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RESTRUCTURING TRAINING IN THE

NIGERIAN NAVY TO MEET EMERGING

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

BY

CAPT (NN) HA EFENUDU (NN/0742)

Participant Course 15

Being a Research Project submitted to the National War

College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

award of

Fellow of the War College (fwc)

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

ABUJA-NIGERIA

JULY 2007

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NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

RESTRICTIVE PUBLICATION NOTICE

1. Having regards to the National War College CDS/56 dated 25

April, 1991 with respect to studies and research carried out at the College,

other laws related to national security, the Board of Governors of the

College has resolved and accordingly directed that:

a. Research projects written by participants being requirement

in fulfillment for the award of Fellow of National War College

(fwc), Nigeria certificate shall be considered and treated as the sole

property of the College.

b. No participant shall publish or cause to be published any

research project written while same is/was participant pursuant to

paragraph (a) above.

c. Provided that nothing shall prevent the College where the

Board deems it necessary in national and general academic

scientific advancement, from approving and/or collaborating with a

participant or any other person from effecting any publication of

material, being within the category of this directive.

2. I, Capt (NN) HA EFENUDU (NN/0742), being a Participant of the

National War College, Nigeria, Course 15 2006/2007 session, having read

the above directive, undertake to comply with same.

Signed ………………..………

Participant

Date …………………………..

Signed ………………………..

Name ………………………… Sign ……………………………

Supervisor Director of Academic

Research and Analytical

Support (DARAS)

Date ………………………….. Date ……………………………

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the research project titled, “RESTRUCTURING

TRAINING IN THE NIGERIAN NAVY TO MEET EMERGING

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES” was conducted by Capt (NN) HA

EFENUDU and completed under my supervision. However the

participant bears full responsibility for the content of this project.

Jun 07 OO OLAWUMI

Cdre

Supervisor

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my lovely wife Maro and my children

Kome, Rosie, Joshua and Jesse

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge my great indebtedness to the authorities of the

Nigerian Navy especially the Chief of the Naval Staff for offering me the

opportunity to attend the National War College. My appreciation also

goes to Brigadier General Maina and the Commandant, R/Adm Isa for all

the encouragement.

I wish to express my appreciation to the following people who read

the drafts and offered valuable guidance; my supervisor Cdre OO

Olawumi, Cdre TJ Lokoson, Capt AD Noafa and Dr Nwankwo. However

any error and shortcomings in this work are entirely the responsibility of

the author.

R/Adm FD Akpan, Cdre OO Olawumi, Capt OF Oduyemi and

Capt AD Noafa provided me with valuable materials and I am grateful to

them. To my wife and children who provided the much needed rest of

mind, I pledge my continued love and support.

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ABSTRACT

The Global Security challenges in the post Cold war era has evolved

more of intra- state conflicts involving irregular or unconventional

warfare. This has necessitated most nations in the World, like the United

States of America to continually restructure their Armed Forces training

in order to appropriately meet the challenges associated with irregular

warfare. Like other Armed Forces, the Nigerian Navy (NN) has began to

experience operational challenges in the area of irregular warfare which it

has previously not trained for. This project is an appraisal of the present

NN training policy and structure vis-à-vis the emerging operational

challenges.

The objective is to ascertain if the training imparted to NN personnel is

adequate for meeting the emerging operational challenges. In doing this

the NN training policy, structure of training on ground, departments

responsible for training and training establishment are examined. The

study undertook the review of the concept of navies, restructuring,

training, and emerging operational challenges in order to properly

understand the relationship between training and operational challenges.

The study revealed that the NN presently trains for conventional warfare

whereas the emerging operational challenges are more of unconventional

war. The challenges are identified as terrorism, hostage taking, illegal

bunkering, crude oil theft, sea piracy, robberies, illegal fishing, oil

pipeline vandalization and youth militancy amongst others. Further, it

was discovered that the NN personnel are presently not trained to enable

them adequately combat these gamut of challenges.

The study therefore sought a review of the NN Training Policy which

should involve a restructure of NN training concept including

establishment of a Special Forces school in irregular warfare.

The study recommends that the NN should adopt unconventional military

training for all its personnel irrespective of specialization and should seek

the establishment of a special Forces Corps.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Content Page

Title Page------------------------------------------------------------------------ i

Restrictive Publication Notice------------------------------------------------ ii

Certification--------------------------------------------------------------------- iii

Dedication----------------------------------------------------------------------- iv

Acknowledgement-------------------------------------------------------------- v

Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi

Table of Content---------------------------------------------------------------- vii

List of Enclosures --------------------------------------------------------------ix

List of Abbreviations----------------------------------------------------------- x

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Background---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Statement of the Research Problem------------------------------------------ 4

Objective of the Study--------------------------------------------------------- 5

Significance of the Study------------------------------------------------------ 6

Scope of the Study-------------------------------------------------------------- 6

Methodology-------------------------------------------------------------------- 6

Limitation------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

Navies---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Restructuring-------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Training-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Emerging Operational Challenges--------------------------------------------- 14

Relationship between Training and Operational Challenges--------------- 16

Review of some Existing literature------------------------------------------- 17

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CHAPTER 3 - OVERVIEW OF TRAINING AND

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE

NIGERIAN NAVY

Nigerian Navy Training Policy---------------------------------------------- 21

Departments Responsible for Training in the Nigerian Navy------------ 25

Nigerian Navy Training Establishments------------------------------------- 31

Assessment of Nigerian Navy training for Emerging

Operational Challenges-------------------------------------------------------- 38

Challenges Confronting the NN Training----------------------------------- 39

CHAPTER 4 - STRATEGIES FOR RESTRUCTURING

TRAINING IN THE NIGERIAN NAVY

TO MEET EMERGING OPERATIONAL

CHALLENGES

Way Forward-------------------------------------------------------------------- 45

Review of Nigerian Navy Training Policy---------------------------------- 46

Establishment of Special Forces School------------------------------------ 49

Relocation of AWWS to a more suitable Environment------------------- 50

CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------- 53

Recommendations------------------------------------------------------------- 54

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 56

Official Publications ----------------------------------------------------- 57

Unpublished Works ----------------------------------------------------- 57

Internet---------------------------------------------------------------------- 58

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LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. Extract of Nigerian Navy Training Policy of December 1996.

2. Unstructured Interview with Chief of Training and Operations

(CTOP) NHQ, R/Adm M Ajadi.

3 Unstructured Interview with Chief of Policy and Plan ( CPLANS)

NHQ R/Adm GAS Ombo.

4. Unstructured Interview of the Commanding Officer NNS

QUORRA Capt JO Aikhomu .

5. Unstructured Interview of Commanding Officer Nigerian Navy

Basic Training School ( NNBTS) Capt SI Alade.

6. Unstructured Interview of Commanding Officer of NNS

BEECROFT Capt AOA Ikioda.

7. Unstructured Interview with the Commanding Officer NNS

PATHFINDER Capt IAA Ibuwariso

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR - Area of Responsibility

AWWS - Above Water Warfare School

B & D - Basic and Divisional School

BRs - Books of References

BSTS - Basic Seamanship Training School

CNS - Chief of the Naval Staff

CPLANS - Chief of Policy and Plans

CO - Commanding Officer

CTOP - Chief of Training and Operations

DOT - Director of Training

DSSC - Direct Short Service Course

EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

ENC - Eastern Naval Command

FOC NAVTRAC - Flag Officer Commanding Naval Training

Command

FOST - Flag Officer Commanding Sea Training

Command

INS - Indian Naval Ship

KP - Key Point

MOD - Ministry of Defence

NAVTRAC - Naval Training Command

ND - Navigation and Direction School

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NDA - Nigerian Defence Academy

NHQ - Naval Headquarters

NN - Nigerian Navy

NNBTS - Nigerian Navy Basic Training School

NNC - Nigerian Naval College.

NNEC - Nigerian Naval Engineering College.

NNHS - Nigerian Navy Hydrographic School

NNLS - Nigerian Navy Logistics School.

NNO - Nigerian Navy Order

NNS - Nigerian Navy Ship

NPA - Nigerian Port Authority

NWC - National War College

OJT - On the Job Training

OLC - Officer Long Course

STC - Sea Training Command

STC - Sub – Technical Course

USA - United States of America

USSR - Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics

UWWS - Under Water Warfare School

WNC - Western Naval Command

UTO - Officer Under Training

VP - Vulnerable Point

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. Global security after World War II was shaped by disparity of

alliances by nation states whereby the United States of America (USA) and

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) became the dominant

players.1 The rivalry between these dominant players brought about the Cold

War, which tended to balance the International security situation between

the Capitalist West and the Socialist Eastern Bloc. However, the demise of

the USSR in 1991 brought about an end to the Cold War but resulted in

changes to the structure of the International Security environment with the

USA becoming the dominant power. 2

2. This brought about new security challenges such as global terrorism

and an escalation of intra-state conflicts like insurgency, hostage-taking and

civil wars.3 Arising from these challenges was the realization that Armed

Forces are more likely to be tasked in intra-state conflicts than inter-state

operations.4 As a result, armed forces would require new strategies in their

methods of training to combat these challenges because the more traditional

methods of training for war may not be adequate to effectively contain these

emerging threats.

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3. In the maritime world, global sea-based commerce has for

centuries brought countries together and naval forces have always played

a central role in its defence.5 Globalization, which has recently brought

about faster trans-national flow in goods and services made the state’s

ability to control international trade increasingly difficult.6 It is therefore,

not surprising that countries like Britain, France, Spain and Portugal

among others with developed navies, regularly assess their training

strategies to device new methods to cope with new challenges.7 The

United States Navy, for instance has made force re-structure a routine in

its efforts to cope with the new security challenges.8

4. In the far eastern countries of the World, particularly the

Philippines, the Navy has concentrated efforts on improving its inshore

support capabilities.9 It has thus begun to adapt new strategies in naval

training procedure.10

In the African continent, the South African navy has

begun restructuring to meet current national challenges by focusing

primarily on defensive posturing instead of its former offensive structure.

As a result of this, changes have been made in the training concept and

doctrine.11

5. The Nigerian Navy (NN), was established by an Act of Parliament

in 1964, and the 1999 Constitution tasked it with the territorial defence of

Nigeria from the sea among others.12

However, new security challenges,

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especially the militancy in the Niger Delta are emerging. Consequently,

newer strategies in training are required to effectively cope with this

emerging security challenges. This is necessary because the current focus

of the NN training policy is geared toward operational and type training

which are meant to cope with conventional warfare and can therefore, not

deal effectively and efficiently with the current militancy including oil

pipeline vandalization, hostage taking and sea robberies in the Southern

Coastal areas of Nigeria.13

6. Thus, the tasks presently engaged in by NN personnel in the Niger

Delta creeks are far beyond the training skills impacted with the present

training policy. 14

While NN personnel are engaged in anti-armed

robberies in the territorial waters, patrols in the Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ) and the provision of adequate security in Key Points (KPs) and

Vulnerable Points (VPs) within the maritime sector, the emerging threats

are youth restiveness and militancy, hostage taking and seizing or damage

of oil exploration facilities including oil and gas pipeline mostly in the

Niger Delta areas.15

7. The emerging challenges (threats) can be grouped into three

categories namely militancy, economic and political. The threats are

further expressed as, threat in the internal waters, territorial waters and

beyond the territorial waters. 16

While the basic and conventional

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professional training provide for NN’s operations in the territorial waters

and beyond to some extent, the NN is yet to develop Joint Training and

specialized creek/land operation courses for its personnel to cater for

internal waters’ threats. The fact that these challenges now exist and NN

personnel are still lacking the required training skills to meet them, aroused

the researcher’s interest in this subject.

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

8. The experiences from the activities of restive and militant youths in

coastal southern Nigeria and re-occurring challenges of hostage taking,

have impacted on NN operations in the Niger Delta area. Confrontation

between militant youths and naval patrol boats reveal that, NN personnel

do not have adequate skills and training for the kind of threat situation.17

Furthermore, NN platforms are not adequate.18

This situation has been

compounded by increasing vandalization of oil installations and these

threats seem to be beyond the conventional warfare concept the NN

presently trains in. It has therefore become obvious that the emerging

threat scenario is beyond the NN training modules. There is therefore need

to expand or restructure the training concepts to be able to address the

emerging threat situations in the NN areas of responsibility.

9. It is against this background that this study intends to appraise NN

training concept with a view to proffering strategies to meet the emerging

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challenges. This study will seek to provide answers to the following

questions:

a. What is the relationship between training and operational

challenges?

b. How adequately has the present NN training met the

emerging operational challenges?

c. What are the challenges confronting the NN training in

meeting emerging operational challenges?

d. What are the strategies for restructuring NN training to meet

the emerging operational challenges?

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

10. The main objective of the study is to appraise the need to

restructure training in NN to meet emerging operational challenges. The

specific objectives are to:

a. Establish the relationship between training and operational

challenges.

b. Examine how adequate the present NN training has been in

meeting emerging operational challenges.

c. Identify the challenges confronting NN training in meeting

emerging operational challenges.

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d. Propose strategies for restructuring NN training to meet

emerging operational challenges.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

11. This study will benefit the Naval Headquarters (NHQ) in policy

formulation for training. It will also benefit the Naval Training Command

in training policy implementation. The Ministry of Defence (MOD),

National Assembly or relevant Defence Committees in matters of

national security will benefit from this research in areas of procurement

and funding for the NN. The study will also add to the body of

knowledge on naval training and will be of value to future researchers in

the field.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

12. This study covers NN training from 1980 to 2006. This time is

chosen because it covers the period the NN started experiencing new

operational challenges especially in the Niger Delta. The study focuses on

training in the NN.

METHODOLOGY

13. The study adopted descriptive method.

a. Sources of Data. The data for this study were sourced from

both primary and secondary sources.

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b. Method of Data Collection. Methods of collection for

both primary and secondary data were as follow:

(1) Primary Data. Primary data were collected

through unstructured interviews which were conducted with

naval personnel holding appointments relevant to the study

such as Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP) and Chief

of Policy and Plans (CPPLANS) at Naval Headquarters

(NHQ) and from the Flag Officer Commanding Naval

Training Command (FOC NAVTRAC) and the

Commanding Officers of training establishments in the field.

Some commanding officers of operational bases were also

interviewed

(2) Secondary Data. Secondary data were collected

from libraries in Naval Headquarters (NHQ), National War

College (NWC) and from the Naval Information Directorate.

Nigerian Navy Orders (NNOs) such as those establishing

Naval Training Command (NAVTRAC), Sea Training, NNS

QUORRA, Nigerian Navy Basic Training School (NNBTS)

and Nigerian Navy Engineering College (NNEC) were

consulted. Other publications examined included the NN

Training Policy, Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) Training

Directive, Sailor Magazines and the syllabi of NNBTS and

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NNS QUORRA amongst others. In addition, Books of

References (BRs) and the internet were also examined.

c. Method of Data Analysis. The data collected from

primary and the secondary sources were analyzed qualitatively

using logical arguments. The analyses were used to draw

conclusion and make recommendations that will improve NN

training strategy.

LIMITATION

14. Some relevant publications and data in the NN were not readily

available. However efforts were made to overcome the constraint through

the use of unstructured interviews. Therefore, the aforementioned

limitations did not adversely affect the findings of this research.

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NOTES

1. G Evan and J Newman, Reference Guide to Concepts Ideas and

Institutions, (New York: Harvester and Wheatsheaf, 1990) p. 66.

2. Encarta Reference Library Premium 2005 DVD.

3. AFCSC: Seapower Symposium; “Adapting Training to Emerging

Trends in Naval Warfare: Nigerian Navy Perspective”, A paper presented

by Syndicate 4, Course 26, 2004.

4. US Naval Institute: Proceedings, (Annapolis: March 2005), p. 60.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 61.

7. William Reitzel, Sea Power and Maritime Affairs on the use of the

Sea, (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1974), p. 11.

8. Ibid.

9. US Naval Institute, Op cit, March 1998, p.165

10. Ibid.

11. South African White Paper: “Defence in a Democracy”, p. 6.

12. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (Lagos: Federal

government Press,1999).

13. The Sailor Magazine, “Repositioning the NN to Meet Emerging

National Security”, (Abuja: March 2006), p. 18.

14. The Sailor Magazine, Op. Cit.

15. AFCSC, Op. Cit.

16. The Sailor Magazine, Op. Cit.

17. Discussion with the Commanding Officer NNS DELTA at Warri

on the need to Restructure Training in the NN on 23 Dec 06.

18. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

15. This chapter discusses some related research works and other

published materials, including those of the internet. The key variables of

the study, which include navies, restructuring, training and emerging

operational challenges are conceptualized. Thereafter the relationship

between training and operational challenges is established. Finally, the

chapter identifies the gap in literature which the study seeks to fill.

NAVIES

16. The Encarta Dictionary defines a navy as “the sea going military,

that is a branch of a country‟s armed forces that fights using warships.”1

Navies are used by the state as an instrument for policy and for the

nation‟s maritime defence. According to Afolayan, “navies are

established by maritime states to protect commerce.”2 Mahan, a 20

th

century maritime strategist, invented the term „Sea Power‟ which

propagated a strong navy to enable control of commerce.3 Navies can be

categorized depending on the size and capability.

17. Morris categorized navies into nine ranks, namely: major global

force projection (complete), major global force projection (partial),

medium global force projection, medium regional force projection,

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adjacent force projection, offshore territorial defence, inshore territorial

defence, constabulary and token navies.4 Morris ranked the US Navy as the

only complete major force projection navy, the former USSR as partial

force projection while Britain and France were placed at the third rug as

medium global force projection navies.5 Booth offered another

classification based on geographical reach. He classified navies as global,

ocean going, contiguous seas and coastal seas navies. The NN was

classified as a coastal navy by Booth. 6

Both classifications show that the

navies in sub-Saharan Africa are ranked amongst the lowest cadres of the

world‟s maritime forces. In Morris ranking, the NN was placed in the fifth

category as an offshore territorial defence navy.7 In this study, a navy is

defined as a sea going armed force that is used by the state as an

instrument of policy and for the nation‟s maritime defence.

RESTRUCTURING

18. According to Lapiana Association, “restructuring implies re-

organization of a system in a new and different way.”8 Wikipedia says that

restructuring is the corporate management term for the act of naturally

dismantling and re-organizing a company for the purpose of making it

more efficient and therefore more profitable.9 This is to enable it meet the

corporate objective. The characteristics of restructuring include, changes in

the management, outsourcing such items as technical support and re-

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organization of functions.10

Organizations that have been restructured

effectively will generally be leaner, more efficient, better organized and

focused on its core business.

19. The restructuring process addresses issues pertaining to the strategic

vision. Some of the questions that require answers are; what are the

benefits, how does it affect the personnel and what areas are being

restructured? Other questions will be, who will effect the restructuring? Is

there a set model for the restructuring, what areas will be affected and at

what cost?11

A restructuring effort that is not aimed at enhancing the

mission of the organization will be baseless. In this study, restructuring is

defined as the reorganization of a system to enable it meet its corporate

objectives efficiently. This definition is apt because while the NN may be

doing some restructuring, it will not be completely dismantling the existing

structure nor be putting in place a completely new and different system.

TRAINING

20. The Nigerian Armed Forces training manual defines training as the

act of instructing personnel to individually and collectively increase their

capability to perform specific military functions and tasks.12

The manual

further states that the development of capabilities or skills could be achieved

through daily work experience or as a consequence of systematic training

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programme. This definition does not address the selection processes in

training. Training emphasizes knowledge of processes and skills necessary

for effective performance.13

Training can help secure increased profits,

lower cost and risk, but will not solve problems of faulty organization,

remedy unsound initial selection nor impact anything if the personnel do not

want to learn.14

21. While stressing the importance of training in the military, Douglas

warned that “in no profession are the penalties for employing untrained

personnel as appalling and irrevocable as in the military.”15

In most

instances training includes the selection or recruitment process.16

Ogunbameru posits that training implies preparations for a specific task or

role by ordered instructions and that it is a process whereby people acquire

capabilities to aid in the achievement of a goal.17

He asserts that, “a training

need exists when the gap between actual and required performance is met

economically by training intervention.”18

Training therefore aims to change

behaviour at the work place in order to stimulate efficiency and higher

performance standard.

22. Another writer, Maduabum opines that the need for training is a result

of a gap between the kind of performance or competence an employee has

and the kind of performance or competence which he or she is expected to

have. The gap or need he says grows out of operating problems.19

Pigor and

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14

Myers say that training can help employees to develop their ability to learn

and adapt skills to new work methods, thus learning to use new kinds of

equipment and adjusting to major changes in job content.20

They aver that,

“in a world where technology advances continue to change, learnability,

versatility and adaptability may well be the most important advantages

derived from training.”21

Synthesizing the aforementioned definitions and

clarifications brings out three features, namely, training is a process; to

learn a skill; to meet performance or competence gap. Therefore in this

study, training is defined as the formal process of acquiring skills or

competence to meet operational obligations in an organisation.

EMERGING OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

23. The concept of emerging operational challenges will be approached

by first understanding the words that make up the variable. These words

are; emerging, operational and challenge. The Oxford Dictionary defines

emerging as something coming out of darkness.22

Akpan posits that

emerging bothers on issues or situations just coming into prominence.23

Emerging in this study is therefore seen as issues or situations just coming

into prominence.

24. The word operational is derived from „operation‟ which means a

mission designed to meet military objectives.24

The mission may be

strategic, tactical, or even of a training nature. An operation can be combat

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or logistical.25

Operational can be used to describe equipment such as

tanks, aircraft and ships when they are in a state of repair good enough to

make them immediately useable.26

Keane says that operational can be used

in such ways as operational area, operational art, operational effectiveness

and operational readiness amongst others.27

It can further be utilized as

operational challenges. This study adopts Keane‟s definition of

operational.

25. Finally, challenge is generally understood as the assertion of

opposition against an individual by a challenger who believes victory is

possible.28

Odumosu asserts that challenge in simple terms means

summons to take part in a contest or a trial of strength or a summon to

prove or justify something, or a call to respond.29

He says challenge could

also mean objection, opposition, confrontation, defiance, resistance and to

thwart.30

The word challenge is associated with difficulties of human

endeavors. Akpan identifies some of these challenges to include insecurity,

terrorism, hostage taking, illegal bunkering, sea piracy or robbery, illegal

fishing, oil and gas pipeline vandalization in the maritime areas, youth

militancy amongst others.31

In this study, challenge is defined as all issues

or conditions which constitute resistance or thwart purposefulness to

perform statutory duties.

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26. Emerging operational challenge in this study is defined as all issues

or conditions just coming into prominence which constitute resistance or

which thwart operational duties. This can further be explained as any

untoward activities coming into prominence that militate against

operational duties.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAINING AND

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

27. The need for training is to fill the competence gap existing between

when an employee is engaged and the competence that is expected by the

organisation.32

Through training, employees can develop their ability to

adapt new skills that will close the existing gap. Operational effectiveness

means the combat readiness of platforms and personnel. Operational

effectiveness relies not only on ships and equipment alone but by the

preparedness of the men and their reserves in manpower and training

terms.33

Orji opined that apart from the importance of working equipment,

operational effectiveness relies on availability of expertise and well trained

personnel to operate ships.34

Expertise and experience of personnel stem

from good training which leads to overcoming operational challenges.

28. Carl Von Clausewitz said that the teaching of tactics is right input

for war.35

Therefore, training plays important role in recommending

strategy and tactics that are required to overcome operational challenges.36

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17

The relationship between training and operational challenges becomes

obvious because effective training directly affects operational challenges

positively. That is, if training is effective, the challenges in operations

become minimized or surmountable. Therefore, if there are emerging

challenges there would be need to train or retrain personnel to meet the

new challenges.

REVIEW OF SOME EXISTING LITERATURE

29. A number of studies have been undertaken, particularly over the last

few years on NN training. Akingbemila in 2005 appraised NN sea training

and maritime warfare and raised the need for training to be modernized.37

His study was however restricted to conventional operations including sea

training only. In a sea power symposium held at the AFCSC in 2004 on

adapting training in the NN to meet emerging trends in naval warfare, the

participants upheld that trained and knowledgeable manpower are the

backbone of modern warfare. Though some of the emerging challenges

were identified, the study focused on cost savings as a result of local

training and information technology.38

It failed to appraise the practical

realities on the ground vis-à-vis the operational tasks.

30. The NN Training Policy of 1996 reveals obvious gaps in various

areas. Unlike in most renowned schools where there are established school

boards to regulate and advice on training standards, NN professional

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schools lack school boards. The professional advice which school boards

readily proposes to the appropriate authority is therefore not available.

31. Though each of the above work or literature has important addition

to knowledge on NN training, none of them addressed training with respect

to the emerging operational challenges of the NN. This study sets out to fill

that particular void in the existing literature and knowledge.

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19

NOTES

1. Microsoft Encarta (2005).

2. SO Afolayan, “Nigerian Navy”, a lecture delivered at Abuja

Nigeria to NWC Participants Course 11, 2001, p.5.

3. William Murray et al, Making of Strategy, (Cambridge: Oxford

University Press, 1994), p. 1.

4. AT Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies, (London:

Macmillan, 1987), p. 24.

5. Ibid.

6. FD Akpan, “The Challenges of the Nigerian Navy in Sub-Regional

Defence”, NWC Project Course 11, 2003.

7. GTA Adekeye, “Nigerian Navy in National Defence”, Lecture

delivered to NWC Course 15, January 2007.

8. Lapiana Association, “Restructuring”, http:.//www.lapiana.org

/resources/ hpleadership/ 06a_ 2004 . html accessed 27 Jan 07.

9. Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia, http//www.wikipedia/restructuring.

.org.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. MPRI Review on Nigerian Armed Forces Training Manual.

13. OA Ogunbameru, Organization Dynamics, (Ibadan: Spectrum

Books Ltd, 2004), p. 256.

14. Ibid., p. 259

15. EAK Akingbemila, “Sea Training and Maritime Warfare in the

21st Century: An Appraisal of the NN”, NWC Course 13 Project, 2005.

16. HA Efenudu, “Naval Training Requirements”, a paper presented at

Naval Training Command Training Seminar, 14 Dec 05.

17. OA Ogunbameru, Op. Cit.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. M Pigors and G Myers, Personnel Administration, A Point of View

and a Method, Ninth Edition, (London: Mdraw-Hill International, 1994),

p. 27.

21. Ibid.

22. Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary, 6th Edition.

23. FD Akpan, Op. Cit.

24. Michael Keane, Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics,

(Annapolis, Maryland: New Institute Press, 2005), p. 144.

25 . Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 145.

27. Ibid.

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28. Dele Ezeoba, “Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea Commission:

Challenges for the Nigerian Navy”, NWC Project, Course 13, 2004.

29. O Odumosu, “Armed Attack on Shipping in the Niger Delta:

Challenges for the Nigerian Navy”, NWC Project, Course 13, 2005.

30. Ibid.

31. FD Akpan, “Repositioning NN Training to meet Emerging

Challenges”, Paper presented at CNS Training Seminar, 2006. p.4

32. O Odumosu, Op. Cit.

33. IF Jenkins, quoted in , “Local Refit in the Nigerian Navy: A

Critical Analysis”, NWC Project paper Course 11, Jul 2002, p.10.

34. JC Orji, “Local Refit and Ship Operational Efficiency: The

Nigerian Navy Experience”, NWC Project Course 10, 2000, p. 14.

35. Raja Mennon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars, (London:

Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 4.

36. Ibid.

37. EAK Akingbemila, Op. Cit.

38. AFCSC, “Adapting Training in the NN to meet Emerging Trends in

Naval Warfare: Nigerian Navy Perspective”, Seapower Symposium 2004.

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CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL

CHALLENGES IN THE NIGERIAN NAVY

32. The concept of training in any navy is an important factor in the

operations of that navy. This is because a navy ought to train as it plans to

operate.1 Training needs form the manpower skill pre-requisite necessary

for the navy‟s operations.2 This chapter therefore sought to discuss how

adequate the present NN training has been in meeting the emerging

operational challenges. This includes discussion of the structures of

training, those charged with training responsibilities and the training

establishments. The challenges confronting NN training are also

highlighted in this chapter.

33. To be able to establish the adequacy of the NN training concept,

the present NN training policy is discussed. The objective is to be able to

appraise if there are any shortcomings that will require updating or on the

other hand if a complete new policy needs to be put in place.

NIGERIAN NAVY TRAINING POLICY

34. The NN Training Policy is based on the concept that, training is

all encompassing and should be the focal point of the Navy‟s operational

efficiency.3 The strategy is based essentially on human resource

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development with a view to achieving the cardinal points of NN Trident

Strategy which are: coastal defence, sea control and sealift. Coastal

defence involves protection of the sea approaches and vital economic and

military installations. The objective of sea control is to secure sea areas

for NN operations such as power projection, while sealift involves NN

capability to provide logistic support and naval gunfire support in

amphibious operations.4 The policy aims at achieving the objective of the

NN Trident strategy. The NN is therefore committed to dedicating

considerable effort and resources to ensuring that its personnel are

adequately trained in relevant skills.

35. The NN Training Policy thus focuses on three levels of specialist

training for the various cadres of officers and ratings. Its formulation

considered all training options available, so the policy was designed to

meet NN peculiar needs and environment aimed at evolving a balanced

training programme to adequately prepare NN personnel for effective

deployment.5 The training policy which was promulgated in 1996, seeks to

achieve the following objectives:6

a. To produce personnel with relevant professional and

technical knowledge and to develop in them a commitment to

those moral qualities required for leadership as defined by the

ideals of duty, honour and service to the nation.

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b. To ensure the combat readiness and operational efficiency of

the NN operational units and support elements.

c. To encourage regular joint operations with the sister

Services in order to keep abreast with the current battle plans of the

different arms of the Services.

36. Though the policy appears adequate, it still falls short in contents

and methodology. The policy does not provide the avenue for the

establishment of professional boards for the NN professional schools. It is

also tailored towards meeting the objectives of the NN Trident Strategy

which involves only conventional operations. Aside this, the training

policy is over ten years old and unreviewed because the appropriate

office failed to perform its responsibility. In the NN Training Policy, the

training pattern is categorized into; basic military training, specialist

training and professional military training.7 This study examined each of

the training pattern as follows:

a. Basic Military Training. This entails pure basic

military training in areas such as drills, discipline, procedure, small

arms handling, dress regulation, divisional duties, physical

education and civics. The objective is the regimentation of the

individual. In the NN, basic military training is conducted at the

Nigerian Navy Basic Training School (NNBTS) Onne, for ratings

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and the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) Kaduna for officers.

The structures to embark on these basic trainings in the two

establishments are adequate.

b. Specialist Training. According to the Training Policy,

specialist training is given to both officers and ratings to prepare

them for their individual branches and trades. For example, the

officers will attend the sub-technical course (STC), officers long

course (OLC) for seamen officers and application courses for

engineers etc. Each of the Branches conduct their specialization

courses accordingly. Courses such as principal warfare are

categorized as Advanced Specialist Courses by the Training Policy.

On the other hand, ratings are trained in various skills to fit into

their particular trades. The specialist training level is adequate if

well implemented. This training affords the personnel

specialization skills which may not necessarily be pure military

duties.

c. Professional Military Training. The word „military‟

relates to soldiers or warlike activities.8 Military professionalism

could be defined as, “the professional expertise acquired by the

members of the Armed Forces in order to perform military

duties.”9 These skills are acquired through training and systematic

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exposure to duty.10

Therefore professional military training may be

defined as skills acquired in order to perform military duties.

Professional military training may be considered to include areas

such as more advanced land warfare and irregular operations which

are not covered in the present policy. The NN emerging operational

challenges include military warfare in the Creeks or brown waters.

37. The NN Training Policy therefore requires re-structuring in the

following areas:

a. Addition to the courses that fall under specialist training.

The new courses may include advanced weapon handling, unarmed

combat, small boats operations, land and creek warfare and anti-

terrorism among others.

b. Inclusion of professional boards in NN professional schools

to serve on advisory levels. This will enable maintenance of high

level of the course contents and monitoring of procedures and

standards. The boards will advise on the need for periodic reviews

and assessment as necessary.

c. The policy could emphasis instruction in irregular warfare.

DEPARTMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING

IN THE NIGERIAN NAVY

38. The responsibility for training in the NN lies with particular

departments who have been tasked accordingly. These departments or

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offices include those of the Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP) at

the Naval Headquarters (NHQ), the Flag Officer Commanding Naval

Training Command (FOC NAVTRAC) and the Flag Officer

Commanding Sea Training Command (FOST).11

CHIEF OF TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

39. The CTOP answers to the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) in all

areas of training, both locally and abroad. The CTOP is responsible for

identifying the training needs and prepares the NN foreign training

budget.12

Other functions of the CTOP include the formulation and

implementation of policy guidelines for the overall training effectiveness.

The quality and standard of training depends on the decisions, actions and

instructions passed down and which affect recruitments, training, drafting

of ratings and appointments of officers from NHQ. It is expected that the

CTOP initiates the need for the training policy review as necessary. The

CTOP is assisted by the Director of Training (DOT) at the NHQ. It was

revealed that the jobs performed at the directorate are mostly routine.

There is hardly any research done to ascertain if the impact of training on

NN Personnel reflects in the operational challenges.13

The need for a

review in training policy, if necessary, is expected to be addressed

through the Training and Operations Branch. Unfortunately, this has not

been done because the present NN Training policy has remained

unreviewed for over ten years despite its numerous lapses.

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40. The CTOP agreed that there is need to upgrade training to meet

operational challenges, but insisted that the present training policy is

adequate.14

On the contrary, some of the inadequacies observed in the

policy included non-provision of avenues for reviews, assessment and the

non-existence of Boards for the professional schools. The CTOP also

agreed that there is a need for Special Forces to be trained and that the

forces could involve Special Boat operations, oil rig protection and

counter insurgency operations.15

Of course Special Force Training is not

covered in the present policy. This clearly shows that there is a need to

restructure NN training to include the suggested additions which became

necessary because of the emerging operational challenges.

NAVAL TRAINING COMMAND (NAVTRAC)

41. NAVTRAC was established vide NNO 06/87.16

The Command is

headed by a Flag Officer (FOC NAVTRAC). He is charged with the

centralized control, execution and superintendence of local training of

NN personnel and coordinating and harmonizing the training doctrine,

concepts and standards.17

FOC NAVTRAC is answerable to the NHQ.

Other functions of FOC NAVTRAC include the management of training

schools within the NN and the administration of NN personnel attending

courses in local civil institutions. NAVTRAC is also tasked with

harmonizing the training doctrine, concepts and standards in the NN. In

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achieving this, some of the command responsibility may involve

establishment of parameters to monitor the value of training vis-à-vis the

current operational challenges. This may be done by establishing a

feedback system between the operational commands and NAVTRAC,

because there is the need to know whether the personnel being trained are

well skilled for the jobs on the field.

42. The FOC NAVTRAC emphasized the need for adequate training aids

for the schools.18

Interviews with the commanding officers NNS QUORRA

in Lagos and NNBTS at Onne, Rivers State corroborated the

FOCNAVTRAC desire for the requirements for training aids as the schools

lacked training aids. The FOC opined that with more training aids and

funding, the present NN training programme is adequate to beef up present

NN personnel skills to meet the challenges to the NN in the Niger Delta

area.19

Thus, the present training mode is theoretical due to dearth of

training aids. More practical training is required. Provision of adequate

training aids and funding could improve the situation.

SEA TRAINING COMMAND (STC)

43. The STC was established on 17 February 2003, vide NNO 03/03

and charged with the following:20

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a. Design and promulgation of appropriate documents for

continuation training for various classes of ships.

b. Provision of familiarization pre-joining training for potential

sea command staff.

c. Design and implementation of shake-up schedules for NN

ships not due for work-up.

d. Design and implementation of basic sub-specialist training

programme onboard NN ships during work-up.

e. Planning and development of sea training command facilities

to provide advanced operation and tactical training for NN ships.

f. Provision of logistics support for ships for sea training and

work-up.

g. Direct liaison with other authorities such as Nigerian Port

Authority (NPA), Western Naval Command (WNC) and Eastern

Naval Command (ENC) for ships exercise programme aimed at

continuation training in ship‟s movement.

44. The responsibility for sea training rests on the STC and on –the-job

training (OJT) onboard ships under the operational commands. The Flag

Officer Sea Training (FOST) complements other training to meet NN

training standard and objectives. The STC is presently under-staffed and

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under utilized.21

Work-up of ships which should be a routine matter are

not regularly carried out as the ships are just becoming operational.

45. The FOST posits that though the tasks of the FOST are laudable in

line with the NNO establishing the command, a lot still needs to be put in

place to achieve the objectives. He agreed that the NN personnel require

additional training to be able to adequately respond to the new

operational challenges especially in the Niger Delta area. Furthermore, he

stated that although some training has commenced in the area of small

boats handling, its combat implementation is still far from being

achieved.22

From the foregoing, it can be observed that more training in

area of Small Boat Operations is required for NN personnel in the face of

the evolving challenges.

NIGERIAN NAVY TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

46. The NN has many establishments tasked with training. Presently

there are 6 major schools that conduct both basic and professional

courses. These are as follow:

a. Nigerian Navy Basic Training School (NNBTS), Onne.

b. Nigerian Naval College (NNC) Onne.

c. Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS) QUORRA, Apapa.

d. Nigerian Navy Engineering College (NNEC), Sapele.

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e. Nigerian Navy Finance and Logistics School (NNLS),

Owerrinta.

f. Nigerian Navy Hydrographic School, Borokiri, Port

Harcourt.

There are other detached schools under NNS QUORRA which include

Nigerian Navy Music School, Otta, and the Nigerian Navy Medical

School at Offa in Kwara State.

NIGERIAN NAVY BASIC TRAINING SCHOOL (NNBTS) ONNE

47. The NNBTS was formerly known as NNS AKASO and was

commissioned in May 1975 as a Navy Operational Base in Port Harcourt.

It was eventually changed to a training base when the Basic Seamanship

Training School (BSTS) and Nigerian Navy Technical School (NNTS)

were established in 1976 and 1981 respectively and tendered to the then

NNS AKASO. The Basic and Divisional School (B&D) in Apapa, Lagos

was also carrying out similar functions to those of BSTS. In order to avoid

duplication of efforts and to streamline NN basic training, the B&D School

was merged with BSTS in 1986.23

As a result of the merger NNBTS

assumed a new responsibility of training all new entrant ratings recruited

into the NN. Annually NNBTS trains an average of 750 trainees.24

The

NNBTS objective is to provide initial basic military training to enable the

ratings fit into the NN Service.

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48. The CO NNBTS observed that there has been improvement in the

training standard in the school due to the good attitude of the instructors

and trainees.25

He however opined that there is a need for training in oil

rig protection, counter terrorism and ground weapon handling in NN.26

Thus, NNBTS graduates require further training before they can be

deployed for land/creek operations. Therefore, at the basic level of

training, there may be need to introduce subjects such as oil rig

protection, counter terrorism awareness and adequate training on small

arms handling. Thereafter, graduates of NNBTS irrespective of trade

could be returned for further professional military training that may

prepare them for operational engagement in land/creek warfare in line

with the emerging operational challenges.

NIGERIAN NAVAL COLLEGE (NNC) ONNE

49. The NNC Onne was established to train naval cadets. However the

role of the College was reviewed to meet new requirements of the NN

such as conduct of naval professional training for the Nigerian Defence

Academy (NDA) cadets during the summer holidays.27

It also conducts

management training for officers on Sub-Technical Course and Special

Duty List Qualifying Course. Others are Direct Short Service Course

(DSSC), Post Commissioning and Midshipman Phase I Training. NNC is

an officer training institution to enhance naval proficiency. The school

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however does not have some necessary aids like training ship or training

boats.

50. The Commandant, NNC Onne observed that training at the Naval

College has remained very theoretical for years since there are no training

aids. The College has no boat for seamanship training and there is also no

training ship. He opined that the officers under training (UTO) are therefore

not getting the practical seamanship necessary for a good professional

foundation.28

51. It was therefore revealed that up-to-date training facilities including

training boats and ship are not available in the College. The trainee

officers therefore are not acquainting themselves with the environment

they are to operate on, in the future and thus enhance their operational

proficiency.

NIGERIAN NAVY SHIP QUORRA

52. NNS QUORRA is the main hub of seaman training in the NN. The

School is made up of the various professional schools charged with the

responsibilities of providing professional and advanced professional

training for both officers and ratings in the NN. The school also has in

addition specialist schools like the Medical, Music, Computer,

Instructional Technique and Physical Training Schools. The professional

schools at NNS QUORRA; are:

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a. Above Water Warfare School (AWWS).

b. Under Water Warfare School (UWWS).

c. Navigation and Direction School (ND).

d. Communication School.

It is desirable that the AWWS be co-located with a Special Force school

that would be established.

53. NNS QUORRA‟s scope of studies presently addresses

conventional war and not irregular warfare as the situation presently is in

the Niger Delta area. The School adequately trains for manning of the big

warships. The CO NNS QUORRA opined that though training in the

school is going smoothly; there is dearth of training aids which would

have added to the effectiveness.29

He suggested a need for the

establishment of a Specialist School to address challenges in the area of

asymmetric warfare including terrorism. He further stated that though the

scope of training at NNS QUORRA can address challenges of manning

and fighting the ship in the NN, it does not meet challenges in creeks and

brown water warfare.30

The school currently does not train in irregular

warfare.31

To be able to meet the challenges in creek warfare and

asymmetric fighting, some Special Forces courses need to be instructed in

the school.

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NIGERIAN NAVY HYDROGRAPHIC SCHOOL

54. The Nigerian Navy Hydrographic School (NNHS) is located in

Port Harcourt, Rivers State. The school provides training for survey

recorders. It also conducts course in basic hydrography. However the

school presently trains only ratings in survey recorder classes 2 and 3.

The OIC Hydro-School highlighted the sorry state of the school and its

facilities. He stated that a lot of letters have been written requesting for

the upgrading of facilities in the school.32

He said the school was very

relevant since it provides necessary knowledge and skill to personnel in

the hydrographic department. The hydro-school in Port Harcourt could be

reinvigorated by reequipping it with up-to-date facilities. Apart from this,

the syllabus of the school is adequate33

.

NIGERIAN NAVY ENGINEERING COLLEGE (NNEC)

55. The NNEC is located at Sapele in Delta State. The School runs

several engineering courses which include the following:34

a. Basic Marine Engineering Course.

b. Weapon Electrical Engineering Course.

c. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Damage Control Courses.

d. Officers‟ Application Course.

e. Intermediate Level Maintenance Course.

f. Petty Officer and Leading Hand Qualifying Courses.

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The NNEC is the hub of the NN engineering courses. The school is well

equipped with facilities though may require upgrade of her facilities.35

The NNEC is an engineering school but may need to introduce some

form of basic training in irregular warfare in its syllabus.

NIGERIAN NAVY FINANCE AND LOGISTIC SCHOOL (NNFLS)

56. The Nigerian Navy Finance and Logistic School (NNFLS) is

located at Owerrinta in Abia State. The school trains personnel in three

departments namely; Store Management, Catering and Writers. The

courses offered in the school include professional qualifying courses for

Leading Hands and Petty Officers. Others are Refresher courses for Petty

Officers and Warrant Officers. In addition Sub-Lieutenant Technical

Courses, Junior Officers Account and Budget/Logistic Course, Medical

Store Accounting and Advanced Certificate Courses are offered.36

The

NNFLS does not presently train personnel on naval operation matters. It

may however be necessary for some basic irregular warfare courses to be

included in the syllabus for purpose of orientation.

57. In addition to the interviews with authorities responsible for

training and heads of training establishments, this study sought the views

of two Commanding officers of operational bases, one each from the

western and eastern naval Commands. These operational bases are the

end users of the trained manpower from NN Schools who are involved in

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creek and land operations. The purpose was to establish if the end

products of NN schools are adequately trained for the tasks they perform.

a. Unstructured Interview with Commanding officer (CO)

NNS PATHFINDER. NNS PATHFINDER is an operational base

in the Eastern Naval Command located in Portharcourt. The base is

charged with riverine patrols and internal security duties in its Area

of Responsibility (AOR). The research revealed that the manpower

available is not adequately skilled to handle some of the operations

they are involved with. 37

There was a strong opinion for the need

for Special Forces to be trained mostly in the area of creek

warfare.38

b. Unstructured Interview with CO NNS BEECROFT. NNS

BEECROFT is an operational base in the Western Naval

Command located in Apapa, Lagos. The base is a direct user of

graduates of NN Schools. The interview revealed that the

manpower required in the base both in terms of number and skill is

inadequate. 39

The discrepancies between the type of training

offered by NN Schools and the job schedules in some areas was

highlighted. It was generally suggested that the Navy need to train

Special Forces especially in brown water operations, counter

terrorism and insurgency operations.40

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58. Strong reasons emerged during the interviews to necessitate a

review of NN training or a complete restructure to enable present

challenges to be addressed appropriately. The includes the fact that the

creeks where NN personnel were not factored into the training module

presently used. Aside from this, the threats are now more militant and

dangerous.

ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIAN NAVY TRAINING FOR

EMERGING OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

59. The analysis of the NN Training Policy and the training

establishments, revealed that the present course contents do not adequately

address the operational challenges presently faced by the NN. Therefore, the

training processes or pattern may require some restructuring. For example, a

rating or officer that graduates from NNBTS or NNC, is only exposed to

basic conventional military training in their area of specialization. If such a

personnel is drafted onboard an operational base, and is deployed for creek

patrols, it can easily be concluded that an inadequately trained personnel is

being deployed for such a task. There is therefore a need to establish

appropriate department or school which are expected to conduct specialized

courses such as creek and land operations as may be necessary.

60. Escort duties are common responsibilities carried out by NN

operational bases in the Niger Delta area. Available evidence revealed

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that none of the syllabi in the training establishment outline procedures

by escort patrol boats. An incident onboard NNS DELTA by a naval

patrol boat escorting oil company‟s convoy proved fatal as the patrol was

easily ambushed by militant youths. During a gun battle that ensued, the

NN lost four personnel including a commander.41

This incident was

traced to inadequate platform, ammunition and inappropriate tactics by

the naval escort boat.42

Apart from overwhelming fire power from the

militant youth, there was also failure of tactics by the naval patrol boat.43

Therefore, the present training in the NN cannot adequately meet the

emerging operational challenges. There is thus a need to restructure the

training concept in line with the emerging scenario.

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE NN TRAINING

61. Various challenges confront the navy‟s training. The challenges

identified in this study include inadequate training objective in the

training policy, absence of training establishment for land/creek warfare

and special operations and inappropriate training environment.

62. Inadequate Training Objectives in the Training Policy. The

present training policy was formulated to address the challenges of the

NN Trident Strategy which primarily focuses on conventional warfare

and policing duties. The policy does not address areas such as oil rig

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protection, creek patrols and unconventional warfare amongst others. It

also does not make provision for overseeing boards for each individual

professional schools and procedure for review. One of the challenges

confronting NN training is therefore inadequate training objectives in the

training policy.

63. Absence of a Training School for Special Forces. Evolving

scenarios in modern military operations readily point to the need for

specialized training. Asymmetric warfare, a term used to describe a

military situation in which two belligerent of unequal strength interact

and take advantage of their respective strengths and weaknesses involves

strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional warfare.44

Countries like Nigeria where continuing internal security problems are

prevalent, should put structures in place to enhance inshore support

capabilities in meeting the insecurity problems by involving in irregular

warfare procedures.45

These inshore support facilities require special

training for the personnel. The NN may therefore need to include the

training of Special Forces to handle the inshore challenges in the coastal

parts of Nigeria. This will require the acquisition of appropriate training

platforms.

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64. Appropriate Training Environment. Another challenge to

training in the NN is inappropriate training environment. The surrounding

where a person undergoes a course of instruction or direction to a large

extent affects the expected productivity.46

Training environment could

either be external or internal. When it is internal, it deals with those

factors within the training establishment which affects training

activities.47

The external environment on the other hand includes factors

such as locations of the establishment, approaches to establishment,

weather, host communities and political activities.48

The location of the

Nigerian Navy AWWS at NNS QUORRA in Lagos for example may not

have satisfied a good training environment. A one time OIC of the school

pointed to the fact that, training activities in various areas are hindered

because of inadequate and inappropriate land area for exercise.49

65. Deduction: An AWWS that trains in IS and land operations is

expected to have the advantage of large land exercise area. The Indian

Naval Ship (INS) DRONACHRYA of the Indian Navy does not just have

the advantage of land area, it also enjoys proximity of the Indian Ocean

Sea coast where it practices live firing.50

The NN is expected to seek for a

relocation of the AWWS to another location accordingly. An appropriate

environment could therefore be considered before the training in

conventional warfare can commence.

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NOTES

1. Military Professional Resource Initiative (MPRI) Manual on

Nigerian Armed Forces Training.

2. Ibid.

3. Nigerian Navy Training Policy (1996), pp. 1-2.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Webster Reference Library, Concise Edition, Dictionary and

Thesaurus (Scotland: Dale House, 2006)

9. JWT Gbor, Military Intervention and Military Professionalism,

quoted in Col AS Kele, “Military Professionalism and Challenges for the

Armed Forces”, NWC Abuja Project, 2005. p. 17.

10. Ibid.

11. Nigerian Navy Training Policy, Op. Cit.

12. Ibid.

13. Discussion with the Acting Director of Training, NHQ, Abuja by

the Researcher on 20 Feb 07.

14. Ibid.

15. Unstructured interview with CTOP, NHQ, Abuja on 5 Dec 06

16. Ibid.

17. AFCSC: Seapower Symposium; Adapting Training to Emerging

Trends in Naval Warfare: Nigerian Navy Perspective: 2004.

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18. FOC NAVTRAC, R/Adm FD Akpan in an interview granted the

Researcher on Training in the NN, Lagos on 15 December 2006.

19. Ibid.

20. EAK Akingbemila, “Sea Training and Maritime Warfare in the

21st Century: An Appraisal of the NN”, NWC Course 13 Project, 2005.

21. FOST, R/Adm N Dirisu in a telephone interview granted the

Researcher on Training in the NN, Lagos on 15 December 2006.

22. Ibid.

23. NNBTS Commanding Officer‟s Handling Over Notes, Aug 06.

24. Ibid.

25. Unstructured Interview with Capt S I Alade Commanding Officer

NNBTS in Port Harcourt on 20 December 2006.

26. Ibid.

27. Telephone Interview with Cdre PE Egwuonwu Commandant NNC

in Port Harcourt on 20 December 2006.

28. Ibid.

29. Unstructured Interview with Capt JO Aikhomu Commanding

Officer NNS QUORRA on 15 December 2006 in Lagos.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Telephone Interview with Capt Mustapha OIC Hydrographic

School by Phone on 21 December 2006.

33. Ibid.

34. AFCSC, Seapower Symposium, Op. Cit. p. 16.

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35. Ibid., p. 18.

36. Ibid.

37. Unstructured interview with Capt I Ibuwariso Commanding officer

NNS PATHFINDER in Portharcort on 21 December 2996.

38. Ibid.

39. Unstructured interview with Capt A Ikioda Commanding officer,

NNS BEECROFT in Lagos on 17 December 2006.

40. Ibid.

41. NNS DELTA signal DTG 131105 Jul 06.

42. Telephone discussion with Capt Ajibade CO NNS DELTA on 11

Mar 07.

43. Ibid.

44. Arreguim – Toff Ivan, How the Week win Wars? A Theory of

Asymmetric Conflict, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press (e-book).

45. US Naval Institute, Proceeding, March 1989, p.165.

46. HA Efenudu, “Naval Training Requirements”, a paper presented at

Naval Training Command Training Seminar, 14 Dec 05.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Discussion with Capt Itoko in Abuja with regards to the location

of the NN AWWS on 11 Mar 07.

50. HA Efenudu, Naval Training Recruitment,” a paper presented at

Naval Training Command Training Seminar, 14 Dec 2005.

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CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIES FOR RESTRUCTURING TRAINING IN THE

NIGERIAN NAVY TO MEET EMERGING OPERATIONAL

CHALLENGES.

66. This chapter proffers strategies for restructuring training in the NN.

This was to enable NN training to fully address the evolving operational

challenges. The ability of a force to attain the desired standards of

proficiency depends largely on its policy, implementation and

coordination. The implementation of a training policy will depend on

determination and adherence to certain parameters like curricula,

procedure and assessment of the training programme. This chapter will

discuss these parameters.

STRATEGIES

67. The strategies will involve the NHQ to first review the present

training policy in the areas of including training in irregular warfare,

establishing advisory boards, setting modalities for review and structuring

in such a way that it can easily be implemented. Secondly, the NN will

need to establish training in irregular warfare. This is because, future

warriors are expected to be as proficient in irregular operation, including

counterinsurgency and stabilization operations as they are today in high

intensity combat.1 There is also the need to relocate the AWWS presently

onboard NNS QUORRA to a better environment. In addition, graduates

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of NNBTS irrespective of specialization could attend the basic special

forces course after one year of graduation for a short duration. This is to

consolidate their military bearings and fighting tenacity when deployed

on purely military duties. On the other hand, officers will be expected to

attend a short duration basic Special Forces course in the ranks of Sub-

Lieutenant and Lieutenants.

REVIEW OF NIGERIAN NAVY TRAINING POLICY

68. It has been identified in this study that the present NN Training

Policy is inadequate in content and will need to be reviewed accordingly.

It falls short in three areas. These include inadequate curricula, lack of

procedure for review and non-provision of professional boards to serve

on advisory roles for the professional schools. The present training policy

provides for the NN roles in conventional warfare only. It does not

provide for instruction on special areas such as terrorism, hostage

situations, asymmetric warfare, land/creek operations, boarding of ships

amongst others. The Policy needs therefore to re-address these

omissions/deficiencies.

69. The new Policy should be more elaborate and clearly spell out the

various types of training, and to who it should be conducted. It also needs

to define who has the responsibility for the various types of training. The

Policy would state in clear terms what training plans are to be made and

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how they are to be executed and assessed. The Policy may prescribe a

methodology for periodic review as necessary to meet emerging

challenges and trends. To implement the strategy, NHQ may need to

convene a Training Policy Review Board with specific instructions on the

observed lapses and the need to adequately address the shortcomings. In

addition certain parameters could be considered. These are enumerated

below.

70. Training Curricula. The training curricula of NN schools ought to

be determined by the Navy’s operational goal or objectives. Today and

future maritime forces are expected to be proficient in irregular warfare

directed at riverine force projection.2 Therefore, the course content for all

professional NN schools should be revisited with the objective of

updating same. The additional course content need include studies in

areas such as terrorism, peace support operations, land and creek

operations, oil rig protection, counter insurgency, boarding of big ships at

sea, small boat handling and such special training as may be necessary.

71. Training Procedure. No matter how a training programme

may seem, it is unlikely to attain the desired standard of proficiency if not

carefully planned, executed and regularly assessed. The desired hours of

training that need to be allocated to a particular course is expected to be

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considered in line with the general objective. The science of developing a

training plan is expected to consider ease of implementation and cost

implications. Training ought to be made for short, medium and long term

purposes.3

a. Long and Medium Term Training Plans. Long term

training plan is expected to be published by Naval Headquarters

sufficiently in advance. This will help to develop and integrate

large number of subordinate plans. In the NN, this plan is expected

to be included in the Training directive. Medium training policy

plans ought to be published by the Commander, who needs to

define in further details the broad guidance on training events and

other activities. This plan defines the allocation of resources to

subordinate organisation and provides a common basis for

preparing short term training plans. Thus, plan enables the

commanders and staff to prioritize and refine mission

requirements.

b. Short Term Training Plans. Short term training plans

need to be conducted at unit levels. The plan is to culminate into

detailed training schedules. The schedules will specify when

training starts, where it is to take place, the time allocated. This

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training procedure adherence is necessary in fulfilling the training

curricula.

72. Training Assessment. To be able to determine the effectiveness

of training, a process of evaluation is needed in the NN. Evaluation takes

place when an evaluator visits ongoing training. This helps to provide

immediate feedback on the training environment and the proficiency of

training. Qualified evaluators are to be tasked on these duties. The

feedback will allow commanders to make changes which will lead to

superior training result in the NN. The Navy needs to put in place the

requirement for training evaluators to enable good assessment of training.

73. Professional Boards. There will be need for the NN to

establish professional boards in all the professional schools. The boards

responsibility is to assist in an advisory role in areas of curricula and

training effectiveness. Members of the boards are to be drawn from both

serving and retired naval personnel and notable civilians. This will enable

adequate input from a qualified persons which is expected to enrich the

schools syllabi.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES SCHOOL

74. The need to establish a Special Forces school in the NN has

become necessary based on the current challenges being encountered by

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NN forces. Naval personnel are often required to dislodge militants from

oil platforms and facilities at sea despite the fact that they are not being

trained for such operations. The different encounters with militant youths

and sea robberies by NN patrol boats and the often high casualty rate is

also a result of lack of the necessary special training required for such

tasks. It is therefore desirable that a Special Forces school be established.

75. This Special Forces school when established in the NN, will handle

warfare situations other than conventional warfare. Officers and ratings

trained in the school are expected to make it their specialization or sub-

specialization. There will eventually be a reservoir of personnel for the

NN to meet the challenges evolving.

RELOCATION OF AWWS TO A MORE SUITABLE

ENVIRONMENT

76. The NN AWWS is presently located within NNS QUORRA at

Apapa, Lagos. The opinion of most AWW specialist officers including

one who once served as the officer in charge of the school is that the

present environment is not conducive for the expected training exercises.4

The AWWS is expected to conduct the following courses amongst others:

AWW weapons (including small arms handling) general gunnery,

internal security (IS) guns.5 Most of these highlighted subjects may

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require isolated environment to enable more effective practical

instructions. Facilities such as firing range and land area are a necessity.

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NOTES

1. US Naval Institute, Proceedings, (March 2006), p. 17.

2. Ibid.

3. Center for Naval Analysis, Future Naval Training Environments,

(Alexandria: Virginia, Nov 02), p. 45.

4. Discussion with Capt K Itoko in Abuja on 14 Apr 07.

5. Nigerian Navy Training Policy, Dec 1996, p. 5.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

77. Over the last two decades, the NN has experienced emerging

operational challenges to its operations. The challenges include terrorism,

insurgency, crude oil theft, hostage taking, pipeline vandalization, sea

robberies, youth militancy and destruction of oil exploration facilities

amongst others.

78. The NN inability to effectively tackle these challenges excluding

platforms availability is inadequate skills of its personnel. This inability

stem from the training that has been made available to them.

79. The NN training policy has been found to be inadequate in the

prevailing operational challenges as it dwells entirely on conventional

warfare tactics. The policy is also focused entirely on the NN Trident

Strategy which is now inadequate.

80. NN needs to restructure its training to enable the personnel acquire

the necessary skills required to effectively address the emerging

operational challenges. The training needs to be restructured as follows:

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81. That a Special Forces school need to be established to train and

impact necessary skills on irregular warfare.

82. The AWWS at NNS QUORRA need to be relocated to a more

suitable environment.

83. Ratings ex-NNBTS need to undergo basic Special Forces course

after one year of graduation for a short duration to be determined. All

officers within the rank of sub-Lt and Lt are to undergo a basic Special

Forces course.

84. It is desirable that a Special Forces Corps be established in the NN.

RECOMMENDATIONS

85. It is hereby recommended that:

a. NN should review its Training Policy in the area of module

course content, procedure, assessment guideline and the

requirement for professional boards to oversee the professional

schools in advisory capacity.

b. NN should include training in irregular warfare in its course

content.

c. AWWS NNS QUORRA should be relocated into a more

suitable environment.

d. The NN should establish a Special Forces school in the

Niger Delta area.

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e. A Special Forces Corp be established by the NN

f. Ratings ex-NNBTS should undergo a short course in a

duration to be determined later in irregular warfare after a year of

passing out of NNBTS.

g. Officers of sub-Lieutenant and Lieutenant ranks should

undergo a short course in irregular warfare.

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Akpan FD, “ Repositioning NN Training to meet Emerging Challenges:,

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INTERNET

Lapiana Association Restructuring, http;,//

www.Lapiana.org/resources/hpleadership/06a_2004 html .

Wikipedia the free Encyclopedia, http//www. Wikipedia / restructuring.

org.