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and political forces. We do strongly believe that there shall be no way of success

without cooperation between military and civilians.

No personality cult, no sectionalism, no vandalism and no vendetta would be favored byus to achieve Democracy, Peace and Prosperous Society for future Burma (Myanmar).

This blog will be pushed toward "The True Reform for Burma by means of co-operation"

in the coming new Hluttaw and the new government.

Thank you so much for reading this.

Saturday, January 01, 2011.

Yangon

Myanmar ( Burma )

And also stated that

Thursday, February 10, 2011Memorandum (1/2011)Memorandum (1/2011)

February 10,2011

This blog is intended to prepare the collections of reference resources for supporting

academic study as well as policy analysis concerning U.S. foreign policy toward Asia or

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the East. China, Japan and Asia-Pacific region, South-East Asian nations, the Indian

Sub-continent and the Russian Federation are the targeted Geo-political parts of this

study to understand the real meaning and the true purpose of the U.S. foreign policy

toward Asia or the East.

Under that title, such a policy toward Burma (Myanmar) is fundamentally and

necessarily included for the sake of shaping future relationship, between the two

countries, Burma and United States of America, which had been infertile since after the

stepping down of General Ne Win.

As reformers, we always propose to make a talk directly only between the two

governments, U.S and Burma (Myanmar) to achieve good understanding for the smooth

relationship in coming days, months and years. U.S. has also openly said that a policy

of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for

advancing our goals.*

*U.S. Policy Toward Burma : Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary of State) Sunday,

November 7, 2010

Suggestions and Opinions are welcome. Please post in the reader comments. Thanks.

Posted by mahathuriya : at6:52 PM

Email This BlogThis! Share to Twitter Share to FacebookShare to Google Buzz

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In addition, there was also shortly declared that ..

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Either evolution or eformation.... .. ..().....

..

..

Revolution.?

Reformation.?

.... ..

..

Revolution is failed. ......... ...

.....

.. .. .... ..

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NewsJune 27, 2011

China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With USVOA News

Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS

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U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right, and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu

Zhengsheng shake hands during their meeting at World Expo site Saturday, May 22,

2010 in Shanghai, China. (AP Photo/Eugene Ho

China is welcoming the opening of a "new channel" of communications with the United

States after talks in Hawaii where South China Sea tensions were discussed.

A commentary Sunday in the official Xinhuanews agency said the talks resulted from

Washington's strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and China's growing global

influence. It said China welcomes America's enhanced role in the region as long as it is

constructive for peace and development.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said after the talks on Saturday with

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai that the two had "candid and clear"

discussions about the South China Sea disputes.

He said the United States wants tensions to subside and that it seeks a dialogue among

all the key players in the disputes.

Both Vietnam and the Philippines have protested recent actions by Chinese naval

vessels in waters the two countries claim as their exclusive economic zones. The two

have sought U.S. support in the conflicts, prompting China to warn the United States

against outside interference.

China and Vietnam agreed at a meeting Saturday in Beijing to peacefully resolve their

dispute through negotiations and friendly consultations. The Philippines last week won

assurances from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the United States remains

committed to a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with Manila.

Despite the tensions, Campbell said the talks in Hawaii helped the the United States and

China achieve a better understanding of each other's intentions, policies and actions.

Xinhuaquoted Cui as saying the talks had been "friendly, candid and constructive."

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The consultations grew out of the third round of a China-U.S. strategic and economic

dialogue in May. China says they reflect an agreement between Presidents Barack

Obama and Hu Jintao to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship.

Further meetings are planned at a date that has not been determined.

Ref:

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-

With-US-124580784.html

.

Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial

All four suspects denied the accusations

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.html

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Continue reading the main story

Khmer Rouge Trials Khmer Rouge tribunal in disarray "Brother Number Two" Chum Mey: Tuol Sleng survivor Duch: Symbol of horror

A UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia is holding its first hearing in the trial of four former

top Khmer Rouge leaders.

The defendants include the "number two" in Pol Pot's regime, Nuon Chea. They face

charges of genocide and crimes against humanity over the deaths of up to two million

Cambodians in 1975-79.

They all deny the accusations, and the trial is likely to last for years.

Last July, former Khmer Rouge member Kaing Guek Eav, known as Comrade Duch, was

jailed for 35 years.

But because of time already served and compensation for a period of illegal detention,Duch - the former head of a notorious prison where some 15,000 died - will be free in

19 years.

Led by Pol Pot, who died in 1998, the Maoist Khmer Rouge regime was ousted from

power by Vietnamese forces in 1979.

'Second Nuremberg'

The four defendants appeared at the initial hearing at the Extraordinary Chambers in

the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) in Phnom Penh on Monday morning.

Besides Nuon Chea, they include former head of state Khieu Samphan, former foreign

minister and international face of the regime Ieng Sary, and his wife Ieng Thirith, who

was minister for social affairs.

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The four showed no emotion as opening statements were read out before the court and

a packed gallery, in proceedings screened on national television.

Please turn on JavaScript. Media requires JavaScript to play.The BBC's Guy De Launey said the defendants will argue that they should not be on

trial at all

Moments later, Nuon Chea - who was dressed in a ski hat and sweatshirt - complained

he was not well and felt cold and left the courtroom.

"I'm ready to come back when the court discusses my requests," he said.

The hearing will run for a maximum of four days, and no evidence will be given.

Instead, the hearing is expected to focus on witness and expert lists and preliminary

legal objections.

The trial proper is expected to open later this year, possibly in September.

"There hasn't been a case as large and complex as this since Nuremberg," internationalco-prosecutor Andrew Cayley told the AFP news agency in a recent interview, referring

to the historic Nazi trials after World War II.

The head of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights said the start of the second case

was a "cathartic moment".

The crimes "remain ingrained in Cambodia's collective psyche. I hope that this trial...

provides all victims with some sense of justice, however delayed that justice may be",

Ou Virak said in a statement.

Theary Seng, who lost both her parents to the Khmer Rouge, told the BBC: "This is the

heart of the matter - this is the case that we have been anticipating for many years,

since the operation of the court in 2006.

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"It will allow a lot of information to surface which will help to chip away at the

repeatedly-asked questions of why did it happen?"

Theary Seng is one of almost 4,000 "civil parties" to the case - victims who will have a

voice in court alongside the prosecution and defence.

Health concerns

At least one of the defendants - Ieng Sary - is expected to argue that he should not be

on trial at all, the BBC's Guy De Launey in Phnom Penh says.

Continue reading the main story

Who were the Khmer Rouge? Maoist regime that ruled Cambodia from 1975-1979 Led by Saloth Sar, better known as Pol Pot Abolished religion, schools and currency in effort to create agrarian utopia Up to two million people thought to have died of starvation, overwork or were

executed

Defeated in Vietnamese invasion in 1979 Pol Pot fled and remained free until 1997 - he died a year later Brutal Khmer Rouge regime

The former foreign minister received a royal pardon 15 years ago as part of the deal

which produced the final surrender of the Khmer Rouge.

The defendants are all in or near their 80s and some have been in bad health, so there

is a real danger that not all of them may live to see the end of the trial, our

correspondent adds.

The suspects have been kept in detention since their arrests in 2007.

Parts of court proceedings will be broadcast on TV, but hundreds of people from all

over Cambodia are still expected to travel to the court to see the accused.

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The current Cambodian government has repeatedly opposed efforts to widen the

tribunal's inquiries, and insisted that there should be no further trials after that of the

four leaders.

Ref:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564

The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning?

ByKamal Hyderin Asia

on Thu, 06/23/2011 - 08:30.

Photo by GALLO/GETTY

In less than a months time, US forces will begin pulling out of Afghanistan. Eventhough the move will be more symbolic and not a total withdrawal, it will pave the way

forward for an eventual handover of Afghan security to the Afghan National Army (ANA)

by 2014.

It is a daunting task, by any stretch of the imagination.

Afghanistan was bigger than Iraq and was even more rugged and suitable for a long

drawn out guerilla war.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e648c85f0b2544ea215e1ba986069321eee9cfde0bafcb5931f31ce5e71f7fcc9f7a100546615695bdf4e5d15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e648c85f0b2544ea215e1ba986069321eee9cfde0bafcb5931f31ce5e71f7fcc9f7a100546615695bdf4e5d15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11dc655863cadba5ac0e00ff42a2a5c3366f320b15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11dc655863cadba5ac0e00ff42a2a5c3366f320b15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11dc655863cadba5ac0e00ff42a2a5c3366f320b15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e6415354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e6415354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e6415354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11dc655863cadba5ac0e00ff42a2a5c3366f320b15354https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/55434fd86c248dfe82c551287e7762939f90f2245b97cefd11cd645e648c85f0b2544ea215e1ba986069321eee9cfde0bafcb5931f31ce5e71f7fcc9f7a100546615695bdf4e5d15354http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564

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The Afghan Taliban, the main adversary in the conflict, had already made its position

clear when it said it wanted a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan

before any talks could begin.

Now US President Barack Obama has made his plans public and that means an almost

30 per cent reduction by the autumn of 2012.

The Americans and their allies are hoping they will be able to hand over the task to the

fledgling ANA which is already near the 300,000 mark.

It is hoped that by 2014 the Afghan army would have sufficient boots on the ground to

take over control of their territory.

The issue is not just that they will have to have sufficient numbers, however, but that

they will need to be well-trained and well-equipped enough to fight against the Taliban,

who are more organised and stronger than at any time since the invasion of

Afghanistan almost ten years ago.

If the past is anything to go by, the real test of the Afghan army will be maintaining the

loyalties of its various ethnic groups.

During the civil war after the Russians forces pulled out in 1989, many soldiers deserted

and switched sides.

The Afghan army crumbled like a house of cards and despite attempts to beef up

loyalists like Najeebullah in Kabul, Moscow was not able to keep the army intact as a

coherent fighting force.

The likelihood of such an eventuality repeating itself cannot be brushed aside.

The feeling is that once the Americans tone down their presence in Afghanistan, the

Afghan army may not be able to cope with the fight.

While it is easy for the Americans to shoot their opponents (whether suspected or real),

the Afghan army may not be in a position to afford that luxury.

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They will be aware that their opposition lives within the same territoriy, and is always

within striking distance .

As the fighting against the Taliban has intensifies, there have already been

numerous cases of desertions within the army.

In the eyes of some senior analysts, the present Afghan army was cannon fodder for

the US and NATO forces.

The policy of pitting Afghans versus other Afghans was always likely to fuel the

probability of a civil war, the ultimate benefactors of which will likely be the Afghan

Taliban.

No wonder there was talk of the need for a political solution to the crisis. In the eyes of

one senior US diplomat, the talking should actually have begun years ago.

The Americans had already made the blunder of lumping the Taliban in with al-Qaeda

in Afghanistan.

The fact is that no Taliban or Afghan was directly or indirectly involved in the attacks

on the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and theAmericans went after both.

While they may now be more confident about winning the their battle against al-Qaeda,

they are far from winning the war against the Taliban.

The Americans may be looking at this summer as the beginning of the end, with the

withdrawal of 10,000 troops, but the Afghan Taliban are just getting started with their

summer offensive.

The Americans figured that they had the watches, but the truth is that it was the

Taliban who have always had the time.

It remains unclear, therefore, whether this is the beginning of the end, or the end of

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the beginning of a new era of chaos for the region.

The real fear here remains that with the US and NATO leaving, will the other regional

states be sucked once more into a proxy war?

Ref :

http://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginning

.

Opinion Asia after the Afghan warThe US withdrawal of its troops will test the will of Asia's power brokers to build a

secure regional order.

Yuriko KoikeLast Modified: 24 Jun 2011 10:08

At the recentShangri LaDialogue in

Singapore - inthe presence of

ChineseMinister of

Defence - USDefenceSecretary

Robert Gatesoutlined his

http://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginninghttp://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginninghttps://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/a0726758530d6e04bdc7bb1bd53fa3b24484cac57d8bb2e71ef5d711e67fd5cbf9d662ac382e363bba5831a6f513aa59bc34489bfb6ac2d1b31ae93916c49453324d5e7115352https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/a0726758530d6e04bdc7bb1bd53fa3b24484cac57d8bb2e71ef5d711e67fd5cbf9d662ac382e363bba5831a6f513aa59bc34489bfb6ac2d1b31ae93916c49453324d5e7115352https://www.btunnel.com/index.php/1010110A/a0726758530d6e04bdc7bb1bd53fa3b24484cac57d8bb2e71ef5d711e67fd5cbf9d662ac382e363bba5831a6f513aa59bc34489bfb6ac2d1b31ae93916c49453324d5e7115352http://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginning

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July will mark two milestones in America's sometimes-tortured

relations with Asia. One is the beginning of the end of the nearly

decade-long struggle in Afghanistan - the longest war in United States

history - as President Barack Obama announces the first troop

withdrawals. The other is the 40th anniversary of Henry Kissinger's

secret mission to Beijing, a turning point in the Cold War and the first

step on China's road to modernisation - but at the time a huge shock to Asia,

particularly Japan.

The looming Afghan withdrawal recalls, at least for some Asians, a third, even more

traumatic event: America's chaotic exit from Saigon in April 1975. Back then, that

debacle seemed to presage a broader US withdrawal from Asia, with a war-weary

American public seeking the supposed comforts of isolationism. Today's Asian

nervousness exists not only because isolationism appears to be gaining ground once

more in America, but also because Afghanistan's stability remains in doubt, while

China's power is rising in the absence of any pan-Asian consensus or institutional

structure.

The US did, indeed, turn inward following the fall of Saigon, and its neglect of

Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 led to chaos and al-Qaeda's near-

takeover of the country. So it is not surprising that many Asian leaders are asking

themselves what commitments the US will maintain once its troops leave Afghanistan.

Perhaps equally as important, many people in Asia are also debating whether the region

would be able to rebalance itself, should the US scale back its military presence.

Fortunately, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has reassured America's Asian

friends and allies that regional disengagement is not being contemplated. At the recent

Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore - indeed, in the presence of Chinese Minister of

Defense General Liang Guanglie - Gates outlined his ideas for continuing US

cooperation in and with Asia. Gates promised to increase the number of US warships

deployed to Singapore as part of the US-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement;

increase the number of US Navy calls in Asian ports; hold more joint naval exercises;

and improve multilateral military cooperation.

ideas forcontinuing US

militaryoperations inand with Asia

[GALLO/GETTY]

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Even more reassuring were the principles that will, according to Gates, guide America's

future Asian strategy: free and open commerce; support for the rule of law and the

rights, responsibilities, and sovereignty of Asia's states; open access to Asian and global

sea lanes, airspace, and cyberspace; and peaceful resolution of all conflicts. These

principles matter, because Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines,

India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and even Mongolia all

regard a US military presence in the region as essential to counterbalancing China's

increasing might.

Gates, however, is due to step down from his post shortly, which is unfortunate,

because the Obama administration's apparent lack of any explicit Asia strategy means

that Gates' reassurances might not reassure for very long. Nowadays, US policy on Asia

needs the type of strategic vision and insight that guided Kissinger's discussions with

Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai four decades ago. Without a clear and convincing

doctrine, at least some Asian leaders are likely to remain dubious of America's ability to

remain Asia's dominant military force, particularly given its economic woes, projected

fiscal retrenchment, and other overseas commitments. This lack of clarity may become

particularly troublesome should China's leaders underestimate the enduring quality of

America's Asian commitments.

Securing a structure of peace in Asia, however, is not solely America's responsibility.

America's friends and allies need to think hard about what sort of regional order they

want, and they must begin to collaborate in order to breathe life into a structure of

peace within which all of Asia can prosper and feel secure. Japan's government in

particular needs to identify a coherent Asia strategy and stick to it, instead of leaning

towards China one minute, and America the next. In constructing a viable strategy,

deepening Japan's partnerships with Asia's great democracies - India, Indonesia, and

South Korea - must be a priority.

But the biggest question concerns China's place in a consensual Asian order, and its

willingness to collaborate with its neighbours, as well as with the US, in creating it. The

doubts that many Asians now hold about China's intentions are well grounded, given

the secretive nature of China's military build-up, and its leaders' increasingly aggressive

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tone in territorial disputes with India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China's

unconditional support for North Korea's wayward regime, despite its repeated crimes

against peace, is also a cause for concern about whether China will treat its neighbours'

security concerns with respect.

Today's Asia-Pacific region has now become the focus of the global economy. According

to the World Bank, three of the top five economic powers will be Asian powers (China,

Japan, and India) within this decade. The boom that has brought this shift occurred

because America's military presence in the region provided stability and predictability.

America's withdrawal from Afghanistan must not be allowed to call this stability into

question.

What happens in Afghanistan as America begins to draw down its troops will test the

willingness of all of Asia's powers to work together to build a secure regional order. In

Afghanistan, their long-term interests are essentially in harmony, as none - including

China - wants to see Afghanistan become a haven for terrorism once again. But only a

strong regional consensus on Afghanistan's future can avert the prospect of a renewed

struggle for mastery there. If such a consensus can be forged, however, it will provide

a foundation for further collaboration in building a pan-Asian order based on consent,

not military might.

Yuriko Koike, Japan's former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser, isChairman of the Executive Council of the Liberal Democratic Party.The article above was first published byProject Syndicate.The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect AlJazeera's editorial policy.Ref:

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011621132915825211.html

.

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U.S. Policy Regarding BurmaBy Phil Robertson, October 11, 2005

Key Points A world-class human rights abuser, Burmas military junta is condemned both by

the UN Human Rights Commissionevery year since 1989and by theInternational Labor Organization for its systematic use of forced labor.

The SPDC continues to refuse to recognize the results of the 1990 elections, wonoverwhelmingly by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and has

imprisoned over 55 NLD parliamentarians.

Economic sanctions by the U.S. and other nations continue to pressure the SPDCregime, despite a recent ruling by the Supreme Court overturning the

Massachusetts Burma law.

Springing from obscurity to Americas editorial pages, college campuses, city councils,and state legislatures, Burma has become a major foreign policy issue seemingly out of

proportion to its relatively limited ties to the United States. Ruled by a series of harsh

military regimes since 1962, Burma serves as a test case for U.S. policy on several

fronts: human rights; a growing worldwide heroin epidemic; the role of U.S. state and

local governments in relation to international trade policy and practice; forced labor,

international labor standards, and the new prominence of the International Labor

Organization (ILO) in the era of globalization; and the role of multinational corporations

in supporting dictatorships. U.S. verbal commitments to promote human rights and

democracy are being put to the test as an embattled democracy movementled by1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyifaces a relentless campaign ofarrests and intimidation by the State Law and Order Restitution Council (SLORC)

military junta, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November

1997.

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SLORC came to power in September 1988, when it commanded the Burmese army to

smash a nationwide democracy movement by gunning down more than 3,000

protesters in Rangoon and thousands more in smaller cities and towns. Nine

consecutive years of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the junta

demonstrate that little has changed since then. The UN Human Rights Commission

(UNHRC) has criticized the SPDC for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,death in custody, torture, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention,

absence of due process of law, severe restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression,

movement, assembly, and association, including portering for the military. The use offorced labor by the SPDC affects as many as 800,000 Burmese daily, according to the

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In November 2000, the ILO

will likely employ

for the first time

Article 33 of its constitution and call on member

states to take action against the junta. The ILO is demanding that the SPDC scrap legal

authority for the use of forced labor, order all government authorities to cease using it,

and prosecute those responsible, especially the military.

Attempting to legitimize its rule, SLORC/SPDC organized a multiparty election on May

27, 1990. The move turned out to be a huge miscalculation, as Suu Kyis NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD) party won a landslide victory, taking 392 of 485 seats in

the Parliament. The official military party won just 10 seats, and the military promptly

refused to honor the results of the election. When the SPDC employed mass arrests to

prevent the convening of the elected Parliament in August 1998, the NLD announced

the formation of the Committee epresenting the Peoples Parliament.

Civil society groups continue to be totally repressed. Only in July 2000 did the SPDC

reopen universities shuttered since 1996 to prevent student gatherings. The dominance

of military spending has relegated Burmas once-proud health service to 190th (out of191) in overall health system performance, according to the World Health Organization.

The SPDC has consolidated control over ethnic groups in border areas by employing the

infamous four cuts strategy, designed to cut off insurgents from food, funds,intelligence, and recruits. The result has been forced relocations and human suffering

that rivals anything seen during ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or Kosovo. Detailed research

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on internally displaced peoples (IDPs) among ethnic groups has found that over

300,000 Shan, more than 200,000 Karen, and over 30,000 Karenni citizens have been

forced from their homes. Hundreds of villages have been turned into free-fire zones, in

which heavily armed SPDC battalions, using civilians as forced porters and

minesweepers, wreak havoc. Another 100,000 refugees have fled to Thailand.

The Peoples epublic of Chinathe SPDCs closest ally and primary diplomaticsupporterhas provided $1.8 billion in military equipment for the SPDCs militarymodernization drive. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a coalition of

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), recently revealed that Burma has one of the

highest numbers of child soldiers in the world. Yet Western and Asian multinationals

continue to invest with government ministries or entities like the Union of Myanmar

Economic Holdings, controlled by military officers.

Successful efforts by activists to pass Burma selective purchasing legislation in twostates (Massachusetts and Vermont) and 21 cities (including New York and Los

Angeles) have pressured at least 39 international companies to withdraw from Burma.

But on June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the National Foreign Trade Council

challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law, marking a counterattack by a coalition of

Americas largest businesses, who oppose any restrictions on foreign trade.

Problems with Current U.S. PolicyKey Problems

Current U.S. sanctions are inadequate, because they only ban new investmentsallowing most existing projects to continue unimpededand do not addressimports into the United States.

The Clinton administration has opposed state- and local-level sanctions asbarriers to trade.

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U.S. policy has failed to respond sufficiently to SPDC complicity in herointrafficking networks.

In 1995, after her release from six years of house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi challenged

the military regime to enter into a dialoguewith no preconditionsto craft a finalpolitical settlement in Burma. This call, repeated hundreds of times by NLD leaders

since then, has been consistently ignored by the junta. The SPDC has instead mounted

an intensifying campaign to dismantle the NLD through arrests of its elected

parliamentarians and members, seizures of property, and junta-organized no-confidence rallies against NLD parliamentarians in their constituencies. An SPDC-appointed constitutional drafting convention waits in the wings, at work on a document

that most observers believe will permanently enshrine military rule.

With their backs to the wall, Suu Kyi and the NLD have called for international economic

sanctions against the SPDC, an international tourism boycott, and no new foreign

investment in Burma. Following a strategy reminiscent of the African National Congress

during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the NLD believes that international

sanctions will deprive the SPDC and its cronies of opportunities to enrich themselves

and will contribute to pressure for an unconditional, tripartite dialogue between the

SPDC, the NLD, and the leaders of the ethnic nationalities.

In May 1997, a concerted grassroots campaign in the U.S. finally persuaded the Clinton

administration to impose economic sanctions to ban future U.S. investment. The

measure takes aim both at actions to facilitate investment (including those by foreign

nationals) and attempts to evade the investment prohibitions. But all investment

contracts signed by U.S. companies before that date are considered legal. In a test case

to hold U.S. corporations accountable, Burmese directly affected by forced labor in the

building of the Yadana Gas pipeline have joined forces with two U.S. NGOs to use the

Alien Torts Claims Act to sue the Unocal oil company for human rights abuses stemming

from its partnership with the SPDC.

Unfortunately, Washington balks at the next logical stepbanning all Burmese importsinto the United States, which are not covered by the May 1997 sanctions. In fact, the

National Labor Committee found that between 1995 and 1999, apparel imports from

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Burma soared 272%. In the year 2000, U.S. companies will import more than $340

million worth of garments from Burma, including those produced in factories owned by

drug traffickers. U.S. activists have vowed that selective purchasing and corporate

accountability campaigns will continue, despite opposition from free trade acolytes in

the current administration, who played a critical role in persuading the Justice

Department to side with U.S. businesses in arguments before the Supreme Court.

Washingtons reluctance to ban Burmese imports is even harder to understand, nowthat it is clear that the SPDC is profiting from collaboration with narcotraffickers. The

Drug Enforcement Agency estimated in 1998 that 14% of heroin entering the U.S. is

from Southeast Asia and Burma ranks as the worlds second largest producer of heroin.Burmas banks can accept foreign currency deposits of any size with no questionsasked, as long as a 30% tax is paid. Cheap amphetamines produced by ethnic groups

like the Wa, who have a close relationship with a top SPDC official, Gen. Khin Nyunt,

are flooding into Thailand. Yet the U.S. only responds with the same old drug war

interdiction efforts, treating the symptoms rather than taking concerted political action

against the SPDC regime, which condones these activities.

SPDC intransigence has scuttled good faith international efforts to create a road map

for political reform that would involve guarantees of aid in exchange for reform.

Meanwhile the Clinton administration, while taking commendable steps to unilaterally

stop new U.S. investments in Burma, has failed to use its leadership to lobby Australia,

Canada, and key European countries to deepen Burmas diplomatic and economicisolation. As a result, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policy of

constructive engagement toward the SPDC, primarily composed of forging commercial

links and defending the SPDC from external criticism, continues largely unchallenged.

Moreover, Japan is now moving to resume partial overseas development assistance to

the SPDC.

Another problem is the lack of adequate humanitarian assistance from the U.S. and

other nations. The intensifying military campaign against ethnic nationalities along

Burmas borders has created a humanitarian crisis that continues to be largely ignoredby the international community. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Burmese

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remain trapped, hiding in the jungles. Yet only a pittance of international assistance

reaches them. Meanwhile, Thailand continues to insist on an overly narrow definition of

a refugee as someone who is fleeing from fighting, has declined to accede to the1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, and refuses to consider setting up

refugee camps for ethnic Shans. Between 700,000 and 1.5 million illegal migrant

workersmany of whom could qualify as refugeeswork in the underground economyin Thailand.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations The U.S. must develop a proactive policy to deal comprehensively with the

humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons in Burma and refugees in

Thailand.

The U.S. needs to expand efforts to delegitimize the SPDC internationally andmust work with allies to apply economic and political pressure on the junta.

Unilaterally, the U.S. should ban imports from Burma.

The U.S. should support stronger action at the United Nations, includingtoughened multilateral sanctions, in concert with the forthcoming ILO call for

governments to critically review their relationships with the SPDC regime.

One of the first steps the U.S. should take is to increase resources for cross-border

humanitarian assistance (food and medicine) to the internally displaced population

while marshalling greater international attention to the plight of the ethnic peoples of

Burma. Washington should also proactively work with the Royal Thai government to

broaden its definition of a refugee, allow Shan camps to be established, and ensure that

no involuntary repatriations occur.

U.S. policy correctly urges a tripartite dialogue between equalsthe SPDC, the NLD,and ethnic leaders. As Aung San Suu Kyi recently wrote in the Washington Post, this

dialogue should be aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement acceptable to major

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political forces in our country. The problem is that this call, echoed by the internationalcommunity, has been met by the SPDC with shrill rhetoric, the jailing of NLD

representatives, and further repression. The main issue for U.S. foreign policy is how to

use political and economic leverage to accomplish a sustained dialogue leading to a just

settlement.

It is still clear that with economic and military backing from China as well as diplomatic

support from ASEAN, the SPDC believes it can bide its time and selectively dismantle

the NLD. The U.S. must intensify political and economic pressure to deny legitimacy and

resources to the SPDC junta. The ILO Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor, headed

by three respected international jurists, found systematic use of forced labor in every

state and division in Burma. A 1996 report by the U.S. embassy in Rangoon found that

3% of Burmas GDP comes from forced labor. In order to ensure that no productsproduced with or benefiting from forced labor (which is often used to build

transportation infrastructure such as ports and roads) reach American consumers, the

U.S. should immediately ban the import of all goods from Burma. Such a move would

directly impact sectors closely tied to the Burmese military (like garment production and

teak harvesting) and would uphold American principles against forced labor anywhere

in the world.

At the same time, the current administration must recognize the legitimacy of U.S. state

and local governments refusing to do business with companies operating in Burma.

Given the flood of heroin entering the U.S. from Burma, the administration should

invoke a national security exemption (citing the Government Procurement Agreement)

with regard to the World Trade Organization to fend off future attempts to overturn

selective purchasing laws. Grassroots activists will certainly continue a concerted

campaign of trade-related tactics to target U.S., European, and Asian companies

invested in Burma, and the U.S. government should not put obstacles in their way,

based on misguided appeals to free trade.

At the United Nations, the General Assemblys annual resolutions on Burma areincreasingly ignored by specialized UN agencies. In the first half of 2000, both the Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNESCO held major conferences with the SPDC

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government in Rangoon, lending international legitimacy to the junta. Although there is

merit in the efforts of some activists in lobbying for suspension of the SPDC as the

legitimate representative of Burma at the UN, Chinas veto in the UN Security Councilwill make that politically impossible. Instead, the U.S. and its allies should undertake an

effort to forbid all UN agencies from conducting regional meetings in Burma and should

urge the UN secretary-general to critically review all UN programs in Burma in light of

the General Assemblys policy decision to promote human rights and the restoration ofdemocratic rule. The U.S. should also call a session of the UN Security Council to pass a

resolution condemning Burmas continued failure to transfer power to the winners ofthe 1990 election, forcing China to protect its client on the international stage, and

further undermining the SPDCs independence in the eyes of its own people.

The U.S. should continue its policy of blocking loans and assistance to Burma from the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and should do likewise at the Asian

Development Bank (ADB). An ADB project, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)

program, is being used to foster transportation, trade, and investment links between

Burma and its neighbors. At the ADB annual meeting in May 2000 in Chiang Mai,

invitees included at least two Burmese bankers with direct ties to drug traffickers.

Initiatives like a GMS Business Forum, which would help foster closer links between

SPDC companies and corporations in neighboring countries, are wholly inappropriate at

this time. The U.S. should work with its European counterparts on the ADB board to

insist on excluding Burma from all GMS projects or, failing that, should defund the

program in its entirety.

The U.S. must hold the line as a consistent supporter of the restoration of democratic

rule, based on the 1990 election. Without U.S. influence in the international community,

promoting a comprehensive policy of economic pressure and political persuasion to

push for final political status negotiations, the SPDC may continue its record of grave

human rights abuse and repression for many more years.

Phil Robertson is the Mainland Southeast Asia Representative of the American Center

for International Labor Solidarity, based in Bangkok, Thailand. These are the personal

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views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of either the

American Center for International Labor Solidarity or the AFL-CIO.

Recommended Citation:

Phil Robertson, "U.S. Policy Regarding Burma" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In

Focus, October 11, 2005)

Ref:

http://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burma

.

Paper no. 4539 10-June-2011

MYANMA: US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement-Not So PragmaticBy C. S. Kuppuswamy

In 2009 the US, on realising that its policy on Myanmar has not had the desired

impact, embarked on a two-track strategy of engagement with the Myanmar

authorities and at the same time continue with the economic sanctions to push

for reforms. This is now being often referred to as pragmatic engagement.

Even with this pragmatic engagement, US has made no headway in its relationswith Myanmar.

Expectations were high after the general elections and when the military junta

0n 30 March 2011 dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

A civilian government was put in place with former Prime Minister Thein Sein as

http://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burmahttp://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burmahttp://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burma

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President.

A Voice of America report then said that the US dismissed the so called transfer

of power in Burma as immaterial as the military leaders continue to remain incontrol.

A major development since then has been the appointment of a special envoy to

Myanmar and a flurry of visits by US officials to Myanmar.

Derek Mitchell, the Principal assistant secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific

Security affairs, has been nominated as a special envoy to Burma. The

appointment is still to be confirmed. On this appointment Suu Kyi remarked I

am a cautions optimist perhaps hinting that it would not make things anybetter. In view of the fact that the UN envoys could not do much in the last

decade or so, the task is not going to be in anyway easy for the US envoy.

Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia along with his deputy

Scot Marciel visited Myanmar in November 2009 and had talks with the ruling

Generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. They were the first high ranking American

diplomats to visit Myanmar since 1995. Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar again in

May 2010,when he was allowed to meet Suu /kyi at a state guest house inRangoon. He warned that the election will lack international legitimacy and that

Burmas arms deals with North Korea are against UN sanctions that prohibitbuying arms from North Korea.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific affairs, Joseph Y.

Yun had visited Myanmar in December 2010 and again in May 2011.

US Senator John McCain visited Myanmar from 01-03 June 2011. After meeting

some government officials he said it was clear that the new Governmentwanted a better relationship with the United States. He had also met Suu Kyi

and pledged to support efforts to foster democracy. He had also warned in a

press meet that Myanmar could face a Middle East-style revolution if the new

government fails to implement democratic reforms.

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US charge d affairs, Larry Dinger, the top diplomat in Myanmar confirmed tothe media in Feb 2011 that:

Of course, the United States is engaging in a dialogue with Aung Sang Suu Kyiand the NLD about US assistance programmes in Burma,"

"We also engaged with the authorities in Naypyidaw and other stakeholders on

such important issues in the effort to consider all important perspectives in the

formulating of US policies toward Burma,"

There have been calls from some ASEAN countries and political parties in

Myanmar for lifting of sanctions in view of the formation of the CivilGovernment. Rejecting these calls, US on 16 May 2011 has renewed its

economic sanctions against Myanmar. President Obama while renewing the

sanctions in a formal notice to the Congress said that Burma was taking actions

hostile to US interests.

While some senators have argued in favour of the stand taken by Aung San Suu

Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, for continuance of the

sanctions, some think tanks and Burma watchers are of the opinion that it is

time for the US to rethink as the sanctions have not served the desired purpose.

On the contrary they argue that the sanctions have strengthened the regime,

weakened the opposition, created a bitterness towards the west and have given

China and neighbouring countries a great economic opportunity.

Review of US PolicyA detailed review of the US Policy on Burma since October 2009 is contained in

the opening remarks of Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

on 02 June 2011. It is worth noting some excerpts of his remarks.

The Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time (after

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transition to the Civilian Government in March 2011) is premature, absence of

fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international

concerns, and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the

regimes gross economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption.

Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations withthe United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they

would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead ofBurma as the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward

achieving the countrys Millennium Development Goals.

The United States clearly and consistently condemned the elections as neither

free nor fair.

With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches ofgovernment, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate

change in policies or progress on our core concerns.

The United States alone cannot achieve progress in Burma. We are tirelesslyworking with our European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge

the Burmese government to constructively engage with the internationalcommunity and address these long-standing issues. India and China remain

important to this issue.

This review is a more an action taken report without indicating any progressachieved in US-Myanmar relations and shifts the total blame on to the Myanmar

authorities for the current status of relations.

Some comments on US PolicyAt this stage, Aung San Suu Kyi is still a determining factor in U.S. policytowards Burma/ Myanmar. Her status in the post-election period may

determine U.S. Policy toward that country for a considerable period. David I.Steinberg.

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If the US continues to press the regime about its relationship with Pyongyang,as seems highly likely, tensions between Washington and Naypyidaw are bound

to grow, making a constructive dialogue on other issues even more difficult.

Should it be discovered that Burma is indeed violating one or more UNSC

Resolutions, President Obama would have no option but to revert to a much

tougher line. This outcome may satisfy critics of the Administration's current

policy, but it will not bring the resolution of Burma's domestic problems any

closer.- Andrew Selth, Griffith Asia Institute.

"US policy for a long time has been based on an objective that was extremely

unlikely to be met - a dialogue between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi

[who was recently released after 17 years in jail and under house arrest] and

the junta leading to democratic change. Western sanctions that were put in

place to force the dialogue have not bankrupted the government, nor pressured

leaders toward political reform. What they have done is severely weaken the

position of independent businessmen and the middle classes on whom an open

society depends." -Thant Myint-U

The US should consider Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic

consideration of its foreign policy interests in the region, including nuclear non-

proliferation. Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not mean casting

aside human-rights issues, which were the initial motivation for imposing

economic sanctions.- Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell(AT online 07 June 2011).

Conclusion

The US policy is dictated by growing support from Congress for continuance ofsanctions, and a strong pro-democracy lobby of the expatriate groups. However

it is time for the US to rethink on its policy on Burma. While due deference

must be given to Aung San Suu Kyis views, the US should not be obsessed withdemocracy and human rights and think of the larger interests of the nation, the

people and the US interests in the region. A good beginning, although a minor

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Ref:

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4539.html

Testimony of Joseph YunDeputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

gesture would be to recognise the new name Myanmar instead of Burma.

Though it is said to be a "two track policy", what is seen on the ground is a "one

track policy" of continuing the sanctions. Sanctions have not worked and will not

work so long as China and India the two large neighbours are not taken on

board. These two countries are in no mood to go along with the US on the

question of sanctions. A break through is necessary and it is for the US to take

the initiative when the new government has indicated its desire to improve its

relations.

Copyright South Asia Analysis Group

All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in

research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are

acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4539.htmlhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4539.htmlhttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4539.html

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U.S. Department of State

Before theHouse Committee on Foreign Affairs

June 2, 2011

Block Burmese JADE Act and ecent Policy Developments

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Berman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for

inviting me to testify today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss thecentral aspects of our Burma policy, including elements of our two-track approach

that comprises pressure coupled with principled engagement. In light of my recent

visits to Burma in December 2010 and again two weeks ago, I would also like to

provide an overview on the Administrations efforts to promote democracy and humanrights in Burma and on key recent developments in Burma including the release of

Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the 2010 elections, and the formation of a

government headed by former top regime general and now President Thein Sein.

After a comprehensive policy review, which Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell

outlined for your Committee in October 2009, the United States launched a dual-track

Burma policy, combining pressure with direct dialogue with the regime. We are

currently pursuing these parallel and complementary tracks in a full-scale effort to

advance progress on core concerns of the United States and the international

community, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for

human rights, and an inclusive dialogue with the political opposition and ethnic groups

that would lead to national reconciliation. We also urge the Government of Burma to

respect its international obligations, including adherence to all UN Security Council

resolutions on nonproliferation. We have made these representations repeatedly in

the context of Burmas nontransparent (2) relationship with North Korea. Althoughmeaningful progress remains elusive, I believe we must continue to bring the full

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range of diplomatic tools to bear and use both dialogue and pressure to promote

positive change in Burma.

First, let me start with the pressure side of our policy. We play a leading role in the

international community in shining a light on the regime's dismal human rights record

and signaling to Burmese authorities that the world is watching. We support an

annual resolution at the UN General Assembly on Burma that draws attention to

human rights abuses and calls for cooperation with the international community to

achieve concrete progress with regard to human rights, fundamental freedoms and

political processes. In 2010, this resolution passed by a higher vote margin than in

any previous year. More recently, in March of this year, we supported the annualresolution on Burma at the UN Human Rights Council to renew the mandate of the UN

Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Burma, Mr. Tomas Ojea

Quintana. We continue to call upon the Burmese government to fully cooperate with

Mr. Quintana, including by allowing him to visit the country again, which authorities

are refusing. Secretary of State Clinton has also expressed our commitment to

pursuing accountability for human rights abuses through establishing a commission of

inquiry for Burma in close consultation with our friends, allies, and partners at the

United Nations.

Coupled with this international pressure, we maintain extensive, targeted sanctions

against senior leaders of the Burmese government and military, their immediate

family members, their key supporters, and others who abuse human rights. We work

closely with our key allies such as the European Union (EU) and its member states,

Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asian nations and others to encourage

them to impose sanctions and to press the regime to make meaningful changes. We

were pleased that in April 2011, the EU renewed its Common Position on Burma,

which authorizes EU sanctions on key regime officials. U.S. sanctions are based on a

series of executive orders and key legislation passed over the past 20 years, including

the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the Tom Lantos Block

Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008. Successive

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Administrations have cooperated closely with Congress to ensure that these

restrictions, whether economic, financial or travel related, have the same purpose:

that the United States will not allow the use of its resources to perpetuate abusive,

authoritarian rule.

The Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 is the most recent piece of Burma-specific

legislation and it constitutes an important component of the U.S. sanctions regime.

There are several key aspects of the JADE Act, which is more than a ban (3) on

Burmese jade: it focuses on stopping anti-democratic activities in addition to

preventing the regime from profiting from trade in precious gems.

The JADE Act includes provisions for financial sanctions and bans the issuance of visasfor travel to the United States by former and present leaders of the regime, officials

involved in the repression of human rights, other key supporters of the regime, and

their immediate family members. These provisions complement already existing

economic sanctions and travel restrictions.

The JADE Act also required the appointment of a Special Representative and Policy

Coordinator for Burma to ensure high-level, dedicated focus on improving the

situation in Burma and promoting genuine democratic reform. I am very pleased tohighlight that on April 14, the President nominated Derek Mitchell for that position. He

is the right candidate for this tough job. He brings a formidable blend of Asia

expertise and senior government and civil society experience to the table. If

confirmed, we have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will fully carry out his mandate

to advance all aspects of our Burma policy, pursuing both pressure on and

engagement with Burmese authorities as warranted by their actions. If confirmed, he

will further strengthen ties with key Burmese stakeholders in civil society, including

the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic groups, and coordinate our

efforts with Congress, allies, and the NGO community for the benefit of the Burmese

people. We look forward to his leadership and hope that his Senate hearing and

confirmation will take place as soon as possible.

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Finally, the JADE Act bans the import of Burmese jadeite, rubies, and related jewelry

into the United States, even if transformed in a third country. The first line of defense

is our Customs and Border Patrol certification requirements, issued through a joint

DHS/Treasury final rule. We have been very successful in enforcing this prohibition

through the final rule, which requires every importer to have written certification at

the time of import from the exporter affirming that none of the imported jewelry

contains jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma. Our prohibition has been

most effective for Burmese rubies and jewelry, as the demand for jadeite in the

United States is virtually nonexistent. The second line of defense is the jewelry

industry itself; industry sources note that the most valuable rubies from Burma are

high quality and very distinctive and that no one in the United States is importing

rubies or related jewelry from Burma. The Jewelers Vigilance Committee hasconveyed to us its confidence that no rubies imported into the United States were

mined or extracted from Burma and that no importer in (4 )the U.S. would want to

risk losing their goods or reputation by violating what they refer to as a well-known

ban.

Burmas regime continues to reap significant revenues from its tightly controlledgemstone industry, and the JADE Act does not cut off all international trade in

Burmas gemstones. Burma's export of rubies and jadeite is doing well, in particularbecause Chinas domestic market for jadeite and related jewelry is on the rise. We willcontinue to call on China and India and other neighboring countries to cooperate with

us on this issue.

Before I turn to the engagement track, I would like to note that we regularly hear

claims from neighboring countries and a variety of other partners that our sanctions

negatively affect the Burmese economy and help to impoverish the Burmese people.

Following Burma's elections, some Southeast Asian nations as well as some political

parties in Burma called on the United States to ease or remove sanctions. The

Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time is premature, absent

fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international concerns,

and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the regimes gross

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economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption.

While sustaining pressure on the Burmese regime, we have initiated efforts to engage

in direct dialogue with senior leaders in the Burmese government over the past 18

months. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell traveled to Nay Pyi Taw, Burmascapital, in October 2009 and May 2010 to meet with senior officials and demonstrate

our willingness to embark on this new path of principled engagement. He also met

with Burma officials on the margins of UN General Assembly sessions in 2009 and

2010 and in several forums held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). During every visit to Burma, we always consult Aung San Suu Kyi, leaders of

the NLD, and other civil society leaders.

Building on the dialogue Assistant Secretary Campbell began, I have also made two

visits to Burma: one in December 2010 and one more recently, in May 2011. In those

meetings, Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations

with the United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they

would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead of Burmaas the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward achieving the

countrys Millennium Development Goals. The Government of Burma, however, has

been opposed to taking any of the steps we, the UN, and others have raised toaddress core human rights concerns and to begin (5) an inclusive dialogue leading to

national reconciliation and real democratic reform. The regime continues to insist that

all of these issues are internal issues.

We are disappointed by the lack of any results from our repeated efforts at dialogue.

When we embarked on our dual-track policy, we went in with our eyes wide open and

we expected that efforts on engagement and real reform would be a long, slow

process. We will continue to try, while also seeking concrete ways to ramp up

pressure on the Burmese government both in private and in public, to undertake

genuine reform. We expect that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for

Burma will play an essential role in furthering all aspects of our policy and determining

if there is a viable way forward.

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Against this policy backdrop, I will briefly provide an update and assessment on the

political dynamics in Burma, highlighting the governments election process and itsresults, the future role of former regime leader Senior General Than Shwe, and the

release of leading opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi.

Burmas 2010 elections were its first in 20 years. These elections were based on adeeply and fundamentally flawed process with highly restrictive regulations that

excluded Burmas largest pro-democracy party, the National League for Democracy(NLD). They took place while Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLDs key leader, remainedunder house arrest, and many other NLD leaders were in prison. The regime cancelled

voting in several ethnic minority areas and heavily skewed the playing field in favor ofthe regimes proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The few pro-democracy and ethnic political parties that did compete won only a small number of

parliamentary seats and mostly at the regional level. Amid widespread media and

well-substantiated claims of vote rigging and manipulation, the regimes USDP wonthe majority of contested Parliamentary seats, while 25 percent of all seats were

reserved for military appointees. The United States clearly and consistently

condemned the elections as neither free nor fair.

Not surprisingly, the elections resulted in a government comprised almost entirely of

either active or former military members of the regime. Together with military

appointees, regime-affiliated members occupy 89 percent of all seats in the legislative

bodies. This legislature convened in Nay Pyi Taw to rubber stamp approval of BurmasPresident, two Vice Presidents, and key Presidential appointees. With few exceptions,

all of those positions were filled by former military leaders and members of the

governments proxy party. The formal regime (6) State Peace and Development

Council (SPDC) dissolved and President Thein Sein, the former Prime Minister within

the SPDC structure and a top regime military leader, assumed power on April 1, 2011.

The convening of Parliament and the formation of a so-called civilian governmentmarked the completion of what the regime refers to as its seven-step roadmap to a

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disciplined and flourishing democracy. We strongly disagree with this assessmentand believe that many questions remain. Specifically, the extent of Senior General

Than Shwes influence is still an important question. He previously held simultaneoustitles as Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Commander in Chief

of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense. In the government announced on April

1, he no longer holds any official title. Some observers believe he will still control the

political sphere from behind the scenes while others claim that he has truly retired.

Therefore, a significant degree of uncertainty exists regarding Than Shwes role andthe respective power of the various institutions that emerged such as the Presidency

and cabinet, the Parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the

military.

With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches of

government, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate

change in policies or progress on our core concerns. There has been some positive

rhetoric but it has not translated into concrete action or changes by the regime. In his

inaugural address, President Thein Sein used terms such as good governance,

transparency, and economic development, a departure from the regimes typical focuson stability and security and threats posed by opposition figures and entities.

President Thein Sein's statements have addressed the need for economic reforms andhis economic advisors recently organized a National Poverty Alleviation Seminar.

Whether any of this seemingly positive rhetoric will eventually transform into concrete

action toward poverty reduction and a free, open society is deeply uncertain.

There is also the noteworthy development of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyisrelease on November 13 from seven-and-one-half years of house arrest. Though

welcome, her release came only at the end of a sentence that we always maintained

was unjustified. She has spent 15 of the past 23 years in detention or under house

arrest. We have pressed the Government of Burma to ensure it provides adequately

for Aung San Suu Kyis safety and security as well as for all residents of Burma.Members of the international community, when allowed to visit Burma, are now able

to consult with her on a regular basis, as is our Embassy (7) in Rangoon. I have had

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the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues with her during my own visits to

Rangoon.

Burmese authorities have dissolved Aung San Suu Kyis political party, the NationalLeague for Democracy, for refusing to re-register as a political party under Burma'srestrictive electoral laws. Although officially disbanded, NLD headquarters remains

open and activities continue. Recently, the NLD has become more involved in social

welfare activities such as HIV/AIDS support and care, education, and provision of

clean water to address humanitarian needs. We are committed to fully supporting

Aung San Suu Kyis efforts to seek reinstatement of the NLD as a legal, political partyand to hold a direct, meaningful dialogue with senior government authorities.

I would also like to highlight the range of humanitarian assistance activities that we

are undertaking inside Burma, which have been authorized consistent with or are

exempted from JADE Act sanctions. Managed by USAID and the State Department,

we support health and education projects targeting Burmas most vulnerablepopulations and initiatives to strengthen civil society and promote democracy.

Assistance includes livelihoods, water and sanitation projects, a teacher training

program and activities to combat infectious diseases and grave public health threats,such as avian influenza, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.

It is important to mention the effects of the ongoing civil conflict in Burma between

government forces and ethnic armies that are fighting for greater autonomy. In the

conduct of these wars, the military has destroyed thousands of villages and subjected

civilians in these areas to pillage, forced labor, killing and rape. This ongoing internal

conflict and the regimes repression have created significant refugee flows and serious

burdens on neighboring countries that are hosting Burmese refugees.

While regime-created humanitarian crises, large-scale displacement and human

suffering will only come to end through political change that promotes genuine

democracy and respect for human rights, we must do what we can in the meantime

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to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to those who have had to flee their

country of origin. For more than 20 years, we have provided crucial support to UNHCR

and NGOs for humanitarian assistance and protection to Burmese refugees who have

fled from persecution and violence to neighboring countries. Since 2005, the United

States has resettled approximately 70,000 Burmese from Thailand, Malaysia,

Bangladesh, and India, almost 50,000 of whom (8) were from the Thai-Burma border

region. Later this month, the Department of States Assistant Secretary for Population,efugees and Migration will be in Bangladesh to address serious issues of Burmasethnic Rohingya refugee population in that country. We also support the International

Committee of the Red Cross, which facilitates family member visits to political

prisoners and provides orthopedic and prosthetic services to landmine victims. These

initiatives enable us to tackle immediate humanitarian issues that affect some of themost vulnerable people in Burma.

Our challenges in Burma remain daunting and the human rights situation deplorable.

Though Aung San Suu Kyi is free, over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention,

the conflicts and the attacks against civilians continue in the ethnic minority areas,

and millions of Burmese citizens are denied basic rights including freedom of speech,

assembly, and association. The United States alone cannot achieve progress in

Burma, and as I noted at the outset of my testimony, we are tirelessly working withour European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge the Burmese

government to constructively engage with the international community and address

these long-standing issues. India and China remain important to this issue and we

regularly discuss our concerns with them about the Burmese regime. We are in

complete agreement with the JADE Acts call for a unified and comprehensiveapproach to promote long-overdue change for the Burmese people aspiring for

genuine and meaningful progress.

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I welcome the opportunity to

answer your questions.

N. B. Numbers in brackets are the pages of the original pdf file.

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..

- China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US- Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial- The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning?ByYuriko Koike- U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson- MYANMA: US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement By C. S. Kuppuswamy- Testimony of Joseph Yun - Deputy Assistant Secretary - U.S. Department

of State

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No 1 - Tuesday, June 28, 2011

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