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Supervisor: Dr. David Zimmerrnan

ABSTRACT

The Canadian hydrofoil warship programme of 1959-1971 represented a triumph

of naval architecture, design, and technology. Launched in respouse to the perceived

threat posed to Canadian security by new Soviet submarine designs, the Fast Hydrofoil

Escort Bras d'Or was designed to regain the lost tactical advantage for Canadian and

NATO anti-submarïne &are (ASW) forces. In the end, Canada's hydrofoil programme

produced a largely successiil and potentiaiiy effective warship after decades of research,

millions of dollars and person-hours, and the mprecedented application of state-of-the-art

technology .

However, three main tàctors contributed to the uitimate tàilure of the project.

First, the project failed because of its inescient management by a convoluted

bureaucratie system. As an experimentai programme with military applications, the

FHE-400 project was managed simultaneously by three separate governmental agencies,

resulting in duplication of effort and wastage of resources. Second, the Iack of a clearly

stated operational requirement for the ship during its early development impeded the

progress of the programme and, more importantly, greatly limited the federal

government 's willingness to support the project. Final1 y, the practical requirement for

the hydrofoil design becarne increasingly dubious as other effective, and more

conventional, ASW systems were developed and successfùlly proven during the 1960s.

Tabk of Contents

A b m t

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement

Dedication

List of Abbreviatioas

htroduction and Historiographie Review

Chapter One: Ongins of the Design

Chapter Two: The Navy's Decision to Build

Chapter T h e : Construction and Evaluation

Conclusion

Appendix A: The Hydrofoil Concept

Appendix B: R a s h of the Royal Canadian Navy

Appendix C : Illustrations

Bibliography

Page . - I l

1 wish to thank Dr. David Zimmeman for his guidance and support in helping me prepare this thesis. I sincerely appreciate Dr. Zimmeman's unwavering support of my shidies at the University of Victoria despite my other profesJional comrnitments which competed for my time and effort.

I would also like to extend my appreciation to Judy Nixon of the History Department for keeping me on track administratively since my d v a l on campus in 1997.

For Hal, d o s e support was instrumental in the completion of this undertaking- I can only hope that this worlc at lem prtially fblfills his expectations.

vii

List of Abbrwiations

N o s (A&W) AK-Ns (Pl Ais ASW CNS m s cwc DDP D m DGFE DG Ships DM D m DNOR DREA DRE3 FHE MIL MND NATO NiCoMo NRE NSHQ RCN RN SNCNS USN VCDS VDS

Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Air & Warfiue) Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans) Anti-submarine Anti-submarine M a r e Chief ofNaval Staff Chief of Naval Technical Services Canadian Westinghouse Company Department of Defence Production Directorate of Hydrofoil Development Director General Fighting Equipment Director General Ships Deputy Minister Deparcment of National Defence Duector Naval Operational Requirements Defence Research Establisinnent Atlantic Defence Research Board Fast Hydrofoil Escort Marine industries Limited Minister of National Defence North Atlantic Treaty O r w t i o n Nickel Cobalt Molytidenum Navd Research Establishment Naval Service Headquarters Royal Canadian Navy Royat Navy Scientific Advisor to the Chief of Naval Staff United States Navy Vice Chief of the Navai Staff Variable Depth Sonar

The Anti-Submarine Hvdrofoil Concept

The mounting threat from advanceci Soviet submarines during the 1950s.

combined with chronic manning shorîages within the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and

the massive expense associated with modem destroyer comûuction, f o r d Canadian

naval planwn to examine alternative wanhip designs. One such design was for a very

fast, open-ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW) hydrofoil c m capable of detecting and

attacking the fastest Soviet submarines.' With its origins in the work of Alexander

Graham Bell and a score of other designers and naval architects over a fim-year

the Canadian experimental hydrofoil programme of the 1950s and 1960s offered a

possible solution to the threat poseà by fast Soviet nuclear submarines. i n d e after

decades of research and millions of dollars, the Canadian hydrofoil warship programme

of 1 959- 1 97 1 evenNally represented a triumph of naval architecture, design, and

technology.

While a technical success in that Bras d 'Or conclusively established the

hydrofoil's trernendous speed advantage over conventional surface ship designs, three

main façtors contributed to the ultimate failure of the project First, the lack of a timely

and clearly stated operational requirement for the ship by naval planners complicated the

programme's development an4 more importantly, greatly limited the fedeml

government's ability and willingness to support the project. Esxntially rnanaged as an

expenmental research project by the Defence Research Board (DRB), the extremely

1 For an overview of hydrofoil theory, including a g d description of the FHE JO0 design, sec Appendix A

experirnental nature of the project made it more prone to inconsistent finaacial and

political support than more conventiooal defence procurement programmes such as the

DDH-280 destroyer project of 1965- 1973.

Second, the project failed because of inefficient management by a convoluted and

cumbersome bureaucratie system. As an experirnental programme with militiuy

applications, the FHE 400 project was managed sirndtaneously by three separate

agencies: the Royal Canadian Navy (Maritime Command afier 1968), the Deparmient of

Defence Production, and the Defence Research Board. The vague and often confîkt-

ridden nature of this management system was fbrther complicated by the prime

contractor, DeHavilland Aircraf? of Cm&, k i n g granted exceptional independent

autonomy over the design and construction of the vesseL3

Final1 y, the pnictical requirement for the hydrofoil design beaune increasingly

unclear as other effective, and more conventional, ASW systems were successflilly

developed. The hel icopter-destroyer team, for example, was developed conc urrentl y wi th

the hydrofoil programme and proved to be an excellent ASW system both in simulations

and actual operations.' As more information becarne available regarding the capabilities

and limitations of Soviet submarines, it became increasingly apparent to Canadian naval

planners that other existing systems could effectively fulfill the Navy's ASW

requi rements.

Canada' s hydrofoil programme eventually produced a success ful and potentiall y

effective warship afier decades of research, millions of dollars and person-hours, and the

J. Jordan, Modem Destrov- (ïandoa: Prenticc Hall Press, 1986), 25. ' "RCNIASW Hydrofoil Project" DG Ships to SNCNS, 30 Mafch 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84/167 Vol. 18), 1. 4 C. Dalley, "The Marritige of the Small Ship and Large Helicopter", Meritme Warfme Builetin, 1985 ed.

unprecedented developmeat and application of stateof-the-art techoology, consûuction

rnatenals, and propulsion ~~sterns.~ Yet, despite performance tbat exceeded design

expectations and enormous potential in tenns of naval applications, the above factors

combined to ensure its ultimate cancel Mon in 197 1.

Historical Background

Canada's postwar navy was, in large! part, a proàuct of its Second World War

experience. In response to the threat posed by Gexman U-bats to the Atlantic sea lines

of communication, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) grew nom a flotilla of sixteen ships

in 1939 to the world's third largest fleet by war's end? in contrast to the R a ' s pre-war

fleet of a few heavii y-armed destroyers manned by a very mal1 core of professionals, the

North Atlantic campaign of 193% 1945 was fou& largeiy by inexperienced "amateurs"

in small and poorly-equipped corvettes. Despite mounting Ailied shipping losses to the

German subrnarine threat, Canada's professional (or "big-ship") navy initially viewed the

submarine assault on Allied shipping as secondary to preparations for major engagements

against the capital ships of the Gennan ~rei~smarine.'

To this end, R a planners comrnitted significant resources and personnel during

the war to the construction of Tribal-class fleet destroyers, designed for escorting fleet

task groups and other fleet-oriented work. Whiie fundamentally misguided in view of the

pressing need for smaller escorts and the resources to support their gruelling cycle of

operations, this ambitious construction programme reflected the continued dominance of

' -'Bras d'Or Skipper Sees Many Roles for Hydrofoil" 7 k Unma Jound, 17 Novemkr I W O . "Reporf on certain incidents which occurred on board HMC Ships Ath- , Crescent, and

Maprficenf' (Ortawa: King's Primer, 1949), 8. ( H a d a referred to as "The Mainguy Reportn). 7 RH. Leu. "'Big Ship Time': The Formative Years of RCN mcers Serving in RN Capital Ships" in J.A Boutiler, ed. RCN in Retfospca 19 la1 948 (Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 75.

the "big-ship" school within the RCN's hierarchy. In basic ternis, Canada's professional

naval corps planned for a continuation of pre-war strategic rationaie: tbat the RCN would

support Britain's Royal Navy in operations against Gemian s d a c e ships and commerce

raiders in order to achieve comrnand of the sea in support of campaigns asbore. In doing

so, the argument continue4 it would be necessary for Canada to acquire a large, balanced

f l e t of powerful warships capable of a variety of missions.

However, the gravity of the U-boat threat and its mounting effect on the entire

Allied war effort eventually altered such grandiose plans. James B. Lamb, a former

corvette commander, summanzed this critical shifi in thinlang which fûndarnentaily

redirected the RCN's course:

But a h y thing happened to the reguiar navy while it waited for the Big Ship that were to fight the Big Battle. For as tbe years wore on, it became clear that the little battle, the U-boat thing, was in fact the Big Bade akr al], and the Iittle ships that were fighting it were al1 that were going to rnatter.8

As a result of severe shipping losses in 1939-40 and the alarming escalation of the U-boat

threaî, the RCN was forced to specialize in anti-submarine &are, consa~ctïng

hundreds of corvettes in shipyards throughout Canada. Despite heavy initial losses of

both warships and merchant vessels through 1942, the efficiency of RCN escort forces

steadily improved contributing to eventual Allied victory in the Atlantic in May 1945.

However, this cdebration was ternpered by the knowledge (by senior officers if not the

generat public) of the mixed success of the RCN effort in the Atlantic and the significant

~ -

8 J. B. Lamb, The Corvette Navy ( Agincourt: Signet, 1977). 8 -

dificulties encountered by Canadian escon v e ~ s e l s . ~ Such difficulties were fiequedy

expressed, both during and after the war, in criticisms concerning the RCN's performance

fiom both within and without Naval SeMce Headquartea (NSHQ). 'O

However, the professional RCN officer corps as a gmup was extremely reiucîant to

abandon its vision of a big-ship uavy and was unabie or unwilling to lend its full support

to the navy's de facto p ~ c i p a l mission: the protection of shipping with small corvettes

and rninesweepen. Very few Regular officen, for example, ever cornmanded corvetîes,

the ubiquitous workhorses of the Atlantic war." The majority served in the RCN's fleet

destroyers (which were promptly transferred to Britain for her defence), in British ships,

or ashore in headquarten billets."

The inability of senior Canadian officîals to secure the necessary outfitting of their

warships was also indicative of the professional navy's tepid commiûnent to the ASW

war and its associated administrative and logistical demands. In tems of operational

performance, Canadi an escorts remained under-equi pped in relation to their British and

Amencan counterparts throughout the war, especially in tems of radar, sonar, and

9 These "significant difialties" included a wide variety o f criticai factors which were only brought to the historical fore in 1985 by Marc Milner in his North Atlantic Run. Hereiofore very liîtle had been written on these shoncomings or their massive impact on the overall Canadian contribution to the Banle of the Atlantic. 'O From the outset of the war, senior Canadian officers were well aware of the general inadequacy of RCN vessels, Commodore L.W. Murray commeming in 1941 that "RCN corvettes have bcen given so little chance of becoming efficient that they are almost more of a liability than an asset," For the most scathing assessrnent of Canada's conmibution to the Banle of the Atlantic, sce Capt 0 D. Macintyre's U-Boat Killer (London: Weidenfeld & Ncholson, 1956) in which the author retèrs to RCN escort vcssels as "travesties of warships." 1 1 Lynch, Canada's Flowers: History of tbe Corvettes of Canada 1939-1945, Appendix TI. 12 For a more thorough disaission of Royal Navy influence on the RCN. see The Mainguy Rcpon, L.C. Audette's "The Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report o f 1949" in RCiU in R e t r o w J.B. Lamb's The Corvette Navy @p. 6-18), and M. Machtyre's "The Influence of Persorne1 Issues on the Professional Development of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1 945- 1965" (Kingston: Royal MilÏtafy College of Canada, unpublished BA thesis, 1995)

communications equipment13 One need only look at the staieaf- the4 technology

present in the Canadian fleet destroyers of the time to appreciaîe the incongnùty of

official support for the ' W o navies." This chronic pttem of technical inadequacy also

revealed the senior decision-makers' rel uctance to lend support to unc convention al"

warship designs despite their effdveness at sea. Althougti the corvette wnsistently

proved itsel f capable of accomplishing escort tasks and destroying U-boats, its origins as

a commercial '%hale-catcher" design wndemned it to dismissal by the Regdar RCN as a

temporary stopgap measure quite distinctly divorced fkom the "core" fleet of destroyen. '' Another exarnple of the RCN's cornmitment to a "big-ship" fleet can be f o d in

the staff work of certain senior officers in Ottawa while the war mged at sea- For

instance, the NSHQ Plans Division (under fbture Admirai Harry DeWolf), at the height

the Battle of the Atlantic, was pnncipaily occupied with drafting a plan for the future

force structure of the RCN.'' Despite the nature of the batîle k i n g fought at that very

moment by scores of small Canadian escort vessels, DeWolf s vision of the postwat RCN

included two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, sixteen f l e t destroyers, and supporting

vessels. l6 A year later, on Christmas Eve 1 943, the Canadian Naval Staff concluded th&:

The minimum navy which wodd be considered would consist of 5 cruisers, 3 flotillas of destroyer each consisting of 8 private ships and one leader, 16 fngates, 12 minesweepers, a Naval Air Service with 2 light fleet aircraft

" For comprehensive analyses of the effects of quipnient shottages in RCN escorts, sa D. Zimmerman's The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa (Tomnto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) and M. Milner ̂ Royal Canadian Navy Participation in the Battle of the Atlantic Crisis of 1943" h J. A Boutilier, ed. "ECN in Retrospect (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1982). 14 T.G. Lynch, Canada's Flowers: History of the Corvcttcs of Cana& 1939- 1945 (Halifax: Nimbus, 198 l), 5 . 1s For a detailed analysis of tbe RCN's plans for a postwar "balancd fleet", sce T-HW. Pile's unpublished M A . thesis "Beyond the Workable Little Flect: Post-war Planning and Policy in the RCN 1945- 1948" (University of Victoria, 1999). l6 S.M. Davis. "The 'St Lautut Decision: Gemsis of a Canadian Fleet", in W.AB. Douglas, cd.. RCN in Transition 191 û- 1985, 189.

carriers, and a fleet train of necessary sup ly and maintenance ships in order to give the whole fleet cornpiete mobility. R

With respect to the RCETs postwar view of the ideal fleet, historia Marc Milner's view

concerning the Regdar navy's quest for permanence during this time is instructive: "The

war fought between 1939 and 1945 was as much to anchor the navy pennanently as to

beat the ~ermans."'~ In this sense, the navy's continued reliance on a predominantly

ASW-onented escort fleet clearly "did not confonn to tbe long-term goals of the

professional navy."I9

As the Second World War reached its closing stages in early 1945 and the

Atlantic wu concluded, senior Canadian naval planaen were as busy arnassing the

elements of a significant postwar navy as they were occupied with organizing Canada's

naval cornmitment to operations against Japan. Two aircraft carniers and kwo

cruisers, for instance, were quired very late in the war fkom the Royal Navy bath as a

solution to British manning concems and with a view for the postwar composition of the

RCN. Historian James Eayrs outlined the strategic rationale on which these acquisitions

were based in that ". . . the cocldeshell flotilla of figates, corvettes, and tmwlen, assigned

to convoy duty by the Allied division of labour, could not p ~ s i b l y perform the duties of

the pst-war peacetime navy "" Rapid postwar demobilization, however, shattered the grandiose drearns of

Canadian naval planners. Before the RCN leadership could consolidaie its wartime gains

I7 "Post-War Canadian Navy", 2 1 Jan- 1944, Naval Heidquarters files in I. +S. ui Defince of Canada Vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 3 972), 8 1. I 8 M. Milner, North A t l a n w n : The Royd Canadian Nayy a d the Bmle for the Con=* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 8. l9 Ibid., 8. 20 Eayrs, 8 1.

in ships and infr-astnicture, the navy shrank to a shadow of its former self, inviting the

observation that "Like a mighty wave, its foam-laden crest broken on the beach, the

Royal Canadian Navy in the fa11 and winter of 1945 was loshg its sbength.'"' The

world's third largest fleet at war's end, the RCN was cut to only eight ships by 1947."

The naval budget plummeted fkom $241 million in 1946 to $65 million in 1947,

representing a one-year reduction of seventy-three percent? The RCN, while

undergoing a demobilization process which Eayn described as "a penod of

demoralization and humiliation wiknown in i ts fbrty-year existence," also had to wntend

with a widespread questionhg of its very raison d'erre?' The traditional peacPtime

functions of fleet exercises, fisheries patrols, and "showing the flag" abroad could no

longer sufficiently justify the enormous expenditure associated with building and

maintaining a modem navy in the postwar era

In addition to budgetary diffrculties, the po- RCN faced a number of other

serious challenges. Despite the advent of the atomic age and its associated threats to

Canadian maritime defence, the funire composition and role of Canada's maritime forces

remained undetermineci for some time. The Minister of Naval Sewbs conveyed this

general sentiment of strategic uncertainty in October 1945 d e n he surmised that Canada

ought to have a "good, workable little fleet" without elaborating on the exact role or

composition of this force." When Brooke Claxton became Minister of Defence in

December 1946, he sunniseù that the RCN's d e would not need redefinition. Claxton

'' J. Harbron, 'Tbyai Canadian Navy at Peace 1945- 1355: The Uncatain Heritage," pvePn's Quraterfy, LxXm? 3, Aununn 1966.3 1 1. T. German, The Sea is at Our Gata (ïoronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 206.

2, D.W. Middlemiss "Emomic Considerations in the Dmlopmmt of the Canadian Navy Since 1945" in W. A.B. Douglas, ed., Ilhe RCN in Tnns 24

ition. 1950-1985, 259. Eayrs, 97.

25 ibid., 87.

viewed the RCN's postsw role as k i n g a natural extension of its wartïme e~perience.~~

In his words, "At sea, our role would largely con& of gusrdhg the lines of

communication as the Royal Canadian Navy did so well in the last ~ a r . " " ~ '

The Postwar Renaissance of the RCN

The universally accepted assumption that the role of the RCN would rernain

ASW-orienteci was formailled as a result of the foimding of the Nor& Atlantic Tnaty

Organization (NATO) in April 1949. Cariada's cornmitment to Europem security finally

provided the RCN with a clear, well-defined, and easily understood raison d'erre. In the

event of hostilities, Canada's navy would contribute anti-submarine forces in support of

NATO in order to secure the Atlantic sea lines of communication for the re-supply of

European allies.28 Claxton's logical assumption that the RCN would continue with its

wartime role was echoed by former naval oficer Tony Geman in that "Anti-subrnmine

work, afier dl, made sense. It was Canada's realm of e~~er i ence .~ '~ Given the attraction

of this mission and the lack of political and public support for any other type of naval

cornmitment, it is interesting to note that the majorïîy of heretofore "big-ship" propnents

within the RCN quickly lent their support to the NATO ab-submarine role. This

dramatic change of heart, as Joel Sokolsky has observed, represented a fundamental

realization on the part of many within the navy that "the RCN's leadership perceived its

salvation in the NATO ro~e."'~ An ASW navy, after dl , was better than no navy at ail.

26 D-I. Bernison, True Patriot: nit Life of Brooke Cimon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 153. '7 %id., 100. " I. Sokolsky, "Cana& and the Cold War at Sea, 194548". in W-AB. Douglas, ed. The RCN in Transition 19 10- 1985,2 13. 2 9 German, 23 3. 30 Sokolsky, 213.

Ironically, this anti-submarine mission, so disdainesi by the wartime "professionai

navy," emerged as the saviour of the RCN. In fact, once the NATO mandate

materialized, the naval budget's downward spiral halted and expenditures skyrocketed

back to w d m e levels by 1953. ' Naval planners were authorized to acquire modem

ships and equipment as new ASW vessels were laid down in 1950 and twenty-one

wartime £iigates were refitted and recomrnissioned as ami-submarine ocean escort~.'~

The RCN also acquired HMCS Magn~~cent, a light flet aircraf€ carrier that was later

optimized for ASW missions.

The requirement for sîrong ASW defences became incmingly clear as the

postwar strategic environment took shape during the 1 950s. The large-scale production

and widespread deplopent of nuclear weapans by the United States and the Soviet

Union threatened the very s u ~ v a l of the human race and reduced the waming time for

war to a matter of minutes. The deployment of nuclear missileequipped Soviet

submarines along the North American seaboarà m e r reduced reaction time and

underlined the n e 4 for strong ami-submarine defences in Canadian and American

The Soviet Union's introduction of fast nuclear-powered submarines also

threatened to degrade or negate NATO's AS W capability. Benefitting h m captured

j' Middlemiss, 259. 32 ^First Converted Frigate Ready", ï k Crowsnest Vol. 5, No. 11.2 (September 1953). 33 ln 1957, the Soviet Navy converteci s e v d Zuh-class diesel-powd submarines to carry the SS-N-4 Sark ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead The Sark had an effective range of 300 nautical miles against land targets. in 1958, the Co&ciass was introducai, having becn designad fiom the outset to carry Sark missiles. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines followcd shortly thereafter, begrming with the Sark-equipped Hoteklass in 1959. Guidcd (or cnrist) missiles werc k i n g dcvtloped for Soviet submarines during the same period. Ln 1960, severai Whi&y-class diesel bats were fitted with the SS-N- 3 Shaddock guided missile which had a range of 400 NM. Submarincs of the Juljen- and miclear-powered Ech-classes began to appear later in the sarne ycar and were both dcsigned to carry the Shaddock. (N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis: Naval h s t i ~ e Pras, 1986)).

German submarine technology and its own innovative nuelear propulsion programme, the

Soviet Union introduced a number of designs in the early 1950s which shattered the

tacticd equilibrium in the North Atlantic. By exploiting their considerable speed

advantage, Soviet submarînes wuid attack shipping with relative impunity h m counter-

attack by NATO escorts. Regardless of the efficiency of NATO deteciion equipment or

ASW tactics, the speed of emerging Soviet aîtack submarine Qsigns completely changed

the naval balance of power in the 1950s."

Ln addition to this crucial speed advantage, Soviet nuclear-propelled submarines

were superior to NATO escort slips in terms of endurance. While less refined than

current nuclear propulsion systems, early Soviet technology nonetheless proviâed the

fi rst nuclear-powered submarines with exponentiall y greater range and endurance in

cornparison to conventional designs. In addition, nuclear propulsion allowed submarines

to remain submerged for greater periods of time. The Geman and Italian submarines

faced by Canadian naval forces during the Second World War, comparatively, spent the

vast majority of time on the surface, typically submerging only to attack or to avoid

dete~tion.~' The introduction and refinement of nuclear propulsion technology

eiirninated the requirement of submarines to recharge their batteries on the surface and

greatly increased range and endurance. More irnportantly, k i n g air-independent,

34 Polrnar, 109. '' C. Blair, Hitler's U-Bort Wu Vol. 1 (Nnu York: Randorn House, 1996), 63. A typiul example of how little tirne U-boats spent submergai is the case of U-123 and her two war parois to the Atlantic seabard of North America in 1942 and 1 943 :

Total Distance (NM) Distance Submaged Perœntage Subrnaged Deployrnent 1 : 8,277 256 3 .WO Deployment 2: 8,918 3 10 3 -48%

(M.-on, W a t i o n DNmbegt (New York: Harper & ROW, 1990). 403.)

nuclear-propelled subrnarines could operate submerged for as long as rations and other

supplies remained to sustain the crew, greatly enbaacing the vessel's capacity to avoid

detection and attack without warning.

The net effeît of this technology (and the Soviets' large-scale application thereof)

mas the perceived marginalization of NATO's effectiveness against the submarine threaî.

In the first two decades after 1945, the Canadian Navy endeavoured to address these

challenges by integrating its new ships and weapons into effective ASW systerns,

recruiting the thousands of personnel cequired to man the new fleee and practicing their

crafi with other Iike-minded navies. Major annual multinational exercises with names

1 ike "Mainbrace" and "New Broom" involveci various combinations of warships and

rnerchant ships fiom several NATO countries with but one mission in mind: the

protection of the Atlantic sea lines of ~omrnunication.~~

New innovations in the fields of ship design, electronic sensors, and combat

systems were refined and applied in an effort to introduce new ASW weapons or

modernize existing ones." Canada's shipbuilding capability was demonstrated in the

development of the SI. Laurent fiigate design in the 1950s and 1960s and in the refitting

of wartime frigates into modem Presroniandass ocean escorts.

Canada also demonstrated its potential as a leader in naval technology by its role

in the development of variable depth sonar, passive sonar systems, and the destroyer-

helicopter t e a ~ n . ~ ~ Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) was introduced and refined as a short-

range method of detecting subrnarines h m surface vessels. Passive sonar systems, both

36 Sokolsky, 2 1 7.

" Eayrs, 95. 38 D. Elrassington, "The Canadian Developrnent of VDS" and C. Dalley, "The Maniage of the Small Ship and Large Helicopter." Mm-rime Wmfore Bulletin, 1985 ed.

fixed and mobile, were developed in an effort to monitor and track patrolling Soviet

submarines. Yet no single innovation held as much promise in the field of anti-

submarine warfàre as did the helicupter-destroyer team. Years of design studies and

trials by Canadian engineers, p i l a , and naval officers d t e d in the mamiage of the

large ASW helicopter and the destroyer escort in the early 1960s.'~ This irnpressive

innovation represented a major tactical advance by providing surface escorts with an

asset by which hostile submarines codd be detected and aîtacked at much longer

ranges.* The importance of this development was reflected in the costly retrofitting of

many Sf. Laurent destroyer morts with flight decks and helicopters and the subsequent

provision of this capability in al1 follow-on designs built for the navy"

The strategic imperative to provide effective countermeasures to the burgeoning

Soviet submarine threat in the 1950s and 1960s atso prompt& the RCN to actively

pursue the development of the experimental Fast Hydrofoil Escort programme.

Developed concurrently with other ASW projects such as the helicopterdestroyer

concept, the radical FHE 100 design was parbcularly attractive to Canadian naval

planners in view of its predicted high speed, manoewrability, and relative invuinerability

to counter-attack. in addition, the design's srnaIl crew complement and low capital cost

per unit promised substantial cost savings in cornparison to conventional ASW destroyers

39 For an authoritativc accoum of Canada's leadership in this field, see C. Dallcy's "The M h a g e of the Srnall Ship and Large Helicopter", Maritime Wqfiare Bullerin, 1985 cd. 40 The advent of the hclicopter-destroyer ASW systcm incrraJed the effective range at which submarines could be detected and attacked h m the tms of nautid miles to the hundreds, thus acponentially muhiplying the local battle space of a single escort. (C. DaHey, "'The Marriage of the S d l Ship and Large Heticopte?', Maritime W a @ m Brrlletin, 19û5 eâ "' Jordan 33.

and ~ r i ~ a t e s . ~ ' However, as this study will demonstrate, the considerable theoretical

potential of this imovative warship design was ultimately wgated by a combination of

factors which finally contributed to its cancellation in 197 1.

Brus d ' a ' s Place in Canadian Naval Historïoara~hv

Despite the considerable resources thai the Royal Canadian Navy (RO

expended on the Fast Hydrofoil Exort programme h m 1959 to 1971, the project has

received no more than cursory mention in postwar Canadian naval historiography.

Indeeci, no serious scholarly effort has been made to analyze fûlly this important chapter

of Canadian naval history. This historiographical inadequacy, however, may be more

attributable to the nascent state of the art rather tban a detiberate or careless oversight on

the part of contemporary historians. Indeed the incomplete nature of Canadian naval

historical writing in general is widely accepted and acknowledged by naval historians

themselves." This is especially true for the postwar history of Canada's naval forces. In

1984, W. A. B Douglas obsewed that "Canadian naval history h m 1945 to 1982 bas

barely been touche&* and that it was possible to "count the number of monographs on

RCN history on the fingers of one hand - and al1 o f them were govenunent

publ i ca t i~ns . ' ~~

42 Once in production, it was estimated that a fùlIy-equipped ASW hydrofoil would cost approximately 58- 1 O million cornpared to the $30 million cost per unit for contemporary AS W destroyer escurts like those of the St Luurenr class. *3 See M. Milner. ''Navol History in Canada: The State of the Art", (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1 995), and W. k B. Douglas, "Canadian Naval Historiographyn, Mariter 's Minor, Vol. 70, 1984, and '?Java1 History: The State of the Art", presented at the "Clio and Mars" Confe~ence, University of New Brunswick, Septanber 1990. es W.A.B. Douglas, " C d i a r t N a d Historiogrrpw, M d m ' s Mimur, Vol. 70 (1 984), 358. " Douglas, "Canadian Navai Histonogmphy", 9.

This changed in the early 1980s. Beginnùig with a major naval historical

conference iit Royal Roads Military College in 1980,~ the new decade saw a renaissance

in Canadian naval bistoriography that was b U e d by several factors. Firsi, scholars

began to challenge the long-accepted pemise that nothing more needed to be written

about our naval past Specifically, historians began to question the conclusions of

traditionai officia1 histories by explorhg heretofote unchallenged assumptions of the

past.J' Second, the govenunent's timely release of invaluable archivai material during

this penod greaîiy hcilitated research in many areas of naval history, especially that of

the postwar p e r i d Finaliy, the latter Mf of this century saw the cultivation of an

increasingiy independent mode of thought among Canadian historians in general and

among naval historians in particular. Ln the words of historian Marc Milner, "between

1960 and 1980 Canada cast o f f its colonial mentality and Canadians started measuring

the RCN in its own nght, as the service of an independent, sovereign tat te.'''^ The

product of these factors was a series of published works during the 1980s which ushered

in the era of a "new" Canadian naval history.

One such effort to reciress a perceiveci historiographical imbalance appeared in the

fom of Thomas Lynch's The Flvin~: 400: Canada's Hvdrofoil published in

1983. This popular and well-received work relates tbe historical beginnings of the

controversial FHE 400 anti-submarine hydrofoil project and offers an extremely detailed

46 This conference, oiganized by Dr. J.A Boutilier, marked a new era for Canadian naval history aod created renewed interest in the field. Tbe proceedings t?om the conference wert published as pt of the weil-received book RCN in Retrospecc 19 10- 1968 (Vancouver University of British Columbia Pms, 1982). 17 See, for example, Marc Milner's ground-breaking rejection of officiai accounts concaning tht performance of Canada's escort fôrces in the Second World War, as Brst expressed in his unpublishcd M.A. thesis "Canadian Escorts and the Mid Atlantic 1942- 1943". 4R Milner, "Naval History in Canada: The State of the Art", 10. 49 T.G. Lynch, The F y n n 400: Canada's Hvdrofoil Pro:= (Halifax: Nimbus, 1983).

narrative of the vessel's design, consûucti~ and operational evaluation. Richly

illustrated with line drawings, photographs, and tabular data, The Fivine 400 draws upon

a variety of sources such as contractor design &ta from Dehavilland Aircraft of Canada .

and other technical information from the Defmce Research Board @RB). The product

of this exhaustive research represents the first attemp to shed some historical light on th is

controversial defence procurement programme. Indeed, Lynch's work remains the sole

publishcd source of information on the hydrofoil project.

Wowever, the value of Lynch's work is significantly limitai in a variety of ways.

First, he makes no attempt to analyze the confluence of events, personalities, and

decisions which directly influenced the course of the project. While saturated with

intriguing information such as contract details and design specificaîions, The Fl~ing 400

fails to discuss the cniciai decisions associated with the programme's approval,

devel opment, and eventual cancellation. Second, nomithstanding a superficial two-

paragraph discussion of the operational requirement for the hydrofoil,50 Lynch makes no

effort to place the programme in any sort of global context in tems of Canadian naval

policy or its perceiveci utility in naval defence planning. Final1 y, Lynch's analysis of the

programme's cancellation is over-simplified and inadequate. While little is admittedly

known of the ministerial discussions leading to the project's ultirnate termination,

Lynch's conclusion introduces more questions than it answers. His reaction to the

cancellation, peppered with vagaries and invective, is representative of the work as a

whole:

'O Lynch, 33-34.

Who is to b h e then? The lack of confidence and courage in Canadians, in their ability to be innovative, onginai; echoed and arnplified by our vote- seeking, faint-hearted, dithering political leadership, îhat's ho.^'

In view of the questionable scholarîy value of Lynch's work, it wodd be fair to state that

the Canadian hydrofoil project has essentidly escapeâ any senous historïcal treatment at

al]. In light of the importance of this hydrofoil warship to naval planning at the tirne, the

technological challenges associated with the programme, and the consequences of its

demise, this thesis is intended to redress ths historiographical shortcoming.

As the FHE 400 project (which eventuaily reached fiuition as Her Majesty's

Canadian Ship Bras d'Or) was shrouded in secrecy during its existence, little was

publicly known about the programme until the mid-1970~. Even then, the majority of

documents relating to the vessel's design, construction, and operations rernained

classified beyond the public's reackS2 and the individuals involved in the programme

rarely volunteered information about their work. Not only were they obligated by

security policies to remain quiet, few chose to comment in any substantial way on this

most controversial of defence procurement projects. In many ways, given the contentious

nature of the project and the bittemess sunounding its cancellaîion, the navy and many of

its senior officers simpfy wanted Bras d'Or to go away.

The combined effect of these factors is the relative non-existence of Bras d'Or in

contemporary historicat literature. Not only were sources a problem but postwar

Canadian military historians were, and to some extent still are, undecided on the proper

" Lynch, 92, '' While documentation relating to dl new wuship designs is clasrified, the Uuiovative design ofBrasd'Or and her potential impact on the naval balance of power in the Atlantic necessitated the assignment of "Top Secret" or "Secret" security classifications to much of the project's documents and rtlated correspondence.

place of Bras d'Or in our military historiography. Viewed simdtaneously as an

experiment gone wrong by some and a triumph of naval technology by others, the

hydrofoil project and the concomitant debate over Canadian naval policy has generally

been reiegated to an infenor histoncal status in relation to other topics in naval history

such as the Canadian contribution to the Batîle of the ~tlantic'~ and other (more

successful) shipbuilding In cornparison to the campaign against the U-

boat menace during the Second Wortd War or construction of the innovative St hurent

class anti-submarine destroyer escorts after the war, the historical value of wfiting about

the ill-fated Canadian hydrofoil project seems doubtfd at best.

However, if one places Bras d'Or in the proper historical and temporal context,

the value of exploring this c hapter of Caaadian naval history becornes clear and

irrefutable. This thesis is intended to provide this context by introducing several key

concepts which greatly affected both the course of the FHE 400 programme and that of

the navy in general. First, the RCN's adoption of the anti-submarïne warfare role during

the Second World War is discussed as a defining moment in ternis of the Navy's

subsequent history. Second, this study illustrates the importance of the Canadian

hydrofoil project to naval planning and defence in the 1960s in its intended role as a

strategic deterreni to the Soviet submarine threat.

s3 See Milner, North Atlantic Ru9 (1985) and The U-Boat Hunt- (1994); Hadley, U W Aniùnst Canada (1 985); McKee d Dariington, Thc C d i a n Naval Chroniclem 1939-1945; uid Lamb, Corvene Navy ( 1977). $4 See Lynch, Çanada's flowers: Histoq of the Corvates of C d (198 1); Macpherson, m e s of the Roval Canadian Navy 1943-1974 (1986); Davis, The 'St Laurent' Decision: Gentsis of a Canadian Fleet" (1 988) in W. AB. Douglas' RCN in Transition 191 0-1 985; Henncssy, Cansda the Naw. and the S hi~building I n d u e (1 99 1) and T h e State as hovator Controlling the Command Technology for Warship Construction in Canada, 1949-1965"; and P . A Baskervilk, ed., Canadian Papen in Business & ~ Q Q Vol. 2 (Victwia: University of Victoria Press, 1993).

Chapter One provides the historicai context in which Bras d'Or was conceived

and developed, with an emphasis on the design's potentiai applications in the field of

anti-submarine Mare. Chaper Two outlines the events leading to the design's

approval and the process resulting in the eventual determination of an operational

requirement for the vessel. Chapter Three analyzes the construction and evaluation

process which cuirninateci in the commissioning of HMCS Bras d 'Or in 1968, with an

em phasis on the programme's convoluted management system and associated

construction delays. Finaily, Chapter Four examines the programme's cancellation,

including an analysis of factors contributing to its demise and a summary of the ship's

potential effect on Canadian maritime defence had it been brought into active service.

The Conclusion alsù offers insight into the cornplex equatioa of wnvoluted procurement

practices, milim-political relations, and the murring historical incongruity between

official Canadian defence policy and the actual employment of Canada's maritime forces.

Cba~ter One: Orinias of the Dcsb

Earl Y Developments

The considerable potential of high-speed hydrofoil craft was first demonstrated by

the research team of Alexander Graham Bell and F.W. "Casey" Baldwin at Baddeck,

Nova Scotia in 191 1. Working at the Bell estate at Beim Breagh and testing their

designs on the waters of the Bras d'Or Lakes, Bell aud Baldwin refhed the surface-

piercing foi! system first inîroduced in 1898 by Exuico Forlanni of Italy. ' Yean of design

testing and modifications finally cuiminated in the completion of HD-l, a sixty-fmt long

craft powered by two 350 horsepower Liberty aircraft engines dnving pusher airscrews.'

The irnpressive efficiency of t h i s hydrofoil was convincingiy demonstrated in 19 19 when

HD-4 achieved the world water speed record of 61.5 knots3, a record which would stand

for over thirty years.

Despite the promise of hydrofoil technology, military and commercial interest in

these craft was extremely limited during the interwar years." The outbreak of war in

1939 led to sorne renewal of interest in hydrofoil craft, especially as remotecontrolled

smoke-laying vehicles intended to mask arnphibious assaults. in 1943, the National

Research Council, in conjunction with F.W. Baldwin, undertook the deveiopment of

expendable smoke-laying hydrofoil craft. These vessels were twenty feet in length,

--

1 3. W. Milman and RE. Fisher, "The Canadian Hydrofoil Programme", RG 24, Vol. 3507, File 8000 FHE 400, Vol. 17, 1. For a precis of hydrofoil theory including a description of the various types of foi1 systems, see Appendi A

AG. Bell and F.W. Baldwin, "Report to Admiral Griffin on the HD-J", B e h Breagfi Recorder, Vol. 23, 1919. A h o t is a meaaire of speed as e x p d in n u i t i d miles per hour. ' M.C. Eames, DREA Report 8 114 "Advanes in Naval Architecture for Future Surîàce Warships" @artmouth: DREA, 1982), 93.

equipped with surfbce-piercing foils5, and capable of speeds in excess of thiriy

k n o d Despite successful trials during which the prototype craft exoeedad performance

objectives, the development of these "Comox Torpedoes" was soon halted in îàvour of

l e s expensive unguideci smoke rockets.

Commander Duncan ~ o d ~ s o n ~ , a mernber of the Cornox Torpedo design team

and an avid proponent of the application of hydrofoil technology for naval use,

endeavoured to constrw:t a record-breaking hydrofoil crafi following his retirement fiom

the Naw after the war. In 1947, he commissioned Philip Rhodes of New York, an

experienced boaî builder, to build the craft based on HD-4 experimentation and trials. At

this time, E.L. Davies, Vice-Chairman of the newly-formed Defence Research Board

(DRB),~ revealed DRB interest in the design and asked Hodgson and Captain (Navy)

W.F. Gray to prepare a bief on hydrofoil applications. Completed in late 1947, the

report was enthusiastically accepted by DM, resulting in officia1 naval support of the

development of an experimental hydrofoil ship. Given these developments, Hodgsoa

asked Rhodes to cease work on their "record-breaker" and redesign the crafi to reflect

5 The various types of foi1 systems are describexi in Appendix A. Milman and Fisher, 2. For a cornpiete lia of naval ranks, see Append'i B.

"e National Research Council (NRC) was replaced by the Defence Research Board @RB) in 1947 as the scientifk advisory agency to governmem. As outiined in the National Defcnce Act, the DRB %hall advise the Minister on al1 matters rdating to scientific, technical and other research and development which affèct national defence." The Chaiman of the DRB (CDRB) thus rcported directly to tbe Minista of National Defence on al1 scientific defence matters, including research and development of new weapons systems. This organizational structure afkrded the CDRB quai standing in the defence hierarchy as the Chiefs of Staff of the three services. As directcd by the DRB, naval-related research was carried out in Halifax, Nova Scotia by the Naval Rcsearch Establishment (NRE) d l 1962 when it was replaceci by the Defence Research Establishment Atlantic (DREA) as the locus of eqcrimental navd research and evaluation. For more information conceming defence reseafch, sec D.J. Guodspecd, A Histow of tk Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Rinter, 1958).

potential naval requirements.9

Rhodes submitted his design in 1948 and a construction contract was let to

McCrea's Boat Shop at Lake Massawippi, near North Hatley, Quebec. Forty-five feet in

length, the vesse1 was powered by a single Rolls-Royce Merlin aircraft engine dnving a

conventional marine propeller. Ogicially designated R-100 after h a DRB file number,

the crafi was informally named Masuwippi &er the lake on which ber initial evaluation

\vas conducted. In Mew of the design's radical design and wnsiderable potefitial in naval

applications, al1 correspondence relating to the project was assigned a "Top Secret7'

security classification. Completed in January 1950, Massawippi was shipped to Halifax

for further trials with responsibility for the project king transferred to the Naval

Research Establishment (NRE) of the DRB shortly thereafter.1°

Comprehensive testing began in Febniary 1950 and revealed a nurnber of

significant weaknesses in the craft's design. Violent vertical oscillation or "porpoising"

was found to occur at high speeds, indicating a dangerous instability in the foi1

configuration. ' ' Second, the transmission system was found to be grossly idequa te , as

reflected in the failure of the main gearbox as a result of the substantial power of the

1,250 horsepower Merlin engine king transmitted to the single marine propeller.

Finally, severe propeller cavitatiod2 was experiend at al1 speeds, reducing the

efficiency of the propulsion system and limiting the maximum speed of the crafi. Despite

~ynch, 1. 1 O M.C. Eames, D E A Report 69/9 "HMCS Brus d'Or - An ûpcn Ocean Hydrofoil Ship" (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 1 %9), 2. 1 I For a complete sumrnary ofM'ippi's qualitative test rcsults, see Lynch's nit FIV~OQ 400, Tables 1-2 and 1-3, pp. 4-5. 12 Cavitation is the formation of vapour bubbles dong the trailing adge of propeller b k which d u c e the propuisive force of the propeller as its sp#d incrtases-

these deficiencies and the escalation of capital expenditures to 52,498,946 by the end of

1952, the DRI3 continued with the project The top priorities of the proje!ct7s

management group became the rectification of the major design problems and the

adaptation of the design to more closely reflect the characteristics of a 50-ton hydrofoil

warship. l 3

The redesigned Mossawippi that ernerged in 1955 featured a number of design

changes that represented major advances in hydrofoil engineering. A cornpiete

restnicturing of the foi1 system resdted in impmved stability and greater loiad-bearing

capability. The design was m e r enhanced by the addition of super-cavitating

propellen which reduced propeller "stippage" during periods of rapid acaleration"

These design improvements, test& during a 1956 evaluation session, represented the

optimum combination of speed, seaworthiness, and stability and conclusively proved the

feasibility of the hydrofoil design principle.

R- 1 03 Bras d'Or

White the results of the Massuwippi's evaluafion were promising, this small-scale

design provided littie insigfit into the performance characteristics of a much larger and

heavier hydrofoil craft. Convinced of the theoretical fèasibility of the hydrofoil design

concept, Canadian naval plannefs sought to evaluate the hydrofoil's potential as an anti-

subrnarine platform. Concurrent with the Mmsawippi trials, the RCN awarded a contract

to Saunders-Roe, a division of the Westland Aircraft Company of Great Britain, for the

" Lynch, 7. 14 The fitting of super-cavitating propeks refleaed the mternational cooperative natufe of hydrofoil research a t the time. Marsawippi eemaged as the ideal test bcd for this innovative propeller design which was a produa of the David Taylor Mode1 Basin in Washington, D.C, Canadian-Amcrican-British interest and concurrent research and developrnmt activity wcre consuint thrwghout this p e n d

design study of a 100-ton hydrofoil craft for employment as an anti-submarine ~ a r s h i ~ . ' ~

The Saunders-Roe study, labelled R- IO2, provideci these answers, althougb

they were not what the RCN wanted to hear. The study concludeci that a lûû-ton

hydrofoil crafi was not technically f a i b l e given the engineering limitations of the

propulsion s y stems and structural materials then available- An official NRE Report

found the R- I O 2 design to be "marginal in several respecfs7' and concluded "that it was

premature to consider craf? larger than 50 tons."'6 Cleariy, the aspirations of Canadian

naval researchers were exceeding the scientific and technicd redities of the day.

Despite these technical constraints, the RCN was detennined to explore the

potentiai of the hydrofoi\ warship. So too was Britain's Royal Navy, which viewed the

small hydrofoil wmhip as a possible solution to their c m defence requirements.

Given this requirement, and the conclusion of a Saunders-Roe design study that a

smaller, 50-ton craft (designated R-101) could be constmcted with available materials

and techniques, Canadian and British researchers joined forces to produce an efficient

hydrofoil design for naval applications. While the small size of this design would be of

extremely limited use in the Canadian context as an open-oçean ASW ship, the RCN's

desire to remain in the forefront of hydrofoil research and development resulted in large-

scale Canadian involvement in the project. Indeed, DRB offered to build a one-third

scale prototype of the maft (designated R-103) while the Royal Navy agreed to fUnd its

testing in addition to conmuaing the full-scale prototype. "

In September 1953, the DRB awarded a 8644,000 contract to Saunders-Roe for

'' Milman and Fisher, 2. l6 M.C. Eames and E.A Jones, NRE Report 6519 "The Canrdian Hydrofoil Projcct: A Progress Rcpo~ on Modifications and Trials of M.V. Bras d'Or, 1959-1963" (Ottawa: NRE, 1%5), 1. 17 Lynch, 1 1.

the construction of the one-third scale R-103 rnanned m o ~ l . ' ~ However, design changes

and technical difficulties consistently delayed the project and inçfeased costs. in

addition, the testing of a one-fourteenth-sude mode1 (on which the larger mode1 would be

based) was agoninng slow, as each design modification was comprehensively evaluated

in test tanks without the bewfit of modmi day cornputer simulations or perfomance

projections. Nevertheless, the one-third scale MO3 was finally completed in Aprii 1957

and named Bras d ' ~ r ' * in homur of the fattrers of modem hydrofoil research, Bell and

Baldwin.

Despite the theoretical promise of the design, early testing of the c m revealed a

dangerous instability whch caused the vesse1 to "fidl off her foils on a number of

occasions, violently impacting the sea surface at high speed. Such instability was

reminiscent of that of Massawippi during the early stages of her 1950 evaluation

programme. Before the source of this fùndamental design flaw could be determined,

however, Admiralty support for the vessel's evaluation suddenly disappeared20 With the

dissolution of the Royal Navy's Coastal Forces in 1957, no requirement remained for a

50-ton fast hydrofoil warship (R-l 01). Consequently, no M e r requirement existed for

the continued evaluation of the one-third scaie mode1 (R-103). Saunders-Roe was

equally noncommittal with respect to the project's firme, simply maintaining the

position that its contractual obligations had been met with the delivery of R-103."

Undeterred and stili tündarnentally convinced of the hydrofoil's potenbal for

l8 ~ynch, 1 1. '' The naming ofR-103 as Brar d'Or in 1957 sbould nut be conîksed wiîh the later FHE .100 which received thc same name. R-103 evcnhially surrendered the nunt Brus d'Or to the FHE 400 project in 1962 and was renamed B e & in honour of the c o a d t o m on the shores of the Bras d'Or Wes wbere thc early tests of Bell and Baldwin took phce. 20 Eames and Jones, 1. 21 Lynch, 13.

naval use, the RCN arrangeci to have &IO3 shipped to Canada on board the newly-

acquired aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure, then fitting out in England Arriving in

Halifax in June 1957, R-103 was off-loaded to the Defence Research Establishment

Atlantic (DREA) facilities and pr~pared for an operational evaluation programme to

determine the cause of her instability. An exhaustive eight-month test period led DREA

researchers to a dramatic conclusion that infiuenced hydrofoil design for years to corne:

the universally acceptecl foii arrangement (fust incroduced by Bell and Baldwin and the

basis of the Saunders-Roe design) was fundamentally flawed With ninety-percent of the

ship's weight on the forward set foil structure and only ten-percent on the after foil,

consistent high-speed stability with this foil arrangement was found to be impossible to

achieve? As assesseci by one of the faîhers of Canadian hyârofoil research and the

principle proponent of hydrofoil technology at DRB, Michael C. Eames,

DREA went astray at first in foIlowing too closely the Bell-Baldwin ideas and conventional a i r c d practices. For example, DREA's second hydrofoil craft Buddeck (originally named Bras d'Or) had three foi1 units of equal size, two forward and one afi. Such a configuration is asking for two-thirds of the foil system to be ineffi~ient.'~

A reversal of this arrangement, with most of the c&'s weight resting on the after

foil, was predicted to povide the wcessary stability and performance. The feasibility of

this concept was confirmed by the success of DREA's small3-ton basic research

hydrofoil named RY which exhibited excellent stability at al1 speedsL4 As explained by

Eames in an official DRB report,

22 Lynch., 14. 23 Eames and Jones, 3. 24 Milman and Fisher, 3.

This tail-first or 'canard' configuration is essential to the DREA concept; it is the only way in which weii damped motions and good grfonnance in following seas can be combiaed with reasonable efficiency . . . .

The foil arrangement of RY, in which nkty-percent of the vessel's weight was h e by

the afler foils, was demonsbably more efficient and stable tban previous designs and

fonned the b i s of the foi1 system for the 200-ton FHE 400 design.26 The work of the

DRB with R- 100 (Massawippi) and R- 1 O3 (Bras d 'Or) proved the feasibility of the

hydrofoil concept for small ships of less than fi@ tons. However, given the load-bearing

limitations of available materiais and complications associated with the utilization of

aircraft engines in the marine environment, no one could confidently predict the success

of larger hydrofoil designs.

This view changed during the late 1950s as a nurnber of technical innovations

shattered long-standing conceptuai hitabons conceming the application of hydrofoil

technology. Devei~pments in the wmmercial and military aircrafi industry produced

high strength, lightweight matenals which, when applied to hydrofoil c m promiseci a

significant reduction in overall weight while providing the foil system the necessary

strength to support the vessel.17 The importance of this innovation cannot be overstated

&en the frequent structurai failures and foil instability associated with early hydrofoils.

Considerable advances were also made in the field of propulsion research, especially in

tems of small, lightweight gas turbines which could be easily modified for marine use."

As gas turbine propulsion systerns off& a much higher thnist-to-weight ratio than

-

Eames and Jones, 4. 26 Milrnan and Fisher, 3. 27 ibid., 3. B. Gunston, Hvdrofoils ud Hovercraft (laodoa: Aldus Books, 1%9). 5 1.

codd conventional internai combustion engines, their integration into subsequent designs

represented an ideal solution to the propulsion inadequacies of d y hydrofoil designs.

RCN Interest in Hvdrofoil Technolom

These significant techaical innovations in the field of hydrofoil technology

occurred at a t h e when the RCN was comprehensively reviewing its interest in hyârofoil

technology. The late 1950s marked the end of the first phase of -ous research into the

potential of hydrofoil ships, beginning with Baldwin and Bell and finishing with the hard-

won lessons provided by R-IO3 and RY. Canadian naval planners now faced two crucial

decisions:

1 ) Was hydrofoil technology suficiently advanced to produce a large, open-ocean hydrofoil warship capable of performing an ASW role?

2) Should the RCN and DRB proceed with the development of such a design?

By 1959, the R a ' s senior leadership was convinced that a large ASW hydrofoil design

was possible. This conclusion was b a s 4 on the recomrnendation of tbe NRE

(predecessor of the Defence Research Establishment Atlantic) in view of pst research

and the introduction of new materials and propulsion systems. This position was

summarized in an official DRB report in that, when compared to conventional ship

design s, '-the hydrofoil princi ple provided the most promi sing approach to rough-water

speeds above the This conviction was fwther supported by the work of the

Amencan Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation whic h also concl uded that larger

29 Eames and Jones, 1.

hydrofoils would be practicable. Indeed, their designers confidently envisioned

commercial hydrofoil craft with displacements of 3OO to 500 tons?

Predictions conceming the ASW capability of hydrofoil warship designs were

equall y optirnistic. Bo& the DRB and RCN were concerned with the clramatic increase

in the maximum speeds of Soviet submarine designs in the late 1950s and were

committed to redressing the imbalance. Before a solution couid be reached, MC. Eames

and E.A. Jones of the DRB sought to adequately define the probiem:

The problem of increasing the speed of ships in rough water hiis t.hw8~e.d naval architects since the invention of the screw propeHer. In this period, which has seen aemnauticai development h m tbe Wright brothers to Apollo I I , the maximum s p e d of ships bas remained virtuaily unchanged. Essentially this is because of surfâce wave resistance and the compouading effects of the rough water surface. The lesson is simple. The bulky hull of a ship must be kept eway from the surface to travel at high speeds."

If speed was the decisive factor in modem anti-subrnarine M a r e (as was widely

believed at this tirne), the RCN's interest in the potentiai effiveness of the ASW

hydrofoil was understandable i n d d

The adwtage of speed in an ASW vesse1 was not limited to its ability to attack

hostile subrnarines. The deplopent of a large number of hi#-speed hydrofoil craA

would enable a naval commander to search a vastly larger area of ocean than couid a

similar number of destroyers and figates. This "small and many" concept offered a

promising solution to the problem of initial detection of subrnarines. This notion fonned

the b a i s of what would becorne the DRB's operational hydrofoil concept:

- -

30 "A Study of Hydrofoil S d w (Long Island, NY: Grumman A i r d Engineering Corpontion, 1958), 3. 3' Eames and Jones, 1.

The major problern of ASW is initial detection, reliabie s o d 2 ranges being very small umpared with the v a t area of ocean to be covered A prornising alternative to the direct appmach of irnproving sonar range is to devise means of providing a significantly larger nurnber of present-day sonars in an economical manner - the so-called "srnail and rnany" concept. This has advantages in flexiiility of depioyment and relative invujnerability, and it calls for development of the carrying vehicle ratber thaa of the sonar itself j3

The "development of the çarrying vehicle" began in 1959 when the NRE proposed the

construction of a 200-ton ASW hydrofoil ship capable of achieving fifty- to sixty-knot

speeds in opendcean conditions.34 in the view of the NRE7s researchers, this design

represented "the smallest, simplest, and most economical vehicie which couid operate in

the open ocean with acceptable Seakeeping, cornfort, and reliability and achieve a high

degree of effectiveness in anti-submarine or other appropriate naval r01es."~~ Such a

vessel, the RCN was quick to note, would dso provide an effective ASW capabil@ at a

much reduced cost when çompared with conventional warships.

The RCN's interest in the ASW potentid of the hydrofoil ship was enhanced as a

result of a m-pmte confierence on hyàrofoil research held in Halifax in January, 1 %O?

This select group of American, British, and Canadian hydrofoil experts gave the NRE

proposal for a 200-ton hydrofoil ship almost universal approval. Heartened by the

conference's positive reception and more çonvinced than ever of the vaîidity of their

design, the NRE researchers subrnitted their final proposal to the DRB on January 9,

32 Sonar, or saund navigation and ranging was fint developed in 1920 b d on the reflbction ofsound waves undenvater jiist as radar is based on the reflection of radio waves in the air. A typical sonar sydem transrnits ultrasonic pulses toward a target by using a aibrnerged r a d i i device (whéther mountsdon tk hull of a ship or towed asteni in a submersible body) and "listens" for reflected pulses. Such nflccted pulses would indicate the M o n and bearing o f a submcrged object such as a submarine. @. Mil la and C. Miller, Modem Naval Combat (London: Salamander, 1986), 60). 33 Eames and Jones, 1. 34 Milman and Fisher, 3. '' Ibid., 3. 36 Naval Board Minutes, 22 July 1960, DND DHH 79/34.

1960." Later that spring, a tender was placed for a full-scale fessibility study of the NRE

proposal. Further development of this innovative anci ambitious design would depend

heavily on the outcome of this study and the RCN7s reaction to it.

During its preliminary investigations, the MIE coacluded that only an aircraft

Company could successfùily wnstruct a 20eton hydrofoil warship given the large-scale

use of aiuminurn as the primary building material and the planned incorporation of

aircrafi turbines for propulsion. The radical nature of the concept would dso necessitate

the large-sale employment of cornputers in the construction process. This reqyirernent

stemrned ffom the planned design's extremely smaii specification tolerances and the wide

range of performance variables which would have to be taken imo account during the

course of the ship's const r~ct ion .~~ To this end, NRE researchers identified the need to

conduct a comprehensive computer study of the design proposal, during which the effects

of sea States, wind, and stress loads could be predicted and analyzed. No such computer

analysis capability then existeci in the shipbuilding industry whereas such practices were

becorning increasingly common in the aircrafi industry.

Not surprisingiy, the soie cornpetitor for the feasibility study contract was an

aircrafi manufacturer, DeHavilIand Aircraft of Canada, which was subsequently

contracted to examine the NRE concept in depth, pursue parametric studies of the design,

and ascertain the design's engineering f e a ~ i b i l i t y ~ ~ The DeHavilland study team was

headed by Mr, R W. Becker, who later becarne Assistant Cbief Designer of the FHE 400

progamme. Under Becker's direction, the DeHavilland tearn investigated the feasibdity

37 Lynch, 30. 38 Milman and Fisher, 5. 39 ~ynch, 3 1.

of various powerplants, sewor requirements40, and possible weapons suites. During the

course of these investigations, however, two areas of grave concem were rievealed. First,

based on computer projections, it was discovered that the planned utilkation of Proteas

gas turbines would be inadequate to provide the necessary thrust for the design.41 In facf

even when significant reductions in ovedl weight were incorporated into the design,

thrust requirements far exceeded the output of the most advanced gas turbine systems

then available. However, the potential performance cbaracteristics of more powerfbl

powerplants then being developed served to convince the DeHavilland team that the

propulsion problem could eventually be overcome.

The second major engineering obstacle to the design's c o ~ c t i o n also involved

an incongniity between the design's requirements and the state of available technology.

Specificaliy, the calculated stresses on the foi1 system, predicted to be in excess of

1 00,000 punds per square inch (psi), rendered existing steel alloys incapable of

supporting the total weight of the ves~el.' '~ Usiag conventional steel, it was predicted,

would lead to stress ftactures and general instability similar to that encountered during

the evaluatïon of Masscnuippi and the original Bras As with the problem of thrust

requirements, however, the DeHavilland study team was confident that men t advances

in metallurgy would be available in time for the design's construction. Of particular

interest to hydrofoil designers was the ongoing development of nickel-cobalt-

molytdenum (NiCoMo) steel which, with a calculated load-bearing capability in excess

JO "Sensors" in naval parlance refa to such equipment as radar, sonars, or any other devices capable of detecting other ships or a i r d . JI Lynch, 3 1 . j2 Ibid., 3 1. J3 Eames and Jones, 3.

of 250,000 psi, would easily meet the smngth requirements of the design's foil system-"

This confidence was nonetheless tempered by the DeHavilland team's rcfomsnendation

that this new ailoy should be extensively tested in order to detennine its ability to

withstand prolongeci exposure to a marine environment

DeHavilland presented its completed study to the NRE and the Department of

Defence Production (DDP) in June 196 1 .'* The design (labelled R-200 after its DRB file

number) was based on the foi1 systern of the Mcraft and had the foilowing principal

c haracteristics:

Length overall 130 feet (39.6m)

Beam 28 feet (8.5m)

Displacement 200 tons

Maximum speed 60 knotsJ6

Despite concerns repding the propulsion system and strength of the foil structure,

DeHavilland was strongly optimistic that a 200-ton hydrofoil warship could be built. The

W ' s support of continued hydrofoil research was such that, even before the report

was completed, its represenbtives approached the Treasury Board (through DDP) for

additional b d i n g in order to M e r &velop the preliminary design. This funding,

which totalled S300,000, was approved in January 1 % 1 and in Apnl DDP awarded a

preliminary design contract to DeHavilland to =develop the engineering ba i s to establish

44 Milman and Fisher, 6. 45 The DDP, as the name suggests, was responsible for alJ aspects of the deftnce procuiemem process, including the awarding of contracts, management of deféace projccts, and liaison with civilian defeuce contractors. @. Bland. The Administration of Defence Policv in C d & 1947 to 1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), 141 .) 56 Milman and Fisher, 4.

feasibility in detail and produce cost estimates together with proposais for a fiill-scale

prototype ship construction This was accomplished by an intensive

theoretical and mode1 test programme which investigaîed the design's hull-borne

seakeeping characteristics, the stability of the proposeci foil system, and the power

requirements of the propulsion system. These factors were evaluated first by cornputer

simulation then confirmeci by test tank evaluations of scaie models.

Concurrently, a separate conaact was let to DeHavilland to wnduct a materials

investigation study that would evaluate the potential of new steel alloys in ternis of

impact yield strength, weldability, and resistance to cracking and warping. This

investigation, which included dose consultation with the Department of Energy, Mifies,

and Resources, revealed that unless adequately protected in a marine environment, these

new alloys would be particularly sensitive to rapid corrosion." Consequently,

DeHavilland arranged for the qualitative evaluation of a number of protective coatings on

undenvater sections of two RCN destroyers and on the foil section of a developmental

Arnerican hydrofoil design to evaluate these coatings under operational condition^.'^

The promise of the DeHavilland design, coupled with the RCWs long-standing

interest in the progmmme, prompted naval planners to include the projected costs of a

NI-scale hydrofoil programme into k i r budgetary planning process. On July 7, 1% 1,

the RcN transfened the 1962-1963 Hydrofoil Projects Estimates h m its modes

standing on the naval projects priority list to the Research and Development Estimates

(Vote 71 7). In doing so, naval planners ensured the availability of suficient h d s in

47 Milman and Fisher, 5. 48 G. J. Biefer, "Stress-Corrosion Cracking of Neopraie Coated 1 8% Nickel Marsging Stai" (Ottawa: Department of Wgy, Mines, and Resowces, 1967). 13. 49 Milman and Fisher, 17.

Fiscal Year 1962- 1963 to finance the construction and M e r development of the

DeHavilland design should it be approved. For the ongoing anaiysis of the DeHavilland

design proposal, in 1 % 1 Treasury Board approved in principle the following fitnding as

part of the 1962- t %3 Research and Developent Eshates:

1 ) an increase in cash expenditure authority of O 100,000;

2) an increase in cornmitment authonty to $200,000;

3) a total Programme Analysis budget of $8,000,000;

4) for actual construction of the vessel, $200,000 in new programme cornrnitments;

5) $100,000 in new programme estunated expendihue; and

6) $7,900,000 for fbture expenditure if the àecision is made to proceed with construction of a full-scale 200-ton hydrofoil ship.50

While these estimates secund sufncient fûnding for the initial development of the design,

formai Treasury Board approval was still necessary in order to proceed with the

construction of the vessel.

As the DeHavilhnd design team endeavoured to cornplete its final design

proposal for a 200-ton hydrofoil ship by late 1962, the RCN undertook a determined

effort to establish its formai operational requirement for such a vessel. The statement of

this requirement, in addition to providing the vesselys designers with necessary technical

information, was vital to understanding the hydrofoil's place in Canadian naval policy

and its intended operational employment. While Canadian naval planners had long

supported the general development of hydrofoil technology for its possible applications

50 Milman and Fisher. 7.

in modem ASW, it was not until mid-1962, when the design process of the R-200

prototype was well underway, did the RCN W l y state a detailed requirement for the

vessel. As Chapter Two dcmonstrates, this oversight was representative of the geaeral

difficulty experienced by naval plamers in keeping pace with the hydrofoil project's

rapid technological development, an organizational shortcoming that would affect the

entire course, and eventuai outcorne, of the FHE Jûû programme.

Chanter Two: Tbe Naw's Decision to Build

Formulation of the RCN's Reauirement

As the technical dimensions of the design continueci to take shape un&r the

stewardship of the NRE, DDP, and Detfavilland, the senior leadership of the Navy

analyzed the operationai requirernent for a 2ûû-ton hydrofoil warship. Prior to the early

1960s, hydrofoil research and development had been an exclusively experimental

undertaking, sponsored by such federal scientific agencies as the DRB and NRE. hdeed,

given the experimental nature of hydrofoil research, it is not surprising that the Navy's

involvernent in successive hydrofoil programmes before 1 % 1 was Iimited to a strictl y

advisory cstpacity. As the RCN's ieadership became increasingly interested in the naval

applications of hydrofoils as a result of this research, they began to address the possi%le

employment of such vessels in an operational ASW environment.

On April 5, 196 1, the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral H.S. Rayner, appointed

the Ad Hoc Cornmittee on Naval Objectives with the foiiowing tenns of reference:

To define the purpose of the Navy and make reconunendations conceming the role, tasks, and composition of the fleet required to meet the Navy's responsibilities in the future in the most effective and economical manner. This will entail an examination of the probable nature of naval forces and design of weapons systems required during the next twenty-five years. '

The cornmittee' s report (referred to as the Brock Report after Chairman Commodore J. V.

Brock) concludeâ that "a capbility is neeâed for escorting and transporting army units to

' Minutes of the 646h Meeting of the Navai Board, 5 April 1 % 1 @ND DHH 79/34), 2.

alrnost any area of the world.. . [and] to protect the sea lines of ~ommunication~

The cornmittee wamed, however, that conventional warship designs could prove

inadequate against emerging Soviet submarine designs: "The present A/S [anti-

submarine] surface ship ... will be of doubtfirl value in dealing with the advanced

submarine, which may have a speed advantage as well as superior sonar to warn it of

attack.'"' The solution, in the fornittee's view, was the development of innovative

ASW systems based on the "cheap and many" philosophy. In Mew of the vast ocean

search areas associated with modem ASW and the mounting construction and

maintenance costs associateci with major combatants like fngates and destroyers, the

Brock Report strongly advocated the employment of numerom smaller ASW platforms

such as hydrofoils. As stated in the Report, the "'small, cheap, and many' concept of

naval forces finds strong backing in the growing capabilities of the submarine, their

number and the high unit wst of present ASW force^.'^

Concurrent with the establishment of the Ad Hoc Cornmittee on Naval Objectives

was the first meeting of the DDP's Hydrofoil Project Review Group. This group, which

included mernbers from the RCN; was fonned to monitor the development of the 200-

ton DeHavilland design and "review the development progress with particular reference

to the technical aspects and recomrnend changes as required to ensure that the design

meets the existing requiremenWh Through its membership in this group, the RCN could

The Report of the Ad Hoc Co-ttee on Naval Objectives (Onawa: Deparment of National Defence, 196 1 ), 9. Hereafter r e f d to as the Brock Report. ibid.. 11.

1 Ibid., 12. Naval represemation included the Dirator Gaierrl Ships, Captain 0 S.M. Davis, d the Director of

Naval Operational Requirements, Captain (N) R.P Welland. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Hydrofoil Project Review Group, (Tocorno: f)eHavilland Aircraft of

Canada, Ltd., Aprif 12-13, 1%1), 1.

closely monitor the project's development and influence design parameters based on its

operational requirements.

Yet the exact opefational requirement for the vessel (which should have helped

determine its design fatures) remained unclear for some tirne. Since the R-ZOO design

originated purely as an experimental resairch programme, the standard conventions of

the defence procurement process were neither observed nor applied. This is especially

tnie with regards to the determination of the opmional requirement for the vessel.

According to the established naval procurement process, a requirement for a new vessel

is detemined, its desired capabilities are stattxi, various designs are considered through

the contract cornpetition process, and a contract is let for the construction of the vessel.

In the case of R-200, the design was the product of a long-standing hydrofoil r-ch

programme conducted over an extended period of time by the NRE and DRB which

subsequently attracted the interest of the RCN for its ASW potentid. As a result, the

RCN did not state any forma1 requirement for the R-200 design until &er the project was

well underway.' This unconventional approach to defence project procurement d e ~ e d

the R-200 programme the clearly defined raison d 'etre and unity of purpose which

characterized other defence projects of the same p e n d

The Hydrofoil Proiect Review gr ou^

This early uncertainty concerning the project's purpose was reflected in the

minutes of the first meeting of the Hydrofoil Project Review Group in April 1961.

- ' The first officiai indication concerning the hydrofoil's intendcd role appeared in a memorandum fiom the Director ofNava1 Operational Requirements (Commodore RP. Welland) which was dated 5 May, 1961, several m o n t h &er work began on a pdiminary design of the vcssel. (NAC RG 24 Acc 83-841167 Vol. File 800eFHE-400 Vo1.6.)

clear mission was formally defined for the ship in advance of the design process,

represented an oversight on the part of a naval leadership that was unsure of the

hydrofoil's role in the existing fleet.

In light of this inadequacy and in response to the col~cems of the Hydrofoil

Review Group, the RCN endeavoureâ to define the pojected role of the hydrofoil in the

context of contemporary Canadian defence policy. The first attempt to determine the

mission capabilities of the vesse1 took the fonn of a meeting of key individuals of the

Naw's senior leadership in May 1961. Indeed, this meeting was cdled specifically by

Commodore R.P. Weilaad, Director of Naval Operational Requirements, to address the

concems of Captain (N) c avis.'^ Tbe predicted "types of employment" for the hydrofoil

were detemined to be:

1 ) as an independent ASW unit on AIS [anti-submarine] barriers or in hunterkiller type operations;

2) as a fleet escort; or

3) as a convoy escort. ' l

Not surprisingly, al1 three roles were decidedly ASW in nature, only differing from each

other in ternis of tactical employment in response to a certain threat-'' The meeting

individually addressed each of Captain (N) Davis' concerns in addition to o f f e ~ g

guidance on other aspects of the proposed design, While a positive step in deterrnining

the deiails of the design, this meeting provideci minimal guidance to the mi l i tq and

'O "AS W Hydmfôil Cr&- DNOR to DG Ships, DEngR, 5 May 1 % 1. (NAC RG 24 Acc l983-84/167 Vol 3506 File 8000-FHE-400 Vol. 6, 1). ' ' "ASW Hydrofoil Craftn, 1. 12 Ibid., 1.

civilian personnel tasked with producing a very complex and innovative design for whicb

no engineering precedent existed

Not until the end of 1% 1 did the RCN generate a statement on the intended

operational employment of an ASW hydrofoil. Produced by the office of the Assistant

Chief of Naval Staff for Air and Warfare (ACNS (A& W)), "Operational Uses of

Hydrofoil Craft" was written in Decanber 1961 as part of a briefing to the Chief of Naval

Staff, Vice Admiral H.S. Rayner. In this document, Commodore RP. Welland

surnmarized the RCN7s operationai research shidies and concluded that these

investigations "indicaîe quite fimly that the hydrofoil in the A/S role will have great

potential on a con-effective b i s as compareci with ptesent equipments [sic]."" in tems

of operationai employment, Welland expanded on his May mernorandun, written while

he was Director of Naval Operational Requkments, by clearly stating the various

missions the hydrofoil would be expected to perfonn and the design specificatioris

required to meet operational demands. In short, this briefing note established the RCN7s

requirernents for an open-ocean ASW hydrofoil and defined many of its required

characteristics, thus clariQing for the tim time the Navy's position in tems of its

operational expectations for the rraft.

The "Black Lace" Studv

In addition to these two i n t e d reports, a theoretical British midy of the

effectiveness of various ASW vehicles m e r illuminated poss1'bilities on the

- - -

If "Operational Uses of Hydrofoil Craft" ACNS (AikW) to CNS, VCNS, SNCNS 1 1 December 1%1. (NAC RG 24 Acc l983-84/167 Vol 3506 File 8ûûû-FHE-400 Vol. 6, 1)

operational employment of the hydrofoil warship. Saunders-Roe Division of Wdand

Aircraft Limited, which constnicted the R-103 Brus d'Or in 1957, was commissioned by

the United States Navy to conduct '&a generalised opedonal analysis of a wide variety of

craft in the anti-subrnariw ro~e."'~ Code-named uBlack Lace." this sîudy asessed the

potential effectiveness of fngates, flying bats, ground effect rna~hines,'~ and hydrofoils

in a variety of ASW roles. E3aseû on a series of theoretical evaluations which analyzed

each system's speed, detectîon ability, and vulnerability, the authors of "Black Lace"

ranked the various AS W platforms in the following order of "comparative ment":

1 ) the ground effect machine wiîh helicopter,

2) the flying boat;

3) the fngate with helicopter,

4) the ground effect machine; and

5) the hydrofoil. l6

Despi te its theoretical speed advantage over the modem submarine, the "B lac k Lace"

team predicted the hydrofoil to be relatively ineffecniai in open-ocean ASW:

there is a real need for a very high speed craft combining the advantages of the frigate with the search and attack speeds of the helicopter or fixed wing aircraft. The hydrofoil boat is king invesrigated for this purpose but it is considered that its effective speeds will be limited to less than 70 knots,

'' "Black Lace Lecture Notesn (East Cowes Isle of Wight: Westlad A i r d Ltd. Sders-Roe Division, Novern ber 1 96 1). 1. lS "Ground effect machinesn, as distinct fiom hovactaft, arc cmft that operate abve the surface of the water or land while supportcd on a cashion of air. At the time of the "Black Lacen study, ao operational examples of these craft were in seMce although many codllltries, Icd by the Soviet Union, were pursuhg their devetopment. Therefore, the capabilhies of thest craft as analyzed in "Black Lacew were purely theoretical. (N. Polrnar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis: Naval Znstitute Press* 1986)- 104). l6 "Black Lace Lecture Notes", xi.

higher speeds, uiough theoretical$ possible, involving complex hydrodynmic and structural problems.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, the RCN remained stepd$st in its support for

hydrofoil development. Indeed, shody &et the publication of the "Black Lace* study,

Rear-Admira1 Je- Brock (then Vice Chief of the Naval Staff) objected to both the

study's methodology and conclusions in a manorandm to the Chief of Naval Staff.

Specificaily, Brock poiated out that the Saunders-Rœ s t d y ail but igwred the

characteristics of ground effect machiws and hydrofoils while in displacement mode (i-e.

hull-borne as opposed to "in flight"). l8 He theorized that hydrofoils would be much more

effective in the displacement mode of operation (which, incidentally, would comprise the

majority of their time at sa), exhibiting superior seakeeping characteristics than would

ground effect machines. lg He also submitted that ground effect machines were still in the

earliea stages of development M e hydrofoil research had al1 but proven the technical

feasibility of the opeuscean ASW hydrofoil warship. Based on these points, Brock

remained convinced of the vaiidity of the ASW hydrofoil ship and recommended to Vice-

Admiral Rayner that its development proceed as planned:

The results of the Black Lace study are king examined in DIU3 and whatever their findings may be, I am personally convinced that this whole project constitutes a very useful starting point for the "small, cheap, and many" studies so strongly recommended in the Naval Objectives Report [The Brmk ~eport] ."

" "Biack Lace Lecture Notes", 2-3. 18 Appendix A contains a more comprehensive description of these moda of hydrohiii o p d o n . ' 9 "Black Lace" VCNS to CNS 14 Deccmber 1961 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84/167 File 3506 Vol. 1. Frle 8000- FHE-400 Vol. 5).

fiid., 2.

Despite the relatively poor showing of the hydrofoil concept in the "Black Lace"

study, the Canadian naval establishment remained generally supportive of the hydrofoil.

Indeed, while the DeHavilland team refined its design proposai at its Downsview,

Ontario headquarters, staff officers at National Defence Headquarterrs in Ottawa sought to

establish a management system to oversee the vessel's eventual wnsbuction. To this

end, Commodore S . U Davis in March 1962 recornrnended that, in the event that a

prototype is constructeci, the Hydrofoil Review Group should continue in its capcity as

the R a ' s reviewing a~thority.~' He provided intnrsting insight on the relationship

between the research-driven DRB and the RCN with its need to produce an operational

vessel as won as possible:

Our normal attitude would be to suggest thai the Scientists keep out of our hair and let the Technicians get on with the job; undoubtedly we shall have to operate in this way if you are going to get a boat built in a reasonable arnount of tirne.. . 22

This comment on the working relationship between the DRB and RCN reveals both the

former's unwavering interest in the project for its scientific value and the RCN's

cornmitment to producing a functional design for immediate service, an incongnùty of

purpose that would define DRB/RCN relations throughout the proj ect ' s existence.

"Staff Operationai Reauirement for an ASW Hvdrofoil"

As the RCN and DRB awaited the final DeHavilland design proposal, naval

planners endeavoured to better define the RCN requirement for the vessel. At the 1 7

" "RCNIASW Hydrofoil Projsct" DG Ships to SA/CNS 30 March 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983fû4 Vol. 1 S), 1. * Ibid., 1.

May 1962 meeting of the Naval Staff, chaired by Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans)

Commodore D. W. Piers, the Director Naval Operational Requirements (Captain (N)

P.F.X. Russell) briefed the Naval Staff on the operatioad requirements for an ASW

hydrofoil including its potential capabiiities, cost effectivenes, and weapons

requirements.'3 This "Staff Operational Requirement for an ASW Hydrofoil" was the

first comprehensive attempt to define specific RCN requirements for the vessel. It was

based on the RW's "Operati-onal Requirement for ASW Systems* which outlined the

need for "large numbers of ASW units at low cost with a high degree of innilnerability to

submarine counter-attack but which, nevertheless, have good effecti veness against ail

types of ~ubmarines."~~ The report essentiall y posi t e - that the proposed DeHavilland

design would effectively meet these staîeà requirements.

The report began with an enunciation of the R a ' s mission requirernents for the

AS W hydrofoil:

1) To defend sea lanes of communication against submarine attack;

2) To detect, iocate, and destroy enemy submarines; and

3) To patrol the coastai areas and approaches to Canadian waters?

Having thus stating the craft's purpose, the report underlined the inherent economy ofthe

hydrofoil warship, especially in terms of construction costs and manpower swings.

Indeed, the hydrofoil's cost-effectiveness was heraided as its principal attraction:

-- -

23 'Minutes of 7/62 Meeting of tbe Naval Staff, 17 May 1 %2 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 1 - 24 "St8ff'Operational Rcquirement for an ASW Hydfofbit" DNOR 30 Jul y 1962 (RG 24 Vol. 3506 File 800eFHE-400 Vol. 8), 1. 25 "StafTOpwational Requiremems for an ASW Hydrofoiln, 1.

It is recognized in the Report of Ad Hoc Cornmittee on Naval Objectives that conventional AS ships are too costly a means of placing ASW systems in the o p e r a ~ g area. High priority has therefore been given to the develop ment of efféctive craft *ch can corry out the ASW operational tasks of the RCN with greater economy of both money and xnanpower. Assertions have been ma& that a seagoing, aLi weaîher ASW hydrofoil c d is a feasible and p&cable vehicle for the performance of the required tasks and that substantial gains in eoonomy will result h m the adoption of such

The study concluded that an operational hydrofoil couid be built for appoximately one-

third the cos of a helicopter-fitted destroyer escort." In addition, the s d l crew,

projected to be twenty personnel in cornparison to about two hundred and fi@ for a

destroyer, would significautly reduce personnel costs and ease the burdni on the RCN's

strained personnel system, which by the early 1960s was nearing the point of wllapse on

the east Coast.

The Naval Staff agreed with DNOR's briefing in that "it satisfactorily

substantiated the operational requirement for an ocean-going hydrofoil c d in the RCN

and its asmciated component ~ ~ s t e r n s . " ~ ~ The decision to build such crafk, however, still

depended on the R a ' s acceptame of DeHavilland's final design proposal and the sea

trials of the prototype.

Despite the long-awaited emergence of a clearly stateà operational requirement

for the hydrofoil project and an everevolving sense of the design's specific

characteristics, the Navy's senior leadership continued to debate whether the RCN shodd

immediately pr0Ceed with the wnstnicûon of a prototype or wait for the cornfletion of a

comprehensive sketch design fiom DeHavilland The first option would result in the

26 "Staff Operational Rcquirements for an ASW Hydrofoil", Appendix E, 1. 27 Ibid., 3. The study coocluded that the wst per opmihg hour for a destroyer was 5747.00 while that for ip ASW hydrofoil would k approximuely $253.00.

Minutes of 7/62 Meeting of Naval S W 2.

speedy production of a vessel that wouid only partly reflect RCN requirements. As such,

the craft would be evduated as a vehicle f k t and subsequently as an operational vessel

as the final form of its fighting equipment was determineci. The second option would

eventuaily produce a more complete warship whkh, by illcorporaîing al1 stated

operational requirements, would ensure that the first vessel built would more closely

resemble the probable follow-on cbaracteristics of the production class. However, this

option would involve a significantiy longer waiting period for the vessel's completion. In

a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Air and Warfare) in June 1962,

Commodore S.M. Davis (DG Ships) indicated his fûll support of the first option: "1

would thus prefer to build a development prototype as soon as we can.. . . -29

Davis' view was undoubtedly influenced by a variety of factors. First, it would

seem reasonable to commence construction of the vessel as soon as possible given the

rapidly expanding threat fiom Soviet missilecapable subrnarines, refiaing the design as

required while construction was underway- Second, Davis probably realized that military

and political support for the vessel, and the funding sssociated with it, would only Iast so

long before priorities changea and that an ongoing construction programme would be

more dificuit to cancel than would a theoretical design proposal. Fùially, Davis was

acutely a w e of American research in hydrofoil technology and endorseci timely

Canadian cornpetition in this industry:

The only way we shall ever be sure about the abilities of these craft will be to build one and operate it. The USN are ccrtainly not going to do it for us and it seems that this is one of the rare occasions when the RCN can do something significant to contribute to the pool of k n ~ w l e d ~ e . ~

z9 "Hydrofoil Programme" DG Ships to N C N S ( M W ) 8 June 1 %2 (RG 24 Acc l983-84/176 Vol. 1 8), 2. 30 Ibid.. 2.

Despite Davis' arguments supporting the immediate commencement of

construction of a " d e r n ~ n ~ o n vehicle", one key figure in tbc defence hierarchy

disagreed with the Director General Ships as to the way ahead for the programme.

Commodore S.E. Paddon, Director General Fighting Equipment, believed that a

comprehensive sketch design should f h t be completed in view of the innovative and

unnied nature of the vesseI's sensors and weapons (particulariy its sonar system). In his

view, as expressed to A/CNS (A&W) twelve &YS d e r Davis' memo, "[Slince the

hydrofoil craft without effective fightiog equipment is of considerably reduced value, 1

would prefer to s e any major expenditure deferred d l 1 have some reasonable

assurance that such equipment c m be buWJ1

Dr. William L. Ford, Scientific Advisor to the Chief of the Naval Staff7 attempted

to coalesce both view into a "Hydrofoil Programme Philosophy." While agreeing with

Davis that construction of a prototype vessel should commence as soon as possible, he

also supported Paddon's view that the development of the fighting equipment should

commence as mon as the operationai requirement for it was approvecL32 This approval

would depend upon the successful evaluation of the vessel itself which would provide

reliable data on payload characteristics, space limitations, and the iike. While

acknowledging the significant challenges inherent in the development of such fighting

equipment as a high-speed sonar system, Ford emphasized the overwhelming importance

3 1 "Hydrofoil Programme" DGFE to ACNS (A&W) 20 lune 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84 Vol. 18), 2. '' "Hydrofoil Programme Philosophy" SAKNS to DG Ships 5 July 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84/167 Vol. 18). 1.

of the success of the surface-pierciag foil system upon which the vesse1 was de~igned-'~

Indeea in Ford's view, the success of the entire project would depend on tbe evaluation

of this foil system in that ",..the confurnation or otherwise of this thesis is the prirnary

task of the developrnent prototype phase. Target Staff Requirements for f i g h ~ g

equipment studies, Sketch Designs.. . and other such exercises are secandary . . . . 9'34

order to test this revolutionary foi1 system in operatioml conditions, Ford supported the

immediate construction of a prototype demonstration vessel.

Concurrent with this procedurai debate, the RCN's senior leadership was king

regularly briefed on the programme's progresS. At one such briefmg of the Naval Policy

Co-ordinating Cornmittee on 28 August 1962, the Vice Chief of the Naval S W Rear-

Admira1 Brock, questioned the RCN's requirement for the hydrofoil warship. Ln

response to the presentation of DNOR's "Staff Operational Requirements" peper, Brock

al1 but rejected this attempt to justiw the hydrofoil's development. As reflected in the

minutes of this meeting,

VCNS (RAdrn Brock] stated that he fiilly supported expimental work such as the hydrofoil. However, the requirement had not yet been clearly defined. He, therefore, did not think the Navy was justifiai in spending large sums on research and development in this field until the RCN had a valid, provable, ASW requirement for such a programme.35

Brock rejected the "Requirements" midy as it was written because it did not adequately

satisfi ACNS (A&W)'s "Operational Requùements for ASW Systems in the RCN", the

" The performance characteristics of the surf-piacing foil system, as opposai to the submagbd foil s stem then k i n g tested by the United States Navy, arc desai'bed in Appendix A '"Hydrofoil Programme Philosophyn. 2. '' Minutes of the 2 4 p Meeting of the Naval Policy Ccwdhating Committa 28 August 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84/167 Vol. 18), 1.

accepted guideline for the development of new ASW systems. Tbat guideline rquired

that such systems must "provide a world-wide versotility, ... (bel invulnerable as possible

to submarine counter attack, [with adequate] protection against air attacc none of which

had yet been addressed in tems of the hydrofoil's design capabilitiesX In view of bis

long-standing support for the "small and many7* philosophy, Rear-Admiral Brock's

surprising rejection of DNOR's heretofore seminai document justieing the hydrofoil's

raison d 'etre illustrates another consequence of the Navy "not doing its homework" in

support of this major engineering project.

In an attempt to rectify this organizational and managerial uiadequacy, the Chief

of Naval Staff ordered the establishment of the ASW Hydrofoil Steering Cornmittee,

chaired by Commodore Welland, ACNS (A&W). This wrnrnittee first met on 1 October,

1962 and was t a s k d with ". . . developing the concept of the ASW Hydrofoil and in

presentation of the proI;'LfamfITe for approval at various levels in the RCN, DRB, Chiefs of

Staff and eventually to Treasury ~oard"~' Whereas the Hydrofoil Review Group of

196 1 was established to Liaise with DeHavilland in the cirafting of the hydrofoil design,

the Hydrofoil Steering Cornmittee was intended to be the voice of the projecî as it was

considered by various approving authorities and ultimately, Treasury Board. To this end,

the cornmittee included every hi@-level individual involved in the programme to date

incl uding ACNS (A& W) (Cmdre Welland), DG Shi ps (Cmdre Davies), ACNS (A& W)

designate (Capt (N) Fraser-Hams), DNOR (Capt(N) Russell), SACNS (Dr. Ford), and

representatives fkom DRB, DGFE, and DDP." At its f i s t meeting, the cornmittee agreed

%id., 2. " "ASW Hydrofoil Developmeat - Steaing Cornmime" (RG 24 Acc 1983-84 Vol. 18). 1. 38 "AS W Hydrofoil Development - SteeRng Cornmittee", 1. For a complue explamion of abbrevidons, see the List of Abbreviations (page i).

that the total cost of a prototype hydrufoil wouid be at least S 10 million with a hinher $2

million for fighting equiprnent Once in productioa, this cost would be reduced to

approximately $8 million per ship.

The Cammim for Sumrt

The submission of DeHavilland's finai design proposal in October 1962 provided

the RCN with the necessary idonnation upon which to base the decision wtKther to

proceed with the vesselys construction. After a preliminary review, a group of RCN

technical officers and representatives fiom the DRB wncluded:

that DeHavilland7s design approach and mode1 test techniques are thorough and adequate. In the fields of foil-borne performançe and sea-keeping, it is considered that DeHavilland's work talces the investigation essentially as far as theory can go, without the final assurance of a full sale vehicle prototype. ''

The Hydrofoil Steering Cornmittee then approached the Naval Board for approval in

principle to commence construction of the prototype ship pending a more complete

analysis of the report. This briefing marked the beginning of an intensive lobbying

campaign on the part of the programme's proponents to gain support for the vessel's

development. On 18 October 1962, a comprehensive briefing was presented to the Board

which included CNS (VAdm Rayner), VCNS (RAdm Brock), Deputy Chief of Naval

Technical Services (Cmdre Deane), the Naval Comptroller (RAdm Dilion), and the Chief

of Naval Personnel (RAdrn Stirling). The briefing covered the history and development

of hydrofoils, their potential operational effectiveness. a comparaîive cost assessment,

39 UC~ns t~Cf ion of a Prototype M W Hyhfoiln, DNOR RC~OR NSS-ûO-36 17 OctOber 1 %2 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84 Acc 167 Vol. 18). 5.

and a technical assessrnent of the design d e r wn~ideration.~ The briefing foncluded

with the request for Naval Board's support in principle for the vessel's constnrction at a

total cost of $13 million, with a cash requirement of $1.2 million for 19634.

Although impressed by the technical promise of the design, the Naval Board

reiterated Rear-Admirai Brock's opinion tbat the craft should only be coostnicted if it had

a proven AS W potentiai. This potential could only be demonstrated after a detailed

fighting equipment study had ban completed." The Naval B a d M e r

wamed that "in the current era of severely restricted funds, the financial resources

available for the development of a hydrofoil craft were likely to be quite limited.'i2 in

the end, the Naval Board ordered a detailed fighting equïpnent study and approved $1 -2

million for the developrnent of the prototype vehicle with the caveat that the

"continuation or completion of the hydrofoil project as an RCN ASW vehicle will be

contingent upon the evaluation of the current development work and of the weapns

system s t ~ d ~ . ' ~ ~

The Naval Board briefing was followed by a similar presentation to the Deputy

Minister of Defence, David Golden, on 14 November 1962 in which the indusûial

benefits of the programme were emphasized. This briefing, which elicited a positive

response fiom the Deputy Minister, concluded by s t a ~ g that:

. .. there is a good case for proceeding with vigour to the development and evaluation of the 200 ton Canadian ASW hydrofoil design on purely technical and staff requirement considerations quite aside h m the direct and potential benefits for Canadian industry or the part it could play in the policy of

" Minutes of the 688& Meeting of the Naval Boud 18 Octokr 1962 @ND DHH File 79/34), 1-2. 41 rbid., 4. " Ibid.. 4. 43 ibid., 5.

encouraging the development of advancecl technologies so essential to any country which aspires to remain among the fiont ranks of nations."

In his briefing to the Houourable D. S. Harimess, Muiister of National Defence, îhe

following week, Vice-Admiral Rayner (CNS) reiterated the programme' s poteatial

benefits to the Canadian ecowmy in addition to outlbing the vessel's projccted role in

the fleet." Based on these factors, Rayner formally stated officiai RCN support of the

vessel's development by conciuding that ". . . wnstniÇtion of a prototype crafl for

evaluation is justifieci.'&

A p D r o v a l t and Received

The outcome of these briefings and presentations was as surprishg and it was

sudden. When approached in December 1962 for additional fun& for the programme's

development, the Treasury Board responded by approving a total of $13 million as

requested in the 1963-64 Estimates for the vessel's constniction and weapons systerns

development'" W ith the necessary fùnding thus approved, Vice-Admiral Rayner

predicted that the craft could be ready for trials by t 965 with its fighting equipment

following in 1966-67? This provision of funding also renewed the confidence of al1

involved as to the project's status and future. The brùnrning optimism of the Canadian

hydrofoil development team was evi&nt in its presentation of their progras to the 5&

NATO ASW Symposium held at Norfolk, Virginia in early February 1963. In addition to

* "DM Briefing - Hydrofoiln 14 Novanber 1 %2 (RG 24 1 SNiWû4Vl67 File 8000-Red00 Vol. 18). 8. ." u P r ~ t ~ t y p e ASW Hydrofoiln CNS to MND 23 Novwber 1962 (RG 24 1983-84/167 Box 3506 File 8000-FHE-400 Vol. 18). 1. 46 ibid., 1. " "The Prototype ASW Hydrofoil C M CNSKDRB to CCS 15 Febnruy 1963 (RG 24 Vol. 447 File DRBS 0570-02 Vol. 16), 1.

"Prototype ASW Hydrofoil". C N S to MM>, 1.

a drarnatic announcement of the project's status and promis@ friture, Dr. Ford

(SAICNS) provided a detailed description of the pl& prototype vesse1 and its

operational characteristics. Dr. Ford wncluded his briefing by emphasizing the poject's

potentially signifiant conm%ution to other hydrofoil research programmes:

The unique features of this design, notably in the foi1 system, the size, and the emphasis on sustained ocean operation, make it a complementary addition to the quite wide spectnim of hydrofoil vehicles now appearing or planned among the NATO

In addition to the already significant expectations on the design's performance fiom

within the RCN, this public announcernent effectively elevated the imporbnce of the

design's eventual completion and evaluation in the eyes of Canada's allies.

With the final design proposai cornplete, the required funds approved, and the

programme's objectives essentially defined, the RCN7s leadership awaited official

Treasury Board approvd for the awarding of the constniction contract for the R-200

project. The long wait finally came to an end on April 13, 1963.

49 "The Canadian Hydrofoil Rojcct* prqared on 30 January 1%3 for pr-on .t the 5. NATO ASW Symposium, SACLANT NorfoUc, Va 4 to 7 Febnury 1 %3 (RG 24 Acc l983-84/167 Vol. 18). 2.

Cbri~ter Thrce: Construction and Evdurition

A Management Svstem is Established

Ofiicial Treasury Board approval for the construction of the R-200 prototype

hydrofoil was followed by the awarding of Contract 2BX.3-244 to DeHavilland A i r d

Company of Canada on April 13, 1%3. The signing of this contract marked the

culmination of decades of intensive research into hydrofoil theory and presented NRE

researchers with the long-awaited opportunity to build and evaluate a Ml-scale 2 0 e t o ~ e

prototype ASW vehicle.

However, the buoyant optimism thaî characterized those involved in the project

was not shared by their political masters. In fact, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's

administration, in power since 1957, was disintegrating in the spring of 1963 as a result

of a variety of defence-related issues. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962

highlighted Canada's nebdous role in the Cold War nuclear balance of power. In

addition, it revealed Diefenbaker's reluctance to put Canadian armed forces on alert for

fear of possible strategic escalation. While Diefenbaker's cabinet debated its options

("furious that Canadian life and death should be determined by a foreign pident,"')

Defence Minister Harkness and Rear-Admiral Dyer, Commander Maritime Forces

Atlantic, transcended Ottawa's vacillation and sent al1 available warships to sea to track

Soviet submarines in cooperation with tbe United States Navy.

The goveniment's position was equally unclear in t m s of its intentions vis-à-vis

the air force's CF- 1 0 1 Voodoo interceptors and B o m c missiles and their designed

' D. Morton, A Militarv H i s t o ~ of C a m (Edmomon: Hurtig Publisks, IWO), 247.

capability to be armed with nuclear warbeads. Shortly &er issuing an adamant denial of

a Canadian nuclear cornmitment, Diefenbaker was publicly humiliateci in a statement by

the United States govemment tha! Canadian Bomorc-B missiles "haà never had a non-

nuclear warhead" and thaî "the V d m could not perform its role without nuclear

mi~siles."~ In the wake of this flurry of embarrassments, Douglas HarbKss resigned as

Minister of National Defence on February 3, 1963, two months before the Diefenbaker

govemment fell to m e r Pearson's ~ ~ k r a l s . ~

Canada emerged h m this episode "with its defençe policies in disarray and its

reputation a little tarni~hed.'~ For the Navy, however, its role remained as clear as ever.

Not only did the RCN's ASW orientation go unchailenged throughout this -4 its

legitimacy was acniaily enhanced by the alarming scale of Soviet nibmariw activity

associated with the Cuban Missile crisis.' Not surprisingly, the new Pearson

administration's naval policy differed little h m its predecessor's in terms of Canada's

cornmitment to NATO and the RCN's continued specialktion in ASW. Indeed,

Pearson's Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, was decidedly pro-AS W fkom the

beginning of his tenure! It was in this political atmosphere that the hydrofoil project

began to take fim shape.

Morton. 248. 3 R Bothwell, 1. Dnrmmood and J. English, since 1945: Power Politics. and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). 233. ' ibid., 233.

The impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on Treanrry Board's approval of tùndiag for the hydrofoil programme remains unclear. However, tbe timing of e v t a s s u w s that the peak of the crisis in late October 1962, and the heavy involverneut of Soviet submrrines in opaations off the North American seaboard during this time, may have enfi4nccd the govanment's support for this M W programme, resulting in the fiil1 approval of its tùnding in Dcwnber t %2. 6 J. W. Arsenault, "The DDH 280 Program: A Case Study of Govemental Expcnditure Decision-Making" in D.G. Haglund, cd., Csrilrda's Defence uidus_tnal Base (Kingston: Ronald P. Fr)n & Company, 1988), 133.

With the ASW mission of the RCN reafhned by the new Liberal administration,

the Navy continued its work on the hydrofoil programme. The aim of the contract let to

DeHavilland was seemingly simple yet technically revolutionary:

... through a prototype vehicle-weapon system devclopnent and trials programme, to confim the feasïbility and assess the operationai potential of an ocean-going ASW Hydrofoil Ship based on the NRE c o e p t and subsequent DeHavilland design studia of a 200 ton model.'

Reflecting the unconventional nature of the hydrofoil design itself, this contract between

the RCN and DeHavilland featured a number of unique characteristics. In view of the

hydrofoil's hybrid design, the contract was administered by both the Aircraft Branch and

the Shipbuilding Branch of the Department of Defence ~oduçtion.~ Fwthermore, given

the cornplex nature of the design and DeHavilland's experience with alurninum

construction techniques, the contract granted DeHavilland extraordinary autonomy in

terms of the details of the vessel's design and construction.

To represent the Navy's stake in the project, a Hydrofoil Project Group was

established on 23 April 1963 to facilitate the RCN's participation in the vessel's

construction. Led by a full-time Hydrofoil Roject Officer fiom the staff of DG Ships,

the group was intended to serve as a liaison authority between the Navy and the prime

contractor and included representation fiom al1 appropriate DRB and RCN directorates.

As the Design Authority, the RCN tasked the Hydrofoil Project Group with establishing

and maintaining "an efficient coordination of al1 activities in support of the ship design,

' "ASW Hydrofoil Roject Omup" DG Ships to ACNS (MW), D/CNTS, DGFE, .ad DSS 23 April 1963 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84167 Vol. 3506 File 800eFHE-400 Vol. 10). Appcndix 4 1. ' "St atus Report - FHE 400 Hydrofoil Ship" DG Ships NSC 8000-36 18 Sepember 1963 DHH Box 79/34). 1.

construction and test Given the unique nature of the design, the group's

task of ensuring the production of an effective ASW ship was substantial indeed

By mid- 1964, this group was reaamed the Directorate of Hydrofoil Development

@HD) and placed under the leadership of the Director of Hydrofoil Development,

Captain (N) RG. Monteith, a staff member of DG ~bi~s.'~ Although officiaily tasked

with providing the overall management of the hydrofoil programme and the Wear

enunciation of prognunme objectives,"" D m ' s actual involvernent in the technical

development of the design was significantly limited by the considerable de fat0

autonomy of the DeHavilland design and construction office. The potentially adverse

implications of this management system eventually affected the programme's

development. Nevertheless, DHD cwrdinated a major planning effort on the part of the

RCN and DeHavilland in advance of the constniction phase. ïhis final design and

construction plan consisted of three phases:

Phase A: preparation of contract plans and prelirninq specificatious for the ship based on the existing DeHavilland design study (to be completed by 1 May 1964);

Phase B: detailed design phase including construction of the vessel (to be completed by 30 Apnl 1966); and

Phase C: contractor's sea trials and the RCN's acceptance of the vessel (to oçcur before 1969). l2

The preliminas, cost estimate for the ship's design and construction totailed $9.1 million,

" S m s Repon - FHE 400 Hydrofoil Shipw, Appendix A, 2. 'O CANAVED to HMCS Slodacaylc~ 2521202 Fcb 64. l 1 SECTEMP 16/64 "Directome of Hydrofoil Dtvelopmem" NS: 8000-36 25 May 1964 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 1. 12 ibid., 1.

$1 .O million of which would be expended in 1963-64, $6.6 million in 1 964-65, and îhe

balance in 1965-66. l3

Marine industries Limited of Sorel, Quebec was nominated as the prime sub-

contractor to buiid the vessel's hull, &cks, and superstnicture and be respons~%le for the

overall integration of other sub-contractor's efforts. DeHavilland would constnrt the

bow and main foil stnictures of high tensile NiCoMo steel at its Malton, Ontario

production facility, which would chen be shipped to Sorel for installati~n'~ By late April

1963, the Pratt and Whitney FT4A-2 gas turbine was chosen as the high-speed propulsion

unit for the hydrofoil and the Davey Paxmm 16YJCM diesel engine was fitted for hull-

borne propulsion requirements.15 Hundreds of other sub-contractors fulfilled the myriad

of other requirements, such as installing the gas turbine and diesel engine and producing

ancillary equipment, electrical w h g , and hydraulics systems.

As the details of the vessel's construction are comprehensively describeci in

Lynch's The Flving 400, this chapter will instead focus only on those construction details

which directly influenced the prognunme's final outcome.16 In addition, this chapter will

consider the project's management system and decision-making processes in terms of

their effect on the vessel's ultimate destiny. By analyzing the project's management

structure and the origins of crucial decisions, it is hoped that this chapter can contribute to

an understanding as to why the programme was consistmly over-budget, behind

schedule, and politically controversial, both within and outside of the Navy.

" SECTEMP 1 6/64, 1. " "The Hydrofoil Programmen N w Week May 1%4 @ND DHH Box 73/1367), 3. l5 "FHE 400 (Blas d'Or)" DND Informotion Servi- 13 Septanber 1966 (DM3 DHH Box 79/34), 2. 16 Complete construction details, includiig design Jpecifications, construction techniques, and layout schematics, can be found in Lynch's The F l v i n ~ 400: C w ' s Hvdrofoil Roi= pp. 35-67.

Earlv Difficulties

With construction barely underway in 1963, it was soon determineci that the

pieiiminary cost estimate of $9.1 million for the ship done would fdl far short of w t d

requirements. The Hydrofoil Roject Group revised this figure in Iaauary 1964 to S 15

million for the ship and an additional $3 million for the fighting equipment." By March,

the estimate for the construction of the ship alone had nsen to f 16.3 million, a figure

subsequently approved by Treasury ~ o a r d ' w e projected cost of the fighting

equipment programme was similarly adjmted to $4.335 million in August 1964 and

received Treasury Board approval. Two subsequent reviews by Dehavilland of the entire

programme (including fighting equipment) in late 1964 and eariy 1965 resulted in a

further upward revision of cost estimates to $26.34 million and $34.324 million

respectively. l9 These "substantial increases" were attributed to:

1 ) gross underestimation of the design engineering effort required by DeHavi lland;

2 ) gross underestimation of the production engineering effort required by DeHavilland; and

3) hi& procurement costs as a result of numerous "one-off' contracts with unique tooling or design requirements.20

In other words, the Naw was paying for its inefficient "hands-off' management system

which granted the prime contractor, DeHavilland, remarkable autonomy in the vessel' s

1- ' THE 400 Hydrofoil Development Rcview of Progres No. 1 / U W NS 8000-36 (DG Ships) 6 Januaty 1964 (RG 24 Acc 1983-841 67 Box 3506 File 8000-FHE-400 Vol. 1 7). 1. l8 '"DHD Proposcd hpft of Treasury Board SubMssioa on the ASW Hydrofoil Programmen (RG 24 ACC l983-84/I6? Vol. 3507 File 8000-FHE-400 Vol. 18). 1. 19 Ibid., Figure 1. 20 Ibid., 3.

design and construction process, checked ody by the acîvïsory Hydrofoil Project Group.

The Navy's belated realization of this oversight occuned only in mid-1965:

In short, we are paying a high price for the self-eàucation of the contractors in hydrofoil engineering and production techniques, and for the Eailure of the contractor to anticipate the magnitude of the problems he would encornter in this unfbrdiar field of endeavo~r.~'

These massive cost escalations during the fim eighteen month of the project

prompted naval planners to revise its complex management system. Given

DeHavilland's difficulty in meeting the Navy's demands on time and within budget, R

was decided that the ". . . inexperience of the wnttactor and many of his subcontractors in

hydrofoil engineering has led to a much greater need for engineering liaison support than

was anticipated . . . .''= To this end, the Deputy Minister of DDP recommended in June

1965 that a new hydrofoil project office be established to inbqpte and strearnline the

management effort of DDP and DND. Heretofore, both d e v e n t s had maintained their

own hydrofoil management teams which resulted in inefficiency, duplication of effort,

and, at times, general confision. In a response àated 5 Jdy 1965, E.B. Armstrong, DND

Deputy Minister, agreed with the proposeci formation of "a single Office responsibie for

technical and contractual control of work by the contractors and for providing a single

source of direction to al1 agencies associateci with the programme.'" However, in the

end it was decided to entrust the existing Directorate of Hydrofoil Developnent witb this

expanded mandate raîher than create a new supervisory authority. The most signifiant

change to the Directorate's organization was that it was invested with executive power

21 "DHD Proposed Dr& of Tfeasusr Board Submission on the ASW Hydrofoil Programmen, 3. l2 Ibid.. 2.

over the entire programme as granted by the Developrnent and Associaîed Research

Policy Group (DARPG) of DND.~'

Despite the provision of this "new" management arrangement, poblems

continued to surface at DeHavilland. The untried technology and novel construction

practices associated with the k i g n smn overwhelmed the contractor's ability to keep

pace with its production schedule. By May 1966, DeHavilland admitteci that it could no

longer meet the intended production schtdule and indicated that it was experiencing

exberne dificulty in designing and producing the vessel's f~ils.~' Poor (or non-existent)

communication between DeHavilland and DHD exacerbateci the situation so tbat by the

time the RCN was idorrned of these difficulties, DeHavilland was desperately behind

schedule and in a severe contractuai penalty situation. As a result, the majority of the foi1

work was sub-contracted to North American Aviation, Los Angeles Division under a

disbursement of $100,000 from the Department of Defence Production to cover initial

c ~ s t s . ' ~ However, North Amencan's work also proved to be largely sub-standard,

forcing DeHavilland to refinish the c'completed" foils prior to their delayed delivery to

Sorel for in~tallation.~~

23 "Management of Hydrofoil Project" DM DND to DM DDP 5 July 1965 (RG 24 Vol. 3 507 Fie 8000- FHE- Vol. 18). 1. 24 "Defence Councit - Minute of the 1 4 8 ~ Meeting - May 17. 1%5" @ND DHH Box 73/1223, Series 3, File 1428), 9.

"RIE 400 Hydrofoil Developrnent Rewiew of Progrrss No. 1/65" NS 8000-FHE 400 (DG Ships) (RG 24 Vol. 3507 File 800eFHE-400 Vol. 13), 2. 26 ibid., 2. 17 This "refinishing" included coatiag the foils with naoprene in order to protect the highly corrosive NiCoMo sted h m the potential ravages of s a water. Howcvu, even with this thick pmtective coating, there remainecl considerable do& as to the foils' ability to resist comaon. The sub-conmrcted sîudy conducted by the Depument of Mines, Energy, and Resoufces, for instance, w a d of this potential problem and recommended that a less corrosive alloy be used in follow-on vessels.

The Great Fire: Mismanagement Revded

As DeHavilland struggied with its production and budgetary difficulties, work

continued at Marine Industries Limiteà (MIL) in Sorel on the vesselys bull and

superstructure. In January 1966, the completed superstructure was fitted to tbe hull,

followed by the installation of the transmission systems, diesel engine, and gas turbine.

Subsequent testing of the foilbome transmission system resuiteâ in a massive failure,

necessitating a comprehensive design and reconstruction of the stem.'^ Under

DeHavilland supervision, the vesse1 ' s revol utionary foi1 systems were attached during the

following weeks. The completed ship was fiaaily "rolled out" h m MIL'S erection shop

to its yard on July 2 1, 1966 for the instaliation of auxiliary machiuery, piping, and

intenor f i~niture.~~ This phase of the construction programme was anticipated to take

several months.

However, tragedy struck on November 5,1966. During tesbng of the power

generation system, a major fire empted caused by hydraulic fluid leaking onto the hot

exhaust casing o f the auxiliary gas turbine. The two MIL technicians who were

conducting the test escaped although one suffered moderate burns. After half an hour,

the fire was exfinguished by MIL'S firemen with the assistance of the Sorel Municipal

Fire Department. The damage was catastrophic: the deck and hull were buckled and

chaned, auxiliary machinery was destn,yed, and the entire ship was either smoke- or fire-

darnaged.)' A DND Fire Investigation Cornmittee was hastily arranged and, after a

'' Lynch. 48. Indeed, the rebuilt transmission systan was not deliveral d l D&miba 19, 1%8, five years &er the initial construction contrad wrs si@. Even then, tbe subscquent repeated Mure of this transmission system continued to plague tht project's opaotiond evaldon. 29

30 "Sophisticated VesJd Near Rcady" O w a Citizen, 22 July 1966. "Hydrofoil Fire Poses Dilemma" Ollrn~a Citizen, 12 Docmiber 1966.

thorough investigation, it informecl the Minister of Defence, the Honouraôle P.T. Heuyer,

that the total cost of repairing the fie damage was estimated at $7.5 million.3'

The Ge's impact on the programme went fàr beyond physical damage and cost

escalahon considerations. Indeed, the fire ami its subsequent investigation served to

reveal the long-term consequences of the RCN's inadquate management and control of

the programme. Fi- the füe calleci attention to the programme's unconventional design

and construction process from which the RCN was virhially, and most surprisingly,

voluntarily excluded Quite distinct fiom the standard practice in which a new design's

specifications were submi&ed to the Naval Engineer's OfFice for approvd, the rnajority

of the materials and systems used in the FHE 40d2 programme never received official

RCN apptoval. The RCN agreed to this practice as it viewed DeHavilland as possessing

far greater experience and expert knowledge in the field of aluminum construction and

aircraft technology as applicable to hydrofoils. The result of this seemingly "blind faith

in DeHavilland's fùlfillment of design requirements meant RCN representatives had little

or no howledge of the fitting of specific systems into the ship. Naval engineers, for

example, had not had the opportunity to review or approve the installation of the

hydraulic flex hose and clamp connection which caused the catastrophic fire.

Second, the fire illustrated the inadequate certification and testing practices that

were part of the ship's technical evaluation prucess. DeHavilland's extraordinary

contractual autonomy, combined with the pressures of production deadlines and

3' Lynch, 66. '' The ship was designated as a "Fast Hydrofoil Escort" in Seprember 1963 and rssigned h l 1 number FHE 400. The official naval description of the vesse1 was "a ship equipped with hydrofoils capable of very high speed offensive operations agaïnst submarincs." (CANAVMED Genaal 168/63 lOl459Z Sep 63, DND DHH Box 79/34).

rnounting costs, resulted in the adoption of an d s f a c t o r y certification process for the

design's components." Certification and testing of vital wmpomnts had becorne

haphazard by the fa11 of 1966 and RCN assistance in this field was neither sought nor

provided Quality control haâ thus becorne proôlematic, contributing to bth the major

fire and a number of subsequent equipment fàilures. The failed flex hose and clamp

connection, for example, although factory testcd to perfomi at pressures in excess of 3OO

pounds per square inch, fkiled at approximately 60 psi as a result of improper installation

and inadequate testing once installed? Consistent with the characteristics of the

established "hands off" RCN management system, the Navy was unaware of this fhteful

test or any other potentially significant tests which were independently conducted by

contractor staff or sub-mntractors.

Finally, the fire investigation revealed that, unlike other naval shipbuilding

projects, the FHE 400 programme was not insured. Based on the nature of the design,

existing insurance regulations, and associated costs, the DDP chose to have the vesse1

constmcted under a Crown "self-insuring, cost reimbursing" contract in which the Crown

would be responsible for any damages whicb occurred during As a

result, the Crown absorbed al1 costs associated with the damage caused by the fire.

Following the fire investigation and a thorough examination of the continu&

feasibility of the programme on the part of the Navy's ad hoc "Ship Review Committee,"

the Minister of Defence, Paul Hellyer, decided to proceed with the programme despite its

history of significant con ove- and the costly fire repair bill. Perhaps indicative of

33 "Defence Council - Mime of tbe 148& Meeting - May 17, 1965" (DND DHH BOX 7311223, Series 3, File 1428). 9. 3' Minutes fiom the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, Firm Session. March 11, 1969. 38 1. 3' Lyrich, 65.

the consensus of political support for the Canadian defence industry, Heuyer's pivotal

decision to proceed witb tbe project f i e r the d y fire amactcd only the briefest of

parliamentary attention. Indeed, the extremely brie€ discussion in the House of

Commons three &ys after the fire leaned âecidedly in favour of continuing with the

programme's developrnent:

Mr. H Russell MacEwan (PC - Pictou): Mr. Speaker, 1 have a question for the Minister of National Defence. 1 should like to ask the minister whether he can report to the house on the approximate damage to the prototype hydrofoil which was damaged by fire at Marine Industries Ltd. In Sorel.

Mr. Speaker: Order, please, This question may have some urgency which is not readily apparent to the Chair. It rnay be tbat the question should be placed on the or&r paper.

Mr. MacEwan: h is important, M.. Speaker, in view of the fict that for rnany years no ships have been built in this wuutry for the nay?

Once the Minister announced his intention to proceed with the project, there was no

m e r political debate on the matter.

Thus, in addition to the R a ' s steadfast conviction of the design's ASW

potential, the economic and industrial bene fits associated with the project' s continuai

development saw it through this crisis. In Aprïl 1967, DM> officially submitted a

proposal to Treasury Board for the continuation of the project with a strict funding ceiling

of 1650.006 million." Treasury Board prornptiy approved this funding ceiling with the

caveat that no further increases in programme cost would be pemitted.3s

36 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 8 November 1966,9671- " This figure included $39.874 million for tbc ship's completion and 510.132 million for the fighting equiprnent dcvelopxnem programme. H W. Smith, "Tirnetable of Main Evtntsn August 1 W5, (Pemonal Nues), 3.

Fiahann Eauimnent Develoment

While the RCN and DeHavilland struggled to wmplete the vesse1 itself, the

fighting equipment programme was king developed concwrently. From the outset, the

fighting equipment package was seen as vital to the overall design and an essential

determinani of the vessel's potential ASW capability. Naval Board had long insincd that

the vesse1 must have a proven ASW capability before a production programme could k

approved. In order to demonstrate this ASW capability, it was decided that the fighting

equipment had to be developed, installed, aad evaluated at sea The fightuig equipment's

importance to the programme's overall poteutid was summarized by Captain (N) RG.

Monteith, Director of Hydrofoil Development, in May 1965 in that ". - . a comprebensive

operationai evaluation with Fighting Equipment must precede any decision for

procurement or production rn~dels."~~

The Director General Fighting Equipment coaducted a preliminary weapons

systems analysis "to provide the detailed engineering basis for the constniction of a

complete prototype outfit of fighting equipment and to derive detailed estimates of

programme timing and c o s t ~ . " ~ ~ The fitting of the fighting equipment package was

projected to take place in October 1966.~' It was determined that the following fighting

equipment would be required for the hydrofoil to fiilfil1 its intended role at a (then)

estimated cost of $2.87 million:'*

39 UHydrOfoil Program'' DHD to C N T S 1 1 May 1 965 (RG 24 Acc 1983-Wl67 Vol. 3777). 2. JO "Prototype Ami-Submanne Hydrofoil Ship", Appcndix A "ASW Hydrofoil Statemern of Requirements" DG Ships June 1%3,3. '' "ASW Hydrofoil Project Group", Appcndix 4 1. " "Staîus Report - FHE 400 Hydrofoil Shipw. 7.

1) sonar detection equipment which remains effective et higb foil-borne speeds;

2) weapons capable of effective pnfomance against high speed targets;

3) an action information system pmitting efficient co rnand and control of the ship during anti-submarine actions developing at much higher speeds dian experienced in more conventional ships; and

4) navigation and communications equipnent that would aiîow the effective integraiion of the hydrofoil as a component of a multi-piirpose force of conventional and hydrofoil ships, helicopters, and longrange maritime a i r ~ r a f t ~ ~

During the early stages of the programme, naval planners emphasized the

importance of the high-speed sonar system to the programme's feasibility. Indeed, the

success or failure of the entire programme was seen to rest on the development ofan

effective high-speed sonar system since the hydrofoil's AS W capability wodd be large1 y

based on its ability to detect submarines and prosecute them at high speeds. The Naval

Board agreed in June 1964 that ". ..the greatest single contribution to the effectiveness of

the FHE 400 would be the achievement of a high speed towable sonar, operable at speeds

of 40 knots or more.'&

However, the Navy 's leadership also recognized that, in terms of the fighting

equipment programme, the development of a hi&-speed sonar promised to be the moa

technically problematic. Therefore, a three-phase research and deveiopment programme

was established to meet the ambitious design requirement for a sonar system which could

be effeciively operated at speeds in excess of forty kn~ts.'~ This experimental

" "Prototype Ami-Submuine Hydrofoil Ship", 2. 54 b'Mnute~ of the 733d Meeting of Naval Board* 26 $une 1964 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 2. 4' Canadian naval ships of the time were equipped with a Variable Dcpth Sonar ( M S ) opable of king towed behind ships at çpeeds of up to 15 k m . Speeds in excess of this renderad the sonar i n e f f i v c (as a result of water flow noise) and placed undue strain on tbe towing cable and the hydrodynamic body in which the sonar was housed.

programme would include:

1) experimental and trials work conducted by NRE;

2) an industrial study, sponsored by the RCN, of the engineering techniques required to exploit present theoretical knowledge; and

3) production of prototype equipment with the RCN as Design Authority, commencing in early 1966 for completion in mid-1968.~

However, the DRB objected to the DGFE proposa1 to proceed exclusively with the

development of high-speed sonar as considerable doubt rmained that a forty-hot sonar

could be developed in time to "meet the ship." Instead, DRB advocated a two-phase plan

in which both an "interim" and hi&-speed sonar system would be developed in the face

of "determineci D R . opposition" to this proposal, DGFE relented and agreed to an

interïm system comprising a low speed (fifteen-knot) towed sonar with high-speed hoist

and an al ternate dipping transducer 'as i11~~~811ce.'~'

Following this agreement on the general design of the sonar system, Canadian

Westinghouse Company (CWC) was contracted to conduct the fighting equiprnent design

study in September 1 9 6 3 . ~ ~ Aithough viral to the progression of the fighting equipment

programme, the letting of this $233,850 contract provided mother example of the

hydrofoil project's complex administrative and management ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ~ While all

"Prototype Ami-Submarine Hydrofoil Shipn, Appendix B "Hydrofoil Fighting Equipmem m e " , 1-2. "7 '3otes on Hydrofoil Sonar Programmesn Directoraie of Systerns Engineering to DG Ships. 6 Dacember 1963 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84 Vo1.3507 Fie 8000-FHE-400 Vol. 13), 3. Tbe "dipping transducer" would be modeled after the dipping sonars used by hovering helicopters and A d only be used when tbe ship was stationary. This " i n s i c e " option rctiected RCN/DRB uncatainty th& the envisageci hi&-speed sonar system could be developed in time to be fitted in thc prototype ship. Spacifically, naval planners doubtcd the towing cable's ability to withstad the s~nsses ofhigh-specd towing operations as weil as the %uestionable eff'ivcncss of the towcd body m such q m d s .

RS. Hennig, "Selection, Design and installation of the Fighting Equipmeat for the Royal Canadîan Navy Hydrofoil RIE-4ûû" Deccmber 196% @ND DHH Box 95/53), 3. 49 Lynch, 61.

previous contracts had been subconnacted tbrough DeHavilland in the interest of overall

design coordination, the fighting equipment design study was a distindy separate

contract let directiy by the Treasury Board through the Department of Defence

Production invotving fiinds which were not to be accounteü for as part ofthe vessel's

construction programme.s0 This deviation fkom the existing contractual practice

obfuscated the place of the fighting equipment programme in relation to the rest of the

hydrofoi1 pmject.

The fighting equipment's staîus was placed in even greater peril in January 1964

when the programme suffered two serious setbacks. First, the delivery of the proposed

"interim" sonar, the US Navy's SQS-35, was &layed at least thirty months due to

failures dunng evaluation. Second, during RCN tes^ the high-sbength towing cables

required for high-speed towing operations failed due to corrosion. As a resdt, NRE

fighting equipment research afler July 1964 focussed i ~ e a d on designing a high-speed

sonar based on the existing AN/SQS-505 Variable Deph Sonar ~~stern.~' In addition, the

interim requirement for a stationary dipping sonar was eventually considerd impractical

and dropped fiorn the final fighting equipaent design." NRE research proceeded with

the production of high-speed towing bodies and the successful towing of hdf-scale

bodies to the scale equivalent of forty-knots.

The completion of the CWC design study in Feb~ary 1965 Uicludd an upwardly

revised estimate of cost to wmplete the fighnng equipment as a result of the recent

decision to change sonars. This report, coupled with similar projected cost incmses for

50 Lynch, 61. '' Ibid., 62. 52 Hennig, 12.

the ship itself, prompted the Chief of Defence Staff(Air Chief Marsha1 F.R. Miller) to

recommend the cancellation of fighting equipment de~elopment.~~ The Minister,

convinced of the importance of the FE package to the wmplete design, decideci instead

that the entire programme should p r d at an estimated total cost of $36.2 million?

However, continued cost ovemms for the ship's consûuction prompted the RCN

in October 1967 to defer indefinitely the fitting of the fighting equiprnent so the fun&

thus saved could be applied to the vessel's completion within the $50.006 million h d i n g

limit imposed in April. The development and testing of various wmpnents in shore

establishments continued throughout 1967 and 1968, most notably with the July 1968

installation of the ship's Action Information System at the Maritime Warfare Schwl in

Halifax Nova scotias'

Sonar research and development also culminateci in 1968 with the development of

the AN/SQS-507 sonar which was specificdly designed for use by the hydrofoil. This

system included a transducer mounted within a hydrodynamic body capable of king

towed at speeds up to forty kn~ts .*~ However, tests revealed that this sonar was oniy

effective when towed at speeds of less than twenty knots, after which noise generated

fiom water flow and the ship itself masked the effective reception of sound signals. As

described by RS. Hennig, this situation was Iess than ideal:

53 "Defence Councit - Minute of the 14gh Meeting - May 17, 1 %Y, 1. " ibid., 1. 5s Hennig, 5 . This system was the first command and control systcm designcd and built in Canada and formed the basis of such subsequent designs as the CCS-280 and CCS-330 systerns used respectively in the Tribal and Cify dass ships of the 1970s and 1980s. 56 NAVRESEARCH DART to RCCWC/CANFORCEHED NRE 406 2919552 hl65 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 1.

In considering the sonar system it was immeâiately evident that in order tu use the hydrofoil's high speed capability to fiil1 advantage, it should be equipped with a sonar capable of operation at the top speed of the ship. Uafortunately, the present state of devebpment of sonar techniques will not dlow this and it is therefore necessaxy to pv ide a sonar system which can be used to good effect at hullbome speeds only.*'

This late realization of the limitations of contemporary sonar technology and their effects

on the hydrofoil's operationai potential seems remarkable i n d d Despite the RCN's

early recognition of the critical importance of the high-speed sonar to the design's overall

effectiveness, the realization that such a system rnight not be poss15le seems to have been

quite late in coming, M e r damaging the programme's chances for c ~ r n ~ l e t ï o n . ~ ~

This significant oversight again underlines the uiadequacy of the programme's

management system. The separate admiaistration of the fighting equipment programme

prevented the close coordination of ever-changing vesse1 requirements and actual figfiting

equipment research and development efforts, resulting in a near-cornpleted ship without

the desired fighting equipment package. Also, by allowing the shipbuilding programme

to remain chronically over-budget, the projeet's management forcd its polîtid and

military masters to rnake the unpalatable decision in October 1967 to defer the fitting of

the fighting equipment suite so as to divert funch to the ailing ship construction

programme.

57 Hennig, 36. 58 While predicted to be ineffective at high speeds, the AN/SQS-507 d l provided the hydrofoil with signi ficant sonar capability. Ahhough the vase1 would be "bhdn while closhg to attack a targ* for example, it could conceivably regain contact on= huilbome again in orda to exearte iîs atrack.

me Shi~'s Com~letion and Evaluaîion

Although well over-budget and behind scheduie, worlc on Bras d *0g9 at MIL'S

Sorel facility continued throughout tbe winter of 1967-68, most of which concentrateci on

repaïring the damage caused by the November 1966 €ire. Ln July 1%8 Bras d'Or was

shipped to Halifax oa a barge and delivered to the Naval Dockyard Here, the ship was

commissioned into the RCN as Her Majesty's Canuliaa Ship Bras d'or." Although now

a commissioned ship with RCN manning, Bras d'Ur remained the property of

DeHavilland pending the successful completion of sea trials.

Hullbome sea trials began in September 1968 and revealed a number of defects

including those involving the hulibome transmission system, hydraulic pumps, bow foi1

bearings, and the autopilot ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ~ The ship was subsequeatiy drydocked for five

months to effect the necesSacy repair~?~ hving this period, the foilbome transmission

system was installed by DeHavilland and alongside trials of the main and auxiliary

machinery were conducted. Undocking on 9 March 1%9, Bras d'Or proceeded with

successful hullbome tests which indicaieci excellent stability and seakeeping

characteristics in moderate to heavy ~ e a s . ~ ~ Foilbome mals began in April and the ship

was finally accepteci by the RCN in May. Brar d'Or camed on with foilbome triab and

eventually exceeded its design specifications by reaching a speed of sixty-three knots off

Halifaw in July 1 9 6 9 . ~

s9 FHE 400 was named Bras d 'Or in Deccmber 1 965 upon MND approd The previous Brus d'Or, tbe R- 103 experimental hydrofoil, was renamed &rdrle& by the NRE so as to avoid confiisio~ @ND Information Services AFN 696-65,23 Decunber 1965 @ND DHH Box 79/34)). * 'Tiydrofoil R d y for Sea Tests" Ottawa Journt 9 July 1968 @ND DHH Box 79/34). 61 Commander J.H. W. Knox, "Trials and Tribulations of a Hydrofoil" CClllCIIjlan Shipping d Mirine Engineering News, April 1970134. 62 HMCS Bras d'Or 1 %8 Annual H i s t o W Report (DND DHH File 1 326). 1. 63 HMCS Bras d'Or 1969 Amni.I HistoricaJ Report @ND DHH Fiie 1 326), 2. anid., 2-

A routine hull and foil survey following these tests, however, revealed a major

hcture in the main foi1 which supported the bulk of the vtssel's weigfit *le foilborne.

This foil section was removed and an examination at DeHavilland's Malton plant found

an additional one hundred and thirty cracks. Further investigation iadicated that an

improperiy sealed plug had allowed the ingress of sea water into the foil stmchue which

resulted in massive corrosion and the subsequent f'racruring of the main foi1 under stress

loading. This corrosion clearly attested to the NiCoMo steel doy's ïnability ta withstand

prolonged exposure to a marine environment.

DeHavilland was contractai in Jmuary 1970 to produce a new centre foi1 element

by surnmer 1970 at a cost of W O , O O O ~ ~ However, construction complications soon

resulted in a delayed delivery date of 30 Septemkr 1970. Meanwhile, a "dummy" centre

foi 1 consîructed fiom regular steel was fitted so hullbome trials wuld continue.

However, these tests were completely inconciusive as the unfaired junctions of the

temporary foil element caused excessive vibrations which essentially voided al1 test

results. The prompt rectification of this problem was closely followed by the recuning

Mure of the diesel engine and its associated hydraulic pumps.

After another four-month docking period during which the new foil section was

installed, Bras d'Or resumed foilborne trials in October 1970 and completed twelve

"flights" in the following three months for a total foilborne time of three hours and fi@-

five m i n u d 6 However, engineering difficulties continueci to plague the programme

through 1970 in the fom of hydraulic pump failures, tranmùssion problerns, and foil

coating problems.

65 Lynch, 75. HMCS Bras d'Or 1970 Annual Historical Report @ND DHH File 1326). 1.

Bras d 'Or's performance was evaluated in au operational setting for the t h e

in February 1971 when she operateci with other fleet mits in heavy weather off of

Halifax. Her seakeeping characteristics in these rough seas were imprtssive, as reflectd

in the comments of HMCS F n w t ' s Commatlding Officer duing this exercise:

Weather conditions were considered most unpleasrurt, heavy seas and 15-20 foot swell, wind gusting to 60 knots, ship [Fraser] spmying overail with upper deck out of bounds most of the tirne. Bras d'Or appeared to possess enviable seakeeping qdities. She was remarkably stable, with a notiœable absence of roll and pitch and apparently no lack of rnaneouv~abilit~.~'

This evaluation wos followed by an ambitious long-range deployment fiom Halifax to

Bermuda to Norfolk, Virginia and retum in June 1971. Although a public relations

success, this deployment revded more critical wealaiesses in the ship's machinery.

First, the ST6 auxiliary gas turbine failed in Norfok as a resdt of a minor electrical

component fàilure. Second, an fuel injector pump for the diesel engine failed, rendering

eight of the engine's sixteen cylinders useless. Third, the bow foi1 bearing had d l but

wom out and required immediate replacement. Fourth, the ship's airconditionhg system

experienced a total failure shortly afkr leaving Halifax, conmiuthg to crew discornfort

and the overheating of key engineering components Finally, and most importantly,

another crack was found in the main foi1 assembly rneasuring approximately two metres

long and apparently c a w d by the continued corrosion of the sensitive NiCoMo steel.*

The ship remained docked after Jdy 197 1 pending a decision on her fate.

67 Lynch, 80. 6g HMCS Bras d'Or 1 97 1 Annual Historical Report @M) DHH File 1376). 2.

In May 1 97 1, a Programme Review Board appointed to assess the project's

continueci feasibility concluded that the need for hydrofoils in the Canadian fleet was not

sufficiently welldefined to jwtify the fitting of the vessel's fighting equipment69 While

the decision to fit this equipment had been d e f e d since October 1967, the suôsequent

technical problerns associated with the vesse1 itself and the chmging defence

requirements of the eady 1970s led naval planners to abandon Bras d'Or's fighting

equiprnent programme. Following a June t 97 2 Defence Council discussion conceming

the possible construction of a production class without fighting equipment, Minister of

National Defence D.S. MacDonald deferred decision pending a comprehensive

assessrnent of additional costs and other tequirements. Subsequent recommendations by

the Chief of Defence Staff in Sepember and October 1971 to continue Bras d'Or's

operational evaluation were similarly deferred by the Minister.

FinaIly, on 2 November 1971, M.. MacDonald told the House of Commons that

work on Bras d'Or was to cease immediately and that the ship would be placed in a state

of preser~ation'~ because of " a reassessment of Maritime Command's requiremenîs" as

stated in the 197 1 Defence White Papa in that:

The first main priority of defence policy is the protection of sovereignty and the surveillance of Canadian temtory and coastlines. The acquisition of new equipment must reflect this policy, and extensive studies have been conducted ... . These factors and considerations have, therefore, lowercd the pnority of the hydrofoil, which began as an experimental project based primarily on an anti-submariae role.".

69 Smith, 4. 70 Treasury Board approved a fùrther SI million for this purpose. " Canada, House of Commons, Debat= 2 November 1971,9239.

Mr. MacDonald îùrther staîed that m e r $4.5 million was required to complete Bras

d'Or and that as much as an additional $20 million would be required to procecd with

production of a follow-on c~ass.~'

Criticism of MacDonaid7s k i s i o n was promp and scathing Mk. J.M. Fo~estall,

(PC - Dartmouth-Halifax East), pointed to the research- and alliance- related benefits of

continuing with the programme. He argued that

The decision not to spend the additional $3 or $4 million required to cornplete the full evduation and research program in connection with the hydrofoil is a wrong decision. It could be said tbat what we have done is to put a $52.2 million worth of mothballs into a miilion dollar garage. In my view the govemment bad a responsibility to complete at least the h i c research work so that we could pass on to our allies the h ï t s and results of a Mi evaluation of the feasibility of the hydrofoil in open sea naval operations and reIated ~ o r k . ' ~

In his equally critical response, M.. D. Rowland, (M>P - Selkirk), was less

complimentary of the programme in general. Ln his Mew, the basic requirement for the

programme, as well as its subsequent management and development, was bdamentaily

flawed. Replying to the Minister's statement, he asserted that

the decision is one more adàition to the increasingly long list of unsupportable blunders in equipment purchases and development made by successive Ministers of Defence. .. which have arisen out of a failure to define clearly the role of OUT defence forces."

Minister Macdonald's redefinition of the Navy's role as primarily "general-

purpose" indeed placed the ASW hydrofoil programme in a politidly indefensible

72

73 Canada, House of Commons, Qg&gs, 2 November 197 1,9239.

74 bid., 9239. ibid., 9240.

position. His cancellntion announcement attempb to explain this qu811dary and

goes on to reject the possible reconfigiwîion of the design for no-ASW roles:

I should also make it clear that because it is a development craft the Bras d'Or is not suitable in its paent codguration for any general pirpose use within Maritime Cornand This, therefore, precludes its use as a patrol or search and mcue ~ e w l . ' ~

However, in addition to the factors Iisted in the minister's cancellatioa

announcement, the FHE 400 programme was doomed to failure for a variety of

reasons despite its technical and operatioml potential. As the Conclusion explains,

Bras d'Or ultimately fell victim to the il1 eff- of a series of inadequate

management systems and the RCN's eariy fdure to defuie a clear operatioml

requirement for the vessel.

75 Canada, House of Commons, Debats 2 November t 97 1,9239.

Conclusion

Feasibilitv Concems

On several occasions during the course of Bras d'Or's development and

constniction, senior RCN officials decided to continue with the programme despite a

number of waming sigw concerning the vessel's feasibility and cost Notwithstanding

the recunence of fiindamental questions regarding the operational rquirement for the

shi p, the overall cost of the programme, and indeed the feasibility of the design itself,

Canadian naval planners dismissed these concems in favour of forging ahead with the

programme's developrnent The project's patrons in the RCN, DRB, and DDP

steadfastly supported its continuation despite the consistent and appailing escdation of

programme costs. Originally estimated in 1963 to cost less than S IO million, the overall

cost of Brus d 'Or's development skyrocketed to over $50 million by 197 1. ' The 1966

fire further raised the project's financial stakes and most c e r t d y would have spelled the

end for 1 ess prorn ising (and less well-supported) de fence procurement programmes.

Pertiaps most surprisingiy, the consistent surfacing of fundamental questions

conceming the feasibility of the design itself had little effect on its continued

development. From the programme's outset, certain aspects of the FHE 400 design

precipitated varying degrees of doubt among observers in tenns of the ship's intended

ASW capability. For example, the Naval Board decided as early as 1 % 1 that the

hydrofoil prototype design must exhibit a proven ASW capability before a follow-on

production programme would be approved? This capability would, in large part, be

1 Hansard, 19 April 1 972, 1432 (Cornons Debates: M. MacRae and J.R Comtois (Parliamentary Secretary ro MND)).

Minutes of the 688" Meeting of the Naval Board 18 October 1962 @M) DHH File 79/34), 1-2.

based on the successfûi development and application of sonar system capable of

operating at higb speeds. Throughout the course of the prototype's constructior; and

eventud evaluation, thi s vital prerequisite to the programme's uitirnate success remained

undetermined. While the AN/SQS-507 sonar was eventually proven to be rowabfe at

high speech, its very development demonstrated that a sonar capable of operating at high

speeds was beyond the scope of existing technology.'

In addition to wncems regarding the capabilities of the vessel's proposeci sonar

system, other significant wnceptual questions were not properly addressed prior to, or

during, the prototype's construction. For instance, the issue of crew fatigue threatened to

adverse1 y affect the hydrofoil ' s operational capability during long-range missions such as

convoy escorting. As a result of its maII crew size, the majority of the crew would be on

watch at any given time, especially during exercises or operations. As revealed in a 1965

study by the R a ' s Maritime Warfare School, crew fatigue during foilborne operations

could have proven to be especially problematic:

If the assumption is correct that the craft may spend a large percentage of the tirne foilborne, crew fatigue may well becorne an important hctor. The hi& noise level and discornfort fkom motion for such a duration of time could seriously degrade e f f i c i en~~ .~

These concems led to a general consensus that foilbme operations would have to be

limited as far as practicable and patrols should not exceed fourteen days, although

suficient provisions couid be carried to sustain a twentyeight &y patrol should the

3 Hennig, 36. ' "Tactical Employment of a Hydrofoil of the FHE 400 Type as a Single ASW Unit - Interirn Reportn CFMWS to CDS. 10 November 1%5 (RG 24 Vol. 3507 File 800eFHE-400 Vol. 17), 7.

operational quirement exist.'

However, these concessions to the possible effeçts of fatigue largely ignore the

long-standing fact that small ocean-going warships have always been limited by crew

endurance. The Canadian experience of operatkg cornettes during the Second World

War especially highlighted this problem, as the demands of exercises and wartime

operations resulted in crew complements king augmented fkom forty-two personnel to

over one hundred by the end of the wm6 Even today's state-of-the-art ocean patrol craft,

equipped with a level of automation fiar exceeding that of HMCS Bras d'Or, remain

severely limited by crew endurance. The German Tiger-class paîrol boats, for example,

possess almost the identical physical characteristics of Bras d'Or (except its foilbome

capability) and have a crew of thirty personnel as opposed to Bras d'Or's complement of

twenty7 Yet these vessels rarely m o l for more than fifty hours at a time becaw of îhe

limiting effecu of crew fatigue! While similar limitations would have undoubtedy

affixted (if not prohibited) the hydrofoil's ability to conduct long-range, long-endurance

patrols, any such concerns were dismissed at the time in favour of the vessel' s continued

deve~opment.~

The cornbined effects of these possibiy negative performance factors were

summarized in a comprehensive study conducted by the Canadian Forces Maritime

5 "Prototype Anti-Subrnarine Ship" DG Ships to the i4& Senior Officas' Conférence, JUIK 1%3 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 1. 6 T.G. Lynch, canada's Flowm: History O 7

f the Corvettes of Ca& (Halifax: Nimbus, 198 1)' 10. C. Chant, Naval Forces of the World (London: Wmchmore Publishing, 1984). 18 1.

8 P.M. Kelly, "The US. Navy Mua RbEvaiuate its Docsine" Pmceedings (Annapolis: United States Naval insitute, July 1996), 68.

High fùel consumption rates whiie foilborne would also have significantly limited the endurance of the FHE &IO class, necessitating m e n t fiiellings at sea fiom repknishmem ships during long patrols. This requirement, in turn, would have required the hydrofoil to runain in contact witb a replenishment ship, dqpding the design's autonomy of operations which promptcd its developamit in the first phce-

83

Warfare %ho01 in 1%5. Through cornputer simuiation and analysis, the Schml's staf!f

evaluated the predicted tactical effectiveness of a single ASW hydrofoil of the FHE 400

type and cornpareci it to the capabilities of a Seo King helicopter equipped with a dipphg

sonar. As the hydrofoil's high-speed sonar was still in its design stages, it was assumed

that a sonar would eventually be developed that could be towed at for@ knots. The study

observed the following:

'at foilbome speeds, a hydrofoil produces a considerable volume of noise offering accurate b&g information to a submarine." This would greaîly facilitate the submarine's ability to avoid the hydrofoil;

"any regular 'grasshopping' 'O cycle carried out by the hydrofoil is very quickly winkled out by a subrnarine and thus the submarine's screen penetration, evasion, etc., problem is an easy one." This predictable cycle of tracking and atiacking would m e r facilitate the submarine's ability to avoid detection;

"against a submarine capable of more than 12 knotts, a single hydrofoil is faced with considerable tracking and attacking difficulties. While engaged in tracking a contact, the hydrofoil is simpty too slow at 12 knots wben operating VDS pariable Depth Sonar], and too fast as well as "blinà" at 40 knots;" and

a very high rate of fuel usage would be necessary to conduct the above operatiom. ' '

Incredibly, this comprehensive study, conducted by the RCN's tactical ASW experts,

concluded that the ASW hydrofoil then k ing constnicted at enormous cost had very

limited potential against the submarines it was supposeci to counter:

'O "Gmsshopping" refers to tbe tnvisioned tuctical employment of hydrofoils in that tbey would detcct and track a submarine at slow speeds thea "sprintn to the submarinc's suspecteci location to attack with homing torpedoes. " "Tactical Employment of a Hyâmfoil of the FHE 400 Type as a Single ASW Unit - Intcrim Repon". 5- 6 .

It is concluded that a single ASW hydrofoil of the FHE 400 type will unlikely offer any consistently dangerous threat to a submarine with a capability of 20 knots or pater, and only a moderate threaî to a submarine with a short burst capability of 12 to 20 knots- Trainer m e s have show the CHSS-2 [Sea King] helicopter to be a vastly superior ASW vehicle.. . . 12

It seems remarkable that as late as 1965, the operational efiectiveness of this multi-

million dollar programme was behg openly questioneà by the Navy 's own senior experts

based on tactical simulations and analyses. Yet the RCN leadership açcepted the

Mari tirne Warfare School ' s study without signi ficant comment and the prototype's

construction programme was permitted to continue unaltered.l3

Staying the Course

The willingness of both military and civilian leaders to persevere with the project

despite its shocking pria tag and questionable operational utiiity demonstrates the

perceived potential of the project in the minds of its proponents. Given the RCN's long-

standing adherence to traditionalism and its heretofore pervasive culture of conservatism,

this unwavering support of such an unconventional shipbuilding project seems

remarkable indeed. However, if one examines the ongins of the programme's political

and militaxy support, the naval leadership's systematic dismissal of these crucial warning

signs can perhaps be better understood.

The RCN of the 1960s was e n t e ~ g a period of austerity resulting fiom

12 "Tactical Employment of a Hydrofoil of the FHE 400 Type as a Single ASW Unit - Lnterim Rcpon", 6. l 3 See ''Tactical Employment of a Single FHE 400 (Type) Hydrofoil" HPM to DMFOR(S) and DFDM, 19 November 1965 and "Tactid Employment of a Single Hydrofoil (FHE 400) DMFOR(S) to DFDM, DGMF. and DC Ops, 2 Decernber 1965 (RG 24 Vol. 3507 File 8000-FHE4û Vol. 17)-

significant reductions in defence spending and increased equipment costs, especiaüy in

relation to new shipbuilding projects.14 From 1958 to 1%8, for example, the Navy's total

number of ships was reduced by one-thùd in the interests of economy as its budget

steadily declined during the same p e r i ~ d . ' ~ From the beginning, it viewed the hydrofoil

programme as a possible cost-effective altemaîîve to the enormous expense associateci

with the continued construction of conventional ASW ship classes. As the 1% 1 Brock

Report concluded, the Navy's existing shipbuilding and procurement policies were

unsustainable in thaî ". . . we can no longer fiord to send sonars to sea at the present high

cost per unit."16

In addition to its promise of substantial capital cost savings, the hydrofoil concept

offered considerable personnel cost savings. With a pl& cornpiement of just twenty

personnel as opposed to approximately 250 for a destroyer escon, the hydiofoil concept

promised to help alleviate the personnel shortages that continued to affect the RCN's

operational readiness throughout the 1960s. l 7 Moreover, since p e r s o ~ e l wsts then

comprkd approximately forty percent of the RCN's total operating budget, the

hydrofoil's reduced çrew requirements offered substantial hancial advantages over

conventional designs. l 8

Solid political and military support for the programme was also rcmted in the

strategic environment of the day. The new Soviet submarine designs which emerged in

'' D. W. Middlerniss, "Ecommic Considerations in thc DNeloprnenî of the Canadian Navy Sinœ 1945" in W-AB. Douglas, ed., The RCN in Transrtion . .

19 10- 19û5 (Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 265. '' Ibid., 262. l6 The Brock Report, 83. I7 Middlemiss, 262. In Middlemiss' vicw. by 1957 this sbonage had ". . . begun to squ- the navy's pg...uons and force ~rnn iaun. "

Department of National Defence, "Mencc '82" (Ottawa: Dcpartment of Supply and Services, l983), 6.

the late 1950s and early 1960s reptesented a significant threat to Canadian security.

However, the highly classified characteristics of the first generattion of Soviet nuclear-

propelled submarines shrouded their existence in a type of mythology that prompted

Western political leaders and naval plmers to genedly overestimate their capabilities

and to assume that conventional ship designs, regardless of their operational capabilities,

wouid be ineffective in countering this mysterious new threat The hydrofoil, by virtue of

its radical design and revolutionary performance characteristics, was developed as a

technological munteweight to the perceived threat fiom emerging Soviet submarine

designs.

In addition to the hydrofoil's perceived operational utiiity, it received

considerable support fÎom a variety of agencies due to its scientific- and research-related

value. Unlike conventional shipbuilciing programmes, Brus d'Or was constnicted as part

of a scientific research project in which the dividends paid in scientific knowledge were

as important as the a c t d production of the ship it~elf.'~ As such, the fuushed product

was more a logical continuation of the pure research and development work conducted by

the Naval Research Establishment than it was a solution to an RCN-sponsored

operational requirement. In this respect, it could be argueci that the eventual 1962

promulgation of an officia1 RCN statement of its requirement for the vesse1 was merel y a

formality based on the existing NRE/DeHavilland design.

19 Eames and Jones, 3.

The Case for Industrial Develomnt

Operational naval planners were not alone in their unwavering cornmitment to the

Canadian hydrofoii programme. The Department of Defence Production, eager to

develop a cornpetitive hydtofoil technology industry in Canada, remainecl cotnmïtted to

the project despite the significant obstacles in N path. From the poject's inception, the

goal of the DDP to enhance Canada's industrial base was clear, as ouüined in a joint

RCN/ DeHavilland presentation to the Canadian Shipbuilding and Repairing Association:

It is hoped that the Navy programme may dso serve to promote an advantageous position for Canada and its shipbuilding industry in the commercial development and operation of hydrofoiis.

In addition to the prornising commercial applications of hydrofoil technology, the DDP

appreciated the possible indusirial benefits of supporting military hydrofoil projects

abroad. The developrnent of military hydrofoils was a growing industry in the United

States especially, and Canadian-Arnerican cooperaîion in this field was a mode1 of

international technology- and information-sharing. The potential for poviding Canadian

industrial support to American naval research and development programmes was

signifiant and instantly appreciated by the DDP.*'

In th is sense, the benefits to Canadian industry of continuing with the FHE 400

programme went far beyond the operational requirement for the vesse1 as an ASW

warshi p. The financial rewards and international prestige associated with king a world

leader in hydrofoil technology were undoubtedly important façtors behind the successive

' O "The Royal Canadian Navy Hydrofoil Programme'', Prescnted by the Royal Canadian Navy and The DeHavilland Aircraft Company of Canada, Limited to the Canadian Shipbuilding and Repairing Association Technical Section - Annual M&n& 11 February 1964 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 9. '' interview with H.W. Smith @HD Project Of5cer). 7 April 1999.

decisions to proceed with the project despite conceptuai and technical setbacks. Indeed,

the potential industrial benefits of tbe FHE 400 hydrofoil programme were significant

enough to outweigh the factors discussed above which, despite their adverse

consequences on the programme and its mounting cost, were dismissed in nivour of the

proj ect ' s continued development.

In many respects, the strong politid support enjoyed by hydrofoil programme

throughout the 1960s was a fùnction of the burgeoning defcnce industry in Canada during

this hme. Shrinking defence budgets in Canada and the United States during the late

1950s resulted in a new philosophy conceming defence spending in both corntries. As

described by Dan Middlemiss,

From the mid-19%~ onwarà, a new and enduring rationale for Canadian defence procurement policy emerged: the political need to sustain the economic stability of this defence industrial sector. To many Canadian politicians, the real purpose of defence contracts was ?O produce jobs and regional development, not military hardware or something as nebuious as ''national security.'"

In this sense, the hydrofoil was but one project that, in addition to its operational

capabilities, promised significant economic benefits for a number of Canadian

contractors and suppliers and concomitant political benefits for the government of the

day .

J. W. Anenault, in his analysis of the DDH 280 destroyer programme, emphasizes

the importance of the defence industry to Canadian defence planning during the 1960s.

Ln examining a programme that strikingly mimors the hydrofoil project in terms of

D. Middlerniss, "Defence Procurement in Canadan in D.B. Dcwitt and D. Leyton-Brown. eds., International Securitv Polig! (Scarborough: Preatice Hall, 1995).

budgetaq excesses and uncleat- operaiional substantiation, Arsenault asserts that the

comection between military operatiomi requirements and actual defence procurement

practices is nebulous at bat:

Perhaps the reason why [Petiison's 19631 Cabinet failed to scnrtinize closer the DDH 280 Program was because it assumed that Carda's national security had relatively little to do with Canadian defence policy. Security bad been primarily a fiinction of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Since Canada was under the protective umbreiia of the United States, its defence policy could a o r d to serve non-secunty objectives, FIM)] Hellyer might have rationalized the decision [to proceed with the over-budget programme] simply as a means of enhancing certain distinctive features of the Canadian Forces (such as ASW capabilities) in an effort to contribute to NATO.*

Little is known about the Cabinet's decision to cancel the hyârofoil project in 1971.

However, by applying Arsenault's rationale to the FHE 400 programme, Cabinet's

continued support of the hydrofoil's development may have k e n rooted in such extra-

operational reasons as alliance politics and regional economic development. The

decision to finally cancel the project in 1971, therefore, could have had l e s to do with

shifing defence priorities than it was a matter of political economy. In this respect, the

April 1968 decision to contract two Quebec shi~ards (including MIL at Sorel) to build

bvo of the DDH 280 destroyers may have made the hydrofoil's cancellation more

palatable in 197 1 by offietting the economic consequences of cancelling the costly

hydrofoil project." Cancellation of the hydrofoil project when it was "the only game in

town" would have had dire consequences for the shipbuilding industry, especially Marine

Industries.

23 Arsenault, 133. 24 ibid., 1 34. Arsenault d e s c r i ï this decision as "a politicll invatment in Quebec, the L i W govenunent ' s power base."

The Cancellation Debate

The hydrofoil programme represented an aberration in Caiiadian naval history in

that our naval leaders, traditionally characterized as fiscall y and technologically

conservatives, pursued a radical and largely experimental shipbuilding programme to the

very end despite numerous wamiags to the contrary. The r-ILS for such dogged

determination are, in hindsight, relatively uncomplicated In addition to the industrial

benefits of hydrofoil development outlined above, the perceived threat posed by Soviet

nuckar submarines cannot be overstated in tenns of its influence on Canadian naval

planning and operations in the 1960s. Indeed, the ability to detect, tmck, and destroy

Soviet submarines becarne the very raison d'erre of the Canadian Navy fiom the late

1940s to the end of the Cold War. The FHE 400 programme was conceived and

supported as a logical step forward for the RCN as it endeavoured to counter this real, yet

largely unknown, strategic threat.

However, as the RCN acquired more information over time concehg the

capabilities of Soviet submarines, the practical requirement for the hydrofoil became

i ncreasingl y dubious. As the mythology smunding Soviet nuclear te~bology was

gradually dispelled, Western navies (including the RCN) successfÙlly countered this

threat by employing relatively conventional t e c h a o l ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ The development of the

helicopter-destroyer tearn, for example, proved to be an extremely effective

countermeasure against fast submarines and stilJ serves today as the standard ASW

2s Mddlerniss, 255. '' The knowledge that mclear submarines emitted high noise levds whcn opcrating at high speeds, for example, enabled naval researchers to effectively re6ne beliwpta sonar-dipping tactics. Even the knowledge that nuclear submarines produced rcactor noises whiie stationary assisted RCN experts in developing countermeasures to the nuclear subxnarine thrait.

weapon system in navies worldwide. In the end, it was discovered îhat completely

radical designs were aot required to wunter tbe threat of the nuclcar submarine and thai

the reflnement of elasting systems and techniques wodd suffice.

in this respect, it is unlikely that the Canadian hydrofoil programme was actually

cancelled as a result of shiftuig defence priorities as is so o h stated In r d t y and in

practice, Canada's Navy remained AS W-oriented afkr the promulgation of the 197 1

White Paper despite that document's cal1 for an enhanced sovereignty protection

~apability.~' In addition, successive ASW-oriented shipbuilding and the

Navy 's continued large-sale involvement in NATO transoceanic exercises M e r

revealed Maritime Command's continued derence to the ASW d e as its primary

mis~ion.'~

instead, the hydrofoil programme was cancelled in favour of existing ASW

systems such as the helicopter-demoyer team. W l e more costly per unit than the

hydrofoil, this weapon system had proven its effecriveness in tactical simulations and

actual operations while the hydrofoil was still being designed and constnicted Indeed,

both systems were k i n g developed simultaneously with the hope that one (or both) could

provide the desired ASW capability for the RCN. While the hydrofoil possessed

signi ficant promise in this respect, the destroyer-helicopter team of the 1960s had

successfully proven its effectiveness against the enterging capabilities of Soviet

submarine designs in actual operations at sea.

" Defeme in rire 70s (Ottawa: lnformuion Csnada. 197 l), 16. 28 Such as the DDH 280-class dcszroycrs d the FFH33Olclrss figotes, both of which were originally designed for pnmarily ASW duties. " Sokolsky, 226.

In addition, the helicopterdestroyer solution was more po l i t i d y and public1 y

justifiable in that destroyer escorts couid a h perfom "generai purpose" fùnctions as

outlined in the 1971 White Paper. Though designed and constmcted for the AS W role,

the Si Laurent class and its successors were fiequently tasked with fisheries patrols,

search and rescue missions, and generaî coastai surveillance worlr The hydrofoil, on the

other hand, had been characterized fkom its inception as a dedicated ASW vehicle and as

such would prove difficuit to justify in the wake of a White Paper based largely on

sovereignty protection

While quite capable of undertaking a vatiety of sovereignty-related roles, the FHE

400 programme had %en sold" to the public as an ASW ship h m the beginning and

therefore merned out of place within the defence policy of the 1 9 7 0 s . ~ ~ The reality of the

programme's cancellation, however, remained: as the capabiliaes of Soviet submarines

were king progressively countered by the successfbi application of existing technology

(especially in the f o r - of the helicopter-destroyer team), no M e r operational

requirement remained in 1971 for the continued development of the coaly and long-

delayed FHE 400 hydrofoil programme.

M While the RCN had evaluated the hydrofoil's suitabidity for a varicty of missions as eariy as 1 % 1, no indication was ever given to the public tha! the ship would k urything but ASW-orientsd. As Canadirn defence policy was shifling in the eariy 1970s, some late attempts wcrc mode to estsbtish the hydrofoil's general-purpose capability but to no avail. Set "Bras d'Or Skipper Sees Many Roles for Hydrofoiln The Ottawa JourmI, 1 7 Novernber 1970.

Ap_pendix A: Tbe Hydrofoil Concemt

A hydrofoil ship is a vessel capable of lifting its hull cl- of the water wiâh its

foil system. This hydrofoil system serves the same function as the wings (or airfoiis) of

an aircrafl, producing lifi by its rnovement through water.' When the hull is clear of the

water after "take-off', the vessel is considered to be "foilborne" as opposed to

"hdlborne" or "in displacement mode". Once foilborne, the resultant reduction in drag

enables much higher speeds "in flight7' than are possible with conventional displacement

There are essentially three types of foil configurations which M e r in how the

hydrofoil vessel's weight is distnbuted:

1 ) conventional: as in aircraft, the forward foi1 supports the majority of the weight, with a smaller stabilizing foil near the stem. Baddeck (R-103) and the early Bell-Baldwin designs were of this type;

2) tandem: equal liftdistributionôetweenthe fonvardandaft foils. No hydrofoils of this type were produceci by any Canadian hydrofoil research programme; and

3 ) canard: the aft foil supports most of the weight assisted by a small stabilizing foil near the bow (also used for steenng). Bras d'Or was thus configured with a 90/10 percent weight distribution between aft and bow foils respe~tivel~.'

In addition to these three foil configurations, there are two basic types of foils:

1) surface-~iercing: this system of fixed foils 1s self-stabiliting in that any motion (such as a turn) results in "force changes" (due to immersion changes) which tend to rem the ship to its initial stable position. In this sense, the foil system provides the same stability regardless of what part of the foils are submerged at any aven time. Bras d'Or was equipped with this type of foil system.

' B. Gunstoq Hvdrofoils and Hovercraft (London: Aldus Books, 1969). 33. ' 'The Royal Canadian Navy Hydrofoil Programmen. Resented by the Royd Canadian Navy and The DeHavil Iand Aircrafl Company of Canada, Limited to the Cariadian Shipbuiiding and Rcpairing Association Technical Section - Annual Meeting, 1 1 Febniary 1%4 @ND DHH Box 79/34), 2- 3 "The Royal Canadian Navy Hydrofoil Programme", 2.

fullv-submereed: - this foi1 system employs hydraulicallycootrolled flaps (much like an aircraft) to maintain a stable foilbome attitude. While more complex than the surface-piercing system, thk arrangement generally offers a smoother, more stable ride. The USN conducted extensive research into this foi1 arrangement and produceci severai successful designs using fully- submerged foils.'

In the case of Brar d'Or, a certain degree of foilbome instability aeçessitated the

installation of controliable anhedrai tips on the main foil unit to irnprove maaoewrability

at IOW foilborne speeds (especially in tums).s In effect, this design modification

represented a confluence of fully-submerged foi1 technology with that of the surface-

piercing foil concept.

Bras d'Or's hullbome propulsion system consisted of a single diesel engine

driving two conventional propellers which were mounted in the main foil structure'

producing hullbome speeds o f up to fourteen knots. For foilbome operations, Brm d'Or

was propelled by a single marine gas turbine which &ove two supercavitating propellers

located at the extreme bottom of the main foil structure. Take-off o c c d at

approximately twenty-two knots and Brus d'Or3 maximum foilbome speed was sixty-

two knots (achieved during trials in July 1969).~ Each propulsion system included its

own transmission and ancillary machinery.

' "The Royal Canadian Navy Hydrofoil Programme". 2. M.C. Eames and E .A Jones, "HMCS BIar d'Or - An Open Ocean Hydrofoil Ship" DREA Rcport 69/9

$Ottawa: Mencc Research Board, 1969). 14. Eames and Jones. 1 0- 1 1.

A~mmdir B: Rank of the Rovd Canadian N a w 1

Non-Comrnissioned Members Officers

Ordinary Seaman Able Seaman Leading Searnan Master Searnan Petty Offlcer, Second Class Petty Officer, First Class Chief Petty Officer, Second Class Chief Petty Officer, First Class

Acting Sub-Lieutenant Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant Lieutenant-Cornmander Commander Captain Commodore Rear- Admiral Vice- Admirai Admiral

' From Mamtai ofRank Repiremenis, BRCN 3048, VOL II (Ottawa: King's Rinter, 1962). 33.

Anpendix C: Illustrations

SWL

FWL

'-MAX 21' 6" RCN PROTOTYPE ASW HYDROFOfL SHlP

Fi jure 1. Original line drawing of FHE 4 0 prototype. (DeHavi lland AircraA Company)

Detailed infomiation on the primaiy sources from the Department of Natiod Defence's Directorate of History and Heritage and the National Archives of Canada are provided in the appropriate footnotes. In an effort to avoid unnectssafy repetition, the primary sources listed beiow are in an abbdated format

Primarv Sources

Di rectorate of History and Heritage:

FHE-400 Files Naval Board Minutes Naval Council Minutes Naval Personnel Files Naval Staff Minutes Report of Proceedings - Ships

National Archives of Canada:

RG 24 Defence Council Minutes Ships' Logs - HMCS Bras d'Or Ships' Files - HMCS Bras d'Or Postwar Canadian Navy Files

DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Limiteci:

Design Specificatioas and Drawings - RCN Prototype ASW Hydrofoil Sbip Hydrofoil Project Review Group Minutes

Commander H. W. Smith Papers

Pnmary Sources - Pub1 ications

Canada. Department of Energy, Mines, and Resowces. Stress-Corrosion Cracking of Neoprene Coated 18% Nickel Maraging Steel. Ottawa: Queen's Rimer, 1967.

______CI . Department of National Defence. Expla~t~roty Material Reiufrng to 1961 - 1962 Estimates. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 196 1.

------ . Department of National Defcnce. M a n d of Rank Requirements- Onawa: King's Printer, 1962.

------- . Deparîment of National Dcfence. Repon on Ncdionul Defënce. 0th~: Queen's Enter, 1957.

-__---_ . Department of National Defence. White Papen on Defence 1964 and 1971. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964 and 197 1.

--- . Naval Research Establishment. NRE Report 65/9. The Cunadian H)&ofoil Projecf: A Progress Report on Mod~fwations and Trials of M V. ûras d'Or, 1959-1963. Ottawa: Dartmouth: NRE, 1965.

-. Defence Research Board DREA Report 69/9. H X S Brar d'Or - An Open Ocean Hydrofoil Ship. Dartmouth: DREA, 1969.

--- . Defence Research Board DREA Report 8 1/4. A h c e s in Naval Architecture for Future Sirr/ace Warships. Dartmouth: DREA, 1982.

Report on Certain Incidents which Occurred on Board H-MC. Ships ATKABASKAN, CRESCENT, and MAGNIFICENT, and on other matters conceming the Royal Canadian Navy. Ottawa, October 1949.

Report of the Ad Hoc Cornmittee on Naval Objectives. Ottawa, 1% 1.

Persona1 Interview

Commander H.W. Smith, RCN, 5 April 1998.

Secondary Sources

Arsenault, J.W. 'The DDH 280 Program: A Case Study of Govemmental ExpendÏture Decision-Making" in Canada's Defence Industrial Base, edited by D.G. Haglund, 1 1 8- 136. Kingston: R o d d P. Frye & Company, 1988.

Audette, L.C. "The Lnwer Deck and the Mainguy Report of 1949" in The RCN in Retrosmt. 19104968, edited by James A. Boutilier, 235-49. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982.

Bercuson, D. True Paûiot: The Life of Brooke Claxton. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993,

Blair, C . Hitler's U-Boat War Volume 1. New York: Random House, 1996.

Blmd, D. The Administration of Defence Policv in Canada 1947 to 1985. Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987.

Bothwell, R, Drummonâ, I., and J. English. Caaada since 1945: Power. Politics. a d Provincial km. Toroato: University of Toronto Press, 1 989.

Boutilier, J.A., ed. The RCN in Retrosmct. 19 10- 1968. Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 1982.

Brassington, D. "The Canadian Development of VDS" in Maritime Warfnre Bulletin. Halifax: Canadian Forces Maritime W a r f i SchooI, 1985.

Chant, C . Naval Forces of the Worfd London: Whcbmore Publishing, 1984.

Crane, B. An introduction to Canadian Defence Policy. Toronto: Canadian lnstitute of International AfEairs, 1 964.

Dalley, C . "The M h g e of the Smdl Ship and Large Helicopter" in Maritime Weare Bulletin. Halifax: Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare School, 1985.

Davis, S. M. "The St Laurent Decision: Genesis of a Canadian FleetY7 in The RCN in Transition. 19 10-1985, edited by W.A.B. Douglas. 187-208. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988.

Douglas, W. A. B. Tanadian Naval Historiography" in Mminer 's Mirror Volume 70, 1984.

----- , ed. The RCN in Transition. 19 10-1985. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 198%.

Eayrs, J. in Defence of Canada: Growinn UD Allied. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

Gannon, M. ODeration Drumbeat. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.

Geman, T. The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy. Toronto: McCIeIland and Stewart, 1990.

Goodspeed, D.J. A Historv of the Defence Research Board of Canada. Oîîawa- Queen's Printer, 1958.

G m m a n Aircraft Engineering Corporation. ' A Study of Hydrofoil Seacraft? Long 1 sland: Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, 195 8.

Gunston, B. Mvdrofoils and Hovercraft London: Aldus Books, 1969.

Hadley, M.L. Canada: Geman Subrnarines in Candian Waters. Montreal-Kingston : McGill-Queen' s University Press, 1 99 1.

Harbron, J. "Royal Canadian Navy at Peace 1945- 1955 : Tbe Uncertain Heritage" in Queen 3 Quarterly L m , 3, AU~UIMI 1966.

Hennessy, M. "The State as Innovator: Controlling the Command Tecbaology for Wanhip C o m c t i o n in Canada, 19494965" in Canadian Pabers in Business History Volume II, edited by P.A. Baske~lle, (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 1993).

Jordan, J. Modem Destrovers. London: Prentice Wall, 1986.

Kelly, P.M. "The U.S. Navy MUR Re-Evaluate its Docttine" in P roceedings (Annapolis: Naval institute Press), July 1996,

Lamb, J.B. The Cornette Naw: True Stories fiom Canada's Atlantic War. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977.

Leir, RR. "'Big Ship Time': The Formative Years of RCN O f i i c ~ n M n g in RN Capital Ships" in The RCN in Retros- edited by J.A. Boutilier, 138-157.

Lynch, T.G. Canada's Flowers: Historv of the Cowettes of Canada 1939- 1945. Halifax: Nimbus, 198 1.

--- . The Flvina 400: Canada's Hvdrofoil Proiect Halifax: Nimbus, 1983. -

Machtyre, D. U-Boat Killer. London: Weiddeld and Nicholson, 1956.

McKee, F. and R. Darlington. The Canadian Naval Chronicle 1939-1945. St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 1996.

Macpherson, K. Frigates of the Roval Canadian Naw 1943- 1974. St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 1989.

Middlemiss, D. W. "Defence Procurement in Canada'' in Canada's International Securitv Policv, edited by D.B. Dewin and D. Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Reotice Hall, 1995).

-_______ . "Economic Considerations and the Development of the Canadian Navy Since 1945" in The RCN in Transition. 1910-1985, edited by W.A.B. Douglas.

Miller, D. and C. Miller. Modern Naval Combat. London: Salamander, 1986.

Milner, M. Canada's Mvy: The First Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

-------. "Naval History in Canada: The State of the Art." Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1995.

---- . North Atlantic Run: The Roval Canadian Naw and the Battle for the Convovs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

-------- . "Royal Canadian Navy Participation in the Battle of ttK Atlantic Crisis of 1943" in The RCN in R- edited by J.A. Boutilier.

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Joumal Articles

Beinn Breugh Recorder "Report to Admiral Griffin on the! HD-4' 19 19.

canadian Shipping and Marine Engineering News "Trials and Tribdaîions of a Hydrofoil" April 1970.

The Crowsnest "First Converted Frigate Ready" September 1953.

Navy Week "The Hydrofoil Programme" May 1964.

The Ottawa Citizen "Sophisticated Vesse1 Near Ready" 22 July 1966. "Hydrofoil Fire Poses Dilemma7' 12 December 1966.

The O~tawa Journai "Hydrofoil Ready for Sea Tests" 9 July 1968 " B r u d 'Or Skipper Sees Many Roles for Hydrofoil" 1 7 November 1970.

Un~ublished Sources

Douglas, W . k B . "Naval History: The State of the Art" Unpublished paper pmentd at the "Clio and Mars" Conférence, University of New Brunswick, September 1990.

Maclntyre, M.D. "The Influence of Personnel Issues on the Rofessional Development of the Royal Canadian Navy, 19454965." Kingston: Royal Militaxy CoUege, unpublished BA thesis, 1995.

Milner, M. "Canadian Escorts and the Mid Atlantic 1942- 1943 ." Fredericton: University of New Brunswick, unpublished MA thesis, 1982.

Pile, T.H. W. "Beyond the Workable Little Fieet: Post-war Planning aad Poticy in the RCN 1945- 1948." Victoria: University of Victoria, unpublished MA thesis, 1999.