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OA Support to OA Support to Stabilisation Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003 ISMOR August 2003

OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

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Page 1: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

OA Support to Stabilisation OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in IraqOperations in Iraq

Jarrod CornforthJarrod Cornforth

ISMOR August 2003ISMOR August 2003

Page 2: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

OA Use during StabilisationOA Use during Stabilisation

• OA is being used for many tasks OA is being used for many tasks during the Stabilisation Phase, during the Stabilisation Phase, including:including:• Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)• Future Iraqi ArmyFuture Iraqi Army• Civil and Judicial AssessmentCivil and Judicial Assessment• Database DesignDatabase Design

• This presentation will concentrate on This presentation will concentrate on the MOE workthe MOE work

Page 3: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

OA Use by the MilitaryOA Use by the Military

• This Presentation is Only Giving ExamplesThis Presentation is Only Giving Examples• OA was not seen as Technical ExpertsOA was not seen as Technical Experts• OA was not seen as something newOA was not seen as something new• OA was seen as neutral and impartialOA was seen as neutral and impartial• OA was seen as a excellent and auditable OA was seen as a excellent and auditable

‘second opinion’‘second opinion’• OA was used as a resource for providing OA was used as a resource for providing

structured and logical processesstructured and logical processes

Page 4: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Who OA Directly Worked ForWho OA Directly Worked For

• GS PLANSGS PLANS• G3 OPS SPG3 OPS SP• PROVOSTPROVOST• G5G5• MEDIAMEDIA• INFO OPSINFO OPS• PSY OPSPSY OPS• G6G6• G2G2• DEEP OPSDEEP OPS• ARTY OPSARTY OPS• MED EVACMED EVAC• MED SPMED SP

• EQUIPMENT SPEQUIPMENT SP• LOG SPLOG SP• EPW HANDLINGEPW HANDLING• JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEEJOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE• GEOGEO• NBCRNBCR• COSCOS

• 3 CDO – Various Cells3 CDO – Various Cells• 7 ARMD – Various Cells7 ARMD – Various Cells• 16 AA – Various Cells16 AA – Various Cells

• Directly asked from Sergeants to Directly asked from Sergeants to Full ColonelsFull Colonels

Page 5: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

What is MOE?What is MOE?

• Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

• MOE is a campaign monitoring MOE is a campaign monitoring process, to measure the progress process, to measure the progress towards the end-state and often the towards the end-state and often the country’s return to ‘normality’.country’s return to ‘normality’.

• A quantitative Measure of the A quantitative Measure of the Situation using operational data and Situation using operational data and data collected by foot patrols.data collected by foot patrols.

Page 6: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Previous ExperiencePrevious Experience

• Measures of Effectiveness have been Measures of Effectiveness have been used successfully before in:used successfully before in:• BosniaBosnia• KosovoKosovo• Afghanistan (Kabul)Afghanistan (Kabul)

• There is no ‘one size fits all’. Each There is no ‘one size fits all’. Each Operations requires tailor made MOE.Operations requires tailor made MOE.

Page 7: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Return to ‘Normality’Return to ‘Normality’

• Base Case?Base Case?• TomislavgradTomislavgrad

• Historic CaseHistoric Case• Before 1991 Gulf War / SaddamBefore 1991 Gulf War / Saddam

• Model City/Country?Model City/Country?• Milton KeynesMilton Keynes

• Measures of EffectivenessMeasures of Effectiveness• Trend analysis, stabilisation/recovery/deteriorationTrend analysis, stabilisation/recovery/deterioration

Page 8: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

What Should Police Be Allowed to do?What Should Police Be Allowed to do?

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Issue traffic fines Carry guns Enter homes Punish peoplefor crimes

Accept bribes Detain people Take propertyfor themselves

Hold politicaloffice

Page 9: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Problems FacedProblems Faced

• There was no ‘normality’There was no ‘normality’

• Scarce ResourcesScarce Resources

• A war was going onA war was going on

• Other Priorities for Unit/HQ Other Priorities for Unit/HQ BranchesBranches

• Education of the DivisionEducation of the Division

Page 10: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

What Data was Wanted?What Data was Wanted?• Availability of:Availability of:

• FoodFood• Water (Drinking/Utility)Water (Drinking/Utility)• ShelterShelter

• Local Area StabilityLocal Area Stability• Attacks on Patrol/CiviliansAttacks on Patrol/Civilians• CrimeCrime• Market activityMarket activity

• Public Reaction to Presence of the Coalition Public Reaction to Presence of the Coalition Forces and their immediate concernsForces and their immediate concerns

Page 11: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

OptionsOptions

• Use data already available:Use data already available:• Unit ReportsUnit Reports• Branch ReportsBranch Reports• Intelligence SummariesIntelligence Summaries• Media ReportsMedia Reports• NGO ReportsNGO Reports

• Create our own data gathering resourcesCreate our own data gathering resources• QuestionnairesQuestionnaires• Foot Patrol Collection SheetsFoot Patrol Collection Sheets

Page 12: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Example of Collection SheetExample of Collection Sheet

Page 13: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Information of Coalition via medium

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Word of Mouth L eafl et Poste r Rad io TV New spaper

Page 14: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

Who is Using itWho is Using it

• GOCGOC• COSCOS• G5 (CIMIC)G5 (CIMIC)• G2 (Intelligence)G2 (Intelligence)• Royal Military Police Royal Military Police • Info OpsInfo Ops• Bdes / BGsBdes / BGs• VisitorsVisitors

Page 15: OA Support to Stabilisation Operations in Iraq Jarrod Cornforth ISMOR August 2003

What it is AchievingWhat it is Achieving

• Overview/background of the situationOverview/background of the situation• See indirect effects of Coalition ForcesSee indirect effects of Coalition Forces• Indicate potential difficulties before they ariseIndicate potential difficulties before they arise• Prioritise areas for aidPrioritise areas for aid• Help with force protection – “hearts and Help with force protection – “hearts and

minds”minds”• Assist with information campaignAssist with information campaign• Reinforce IO/NGO co-ordination and Co-Reinforce IO/NGO co-ordination and Co-

operationoperation• Assist in Briefing VIPs/Media/PoliticiansAssist in Briefing VIPs/Media/Politicians• Altered as the situation alteredAltered as the situation altered