRC

2000 recruited CRC

The new Interagency Management System rapidly puts experts on the ground

30-45 45-90 2-5 Days

Page 18: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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R&S Planning, operations and program management

R&S Planning, operations and program management

Criminal Justiceand PolicingCriminal Justiceand Policing

Economic RecoveryEconomic Recovery

Essential ServicesEssential Services

Diplomacy and GovernanceDiplomacy and Governance

Civilian Force ProtectionCivilian Force Protection

Who are the Active Response Corps?Who are the Active Response Corps?

State, Justice, Homeland Security, USAID•Civilian police, investigators, criminal justice, courts, corrections

State and US Agency for International Development (USAID)• Planners, logisticians, operations set-up, military liaison, assessment, local engagement

US Dept. of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, USAID•Agriculture, fiscal/monetary policy, banking, taxes, commercial law, business development

USAID and Health and Human Services•Public Health, education, infrastructure

State Diplomatic Security Agents•Security planners and officers

State and USAID•Human rights, governance, conflict mitigation, civil society/media,DDR

Page 19: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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What is the Standby Response Corps?What is the Standby Response Corps?

Request: Training for Standby Response Corps members in FY09

$75.2 million request also provides for:

• 250 new Interagency ARC positions

• 8 weeks of ARC training

• Armored vehicles, communications and personal equipment

• Basic office support

The SRC is:

INTERAGENCY – employees from State, USAID, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security

VOLUNTARILY “ON CALL” – SRC members are “on call” to deploy from their current position, in support of a regional crisis or transition requiring a surge of US civilian expertise, with 30 days notice for up to 180 days

SPECIALIZED – SRC members have individual backgrounds related to R&S and hardship situations; sectoral and functional expertise; receive 2 weeks of R&S training per year

Currently there are 130 State SRC members supported by additional retirees. Currently there are 130 State SRC members supported by additional retirees. SRC experts have deployed to Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, and civil-military SRC experts have deployed to Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, and civil-military

training. With CSI, SRC would grow to 2000 in FY09.training. With CSI, SRC would grow to 2000 in FY09.

Page 20: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Composition of the First 500 CRC

Page 21: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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Expert Personnel to provide rapid response oversight, management, programming and advisory capacity

Active and Standby Response Corps $75.2Training and EquipmentU.S. Civilian Reserve Corps $86.8Training and Equipment

Deployment Supportto put civilians on the ground quickly, protect and sustain them for first 60 days

Deploying and Sustaining US experts $41.5Civilian Force Protection $22.1

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilizationto manage Washington coordination and leadership of R&S planning and operations and the development of prevention mechanisms and best practices

Operating Costs $23.0Total Request $248.6

A New State of ReadinessA New State of ReadinessTo be fast, flexible, localized and comprehensive – the USG must be READY.

In FY09 the Civilian Stabilization Initiative request includes:

FY09 Request (in mil)

Page 22: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&S: TrainingMeeting the Challenge of R&S: Training

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

Integrated Integrated

USG USG

Training Training

StrategyStrategy

Integrated Integrated

USG USG

Training Training

StrategyStrategy

• Developing a USG Integrated Training Strategy for all personnel involved in the IMS

• Seven new R&S courses at the Foreign Service Institute

• Establishing an exercise plan to increase civilian exercises and participation in military exercises.

Page 23: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

•Lack of common planning and assessment process and reliable measures of progress

•No unified operating system to ensure unity of action (planning, executing, monitoring)

•Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response

•Gap in specialized training and preparation for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and unstable environments.

•No common repository for capturing and applying lessons learned and best practices.

• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for non-humanitarian activities -- constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.

Meeting the Challenge of R&SMeeting the Challenge of R&S

Common Past Reconstruction & Stabilization ChallengesCommon Past Reconstruction & Stabilization Challenges

• Developing a USG Lessons Learned System for R&S. Held a PRT Lessons Learned workshop.

• Essential Task Matrix• DDR, elections and

other thematic guides for planners

• Integration of lessons into training curriculum

• Proposed Conflict Response Fund (Congress rejected)

• Section 1207 renewed in FY08 NDAA

Page 24: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

International OrganizationsInternational Organizations

Political/Economic ForaPolitical/Economic Fora

Regional OrganizationsRegional Organizations

Bilateral Partner CountriesBilateral Partner Countries

Building Global Capacity with International PartnersBuilding Global Capacity with International Partners

G8 (Peacebuilding Structures, Capacity, Conflict Prevention)

Collaboration with countries having nationally coordinated crisis response mechanisms

NATO (Comprehensive Approach)EU (Work Plan)

““We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.” crisis and post crisis situations.”

EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Javier Solana EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Javier Solana December 14, 2005December 14, 2005

United Nations (Peacebuilding Commission, DPKO, DPA)

Page 25: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

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QUESTIONS?????For additional information, go to:

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

WWW.CRS.STATE.GOV