Niklas Luhmann as an Empirical Sociologist Meth

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Cybernetics And Human Knowing. Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 9-31

Niklas Luhmann as an Empirical SociologistMethodological Implications of the

System Theory of Society

Cristina Besio1and Andrea Pronzini2

Although its theoretical fruitfulness is widely recognized, Niklas Luhmanns system theory is stillconsidered unable to guide empirical research. We think that this criticism underestimates thepotential of system theory. Starting from the discernment that in the works of Luhmann not onlyepistemological considerations and methodological suggestions, but also the practical application of

methodological procedures, are present we highlight the empirical side of Luhmanns system theory.Research inspired by system theory can be empirical as long as the following prerequisite isfulfilled: the research should embrace epistemological premises which overcome the presumption ofa direct access to the world as it is. The latter should be replaced by the acknowledgment of theexistence of different perspectives and of the contingency of every observation (including empiricalones). At the methodological level this has the consequence that questions of what it is and thecorrelated aim to collect additional data in order to uncover additional facts are no longer central. Onthe contrary, what becomes crucial is the observation of how the world is being observed throughthe contingent criteria of the observed social systems, while relying on the contingent criteria of theobserving social system.

Introduction

Although the system theory of society developed by the German sociologist NiklasLuhmann has been very fruitful in describing typical modern phenomena like science,the market economy, politics and so on, it risks facing a sad destiny: admired anddiscussed by academics interested in the history of sociology on the one side, ignoredby empirical researchers on the other side. Undoubtedly one reason for this is thesame one that caused Parsons sociological theory to be scarcely used in research:Such abstract theoretical approaches are considered unable to steer empiricalinvestigations. Indeed, the methodological aspects are at the core of the confrontationwith Luhmanns theory. In fact, frequently critique of this theory stresses its distancefrom an empirical approach. On the other hand, starting from the recognition of thevalidity of the theoretical construct, many attempts to make system theory usable inempirical social research have flourished (see Bora, 1994; Nassehi, 1998; Nassehi &Saake, 2002; Sutter, 1997; Castrignano, 1992; Schneider, 2000).

Our paper contributes to the discussion on the relationship between system theoryand research methods. We ask: Which characteristics should methods have in order to

1. Cristina Besio, Institute of Sociology, Technische Universitt Berlin, Franklinstr. 28/29, 10587 Berlin, [email protected]

2. Andrea Pronzini, Faculty of Humanities, University of Luzern, Kasernenplatz 3, 6000 Luzern, [email protected]

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2005For personal use only -- not for reproduction


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10 Cristina Besio and Andrea Pronzini

be suitable for system theory? The epistemological innovations introduced by thistheory make it necessary to identify methodological rules that suit its theoreticalarchitecture. In order to be able to reflect on the features of methods we have toprimarily stress the specificity of the epistemological premises of system theory. Inother words, the central nerve of the methodological problem does not consist in themethodology itself, but is deeply rooted in knowledge theory (Luhmann, 1987, p. 36).Within system theory, theory, methodsand empirical reference each have a specificand not the usual meaning. Our first task is to stress this through some reflections onobservation (part 1). In a second step we track down the main tenets of systemicmethodology (part 2). By doing this, we systematize suggestions that can already befound in Luhmanns texts. As a matter of fact, in the works of Luhmann, in addition toclear methodological indications, there is a continuous application of an empirical

method that suits the theory (Besio & Pronzini, 1999; Nassehi, 2000). We will alsopoint out that if the specific methodological assumptions of system theory are takeninto account, empirical procedures which stem from other research traditions can beused in combination with system theory.

1. The epistemological roots of sociological empirical research

1.1 An alternative to the distinction between subject and objectIn order to understand what part methods can play in a research programme guided by

system theory it is crucial to discuss how the relation between observation and realityis understood in this context.

Relying on the work of George Spencer Brown, Luhmann argues that anobservation is possible only because an observer uses a specific distinction in order toindicate one side of that distinction (this and not that, cold and not warm, true and notfalse). The very important consequence is that a direct observation of objects isimpossible. There is no objective and universally valid observation; any observationdepends on the distinction made by an observer: There exists in reality no where forthe there to be. Nor is there any when. All these are constructions of imagination,

inventions of apparently stable formations for the apparent appearances (Spencer-Brown, 1994, pp. vii-viii). The use of one distinction is actually the condition of theobservation itself (Luhmann, 1990a). Consequently, the results of observation willvary on the basis of the distinctions the observer refers to.

Every observation relies on a distinction and system theory is no exception.System theory is based on a contingent difference: the distinction system/environment. This distinction replaces the distinction subject/object whichcharacterizes classical epistemology. This substitution has far-reachingepistemological consequences. As long as observations are based on the distinction

subject/object the world is considered an object which is separated from the subjectand which acts as the ultimate reality. It is assumed that reality exists independentlyfrom observers and that every observer who does not make mistakes should producethe same description of the world (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 78). Ones perspective is



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Luhmann as an Empirical Sociologist 11

completely different when the leading distinction is system/environment: The choiceof this distinction shatters the idea of an objective world and of a subject with essentialqualities. In system theory there is no transcendental subject and the world loses itsstatus of an object of observation whose essence could be disclosed by a constantincrease in scientific knowledge.

Observations are always observer-dependent; a particular construction is made bythe observer (a system) that differentiates itself from the environment. This is thereason why system theory argues that the world always remains unobservable. Statingthat the world remains unobservable means that the knowing system always has to usea distinction in order to observe. For these distinctions there is no direct correlation inthe world. The system cannot reach the world directly because it cannot escape fromthe boundary set by its own operations. The world cannot be known, but a system can

construct its own reality on it (Luhmann, 1990b, p. 230). Every kind of knowledgeproduction including the scientificoriginates from a system that differentiatesitself from an environment that can be known only by internal constructions of anobserving system. These reflections have far reaching consequences also for empiricalresearch which can no longer be considered to have a privileged access to reality.

Empirical research has trouble giving up the distinction subject/object (Luhmann,1992, p. 71). This can be clearly seen by the idea of research as a test of previouslydefined hypotheses which characterizes empirical research based on quantitativemethods (Kromrey, 2006, pp. 24-70; Lamnek, 2005, pp. 242-273; Schnell et al., 2005,

pp. 53-84). One is aware that the hypotheses are a construction of the scientificobserver, but their truth or falsity is treated as empirically provable: Right resultsmust match with reality. Research based on quantitative methods breaks down realityinto variables whose values can be measured. The goal is to check the presence/absence of some variables, to quantify them and to observe their correlations. Eventhough the naive assumptions of the first positivism are left behind by recognizing thatevery perception is pre-structured and mediated by the observer, empiricalobservations are still considered at least good approximations to real phenomena.

This also pertains to qualitative methods despite their differences in comparison to

the quantitative approach (Wenturis et al., 1992, pp. 265-313; Lamnek, 2005, pp. 218-243). Interpretative approaches such as symbolic interactionism, fieldworkethnography, discourse analysis and others maintain that social reality is symbolicallyconstructed. Their idea is that the world is pre-structured by competent observers.Methodologically, the qualitative approach calls for the reconstruction of the point ofview of the observed actors. The qualitative researcher interprets the world from theperspective of the subjects of his interpretation (Lamnek, 2005, pp. 252-254). Theresearcher has to understand the observed milieu from within (Geertz, 1983,pp. 289-309). This means that sociological interpretations have to be consistent with

lay interpretations. The specific observation of the researcher is not allowed to take theplace of the observation of the observed actor.The persistence of the assumption that reality is reachable can be tracked down in

different qualitative methods, for example, in hermeneutics (Esposito, 1996).



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Although its main concern is no longer the reconstruction of the motives andperspectives of individuals, hermeneutics still sticks to the following basicassumption: the uniqueness of the sense of the text and the possibility of reaching aconsensus on its interpretation. Even though it allows for different interpretations, thetext has a univocal sense that steers the multiplicity of interpretations (Esposito, 1996,p. 605). The sense of the text is treated as positive data which guides the search for arational agreement in the research process (Luhmann, 1997, p. 36). But this search foran agreement means not acknowledging the incommensurability of observations.Different points of view are levelled, as if different researchers were a unique subject(Luhmann, 1990b, p. 229). But why must different observations which focus on thesame object, in our case a text, find convergence? This is necessary only if one thinksthat there is a world which exists independently from an observer.

1.2 The non-arbitrariness of observationsWhen empirical observations are understood as operations of an observer thatconstructs its own world, as in system theory, the whole question about objectivity iscouched in a very different manner: if we cannot refer to a given world, how canscientific observations control their own production of knowledge? When oneabandons the idea of an objective world and of inter-subjective consensus, how canone then distinguish between a true and false scientific statement? According toLuhmanns theory it is not even possible to appeal to a higher state of theory in respect

to empirical observations: indeed, not even theory has a privileged access to reality.3The answer is much more difficult and can only be found by seriously andconsequently walking the path of operative constructivism to the very end.

In order to fully grasp the methodological implications of the epistemologicalpremises of Luhmanns system theory we need to present some pillars of its operativeconstructivism. In this framework the process of knowledge creation is based onobservations (as described above). However, it has to be stressed that an observation isalways an operation of a system (Esposito, 1992a). This is possibly one of the mostimportant tenets of operative constructivism and also what differentiates it from other

constructivist approaches.The distinction between operation and observation is at the heart of Luhmanns

knowledge theory. With operationLuhmann describes the basic elements of systemswhich reproduce themselves by autopoiesis. Observations are a particular form ofautopoietic operation. There are systems that are made of operations that cannotobserve (like biological systems). There are other systems (like psychic and socialsystems) that are made of observing operations. Operative constructivism means thatevery observation is at the same time also an operation of a system. That means thatevery observation (itself an operation) has to connect to other operations of the

system. There is no observation without autopoiesis. Every observation has an

3. The idea of higher status of theory was a central assumption of Adornos approach. For a brief critique of theFrankfurter Schule see Luhmann (1990b).



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operational level, but its functioning cannot be explained by reducing it to theoperation: The process of distinguishing and indicating should also be considered.

One added value of this distinction is that the observing system is not seen assomething totally separate from the observed phenomena. The subject is replaced bythe observer, which is not an entity detached from the observed objects. Becauseevery observation made by the observer is at the same time an operation of a system,the observer is in the world (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 68 ff.; Esposito, 1992a, p. 68 ff.).Every observation is always a specific operation of a system. Classical knowledgetheories which came after Kants metaphysics, by recognizing that all knowledgedepends on a subject, ask the question of how knowledge is possible in spite of thedependence of reality on cognition structures, whereas systemic constructivism takesanother path: knowledge is possible exactly because there is no direct access to reality

(Luhmann, 1988). Only because systems reproduce themselves by operations that relyon specific distinctions are they able to observe the world. Having no access to realitydoes not mean that the differences are not real. On the contrary: The only one ultimatereality is the reality of the operations of the system.

Indeed the distinction between observation and operation marks the paradoxicalfoundation of system theory. In Luhmanns system theory at first glance everythingseems to depend on observation: How things are is nothing but the result of anobservation (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 140). Also the distinction between knowledge andthings is a distinction made by an observer. However, in order to observe, a system has

to operate: Assumptions about being presuppose an observer who has to be in orderto observe. (Thyssen, 2004, p. 11). In other terms, whenever we are observing in theframework of system theory we observe operating systems which are in the world.Luhmann maintains the empirical Faktizitt(actuality) of the observing systems. Thisis an implication of considering observation as an indication of one side of adistinction. When a system observes it uses a distinction in order to indicate one side(this and not that) but the distinction itself is unobservable. This means that thecondition of observing (the distinction itself) is unobservable. As a consequence, it isprecisely the paradox which allows for observing: The world is observable because it

is unobservable (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 46). In addition, second-order observations arealways also first-order observations (Brier, 2007, p. 42). A distinction implies thatfurther operations are necessary in order to observe observations, that is, to indicatetheir leading distinction as one side of a new distinction. A distinction may seem naveor dogmatic, but it is a beginning: It is an indication that severs the unobservableworld. What has been excluded is not observed, but by drawing a distinction thesystem has started to operate. This has consequences: A domain of cognition of anoperating system comes into being, whereupon the initial distinction can be observedin this domain.

The paradoxical foundation can also be expressed as follows: in order to observe asystem has to operate (an observation is always an operation of a system), but only anobserver can describe operations. This paradoxical construction deserves a very closeattention. In fact, it has been argued that a major problem of Luhmanns epistemology



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is that it avoids a philosophical solution to the problem of the paradox (Thyssen,2004). Instead, Luhmann focuses on observing how systems operate in the presence ofthe paradox; how they unfold (but do not solve!) the paradox. There is no solution tothe paradox offered by Luhmann, but it can be handled in time (Thyssen, 2006, p. 8).If one does not accept it and looks for a philosophical solution, the paradoxicalfoundation of system theory can be interpreted in terms of an open ontology (seeBrier, 2007). We choose, on the contrary, to follow the path of Luhmanns operativeconstructivism and to show what consequences it has for sociological research.Instead of speaking of open ontology, we prefer to speak of operative, contingentontology. Ontology comes into being only thanks to the operations of a specificsystem that construct its own world by severing the world in two (system/environment) by connecting operations to operations. Choosing operative

constructivism means renouncing the search for an ultimate philosophical foundation.Indeed operative constructivism means accepting the paradoxical foundation ofknowledge without trying or even feeling the need to solve the paradox. Observedsystems and the observer exist only because they mutually and paradoxicallypresuppose each other. Luhmanns solution is a third way between realism andconstructivism, indeed it is a sociological way.4

Starting with the above mentioned considerations we maintain that the absence ofabsolute principles does not mean that the theory is open to every observation. On thecontrary, (a) there are constraints which depend on the internal dynamics of a system,

and (b) constraints which depend on the structural couplingof a system with othersystems in its environment; moreover, (c) there are differences between distinctions.

(a) Because every observation made by a system is an operation which has toconnect to other operations of the system, specific limits are set to the range ofpossible observations. As the foundation of every observation is not a structure or aprinciple but a paradox, all the attempts to make it work are contingent and depend onthe conditions of acceptability of a system (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 47). The internalsetting of boundaries is the first mechanism of control over the observations. A systemthat has started to operate in an environment (otherwise there would be no system)

comes into being, and, in the case of communication systems, develops the capabilityof self-observation. It also develops structures which make some connections moreprobable and others less probable. For science this means the internal construction ofconnected concepts, procedures, rational criteria, rules for inferences, methods,disciplines and so on. In other words, scientific observations strengthen or weakeneach other in a recursive process. System theory is therefore nothing butcommunication that participates in the reproduction of the system of science andtherefore has to connect to scientific communications.

(b) A description of reality works until the observing system (e.g., science) can

operate with it. Does it mean that the environment has no relevance at all? Luhmann

4. If one then wants to indicate an operative way of dealing with the paradox (and dealing with it does not mean toresolve it) one has to address the concept of time. This last plays a central role in the work of Spencer Brownwho also renounced a philosophical foundation for his calculus, replacing this with the paradox itself.



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insists that the environment counts (Thyssen, 2004, pp. 9-11). According to Luhmann,the fact that a system keeps on operating means that the system is tolerated by itsenvironment. It keeps on operating in an environment.

To explain this we refer to the concept of structural coupling (Luhmann, 1997,pp. 92 ff. & 779 ff.). The concept pertains to different aspects of the environment andexplains, for example, the fact that society can operate in only a very limited range oftemperatures or can only operate as long as the participating persons are not too ill.5

The concept allows the explanation of the relationship between a system and othersystems in its environment. Whenever systems are structurally coupled an operation ofone system provokes self-irritation in the other system which then begins to processinformation. The structures of the two systems are connected in a way which canalizesspecific irritations in a highly selective manner. For example, language is a structure

which connects psychic and social systems and enables both to self-irritate on thebasis of linguistic events which happen in the other system. In the long run,structurally coupled systems evolve in a way which suits the autopoiesis of bothsystems (otherwise they stop operating, ending their existence). So the human mindevolved in a way which is compatible with modern society. As a consequence,structural coupling limits the possible structures of a system.

This is also true for scientific observations. The environment tolerates a limitedrange of structures (theory, methods, descriptions, etc. ). This is the way in whichthe world, although it is not directly accessible for the observing systems, sets

constraints on the system. The world is not a direct source of information for a system.The world does not kick back as an objective world that tells the observer if therepresentations she or he made are true or false. The world kicks back only in thesense that it tolerates some constructions and does not tolerate others. The observingsystem can keep on observing only as long as the distinctions used do not hinder itsoperations (its autopoiesis) in its environment.

To clarify this for the case of scientific observation: Every communication, evenscientific, has no direct contact to the world. Communication can refer to naturalphenomena, for example, as a theme, but in order to communicate about them social

systems rely on the perception of individuals. Communication can be irritated onlyby what has been seen, heard and so on from psychic systems (which are in theenvironment) and not directly from nature. Social systems are structurally coupledwith psychic systems: this means that social systems can internally constructinformation that goes back to irritation caused by psychic systems. Of course, notevery perception is relevant for science. Science has to discriminate between everydayand methodologically guided perceptions. However, perceptions of the latter canunleash effects on scientific communication. In the long run, this leads science toselect communicative representations which are also tolerable for perception (that is

for psychic systems). The effects are never direct, but mediated through the structures

5. The description in terms of temperatures or illness is a construction of an observing system, which has to operateas system in an environment in order to observe. In other words: the idea of structural coupling is only anotherformulation for the paradox of the operative constructivism.



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of science (such as theories or concepts). In other words, science cannot import humanperception. But even if this would be possible, science would still not be able to gainaccess to the world because perception is also the result of an autopoietic network ofoperations of an operating system, in this case consciousness. Moreover, psychicsystems are also structurally coupled with other systems, in particular with theneurophysiological processes of the brain which limit the development of psychicstructures. As a consequence, the observation of nature is far from unconstrained: notevery hypothesis is accepted from the scientific community, not every perception canbe formulated in words, not every world state can be perceived with human senses,and so on.

(c) There are no unquestionable distinctions, but it matters which distinctions areused. Indeed, there are great differences, in particular between distinctions that can be

applied to themselves, that allow the observer to observe itself, and distinctions that donot. The classical distinction subject/object generates an unbridgeable distancebetween the observing subject and the observed object. In contrast, the distinctionsystem/environment maintains that the observer is also a system; as such it is notdifferent from the systems it sees in its own environment. The distinction system/environment can re-enter itself and therefore allows for self-observation.

(a), (b) and (c) show that knowledge is not arbitrary. A theory of knowledge basedon the anything goes approach is not plausible. Only some forms of knowledge areable to connect with the operations of science (Luhmann, 1997, p. 52). Furthermore

only some specific forms of knowledge are compatible with the structural coupling ofa system. On the one hand, system theory can define and describe the contingentnature of knowledge; on the other hand, it stresses that scientific knowledge can neverbe arbitrary. Non-arbitrariness stems from the operational constraints of a system thatdifferentiates itself from an environment. Obviously, even system theory can only seewhat it can see, but the partiality of observation is not treated as a limit, but as achance. As a consequence, research guided by system theory produces knowledgewhile seeking to increase both the awareness of contingency and the non-arbitrarinessof combinations at the same time.

1.3 Theory /empirical approach vs. theory/methodsAs methods seem to guarantee proximity to reality, in sociology the production andanalysis of data is preferred by far to theoretical analysis. An undesirable consequenceis the widespread practice of ignoring theory when describing data. In fact, methodsoften act as a substitute for theory. Data are collected, and then an investigation on thepossible and significant statistical combinations is carried out (Luhmann, 1990a,p. 369 f.). Instead of a theoretical description supported by data one finds descriptionsconsisting almost exclusively of data aggregations.

System theory forces to the refutation of this asymmetry in favouring methodsagainst theories. Indeed, considering both theory and method as structures of a systemthe degree of empiricism ... of a theoretical selection does not seem to be different orsmaller than the one of a statistical or empirical research In neither of these cases



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can one pretend that there is a direct reference to reality (Corsi, 1989, p. 577).Therefore it makes no sense to keep distinguishing between theory and empiricalapproach in this respect and to pretend that the latter has an exclusive access to reality.Theory and methods both talk about an external reality, but this reference is in bothcases nothing more than a product of the operations of a system.

To take this into consideration properly, we argue that the distinction theory/empirical approach has to be replaced by the distinction theory/methods (Besio &Pronzini, 1999). Methods are programs (structures) of an autopoietic system, science,that allow for distinguishing between true or false statements. They are rules andprocedures which allow a judgement if a statement is true or false, excluding theattribution of both values and of a third value. It is important to stress that assigningtrue value to a statement does not mean that a correspondence to reality has been

discovered. Truth is not the agreement between assertions and reality, but is acommunication form. A methodologically controlled operation needs a self-observation of science which estimates which procedures are suitable to attribute avalue (true or false) to propositions. An observation based on methods relies onprocedures (e.g., experimental settings, rules for sampling, instruments, etc.) whichhave been defined as correct by science. Assigning truth values to statements by themeans of methods is a genuine scientific operation which does not take place in othercontexts.

Theories, which also are programs of science, are instead descriptions of the

world whose function is the comparison between facts in more and more improbableterms (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 408). Theory can help to gain a new understanding ofreality by elaborating surprising comparisons. Understanding by using a theory meansthe application of distinctions that goes beyond common sense.

Theories and methods are scientific structures with different functions and mustalways be used together (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 403). Theories and methods set for eachother specific limits, excluding, once again, arbitrariness. Methods do not allow forproof if the theory corresponds to the real world; methods establish the rules that haveto be followed in order to apply the code true/false to propositions. This is why

theories can be replaced by considering the results that come from the use of methods.Theory allows us to choose which data can be considered, allows for building upexpectations of where data can be found and also to ask questions concerning specifictexts. The specificity of a theory calls for a specific method (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 403).

1.4 The function of theory: an exampleThe above allows us to point outagainst the widespread idea that system theorylacks methodologythat, starting from an understanding of method as a tool forapplying truth values, within system theory methods has a crucial role. As system

theory strives to produce scientific knowledge, in the terms of the theory itself, itcannot neglect either theory or methods.In his observations of social systems Luhmann never works without theory and,

we argue, without methods. As a matter of fact, the texts of Luhmann are filled with



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methodological suggestions and also with concrete applications of methods. On thebasis of theory-guided comparisons, Luhmann observes social semantics andstructures.6He analyzes which communicative forms have been preserved in writtentexts, which distinctions are at the basis of communication processes, whichdescriptions have more plausibility, and then he connects the whole to hypotheses onthe structural evolution of society. In the next section we will focus on methods. Butfirst we show how theory can inspire empirical observation. We do this by referring tothe example of temporal semantics (Luhmann, 1980, pp. 235-300). The task ofLuhmanns analysis is not to test a hypothesis by controlling of a representativesample as to whether it confirms theoretical expectations; but rather to explore texts insearch of tendencies that theory sees as relevant and which it can meaningfullyinterpret. System theory steers the reading of historical materials and allows for

complex comparisons between semantics and the structures of older society andmodern society. We highlight only few points:

1. The following hypothesis guides the analysis of the development of temporalsemantics in modernity: the increasing complexity of society at the operational levelimplies an increase of the temporalization of society. This has far-reachingconsequences for semantics. With temporalization of society Luhmann points out thefact that it is impossible to connect all the communications that take place in society atthe same time. Operative temporalization of complexity means, for example, that withfunctional differentiation the different contexts of society (politics, economy, science,

etc.) operate within time-frames that cannot be coordinated with each other or with thetime-frame of everyday life. As a consequence, society has to connectcommunications according to different time frames. That is to say, modern society hasto temporalize its operative connections. Under these conditions, time semantics mustchange, too, in order to not lose coordination with the social structures. Time can nolonger be considered as a circle that is the same for all observers. With thedifferentiation of modern society in functional systems, the steadiness of the essenceof things, to which the idea of circular time is related, loses its plausibility. Semanticsdevelop from a spatial concept of the present, understood as presence and therefore

related to something that lasts, to a momentary, almost vanishing present.2. In his analysis Luhmann also identifies which problems arise when semantics

vary. For example, when the present is conceived as a momentary event with norelations, the problem of explaining the relations between things and different eventsis raised. If the present has no duration, how can one explain that things show a senseof continuity? It is the idea of creatio continuawhich gives an initial answer. Later oncomes the idea of historicized time and of the temporal horizons of past and future,which will allow for explaining connections between events and considering the vastamount of possible combinations of different elements in time.

6. The idea that empirical observation is always theory-guided implies that in the framework of system theory onehas to be explicit about this hypotheses, its theoretical assumptions and ones own role as an observer (Brier,2007, p. 25). This premise is also used by Bourdieu in his empirical analyses. It makes the work of Bourdieuparticularly interesting for empirical research inspired by system theory.



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3. Theory can also show how different concepts are connected to each other andhow the development of specific concepts (e.g., concepts of time) can favour thedevelopment of other concepts (e.g., concerning the right behavior). For example, ifthe present is reduced to a vanishing event, everything is perceived as constantlychanging and the future is seen as highly uncertain, attitudes like prudentia, whichrely on a calculable temporal horizon, do not function any more.

Theory tells the researcher what she or he can expect from structuraldevelopments of society. Theory explains data. In this case, in texts (letters, novelsetc.) one finds examples that support the hypothesis of a variation of time semantics.

2. The method of system theory

On the basis of the epistemological premises described above we stress somemethodological implications for system theory concerning: the typology of empiricalmaterials to be used (2.1, 2.2), the unities of analysis (2.3), which kind of questionscan be asked (2.4), the typology of comparisons (2.5), the interplay between theoryand methods (2.6) and some examples of how empirical methods stemming fromother research traditions can be used (2.7).

2.1 Explanation of trivialitiesPerhaps the suspicion that the systemic approach neglects empirical research depends

on the frequent statement made by Luhmann that one has to refer to so-calledtrivialities and that in many cases it can be advisable to make use of observationsalready made by others instead of collecting data ex novo. As a matter of fact,Luhmann, though he does not exclude making data collections, considers analysis ofexisting data particularly worthwhile. A question arises: which data are suited to bereinterpreted through the lens of system theory? Which are the trivialities?

Instead of making data collections that aim to take an increasingly completepicture of a given social world, one can refer to socially uncontested facts, namelytrivialities, and make them revealing in the light of theory. Trivialities are

characteristics of society that are immediately observable and that often, as treated asobvious, no one has the need to explain. One can better understand the importance oftrivialities when taking into account the question of complexity. Empirical research,although very scrupulous in collecting data, usually works with a limited set ofvariables on the basis of ceteris paribusclauses, that is to say always with a limitedportion of society. This is very problematic from the point of view of system theory.Because system theory aims to describe society as a system, it has to include morethan just a limited portion of society. In order to face complexity, system theory needsother tools: these are mainly theoretical concepts and so-called trivialities. Trivialities

allow the theory to observe in more sociologically informative ways.

7

The examples of triviality in Luhmanns texts are manifold. Often he starts with atriviality, for example in the article Die Knappheit der Zeit und die Vordringlichkeitdes Befristeten: Zeitdruck ist eine verbreitete Erscheinung(time-pressure is a



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common phenomenon) (Luhmann, 1968, p. 3). He reminds us how the quick glance atthe watch or organizer are routines gestures, folders with the sign urgent or veryurgent populate every office-desk, deadlines determine the rhythm of the our work.Luhmann stresses Das alles bedarf vor den Lesern dieser Zeitschrift keinesNachweis (Translation: this certainly does not require any further elucidation for thereaders of this journal). Starting from this point Luhmann explains how thisorientation to time began, in which systems it is found and which functions it has.

Theory sheds a new light on trivialities. For example, the well known fact thatchildren in schools do not only or primarily learn the lesson content but develop theirown culture is considered by pedagogical approaches to be a serious problem in theeducational process. Youth cultures supposedly have to be understood and changed inorder to better educate children. For Luhmann this specific kind of learning cannot be

avoided. He describes the development of subcultures in schools as a normalsocialization process. Moreover, this kind of learning has great relevance when, forexample, children learn to deal with organizations, competition, evaluation and so on.This interpretation is possible because system theory sees education as a specific formof (self)socialization. Socialization is a continuously ongoing process based on thestructural coupling between communication and consciousness (Luhmann, 2002,p. 48 ff). Yet, education is a specific communication form which has to be organized(e.g. in schools) and has to take place in specific interactions (classrooms). This is thereason why classes which aim to educate always have the collateral consequence that

they socialize in an uncontrolled manner (Luhmann, 2002, p. 79).System theory refers to trivialities in order to make its uncommon interpretations

plausible. For example, to strengthen the theoretically deducted assertion that minorevents in a social system can have unforeseen consequences in others, Luhmann(1990c, pp. 222) gives examples which sound very enlightened such as the following:a small payment to a politician, which is a minor event in the economic system (whencompared with the enormous transactions which take place every day), can become ascandal in politics.

The majority of sociological research does not feel the need to explain trivialities

because its main goal is the knowledge of the real world. For system theory thecontrary holds true. For the majority of sociological research, if something is trivial, itis not interesting, because there is already an agreement on it. Since trivialities aresocially accepted facts, sociology does not think that they need to be furtherexplained. Trivialities do not need to be questioned and are considered only in order togain more exact measurements. For example, the increasing disaffection of theelectorate with political parties can nowadays be considered as a triviality.Correspondingly, sociological research aims to precisely quantify the disaffection orto show differences between or in a nation and to connect the disaffection to the socio-

7. One has to keep in mind that reference to trivialities is not exclusive to system theory and is also specific toclassics such as George H. Mead and Herbert Blumer. As far as trivialities are concerned, Blumer once statedthat: The premises of symbolic interactionism are simple. I think they can be readily tested and validated merelyobserving what goes on in social life right under ones nose (Baugh, 1990, p. 34).



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demographic characteristics of the electorate. These kinds of analyses mainly add avariety of quantifications to the description of the topic. System theory takes acompletely different approach to trivialities. If one observes a social acceptedphenomenon from the point of view of a theory of society, new comparisons arepossible: One can assume that the political disaffection is part of a broaderdisaffection of modern society with its formal organization (see e.g., Luhmann,1993b). Starting from this, one could therefore investigate the peculiar connectionbetween formal organizations, function system, and society and then concentrate onthe more specific case of political parties.

2.2 Secondary analysisThe analysis of trivialities sometimes turns out to be a secondary analysis. Often,

trivialities consist, namely, of facts that are already taken for granted by the researchcommunity. The latter can comprehend knowledge of milieu participants (Luhmann,1997, p. 37), quantitative data, data collected by means of different techniques such asparticipant observation or text analysis, and so forth.

Luhmann, for example, refers to some intuitive knowledge that has beenconfirmed in studies on attribution processes. It is known that nowadays people arenormally more open to accept risks that result from their own earlier decisions (e.g.,smoking or driving fast), while, on the other hand, they hardly accept risks imposed bythird parties (e.g., construction of new polluting industries near their own home).

Luhmann interprets this well-known fact by the means of the theoretically developeddistinction risk/danger (Luhmann, 1991).

One further example: In order to describe how mass media select information,Luhmann (1996b, pp. 53-81) refers to empirical studies on news values. Typically,these studies are based on content-analysis and unravel so-called news values. Theseare criteria used by the media to distinguish between information and non-information(e.g., immediacy or drama). Luhmann himself offers a list of such factors referring tonumerous nice or current examples from the press or media-studies. Sometimesexamples are limit cases or counterfactual.

A typical problem of secondary analysis is that if the data have not been collectedby considering a specific hypothesis, the researcher may not be able to find theinformation he is looking for (Boudon, 1996, p. 37). Indeed, if one has theoreticalhypotheses and wants to verify these with the help of data, one has to ask questionsthat are reality specific. If, on the contrary, one treats data constructed by empiricalresearch as material that needs a theoretical explanation, things are different.Reference to this material is not reductive because the same data can be observed fromnew points of view that are very different from the one for which they had beencollected. In other words: system theory uses data produced by observing with other

distinctions as material for its second-order observations.



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2.3 Only communication can communicate8

Several sociological approaches analyze communication as composed of actions ofindividuals that have specific motives and intentions. Individuals are considered theprimary source in order to study the social level. System theory starts with anotherassumption: the distinction system/environment. Systems differentiate themselvesfrom the environment reproducing a specific operation. Psychic and social systems arebased respectively on thinking and communication and are found in each othersenvironment. Sociological analysis concentrates on social systems. According tosystem theory, social phenomena cannot be explained by the analysis and combinationof actions and intentions. This is the reason why, in this framework, units ofobservation are no longer individuals, but communications.

At this point an explication is needed. Social systems are not able to directly

observe communication, but communication can only be inferred (Luhmann, 1984,226; Brier, 2007, p. 41). Social systems are forced to observe themselves in a moresimple form: that is as a sequence of actions. But does this also apply to systemtheory? Is system theory also forced to reduce communication to the category ofaction? The answer is no: Theoretically, the theory asserts that communication (andnot action) is the basic element of social systems. But, methodologically, how cancommunication be observed? Our answer is that one can observe chains ofcommunication. This is our methodological solution to the fact that we cannot observecommunication directly. Communication is described as the synthesis of three

distinctions: utterance, information and understanding of the distinction betweenutterance and information. Communication takes place when someone understandsthat someone else has intentionally uttered something. Communication can exist onlyif the distinction between action and information is understood. It is not enough thatsomeone writes or says something. Understanding is highly relevant here, as it allowsfor the self-referential processing of communication. Understanding is crucial forcommunication, but it is not visible. However, following utterances can find aconnection only starting from understanding. As a consequence, understanding can beanalyzed through its consequences for utterances. Observing the connection we can

empirically infer from communication. In other words: A social system features asequence of self-referring communications. At the level of methods, the researcher hasto observe how communication sequences develop and process meaning. Theconnection (Anschluss) between communications is at the core of the analysis ofsocial events, processes and structures. Communication can be reconstructed as asequential chain of operations (Schneider, 2000, 131) in which communicativestructures such as programs, semantics and roles are used.

Empirical observation which focuses on communication does not try to detect themotives of individuals. This is considered impossible: In order to know the motives of

individuals, because of their intransparency, the researcher has to revert tocommunication. However, radically distinguishing between psychic and social

8. Luhmann (1996a, p. 261).



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systems one maintains that what is communicated by individuals never coincides withtheir thoughts: Once thoughts are uttered and understood they become part ofcommunication and therefore underlie communicative rules. Interviews are alsocommunicative situations where what can be observed is only communication.Moreover, even if one could know the motives of individuals, one still would not beable to explain how society works. While a focus on motives overemphasizes theircausal role, focusing on communication stresses that no individual has the power tosteer communication.

Starting from the assumption that social systems are an emergent order of realitywhich cannot be reduced to participating individuals, one sets different researchpriorities. The researcher can focus on specific communication processes, semanticsand structures. Motives themselves can be studied as forms of communication that

refer to psychological conditions. It becomes interesting to observe how motivesfunction in communication. One can notice that, for example, whereas persons remainquite stable, motives change due to circumstances and in different contexts themotives ascribed to a person can vary. This way the person/motive distinction providesthe social systems with the capacity for both continuity and discontinuity (Luhmann,1996c, p. 344).9

2.4 Observing the observerIf the conditions of the production of knowledge are not universal, but there are only

operating systems which observe, it is meaningful to observe these concreteobservers. System theory stresses that the observation of observers relies on specificdistinctions. It is the choice of a specific distinction which regulates what has to beincluded or excluded by the observation. This applies to both observing systems: theobserving observer and the observed observer. In other words, when the observerwants to observe something as a system, at the same time he assumes that he observeshow the observed system sets its own delimitation and in this way differentiates itselffrom its environment (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 4).

An observation based on the subject/object distinction treats the observed system

as something objective. So the social world is observed at the first order, namely as ifthe observations made by communication were objects (Esposito, 1992b, p. 259).While a first-order observation means observing things as facts, a second-orderobservation means to observe observations and to highlight their selectivity andcontingency. From the point of view of Luhmanns theory, communication is alwaysthe contingent result of complex systems. Communications cannot be treated as fact;on the contrary, it is always the realization of something that could also be different.

9. While the analysis of the real intentions of individuals is not necessary to understand social phenomena, the

individuals do not become insignificant. They are in the environment of social systems and are an essentialprecondition for their development. By means of the concept of structural coupling the relationship betweensocial and psychic systems can be studied. One can, on one side, analyze how psychic systems affectcommunication and on the other side, analyze which consequences communication has for them (Luhmann,1990c, p. 65)



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Second-order observation means that the distinction used cannot be treated as anobject and has to be modalized (Esposito, 1992b, p. 268). This allows for theobservation of the contingency of the observed observers (Nassehi & Saake, 2002).

Attention is focused on the utilization of a specific distinction instead of otherpossible distinctions. This kind of approach underlies, for example, the well-knownanalysis of ecological communication (Luhmann, 1990c).10What matters is not theobjectivity of the data, but how a specific observation is constructed, how the systemlimits itself, and the fact that some information is processed instead of otherinformation. The classics of sociology had another relationship with empiricalresearch. They tried to interpret the facts on the basis of what there is behind (forexample, Marxs theory) (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 123). In order to do this, one had toassume that the sociologist always knows more than the text he interprets. According

to system theory, societys latency, (what there is behind) is the distinction used byevery different observer (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 139). The researcher observing at thesecond order does not ask what questions (what it is) but how questions (how theworld is being observed). This way one gains the possibility of observing whatobservers see and what they do not see (Luhmann, 1997, p. 375). This means that theobservation of the distinctions allows us to observe not only what has been told orwritten, not only realized operations, but also what is left unexpressed.

2.5 The functional method

Causal analysis is at the heart of quantitative empirical research. This, in a first step,identifies and isolates variables, and then analyses their connections on the basis of thecause/effect scheme. But the impossibility of taking into account all variables whichare relevant to explain social facts implies a choice (Blalock, 1984, p. 16ff.). Theresult is that in spite of the pretension of knowing facts, only a highly selective andcontingent combination of the innumerable relevant causes and effects is realized. Thechoice of highlighting specific causal relations has no correspondence to theenvironment (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 109). This selection does not trouble system theory.Instead, the main problem of causal analysis is seen in its inability to take the

unrealized possibilities of social systems into consideration and the relatedimpossibility of observing the contingency of the actualized ones. In fact, the mostinteresting aspect for system theory is asking why possible interactions do not takeplace (Luhmann, 1997, p. 39). In the framework of system theoryfunctional analysiscan be considered an adequate methodology in order to answer this question(Luhmann, 1970; Castrignano, 1992, p. 138). Causal analysis and systemic functionalanalysis have an opposed approach to contingency. Functional analysis is interested in

10. In the bookEcological Communication, instead of observing the destructive consequences of human behavior on

the environment and how people are incapable to react adequately to ecological menaces, Luhmann observeshow different systems observe ecological problems. By the means of this analysis one becomes aware thatdifferent observations are based on very specific structures and e.g. for economy only prices and the possibilityto gain or to lose money in respect to ecological questions are relevant criteria. As a consequence one can, forexample, better understand why the moral semantic of social movement can hardly influence this system.



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comparisons that highlight other possibilities. It questions the effect stressing the factthat there are multiple causes which can act as a functional equivalent in producing theobserved effect. A specific aspect of society can have different causes and the interestof the researcher is not the identification of the probability that a given cause producesa specific effect, but the identification of the causes that are functionally equivalent inproducing this specific effect (Luhmann, 1970, p. 14). Functional analysis does notpretend to know the world as it is, but aims to show its contingency. Throughfunctional analysis the artificiality of what the observed milieu take for granted can behighlighted (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 137).

Different aspects of society can be compared on the basis of a specific referenceproblem which they are able solve. They are functionally equivalent in the solution(in terms of cause/effect, they can all act as a cause to reach a specific effect). As an

example we can take the function of producing collective binding decisions whichevery complex society has to fulfil (Luhmann, 2000a, p. 84 ff.). Historically, thisfunction has been fulfilled in different manners, for example through the opendemonstration of strength, struggle or occupation of political offices. These are allforms to show and use power. They allow people to recognize who has power andtherefore can make binding decisions. In other words, they all are functionallyequivalent in motivating the acceptance of decisions even if these do not appearrational or advantageous. However, functional equivalents cannot simply replace oneanother. Political offices, for example, if compared with a pure show of strength, make

opposition to political power less probable and therefore assure more stability. Thisway functional analysis simultaneously demonstrates the contingency of structuresand the unlikelihood of the substitution of functional equivalents. It pursues theidentification of contingency and of regularities as two faces of the same coin.

2.6 ZettelkastenHow is the interplay between theory and methods realized? Two interrelatedtechniques are available: a) a specific way to read scientific texts; b) a specific way toorganize collected material, the so-calledZettelkasten(card file).

a) How can the reader recognize what is actually relevant in scientific texts?Luhmann (2000b, pp. 153-154) rejects two widely used techniques: On the one hand,one can hardly gain insight into the relationships between concepts and into theproblems discussed in a text if one merely associates knowledge with authors ordifferent labels such as system theory or symbolic interactionism (Luhmann 2000b,p. 154). On the other hand, neither collecting knowledge on specific sociologicalthemes such as risk or socialization is satisfactory. This has the advantage ofdisclosing the state of the art of a topic, but the researcher soon notices that thisknowledge has to be updated. She or he can only search for new knowledge as she or

he does not activate the necessary instruments in order to exploit the existing one.According to Luhmann: The problem of reading scientific texts seems to be that onedoes not need a short term memory, but instead a long term one, in order to gain pointsof reference to distinguish the important from the unimportant, and the new from what



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has only been repeated (Luhmann, 2000b, pp. 154-155). The researcher has to read ina selective manner: she or he must be guided by her or his own problems, distinctions,already examined empirical findings, relating what she or he is reading to what she orhe already knows. The underlying epistemological assumptions of constructivism areevident. At the level of procedure this can be done by making notes which primarilydo not quote or summarize the text, but reframe what has been read. As this processbecomes a routine, what will be written down will be only the readers own ideas (thatcome to mind while reading). This way of working assures the simultaneous self-reference and external reference of the theory. System theory makes a second-orderobservation of scientific statements in order to grasp insights that activate its owndistinctions. This means that the availability of complex distinctions and concepts isthe condition which enables the theory to observe the findings of others. As a result,

this can strengthen some ideas but also lead to the rejection of others. For example,empirical studies can provoke surprise or doubts about specific theoretical statements.

b) The information gained should also be properly stored. One has to build amemory that makes it possible to selectively pick up information and make newconnections. This can be realized by using the file card system of Luhmann. It reflectsthe style of reading that has been sketched out above. It is not aimed at storinginformation about authors, theories or sociological topics, but it catches irritations thatbecome information when filtered through the distinctions of the theory. Themechanism is quite simple: The information retrieved is put down on paper cards to

which a number is attributed. Each further card becomes progressively anothernumber, and these numbers, and the position in the card box as well, will never bechanged. When the researcher reads texts which relate to reflections already writtendown in the past, one can continue the pre-existing cluster of cards by adding one cardand sequentially numbering the new card. Or a new card can specify a concept of aspecific card, so that it can be inserted among the sequential cards (e.g., between card1/3 and card 1/4 one can put a card numbered 1/3a). An important task is keeping theposition and the number attributed to cards fixed. That way, as the card file grows, oneis also forced to make internal references. That is, one has to build up connections

between the ideas one has written down on cards. A card file without internalreference between cards would not allow for the construction of a complex memory.Obviously, one also needs another file card with alphabetically ordered concepts thatrefer to specific cards of the main file card. All is subsumed to the internal conceptualarchitecture of the theory.11 The file system allows for surprise. After a while theresearcher who has constructed the file card system has no control over it. The way thefile card answers; the connections it shapes are not decided by the researcher.

11. This means that something can be remembered, but a lot of information gets lost. However, to forget is anecessary step in order to develop knowledge when a society becomes complex. The card index inventionmirrors a society which is learning a new way of organizing its memory whose primal function is notremembering but forgetting (Cevolini, 2004).



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2.7 A variety of methods: The examples of conversation analysisAs we have already mentioned in the chapters on the analysis of trivialities andsecondary analysis, available data, both quantitative and qualitative, can be used withselective sight of the theory. This means that available data can be used if, and only if,they are compatible with the theoretical and methodological premises of systemtheory. Obviously, these premises should be also taken into consideration when theresearcher collects the data him/herself. In the works of Luhmann the use of availabledata is very important. However, data can be also collected and analyzed ex novospecifically starting from system theory.

In fact Luhmanns analyses of historical sources are of this type. For example, hisanalysis of time semantics does not refer only to secondary sources such as literatureor historical studies, but also refers to or directly cites source documents. In order to

show the compatibility between theoretical reflections and empirical observationsBelegeare presented as examples.12Starting from theoretical hypothesis, for exampleon specific semantics, one has to show that communication chains which have thecharacteristics foreseen by the hypothesis can be observed. The observation mustfollow methodological rules which are considered valid in a discipline. Nevertheless,the choice of the sources is guided by theory and theory can suggest that somemethods are more appropriate than others.

Moreover, while observing organizations Luhmann employs descriptions whichare comparable to thick (qualitative) empirical observations in the framework of

ethnomethodology. From the perspective of the participant observer he describesdecision processes for example, in courts, administrative bodies, and universities, thesetting of deadlines or the relevance of changes of personnel, the difference betweeninternal and external descriptions of organizations etc. Also in this case, system theorystresses the importance of tightly fitting concepts (Ziegert, 2006, p. 52), that is to say,the importance of concepts which fit with methodologically guided observations. Inother words: In order to formulate scientific sentences one has to reach a fit betweentheoretical descriptions and data which have been constructed through empiricalobservation.

Once the methodological pillars are identified, there are no obstacles whensearching for a connection to other empirical traditions (Vogd, 2007). In order tocollect and analyze data it is possible to resort to methods developed within otherframeworks. Also, in this case a match with the theoretical and methodologicalpremises of system theory is needed. Some researchers have already tried this (e.g.,Bora, 1994; Nassehi & Saake, 2002; Castrignano, 1992).

An interesting example is the use of techniques of conversation analysis (e.g.,Baraldi, 2006; Lee, 2003; Hausendorf & Bora 2006). It has been argued thatconversation analysis can be suitable for system theory because they share some

important premises (Hausendorf, 1992). In particular, they share the idea that social

12. For example, showing that the semantics of the 17th century begin to consider the present as a punctual eventsome verses of the famous English author and poet John Donne are cited as are reflections from a treatise of thetheologian Francois Senault.



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structures are a result of communication processes which operate in a self-referentialway. The meaning of an utterance is not determined by an actor, but is seen as theresult of a meaning attributional process sequentially and retrospectively realized bythe utterance(s) following next to a preceding one (Schneider, 2000, p. 124). Startingfrom this consideration one can analyze how social structures originate from theseprocesses and shape them. Chains of communication are observed and not individuals.Rather than looking for latent structures (non-observable givens), those distinctionswhich are used in order to observe are the object of the search. These are considered ascontingent products of communication processes and therefore their development hasto be explained. Once established, structures reduce complexity and make autopoiesispossible.

Hausendorf and Bora (2006), for example, analyze how citizenship is

communicatively constructed in citizenship talks. They analyze how this constructiondevelops, by observing, for example, how new participants are introduced or whichrelevance is attributed to specific groups (e.g., politicians, doctors, etc.). The authorsresort to procedures of sequential analysis that allow the identification of subunitswhich the researcher can concentrate on. The sequence of these units is the base fromwhich to follow the unfolding of communication over time. Instruments of semantic,pragmatic and linguistic analysis allow the researchers to analyze which kind ofstatements are expressed, which words, linguistic or non-verbal forms are used, forexample, in order to define membership to a specific group or category, how the use of

words or the reference to categories changes over time, which arguments are used, andso forth. This fine analysis leads to reconstructing social constructions (Hausendorfand Bora, 2006, p. 88). The theoretical framework also allows investigation into thefunction of specific procedures or devices used by participants (e.g., clarification ofcategory belonging through forms such as: to be a ... or to come from ...) and toinvestigate which functional equivalent could be used instead (e.g., accentuation ofcategory belonging through forms such as the contrast between categories: First ofall we are citizens then we are researchers).

Conclusion

In opposition to a widespread assumption, we argue that system theory is structurallybound to empirical research. Starting from Luhmanns definition of the role of theoryand methods in science, an observation which has the pretence to be scientific cannotneglect empirical data or theory. The emphasis on theory in Luhmanns texts can beexplained referring to a contingent situation of modern sociology. Luhmann felt thatthe discipline shows an unbalanced relationship between theory and methods and thatmethods are ranked much higher than theory. The consequence is that most research is

conducted outside of an encompassing theoretical framework; an amount of casestudies and statistical analyses are available but lack proper interpretation. Animportant message of Luhmann is the following: theory can help to gain relevantinformation from data. Theory can shed new light on well-known phenomena by



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offering improbable but conceptually justified comparisons. This statement underliesthe relevance of theory, but also the necessity of data. This strong interplay of theoryand methods is also what allows for testing the results of system theory research:Because the proof cannot be sought in the correspondence with an external reality, theinternal consistency and mutual refinement of theory and methods is what assures thescientific proof. Then it is the structural coupling that determines if the knowledge soproduced will be tolerated by the environmentor whether it will not.

The interplay of theory and methods is particularly important in order toaccomplish the main tasks of sociology: the description of society. It is evident thatthis is a task which empirical research cannot accomplish alone. Collection andevaluation of data are not enough. The possibility of describing facts with the help ofdifferent concepts, of presenting data in a different manner by referring to other

distinctions, is crucial. The knowledge produced by empirical research, even ifremarkable in its quantity and its variability, remains merely as knowledge whichrefers to portions of society. While empirical methods generate a huge variety of data,observation with the help of a complex theory allows for properly connecting data andinterpreting many contexts. However, without a link to data, theory would remain anabstract description lacking plausibility. As methods rule the process of defining aproposition as true or false, a theory which avoids the connection to methods wouldlose its connection to scientific development. The tight fit between methodologicallyobserved phenomena and the concepts which capture them is central; not the theory

alone. The objective of the enterprise is ... not so much theory building asproducing good science (Ziegert, 2006, p. 52). As a consequence, not only thedevelopment of theory, but also further application and refinement of methods forsystem theory are promising research tasks for the near future.

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank the editor of C&HK Sren Brier and two anonymousreviewers for their comments which have helped us improve our argumentation.

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Niklas Luhmann as an Empirical Sociologist Meth